EDOC6984

11 January 1994

Doc. 6984

1403-7/1/94-2-E

REPORT

on the humanitarian situation and needs

of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population

(Rapporteur: Mr EISMA,

Netherlands)

Summary

Most of the some 1,9 million Iraqi Kurds and others who fled northern Iraq for neighbouring countries in the spring of 1991 during the brutal suppression of their up-rising by Saddam Hussein have now returned to the area controlled de facto

by the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government. However, tens of thousands remain outside Iraq's borders and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons are unable to return to Kurdish areas under Iraqi Government control for fear of persecution. Despite the "security zone" and the "air exclusion zone" established under international protection in parts of the Kurdish-controlled region, breaches of security still undermine relief and reconstruction efforts.

The United Nations programme of humanitarian assistance for Iraq, which pays particular attention to the needs of the north of the country, is under-funded, although the food and fuel situation in the north is somewhat better now than last winter. The emphasis is now on re-building productive capacity. However, the economy of the Iraqi Kurdish region is doubly penalised by the United Nations sanctions on Iraq and the Iraqi Government's own embargo against this region.

The Assembly recommends that once Iraq fully complies with all relevant United Nations resolutions, respects the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdish region and stops its persecution of minorities, consideration be given to a partial lifting of the embargo. In the meantime the Iraqi Kurdish region might be exempted under certain conditions, the "security zone" and the "air exclusion zone" should be extended, the United Nations Guards contingent should be strengthened, and as many countries as possible should step up their contributions to relief and reconstruction efforts by the United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian organisations. Council of Europe member states are urged to help finance the resettlement of refugees who have returned to the region.

I. Draft resolution

1. The vast majority of the some 1,9 million Iraqi Kurds and others who fled northern Iraq for neighbouring countries in the spring of 1991 during the brutal suppression of their uprising by Saddam Hussein have returned to the area controlled by the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government. However, at least 63 000 remain outside Iraq's borders and some hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons are unable or unwilling to return to Kurdish areas under Iraqi Government control for fear of victimisation, notwithstanding an official amnesty for returnees.

2. Despite the presence of United Nations Guards and the maintenance by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the co-operation of Turkey, of a "security zone" in a restricted area of northern Iraq and of an "air exclusion zone" above the 36th parallel, security in the region is constantly undermined by terrorist attacks — inspired by the regime of Saddam Hussein — on the population, on relief workers and on humanitarian convoys. Several non-governmental organisations have been forced to halt their assistance activities as a result.

3. This assistance is provided mainly through the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Programme in Iraq in application of Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), as agreed with the Iraqi Government in a periodically re-negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The last MOU having expired on 31 March 1993, the current assistance programme, for the period 1 April 1993 to 31 March 1994, is operating on the basis of tacit renewal. Several non-governmental relief agencies, funded largely by the United States and the European Union, provide assistance to the Kurdish autonomous region from Turkey without the authorisation of the Iraqi Government, whose conditions they consider unacceptable.

4. In addition to providing basic food, fuel and medical supplies through the winter, the main emphasis must now be on consolidating the security of the Iraqi Kurdish region in a stable, autonomous and democratic framework and on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential services and infrastructure in order to give its approximately 3,5 million inhabitants the productive capacity to fend for themselves. However, the economy is doubly penalised by the United Nations sanctions on Iraq and by the Iraqi Government's embargo on the Kurdish region. Moreover relief aid is still inadequate and should be stepped up as a matter of urgency.

5. The Assembly is aware of the humanitarian plight of other persecuted minorities in Iraq, including the Turkmen and Assyrians but especially the Marsh Arabs in the south, whose very survival is threatened by the Iraqi Government, thus causing further movements of refugees.

6. Accordingly, the Parliamentary Assembly:

i. recalls Order No. 460 (1991), which remains in effect;

ii. demands that the Government of Iraq immediately and fully comply with all resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and in particular put an immediate end to:

a. its acts of aggression perpetrated in and on the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region;

b. all harassment and blocking of relief efforts to that region;

c. its embargo on supplies to the region;

d. the genocide of the Marsh Arabs and the destruction of their habitat;

e. the persecution of other minorities in Iraq;

iii. calls on the member states of the Council of Europe to use their influence with the Security Council of the United Nations with a view to:

a. bringing the United Nations Guards contingent in Iraq up to its original strength of 500 in view of its positive role in protecting relief convoys and in providing the humanitarian organisations and the United Nations with security guidance as well as access to its communications, transport and medical facilities;

b. examining the possibility of:

i. exempting the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region from the economic sanctions against Iraq, provided that adequate control can be established over its borders with the rest of Iraq;

ii. lifting the sanctions against Iraq in consideration of its government's recent agreement to comply with Security Council Resolution 715 and in return for satisfactory assurances that it will respect all relevant United Nations resolutions as well as the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdish region and stop its persecution of other minorities;

iii. re-deploying United Nations Guards in southern Iraq;

iv. appeals to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, in co-operation with the Government of Turkey:

a. to extend the existing "security zone" in northern Iraq by prohibiting Iraqi forces from entering the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region;

b. to extend the existing northern "air exclusion zone" to below the 35th parallel;

v. recommends that the European Union consider giving greater priority in its aid programme to mine-clearance, training in mine removal and schemes to promote community awareness of the dangers of mines;

vi. appeals to the member states of the United Nations, in particular to the United States of America and to Council of Europe member states, as well as to the European Union, to step up urgently and generously their contributions

a. to relief and reconstruction efforts on behalf of the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region;

b. for the alleviation of the plight of women and children in particular;

c. in support of the strengthening of the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq;

vii. requests that the governments of the Council of Europe member states introduce and finance, through the Social Development Fund, projects for the resettlement, training and employment of refugees in the Iraqi Kurdish region, in particular women and children;

viii. demands that the Government of Iran stop forthwith its shelling of Iraqi Kurdistan and foster the return of all Iraqi Kurdish refugees remaining on its territory.

II. Explanatory memorandum

1. Background

1. After the provisional cease-fire which brought the hostilities between Iraq and allied forces to an end at the beginning of March 1991, large-scale armed insurrection broke out in the country. The Iraqi army and security forces then launched a brutal campaign to crush the insurgents, especially in the Kurdish provinces of northern Iraq, causing nearly two million refugees to flee, mostly into the mountains and beyond the borders of Turkey and Iran.

2. On 5 April 1991 the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 688 (see Appendix 1), insisted that the Iraqi Government allow access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq, and called on the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal to address the needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.

3. To implement Security Council Resolution 688, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed on 18 April 1991 between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Iraqi Government setting out the terms of the United Nations humanitarian presence in Iraq, including the stationing of up to 500 United Nations Guards (a limit subsequently reduced to 300) to protect humanitarian convoys. The MOU was renewed for six months on 24 November 1991 and again on 22 October 1992. Negotiations for its further renewal are still going on. The MOU provides the framework for the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Programme in Iraq, designed to meet the basic requirements of the country's most vulnerable population groups, especially in the north.

4. During April 1991 emergency relief had first been provided by allied forces through "Operation Provide Comfort" and by non-governmental organisations. To encourage the refugees to return, a "security zone" was set up on the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom and France covering the northernmost part of the Kurdish region (see map in Appendix 2). In addition, the three allies imposed an air exclusion zone north of the 36th parallel, denying over-flight to fixed-wing aircraft of the Iraqi air force. This depends in turn on the periodic renewal by Turkey of an agreement to allow allied aircraft to use Inçirlik air base for carrying out daily control flights.

5. In April 1991 a cease-fire had been reached between the Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmergas (the militias of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, see below), leaving a large part of the Kurdish region under the control of the latter. When subsequent negotiations on a political agreement failed the Iraqi Government withdraw its troops from the major Kurdish cities. However, Kirkuk and its environs and certain other Kurdish areas remained in the hands of the government. In October 1991, this government withdrew its funds and services from the areas under Kurdish control and imposed an embargo on supplies entering from the rest of Iraq, the whole of which was still under the embargo first imposed by the United Nations following Iraq's invasion of Kuweit in 1990.

6. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front, a coalition of eight parties co-chaired by the leaders of the two largest parties, Mr Masood Barzani (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and Mr Jalal Talabani (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), organised elections for a regional parliament. These were held in May 1992, and in June a regional Kurdish government was set up. Although this administration has no internationally recognised status, it is the main provider of services in the areas outside Iraqi Government control. However, it lacks the funds required for the essential needs of the population.

7. The vast majority of those who fled northern Iraq in March-April 1991 have now returned to the area but many live in precarious conditions, especially those unable or unwilling to return to their homes in places under Iraqi Government control, despite an official amnesty. In addition to ensuring basic supplies through the winter, the emphasis must now be on consolidating the security of the area and on reconstruction in order to give its approximately 3,5 million Iraqi Kurd inhabitants the productive capacity to fend for themselves.

2. The Parliamentary Assembly's interest in the region

8. On 24 April 1991, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1150 (1991) on the situation of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities.

9. The Assembly considered that the scale of the humanitarian problems posed by the exodus of the Kurdish population made them a matter not only for Turkey and Iran but for the entire international community, and that the Council of Europe must give concrete expression to its solidarity with the Kurdish refugees. Therefore, the Assembly called on the Committee of Ministers, among other things:

i. to help finance a reception centre for Kurdish refugees and other minorities;

ii. to take steps to ensure that the international humanitarian organisations were allowed free access to the refugees to ensure their survival, and that Turkey benefited from the concrete support of the Social Development Fund; and

iii. to invite Council of Europe member states to grant emergency aid to international governmental and non-governmental humanitarian organisations to enable them to provide relief and protection for the refugees.

10. At the same time, the Assembly adopted Order No. 460 (1991) pointing out that the extent of the refugees' and displaced Iraqi population's basic needs called for humanitarian aid that would have to be continued in the near future, and instructing its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, if necessary in co-operation with other committees concerned, to follow closely developments in the refugees' situation, by a visit to the region if required, and to report back to it in due course.

11. On 9 September 1992, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography discussed how best to implement Order No. 460 (1991), agreed to prepare a report on the humanitarian situation and needs of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population and decided to organise a hearing to gather information for the report. This hearing was held in Geneva on 11 June 1993, with the participation of representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government and Parliament, of the Iraqi National Council, and of international governmental and non-governmental organisations. Although it has not proved possible to study the humanitarian situation and needs of the region on the spot, further information has been collected through discussions with those who have done so, from studies and reports and through participation in meetings at which the Kurdish regional authorities and humanitarian organisations have been well represented, notably the International Conference on Iraqi Kurdistan: the need for continuing support and development (Brussels, 10-12 October 1993).

3. Location and numbers of refugees and displaced persons

12. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 2 000 mainly Iraqi Kurdish refugees remain in the Silopi camp just inside the Turkish border with Iraq, 600 having been voluntarily repatriated in 1993. An agreement with Iran to repatriate 15 000 out of a total of some 60 000 refugees from that country in 1992-93 has resulted in the return of only 4 000. There are also about 5 000 in Syria. Among the refugees who fled the region are also Turkmen, Assyrians and Arabs.

13. According to the Iraqi Kurdish authorities there are somewhere between 300 000 and 500 000 displaced Iraqi Kurds and others who are unable or unwilling, for fear of victimisation, to return to their homes in places now under Iraqi Government control (mainly from the Kirkuk area). They are mostly living in hard shelters, abandoned buildings or tents in the autonomous region. Recent Iranian shelling of the border area has led to the displacement of at least 5 000 people.

4. The economic situation in the Iraqi Kurdish region

14. Economic sanctions were first imposed on Iraq by the United Nations following the invasion of Kuweit in 1990. After the Gulf war of January-February 1991 the Security Council decided (Resolution 687) to maintain the sanctions until Iraq had fulfilled all the terms of the cease-fire agreement and conformed to all relevant United Nations resolutions, including those providing for humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable Iraqi population, for war reparations to be paid by the Iraqi Government and for the identification and destruction or removal of Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction". Under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) Iraq was allowed to import foodstuffs on simple notification of the United Nations Sanctions Committee. Materials and supplies required for basic civilian needs could be imported under a simplified "no objection" procedure. Supplies for strictly medical purposes continued to be exempt. The United Nations embargo continues to apply to the whole of Iraq, including the Kurdish autonomous region. However, since October 1991, the Government of Iraq has imposed its own embargo on that region, so that the Iraqi Kurds are doubly penalised. As a result, they are to a large extent dependent on outside help.

15. United Nations Resolutions 706 and 712 (1991) allowed Iraq to sell up to US$ 1,6 thousand million of oil to pay for humanitarian needs, war reparations and United Nations monitoring expenses. Sales would be under strict United Nations supervision and funds channelled through a United Nations escrow account. In view of Iraq's refusal of these terms on the grounds that they infringed its sovereignty, Security Council Resolution 778 (1992) provided for the use of Iraq's external assets from past oil sales, frozen at the time when the United Nations embargo was first imposed. The Iraqi Kurdish authorities claim a proportion of these assets. They also plead for the lifting of the United Nations sanctions in respect of their region.

16. The economy of the Kurdish-controlled part of northern Iraq is by all accounts in a parlous state. Over 4 000 villages, some 80% of the total, were reduced to rubble either during the Iran-Iraq war or by Iraqi Government forces during the infamous "Anfal" campaign in the late 1980s designed to depopulate the countryside. The village inhabitants were either massacred (for example with chemical weapons at Halabja) or herded into "collective towns". Moreover, severe damage has been sustained to road and power networks, hospitals, water and sanitation systems, and productive capacity. The electricity grid in Iraqi Kurdistan is linked to the national grid and has been subject to supply cuts. For example, Dohuk governorate has been cut off since 5 August 1993, resulting in serious problems for water, sanitation and health services. Unemployment in the urban areas is estimated to be 80%. Agriculture, which employed as many as 65% of the population, has drastically declined because of the destruction of villages, the presence of mines and the neglect of farm lands and irrigation networks. Orchards have been stripped and livestock herds decimated. The very limited industrial resources of the area are not fully operational owing to lack of spare parts and raw materials. The region could produce enough oil for its own fuel needs. Production at eight wells capped by the Iraqi Government with a capacity of 25 000 barrels a day could begin within a month with permission from the United Nations Sanctions Committee and at an estimated start-up cost of US$ 40 million (including ancillary investment in refineries, etc.).

17. The situation deteriorated after October 1991 when the Iraqi Government withdrew economically and politically from the region, and imposed its own embargo. This meant the virtual end of government salary payments and food distributions. The region derives only 7% to 10% of its food needs from the central authorities. Food prices are extremely high. The same is true of fuel, the Iraqi Government having imposed a complete ban on fuel supplies in July 1992. Financial chaos resulted from the withdrawal by the Iraqi Government of the 25 Dinar note. Since the banking system hardly functions, the economy is based largely on cash and barter.

18. The financial resources of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government are extremely limited. Since there is no tradition of income or value-added taxes, reliance is placed on "customs levies" which have in the past been collected through a network of check-points by the political parties to finance their armies of peshmergas. Three-quarters of government revenue is now derived from such sources. A high proportion of government expenditure is on civil servants' salaries.

5. Humanitarian assistance

19. Relief for the Iraqi Kurdish refugees and displaced persons is provided mainly by the United Nations through the large-scale Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Programme in Iraq, which has depended on the periodic renewal of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq. The MOU sets the terms under which assistance may be provided by the United Nations agencies and certain non-governmental organisations, for example regarding access to the Kurdish region and the amount of aid earmarked for the rest of Iraq. The current MOU expired on 31 March 1993, and is still being re-negotiated. Nevertheless, the United Nations agencies consider it to be tacitly renewed, thus allowing the present humanitarian programme (1 April 1993-31 March 1994) to be carried out.

20. The European Community, together with its member states, has made a substantial contribution 1 — in 1991 some 60% of the total world effort, followed by considerable sums later — to the United Nations programme. The European Community Humanitarian Office has its own field offices in the region. Its programmes are pursued principally through collaboration with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Several regional authorities in European countries carry out their projects in direct partnership with the regional administration of Iraqi Kurdistan. Most European NGOs — whose projects are sometimes co-financed by their governments or by quasi-governmental agencies — operate in the region in partnership with local Kurdish NGOs which relate to the regional administration.

21. Some relief and humanitarian organisations refuse to be bound by the MOU, objecting to such Iraqi Government imposed conditions as having to divulge the names of local relief workers, or having to make financial transfers only at the official highly unfavourable exchange rate. Consequently, their access to the Kurdish region has to be through Turkey rather than Baghdad, which can be more difficult logistically.

5.1. Security problems

22. The provision of humanitarian assistance in the Iraqi Kurdish de facto autonomous region is constantly hampered by serious incidents, including the killing of a United Nations Guard and a number of NGO staff, the interception of convoys, arrests of local drivers and attacks on vehicles. Bomb attacks have been perpetrated in the most densely populated parts of the region. Time bombs have been attached to trucks while stopped at Iraqi Government check-points, as documented by the former Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr Max van der Stoel. There have also been overt military attacks by Iraqi Government forces and troop concentrations near the border of the Kurdish autonomous region. Moreover, shelling of the eastern border areas by Iranian forces has not only caused the inhabitants to flee once again, but has also forced NGOs to halt their assistance and reconstruction operations.

23. The "security zone" from which all Iraqi Government forces are excluded covers only a small percentage of the territory controlled by the Iraqi Kurds, while the "air exclusion zone" covers about two-thirds of that territory. The maintenance of these zones depends on the continued presence of British, French and United States forces, while use of the Inçirlik air base in Turkey depends on renewal every six months of an agreement with that country. There appears to be some doubt as to whether the Turkish Government is willing to renew the agreement past May 1994. If the agreement were not renewed, the situation would certainly become much worse. Consideration might then be given to the use of appropriate facilities in the Iraqi Kurdish controlled region itself. Given the continued insecurity in the region, the best solution from the point of view of the Iraqi Kurdish administration would be to extend the "security zone" and the "air exclusion zone" to the whole autonomous region for as long as the threat from Saddam Hussein's regime persists.

24. A further major security problem is that of land-mines. There are an estimated twenty million mines, mainly of the plastic non-self-destructing variety, mostly in the south-eastern areas (Sulaimaniyah governorate) particularly affected by the Iraq-Iran war. Mines were also laid during the Iraqi Government's "Anfal" campaign to de-populate the countryside. The mines have caused widespread injury and mutilation, especially among children out to gather fire-wood. Needless to say the existence of the mines has deterred many from returning to re-build their villages or till their land. An emergency mine-clearance, training, and community education programme is being carried out by the Mines Advisory Group, a non-governmental organisation, with financing from the European Union and other NGOs. The aim is to establish an indigenous capability to deal with the problem.

5.2. United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Programme in Iraq

25. According to the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assistance Programme in Iraq achieved its initial goal of repatriating and resettling most of the 1,9 million refugees during its first year of implementation. Ninety per cent of the refugees had returned voluntarily by October 1991. "Blue Routes" facilitated the movement back home of returnees from the Turkish and Iranian borders. The provision of food, water, clothes, domestic items, emergency shelter materials and basic health services were delivered through United Nations humanitarian centres located along these protected circuits.

26. The December 1991-March 1992 plan of action took assistance to former refugees one step further through its local resettlement activities: substantial reconstruction assistance was provided to families for the rebuilding of over 1 200 villages in northern Iraq. Hard shelters and pre-fabricated housing were made available to those families who chose not to return to their villages of origin. Further assistance was also provided by NGOs.

27. From July to October 1992, humanitarian activities greatly decreased during negotiations with the Iraqi Government on renewal of the Memorandum of Understanding. Assistance to northern Iraq resumed in November 1992 and continued until March 1993, mainly through the provision of food, fuel, medicine and some agricultural inputs, thereby avoiding renewed displacements of population.

28. Support for emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction in a number of infrastructure sectors was also provided, notably in agriculture, traditionally a prime source of employment in the north, water treatment and distribution, health (immunisation), education and training.

29. Nevertheless, the March 1993 United Nations Needs Assessment Mission found that the situation of the Iraqi civilian population had deteriorated and that the needs of displaced persons in the north remained critical. Close to 140 000 displaced persons of urban background remained in hard shelters. Unwilling to settle in their cities of origin under central government control, these could not be relocated to rural areas because of their urban roots and lack of land ownership. Furthermore, they were unable to find work owing to prevailing high unemployment rates in urban areas. There were also some 586 000 displaced persons from rural areas in the so-called "collective towns", whose lack of resources hindered their return to rural areas. Their return is further complicated by the extensive presence of mines and the fact that numerous villages still remain in ruins as a result of the "Anfal" operations of 1987-88 (see paragraph 16 above).

30. The 1993-94 Humanitarian Programme aims at limiting the consequences of rapidly deteriorating conditions throughout Iraq. Rural rehabilitation projects have been designed to encourage self-reliance among the Iraq Kurdish population in order to allow them to meet a greater proportion of their needs on a sustainable basis. The United Nations will increasingly work with the local authorities in order to increase self-sufficiency at the village level.

31. The new focus of the Humanitarian Programme — in addition to the provision of basic relief supplies — is on projects concerned with basic agriculture, integrated shelter, health, water and sanitation, energy provision, and road maintenance and repair. For instance, the shelter project intends to meet a more comprehensive range of needs than just improved housing. The reintegration of displaced persons from "collective towns" into their former villages will be promoted through the delivery of materials for the improvement of community and educational facilities, as well as for the water, sanitation, and health sectors, thereby allowing for basic community self-sufficiency. However, work is still very much at the project stage.

32. Similarly, agricultural projects designed to increase productivity of the winter wheat and summer vegetable crops through the provision of seed, fertiliser and crop protection chemicals, will also encourage rural resettlement. While income-earning opportunities for small-scale farmers will be enhanced, local market prices could decrease due to the greater availability of food stocks within the region. The inclusion of a buy-back scheme for the 1993 wheat harvest is designed to increase food availability in the north. The local purchase by the World Food Programme of surplus wheat production will be at one-third to a quarter of the cost of importing wheat flour. Mine-clearance on agricultural land will facilitate crop production as well as relocation to original villages.

33. The 1993-94 United Nations Humanitarian Programme in Iraq seeks to address humanitarian assistance needs throughout the country. The requirements are considerable. The implementation of projects included in the one-year programme is subject to the availability of funds. The total revised estimated financial requirements for projects included in the plan amount to approximately US$ 467 million. Priority needs alone are estimated to require a minimum of US$ 212 million. As of 30 November 1993, US$ 114,4 million were available for the United Nations programme, although resources contributed bilaterally brought this up to US$ 180 million. While the financial and other resources required remain considerable, the fact that the plight of the Iraqi Kurdish people is no longer in the forefront of media attention makes it that much more difficult to raise funds. Yet, the consequences of reducing humanitarian assistance to the north and other regions of Iraq are likely to be serious. Starvation and freezing in the north is one possible scenario for the winter, which is already much harsher than the last one.

34. Outstanding requirements at 30 November 1993 remained for all areas of the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, in particular for agriculture, health, food, water and sanitation, the United Nations Guards and all rehabilitation activities. Nevertheless, the food and fuel situation in the north is apparently better than last winter. For example, some 153 million litres of kerosene for heating have been delivered, enough to cover the needs of the population in the north until March 1994. There has been funding for diesel fuel for winter ploughing. Taking into account those most in need and the availability of funds, the United Nations is providing enough food for a total of 750 000 people. Total requirements for a population of 3,5 million are of course higher, but needs are being better met after a good harvest. It remains that the shortfall for the programme as a whole is considerable, and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs plans to hold a meeting with donors, NGOs and other United Nations agencies on 21 January 1994 to assess the situation.

6. Conclusion

35. There are four main conditions for the successful completion of the return and long-term resettlement of the population that fled the Iraqi Kurdish region in the spring of 1991. The first is security from the threat of renewed attacks and the danger of land-mines, the second is the partial lifting of sanctions, the third is the re-building of the village communities and infrastructure that form the backbone of the region's agrarian economy, and the fourth is the willingness of the Government of Iran to allow the voluntary repatriation of the refugees remaining on Iranian territory.

36. As is recognised by all agencies providing assistance to Iraqi Kurdistan, the region's fundamental, long-term reconstruction and development needs must be addressed in order to mitigate its short-term dependence on outside help. However, this poses a basic dilemma in that full economic assistance and restoration of productive capacity imply the removal of United Nations sanctions either on Iraq as whole, which the international community would be unwise to contemplate until the Iraqi Government has complied fully with the Gulf war cease-fire terms and subsequent Security Council resolutions, or on the Iraqi Kurdish de facto autonomous region, which the United Nations has been unwilling to consider since it could be understood as a step towards the division of Iraq.

37. According to its spokesmen, the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government does not harbour separatist aims. It wishes to maintain a certain autonomy within a federal structure. In this conception, the Iraqi central government would control foreign policy, monetary and financial policy and the armed forces. The regional government would have some say in these areas but would manage all other aspects of policy with regard to the region under its control. The prospect of at least partial removal of sanctions against Iraq could be used as an inducement for the Iraqi Government to resume negotiations towards an agreement along these lines, although further conditions would have to be the regime's compliance with all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and in particular an immediate end to the persecution and repression of minorities.

38. In the meantime, the embargo could be at least partially lifted to foster economic development in the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region, at the very least so as to enable it to produce enough oil to meet its own fuel needs. Large-scale return to agrarian activity requires the reconstruction of villages and their supporting infrastructure of roads, water, sanitation and power. Many humanitarian organisations have been working extremely hard and courageously to assist the process. But such work requires security. A climate of confidence and long-term stability is needed to encourage investment and trade. These conditions are at present far from being met. Pending a definitive settlement of the conflict between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish region, the latter's security could be increased by the extension of the existing "security zone" and "air exclusion zone" to cover the whole region. In view of doubts about the willingness of the Turkish Government to extend the agreement to allow the use of Inçirlik air base for this purpose, consideration should be given to the development of suitable facilities in the Kurdish-controlled region of north Iraq itself.

39. Finally, all countries must be encouraged to contribute urgently and generously to the reconstruction work in the area and to the provision of basic needs through the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme in Iraq and through bilateral and other channels, including the Council of Europe Social Development Fund.

APPENDIX 2

Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.

Origin: Order No. 460 (1991).

Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 17 December 1993.

Members of the committee: MM. Flückiger (Chairman), Cucó, Sir John Hunt (Alternate: Mr Atkinson) (Vice-Chairmen), Mrs Aguiar, Mrs Arnold, Mrs Astgeirsdottir, MM. Attard Montalto, Biefnot, Billing, Böhm, Branger, Mrs Brasseur, MM. Brennan, Brito (Alternate: Poças Santos), Brunhart, Ehrmann, Eisma, Fava, Foschi (Alternate: Visibelli), Fuhrmann, Galanos, Ghesquière, Gotzev, Mrs Hacklin, MM. De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman), MM. Iwinski, Kalus, Karcsay, Kiliç, Kiratlioglu, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Laanoja, Landsbergis, Lupták, Mrs Mascher, Mr Pahtas, Mrs Persson, Mrs Robert, MM. Sarafopoulos, Siwek, Skaug, Stoilov, Miss Szelényi, MM. Trojan, Vázquez, Zlobec.

N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries to the committee: Mr Newman and Miss Nollinger.