Developments in the Russian Federation in relation to the situation in Chechnya

Doc. 7531
23 April 1996

REPORT[1]
Rapporteur: Mr MUEHLEMANN,   Switzerland, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group

Summary

            The Assembly deplores that the armed conflict in Chechnya, which began in December 1994, continues despite the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on 30 July 1995.

            It unreservedly condemns the current violations of human rights and international humanitarian law being committed both by the Federal Russian troops and the Chechen combattants.

            It urges that concrete measures be taken without further delay to implement President Yeltsin's or other peace plans, and considers that these efforts will be successful only if they involve all the parties to the conflict acting in good faith, including leader Dudaev.

I.    Draft resolution

1.         The Assembly deplores that the armed conflict in Chechnya, which began in December 1994, continues despite the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on 30 July 1995.

2.         It unreservedly condemns the current violations of human rights and international humanitarian law being committed both by the Federal Russian troops and the Chechen combattants, in particular

i.          the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Russian military, especially against the civilian population, which is in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Second Protocol;

ii.          the taking of hostages and the brutal terrorist attacks perpetrated by Chechen fighters, which cannot be justified by any cause, as well as their taking-up of positions near civilian dwellings and not giving civilians clear warnings to evacuate before taking up such positions, which is also in violation of the same conventions.

3.         All these actions constitute a grave violation of the Council of Europe's most elementary human rights principles.

4.         It recalls that in its Opinion No. 193 on Russia's request for membership of the Council of Europe, adopted on 25 January 1996, note was taken of the Russian Federation's intention "to settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means", a commitment of particular importance in the Caucasus, traditionally a zone of tension; as well as of the commitments "to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law, including in cases of armed conflict on its territory" and "to co-operate in good faith with international humanitarian organisations and to enable them to carry on their activities on its territory in conformity with their mandates", commitments which are all currently not being honoured by the Russian Federation.      

5.         The Assembly notes that the President of the Russian Federation presented a "plan to solve the crisis in the Chechen Republic" on 31 March 1996, proposing, inter alia:

i.          a cease-fire;

ii.          phased withdrawal of federal troops;

iii.          extension of the "islands of peace" negotiated in the field with the local authorities;

iv.         convening of a "political forum for peace", bringing together representatives of the Chechen people and of federal institutions;

v.         talks on the future status of Chechnya on the basis of the Federal Russian Constitution;

vi.         conclusion of agreements on the demarcation of authority between federal and local institutions;

vii.        a resolution by the State Duma on an amnesty for separatist fighters who have not committed the most serious crimes.

6.         The Assembly urges that concrete measures be taken without further delay to implement elements of this or other peace plans and considers that these efforts will be successful only if they involve all the parties to the conflict acting in good faith, including leader Dudaev.

7.         It calls on the parties to the conflict to open without delay and without preconditions negotiations on the status and reconstruction of Chechnya, with the assistance of OSCE and the Council of Europe.

8.         It also insists that representatives of humanitarian organisations, especially representatives of the Red Cross, be allowed to visit prison camps, and also that journalists from all the media be guaranteed access to the war zones.

9.         The Assembly reminds the Russian authorities of their commitment, included in Opinion No. 193 (1996), to ensure that "those found responsible for human rights violations will be brought to justice - notably in relation to events in Chechnya", and demands that documented human rights abuses, for example in the filtration camps, be investigated, and the guilty punished.

II.    Draft order

1.         The Assembly welcomes the constitution of an ad hoc committee on Chechnya by the Bureau in conformity with Order 516 adopted on 25 January 1996 and requests that this ad hoc committee be convened in Moscow and Grozny without delay, with a view to contributing -in co-operation with the OSCE - to the resumption of dialogue between the parties to the conflict.

2.         It instructs its ad hoc committee to monitor closely the cease-fire implementation and the human rights situation in Chechnya.

3.         It considers that its ad hoc committee shall act in close co-operation with Russia's parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe.

4.         The Assembly requests that the ad hoc committee be closely associated with the monitoring of the commitments and obligations entered into by the Russian Federation upon accession to the Council of Europe.

III. Explanatory memorandum

by the Rapporteur

CONTENTS

A.        Introduction

B.        Programme

C.        The conflicth in Chechnya

D.        The general situation in Russia

E.         Conclusions

A.        Introduction

            On 19 March 1996, following Russia's admission to the Council of Europe, the Bureau established an ad hoc committee on Chechnya with the following membership:

Members:
Mr M�hlemann, (Switzerland, LDR), Chairman
Mr Schwimmer, (Austria, EPP), Vice-Chairman
Mr Atkinson, (United Kingdom, EDG)
Mr B�rsony, (Hungary, SOC)
Mr Bindig, (Germany, SOC)
Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout, (Netherlands, LDR)
Mr Hagard, (Sweden, EDG)
Mr Laakso, (Finland, UEL)
Mr Seitlinger, (France, EPP)
Mr Severin, (Romania, SOC)
Mr Lukin, (Russia)
Mr Fyodorov, (Russia)

Alternates:
Mr Berg, (Norway, EDG)
Mr Fenech, (Malta, EPP)
Mr Gricius, (Lithuania, LDR)
Mr Iwinski, (Poland, SOC)
Mr L�pez-Henarez, (Spain, EPP)
Mr Oliynik, (Ukraine, SOC)
Mrs Ojuland, (Estonia, LDR)
Mr Urbain, (Belgium, SOC)

            Since it was not possible in the short time remaining before the Assembly's April session for the committee to visit Moscow, still less Grozny, the chairman went to Moscow, accompanied by Mr Berg, from 8 to 10 April 1996 to assess the current situation.

            As a result of this visit, it would appear necessary to hold the first, constituent meeting of the ad hoc committee in Strasbourg on 22 April 1996, prior to meeting in Moscow in May 1996. This meeting in Moscow should be preceded by an on-the-spot visit of a small group (3-4 persons) to Chechnya.

            Following Russia's admission, the planned advisory and supervisory function should be assumed as quickly as possible by a monitoring committee. This committee should also be prepared to observe the two polls of the presidential elections on 16 and 30 June 1996.

            The excellent programme for the visit of 8-10 April 1996 had been carefully prepared by the Russian authorities and included constructive discussions with presidential advisers in the Kremlin, members of the government in various ministries and parliamentarians in the Duma and the Council of the Federation.

B.        Programme

1.         Presidential staff

2.         Government

3.         Duma

4.         Council of the Federation

5.         Other figures

C.        The conflict in Chechnya

            Since Russia's military intervention in Chechnya in December 1994, the armed conflict has not ceased.  A cease-fire was agreed with OSCE help in July 1995, but met with serious difficulties from the outset. The Russian President gradually realised, however, that the war in Chechnya was increasingly unpopular among the Russian population and began to seek a peaceful solution.The presidential and Duma elections in December 1995 were expected to help the cause of peace but proved provocative. Dudaev and his supporters responded with the use of force, culminating in the hostage-taking in neighbouring Dagestan. The Russian troops' reaction was disproportionate, neither hostages nor the civilian population being spared in subsequent military action. Unfortunately, there was no decrease in human rights violations on either side so that UNO, OSCE and the Council of Europe were repeatedly obliged to issue critical statements.

            In view of the confused situation and the impending presidential elections, President Yeltsin called for a peace plan to be drawn up, involving representatives of opposing viewpoints. One group favoured taking a hard line, using carefully targetted military strikes to force Dudaiev into peace concessions. The other group developed a step-by-step peace policy taking Dudaiev's relatively strong position into account. At present, the Russian forces of the Army and the Ministry of the Interior more or less control the flat plain with the larger towns, but are unable to prevent sporadic infiltration by the opposing side. There is still continual fighting over small towns and villages in the hills and the situation is complicated there. The inaccessible mountain region remains the last bastion into which Dudayev can retreat. Meanwhile, he seems to be receiving logistical support from Azerbaijan as well as certain Islamic states. Controversy surrounds the influence of Chechnya's civilian government under Zavgayev which is supported by Russia. There is no doubt that immediate unilateral withdrawal of Russian troops would result not in peace, but in disorder akin to civil war, as in Afghanistan.

            On 31 March 1996, President Yeltsin determined to implement the following peace plan:

            The success of this peace plan will depend on the attitude of Dudaiev, the armed forces ministries in Moscow and the mediators. President Yeltsin has to succeed if he is to win the June 1996 elections.

            Unfortunately, the OSCE delegation in Grozny has little room for manoeuvre. It apparently incurred Dudayev's displeasure after openly criticising the hostage-taking in Dagestan, though relations now seem to have improved considerably. The Russians reacted rather negatively to the outspoken human rights report of early 1996. It would be a good thing if this courageous delegation could be involved in Yeltsin's peace plan.

D.        The general situation in Russia

            Even after the Duma elections of December 1995 the domestic political situation in Russia did not change decisively. Everything is currently dominated by the presidential campaign, in the final phase of which the incumbent, President Yeltsin, will no doubt face the Communist party chief, Zyuganov. President Yeltsin is making an impressive effort to close the gap, using his Chechnya peace plan and closer cooperation with certain CIS states to regain psychological ground with the population.

            Individual freedom of opinion and freedom of information for the mass media remain the chief strengths of the reform process. Human rights violations in the Chechnya war and intolerable conditions in the prison system must be unequivocally condemned.

            The Duma elections of December 1995 were free and fair, but resulted in gains for the forces critical of reform. Cooperation between the executive authorities and the Duma is consequently once again marked by conflict , whereas the Federation Council has an often corrective, constructive influence.

            In the economic sphere there has been some slight progress, even though large sections of the population find themselves in precarious social circumstances. Western investment is discouraged by constant breakdowns in everyday law and order.

            Local conflicts remain latent in Tadjikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Moldova, but without flaring up as they have in Chechnya.

E.         Conclusions

1.        By contrast with former Yugoslavia, the Chechnya conflict has so far been confined to Chechnya, without spreading to neighbouring countries and causing balkanisation of the Caucasus.

2.        President Yeltsin's peace plan is to be taken seriously but depends on constructive cooperation by Dudaiev.

3.        Peaceful change, democratic development and reconstruction in Chechnya require the support of international organisations.

4.        The human rights situation in Chechnya must be constantly monitored and violations by both sides firmly condemned.

5.        Human rights violations must be investigated and the culprits punished.

6.        Access to the conflict areas must be afforded to representatives of humanitarian organisations and journalists of all media.

7.        The Council of Europe should become active in cooperation with the OSCE in Chechnya in order to improve the human rights situation, start democratic development and support current peace efforts.

8.        The Council of Europe must immediately send a permanent monitoring committee to Russia to help reinforce and improve the reform process.

9.        The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should give these efforts greater financial support and unwaveringly continue its own development and co-operation programme.

10.        These long-term efforts by the Council of Europe must be planned and implemented in close cooperation with the Russian delegation.

Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 22 April 1996 by 23 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions; draft order unanimously adopted by the committee on 22 April 1996.

Members of the committee: Mr. B�rsony (Chairman), Lord Finsberg (Vice-Chairman, MM. van der Linden (Vice-Chairman), Alvarez Cascos, Antretter, Baumel, Mrs. Belohorska, MM. Bergqvist, Bernardini, Bj�rck, Bloetzer, Bokov, B�chel, B�hler (Alternate: Mr. Hornhues), Cem, Cerqueda Pascuet, Chornovil, Deasy, Demiralp, Desyatnikov, Diacov, E�rsi, Fassino, Galanos, Gjellerod, Gotzev, Gricius, Hardy, Irmer, Iwi_ski, Kalus, Kaspereit, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Mart�nez, Masseret, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral (Alternate: Roseta), Muehlemann, Nothomb, Mrs. Ojuland, MM. Oliynik, Paasilinna, Pahor, Pottakis, Pavlidis, Popovski, Pozzo, Radulescu Botica, Mrs. Ragnarsd�ttir, MM. Schieder, Schwimmer, MM. Severin, Sinka (Alternate :  Mme Kusnere), Sir Dudley Smith,  MM. �pa_ek, Spahia, Mrs. Suchocka, MM. Thoresen, Urbain, Vella, Woltjer, Zhirinovsky (Alternate: Glotov), Ziuganov.

N.B. The names of those members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the committee : Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen.

[1]. by the Political Affairs Committee