World Trade Organisation and the implementation of the Uruguay Round
12 July 1996
Rapporteurs: Mr DEMIRALP, Turkey, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group and Mrs VERSPAGET, Netherlands, Socialist Group)
The report examines the implications for world trade of the GATT Uruguay Round and the establishment, in 1995, of the World Trade Organisation. Council of Europe member states are called on to ensure that the Singapore ministerial meeting to be held in December 1996 consolidate the gains made and make headway in new areas such as labour standards, human rights and the protection of the environment.
Finally, the challenges facing the World Trade Organisation are outlined, such as the settling of disputes, the expansion of its membership to include major countries like Russia and the People's Republic of China and efforts to assist the development of the poorest countries.
I. Draft resolution
1. The Assembly welcomes the creation, in 1995, of the new World Trade Organisation (WTO) and supports it in its mission to implement the Uruguay Round and, more generally to maintain an open, multilateral, worldwide trading system. The Assembly considers such a system a major vehicle for peace and prosperity among all nations, and in particular for allowing developing and transition countries to partake of global economic growth.
2. The Assembly encourages the WTO to assure liberalisation in fields started but not completed under the Uruguay Round, such as services, telecommunications, maritime transport services and agriculture; and to tackle resolutely new areas such as the relationship between trade and the environment, trade and investment, competition policy, and trade and social standards.
3. The Assembly considers the WTO ministerial meeting to be held in Singapore in December 1996 as being of great importance for the above purposes, and calls on the governments of Council of Europe member states to do their utmost to ensure its success.
4. Labour standards must be raised worldwide to protect the health and safety of workers and to reduce the current exploitation of, notably, women and the young, in many countries. The Assembly in this context expresses its support for the efforts undertaken by the International Labour Organisation to ban child labour worldwide, notably by making national legislation conform to international standards for the minimum age of workers, and believes that these efforts should inspire the WTO's work. Nonetheless, labour standards should not be used as a pretext for protectionism.
5. Progress on responsible trade which is in relation to the environment is particularly important in order to protect the natural resources of poor countries and ensure sustainable development for the benefit of local populations.
6. The Assembly encourages member countries of the WTO to further expand its membership so as to include major countries still outside, among them Russia and other countries in central and eastern Europe, as well as the People's Republic of China, provided they meet the conditions for membership.
7. The Assembly in this context calls on those among its member states which are not yet members of the WTO to make every effort to join it as early as possible, in full respect of its principles.
8. The Assembly notes the increasing number of regional trade arrangements. It considers that such arrangements can be useful instruments under certain circumstances. It is, however, essential that such arrangements and links be fully compatible with, and helpful to, WTO principles and aims, in order to avoid a retreat into protectionism and a multitude of special arrangements.
9. The Assembly calls on governments of Council of Europe member states belonging to the OECD to conclude rapidly within that framework a new Multilateral Agreement on Investment, to promote accession to it by all WTO member states and to include in this agreement social and environmental standards.
10. The Assembly calls on the governments of Council of Europe member states:
i. to work within the WTO in favour of greater participation in the world economy and trading system of, in particular, the less developed countries, which are hindered in their development by heavy debt, limited trading access to industrialised countries and excessive concentration on a few export commodities;
ii. to pay particular attention to the difficulties these countries may face as a result of higher food prices due to Uruguay Round trade liberalisation, and to their debt problem, and to alleviate these difficulties through appropriate economic policies and special aid measures;
iii. to ensure that in the realisation of its objectives, the WTO be guided by the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its European Social Charter, as well as other Council of Europe conventions in fields such as nature conservation and animal welfare.
11. Finally, the Assembly calls on the governments of Council of Europe member states:
i to co-operate closely with each other in order to co-ordinate the activities of the WTO with those of other competent bodies such as the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation and other United Nations Specialised Agencies;
ii. to respect strictly the WTO's disputes settlement mechanism in view of its central role in upholding the organisation's principles.
II. Explanatory Memorandum
by Mr DEMIRALP and Mrs VERSPAGET
II. A Historical Background
III. The Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organisation
IV. The Uruguay Round and WTO Achievements
V. Regional Trade Groups
VI. Central and eastern Europe
VII. The Environment
VIII. Labour Standards
X. Trade and Human Rights
XI. Developing countries
XII. Future Challenges
1. The Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement, which took effect on 1 January 1995 after more than seven years of intensive negotiations and involving eventually over a hundred countries, was the most comprehensive since the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was concluded. The Uruguay Round deals with trade in goods as well as areas not covered under GATT, such as services, trade-related intellectual property rights, and investment. It strengthened international trade rules and provided for the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which today monitors the trade relations of some 120 countries. The agreement, the aim of which is to create a more open international trading environment, has far-reaching implications for the globalisation of world economy and should lead to new opportunities for less developed nations.
2. The present report is based on information gained during the meeting of the Sub-Committee on International Economic Relations (of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development) at WTO headquarters in November 1995, including an exchange of views with Mr Renato Ruggiero, the Director General. It also builds on the European Parliament's Hearing on the WTO in Brussels in November 1995. It in particular takes into account the many useful contributions made by members of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development at several meetings up until June 1996.
3. Neither GATT nor the WTO are new to the Parliamentary Assembly. In virtually every report in recent years on OECD activities, it has pointed to the close relationship between the work of the OECD and that of the WTO. (The Parliamentary Assembly since 1962 serves as the OECD's parliamentary forum, since 1992 in an enlarged Assembly including parliamentary delegations from non-European OECD member countries.) Thus, in its last Resolution on the subject, 1069 (1995), the Assembly called on OECD member countries to "respect fully the Uruguay Round agreement and the authority of the World Trade Organisation, especially as regards the orderly settlement of disputes". It also asked them to "maintain the momentum of trade liberalisation as a vehicle for economic growth, including through active preparation for an ambitious World Trade Organisation Ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1996", and to "submit any trade dispute for settlement within the World Trade Organisation". It has also stressed the role of the OECD as a 'preparatory forum' for many issues to be taken up by the WTO.
4. Furthermore, it expressed the wish that OECD member countries, in their relations with economies in transition and developing countries, "promote the integration of these countries into the world economy, in accordance with the rules and disciplines adopted under the Uruguay Round agreement and the World Trade Organisation, taking efforts to ensure that all countries are able to benefit from rules-based multilateral trade liberalisation, including the least developed and poorest countries".
II. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
5. The genesis of WTO began in 1947, with negotiations in Havana for the creation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO). The British economist John Maynard Keynes had, already during the Second World War, suggested the creation of such an organisation in order to stabilise primary commodity prices. It would have been the "third pillar, in addition to the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -of a new international system.
6. It should be remembered that the general assumption around 1946-48 was that the Second World War would be followed by a period of recession and unemployment, with repercussions on primary commodity prices. However, this did not materialise as the industrial countries entered into an unprecedented period of twenty-five years of full employment and steady growth.
7. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, established in 1948 after it became clear that the International Trade Organisation would not see the light of day (in large measure due to the fact that the US Congress did not ratify the treaty foreseeing its creation), has provided the framework for trade negotiations in the postwar era. The fundamental purpose of the GATT was to achieve "freer and fairer trade" through reduction and elimination of other trade barriers. Three principles have guided GATT operations: (1) non-discrimination, multilateralism, and the application of the Most-Favoured Nation Principle (MNF) to all signatories, (2) expansion of trade through the reduction of trade barriers, and (3) unconditional reciprocity among all "Contracting Parties". GATT's goal was to establish a world trade régime, or universal rules for the conduct of commercial policy.
8. Trade liberalisation was "put on the defensive" as early as the 1950s with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), for even though the EEC Rome Treaty supports worldwide open trade and sees itself as a vehicle to promote it, its very creation signifies a deviation from the ideal of a single, global, multilateral system. The thought was, however, that the internal abolition of trade barriers among EEC members would be ahead of worldwide trade liberalisation within GATT, and that no EEC rules would run counter to GATT rules.
9. The Dillon Round was initiated by the United States to counter the threat of the EEC's external tariff and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of production subsidies. The sectoral, or item-by-item, approach of these negotiations, however, showed meagre results. When tariff reductions in the early 1960s began to impinge on key industrial sectors and the interests of powerful groups, it became clear that a new approach to tariff reduction was required.
10. A new method of tariff negotiations was employed in the Kennedy Round, concluded in 1967. It produced a general tariff cut of 35 percent on some sixty thousand products, incorporated an anti-dumping agreement to ensure fair competition, and provided for food assistance to the less developed countries (LDCs). Yet the Round failed to deal with the increasing problem of non-tariff barriers, the special problems faced by LDCs and the thorny issue of agricultural trade. Despite these failures the Kennedy Round can be considered a high point in the postwar movement towards trade liberalisation.
11. The Tokyo Round, from 1973 to 1979, made the first systematic attempt to resolve the developing conflict between the growing economic interdependence among national economies on the one hand, and the increasing tendency of governments to intervene in their economies to promote economic objectives and domestic welfare on the other. Among the vast array of subjects discussed in the Tokyo Round, four stand out: (1) violations of the Most-Favoured Nation principle; (2) tariff reductions and removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs); (3) liberalized trade in agriculture (4) and the establishment of "Codes of conduct".
12. The primary goals of the Tokyo Round were to stabilise trading relations among the advanced OECD countries and to grapple with the emerging requests of the less developed countries for special treatment. The Round succeeded in reducing tariff barriers and establishing a number of "Codes of good behaviour" regarding non-tariff barriers. In brief, the Codes were designed to limit a return to the mercantilist trading practices of the 1930s. It also attempted to clarify international norms in order to make national practices working against trade liberalisation more transparent and subject to international scrutiny.
III. THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
13. Although the Tokyo Round was by far the most articulated and wide-ranging trade negotiation so far, it left untouched numerous complex issues that have since become increasingly significant in international economic relations. Among them were agriculture, the expanding role of services, particularly finance and telecommunications, and high-technology industries. (In 1986, services accounted for approximately one quarter of the $2 trillion annual value of world trade. Furthermore, agriculture and services were never covered by the GATT. In addition, both services and high technology industries are closely associated with foreign direct investment by multinational corporations, a subject which lies outside the GATT framework.
14. This changing environment and patterns of world trade suggested that future trade negotiations would have to be vastly different from those of the past. In September 1986, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, the members of the GATT decided after intense debate to launch a round of multilateral trade negotiations to deal with these issues. The strongest proponent of what has been called the Uruguay Round was the United States, supported primarily by the Japanese and the economies of the Pacific Basin, and opposed by certain members of the European Community and the larger LDCs.
15. Given an American agriculture in serious trouble and rising protectionist pressures in Congress, the United States demanded that other nations open their economies to American service industries, in particular US multinationals, remove agricultural export subsidies, and write clear rules preventing the piracy of patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property rights.
16. As regards agriculture, a global over-capacity arose as several nations became self-sufficient in food and even became exporters. The agricultural sector in Europe enjoyed particular political influence. The tendency was to protect domestic agriculture and subsidise exports through the Common Agricultural Policy.
17. The service and high-technology sectors have become primary growth sectors for the advanced economies and a growing number of newly-industrialised economies (NIEs). A number among them, such as Brazil, India, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Korea have also targeted these sectors as a springboard for economic development. Small wonder, then, that this latter group of nations tended to protect these sectors against foreign competition. Moreover, the service industries (finance, communications and information processing) permeate domestic social relations and institutions, creating resistance to outside pressure for change and the opening of national markets.
18. In the 1980s, changes in the global pattern of international trade were in part caused by renewed protectionism in different countries due to domestic economic concerns, increasing competition among major multinational companies ("oligopolistic" competition) and "strategic" trade policies of certain countries. Moreover, the rapidly rising trade competitiveness of Japan and various NIEs placed severe strains on the multilateral trading system and added to the debate on its future.
19. The Uruguay Round was concluded at the end of 1993. In March 1994 at Marrakesh, the WTO Agreements were signed and at the beginning of 1995 the World Trade Organisation came into being. Based in Geneva, it is essentially a continuation of the GATT. Its immediate task will be to implement the Uruguay Round agreement, and beyond that tackle any new areas not covered, or covered adequately, in the Round. A first stock-taking will take place at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore in December 1996.
IV. THE URUGUAY ROUND AND WTO ACHIEVEMENTS
20. While it is somewhat early to draw firm conclusions from the Uruguay Round, it should be noted that world merchandise exports rose by 8% in 1995 (down from 9.5% in 1994). Growth in 1996 is expected to slow to a still robust 7%. Furthermore, continuing a long-standing trend, trade growth exceeded production growth in the world by a wide margin. Particularly pronounced was the expansion in non-OECD countries of 'processing trade' (assembly of manufactures). For the fourth consecutive year Asia's import growth exceeded its export growth. Central and eastern Europe was the most dynamic region for trade, with export and import values up by at least one quarter. Also Africa and the Middle East recorded their best trade performances in recent years. Finally, trade in office and telecom equipment was again the most dynamic category of manufactures trade.
21. The significance of the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organisation for the world economy is considerable. Long-standing tensions affecting world trade in goods has been resolved. Quantitative restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products will be eliminated by developed countries, and tariffs reduced. Protection of agriculture is being reduced. Major traders have reduced tariffs on industrial products, on average by 40%.
22. The WTO brings trade in services under multilateral rules for the first time. In most developed economies, this sector already accounts for 60% of GDP and an even higher share of jobs. Services will be even more important in the future, since most new business opportunities are expected to be generated in this sector.
23. The WTO also mandates minimum standards of intellectual property protection and their endorsement. These rules will be applied on a global basis, including developing and transition economies. The global coverage of these rules should give a strong boost to trade in technology-intensive products.
24. The respect for the rules under the Uruguay Round and the WTO will be enhanced under speedier and more automatic procedures for dispute settlement. Under the WTO, the adoption of a dispute settlement panels' report will no longer require the agreement of the losing country. An independent review by an appellate body is meant to safeguard against possible mistakes.
25. Under the Uruguay Round both industrial and the developing countries have made significant commitments to open their markets by reducing import tariffs and enlarging the number of tariffs that cannot be raised above specified levels without concessions in other trade areas. Industrial countries agreed to lower import tariffs on industrial products from the average 5 percent to 3.6 percent in five steps, starting in 1995. The largest cuts will affect wood and wood products, metals, non-electric machinery and mineral products.
26. As regards agricultural products, the industrial countries committed themselves to reducing the value of direct export subsidies by 36 percent, and the quantity of subsidised exports by 21 percent over a six-year period. The reduction of subsidies is an important first step toward liberalisation of world trade in agricultural products. If the cost of current protection drops, opportunities could open up for efficient producers in industrial, developing and transition economies. Further significant results attained in the Uruguay Round relate to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
27. Less developed nations still tend to rely on import tariffs and quantitative restrictions as instruments of trade policy, while industrial countries have increasingly relied on non-tariff barriers such as voluntary export restraints since the late 1960. Less transparent than tariffs, non-tariff measures offer more room for discretionary action by governments and create considerable uncertainty. Under the Uruguay Round agreement the most harmful practices - such as "voluntary export restraints", or "orderly marketing arrangements" - will be banned, while other non-tariff measures will be phased out in four to five years at most.
28. With respect to the MFA, it was agreed to phase out over ten years bilaterally negotiated import quotas on textiles and clothing (many of which came into existence in 1974 and were originally meant to last for only four years). This progressive widening of market access will strengthen the position of efficient producers. On the other hand, it will also mean the closure of more textile plants in Europe, a fact which has also been pointed out eg by Portuguese members of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development.
29. The Uruguay Round agreement also attempted, for the first time in the history of trade negotiations, to set rules for international trade in services and intellectual property rights, as well as for trade-related investment measures. The inclusion of those "new areas" in the agreement reflects their growing weight in the world economy, During 1982-92, according to World Bank data, world exports of services grew annually by an average rate of 9.5 percent, whereas merchandise exports rose by 7.1 percent.
30. Although the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does not cover financial services, maritime transport and audiovisual services, it introduces a number of general obligations (such as the Most-Favoured Nation treatment) and transparency requirements in the services area with respect to national laws and regulations. This should provide a solid basis for future negotiations. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) establishes standards for the protection of intellectual property rights (most-favoured nation), including patents, industrial designs, trademarks, geographic indications, and copyrights. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures prohibits certain arrangements restricting trade, such as trade balancing requirements. The industrial countries have two years, after the Uruguay Round agreement takes effect, to eliminate such restrictions; the less developed countries five to seven years.
31. Even though there is still uncertainty about the impact of the Uruguay Round agreement on individual countries, the World Trade Organisation estimates that real world income will grow by an extra by $510 billion over the next ten years as a result of trade barrier reductions in the goods area, of which some $116 billion would accrue to developing and transition economies. The Uruguay Round will create opportunities for the growth of production and exports in sectors that are particularly important for developing nations, such as temperate zone agricultural products, textiles and clothing.
V. REGIONAL TRADE GROUPS
32. Especially since the early 1990s, countries all over the world have been forming Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) and deepening existing ones at a rapid pace. APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) plans to complete a free-trade area by the year 2020. In Latin America and the Caribbean there has been a wave of regional agreements, prominent among them the Mercosur. There are plans for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by the year 2005. The European Union stands before further enlargement, and is envisaging trade pacts with Mercosur and other regional arrangements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - involving Canada, Mexico and the United States - is planned also to include Chile in the near future.
33. Whether an RTA facilitates or impedes eventual global free trade will depend on how it is designed - including whether procedures for joining the arrangement are liberal, and whether it satisfies World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. The basic principle behind the WTO is that member countries should not discriminate between one trading partner and another. For instance, if a country cuts tariffs on trade with one country, it must cut tariffs for all. So far, according to World Bank and IMF data, it appears that the rapid expansion of intraregional trade within the world's leading RTAs has not been at the expense of non-members. Yet the WTO Director General Mr Ruggiero in his discussion with the Committee in late 1995 did express concern over the proliferation in recent years of RTAs. For the WTO it is becoming more difficult to track them all.
34. The WTO will strengthen the monitoring of regional trade agreements, in response to growing concern that proliferating regional deals may put the multilateral trading system in jeopardy. In November 1995, the WTO's General Council agreed to establish a single watchdog committee on regional trading agreements. The idea for a single committee emerged from a meeting of trade ministers, including the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada. Under the present cumbersome procedures, a separate WTO working party is established for each notified regional arrangement. Since already twenty working parties are active, Canada argued that this watchdog committee would streamline the WTO's work in checking whether proposed free trade areas and customs unions were consistent with fair trade rules.
35. As regards the motivation for forming regional trade arrangements (RTAs), four major factors would seem to play a key role. Firstly, members may see economic benefits accruing from a more efficient production structure (including economies-of-scale through spreading fixed costs over larger regional markets) and enhanced economic growth from foreign direct investment. Secondly, smaller countries may seek increased security of market access, so-called "safe havens", through RTAs with larger countries. Thirdly, members may value non-economic objectives, such as strengthening political ties and managing migration flows. Finally, members may wish to improve their bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations by conducting them jointly with others.
VI. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
36. After the breakup of the USSR, central and eastern European states experienced a substantial contraction in their international trade. Sharp declines were reported in the volume of trade among the countries (referred to as "interstate trade") and in their trade with the rest of the world. The progressive introduction of international prices for interstate trade, though essential for improving resource allocation, is producing significant shifts in terms of trade by affecting export and import prices for several nations, adding to the financial burdens of individual countries (eg Ukraine oil imports).
37. Some longer-term decline in interstate trade was expected, since previous trade patterns among these countries were not based on comparative cost and locational advantage. In fact, along with the collapse of the trade arrangements of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the shift by East European countries to convertible currency trade at world market prices came the dissolution of the traditional trade within the area as a whole.
38. Government controls also take a toll on exports. Export controls seem to be motivated by two considerations. One is a desire to hold domestic prices of inputs below international prices, and thus ease the adjustment of enterprises. The other is the residual of the "central planning mind set", which views keeping goods at home as desirable, especially in times of constrained domestic supply. Such controls have, however, created distortions, corruption, as well as uncertainties and limitations for exporters.
39. The decline in imports from the rest of the world reflected declining demand as incomes and output fell and shortages of foreign exchange arose. To cope with inflation and the confused trade and payment situation, numerous enterprises have resorted to barter, which still accounts for a large, although not quantifiable, share of inter-state trade. This is also due to the dramatic decline of the interstate banking system and to the fact the new national currencies were not convertible for trade transactions.
40. Given this situation, the countries in the area should observe trade policies that do not penalise exports, that avert non-tariff barriers, that rely on low and uniform tariffs. Furthermore, WTO members should facilitate entry for products coming from the countries in transition. Equally important for strong trade performance in the longer term are an environment of macroeconomic stability, a competitive and reasonably stable real exchange rate and currency convertibility - all things that have been recommended in a recent Resolution of the Assembly on the economic situation in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (Resolution 1078 (1996); Doc. 7453). Countries in transition should attempt to augment export earnings to finance the imports required to restructure their economies, to maintain consumption, and to strengthen their creditworthiness. Unfortunately, in some cases, these countries are pursuing policies that are inimical to exports, and maintain serious deficiencies in the institutional infrastructure needed for trade development.
41. As regards European Union trade with Central and East European countries (CEECs), the negotiations so far conducted represent a firm commitment from the European Union side to include CEECs in its strategy for widening the Community. Among the most relevant provisions covering CEEC access to EU markets, two aspects stand out. The abolishment of all quantitative restrictions on industrial imports from the CEECs, except for textiles and coal, as well as of tariffs on over 50 percent of the EU's imports. Sensitive sectors, such as iron and steel, chemicals, furniture, leather goods, footwear, glass and vehicles, will be included in the next round of negotiations. On the other hand, there can be no new duties or quantitative restrictions imposed by the EU, and the tariff reductions do represent some advance on Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) rates.
42. What is remarkable, however, is the increasing importance of central and eastern Europe as a world trade participant. It is in fact the most dynamic region in the world in this respect, with exports and imports rising by annual 25% in 1995. It is very important both that WTO members help these countries join the WTO as soon as possible, and that the countries themselves do everything in their power to be in a position to live up to WTO requirements. These include progress toward privatisation, price liberalisation, import duties and subsidies compatible with WTO rules, as well as the abolition of non-tariff barriers.
VII. THE ENVIRONMENT
43. The WTO has been entrusted with another new area: the link between trade and the environment. The first findings and recommendations of the work undertaken so far will be presented at the December 1996 Ministerial meeting in Singapore, and it is something which many members of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development feel very strongly about, as reflected in the discussions leading up to the adoption of this report.
44. Public awareness of actual and potential threats to the natural environment has grown rapidly in the last few years. Concerns about deteriorating environmental quality and natural resource depletion have raised the spectre of irreversibility - the fear that irreparable damage is being done to the planet through the exhaustion of finite natural resources, the reduction of biodiversity and the destruction of air, land and water resources. This has resulted in severe pressure on governments, particularly in industrial countries, to develop policies to address environmental degradation.
45. Concern for the environment has generated numerous questions regarding the interaction between trade and the environment. Most of these questions relate to the impact of environmental regulations on trade patterns and gains from trade. Several studies analysing the impact of environmental policy on trade conclude that as long as damage to the environment is not internalised into the costs of production, misallocation of resources will continue.
46. In 1972, OECD countries agreed to a "polluter-pays" principle concerning the financing of environmental control costs (ECC). This was to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources through the internalising of environmental costs, so-called "negative externalities". This theoretically implies a loss of comparative advantage in pollution-intensive sectors for the country with relatively high ECC. One proposal has been to subsidise ECCs, so that industries in countries with high standards will not experience this loss of comparative advantage. This would imply that the World Trade Organisation would need to distinguish subsidies for the attainment of environmental goals from 'ordinary' subsidies.
47. Government subsidies which compensate firms for the cost of meeting regulations in fact inhibit a shift of resources away from pollution-intensive industries. Thus, there does not seem to be any efficiency advantage, from the environmental point of view, in using subsidies to meet environmental control costs. Furthermore, the economic literature on pollution has long argued that tax schemes or marketable permits are usually a more efficient method of internalising pollution costs than subsidies. This strongly suggests that subsidies used to achieve environmental goals are likely to be guises for averting losses in competitiveness, and that they should in consequence not be allowed by the WTO.
48. These above issues are mainly related to the analysis of pollution remaining within a nation's own boundaries. In order to address properly the question of the appropriate policy response to transfrontier pollution ("transnational externalities"), an international tax on emissions has been recommended, equal to the damage generated in all countries taken together. Given national sovereignty, however, this policy is difficult to implement.
49. Unlike the case of producer pollution, there seem to be strong arguments for harmonisation of product standards to avert protectionism. To this end, there may be a role for tariffs to move the global economy and international trade towards a better allocation of resources. Since no valid solution has so far been proposed to solve the problem of pollution spills across national boundaries, the Rapporteurs believe that further empirical work on the effectiveness of innovative strategies and their implications for trade patterns should be encouraged.
50. Trade in hazardous substances is generally related to the issue of product standards. In this case the question becomes whether the domestic environmental standards of the exporting country should be imposed on the importing country. Evidence of potential or actual damage due to export of goods which are domestically prohibited or severely restricted abounds. Most of the cases concern exports of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, food and hazardous waste.
51. In 1989, GATT established a Working Group on Exports of Domestically Prohibited Goods and Other Hazardous Substances. Its task was to examine the trade-related aspects of this issue not adequately addressed by other institutions. The main concerns have been to provide information on domestically prohibited goods and hazardous substances, and to establish procedures whereby export notification is given in the exporting country, and time and information is given for the importing country to make an informed decision to import or not. Among the UN agencies and other international bodies, the most active has been UNEP, the UN agency specialised in environmental protection.
52. In 1975, UNEP established an International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals. In 1987, it adopted the London Guidelines for Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade and in 1989 the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. Also in 1989, under UNEP auspices, the Montreal Protocol of Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was established. All these recommendations have placed a particular emphasis on "informed consent" on the part of the importing nation.
53. Important trade-related concerns in the area of environment include biodiversity, gold mining, cocaine production, deforestation not only in West Africa but also in the other tropical areas, and cobalt mining. Biodiversity is valued for maintaining the possibility of responding to new situations that may arise, for instance in the area of agriculture and medicine. The initial response of the international community to the threat of genetic impoverishment was to build a network of "gene banks" where genetic materials, such as seeds of extinct varieties, are conserved. Even though this method of conservation shows certain shortcomings when compared to that of preserving plant biodiversity in the natural habitat, it is consistent with the objectives of the Biodiversity Convention negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme in 1992.
54. Gold production has become a major source of income for several countries in the Amazon region, especially Brazil, which has become the fourth largest producer in the world. The primary concern of the industry is mercury pollution resulting from gold production. There are significant risks to the health of the populations of the region from current gold mining techniques leaving mercury residues. Other factors involved are human rights and the say of native tribes over the use of natural resources on their land. Since the current situation is in direct opposition to accepted labour and environmental standards, the WTO should take measures aimed at modifying the norms governing gold trade.
55. The production of cocaine in South America, in particular the Andean region, has had a devastating impact on the environment. The effects include pesticide residues, chemical dumping, deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution, mono-agriculture and loss of bio-diversity. In an attempt to assist the Andean region the World Trade Organisation should seek to create the trade conditions for alternatives to cocaine production.
56. The eleven member countries of the African Timber Organisation (ATO) are aware not only of the economic potential of forest resources but also of the danger of their uncontrolled depletion. About 7.5 million hectares of closed forest and 3.8 million hectares of African forests are cleared each year for a variety of purposes. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that 13,000 square kilometres of African forest disappear every year through forest clearing. If present trends continue, the tropical rain forests of the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and other West African countries will all but disappear by the year 2020. For this reason ATO countries have amended their forest laws in order to obtain a practical and consistent regulation for the protection of their rain forests, including trade in wood.
57. At issue in the case of manganese and cobalt mining in the Pacific Ocean are questions related to how the common heritage of mankind should be used; who has the right to the economic benefits from them? And who should prevent resource depletion and potential damage to the environment? Since seabed mining is not yet commercially viable in the depths beyond national jurisdiction, one approach could be that of multilateral cooperation set out in Principles 7 and 12 of the Rio Declaration. It could serve as a prerequisite for effective action in tackling global environmental problems and as a framework for future trade and environmental issues in multilateral fora.
58. There is a need for more empirical work on the trade-environment issue. Much remains to be done in advancing our understanding of the factors that influence their interaction. New initiatives should be taken by UNEP to realise basic global environmental standards for different areas of production, especially in mining.
59. Two preliminary conclusions may nevertheless be drawn. First, where environmental problems cannot be adequately addressed in a domestic setting, international cooperation offers better prospects for sound environmental outcomes than do punitive unilateral action, especially in the cases of transnational pollution and hazardous waste. Second, fast-growing economies with liberal trade policies have experienced less pollution-intensive growth than closed economies. This is due to the fact that trade liberalisation tends to reduce environmentally destructive economic distortions.
60. In conclusion, the Rapporteurs encourage the WTO to continue its work on trade measures related to the environment, and to explore the possibility of developing criteria for WTO rules. Work on this should move forward already at the WTO Ministerial meeting in December 1996. The preparatory work undertaken by the OECD, inviting trade adn environment experts in a single forum, is of particular value in this respect.
VIII. LABOUR STANDARDS
61. Over the past few years the range of "trade" issues has widened. Labour standards constitute the perhaps most politically contentious one. The growing discussion of labour standards and workers' rights in the context of trade policy is taking place not least since lax standards are perceived as morally wrong and as providing unfair competitive advantage. The International Labour Organisation has presided over the creation of numerous international labour standards, and the European Union has a social chapter in its Treaty on European Union (while the Council of Europe has had a European Social Charter since 1961). However, these efforts had little consequence for less developed countries until they were linked with the possibility of enforcement through trade sanctions.
62. The United States has been the leader, though it is quite possible to imagine future alliances on this issue with European countries individually or the EU. Beginning in 1984, eligibility for U.S. trade preferences under the Generalised System of Preferences was made conditional on an acceptable standard of workers' rights, and in 1998 the Trade and Competitiveness Act stipulated that failure to provide certain workers' rights could be considered as an "unreasonable" trade practice against which the United States could retaliate.
63. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) focused attention on the issue and provided an opening for organised labour to regain some of the voice it had lost on trade questions. However, little empirical work has been done on the effect of different labour standards on labour market conditions, productivity, competitiveness or growth. Much will depend on the stringency of the standard, its effect on a nation's economy and how it is enforced. On the one extreme are standards such as the demand for wage convergence through increasing minimum wages, which could amount to a denial of the principle of comparative advantage through lower labour costs. On the other are standards such as a ban on forced labour, which has an important humanitarian rationale but is unlikely adversely to affect the overall competitiveness of a nation.
64. Trade sanctions, although sometimes deemed to be politically necessary by individual countries or groups of countries, have welfare-reducing consequences for both parties. Positive inducements, however, such as assistance to labour organisations in the low-wage country, or an expansion of trade adjustment assistance in the high-wage country could be welfare-improving. Nonetheless, not only is very little known about the ultimate effects of imposing labour standards, but public policy on labour issues is also vulnerable to political processes in both developed and developing nations.
65. With the end of the Cold War, donors began to revise their aid programmes in response to the declining significance of geo-strategic concerns and the increasing importance of other goals, such as poverty alleviation and reduced military spending. This has also been echoed on several occasions by the Parliamentary Assembly, for instance in its pioneering Resolution 981 (1992) on the New North-South Relationship (Rapporteur: Mr Aarts and Mr Holtz; Doc. 6594), which suggested as "yardsticks" for development aid not only the poverty criterion in the recipient country, but also those of human rights, economic and social reform, limits on military expenditure and the protection of the environment. It is clear from the discussions in the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development that labour standards - especially in their more fundamental relation with human and basic social rights - are at the forefront of the Parliamentary Assembly's concern in this area. Again, headway should be made at the WTO Ministerial meeting in December 1996.
66. Another cluster of trade policies focuses on improving the regulatory climate for foreign investors. The liberalisation of policies governing foreign investment and the granting of so-called "national treatment" (that is, equal treatment of domestic and foreign firms) has typically been accompanied by broader regulatory changes designed to bring national policies into line with accepted international norms and practices.
67. This interest has been pursued directly through negotiations on trade-related investment measures and the partial liberalisation of trade in services, but also through encouragement of other reforms with consequences for foreign investors, including privatisation, financial market deregulation, domestic competition policies and commercial law. In general, there seems to be a stronger case that these reforms have been welfare-improving, though they have also had an effect on income distribution.
68. The rate of technological innovation and diffusion has accelerated dramatically. Modern research and development activities have, together with communications, enhanced both the importance of innovations for competition and their rapid spread to competitors throughout the global economic system. International production has become an important ingredient in corporate strategies, as oligopolistic corporations increasingly seek to maintain their position and market access through foreign direct investment, notably in countries with low wages.
69. The challenge is twofold. Firstly, we should identify how and to what extent the behaviour of multinational corporations affect international competition. Secondly, we should see whether there are areas where explicit competition rules are necessary to complement existing ones and ensure fair competition among enterprises, essential to the proper functioning of markets.
70. As with international trade, the transfer of activities abroad by multinational corporations has significant economic and political consequences. The fact that foreign direct investment and the internationalisation of production have taken place in a system of competitive nation-states raises political problems. It has opened the possibility for home countries to entice multinationals to meet certain national objectives. From a strictly economic point of view, this line of reasoning also explains why such a large part of today's global trade consists of the import and export of components and intermediate goods, rather than final products as would be expected from conventional trade theory.
71. Contrary to what some may think, the establishment of an open and multilateral world trade system is not ensured simply because of the creation of the World Trade Organisation. A formal institution can sometimes be more easily deadlocked by international conflict than a more informal arrangement such the WTO's predecessor GATT. The Assembly in this situation has called on the OECD to help lay the conceptual foundation for a strategy of worldwide trade liberalisation within the framework of the World Trade Organisation. In its previously referred to Resolution 1069 (1995), it encouraged the OECD to "explore and formulate issues (such as labour and social standards, human rights, protection of the environment, competition and investment) for subsequent negotiation in the World Trade Organisation and the Bretton Woods institutions".
X. TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
72. The debate about the place of human rights in trade pits those who believe that economic development must precede and will pave the way for human rights against those who say human rights is an absolute concept which must take precedence over any other considerations, including trade.
73. Your Rapporteurs strongly believe that the time has come to insist strongly on the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms as a condition for normal trade relations. The WTO is a unique tool for entering this concept into trade and investment negotiations, provided the more economically important among its members, including Council of Europe member states, overcome short-term, opportunist considerations in favour of longer-term and higher ideals. A balanced development strategy should be able to provide a fair distribution of wealth, including health, food, education, water and shelter, as well as "non-material" needs such as those for participation, identity and a sense of purpose. Such an approach, based on the protection of basic human needs and rights should be accepted as norms by the international community as a whole, including that which busies itself with development and trade issues.
XI. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
74. The general significance of trade for human prosperity is a complex matter. While trade clearly provides societies with access to products that would otherwise be unobtainable and permits specialisation in areas of production for which they are best suited, the impact of current world trade on the less developed countries (LDCs) is more complex.
75. Some LDCs exhibit worrying patterns of import dependence. The latter ranges from basic foodstuffs through a range of high-value goods and services, in which the advanced industrial countries (AICs) and a few newly industrialised countries retain effective oligopolies.
76. While several LDCs produce and export agricultural commodities, these are not commonly staple foodstuffs. The skewed pattern of agricultural production of many LDCs reflects historical influences and distorting governmental policies. Production for export in most LDCs harks back to the era of imperial control and remains oriented towards the requirements of the metropolitan economies.
77. The combination of a high measure of dependence on imports of basic foods and agricultural inputs, and a reliance on external sources for the supply of advanced industrial goods and services, condemns numerous LDCs to a position of serious structural weakness within the international economy. Too much that is vital for the basic survival of their populations, and too much that is necessary for economic growth and development, has to be supplied from outside. The requirements for foreign exchange that such dependencies create add to the demand for foreign earnings to satisfy the demand for luxuries by the elites of many LDCs.
78. Moreover, the strong decline in earnings received from exports of many primary commodities during the first half of the 1980s illustrated the excessive concentration by several LDCs on a few export commodities, and the resulting vulnerability to changing world conditions to which they were condemned. As a result, the financing of further development and imports of many basic resources suffered.
79. Sub-Saharan Africa has had a disappointing history in terms of intra-region trade and economic development. A primary obstacle to effective regionalisation within Africa has been the legacy of dependence on markets in advanced industrial countries and particularly those of former colonial masters. These North-South trade flows have effectively inhibited the emergence of South-South exchanges within the subcontinent. Many sub-Saharan African economies remain critically dependent on earnings of foreign currencies derived from the export of their primary products to markets outside the region.
80. Since trade preferences alter the incentives facing firms, the formation of a regional trading agreement - a phenomenon which has dramatically expanded over the past three years in various parts of the world - is likely to influence direct investment flows. Firms located in developing countries will have a strong incentive to locate new production facilities in countries belonging to such an agreement.
81. Such regional agreements could, however, have serious consequences for LDCs remaining outside. Plant closures will adversely affect their employment situation. The increase in competition within the free trade area will make investment outside the area less attractive.
82. The picture is one of substantial asymmetry in trade flows among countries. The World Trade Organisation should adopt measures which can reduce the vulnerability of LDCs vis-ŕ-vis advanced industrial countries. Along with NGOs and other international organisations, the WTO should develop an ongoing dialogue with LDCs with a view to reducing their structural weaknesses, eliminating distortions due to the colonial past, stabilising their trade relations and improving their access to northern markets.
83. To this end, the WTO is attempting to collaborate more actively and regularly with the International Trade Centre and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in order to assist developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, to integrate themselves into the multilateral trading system and to draw the maximum benefit from trade and investment opportunities.
84. Africa's external debt, especially the multilateral debt of heavily indebted poor countries, is a further complicating factor. Several international organisations, including the WTO, are working together to analyse the nature and extent of this problem on a country-by-country basis. Recent data suggest that the debt service burden can be successfully managed. For some countries this could happen if the international community continues to give strong support, including adequate concessional assistance, to countries that undertake serious social and economic reforms aimed at establishing an institutional as well as economic framework in which domestic and foreign entrepreneurs will have enough confidence to invest.
85. In the absence of such reforms which would move African economies toward a more balanced and self-sustaining growth, these countries would still require substantial external aid flows. In order to assist Africa in its effort to become a full participant in the international economic system, the Rapporteurs believe it is necessary to mobilise a portion of the International Monetary Fund's gold holdings (as suggested at the G-7 meeting in Lyon in June 1996) which could be matched by an equivalent amount coming from other international organisations and bilateral donors, with the aim of reducing Africa's external debt and supporting African countries as they strive to reform their economies.
XII. FUTURE CHALLENGES
86. With the completion and implementation of the Uruguay Round, the trade policy community must consolidate commitments made in the Round as well as looking ahead. The most immediate task is the ministerial meeting in Singapore in December 1996. It is hoped that this meeting will result in a decision to phase out all tariffs and non-tariff barriers by the year 2020, with the process beginning in 2005 once the Round's results are entirely implemented.
87. Further down the road lies the need for WTO members to develop consensus on an even more difficult group of trade issues, many of which challenge traditional concepts of sovereignty. The best road ahead is a constant, committed effort to continue to strengthen the multilateral trading system. This means that all the results of the Uruguay Round must be delivered in full.
88. New issues, such as labour standards, environment protection and competition should be examined in earnest. The developed world should adopt a more positive attitude towards the emerging dynamic economies. The latter, in Asia and elsewhere, present an opportunity rather than a threat, not least because their strong growth has a stimulating "pull" effect also on the economies of the industrialised countries.
89. Much of the WTO's credibility hinges on the successful operation of its dispute settlement mechanism. It is essential that all WTO members participate in good faith in solving disputes, and that they respect the results.
90. Regional trading arrangements should not be an obstacle to the WTO, but should supplement it. It would seem preferable simply to respect and bring forward WTO rules, rather than create "mega-agreements" between individual regional groupings, such as the European Union and NAFTA.
91. Globalisation, said WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero at a lecture at Harvard in 1995 is a "multiplicity of interlocking economic relationships among national economies", and a natural result of technological advances in communication and transport. The evidence of global integration, he continued, is clear in the way trade growth has outstripped production growth year after year - each 10 percent increase in world production has been associated with a 16 percent rise in world trade.
92. Cooperation may fail to materialise, but the underlying assumption is that joint gains can be realised from more extensive policy coordination as interdependence increases. This belief suggests a development theory of deep integration: as countries reach a certain stage of development and a certain level of economic integration within the world economy and policy convergence, then the demand for formal coordination increases. Interdependence has made a substantial contribution to rising incomes and peace among nations.
93. Among the challenges facing the WTO in coming years is its expansion from at present 119 members to large and economically important countries like China and Russia. China's membership is still far away. It will require fundamental changes in the way the country runs its foreign trade and its domestic economy in areas such as investment rules, market opening and intellectual property rights, Russia's membership in the WTO is likely to come sooner than China's, but the road ahead is difficult. In exchange for more stable trade relations, the country will have to abolish state subsidies for exports, reduce tariffs, open national markets, liberalise trade in goods and services and guarantee the respect of intellectual property rights.
94. Another challenge for the WTO is the "new protectionism", in particular in some industrialised countries where the fear is also spreading that jobs and wealth are rapidly being lost to emerging economies. Protectionist sentiment is strong in agriculture and textiles, but it is spreading to manufactures. What is feared by the WTO is a return to unilateral action by countries, bilateral agreements replacing multilateralism, and regional trade blocs which become increasingly protectionist. Presumably, though, the existence of the WTO as an official, permanent institution will be in a better position to prevent protectionism than intermittent Rounds.
95. Finally, the WTO will, in 1997, have to work in favour of worldwide acceptance of the by then presumably concluded Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), established within the OECD but open to all WTO members. This instrument will be very important in liberalising, protecting and establishing common rules for foreign direct investment, on which countries increasingly depend for their economic development.
96. Part of the debate on the organisation of the world economy centres around the compatibility of multilateral and regional forms of international organisation. Are regional trade agreements inherently discriminatory, or can they remain open and provide the basis for deeper multilateral integration? Several points are relevant to this controversy. The first is the growing interest of central and eastern European countries and less developed countries in multilateralism. Indeed, they are rapidly becoming its staunchest advocates. In November 1995 the Chinese authorities agreed to reduce tariffs on imports by at least 30 percent in 1996, to cut non-tariff barriers and to end quotas, licensing and other import control measures on about 170 tariff items.
97. As policy reforms take root and are consolidated, they will contribute to the emergence of new, international groupings linked by trade and investment. As trade grows, and the trade policies of some advanced industrial countries have become less predictable, the advanced developing countries have come to see the WTO as offering "protection against protection". However, even a well-institutionalised, rule-based regime with clear mechanisms for dispute settlement is no absolute guarantee against actions by powerful trading groupings or nations.
98. Nonetheless, the less developed nations have a solid and growing interest in increasing discipline over "grey area" measures, and in institutionalising stronger mechanisms for dispute settlement. So far governments are making use of the new dispute settlement system in a manner which demonstrates considerable faith in the WTO. In just nine months, around twenty cases have come before the Dispute Settlement Body, a number far greater than in any single year of GATT's 47-year existence.
99. The price to be paid for securing these benefits from the multilateral system would be the acceptance by the LDCs of an expanded policy agenda as advocated by the advanced industrial countries, in particular the United States. This agenda would include such areas as trade in financial services, movement of people, maritime transport services, basic telecommunications, further reductions in agricultural support and protection, competition policy and labour standards. The WTO will probably become a more important forum for negotiations involving developing countries and economies in transition as regards issues of deeper economic integration. The aim of the WTO is to have all the world's nations as members, and to have them adhere to the same multilateral system. The terms on which the transition economies will accede to the WTO must be such as to contribute to their reform process and help them realise the full potential of trading opportunities.
100. At present, most of the transition economies and other less developed areas of the world are facing the next stage of reform, which typically involves institutional changes that are more time-consuming and less well understood, such as building regulatory and enforcement capacity. Intellectual property rights provides an example. Much of the controversy between the United States and the developing countries on this issue centres not on the laws themselves, but on the judicial system and enforcement mechanism. In such settings even committed governments may face difficulties in complying with international agreements.
101. The WTO also faces problems in reaching agreement among its members on a number of issues. Thus, the United States is not party to a pact on financial services reached by all the others in 1995. Negotiations for a pact on standardising global telecommunications markets collapsed when the United States decided the offers on the table did not go far enough. And more recently an agreement on maritime services has been endangered for the same reason.
102. A further issue concerns the political sustainability of reforms, especially uncertainty about their consequences for social welfare. At its June 1996 meeting, the Committee discussed extensively labour standards and workers' rights, considering them critical for the fair distribution of benefits and social justice. It paid particular attention to problems related to employment contracts, social security, worker safety and occupational health. Many members strongly criticised countries which do not recognise international labour standards such as the rights to adequate wages and working conditions.
103. However, trade liberalisation has yet to bring the tangible, positive benefits for all, as promised by its advocates. Freer trade has so far failed to have significant effects on employment and living standards of the broad masses in many of the poorer countries, but has instead generated greater social and political instability. This situation casts serious doubt on free trade as being capable on its own to offer a solution to the majority of current economic problems. Governments, NGOs and international organisations should redefine the social obligations of business by placing greater emphasis on social, labour and environmental standards.
104. Mr Ruggiero told the Sub-Committee on Economic Relations at its meeting in Geneva in November 1995 that he sees the struggle for more open trade - based on a single multilateral system of rules and principles - as in large measure determining whether the world of the future will be one of peace and prosperity, or one of confrontation and continued, or worsening, poverty.
105. Economic integration hurts, not only in the traditionally well-to-do countries through industrial relocation and increased unemployment, but also in developing countries which are equally affected. However, we cannot turn back the clock, for if we isolate ourselves our countries will be outside the "knowledge loop" that increasingly governs the world's economic development, shunned by investors, excluded from new export markets and paying excessively for the products and services that we consume. We have to take the plunge into the unknown, for in locking ourselves into the known we would soon discover it is an impasse. The role of the WTO is to help the world community see clearer the road ahead. It deserves our wholehearted support in that mission.
Reporting committee: Committee on Economic Affairs and Development.
Budget implications for the Assembly: none.
Reference to committee: Doc. 7352 and Reference No. 2021 of 25 September 1995.
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 26 June 1996.
Members of the committee: Mr Davis (Chairman), MM. Pavlidis, Mrs Degn (Vice-Chairmen), Alo_lu (Alternate: Demiralp), Andreoli, Bársony (Alternate: Szalay), Behrendt, Belyaev, Benetatos (Alternate: Pavlidis), Bilinski (Alternate: Wielowieyski), Billing, Mrs Blattmann, MM. Bloetzer, Bogár, Mrs Burbiené, MM. Buzatu, Mrs Calner, MM. Cerqueda Gispert, Coviello, MM. Dokle, Mrs Durrieu, MM. Elo, Eyskens, Fenech, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Figel, Frey, Galváo Lucas, Gonzalez Laxe, Goop, Grimsson, Gusenbauer, Kamhi, Kirilov, Kirteins, Kolá_, La Loggia, Latronico, Le Grand, Leers, Liapis, Malinowski, Masliukov (Alternate: Shuba), Mautner-Markhof, Merkushov, Minkov, Muravschi, Novák, Pahor, Pereira Coelho, Poppe, Puche, Radulescu Botica, Rippinger, Siebert, Telgmaa, Townend (Alternate: Sir John Cope), Tripunovski, Tumanov (Alternate: Oorzhak), Valleix, Van der Maelen, Mrs Verspaget, MM. Wallace, Yaroshynsky.
N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: MM. Torbiörn and Bertozzi.
. by the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development