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<font size="3"><b>Implications for Europe of an economic and
monetary union</b></font>

<p align="left"><b>OPINION </b><a href="#Footnote1" name="Footref1"><b><sup>[1]</sup></b></a></p>

<p align="left"><b>Doc. 7731</b><br>
17 January 1996<b> </b> </p>

<p align="left"><b>Rapporteur: Mr Alfred GUSENBAUER, Austria,
Socialist Group</b></p>

<hr size="1">



<p align="left"><b>1. Inadequate social and economic perspective.</b>
</p>

    <p align="left">The project of introducing a single European
    currency is inherently both political and economic. If it
    fails economically it will fail politically. It will fail
    economically if it does not contribute to raising the living
    standards of all Europeans and including, in particular, of
    those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. The
    &quot;convergence criteria&quot; laid down in the Treaty of
    Maastricht for gauging whether an economy is
    &quot;healthy&quot; enough to participate in the EMU cover
    only<b> </b>short-term monetary and fiscal indicators. No
    criteria were included for employment, unemployment or the
    level and distribution of real earnings. It is these,
    however, which measure the success or failure of an economic
    system in providing for social welfare.</p>

<p align="left"><b>2. Anti-social consequences.</b> </p>

    <p align="left">A major reason for the increase in fiscal
    deficits has been the slowing of economic growth. A
    coordinated effort to reduce fiscal deficits in Europe at a
    time of extremely weak growth risks making the situation
    worse. It is essential therefore that the cure' does not
    increase the disease. It impossible to judge the economic and
    social costs and benefits of budgetary cuts without knowing
    where the cuts will fall. Although the Maastricht criteria do
    not prescribe what types of cuts states would have to adopt,
    experience shows a strong emphasis on cuts in the social
    field. Great caution is needed to ensure that such emphasis
    does not derive from the use of incomplete economic arguments
    to conceal essentially political motives. </p>
    <p align="left">As a result of excessive anti-social-welfare
    bias in the current EMU project, countries that are not
    members of the EU but wish to join may fear to increase their
    social welfare expenditure despite the fact that in many of
    these countries such expenditure is already very low, and the
    need for major increases is strongest. </p>
    <p align="left">This point was underlined in the recent
    (December 1996) opinion of the social affairs committee of
    the European Parliament: EMU should not be treated as an end
    in itself, justifying economic measures that reduce social
    welfare. </p>

<p align="left"><b>3. Economic &quot;stability&quot; versus
social welfare </b></p>

    <p align="left">The debate about the Stability Pact has shown
    that there are political forces which seek to increase,
    rather than diminish, the economic and social restrictiveness
    of the Maastricht criteria. On the other hand, there are
    opposing forces which are beginning to appreciate the dangers
    not only of the original criteria, but of the desire of some
    countries to increase their restrictiveness following the
    introduction of the euro. It must be recognised that a single
    currency combined with powerful restrictions on fiscal policy
    would leave national governments with few instruments for
    macroeconomic adjustment. Some constraint on fiscal
    irresponsibility is needed, but there is sufficient
    international heterogeneity remaining in the European economy
    that unless governments retain a reasonable degree of freedom
    to use fiscal policy to offset shocks, the social, economic
    and political consequences could be grave. </p>

<p align="left"><b>4. The European Central Bank</b> </p>

    <p align="left">In consequence of the situation described
    above, the ECB will be the key macroeconomic policy
    institution of the European economy. It is therefore
    essential that its current mandate, which covers only the
    target of price stability, be amended to recognise that low
    or moderate rates of inflation are desirable as means to the
    much more fundamental ends of economic growth, adequate
    employment opportunities, rising living standards and reduced
    inequality. While retaining a degree of short-term
    operational independence, the ECB should be made accountable
    to democratic institutions including the European Parliament.
    In such accounting, the performance of the ECB should be
    judged, <i>inter alia</i>, by the performance of the real
    European economy. </p>

<p align="left"><b>5. The Exchange Rate Mechanism</b> </p>

    <p align="left">The relationship between the participating
    and non-participating countries will determine whether EMU is
    a project to further or to disrupt European integration. The
    revival of the ERM can meet that challenge if it takes into
    account integrationist solutions such as a symmetric
    relationship between the countries. The ERM also needs to be
    accompanied by measures against speculative eruption of
    financial markets in order to re-orient them more strongly
    towards long term investment.</p>

<p align="left"><b>6. Social action - unemployment</b> </p>

    <p align="left">Attempts to reduce both open and disguised
    unemployment have had a low profile in the EU compared with
    efforts to continue the process towards EMU. However, the
    White Paper on Growth, competitiveness and employment', the
    decisions of the Essen Summit of 1994 and the declarations
    made at the opening of the IGC in Turin in 1996 indicate a
    growing awareness of the problem. Nevertheless if the EU is
    to take fighting unemployment and under-employment seriously
    there is urgent need for common institutions based on
    EU-treaty regulations to elaborate and implement
    macroeconomic policies. Only a combined effort, using a range
    of economic policy instruments, will be able to meet the
    challenges which are the main concern of the majority of
    citizens today. </p>
    <ol type="a" start="1">
        <li><p align="left">Monetary policy must be the servant,
            not the master, of the objectives of economic growth,
            growth of employment and growth of real living
            standards for all the people. </p>
        </li>
        <li><p align="left">New initiatives in fiscal policy are
            required to efficiently promote an equitable social
            distribution of economic welfare. </p>
        </li>
        <li><p align="left">Any automatic form of stability pact
            should be avoided. </p>
        </li>
    </ol>

<p align="left"><b>7. Fiscal policy</b> </p>

    <p align="left">It should be recognised that the EU will have
    to aim at some degree of harmonization of fiscal policy, for
    example in ecological taxation or in measures to avoid
    serious distortion of competition, without losing sight of
    the principle of subsidiarity, which latter, in the fiscal
    sphere, implies that there is no harm in intra-regional
    differences in tax or expenditure patterns provided these do
    not lead to major distortions or problems of enforcement. </p>

<p align="left"><b>8. Other areas for social action - information
and training </b></p>

    <p align="left">It is necessary to ensure that those members
    of society (whether employees, independent workers or
    non-employed) who are least advantaged economically and
    socially are not required to experience excessive adverse
    movements of relative social and economic welfare as the cost
    of adapting to the new monetary system. We must not
    underestimate the effort that needs to be made to inform and
    re-educate the public, in particular old people and small
    businesses. </p>
    <p align="left">The public image of the EU will depend in
    part on the success of the transition to the Euro. There is a
    risk that the European currency will become a focus for the
    discontent of the public concerning the growing gap, already
    perceived in some quarters, between the ordinary people and
    the �lite. There could be a danger of increased support for
    extremism and politically dysfunctional forms of populism.</p>

<p align="left"><b>9. Conclusion</b> </p>

    <p align="left">In short, it seems that Europe is becoming
    integrated faster in political and financial terms than in
    socio-economic terms. It must be devoutly hoped that the EMU
    will cause economic growth in Europe to recover to a rate
    sufficient to provide adequate employment opportunities at
    satisfactory levels, and with satisfactory distribution of
    real earnings. If not, it will provide benefit, if at all, to
    only a small part of the population. In that event it would
    represent a failure of the economic and social system as
    whole. </p>
    <p align="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<i>The Rapporteur
    would like to thank Professor Robin Marris and Mr Stephen
    Marris for their contribution to the preparation and
    discussion of this opinion.</i> </p>

<p align="left"><b></b>&nbsp;<b>Proposed amendments to the draft resolution in
Doc. 7711:</b></p>

    <p align="left">Add a new first sub-paragraph 4 (i):</p>
    
        <p align="left"><i>&quot;to ensure democratic
        accountability of the European Central Bank;&quot;</i></p>
    </blockquote>
    <p align="left">Add a fourth sub-paragraph 4 (iv) </p>
    
        <p align="left"><i>&quot;to ensure that EMU serves not
        only political but also economic and social goals of
        which the most fundamental are economic growth,
        employment and rising living standards for all the
        people&quot;.</i> </p>
    </blockquote>

<hr size="1">

<p align="left">Reporting committee: Committee on Economic
Affairs and Development (Doc. 7711)</p>

<p align="left">Committee for opinion: Social, Health and Family
Affairs Committee </p>

<p align="left">Reference to committee: Order No. 481 (1992) and
Reference No. 2137 of 6 November 1996</p>

<p align="left">Opinion approved by the committee on 7 January
1997</p>

<p align="left">Secretaries to the committee: Ms Coin and Ms
Meunier </p>

<hr size="1">

<p align="left"><a href="#Footref1" name="Footnote1">[1]<i> </i></a><i>by
the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee </i></p>
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