Implementation of the Dayton Agreement for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina

REPORT(1)

Doc. 7733
22 January 1997

Rapporteurs: Mr. Peter BLOETZER, Switzerland, Group of the European People's Party
and Mr. René VAN DER LINDEN, Netherlands, Group of the European People's Party)

Summary:

The elections of 14 September 1996 have opened the way for the setting-up of common political structures for the three constituent peoples and the two autonomous entities - the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To assess progress following the elections, the Political Affairs Committee sent delegations to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 16 and 17 December 1996. One purpose was to assess the impact of current disturbances in Belgrade on prospects for the implementation of the Agreement.

The draft resolution expresses condemnation of interference with the outcome of local elections in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The state of democracy in neighbouring countries to Bosnia-Herzegovina will be decisive for the success of the Agreement. The performance of the media in these countries will be a significant factor for the forthcoming municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The draft resolution calls for more enlightened policies towards the media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. It notes serious allegations made against the Croatian Republic in regard to its policies and actions in Mostar and the Mostar region. It calls for these allegations to be immediately examined under the Assembly's monitoring procedure. It calls for a stronger mandate and additional resources for the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pending the possibility of progress with Bosnia-Herzegovina's application for membership of the Council of Europe (10 April 1995), the question of a special relationship between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Council of Europe should be studied.

I. Draft resolution

1.The Assembly welcomes the holding of the elections of 14 September 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have opened the way for the setting-up of common political structures for the three constituent peoples and the two autonomous entities - the "Republika Srpska" and the Bosno-Croat "Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina". The Constitution in Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement can thus come into effect.

2.The next step will be municipal elections. These should be held in 1997, if possible within the next six months. They will open the way for further progress in the setting-up of joint political structures.

3.The conduct of municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina - and, in particular, the possibility for peaceful transfers of local authority following these elections - will be influenced by the security atmosphere which prevails during the election campaign and on polling-day, and also by the respect shown for election outcomes in neighbouring states, notably at municipal level in Zagreb and Belgrade and throughout Serbia.

4.The Assembly re-affirms its view that democracy and the rule of law and respect for international law in the neighbouring states of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are vital to stability in the region. It condemns all policies, actions and omissions to act by the Governments of these states which undermine or put at risk the restoration of an independent sovereign democratic State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as provided for by the Washington and Dayton Agreements of 1995.

5.The Assembly deplores the annulment of election results in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the effect of cancelling opposition victories in the second round of local elections held on 17 November 1996. The Assembly proclaims its solidarity with those who are persistently, peacefully and courageously demonstrating against this manipulation, in Belgrade and in other parts of Serbia. Respect for the integrity of the election process is part of the rule of law. It is the cornerstone of democracy and political pluralism.

6.The Assembly deplores the lack of coverage given to these demonstrations by the state-dominated media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It condemns without reserve the pressure exerted on the independent media in Belgrade, notably Radio B.92. The Assembly deplores equally, in Croatia, the continuing uncertainty of the attribution of a frequency concession to Radio 101 (Zagreb).

7.Experience of the elections held in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 14 September 1996 shows that the state-dominated media in Belgrade and Zagreb, whose programmes reach the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be a significant factor in the campaigns of the political parties and have an important influence on the general security atmosphere for the municipal elections in 1997.

8.The time has come for the governments and the broadcasting authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb to determine and announce clear policies and guidelines for media coverage of events and issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9.The Assembly notes the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference for Bosnia-Herzegovina (London, 4 and 5 December 1996). The Assembly welcomes the continuation of a NATO-led stabilisation force (SFOR) for a period of 18 months; the continuation of the mandate of the High Representative, with stronger co-ordination structures, notably for reconstruction; the forthcoming International Donor Conference, and the enhanced prospects for rehabilitation and reconstruction in 1997.

10.The Assembly regrets the lack of progress on all other fronts: free movement between the entities, respect for human rights, transfer of indicted persons to the War Crimes Tribunal, returns of refugees and displaced persons to their former places of residence, an agreed regulatory framework for the media, arbitration on the Brcko area, and allegations of police misconduct and of the continued interference of Croatia in the Mostar region.

11.In the light of this lack of progress, and excepting programmes of humanitarian aid and poverty relief, the Assembly calls for the implementation of reconstruction programmes to be made conditional on the compliance of the authorities of the Republika Srpska and the Federation, as also of the central Government, with their obligations under the Washington and Dayton Agreements.

12.The Assembly resolves:

  1. to call for a stronger mandate and additional resources for the Office of the High Representative (further to Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement), with authority to apply the principle of conditionality, as indicated above, and with powers to recommend to the appropriate state authority the disqualification or dismissal of persons who obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, notably at local and cantonal levels, and to place restrictions on their possibilities of international travel;

  2. to call on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to accept the conclusions reached by the OSCE Mission, led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, which visited Belgrade 20-21 December 1996 at the invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and thus accept the election victories of the Zajedno coalition candidates in thirteen municipalities of Serbia and Belgrade;

  3. subject to a satisfactory outcome to the current political crisis as recommended by the OSCE mission, to continue dialogue with the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the question of implementation of the Dayton Agreement;

  4. to explore the question of special relations between the Council of Europe and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to examine the question of special guest status for the Parliament of the central state of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the earliest opportunity;

  5. to examine immediately, under its monitoring procedure, the allegations made by the authorities in Sarajevo about the policies and actions of the Croatian Republic in Mostar and the Mostar region.

II. Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteurs

A. Background

As further explained in Annex A, a delegation of the Committee visited Belgrade and Sarajevo 16-17 December 1996. The delegation was as follows:

The agenda of the delegation was:

This agenda was pursued through the following programme:(2)

Monday 16 December

09 h 30    Zurich-Dubendorf military airport for departure to Belgrade

11 h 30    Discussion with President Minic (Chamber of Citizens), President of the Federal Assembly

13 h 00    Working lunch with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jovanovic

14 h 30    Welcome by Mr Djindjic and Mrs Pesic and discussion at Zajedno headquarters with leaders of the opposition coalition:

17 h 00    Departure of Mr Bloetzer and Mr Hartland from Belgrade to Sarajevo

[check-in Hotel Bosnia]

18 h 30    Working dinner hosted by Swiss Ambassador Christian Hauswirth for contacts with leading political personalities in Sarajevo [Senior Deputy High Representative Steiner, Senior Deputy Head of OSCE Mission (Democratisation & Human Rights) etc. - see Annex A]

Tuesday 17 December

09 h 30    Meeting with BH Human Rights Ombudsperson Gret Haller and FBH Ombudspersons Esad Muhibic and Branka Raguz

10 h 00    BH Foreign Minister Prlic

10 h 45    President of FBH House of Representatives Konjicija
                President of FBH House of Peoples Ljubic

11 h 30    BH Presidency: Minister Rizvanbegovic (on behalf of President Izetbegovic)
                Foreign Affairs Adviser Hajric

12 h 00    Outgoing RBH Prime Minister Muratovic

13 h 00    BH Council of Ministers Co-Chairman Silajdzic

14 h 30    RS National Assembly President Kalinic
                RS National Assembly Vice-President Vjestica

on flight Split-Vienna the following morning

OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador Robert Frowick

 

The draft resolution has been prepared on the basis of an assessment of the following statements and representations made to the Rapporteurs in these discussions.

B. Analysis

Mr Milomir MINIC, President of the Chamber of Citizens, President of the Federal Assembly

Mr Zivadin JOVANOVIC, Deputy Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

Policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was to support implementation of the Dayton Agreement. There were 700 000 refugees in FRY as a result of the war. They were not all of the same ethnic background. But all were treated on an equal basis, without discrimination, and could choose where they lived.

Economic reconstruction, leading to the creation of jobs, was the key to restoring links between the two BH entities and to the normalisation of BH-FRY relations. As provided for in the Dayton Agreement, the two entities must be treated on an equal basis.

It was an over-simplification to present the situation in Serbia as "annulment" of local elections by President Milosevic. The European Union was wrong. It was time to remove the "outer wall" of sanctions.

The practice of holding elections was well-established. The first multi-party elections were held in 1990. Federal elections were held in June 1992. Presidential, federal, Serbian republic and local elections were held in December 1993. Federal, Montenegrin republic, regional (Voivodina) and local elections had just been held on 3 and 17 November 1996. Serbian republic elections would be held in 1997.

For the elections held on 3 November 1996, there had been a 60% turn-out of the 7,6 million electorate. Ten parties had won seats in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly. There were 138 seats in this Chamber: 108 elected from 29 electoral districts in Serbia, and 30 from 7 electoral districts in Montenegro.

The Left Coalition - supporting Slobodan Milosevic, and consisting of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Yugoslav Left (JUL) and New Democracy (ND) - had won 64 seats, with 1.85 million of the 4.6 million votes. Other seats were distributed as follows:

Following a second round of voting for local elections on 17 November 1996, of 189 municipalities 154 were won by the SPS and 35 by opposition parties (including the Sandzak and Voivodina).

Complaints following this second round had been lodged not only by "Zajedno" but by the SPS. On rulings by election commissions, 3.9% of the elections had been annulled with a view to having them re-run. This was roughly the same percentage of annulments as for previous elections. The rules were the same as for all elections since 1991. "Zajedno" had accepted these rules, and had broken them by declaring premature victories.

A solution should be found on the basis of the OSCE Mission which President Milosevic was inviting, and also on the basis of a proposal by the Serbian Parliament for a "round table" to discuss disputes about voting, the financing of political parties and the media.

Meanwhile, the "Zajedno" Coalition had refused to attend the constitutive session of the Chamber of Citizens on 10 December 1996, and was continuing its boycott. This was not in the interests of the citizens of the Federal Republic, nor good for the stability of the State. Issues arising from elections should be discussed and resolved in Parliament.

The Federal Assembly would welcome the opportunity of restoring its relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. A renewal of its participation in debates on implementation of the Dayton Agreement, to which the FRY was party, might prepare the way for renewal of "special guest status". It was understood that this would mean a multi-party delegation reflecting the plurality of opinions in the Federal Assembly and thus including representative(s) of "Zajedno".

However, the unresolved question of "continuity" in the status of FRY following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992 meant that in present circumstances no application would be made to Strasbourg on behalf of the Federal Assembly.

"ZAJEDNO Coalition"

The demonstrations were in no way a call for revolution. The call was for the peaceful and regular transfer of local power in specific municipalities following democratic elections. A re-run of 17 November second round voting was unacceptable.

The boycott of the Federal Assembly was justified. Taking their seats as Federal deputies would not improve their access to the media. It would not mean any greater public understanding of their case.

The probable implications of the boycott for the presence of a Federal Assembly delegation at the next part-session in Strasbourg were accepted.

For its part, Europe must understand that the issue of the outcome of the local elections was of great symbolic importance. The question was whether the FRY was ever likely to move under its present leadership from a monolithic to a pluralist structure for the exercise of power.

If not, the political process in FRY was outside the frame of international standards of democracy, and in violation of international principles of human rights. The whole system was illegal.

The test of a dictatorship was quite simply whether or not power was peacefully transferred following an election.

An OSCE inquiry would be welcome, if the Mission stayed long enough and had access to the data. On these conditions, "Zajedno" would be confident as to the outcome of international arbitration and would accept it.

BH Human Rights Ombudsperson Gret HALLER

FBH Ombudspersons Esad MUHIBIC & Branka RAGUZ

The situation was equally bad throughout the Federation irrespective of ethnic backgrounds. At local level, evictions were continuing and returns were being blocked. This was with the connivance of those who had come to power as a result of the war and who had close connections with the military command centres and the power structures of the nationalist political parties. These parties had an interest in the continuing absence of democratic structures at local level. In regard to the mediation of authority from centre to periphery, appointed ministers were mere figure-heads. Power lay within the party bureaucracies. They controlled 90% of the flow of economic aid.

Human rights had never been more restricted than today. Often it was the legally constituted police which was blocking freedom of movement. The situation could not be adequately observed from Sarajevo and from Mostar.

The crucial issue was the conduct of the Federation police. Harassment, intimidation, violence and evictions were often the deeds of men in masks (but nonetheless recognizable), or claiming to be from the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The Property Commission had only just started three weeks ago.

Europe should make the return of refugees and displaced persons its first priority. IPTF needed a stronger mandate, and both IPTF and SFOR needed mandates which would enable them to work together.

It remained to be seen whether democracy could be effectively introduced in a disordered and unstructured society, which was for the most part being governed at local level with blatant disrespect for human rights.

BH Foreign Minister Jadranko PRLIC

Without normalisation of relations between Croatia and the FRY, and without constructive policies from Zagreb and Belgrade, progress in implementation of the Dayton Agreement would be impossible. Events in Belgrade showed why there was as yet no full normalisation of relations with Sarajevo.

With 50 000 foreign soldiers and 2000 foreign police on its territory, it was fully realized how distant Bosnia-Herzegovina was from membership of the Council of Europe. The relationship, as it stood, with the Council of Europe was appreciated and should be developed.

"Conditionality" in the implementation of aid and reconstruction programmes might imply a greater degree of coordination between 13 international organisations than it was realistic to expect. The World Bank was already giving signals to this effect.

In conditions of such poverty and distress, economic pressure would increase ethnic nationalism.

Economic growth (from a desperately low level) had already been achieved in the Federation. This was a positive factor for multi-ethnic aspirations. But how could this message be diffused without effective nation-wide media ?

It was still uncertain whether, that afternoon, the BH House of Representatives would be able to convene to approve the appointment of the Government. A number of draft laws were already prepared for discussion and adoption, including one for a single financial system for the whole country.

The municipal elections should not be further postponed. There had always been a high degree of devolution of power to municipalities ("opstinas").

President of FBH House of Representatives Abdulah KONJICIJA

President of FHB House of PeoplesMariofil LJUBIC

Progress was far too slow for the return of refugees and displaced persons (2.1 million). There was no progress at all in the arbitration over Brcko. There were draft laws which had been ready three months ago and were still not adopted. The issue of the alignment of the Constitutions of the two entities with the "Dayton" Constitution had not been resolved. The media were still operating in the way which had led to the outbreak of war.

Minister of Culture (representing BH President Izetbegovic) Fahrudin RIZVANBEGOVIC President's Foreign & International Relations Adviser Mirza HAJRIC

The traditional values of society in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be restored. The return of refugees and displaced persons to their former homes was essential. The inaugural session of the BH House of Representatives had been held in the National Theatre on 5 October 1996, but without Republika Srpska representatives. However, they were expected to attend the session that afternoon.

Stress was laid on the negative aspects of the role and presence of the international community.

Outgoing RBH Prime Minister Hasan MURATOVIC (now Foreign Trade Minister)

One should look beyond "Dayton" to the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into European structures. Much bitterness had been created by the admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe. This move was incomprehensible, considering Croatia's record on human rights and the performance of the State- and HDZ-controlled media.

Throughout the war the BH Government had defended a multi-ethnic multi-religious concept of society. Membership of the Council of Europe would symbolize Europe's recognition of this. BH must not be left as an island, without the opportunity to present its case in the Council of Europe alongside Croatia and perhaps soon the FRY.

Membership of the Council of Europe would help to advance free movement between the entities. BH could not at present exert its authority equally throughout its territory. "Conditionality" in the implementation of aid and reconstruction programmes was correct. Economic pressure would be effective on the Republika Srpska. With half the territory and its population much reduced by expulsions (down to below 800 000), capital was badly needed to revive the RS economy.

There were four major problems with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement:

Current events in the FRY might be a positive factor if they led to any genuine democratisation. But the leadership of the demonstrations was divided. It included the ultra-nationalist friends of Karadzic. Protest against Milosevic was the common factor.

The Republika Srpska supported the opposition. The influence of Belgrade had greatly declined. The major change was that the RS now realized the need for a relationship with the FBH. Though wanting maximum autonomy within BH, it was recognized - as a matter of policy, probably - that BH would give a better frame than any "special parallel relationship" with Serbia, within which to revive the RS economy and protect its interests. If RS came under the influence of Belgrade, many of its current leaders would be ousted.

Milosevic was likely to remain in power. Although his party might lose votes in elections in particular areas, in any presidential election he would most likely win.

Meanwhile, normalisation of FRY/BH relations was delayed.

BH Council of Ministers Co-Chairman Haris SILAJDZIC

Perhaps "Dayton" was not the right approach - not if one of its implications was admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe. It had taken 300 000 dead for Belgrade to realize its policy was wrong. There was not much difference between Belgrade and Zagreb. Croatian police were operating on BH territory. No mention of this had been made at the London Conference. Croatia was not acting as a friendly State, nor as a constructive partner in the implementation of "Dayton". Beyond disrespect for the international frontiers of a neighbouring State, it had virtually annexed part of BH territory.

1997 would be a turning-point. A European frame was essential to provide for the integration of the Republika Srpska. BH should be treated as a special case and should become a Member State of the Council of Europe as soon as possible. The Republika Srpska could not contest the validity of the current application. International recognition had been accorded to the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RBH) at the time the application was made. The "Dayton" Constitution could not be cited to contest this. No-one could challenge BH's recognition as a State with a single international personality, with entity and cantonal "governments" operating at lower levels.

Current events in Belgrade might weaken Milosevic. It was a cause of concern that Bosnia-Herzegovina was never mentioned in his speeches. FRY had suffered quite unexpectedly from the war, with the need to accommodate 700 000 refugees. But part of the protest in Belgrade was lament for the non-achievement of "Greater Serbia". Djindjic was still calling for integration of the Republika Srpska in FRY/Serbia.

One day Belgrade would have to make an apology for what had been done to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The people of Serbia were slowly beginning to understand that there had been a policy of genocide.

Hope lay in the fact that the FRY must realize that its social problems were increasing. They could not be surmounted without radical reform. Thousands of jobs in large State-owned industrial concerns were at risk. The mode of functioning of the economy had to change.

Hope lay, too, in that Croatia would change in the post-Tudjman era.

RS National Assembly President Dragan KALINIC

RS National Assembly Vice-President Miroslav VJESTICA

Priority was to end the isolation of Republika Srpska. Policy was to cooperate in implementation of the Dayton Agreement in both its aspects, military and civil.

However remote from the ambitions of either side four years ago, "Dayton" was at least some kind of solution. It gave the Republika Srpska its own territory, flag, currency, army, police and citizenship, and the possibility of a "special parallel relationship" with a neighbouring State.

Policy in the longer term was not to seek independence but maximum autonomy within BH and equality of treatment and status in respect of the other entity (FBH). This must include locations for the sessions of the BH institutions. Because of the Croatian and Islamic dimensions to the functioning of the Federation, no interference from Sarajevo in RS affairs could be accepted.

There was no reason to change the mandate of SFOR. But if "Dayton" meant equality in disarmament, why was there a special United States re-armament programme for the FBH ("train and equip") outside the Dayton framework ? War might yet break out again in spring 1997. If so, the RS army, which was professional and non-ideological, was strong enough to repel Muslim attacks.

There was gross inequality of treatment between the entities for economic reconstruction. Only 2% of total investment was allocated to RS. Former RBH Prime Minister Muratovic said he was proud of this. But continued poverty meant social instability, which led to political extremism. Also, it was wrong to punish ordinary people because of their governments. Moreover, there were many more RS persons indicted for war crimes in The Hague than from the Federation. "Conditionality" could not be the right policy for the international community.

The return of refugees and displaced persons should be in two phases: first, to their current ethnic majority areas; then, if they wished, to where they lived before the war. 80% of refugees in RS would probably not want to return to live in the Federation, and most probably would not be allowed to do so by the Croats. They would not be prevented by RS authorities from seeking to do so. There should be compensation for loss of property, as foreseen by the Dayton Agreement. There should be no attempt to impose by force returns to localities near the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and in the Zone of Separation. For the time being, this Zone should be administered under international authority. There would otherwise be a permanent state of tension.

It was essential that there be an acceptable outcome to arbitration over Brcko. There could be no question of separating - or limiting access between - the western and eastern parts of the Republika Srpska.

Relations with neighbouring countries were an important factor for implementation of "Dayton".

Relations with Croatia might be less problematic in the post-Tudjman era. Meanwhile, if trouble broke out in East Slavonia and led to an exodus of ethnic Serbs, they would not find shelter in Serbia but would come to the Republika Srpska, which already had 300 000 refugees (making a total population of 1.3 million). The attitude of the international community towards the human rights of ethnic Serbs living in Croatia immediately before and during the war was inexplicable.

Stability in the FRY was essential. But stability meant democratisation and transformation of the economic system. The Republika Srpska wished to develop a liberal capitalist economy. The FRY was still neo-communist. There was no question of rapprochement with the FRY. Moreover, Milosevic had introduced economic sanctions against the RS, which had thus been doubly penalized. There had been a blockade on virtually all imports. Milosevic had played a game against his own people. However, there was no spirit of revenge in Republika Srpska. The problem of governing Serbia was immense, with its population of 10 million including three substantial ethnic minority populations with aspirations to self-determination.

There were 18 Bosniac Muslim members from the FBH in the RS National Assembly. They had left the inaugural session because they did not want to take the oath in the form it which was acceptable to the other members. But this problem was close to a solution. It was not related to the refusal of RS members to attend sessions of the BH House of Representatives until the principle of periodic sittings outside Sarajevo had been accepted.

Ambassador Robert FROWICKHead of OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina

Chairman of the Provisional Election Commission

In all aspects of implementation of the Dayton Agreement other than institution-building, there had been no essential change in the situation since the 14 September 1996 elections. "Conditionality" was the right approach in the implementation of reconstruction programmes. The High Representative's authority and resources should be strengthened. The behaviour of neighbouring countries was a key factor of stability or instability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus for implementing the Agreement. Hence the potential significance of what was happening in Belgrade, and the need for close monitoring of Croatia's relationship to the Federation.

Preparations for the municipal elections were well under way. Some shortcomings in the preparation of the 14 September 1996 elections would be avoided. They would be held under international supervision and monitoring. There should be a stronger role and more resources for the IPTF.

C. CONCLUDING REMARK

The purpose of this unusually detailed account of our impressions of the main points arising in our exchanges in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Pale is to show the differing perspectives on the Dayton Agreement and its implementation (and some of the elements of assessment which are cited in justification of these perspectives) both within and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, within Sarajevo itself and between Sarajevo and Pale.

It was on the basis of these impressions and the foregoing analysis that a preliminary draft resolution was presented to the Committee at its meeting in Paris on 13 January 1997. The Draft Resolution in the present document is virtually unchanged - except for an amendment now incorporated in paragraph 6.

ANNEXES

A. Oral report on behalf of Mr. Bloetzer to the Committee
London 18 December 1996

B. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina
London 4-5 December 1996

C. Report and conclusions of OSCE mission led by Mr Felipe Gonzales
Belgrade 20-21 December 1996

D. Response by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
3 January 1997

E. Conclusions of the OSCE Chairmanship
3 January 1997

F. Radio 101, Zagreb
[cf. paragraph 6 of the Preliminary Draft Resolution]

G. Recommendations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Delegation following observation of the 3 November 1996 elections

H. Statement by FBH President Zubak on the structure of the Federation entity
(AFP report 9 January 1997)

ANNEX A

Political Affairs Committee, London 18 December 1996
Statement made on behalf of Mr Bloetzer, Co-Rapporteur

 

"The background to our mission was set by the Peace Implementation Conference held in London 4-5 December 1996. The Rapporteurs considered they should present some observations to the Committee on the conclusions of the Conference. Accordingly, they planned a fact-finding mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) in the second week of January 1997.

Then came the events in Belgrade (on which the Chairman has commented), together with the reminder from High Representative Carl Bildt that the future of BH depended much on developments, policies and actions in neighbouring countries.

President Fischer asked the Rapporteurs to advance the dates of the mission in order to report to the Committee at its present meeting. They agreed to this, though knowing that Co-Rapporteur van der Linden would not be able to accompany Mr Bloetzer to Sarajevo, and that the latter would be unable to stay in London beyond late afternoon.

Fog in Sarajevo yesterday caused us to travel to Mostar last night, and then this morning to Split, where the earliest flight could only leave us in Vienna by midday. Although this has made it impossible for Mr Bloetzer to be present now, it gave him the opportunity to speak with Ambassador Robert Frowick, Head of the OSCE Mission in BH and Chairman of the Provisional Election Commission.

The brief analysis and conclusions which Mr Bloetzer wants to have put at this meeting to the Committee were confirmed by his exchanges with Ambassador Frowick. Ambassador Frowick would moreover welcome an opportunity to contribute to the Assembly's debate next January, if the Committee and the Bureau should think it appropriate to extend an invitation.

Two themes were raised by Mr Bloetzer in all the discussions. First, the impact on BH of events and policies in neighbouring countries. Secondly, "conditionality" - that is, the concept written into the conclusions of the London Conference that aid (except humanitarian and poverty relief) should be made conditional on progress by the BH political leaderships in meeting their obligations under the Dayton Agreements.

At a working dinner hosted by the Swiss Ambassador on Monday evening, Mr Bloetzer spoke with the Senior Deputy High Representative, Ambassador Michael Steiner, and with representatives of the World Bank, of the Provisional Election Commission (which has the task of organizing municipal elections in 1997), of UNHCR, of ICRC and with BH Human Rights Ombudsperson, Ambassador Gret Haller.

The following morning Ambassador Haller organized a meeting with two of the three Federation (FBH) Ombudspersons who are operating under the Washington Agreement. They gave disturbing reports of the situation which persists locally throughout the Federation "entity" of police toleration of harassment, eviction and obstruction of those seeking to return to their former homes.

We then saw BH Foreign Minister Prlic; outgoing BH Republic Prime Minister Muratovic; newly-appointed Co-Chairman of the Council of Ministers (and former

Presidential candidate) Silajdzic; the Minister of Culture and the Foreign Policer Adviser of President Izetbegovic; the Presidents of the FBH House of Representatives and House of Peoples, and the President and Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska (RS).

Both parliamentary leaderships - at the level of the FBH and RS "entities" - would welcome the opportunity to take part in a special enlarged hearing of our Committee, at the next or a subsequent part-session, on the functioning of the BH joint political and parliamentary institutions.

However, to our dismay, no contact was possible with the BH House of Representatives itself. Its constituent meeting had still not taken place. It was scheduled for that same afternoon, Tuesday 17 December, for the fundamental purppose of approving the composition of the BH Council of Ministers. But there was doubt whether the RS elected representatives would agree to attend. The issue causing this uncertainty was whether the House would hold meetings not only in FBH but also RS. The latter was claiming that recognition by FBH of its equal status as an "entity" under the Dayton Constitution was at stake.

The great achievement represented by the holding of the September 14 elections was to make it possible for joint FBH/RS institutions to be set up. The BH Presidency is now meeting. However, from the continued lack of consensus on the setting-up of the joint Parliament and his talks with political leaders and personalities of the international community, Mr Bloetzer concludes that little else has changed - nothing in terms of freedom of movement, nor of human rights, nor of media performance and its State control, nor of returns of refugees and displaced persons, nor of the transfer of indicted war criminals to The Hague, nor for the situation in Brcko.

The Rapporteurs will present a draft resolution to the Committee on 13 January 1997. Its five main elements would be: to welcome the establishment of the stabilisation force S-FOR, to succeed IFOR; to call for the strengthening of the International Police Task Force (IPTF); to urge that the municipal elections be held as soon as possible; to welcome a stronger mandate for the High Representative to apply "conditionality" (except for humanitarian aid and poverty relief), with agreed powers of dismissal or disqualification of officials and politicians at local and cantonal levels; to call for moves towards a balanced relationship between the Council of Europe and the signatories of the Dayton Agreements:

ANNEX B (FR)

Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina
London 4-5 December 1996

ANNEX C (FR)

Report and conclusions of OSCE mission led by Mr Felipe Gonzales
Belgrade 20-21 December 1996

ANNEX D

Response by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
3 January 1997

ANNEX E

Conclusions of the OSCE Chairmanship
3 January 1997

ANNEX F (FR)

Radio 101, Zagreb
[cf. paragraph 6 of the Preliminary Draft Resolution]

ANNEX G (FR)

Recommendations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Delegation
following observation of the 3 November 1996 elections

ANNEX H

Statement by FBH President Zubak
on the structure of the Federation entity

(AFP report 9 January 1997)

 

9 January Bosnian Federation Mr Zubak: Herceg-Bosna still exists

ZAGREB, 9 January 1997 (AFP) - The President of the Croato-Muslim Federation of Bosnia, the Croat Kresimir Zubak, reasserted this week the existence of Herceg-Bosna, denying that he had announced that this Croatian separatist entity, regarded as an obstacle to peace, had disappeared.

In a letter to the senior civilian Representative in Bosnia, Mr Carl Bildt, dated 19 December 1996, Mr Zubak had said that the Government and Ministries of Herceg-Bosna had ceased to function as of that date.

This declaration had been interpreted at the time as the official announcement of the disappearance of this maverick entity, whose disbandment had been repeatedly demanded by Washington.

In an interview published this week by the Croatian weekly "Horizont", Mr Zubak said that he had read articles in the press published in Sarajevo "expressing doubts" as to whether the entity had actually been disbanded.

"Some of these analyses are correct, in particular those stating that I have not declared that the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna has ceased to exist. What I did say is that the Ministries and Government of Herceg-Bosna had ceased to exist," declared Mr Zubak, who is also President of this Croatian mini-state, unilaterally declared in 1993, at the height of the war between Croats and Muslims in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"Why didn't I say that the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna had ceased to exist? Because no formal and legal decision had been taken to that effect," Mr Zubak told "Horizont," a magazine based in (southern) Mostar, the would-be "capital" city of Herceg-Bosna.

Mr Zubak justified the maintenance of Herceg-Bosna by the absence of conditions enabling certain institutions in Herceg-Bosna to be incorporated into those of the Federation.

"I am referring to Herceg-Bosna state companies and the pension and social insurance funds (...). Only once the equivalent institutions are set up within the Federation will they cease their activities," added Mr Zubak, who is also a Croatian member of the Bosnian collegiate Presidency.

Since the creation of the Federation in March 1994, at the instigation of the United States, the announcement of the disbandment of Herceg-Bosna had been made on several occasions but never put into practice.

The Bosnian Croats, a minority in the Federation, are reluctant to give up their separatist entity, backed by Zagreb, despite undertakings given to their Muslim partners in the Federation and the international community.

The maintenance of Herceg-Bosna undermines the Federation which, along with the Republika Srpska (RS, the Serbian entity), is one of the two bodies making up Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The Federation, seen as the cornerstone of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has yet to get off the ground, in particular because of the refusal by the Bosnian Croats to give up their separatist ambitions and their dream of merging Herceg-Bosna with neighbouring Croatia.

 

 

Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 13 January 1997 with one abstention.

Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairman), Mr. van der Linden (Vice-Chairman), MM. Aloglu, Antretter, Baumel, Mrs Belohorska, MM. Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzer, Bokov, Büchel, Bühler, Cem, Cerqueda Pascuet, Chornovil, Deasy, Desyatnikov, Diacov, Domljan, Sir Anthony Durant, MM. Eörsi, Evangelisti, Gjellerod, Gotzev, Gricius, Hardy, Irmer, Iwinski, Kalus, Kaspereit, Kyprianou (Alternate: Christodoulides), Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. Lopez Henares, Maginas, Masseret (Alternate: Seitlinger), Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral, Muehlemann, Mrs Ojuland, MM. Oliynik, Paasilinna, Pahor, Popovski, de Puig (Alternate: Martínez), Radulescu Botica, Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, MM. Risari, Schieder, Schwimmer, Selva, Severin, Sinka, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Spahia, Mrs Stepova, Mrs Suchocka, MM. Thoresen (Alternate: Berg), Urbain, Van der Maelen, Vella, Vrettos, Woltjer, Zhirinovsky (Alternate: Glotov), Ziuganov (Alternate: Lukin).

N.B. The names of those members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the committee : Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen, Mr Gruden.

Note: 1by the Political Affairs Committee

Note: 2The programme was prepared at very short notice, thanks to the cooperation of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Permanent Representation to the Council of Europe; OSCE Coordination Unit, Berne; Embassies in Belgrade and Sarajevo); of the Consul General in Strasbourg of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and of the services of the Federal Assembly; and of the Office of the Representative of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe in Bosnia-Herzegovina.