European space policies
Report
Doc. 7875
7 July 1997
Rapporteur: Mr Luciano LORENZI, Italy, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers Group
Summary
The present report continues the Assembly's tradition of studying European space policies and their importance for member states. It describes the main developments in the activities of the European Space Agency since 1992 when the last Assembly report was presented. Reflecting the fact that Russia is now a full member of the Council of Europe, for the first time the report gives a general outline of that country's vast space programme. Both the ESA and Russia have significant scientific and technological capacities in the area, and the involvement of the private sector is important for both.
Space exploration has direct and indirect effects on the economy, making the industry a powerful source of technological innovation. Governments should continue their efforts in the area to ensure that European technology is compatible. Meanwhile, to strengthen European positions on the world market, it would be useful to provide for a more competitive approach both wihin national space programmes and ESA, including a partial liberalisation of the principle of industrial return.
At present, space projects are becoming progressively more international, involving the efforts of the ESA, Russia, as well as the United States, Japan and other countries. Numerous multilateral initiatives have been undertaken, although coordination is still insufficient. European space programmes may gain much from extensive cooperation in terms of both increased knowledge and higher competitiveness. The report aims at suggesting some policy measures to this end.
I. Draft recommendation
1. The Assembly notes that both the member countries of the European Space Agency (ESA) and Russia possess a significant scientific and technological capacity with regard to space exploration.
2. ESA serves as a positive example of how numerous European nations, many of them with limited resources, can unite and coordinate their efforts in a technologically sophisticated area. It has performed a number of successful space missions, including manned flights, the major technological and commercial basis being the Ariane launching devices.
3. This cooperation is based upon the principle of one state - one vote, but it also provides for a flexible optional programme. In placing space-related orders, the fair industrial return principle is still applied, although recent developments seem to be moving towards a slightly stronger market orientation.
4. Russia, as the largest European space-faring nation, has inherited from the Soviet era a vast space complex and is running a full-range space exploration programme. The economic reform process has led to major budget cuts in this sector, but Russia has still managed to retain unique and compatible technology and know-how, especially for manned flight missions.
5. Space programmes have a considerable impact on the economy, both directly (by developing new markets and creating new jobs) and indirectly (by providing technological spin-offs to other industries). Given the predominant importance of quality hi-tech products and services for modern industrial development, space exploration serves as a powerful source for the acquiring of new knowledge and for technological innovation.
6. Being of universal importance, space research and exploration lend themselves to increased international cooperation. Regular exchange of scientific data, as well as joint production and utilisation of space capabilities, have important cost-benefit aspects. Besides overcoming national barriers, cooperation in space also has a major positive implication for the political climate in Europe and internationally. For these reasons, the development and implementation of international space policy deserves a higher level of political attention.
7. Earth observation is one of the most promising areas of international space cooperation. It has a wide scope of applications ranging from traditional climate and environmental monitoring to the prospective use of satellite data for peacekeeping and disaster management.
8. The world space community is now linked by a tight network of organisations. East-West space cooperation has become a significant element of space technology development. This is particularly evident in the case of the International Space Station Alpha where the USA (NASA), ESA and Russia are major partners. However, there is still room for improving international coordination of efforts.
9. The Assembly welcomes in this context the American initiative to convene a series of workshops with the aim of improving international space cooperation.
10. The Assembly considers it important to follow and contribute to the development of European space policy and its internationalisation. New reports on this topic should more fully reflect the changes in the membership of the Council of Europe and forthcoming major developments in international space cooperation.
11. The Assembly therefore asks the Committee of Ministers and in particular member governments of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement:
12. The Assembly further recommends that the Committee of Ministers call on the governments of Council of Europe member and observer states:
i. to increase their space research efforts within national and international programmes;
ii. to develop international cooperation in various spheres of space exploration, integrate it on a regular basis into national space programmes, thus ensuring a maximal use of the advantages provided by the international division of labour;
iii. to enhance the political, legal, institutional and financial framework for such cooperation;
iv. to ensure a full compliance with their existing international obligations in this field;
v. to enhance the role of the present international fora and if need be to establish new mechanisms for reviewing existing space capabilities and the use of their products and services, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts;
vi. to encourage their respective space agencies:
- to exchange information on their processes of selecting and funding space projects;
- to engage in a regular dialogue with a view to establishing a cooperative strategy for further space exploration, especially in implementing common objectives;
- to increasingly seek cooperation with a view to cost cuts and increased benefits of space exploration programmes;
vii. to evaluate the political and technical feasibility of converting parts of their military space-related installations for civil purposes;
viii. to consider making their space-related projects more responsive to market incentives, including a partial liberalisation of the industrial return principle and encouraging a more active participation by the private sector;
ix. to pay special attention to cooperation in the field of Earth observation, including application of satellite sensoring data, to support peacekeeping operations, as well as crisis and disaster management;
x. to address new areas of space cooperation, such as the mapping, controlling and removal of orbital debris;
xi. to continue work on possible future transmission of solar power to the Earth.
xii. to examine the feasibility of installing a permanent base on the Moon.
13. The Assembly asks ESA to explore the possibility of enlarging its membership.
II. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Luciano LORENZI
Contents
First part: The European Space Agency
1. The governing principles of ESA
3. The meetings of the Ministerial Council and its main decisions
Second part: The Russian space programme and policies
1. Brief historic overview. Governing bodies and main policy guidelines
2. Civil space programme tasks
3. Launchers and launching pads
Third part: The economic and industrial spin-offs of space research
Fourth part: International space cooperation - technological and policy challenges
Appendices
1. The Parliamentary Assembly, through the intermediary of its Committee on Science and Technology, has always taken a close interest in the European space policy. It represents one of the points where science and technology (the Committee's area) coincide with one of the central tasks of parliamentarians, ie representing the interests of voters and monitoring the ways in which public money is spent. Do the immediate, medium-term and long-term results of space-related activities justify the money spent on them? Now that global political bipolarity has gone, and strategic competition has gone with it, is space as important for us as it used to be? Is it worth to go beyond putting satellites (instantly useful for telecommunications, meteorological observations and so on) in orbit and - literally -aim further? Which is the degree of competitiveness reached by Europe in the world's space activity and which is the role played by ESA in attaining this degree ? These are questions which have to be answered, and they justify the Assembly's looking again at the question of European space policy.
2. Traditionally, the Council of Europe made reports on the activities of the European Space Agency, and this approach is also partly reflected in the present document. Since 1992 when the latest report on the European space policy was presented, the Council of Europe has considerably enlarged its membership to include Russia, one of the world's largest space-faring nations. A special note should also be made on the Ukraine which conducts fundamental space research as well as space technology development.
3. The scope of the Russian space programme deserves a special presentation. The present report provides a general overview of the Russian space activities with the main focus on the international cooperation aspects.
4. In July 1996, the Rapporteur paid visit to ESA headquarters and met with Mr Jean-Marie Luton, Director General of ESA, and the representatives of several directorates. Discussions took place on ESA's near, medium and long-term policies. In May 1997, Mr Alexander Medvedchikov, Deputy Director General of the Russian Space Agency, presented the Russian Space Programme to the Committee on Science and Technology. These exchanges of views helped substantially the drafting of the report.
First part : THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
1. The governing principles of ESA
5. The ground rules of ESA stipulate that all 14 member states shall participate in the mandatory activities and shall contribute to the fixed common costs. All authority flows from the Council and the Director General. The Council is the sovereign legislative body, composed of delegates of the member states; the Director General is the executive officer. The Council meets as required either at delegate or ministerial level.
6. The scientific and technological research work belongs to the mandatory activities of the ESA in which, as mentioned, all member states participate. The space application system belongs to the optional activities, in which in principle all member states participate, except those which formally declare themselves not interested in participating. (Appendix 1: comparison of member states' mandatory contributions, in 1996, with total mandatory and optional contributions to ESA programmes).
a) The mandatory activities
7. The Scientific Program budget is based upon mandatory contributions of the member states, related to their respective GNP's. Decisions therein have to be in the first place driven by science, and political and industrial considerations are supposed to intervene only at a second state. That is the reason why contributions are not reflecting national choices of priorities, but only overall economic performance of each country. The system avoids the possibility for an individual nation to use the leverage of its financial contribution or of its membership in the program to further its own preferences.
b) The optional activities
8. In the field of optional programs, each nation is able to choose the level of its financial involvement. As the matter of fact, following the introducing of the "optionality" concept in the ESA Convention, the member states can not adhere at all in programs which present no economic, industrial or strategic interest from their point of view. The percentage of the contributions, for the optional programs, is also to be established, without any imposed limit, by the member states.
9. The menu of optional programs includes telecommunications, meteorology and navigation satellites as well as Microgravity, European contribution to the International Space Station and Ariane. Nowadays, the optional programs constitute more than 80 % of the ESA's activities.
10. According to Mr Roger Bonnet, Director of Science, the science policy of the Agency has to be driven by scientific community, and not vice-versa. They consider that, though not every single scientist would recognise in ESA's scientific program his preferred projet, there is a general consensus among European scientists that, by and large, the program has served them well, as it has served space science in Europe and science more generally.
11. In the view of your Rapporteur, even if the scientific community is supposed to posess a better knowledge on the current needs of science, the final decisions on ESA's space policy have to belong essentially to political decision makers. They assure the interface between scientific research and the society's needs. Politicians are able to express the concerns of people having elected them and they must understand the scientific world enough to be able to carry its message back to citizens.
12. It is accepted as a ground rule of the Agency the fact that scientists should fund their own payloads under national auspices, while ESA will fund the procurement of the common services, usually the carrier, the launcher and the operations.
3. The meetings of the Ministerial Council and its main decisions
13. The Resolution 978 (1992), which followed the report on European space policy, of Mr Fourr� and Mr Lenzer, was adopted short time after the Council meeting at Ministerial level in Munich (November 1991). The Assembly took note of the resolutions adopted at Munich, on the "European long-term space plan 1992-2005 and the programmes", on the "programme for observation of the Earth and its environment" and also of the decision for the Council to meet "in principle" every year at ministerial level.
14. The Assembly warned that the annual frequency of such meetings should not however constitute any hindrance to longer-term commitments required for execution of the space plan.
15. One year later, the Council met again at ministerial level in Granada (November 1992). It adopted three resolutions, "on the implementation of the European Long-Term Space Plan and programmes", "on international cooperation" and "on space cooperation with the Russian Federation".
16. After a three years break, the Council met at ministerial level in Toulouse (October 1995). It adopted two resolutions, "concerning decisions on Agency programmes and finances" and "on directions for the agency's policy and future programme". It seems that the principle of annual meetings at ministerial level was abandoned, in favour of a periodicity determined only by the maturity of topics in discussion and by the strategic political importance.
17. On 4 March, 1997 the Council of the European Space Agency met at ministerial level in Paris. It decided in preparation to the next meeting in 1998 to conduct deliberations on the Agency’s future evolution and an overall strategy for its role in relation to those of the other European bodies involved in the space sector, such as the national agencies and the European Commission. The council decided to streamline the decision-making procedures within the Agency and to implement partnership agreements with European industry to strengthen its worlwide competitiveness.
18. In 1991, the long-term space plan covered three major projects to constitute the European space infrastructure: Ariane 5 (a high performance launcher suitable for commercial launches and low orbit manned missions), Hermes (a space plane suitable for carrying crews and payloads into space, bring them back to Earth and providing them with support during the in-orbit work), and Columbus (The European participation in the International Space Station). All three projects belonged to the "optional programs" category.
19. In 1992, the Council actually suspended the Hermes project and revised the Columbus project, by making the Man-tended Free flyer disappear from the plan. This followed an estimate of the financial resources of the member states, which imposed to abandon or to delay indefinitely at least one of the elements of the Munich plan. The Resolution concerning Agency programmes and finances, adopted in Toulouse last year, notes that "the European contribution to the International Space Station shall consist of the Columbus Orbital Facility (COF), a general-purpose pressurized laboratory, the provision of logistics services using Ariane 5 and the Automatic Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and of orbital manoeuvring capabilities by the AT, complemented by utilisation preparation activities with a view to multidisciplinary utilisation of the Space Station by the European Partner". Concerning the development of a crew transport vehicle, a decision is supposed to be taken by member states concerned, by the end of 1997.
20. Europe's contribution is estimated at approximately 235 million Ecus per year, totalling some 2,500 million Ecus. It has been proposed that it should be paid in Ariane launches, rather than cash, but no decision has been taken.
21. The main contributors are Germany (41 % of the total), France (27.6%) and Italy (17%). Note should be taken of the increases accepted by Germany and France (35.8% and 26.8% respectively at the beginning of 1995) and, above all, the decrease in Italy's contribution (24% at the beginning of 1995) and Belgium's (from the 6.3% suggested at the beginning of 1995 to 1.17%)
22. There seem to be serious fears that contributions to the programme will not be properly reflected in contracts awarded to industry in the contributing countries.
23. ESA's industrial policy is governed by the "industrial return principle". Its implementation is measured through the "industrial return coefficient", defined as the relationship between the percentage of contracts awarded and the percentage which each State contributes to the Agency's programmes". The return is industrial and not financial in nature.
24. It is partly thanks to the principle of proper returns that space today is a matter of common interest to ESA member countries and one of the rare sectors - if not the only one - where we can really talk of European industrial co-operation on a grand scale, an area in which it has been possible to transfer the collective learning shared by European partners to other sectors, an opportunity for small countries to maintain a core of expertise by keeping teams of engineers who would otherwise have been attracted elsewhere. Finally, it can be said that, in one way or another, all space powers more or less openly practise a form of proper returns: NASA, for example, takes great care to maintain a certain balance in its expenditure between the different regions of the United States (Florida, East Coast, California etc). All these different elements must be taken into account in the reworking of the proper returns concept which has now become necessary. Any attempt to rush the process would clearly be damaging, as a consensus seems indispensable, but a few working principles can be identified: the closer the project to the application, the less justified the proper returns rule appears to be; the greater the need to concentrate European expertise in the face of international competition, the more questionable the proper returns concepts; the requirements of the proper returns rule could also be modulated according to the extent of project innovation, the generic features of the technologies used, the intensity of international competition in the field of expertise concerned etc.
25. The special situation of Italy has been taken into account by the Council of ESA which, in its Resolution concerning on Agency programmes and finances, adopted in Toulouse, mentioned "the continuous unsatisfactory situation of the industrial return to Italy" and insisted on the need of taking measures to correct overall industrial return imbalances (Appendix 2 : overall return coefficients, cumulated from 1972 to end 1995). During its meeting in Granada, in 1992, the Council took the decision to fix at 0.96 the lower limit for the overall return coefficient, but at the end of December 1996 three member states registered lower coefficients: Italy, Sweden and Switzerland.
26. At the meeting in 1997 the industrial return coefficient for mandatory programmes was reduced from 0.96 to 0.90. For optional programmes, the contributions can be adjusted within a band of plus-minus 20 per cent. For preparatory programmes there will be free competition without any industrial return constraints. These changes will be applied gradually over 1997-99, in parallel with special measures to absorb the industrial return deficit accumulated by the three above-mentioned countries.
27. The Ariane 5 project was finalised; 12 member states contributed to its development (Appendix 3: the percental contributions). Unfortunately, the maiden flight failed on 4 June and this affected the highly favourable position which Ariane 5 seemed to enjoy, thanks to the "glorious" record of Ariane 1-2-3-4 (Ariane 4: only 3 failures in 58 launches since 1988). These earlier successes have been backed by a powerful publicity campaign, presenting Ariane 5 not just as a continuation of what had gone before, but as a totally new kind of launcher, and an enormous step forward by Europe at the end of this century. Arianespace, the private company responsible for marketing and launching Ariane, holds about 60 % of the world' launchers market, but it has to face the increasing competition: the soon arrival of two improved, and above all, cheaper American launchers (McDonnell Douglas Delta 3 and Lockheed Martin Atlas II AR), and the two new Russian-American commercial cooperation ventures (ILS: Proton and Atlas and Boeing: Zenit 3). China is also working to a heavy launcher, the LMX.
28. The development of Ariane 5 costed around 4756 millions ECU, around 5 times more than the development of Ariane 1 and about 10 times more than the development of Ariane 4 (Appendix 4: comparison of the costs of the development of Ariane family).
29. An analysis of the failure was elaborated by an independent Inquiry Board, set up by the Director General of ESA and the Chairman of CNES. The facts are that only about 40 seconds after initiation of the flight sequence, at an altitude of about 3700 m, the launcher veered off its flight path, broke up and exploded. The report by the Inquiry board, published mid-july 1996, estimates that the failure was caused by the complete loss of guidance and attitude information, due to specification and design errors in the software of the inertial reference system. These errors determined the change of attitude of the launcher, which caused its disintegration due to aerodynamic forces. Destruction was automatically initiated upon disintegration, as designed.
30. The Inquiry Board considers that the extensive reviews and tests carried out during the Ariane 5 Development Programme dit not include adequate analysis and testing of the inertial reference system or of the complete flight control system, which could have detected the potential failure. In view of reducing the risk of failure of launchings, the Inquiry Board is recommending, among others, the consideration of a more transparent organisation of the cooperation among the partners in the Ariane 5 programme. It emphasises the need of a close engineering cooperation, with clear cut authority and responsability, to obtain a system coherence, with simple and clear interfaces between partners.
31. In fact, many comments in mass-media revealed exactly the needs expressed in the Inquiry Board's recommendation; the responsability of the failure seemed in many cases to be accepted as diffuse and a considerable amount of criticism was pointed at ESA in particular, even if, as shown above, launchings' responsability belong to Arianespace. As Rapporteur, I consider that improving the cooperation system among the partners in the Ariane programme, as recommended, will have direct and quick effects also on public understanding on European space activity.
32. None the less, a single failure by Ariane 5 should not affect the future of the project. The trust in the commercial success of the project seems not to be damaged, maybe also because the first Ariane 5 mission was a scientific (the Cluster mission) and not a commercial one. The fact that Ariane 1-4 produced benefits of about 4 times the size of the investment contributed to maintain trust. A particular case to analyse is the United Kingdom's one: in 1987, UK refused to participate in the Ariane 5 programme. Now it wants to joint in and to contribute at the future activities linked to Ariane 5 up to 2003 (commercialisation, maintaining the infrastructure etc.). At its meeting in Toulouse, the Council of ESA agreed to allocate 1713 million ECU for these future activities. France will contribute more than half (50,4%), Germany 19.4% and Italy 8.33%. UK wants to contribute with around 1% and insists on the development of the commercial trends, in spite of the scientific ones.
5. The HORIZON 2000 and HORIZON 2000 PLUS long-term plans
33. The long-term plan in Space-Science called HORIZON 2000 was established in 1984, with wide involvement of the scientific community, and it was adopted by the ESA in 1985. Its realisation was made possible by the commitment of the member states to provide a 5 % annual increase in funding for the Scientific Program over about a decade.
34. HORIZON 2000, which is due to terminate in 2006, consists of four large, six medium-sized and possibly also a number of small projects, covering all major fields of space science. Its centerpiece is a set of four so-called "cornerstones". Two of them belong to Solar System exploration, and two to astronomy and astrophysics.
35. The Solar System exploration projects include among other things the Solar Terrestrial Science Program (STSP), which comprises two medium-sized missions (a solar physics mission (SOHO) and the magnetospheric mission Cluster), and the Rosetta mission, which is meant to study pristine cometary material for detailed analysis of the early history of the Solar System.
36. In December 1995, the SOHO spacecraft was successfully injected into its halo orbit and the tests which followed confirmed its very good performance. Unfortunately, the future of Cluster mission is seriously put into question, because the four satellites which should have been put into orbit by the maiden flight of Ariane 5 were lost in the explosion of the rocket, the 4th of June 1996. The cost of Cluster in 1995 was around 489 millions ECU and the budgetary cuts of the ESA make difficult its re-financing. The loss for the scientific community, which had worked for about a decade to prepare the mission, is enormous.
37. The Rosetta mission is now close to its definition phase. The Council meeting in Toulouse imposed a serie of budgetary constraints which had to be taken into account by the ESA Science Programme Committee (SPC). The SPC recommended to endeavour to reduce all project element costs by at least 10 % and excluded the provision of a scientific camera and payload support items from the project budget. A firm order has been placed with Arianespace for an Ariane 5 launch vehicle for January 2003.
38. The projects related to astronomy and astrophysics are a X-ray spectroscopy mission XMM, which is a X-ray astrophysics observatory with an anticipated lifetime of ten years, to be launched in 1999, and the Far-Infrared Space Telescope (FIRST), which is a direct detection spectroscopy mission in the unexplored region of the electromagnetic spectrum, and which will be launched by Ariane in 2005.
39. Regarding the medium-size missions of the Horizon 2000 Programme, the first mission which was selected was the Joint ESA/NASA Cassini Mission, which will put a satellite in orbit around Saturn (the NASA-provided Saturn Orbiter). The Orbiter will release the ESA-made Huygens probe, which will land on Titan after a two-hours descent in its atmosphere. The launch date is scheduled for October 1997, and the arrival in the neighbourhood of Saturn will take place in 2004. The second mission, selected in 1993, is INTEGRAL, the International Gamma-Ray Laboratory. INTEGRAL is scheduled to be launched on a Russian Proton Launcher in 2001.
40. Mr Roger Bonnet, ESA's Director of Science, estimates that HORIZON 2000 has made of ESA the number one in several areas of space science: cometary science, astrometry and solar and heliospheric physics. He considers that soon it will also be the case for infrared, X-ray and gamma-ray astronomy.
41. An approach similar to the HORIZON 2000 is being followed in the preparation of HORIZON 2000 PLUS, a plan which covers the period 1995 - 2016 and which represents the forward roll-over of the twenty-year HORIZON 2000 programme. HORIZON 2000 PLUS contains three cornerstones: a mission to Mercury, an interferometer observatory for either astrometry or infrared astronomy and a space-based gravitational-wave observatory.
42. HORIZON 2000 Plus also includes a number of medium-size missions. These will be selected according to the emerging needs of the scientific community. However, at the time of the definition of HORIZON 2000 Plus (1994), some priorities were stressed, such as Mars exploration and the need for the European astroomical community to remain on-board of the Hubble Space Telescope and follow-on projects. The Scientific Programme is also interested in lunar exploration. However, the financial means required for such an enterprise exceed the possibilities of the programme and the initiative must be examined in an agency-wide or world-wide context. The missions of HORIZON 2000 which have not yet been launched and HORIZON 2000 Plus together compose the new HORIZON 2000 programme.
43. Some people argue that manned spaceflight has served no purpose for the last ten years (ten years ago, Russian cosmonauts stayed on board the MIR station for over a year, showing that a flight to Mars was physically possible). But they are overlooking the need to conduct scientific experiments in space, as a part of basic research. To contest this need is to contest the very principles of scientific research. Moreover, in Resolution 978 (1992), the Parliamentary Assembly declared that "manned flights must pursue major scientific and technological objectives", without, of course, losing sight of profitability "considered from every angle".
44. In February 1996 the EuroMir 95 mission was concluded. Two Russian astronauts and ESA astronaut Thomas Reiter had spent 180 days in orbit aboard the Russian space station Mir. The accumulated data from the 41 experiments carried out onboard Mir was entrusted to scientists which will be able to get informations in the fields of life science, astrophysics, material science and technology. The main programme developed on board was the Microgravity programme, consisting of 18 life-science and 8 materials-science experiments.
45. In preparation for Space Station Utilisation, definition studies are being initiated for three major multi-user facilities: the Materials Science Laboratory (MSL), the Fluid Science Laboratory (FSL) and the Biolab (BL).
7. Earth observation programmes
46. These programmes are designed to increase Europe's capacity to monitor the processes which affect the environment at regional and global level, study issues such as global warming, climatic change and reduction of the ozone layer, map the earth's gravitational and magnetic fields, map the dangerous areas in case of catastrophes (ie, floods, forest fires, oil spilling on sea, nuclear accidents etc.), facilitate studies on population growth and on urban planning etc.
47. The Council meeting in Toulouse consolidated the foundations of a European policy in this area, in co-operation with the European Union and EUMETSAT (an intergovernmental organisation set up in 1986 to monitor Europe's weather satellite system). This policy will cover two types of mission: "Earth Explorer" missions (studying the planet for research purposes) and "Earth Watch" missions (for applications with operational character). The ESA is also to seek broader co-operation with its Russian, American, Japanese and Indian counterparts via the "Committee on Earth Observations Satellites".
48. The environment monitoring programmes of the ESA are currently based on ERS1 and ERS2, two Earth observation satellites placed on orbit in July 1991, respectively in April 1995, and who are now operating in tandem. In succession to ERS1 and ERS2, ESA will deploy different satellites, which will use the multi-use platform developed under the Columbus programme. The first platform user, ENVISAT1, is to be placed on orbit by an Ariane launcher in 1999.
Second part: RUSSIAN SPACE PROGRAMME AND POLICIES
1. Brief historic overview. Governing bodies and main policy guidelines
49. Russia has from the Soviet era inherited a vast space related complex, consisting of research institutions, design bureaux, production facilities, ground installations and orbiters. From the 50-s to the 80-s, the Soviet space programme, together with the nuclear project, defined the development of national industry, research facilities and the guidelines of domestic and foreign policy. The country invested enormous resources, human as well as financial, to develop and run a full-range space exploration programme equalled only by the USA . Most of the programme in its initial phase was conducted with national defence in mind.
50. The former USSR made a great number of pioneering achievements in space exploration, such as the first satellite in orbit (Sputnik, 1957), the first manned mission (Yury Gagarin, 1961), the first woman in space (Valentina Tereshkova, 1963), the first space walk (Alexey Leonov, 1965), etc. Russian cosmonaut Valery Polyakov holds the world record for space endurance (438 days). By comparison, the American national endurance record is 115 days, set by Norman Thagard on board the Russian space station Mir.
51. In the late 80-s, the space programme for the first time came under a critical focus, when the newly elected parliamentarians questioned whether it was reasonable to spend public funds on an industry producing virtually no direct effect. In recent years, and specially since the beginning of the radical reforms in 1992, financial support for space exploration has drastically declined, reflecting both the decrease in military expenditure and the general budgetary constraints caused by the deep economic crisis. The space industry has been going through a complicated period of adaptation to new economic conditions.
52. The modern legal base for space exploration was laid in 1993 when a special Law on Space Activities was adopted. The Law was apparently the first legal document in Russia outlining the importance of the space industry for the nation and defining the general approach to space exploration. On May 1, 1996 the Russian Government approved the Concept of Russian National Space Policy, a basic framework document for a 10 year period. The Government has also given its approval to the Federal Space Programme-2000, and the drafting of the Programme-2005 is underway.
53. The governmental bodies responsible for developing and implementing the Federal Space Programmes are the Russian Space Agency (RSA), the Russian Space Forces and the Ministries of the Economy and Finances. Scientific backup to the above programmes was provided by an Inter-Agency Expert Commission headed by the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Commission has formulated the following main goals for Russian space technology development:
54. The RSA, established in 1993, is responsible for peaceful space exploration and enjoys a status similar to that of a cabinet ministry. On April 11, 1997, Mr Yury Koptev, Director of the RSA, was received in the Kremlin by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin who promised the Agency major financial as well as political support, including establishing a direct communication line to the President.
2. Civilian space programme tasks
55. Once an auxiliary business, peaceful space exploration now represents a major part of the Russian space programme. According to Russian experts, space research may help resolve a number of global problems relating to the sustainable existence of humankind. These are some of the problems where spatial solutions are applicable:
56. The specific agenda for 1997 is as follows:
Communication and TV transmission
Maintaining the required level of reliability of the existing orbital fleet, creating a new generation of vehicles to meet world market demands, providing satellite communication (including mobile telephone) services to Russian customers and broadening the scope of satellite TV transmission.
Navigation
Ensuring a broad use of space technology for precision navigation support of transport units.
Remote Earth observations
Constant surveillance of large-scale atmospheric processes, serving the needs of agriculture, topography, geology, environmental monitoring, data collection and assessment of the situation in disaster areas.
Manned flight experiments
Launching manned Soyuz-TM spaceships with crew members from Russia, USA, Germany, France.
Launching Progress-M reloading unmanned ships.
Joint space missions between the Mir Station and Space Shuttle vehicles.
Continuing the assembly of the Russian elements of the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), ensuring a necessary number of manned and automatic transport missions.
Fundamental space research
Astrophysical sensoring of X-ray and gamma-ray sources.
Complex research on the Sun, terrestrial magnetism, circumterrestrial plasma and Solar-Earth interaction.
Space related medical and biological research.
57. Nearly all aspects of the Russian civilian space programme involve active international cooperation in both the production and utilisation of space facilities.
3. Launchers and launching pads
58. Russia is at present using four launching pads: Baikonur, Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, and Svobodny. Plesetsk is used for over 60 per cent of all launches, Baykonur for appr. 35 and Kapustin Yar for some 3 per cent. Svobodny, situated in the Far East close to the Chinese border, is a new site and had its maiden launch in 1997.
59. Baikonur Cosmodrome, operational since 1955, is probably the most internationally renowned of these sites as over 1,000 spacecrafts have been launched from it. This figure includes most of the manned missions, among them over two dozen with international crews on board. The cosmodrome covers an area of 6,717 km� and employs some 12,000 personel. After the break-up of the Soviet Union the launching pad became the property of Kazakhstan. Russia still uses the facility extensively on the basis of a bilateral treaty.
60. Since the first Sputnik launch in 1957, the Soviet Union/Russia has developed a long series of launching vehicles capable of performing various delivery missions. The major launcher producers are the Moscow-based RSC Energia and Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Centre, both established decades ago and possessing top-notch space technology and know-how. Khrunichev features the Proton, the main Russian vehicle capable of delivering over 4,800 kg to a geostationary transfer orbit.
61. In 1995, the first-ever comprehensive historical launch data was published in Russia by a research group from the Space Forces. As of 22 February, 1995, Russia (USSR prior to 1992) had made 2,656 launcher missions which put into orbit 2,976 spacecraft. Altogether the country is responsible for almost two thirds of the total number of space vehicles launched worldwide. Unsuccessful launches (including test failures) have represented under 6 per cent of the overall launch figure.
62. The launch activities peaked in 1981 and 1982 with well over 100 missions each year. Recent years have seen a major decline. In 1993, there were 48 launches; in 1994, 49, going further down to 33 launches in 1995. In 1996, Russia performed 27 launches putting into orbit 30 spacecraft, of which 27 were Russian and 3 foreign.
63. From the 1970s, the then Soviet carriers were used to put in orbit astronauts and payload from COMECON member countries under the auspices of the Intercosmos programme. In the mid-80s, the Soviet Government entered the market for the first time with a bid for the commercial launching of Western payloads. The offer was blocked for a number of years by the US ban on the Soviet launching of any devices using American components. In the 90-s, most of these bans were lifted, and Russia entered into extensive international cooperation in this area, including notably the USA.
64. Russia maintains a major civilian orbiter fleet which consists of both robotic and manned vehicles. The main tasks of the fleet are:
65. The number of space vehicles involved in commercial and research activities has increased from 31 in 1992 to 42 in 1996. In recent years Russia made 12 to 15 civilian payload launches annually. 65 per cent of the Russian orbiter fleet vehicles are serving such commercial purposes as communication and broadcasting, geological and environmental surveillance. Appr.15 per cent of the vehicles are devoted to fundamental research, the rest being manned spacecraft.
66. The biggest increase in recent years has been in the field of communication satellites (from 15 to 23). New types of communication satellites have been introduced, as Gals, Gonets-D1, Express, etc. With the world's biggest territory stretching over 11 time zones, Russia is vitally dependant upon reliable satellite-based communication and broadcasting. Their importance is ever growing in the age of new information technologies, providing users throughout Russia with modern computer network links.
67. Another major orbiter application is Earth observation. This task is performed by Resource, Ocean-O1, Meteor-3 and Electro type satellites. The data acquired by these devices are applied in geological research, weather forecasting, and environmental monitoring. Satellites are also widely used by the Russian Ministry of Emergencies to control the situation in zones of disaster, especially in remote areas (such as Siberian taiga fires, etc.).
5. Manned flights. Mir and Alpha space stations
68. Starting from 1961, Russia has acquired vast experience in manned flights, with the main emphasis on complicated long-term missions. The country has developed a broad range of manned spacecraft (at present, the most used is the Soyuz-TM vehicle), and a series of orbital stations which succeeded each other ensuring a virtually permanent presence in orbit. Russia has also inherited a unique crew training facility (Gagarin Star City outside Moscow), actively used by both Russian and foreign space programmes.
69. At present, Russia is the only country in the world to support a permanent space laboratory, Mir. It is the first station ever designed for expansion. The 20.4-ton Core Module, Mir's first building block, was launched in February 1986. It provides basic services (living quarters, life support, power) for long-term human missions, as well as scientific research capacities. The Core Module has also docking points for two resupply vessels and four expansion modules. In 1987-96 five additional research modules were docked to the station.
70. For over a decade, the Mir station has remained in operation, most of the time in the manned mode. It has been visited by numerous Russian and foreign crews, and pieces of research equipment produced in a number of countries have been installed on board. ESA astronaut Thomas Reiter performed a 180 day long mission on board Mir in 1996 together with two Russians. The unique experience gained by Russia in the long-term running of the orbital station and performing long manned missions has attracted broad international attention.
71. Due to regular maintenance and repair, Mir is still actively at work and remains generally in a good condition, but its life expectancy is also limited. The station has recently suffered from a series of technical faults, including a ca. 20 second long fire on board. In the foreseeable future, a replacement will be needed.
72. Russian experience is now being used extensively within the framework of the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) initiative. The station is a huge project run primarily by NASA, RSA and ESA and worth appr. US$ 40 bn. The estimated Russian share of the project is about 40 per cent. The country is to produce and deliver into orbit the Functional Energy Block (better known by its Russian acronym FGB) and the Service Module, as well as some of the solar panels. The FGB is funded and owned by the US, the Service Module by Russia.
73. The ISSA project consists of three phases, each designed to maximize joint space experience and permit early utilisation and return of investments.
i) During Phase 1, which is currently underway, the Mir Station is being regularly visited by 8-10 day-long Shuttle missions. Russian and American spacemen work together on board both spacecrafts, conduct joint space walks and practice space station assembly routines adding new modules to Mir. The flight experience gained from Phase 1 will reduce Alpha Station assembly and operating risks. The first Shuttle-Mir mission took place in June 1995, and a total of 9 flights are scheduled, ending in May 1998.
ii) Phase 2 (1997-99) assembles the components that establish three-person crew capability and an initial laboratory environment for science and technology activities. There are six Russian and six US flights scheduled. In this phase, Russia is to launch both the FGB and the Service Module, as well as a universal docking module. The USA are to launch the Resource (docking) Node 1 and Laboratory Module and a Canadian robotic capability. These parts are to be assembled in space into a single unit during manned missions.
74. The first planned launch of the Proton launcher delivering the FGB was scheduled for November 1997. However, inadequate government funding of the contractors for building the other element, the Service Module, has put the project seven months behind schedule. In April 1997 NASA decided to postpone the launch of FGB to October 1998 at the latest. Russia needs some estimated US$ 350 mill. to finish the construction and questions have been raised in the US whether the country would be capable of the task. At present, major steps are being taken to comply with the order, which is going to have a major impact on Russia's reputation as a space partner.
75. In Phase 3 (1999-2002), the station assembly is to be completed, incorporating the elements produced by the ESA, USA and Japan. The main ESA contribution is a general purpose laboratory named the Columbus Orbital Facility (COF). In this Phase, as many as 29 Shuttle flights are planned.
76. Fundamental research effected by the Russian space programme includes astrophysical sensoring of remote space, research on Solar-Earth interaction, the Solar System, etc. One of the most important tools is the research module Kvant which has been connected to the Mir station since 1987.
77. Among the facilities used for fundamental research shall be mentioned the GRANAT X-ray satellite launched in December 1989 and the multinational INTERBALL project, designed to study plasma processes in circumterrestrial space. This latter initiative included launching two pairs of satellites in 1995-96, one to an altitude of 20,000 km and the other to 200,000 km, gathering information to improve our general understanding of solar-terrestrial physical processes. Some 15 countries contributed to the INTERBALL project, most of them European. Russia was represented by the RSA, and in particular by its Babakin Research Centre.
78. In November, 1996, Russia made an unsuccessful attempt to send a probe to Mars. The mission failed due to launch control troubles.
79. Russia participates also in the international Cosmology project building SPEKTR, astrophysical observatories with components from a number of participating countries, and in the RELICT-2 project for monitoring electromagnetic waves remaining from the Big Bang. A number of new satellite launches are scheduled in these and other projects for 1997-98.
Third part: THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL SPIN-OFFS OF SPACE RESEARCH
80. Since the beginning of the nineties, the economic stakes of space technology have radically changed: while the building of large space infrastructures is increasingly under pressure as public spending is cut, space applications are being developed beyond the wildest expectations. It seems a good time to consider the return on investments, ways of making the most of the existing infrastructure and the strategic orientations required, particularly for European countries which have invested substantial efforts in space research for 40 years.
81. The economic impact of space projects can be seen in many different areas: creation of new markets (launchers, satellites, ground-stations, instrumentation etc), use of satellite-derived data in numerous business sectors, exploitation and dissemination throughout the economy of technological knowledge gained from space projects etc. The mechanisms through which these effects are generated and passed on to the rest of the economy are complex but may be grouped into two main categories for the purpose of identifying their nature and scale: direct economic effects and indirect economic effects. This will serve as our basis for appraising the achievements and prospects in the space field.
82. The impact of space activities on the economy may be broken down, therefore, into two main categories:
The following is an attempt to indicate the nature and scale of these two types of effect, based on the most pertinent studies in this area.
83. In implementing space projects, States have expressly sought to establish a coherent chain of activities, with the setting up of public agencies at one end and the identifying of applications to solve the major problems facing society (communications, security, availability of natural resources etc) at the other. Obviously, the building and operation of the space infrastructure (satellites, launchers) occupies a central role in this chain of activities but, in economic terms, it is clear that, the further down the chain one goes, the greater the financial stakes. The figures (as established in a recent study by Euroconsult) are set out below. The estimates given are overall volumes on a world scale.
84. At the top of the chain, the annual budget of space agencies is an average $200 billion. The satellites and launchers market represents an overall annual total of $60 billion. The middle of the chain is occupied by commercial activities linked to the direct running of the space infrastructure, breaking down as follows: firstly, exploitation (operation and control of the satellite infrastructure) representing $50 billion worth of business and usually handled by highly structured and specialised agencies (eg Intelsat); secondly, the ground infrastructure needed to exploit satellite data, which has generated a host of major markets - the hardware part of ground installations includes national network stations, satellite television reception stations, mobile device communication terminals, specialised terminals for private company networks (VSAT) etc - worth a total of some $150 billion a year; finally, these installations give rise to a set of associated services (software) to process and transmit space-derived data to users. The market for such services is growing fast and may be estimated at some $275 billion. At this intermediary stage between satellites and the end-users of space-transmitted data, we could of course add the knock-on effects on complementary equipment markets (televisions, fax machines etc) and the audiovisual industry.
85. The final category of direct economic effects as we move down the chain concerns the final use of services sourced from the space infrastructure. While not accurately measurable, the economic gains linked to the use of space systems are very substantial and may be estimated at at least $500 billion.
86. By way of example, the use of telecommunications satellites has helped to lower the price of telephone calls, particularly on transatlantic links. While this initially benefited telecommunications network operators, as demonstrated by the fall of over 90% in the annual cost of a half-segment rented through Intelsat between 1965 ($32,000) and 1988 ($4,400), the advantages for the end-users seem considerable and not only in terms of price; space-bound telecommunications facilities (which are far more of a complement to than replacement for terrestrial facilities) offer advantages of reliability and equality of coverage (generally speaking, connection costs are the same anywhere on the planet). In the area of transport alone, the use of space-derived data improves efficiency as a whole (optimised routing and therefore energy savings for air, sea and road traffic). Space-bound telecommunications are furthermore a vital complement to conventional systems for developing business in a country poorly served by terrestrial telecommunications networks or in certain sectors with a big future such as distance learning or remote medicine. The use of meteorology satellites and the resulting improvement in weather forecasting have yielded substantial economic benefits in many sectors such as agriculture, fishing, building, public works, transport and insurance. These advantages are measured mainly in terms of increased productivity. Similarly, remote sensing permits significant savings in the areas such as mineral prospecting or mapping.
87. To grasp the scale of the direct economic effects of space projects, we must consider the number of end users concerned by space applications. At the beginning of the nineties, the direct users of space-derived data in the world numbered 1 or 2 million. Early next century, with the development of satellite television, mobile services and other applications, that figure will climb to over 100 million direct users. The economic impact of this change of scale is still difficult to gauge. What is clear, is that in a context of accelerated globalisation of business, the space infrastructure is a remarkable driving force and support for that process, enabling local systems anywhere on the planet to be connected and to interact with any other point on the globe.
88. Indirect economic effects result from the diffusion of "spin-offs" from high-tech programmes to the entire economy, triggering a real burst of innovation. This "accidental" process begins with the firms tendering for space contracts before cascading down to the rest of the economy. These indirect industrial effects encompass all the technology, know-how, image and new trade relations gained by companies working on space projects and applied by them to other projects, either in the space sector or in other business sectors. One of the best-known illustrations of this transfer from the space sector to other industries is teflon coating, developed for the Apollo programme. In fact, the set of examples which could be given today is vast and complex enough to be the subject of a separate report.
89. In an attempt to evaluate these indirect affects in-depth, without falling into the trap of the obvious case study, the Bureau d'Economie Th�orique et Appliqu�e (BETA - Bureau of Theoretical and Applied Economics) has run a series of surveys on the indirect effects of ESA programmes. Two major surveys were run (1980 and 1988), using representative samples of firms commissioned by the ESA. The effects measured (in terms of added value) were classified into 4 main categories:
90. The studies concluded that, on average, for every 100 units paid by the ESA to European industry, there were 300 units of indirect benefits to project contractors. This is a minimum indicator of the scale of the phenomenon, since only the lower end of the bracket of companies' estimates was used and a whole host of effects are likely to escape assessment (through omissions, secrecy etc). Finally, the BETA studies focused only on contractor companies and therefore did not incorporate cascade effects to the rest of the economy.
91. The interval between the two studies makes it possible to gauge how the effects developed. The comparative table of results appended shows that the proportion of technological effects and effects in the area of expertise grew while the commercial effects and particularly the effects on organisation and methods tended to diminish. The growth of the first two is explained by the fact that the development of new technologies, the transfer of technological expertise and the constitution of specific know-how take time but, once under way, have a powerful cumulative impact. On the other hand, commercial effects are far more closely related to a given context and strongly linked to the success and ambitions of space projects of the moment. To some, space missions have become quite commonplace and no longer bestow any particular prestige on the companies involved. As for the extension of organisational methods used in space projects (eg very thorough quality control methods or methods for managing complex projects), companies feel that they have done enough to take them on board.
92. As far as technology transfers are concerned, industrial contractors admit that there are often difficulties in passing from space-oriented production, characterised by very small production runs or prototypes governed by extremely tight demands on quality and performance, to more commercial production, using longer runs for which cost reduction is the key consideration. Generally speaking, the existence of spin-offs outside the space field seems linked, on the one hand, to corporate policies (particularly to their organisational pattern; a company organised on a cellular basis or by project with an inhouse technology transfer department has a better chance of benefiting from spin-offs) and, on the other hand, to the presence of neighbouring technology sectors (more than two thirds of spin-offs from space contracts are to be found in sectors which are technologically very close: aeronautics, defence, telecommunications, but still rarely in other sectors). On this latter point, the comparative study reveals a worrying trend in indirect benefits from the space field: whereas they represented half of the total effects in 1980, they accounted for only a quarter in 1988. This shows that space projects increasingly form an autonomous economic activity, directing exchanges towards the closest technology sectors. The transfer of knowledge picked up on space projects to more distant sectors may well become increasingly difficult.
93. The importance of space project spin-offs must not blind us to the fact that the process can operate in either direction: numerous technologies used in the space sector originated elsewhere. In early space research, military technologies substantially contributed to the development of space technologies. Seen from this angle, the space sector can be seen as a workshop for assembling and blending the high-tech achievements of other sectors, which are then pushed to their uttermost limits in the space context (made lighter, radiation-resistant etc). It seems increasingly logical, therefore, to consider the economic impact of space projects from the point of view of ongoing interaction with other sectors. What is clear is that space programmes have acted as catalysts in innovation, by harnessing available technologies, bringing together the best researchers and initiating joint projects with the best teams. And the areas in which indirect economic benefits have been strongest are precisely those in which the demands of space projects and the demands of society meet: energy saving, miniaturisation, quality control, etc.
94. The economic studies presented conclude that, overall, space expenditure, through the political structures established by the European space enterprise, has indeed had a beneficial outcome, both directly and indirectly. But the assessment also points to the strengths and weaknesses of the efforts made and helps to bring them into perspective:
95. The primary direct economic effect of space expenditure, which for most States has been limited to the funding of the infrastructure at the beginning of the chain of activities, has been to give a coherent structure to that chain, now characterised by spectacular development in the applications segment. It is quite fair to say that the economic benefits in the applications segment are over 10 times greater than the initial investment. However, the scope of the applications could be considerably broader: one only has to realise that the main problems facing society today - pollution and other environmental problems, the growing need for mobility, development of large metropolises, the need to control conflicts throughout the world, water supplies etc - all have a space-technology solution. This simple idea has far-reaching consequences for the design of space projects on the one hand and for their potential for use on the other hand. As far as the definition of future application-oriented projects is concerned, they must be increasingly designed in close conjunction with the other sectors of expertise required to solve specific problems: finding solutions to environmental problems, for example, requires complex co-operation between chemists, biologists, planners etc, who will have to be involved, far more than in the past, in the design of application-oriented space projects in this field. As for the potential users of space applications, there is a real problem of information on how space technology can help to solve their problems: very few planners responsible for big city management are aware of the potential contribution of space applications to solving problems of traffic congestion, management of the urban heritage, pollution and so on. If information is lacking, there is obviously a risk that space infrastructures will be poorly used and also that inadequate interaction between solution-seekers and users will undermine the constant improvement in the quality of services offered by the space sector.
96. Here we come up against one of the main difficulties facing any attempt to accurately evaluate the direct economic effects of space technology: the fact that space applications are nearly always just one component among others in a global solution to a problem (a user does not know a priori if he is communicating with someone via a satellite or a cable, the space applications used in remote sensing are more a complement to than replacement for conventional solutions such as airborne surveillance and so on). It is particularly difficult, therefore, to identify and appraise (especially for a private investor) their precise economic contribution among a host of others; in a way, space is a universal force but not always identifiable. Here again, the public authorities need to inform and educate people as to the true costs and advantages of using space infrastructures. One particularly sensitive area is the pricing of access to satellite images used in remote sensing. This is clearly a very grey area, with strong differences of opinion between the United States and European countries, which acts as a brake on investment.
97. Indeed, the development of direct benefits is bugged by a whole host of economic and organisational hindrances:
98. The indirect effects of European space projects have been most appreciable but many factors, discussed above, demonstrate the potential risk of such benefits drying up. The implementation of projects of great new potential, the framing of an active technology transfer policy and an appropriate policy of contractual incentives would help to enhance the indirect economic effects of space programmes. But the main stumbling block is that the spin-off process is always seen as filtering down from space projects to other activities. This narrow view must be discarded; we should now regard space technology essentially as an activity which interacts with other sectors and foster means through which it can also enhance the technologies developed in other sectors. This is particularly true for technologies developed for military purposes, and all developments linked to dual technologies should be our first and foremost consideration.
99. The rule of proper returns, so often criticised but, as we have seen, not without its good points, must be reworked and adapted to the new industrial context. There is certainly no reason to rush into making a clean sweep, even if the price to pay will be an exceptional statute for space technology vis-�-vis the institutions of the European Union. It must be remembered that the European space sector remains until now the only true example of European industrial co-operation on a grand scale. However, if European industrialists are to have a clear view of space programmes, any risk of conflict or divergence between the ESA and the European Union must be unequivocally removed. The challenge is without doubt one of ultimately transforming the present multi-State structure into a real integrated European structure. This supposes in particular that the ESA budget will transit via the European Union budget, once there is full integration, with the result that national contributions are no longer distinguishable.
Fourth part: INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION - TECHNOLOGICAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES
100. As a problem of importance for the whole of humankind, space exploration represents a model case for international cooperation. The global scope of space activities, numerous common interests and objectives of various scientific communities and countries, as well as the long-term nature of projects have created a good fundament for close global cooperation. Regular exchange of scientific data, joint production and utilisation of space capabilities assure reduction of costs for each participant.
101. The whole story of ESA is a positive example of how numerous European nations, many of them with limited resources, can unite and coordinate their efforts in this area. It is noteworthy that some of the ESA member countries also run space programs of their own, thus demonstrating an effective cohesive approach to pursuing specific national interests and a strong international commitment.
102. The major space-faring nations, the former USSR and the USA, have traditionally had limited interest in international cooperation in the area, due to both security constraints and to the very scale of their space programmes. Exceptions to this rule were in many cases made primarily for political reasons, like the Apollo-Soyuz docking in 1975 highlighting the detente era. In the 1990-s, however, both Russia and the USA have increasingly been involved in specific international cooperation projects. The Russian experience in running permanent orbital stations and the American Shuttle-based Space Transportation System are today seen as complementary ventures.
103. The opportunities for a global cooperation in space exploration are now virtually better than ever. Many of the previous restrictions imposed under the Cold War have seized to exist. East-West cooperation has become a significant element of space technology development. However, most experts tend to think that the global space activities are still too much dominated by single-country projects which suffer from a lack of common goals, coordination, and integrated planning.
104. The benefits of joint action are especially evident in the case of the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA), which in many respects is a precedent-setting breakthrough. It is going to be the most costly and the most multilateral space project ever, involving the efforts of the USA, Russia, ESA, Canada, and Japan.
105. An interesting feature of the ISSA development is that not only modules from different countries will be assembled together, but the building of these modules themselves relies heavily on cooperative efforts. For example, the European producers supply the Russian Service Module with a computer-aided data processing system, while Russia assists ESA in developing the European automatic transport vehicle to resupply the station, and delivers the docking equipment.
106. The ISSA will clearly demonstrate whether the different nations are ripe to develop and run a huge space-based object together, with all the challenges it represents in the fields of technology, standardisation, language, or psychology. Whatever the outcome of the project, it will have significant repercussions for the whole of the global future cooperation in space. It is therefore of crucial importance to ensure a strict programme compliance and a fullest possible utilisation of the immense capabilities of the station for research and industrial uses once it is in operation.
107. Space launches have in recent years become an important field of international cooperation. At present, the world market is dominated by the ESA-produced Ariane launchers whose share is about 60 per cent. In 1996, the French builders of the Ariane, Arianespace and Aerospatiale established a joint venture with the Russian Progress design bureau. This joint venture called Starsem will provide for a coordinated marketing of the Ariane (designed for payloads over 3 tons) and of the Russian-made Soyuz launcher, presumably the best in Europe for putting minor payloads into low and medium orbits. Another interesting project is the quadripartite Sea Launch joint venture established by Norway, Russia, Ukraine, and the USA. The venture aims at building a unique sea-based launching pad, converting the Norwegian technology of constructing offshore drilling platforms. The first satellite launches from this platform in the Pacific are scheduled for 1998.
108. At present, the most promising area for enhanced interstate cooperation is the Earth observation, especially the environment monitoring. The global nature of environmental problems has already received attention of policy-makers in most countries. An increasing number of customers, including the developing countries, rely now on satellite technology for weather forecasting, navigation, and environment control. The main problem in this area seems to be the lack of coordination, an inefficient gathering and distribution of satellite data, resulting in a major duplication of efforts and low efficiency in the utilisation of existing satellite capabilities.
109. Besides the traditional applications, satellite observations are now also utilised in the new fields of disaster and crisis management. In 1987, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted a Resolution setting up an intergovernmental open partial agreement to achieve closer co-operation between member states for the purpose of improving prevention, protection and relief in cases of major natural and technological disaster. The EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement now covers 21 states, most of them members of the Council of Europe. In 1994, its Executive Secretariat asked the ESA to explore, in co-operation with the European Commission, the possibility of using space technologies to improve risk prevention and the organisation of relief.
110. Another prospective application is the satellite support of peacekeeping. These operations are becoming increasingly numerous and internationalised. In the light of this development, the existing capabilities, mainly the Russian and American, could be effectively used to observe problem areas with the view of crisis forecasting, prevention, and resolution. This idea was for the first time discussed in an international workshop in 1994. One year later Mr Yury Koptev, Director of the RSA, proposed to the WEU Assembly to consider establishing a European space-based observation system to monitor the environment, major emergencies and conflicts, as well as to verify disarmament treaties.
111. Earth observation programmes ("looking-back" task) are only one size of the surveying possibilities the space-based instruments can offer. The other surveying mission they are supposed to accomplish is the so-called "looking out" task. To make further progress towards understanding the origins of Universe and how our Galaxy and its neighbours have formed, it is necessary to observe the outer space. Only space-based instruments can attain the accuracy needed to survey stellar motions and distances throughout the Galaxy. Space science allowed also much progress in understanding the laws of physics and is able to furnish information to understand the deepest problems of natural sciences, namely the nature and origin of the matter on the one hand, and the origin and evolution of life on the other. Using the space-based gravitational-wave observatory, as proposed for HORIZON 2000 PLUS programme, may verify Einstein's General Theory of Relativity. Concerning the origin and evolutions of life, the space science may bring answers to such questions as: "are there other planets that can support life as we know it?" or "if so, could we detect the presence of such life?".
112. Finally, a few words should be dedicated to the prospective space projects of great importance to the humankind. These include, among others:
113. This list of present and potential space cooperation projects is far from being complete, but it shows clearly enough that Europe, as well as other continents are facing a major space exploration agenda which can only be implemented by concerted global action, but which also implies a strong international competition. Today's technology makes most of these tasks principally feasible. The contribution of the policy-makers would be to establish modalities which would make such international cooperation both efficient and economically attractive for Europe.
114. The economic benefits of space projects largely depend on the industrial policy pursued by space agencies. The choice of projects backed by the authorities, the nature of tenders awarded to industry, the transfer policy adopted, are all elements which strongly influence the impact of space projects on society.
115. In the European Space Agency, the main principles of industrial policy are drawn from the ESA convention. This convention, seen by many countries as the founding agreement for a European-style NASA, is based on two main principles, one of them purely political - one State, one vote - and the other industrial-political - proper return on investment. These principles have guided the development of European ambitions in space, according to the aims set out in Article II of the convention in particular, which provides for the elaboration and implementation of space programmes and of an industrial policy, and the integration of national programmes progressively and as completely as possible into the European space programme. The comparison which we can make today between the results achieved and the original aims reveals a mixed bag of very positive points, ambiguities and shortcomings.
116. The results of efforts to elaborate and implement European space programmes have already been dealt with extensively above. But what must be stressed here is the undeniable success achieved in creating an infrastructure which, in terms of cost and efficiency, is easily comparable to that of NASA. However, it is at the meeting point of applications and markets that the results are far more ambiguous. The demarcation of operational areas controlled by public authorities and those better left subject to market forces is not always clear in Europe, often because there has been too little interaction on the whole between the operational entities (Eutelsat, Eumetsat etc). In particular, views still differ considerably, even within European countries, as to what should be under ESA control and what should not.
117. Further ambiguity may be seen in links between European and national programmes. When ESA was set up, efforts to strike a compromise resulted more in a multi-state formation than an integrated European structure. Views certainly differed greatly between the small countries, whose tendency was to invest all their hopes in the ESA, sometimes at the cost of all ideas of a national policy (and their motivation was all the stronger since the ESA's one country-one vote rule gave their vote considerable weight), and the larger countries which saw the ESA as a natural extension of their national efforts. This compromise subsists today, particularly as the present convention remains vague on certain major points. For example, there is no obligation for a Member State to transform one of its projects into an ESA project (if only optional). The convention merely mentions a procedure under which any civilian programme undertaken by a Member State is open to co-operation from other Member States. The rivalry between national and European interests especially evident in coordinating investment on the ground is a source of over-investment, duplication and incoherency, which all serve to undermine overall effectiveness.
118. The outcome of the industrial policy pursued by the ESA, and particularly the matter of proper returns, is now more than ever the subject of hot debate. The negative aspects of proper returns are well known: distortion of competition, cumbersome administration, risk of duplication, risk of artificially maintaining uncompetitive expertise, lack of incentive, risk of braking the inevitable processes of industrial concentration for facing up to international competition etc. The principle of proper returns has nevertheless long served as the indispensable binding agent in the European space enterprise: without this principle, European space projects would certainly have been limited to two or three industrial groups located in one or two countries.
119. At its 1997 meeting, the Council of the ESA outlined a new industrial policy. Its main aims are to make more cost-efficient use of ESA’s resources, to increase European industry’s shares of the world markets, to stimulate industrial innovations, and to achieve balance between the interests of the prime contractors and subcontractors. The new partnership with the industry focuses on three main courses of action:
120. Besides, a move is made towards encouraging stronger competition by a reduction of the industrial return coefficient. In placing orders, special attention will be paid to small and medium-size enterprises.
121. In today’s Russia, the massive budget cuts have led to a strong competition within the space industry, as well as other hi-tech branches. The Russian legislation generally requires tenders in placing any governmental orders, and the present government is determined to reinforce this principle. On some occasions, Russian companies ran a painful competition also on the external market, such as the recent bid for engine for the new American launcher, Atlas IIAR. Despite all efforts, a coordinated national industrial policy is still lacking in the country. It is now broadly recognized that space activities play an important role for technological development nationwide and need a priority attention, although the financial limitation impose serious practical constraints. Foreign orders and private financing are used to cover part of this deficit. Meanwhile, a number of space projects have been frozen, including the space shuttle Buran which made its only unmanned flight in 1988. Some of the space industry capacities are converted to produce other, much less sophisticated goods. A complete reliance on one or the other may not serve the long-term objectives of space exploration projects and may not generate necessary public support.
3. Reinforcing political cooperation
122. In many ways, space exploration has now turned into a powerful instrument of increasing economic productivity and stimulating technological innovation. The cooperation in space also has a major positive implication for the political climate in Europe and worldwide. For these reasons, the development and implementation of international space policies deserve a higher level of political attention.
123. The world space exploration community is now linked by a tight network of organisations and cooperation agreements. Bilateral cooperation seems to be leading so far, on the political as well as private business level. ESA has signed framework cooperation agreements with Hungary, Romania, Poland and Greece and has received formal requests to conclude agreements with the Czech Republic, Portugal and Cyprus. Russia has signed space cooperation agreements with all the CIS countries, France, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal, USA, Japan, China, Israel and other states. Russian companies have entered into more than 80 space-related contracts and established some 10 joint ventures in this sector. A look at NASA would give a similar picture.
124. The international organisations vary in membership, political level and mandate. They cover most of the space-related issues and have often achieved sufficient positive results. However, there is still room for major improvement, ensuring a more efficient use of the existing infrastructure and providing a better cohesion between different national space programmes. The coordinating role of international space institutions should therefore be enhanced.
125. However, although various nations have a broad range of common interests in space, each country also has an individual set of specific goals, resources, constraints, and obligations. Different countries will follow their own rationales for engaging in exploration missions. Under the circumstances, it does not seem feasible in the near future to establish a kind of overarching international rationale for space programmes or to seek identifying a single dominant project. Nor would it be useful to attempt establishing a single political structure governing the space activities worldwide. Instead, existing institutions and programmes should introduce a closer cooperation.
126. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has traditionally been engaged in space policy debates. The first Recommendation on the topic was adopted as far back as in 1971. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the Assembly should maintain its attention to this policy area due to its global importance. New reports on this topic should reflect the forthcoming major developments in international space cooperation. The process of the reconsideration of the European space policies could start in mid-1998 in the view of the provisional results of construction of the Alpha station, as well as the outcome of the new ESA Council meeting and the planned space policy debate in the European Parliament.
127. On the intergovernmental level, a better coordination is first of all needed between the national space agencies. They should serve as the principal propagators of space exploration and of international cooperation in the area. According to the experts, it is time now for these bodies to attempt developing an international 'cooperative strategy' defining the goals and common interests of all space-exploring nations, as well as the methods to achieve these goals through joint effort. Besides, there is a need for a better exchange of information concerning the processes for selecting and funding prospective space-science projects, with the view of developing a relatively unified set of criteria, especially useful for international projects.
128. It could also be reasonable to establish new international bodies for specific space-related issues, such as:
129. Last, but not the least, one should encourage establishing international fora providing for a broad constructive dialogue between various actors of the space exploration projects (government officials, researchers, industrial leaders, users of spatial services, etc.). In this context, we could mention the initiative of the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics to hold a series of policy workshops on international space cooperation. The first two meetings were held in the USA in 1992 and 1994, the third one at ESA ground facilities in Italy in 1996, the fourth is scheduled for 1998 in Canada. These workshops have produced a number of fresh initiatives which have partly inspired this chapter. Your Rapporteur thinks that Europe should both actively participate in such arrangements and be more active in initiating them.
130. After more than 40 years of massive investment, the different European States have succeeded in establishing a space infrastructure (satellites, launchers, ground-stations etc) which is both coherent and operational. The applications generated by that infrastructure are enjoying spectacular growth and the prospects for growth beyond the beginning of the next century remain most promising. It is likely that, while the space infrastructure will always require constant improvement and maintenance, it is now the applications which will serve as the driving force in space technology development. The associated economic prospects are considerable.
131. In order to comply with the strict demands of the world market, all the European nations will have to increase their competitiveness as far as both the product quality and marketing are concerned. The emerging market of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America as well as the increasing demand for "small" launchers represent major new opportunities for the space industry. Having renowned technological expertise will not be enough. It will also need political will, experience underscored by convincing demonstrations, effective financing arrangements, and control and influence over the system of standards and regulation governing these activities. The efforts required from European firms to take the lead in these markets will have to be strongly supported by the national governments and European institutions.
132. In particular, the European institutions could play the role of lead-users in the numerous space applications falling within the public interest (anti-pollution measures, territorial surveillance, conflict surveillance, coastal surveillance etc) or the role of spokesman for groups of users who have difficulty in expressing their needs and requirements (farmers for example); they could also act as a clearing house for the disparate efforts of large-scale users in strategic areas. The setting up of a European institution for the use of telecommunications satellites, responsible for negotiating orbital positions and frequency allocations, would be desirable from this point of view. Europe must have a strong and consonant voice to express its strategic wishes on the world scene. A similar institution in the area of satellite navigation services must be set up as a matter of urgency.
133. The European space enterprise has been founded on principles geared to the creation of a solely civilian infrastructure. This approach, fully agreed when the ESA was first set up, nevertheless has negative implications as far as American competition is concerned. Europe does not enjoy the advantages offered by the ability to design and implement joint defence-civilian projects. For some applications (ground observation), this lack of collaboration is a distinct handicap for innovation. Joint discussions must be held to establish whether joint-ventures between the defence and civilian sectors are conceivable for certain activities or only possible on an individual State basis. The long-term consequence, however, would be to foster the more rapid development of national efforts in relation to European efforts.
134. Unfortunately for space science, it seems that at this precise moment the enormous drive towards discovery, which was specific to the last decades, has lost its momentum. Man has completed the exploration of the Earth, has developed communications and informatisation to a previously unimaginable degree, and walked on the Moon. Now humanity has entered the age of balanced budgets at all costs, and strictly monetary-based assessment of every activity. Space science suffered because of budget cuts in the last years and it needs to take serious steps to raise public awareness of the importance of fundamental space research.
135. Education, particularly of potential users, is a major strategic challenge, falling largely to the public authorities. However, the problem is that most potential users do not directly "consume" space products and services, which are generally incorporated in existing media (eg in large data networks). It is therefore a question of both educating engineers and designers as to the technical potential of space technology for enhancing existing applications and of creating awareness of the potential contribution of space technology among the end-users.
136. While the bulk of space programme investment has been covered by public funding, it is likely that market forces will now gradually take over. However, an abrupt withdrawal of state involvement would certainly be a grave error. Work on the infrastructure is not yet complete and some undertakings will remain out of reach for private investment, some aspects of space technology touch on security and defence matters and justify the involvement of States, scientific projects lie very much in the domain of public authorities and so on. And, as we have already seen, the presence of the States is also necessary to oversee the development of applications, if only because, in many potential fields of application, potential users have not established their requirements or are unable to express them or also because numerous applications lie in the public interest.
137. Space agencies must therefore take on a new role. Alongside the major scientific undertakings, their other projects will have to be more closely related to applications. This change of approach is not easy, as it goes against the "space culture" which has governed the construction of the space infrastructure to date. In the design of application-oriented projects, a stronger role will have to be played by the potential users from the very beginning. The radical changes made in this field by the car industry is a source of inspiration. Procedures for awarding contracts to industry can also be improved, if we once again draw inspiration from the spectacular progress made in certain industries. Another major task of space agencies is providing a better international coordination of efforts.
138. European space cooperation is now going sufficiently beyond the ESA, and this development should be welcomed. The scope of the present space exploration goals and the severe competition on the market move Europe towards a more active global cooperation, including enhanced ESA-Russia links. Such engagement will provide Europe with technological innovation and strengthen its positions on the market.
139. As far as the ESA is concerned, the proper returns principle will have to be reviewed, in conjunction with the other European institutions, but the process must not be rushed. This principle is, after all, the binding agent of European space efforts and may serve to attract new countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. Generally, in-depth discussion between the ESA and the European Union with a view to clearly determining their roles and removing any ambiguity seems desirable. Any political uncertainty in this area would be damaging to Europe's ability to compete.
140. While it is likely that space programmes will continue to generate indirect effects, the nature of those effects could radically change. As technologies become increasingly interactive, cross-fertilisation coming from other sectors is as much a hope for the future as the conventional transfer of technology from space to other disciplines.
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5
Appendix 6
Reporting committee: Committee on Science and Technology.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
Reference to committee: Doc. 7583, Reference No. 2094 du 24 June 1996, and Doc. 7854
Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 27 June 1997
Members of the committee: MM. Melnikov (Chairman), Tiuri, Mme Terborg, Mr Birraux (Vice-Chairpersons), MM. About, Bartodziej, Bauer, Beaufays, Berceanu, Mrs Biga-Friganovic (Alternate: M. Lang), Bogar, Brunhart, Caccia, Cherep, Cherribi, Chornovil, Cioni, Connolly, Cunliffe, Fernandez Aguilar, Frey, Galley, Hadjidemetriou, Ivanov, Janecek, Johansson, Karlsson, Kitov, K�lahli, Lambergs (Alternate: Boka), Leers, Lekberg, Lenzer, Liiv, Lorenzi, Maass, Melcak, Mozgan, Mrs Nistad (Alternate: Mr Lie), MM. Niza, Olrich, Onaindia (Alternate: Mrs Guirado), MM. Pawlak (Alternate: Rewaj), Petersen, Prokes, Prusi, Raskinis, Rokos, Roseta, Ryabov, Steolea, Szalay, Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, Jack Thompson (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Turini, Vella, Weyts, Y�r�r, Mrs Zissi.
N.B. The names of those members who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries of the committee: Mr Lervik, Mr Torcatoriu