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Doc. 7973
23 December 1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina: return of refugees and displaced persons
Report
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography
Rapporteur : Mr Tadeusz Iwínski, Poland, Socialist Group
Summary
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in the internal and external displacement of approximately 2.2 million people. The Dayton Agreement, concluded on 21 November 1995, stipulates in its Annex 7 that all these refugees and displaced persons have the right to return to their homes of origin. The actual return figures for 1996 and 1997 fall short of expectations, and 689 000 refugees and 866 000 displaced people are still awaiting a durable solution. The report assesses the progress made towards full implementation of the provisions of Annex 7 and seeks to identify the main obstacles to return. The draft recommendation proposes concrete measures to be taken in order to speed up the whole process.
The Rapporteur pays tribute to the efforts made by the international community, and in particular by the UNHCR, towards the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I. Draft recommendation
1. The Parliamentary Assembly reaffirms its support for the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement, whose Annex 7 recognizes the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin, to have restored to them the property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.
2. The Assembly welcomes the measures taken by the international community to promote and facilitate the early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons, and in particular the efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Assembly emphasises that all returns must be truly voluntary and coordinated with UNHCR.
3. The Assembly recalls that about half of the approximately 2.2 million people who were uprooted by the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were displaced internally and the other half became refugees in the countries of the former Yugoslavia (580,000) and elsewhere in Europe (635,000).
4. The Assembly welcomes the return, in 1996 and 1997, of 204,000 internally displaced persons to their homes and 172,900 refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fact that a further 350,000 refugees have found durable solutions in their host countries.
5. However, the Assembly is concerned that returns so far have been almost exclusively to areas where returnees find themselves in the majority ethnic group, whereas only some 35,000 people have returned to minority areas. Moreover, a total of 860,000 people remain displaced (450,000 in the Federation and 416,000 in Republika Srpska) and 689,000 refugees still await a durable solution in the form of repatriation, integration in present locations or resettlement in a third country. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the remaining refugees and displaced persons originate from areas where they would now be in a minority underscores the need for rapid progress in minority returns.
6. The Assembly deplores the obstacles which hamper speedier return - notably political, legislative and administrative obstruction on the part of the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially the Republika Srpska, human rights violations and discrimination against minorities, insecurity including the widespread presence of landmines, high unemployment, a depressed standard of living, severe shortage of housing, and absence of utilities and infrastructure.
7. The Assembly emphasises the urgent need for the international community to finance housing in which to accommodate internally displaced persons presently occupying the homes of returning refugees and expansion of housing capacity in areas having received large numbers of returnees.
8. The Assembly considers it important that all international governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in the reconstruction and return process should ensure that they keep each other and the local authorities informed of their projects and plans, including sources of financing, in order to improve coordination and avoid duplication of effort.
9. The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers urge:
i. the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
a. to develop inter-Entity dialogue and cooperation at all political levels with a view to the full implementation of the provisions of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement;
b. to adopt a comprehensive framework policy to promote the return of refugees and displaced people and to facilitate their integration;
c. to support UNHCR's "Open Cities" initiative as a means rapidly to accelerate minority return movements;
d. to support the implementation of the results of the municipal elections held on 13-14 September 1997, and in particular the installation in office of mixed municipalities;
e. to support more actively the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to have all indicted war criminals brought to justice;
f. to speed up the establishment of joint police forces;
g. to abolish all illegal practices by the police forces aimed at the intimidation of members of minorities, including the drawing up of secret lists of alleged war criminals;
h. to introduce effective law enforcement measures aimed at ending human rights violations and discrimination against minorities;
i. to put a stop to the illegal encouragement and inducement of relocation as a means of "ethnic engineering" aimed at consolidating control over territory and blocking minority returns;
j. in accordance with the recommendations of the Office of the High Representative, to amend all property legislation, particularly on socially owned apartments, aimed at obstructing the return of pre-war residents and, once amended, introduce effective enforcement measures;
k. to remove all administrative obstacles to return such as war taxes, visas and customs fees, and speed up delivery of passports and travel documents;
l. to abolish the unacceptable practice of refusing to register returnees who have no accommodation, thereby leaving them with no social rights or benefits;
m. to remove obstacles to freedom of movement and communication, and in particular to implement procedures on uniform vehicle registration and introduce nationwide licence plates;
n. to intensify efforts to remove land-mines;
o. to enforce the prohibition of anti-minority propaganda and promote reconciliation in the mass media;
p. not to be bound by the principle of reciprocity in regard to minority returns;
ii. the member states concerned:
a. to comply fully with UNHCR recommendations concerning repatriation of refugees and work closely with UNHCR to ensure safe, dignified, phased and orderly return;
b. to refrain from forced repatriation of refugees originating from minority areas in order to avoid further destabilisation of the ethnic composition of the country;
c. to continue to extend international protection to those categories of refugees deemed in need by UNHCR until all conditions for return in safety and dignity to the place of origin are assured;
d. to guarantee loans for reconstruction projects financed by the Social Development Fund, in particular in the housing sector, in addition to their efforts made elsewhere;
e. to follow the example set by certain member states in allowing refugees to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina and to come back to the host country pending a permanent decision to return;
iii. all member states:
a. to step up contributions to the funding of reconstruction, in particular with a view to the provision of temporary and permanent housing as well as utilities and infrastructure;
b. to increase their financial support for the "Open Cities" declared by UNHCR, and for other municipalities open to minority returns (twinning of villages, etc);
c. to support income-generating projects and intensify investment with a view to expanding employment;
iv. the appropriate sectors of the Council of Europe:
a. to continue to contribute to confidence-building and the development of civil and democratic society in Bosnia and Herzegovina through legal expertise, training programmes and support for non-governmental organisations, as well as for the Local Democracy Embassies.
II. Explanatory Memorandum by Mr Iwínski
Contents
Page
1. Introduction 6
2. Assessment of progress in the implementation of Annex
of the Dayton Agreement 7
1. General overview 7
a. Situation at the beginning of 1996 (before the first returns) 7
b. Present situation 7
2. Majority returns 9
3. Minority returns 9
4. Measures undertaken to facilitate returns 10
a. Facilitation of repatriation formalities 10
b. Incentive packages and repatriation assistance 10
c. Target Areas for Return 11
d. Shelter programmes 11
e. Coalition for return 11
f. Community level confidence-building 11
g. Zone of separation return procedures 11
h. Pilot projects within the Federation 12
i. Organised assessment visits 12
j. Transit centres 12
k. Bus services 12
l. Financial incentives for municipalities 12
m. Open cities 13
n. Human rights institution 13
3. Obstacles to return 13
1. Conditions affecting all returnees 13
a. Housing gap and lack of infrastructure 13
b. Laws 14
c. Administrative obstacles 14
d. Economic situation and unemployment 14
e. Freedom of movement 14
f. Mines 15
2. Particular concerns affecting minority returns 15
a. Lack of political will 15
b. Lack of security 15
c. Relocations 15
d. Media propaganda against reintegration 16
4. Conclusions – Recommendations 16
Appendix - Programme of the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina organised
by the Sub-Committee on Refugees, 12-16 October 1997 19
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) concluded on 21 November 1995 considers the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin a crucial part of the reconstruction process. Accordingly, it recognizes the right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin. Annex 7, entirely devoted to the question, also recognizes the right of returnees to have restored to them property of which they were deprived as of 1991, and to compensation for any property that cannot be restored.
2. Under reference 2155 of 27 January 1997, the Committee was seized of a motion for a recommendation on the unilateral repatriation of Bosnian refugees. This report is the Committee's response to that reference. The Committee held a Hearing on the repatriation of Bosnian refugees in January 1997. The Sub-Committee on Refugees organised a Seminar in Sarajevo on 16 October 1997, and a delegation of the Sub-Committee visited certain regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina relevant to the question of returns, where they had the opportunity to speak with representatives of UNHCR and other international agencies and non-governmental organisations directly involved in the repatriation process, as well as with repatriates themselves. The programme of the visit, which took place from 12 to 15 October 1997, is appended to the present report.
3. On 25 September 1997 the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a list of minimal short term conditions to be fulfilled before the opening of the procedure for accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The list includes the adoption of concrete measures for an accelerated voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin, in particular to "minority areas", as well as free movement of persons across the inter-entity boundary line. On 6 November 1997 the Committee on Political Affairs held an exchange of views with the special guest delegation from the Bosnian Parliament. The committee agreed that there had been progress in many areas covered by the list of minimum conditions, but significant problems still remained, particularly regarding co-operation with the International Tribunal in The Hague, the protection of human rights, the return of refugees and media freedom.
4. It should be noted that at present the Committee is seized with another report concerning the refugees and displaced persons from the region, namely on the return of Croatian refugees and displaced persons (Reference 2185).
5. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his particular gratitude to the Bosnian special guest delegation for their invitation to hold the Seminar in Sarajevo, and for their hospitality on that occasion, as well as to UNHCR, without whose invaluable assistance the field visit could not have taken place.
2. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX 7 OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
1. General overview
a. Situation at the beginning of 1996 (before the first returns)
6. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave rise to the movement of approximately 2.2 million persons out of a pre-war population of 4.3 million. Of these, some 1 million people were displaced within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas over 1.2 million persons found refuge in 25 host states. Just under half of these (580 000) stayed in the countries of former Yugoslavia, while most of the rest (635 000) have been dispersed in other European countries.
7. By early 1996, when the first returns took place, Germany was host to the largest number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina (345 000), followed by Croatia (288 000), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (253 000), Austria (80 000), Sweden (61 500), Switzerland (26 700), Slovenia (33 400), the Netherlands (23 500), Denmark (23 000) and the United Kingdom (13 000).
8. Concerning the ethnicity of refugees, 80 % of those staying in the European countries (outside the countries of former Yugoslavia) were Bosniacs and 13% Croats. In Croatia, the majority of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina were of Croat origin, and 23% were Bosniacs. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the ethnic origin of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina was uniform: 99,9% Serb.
9. As for the place of origin of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina staying in the European countries (other than the countries of former Yugoslavia), 35 % of them originated from the present Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 65% from Republika Srpska. 55% of refugees staying in Croatia originated from the Federation, and 45% from Republika Srpska. 80% of refugees of Serb origin living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia originated in the Federation. These figures show clearly that over half of the refugees abroad, whether in Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or other European countries, originated from areas where they would now be in minority.
10. Concerning the displaced persons, according to UNHCR estimations, some 75 % of the total were in a refugee-like situation, and originated from areas where their ethnic group would constitute a minority.
b. Present situation2
11. The actual return figures for 1996 and 1997 fell short of expectations, as regards both refugees and displaced persons. Moreover, an additional 80 000 people were displaced as a result of the transfer of territories, mainly the Sarajevo suburbs, between the two entities.
12. To date, 172 900 refugees have returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina (90 000 in 1996 and 82 900 in 1997) mainly from Germany and Switzerland. Over 350 000 refugees have found durable solutions in their host countries: they have been granted a more permanent status, started the process of acquiring citizenship, or obtained it.
13. 689 000 refugees still require a durable solution. The overwhelming majority originates from the minority areas. The greatest number of refugees are located in Germany (approximately 250 000), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (253 000) and Croatia (160 000).
14. Over 204 000 internally displaced people have returned to their homes since the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement (164 000 in 1996, 40 000 in 1997), mainly to the Federation (102 000).
15. 866 000 people remain displaced (450 000 in the Federation and 416 000 in Republika Srpska). The majority of them come from regions where they would now constitute an ethnic minority. They usually occupy the homes of other displaced people or refugees. The inability to find solutions for the displaced through minority returns means that other return movements are blocked since the original owner or occupant cannot come back to his or her home.
16. In many areas absorption capacity is at a breaking point, and new returns, in particular those of ethnic minority groups, result in tension and incidents.
17. Although UNHCR accepts that refugees originating from majority areas can be expected to return to their homes in those areas, the forced return to majority areas of persons originating from minority areas can only lead to further displacement of the population.
18. Some 600 people have been deported to date (539 from Germany) and thousands more have been induced to return for fear of being deported. Given the extreme housing shortage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such practice reduces opportunities for minority returns to take place, since these people usually come back to majority areas and occupy someone else's house.
19. UNHCR is encouraging host countries to implement return policies that have the least destabilizing effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and enable peaceful, orderly and phased reconstruction of the ethnic composition of the country.
20. A certain number of "active relocations" (where individuals decide to make a new start in majority areas), as opposed to "passive relocations" (where individuals relocate for lack of an alternative but have no intention to remain) have been observed. Voluntary reversals of war-time shifts of population from villages to cities are however difficult to distinguish at this stage. The difficult economic situation prevailing in the Republika Srpska may also be a factor discouraging relocations to the Serb majority area.
21. A separate problem, which will be only mentioned here as it will be the subject of another report under preparation by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, is linked with the presence of 48 000 Croatian Serb refugees, many without identification papers, practically stateless, who settled in the Republika Srpska following Operations "Flash" and "Storm" launched by the Croatian Army in the Summer of 1995.
22. During the visit, particular attention of the Delegation was drawn to specific problems encountered by disabled refugees and displaced persons who constitute one of the most vulnerable groups and in the majority of cases do not enjoy any privileged treatment.
2. Majority returns
23. So far, returns have occurred mainly to areas where the returnees form part of the majority group (so-called majority returns as opposed to minority returns). The great majority of these were to the Federation.
24. Most of the majority returns were over by the end of 1996, and this is the main reason for the slower than expected pace of return in 1997.
25. Up to 80% of these returns were considered by the UNHCR to be "spontaneous", i.e. entirely voluntary. A certain number of returns have been "induced" by the threat of deportation, and, as already mentioned, some 600 were actually deported.
26. UNHCR's efforts to implement a return plan have met with success as far as majority returns are concerned. The authorities in the Federation are in principle more cooperative than the authorities in Republika Srpska, which, for example, have consistently failed to send a representative to attend the Repatriation Working Group. A significant number of the municipal authorities have continuously failed to provide UNHCR with regular statistics on returnees -figures which are essential to return and reintegration policy.
3. Minority returns
27. Almost all displaced persons and the overwhelming majority of refugees who have not yet found a durable solution originate from places now under the control of a different ethnic group.
28. The pace of the return process in this case is visibly slower. In 1996 there were only 10 000 minority returns, most of which occurred discreetly. In 1997 more than 20 000 have taken place so far, mainly to the territory of the Federation.
29. Minority returns are still very much blocked. In particular this is true in regard to Republika Srpska, the Croat controlled areas and some hard-line Bosniac areas. The exceptions in Republika Srpska are some of the Zone of Separation (ZOS) areas and priority areas nominated by the Brčko Return Commission. However in these cases permanent protection by SFOR is necessary in order to allow return in safety. Recent incidents in some ZOS areas and Drvar demonstrate that without the security umbrella provided by SFOR, minority returns are not possible.
30. There have also been a small number of minority returns to different locations in Republika Srpska like Sipovo, Kotor Varos and Banja Luka. But in general the Republika Srpska government maintains an anti-minority return policy, using the argument that the needs and rights of the displaced Serbs must be met first. There is no possibility for minority returns to Eastern Republika Srpska.
31. The Croat-controlled areas in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina are particularly hostile to minority returns, although there have been some returns of Bosniacs to Glamoč and to Croat-controlled areas in central Bosnia. They also are dependent on protection by SFOR troops.
32. The attitude of the authorities in the Federation towards minority returns is in principle better than in the Republika Srpska but in many cases, in particular at the municipal level, there is a lot of room for improvement. There are numerous cases of deliberate obstruction and of the application of quotas (exchange of equal numbers of minority returnees between the Entities).
33. It is possible that interest in the UNHCR's "Open Cities" initiative by local authorities wishing to attract funding will result in a wider opening for minority returns, in particular in Central Bosnia Canton.
34. Both in the Federation and in Republika Srpska, ethnic groups, in particular displaced persons occupying the houses of minorities, are often manipulated by the nationalist parties to oppose violently the returns of these minority-members of a given community.
4. Measures undertaken to facilitate returns
35. In order to facilitate the repatriation process in coordination with all relevant bodies, UNHCR initiated the following measures:
a. facilitation of repatriation formalities
36. A Quintpartite Agreement on Transit, signed on 29 May 1996 by Austria, Croatia, Germany, Slovenia and Switzerland has greatly facilitated movements of returnees through the territory of participating states. A number of other asylum States have expressed their interest in acceding to that Agreement. The formalities regarding travel documents have also been simplified. However the consular authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not always capable of streamlining procedures (there are unjustified delays in issuing passports).
b. Incentive Packages and Repatriation Assistance
37. Some asylum countries offer different financial incentives which include travel expenses and travel pocket money, a repatriation grant, luggage allowances and assistance to receiving communities. Concern has occasionally been expressed that this might be a source of tension in home communities, but this fear does not seem to be justified. Nevertheless, returnees are often forced to "share" their hard currency benefits through the imposition of high "war taxes".
c. Target Areas for Return
38. In June 1996, UNHCR initiated a programme aimed at accelerating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their original houses through the designation of "Target Areas", concentrating investment in shelter and infrastructure in order to increase absorption capacity. The International Management Group was entrusted the leading role in the coordination of the programme. The majority of the Target Areas selected were in the Federation (19 out of 22 in the beginning of 1997) due to the lesser degree of co-operation offered by the authorities in Republika Srpska. Lack of employment opportunities remained a significant factor constraining the return of displaced people; nevertheless, during 1996 the Target Areas project made possible the return of more than 100 000 internally displaced persons, mostly to majority areas.
d. Shelter programmes
39. In February 1996 UNHCR initiated a "Trust Fund for Shelter Materials in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in order to expand its existing shelter-material support programme to include urgent repair of housing. The building materials are produced locally in order to increase employment opportunities.
e. Coalition for return
40. Coalition for return, a multi-ethnic movement of displaced persons from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in October 1996 on the initiative of the Deputy High Representative. Its main aim is to lobby for the creation of an appropriate climate and conditions for returns.
f. Community level confidence-building
41. This project is carried out under the aegis of OSCE as part of the long-term democratisation strategy to facilitate the development of a multi-ethnic civil society. The main aim is to develop dialogue and co-operation in areas where the population must overcome mutual distrust. Community level confidence-building tools include: cross-ethnic meetings of all target groups, town meetings, and open information meetings.
42. The Council of Europe has also elaborated a number of projects for Bosnia and Herzegovina within its general programme of “Confidence-building measures” aimed at increasing tolerance and understanding between peoples. They are carried out in a wide variety of fields, including the media, education, cultural and social areas. Their primary distinguishing characteristic is that the activities involve non-governmental partners. Some of the projects develop the concept of Local Democracy Embassies.
g. Zone of separation return procedures
43. The ZOS is a two-kilometre-wide strip on either side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and is subject to specific return procedures agreed by the international community in October 1996. Although by the beginning of September 1997, the return applications of some 3 354 families had been approved by the International Housing Commission, only 489 persons had actually been able to do so, mostly to the Republika Srpska side of the ZOS. The main obstacle to return is the very poor security situation and the lack of will to allow return to this politically and militarily sensitive area.
44. Brčko, subject to arbitration, is monitored by an International Supervisor who has established particular return procedures for this region, allowing some 295 families (1 133 persons) to return to date, under more intense supervision from SFOR than in other locations. Only 84 families returned in 1996 under the international procedures for return to the Zone of Separation. During the meeting with Ambassador Robert W. Farrand, Supervisor, the delegation was informed of specific security problems in this area. The members visited two returnee villages in the ZOS and had a possibility to speak to the inhabitants.
h. Pilot projects within the Federation
45. Initiated as early as November 1995, this plan originally provided for 600 ethnic minority families to return to "pilot project towns", where confidence-building measures were undertaken. However, the scheme proved to be too little effective, and was not expanded.
i. Organised assessment visits
46. Endorsed by the Parties in the Joint Statement and Guidelines of May 1996, these visits unfortunately have not proved to be a success, mainly due to the obstacles created by the local authorities. Nevertheless, UNHCR continues to support the efforts of leaders of displaced persons and communities seeking to carry out these visits.
j. Transit centres
47. Established by UNHCR jointly with the Federation Ministry for Refugees, these centres offer accommodation for returnees for a maximum of 48 hours (in practice much longer) and provide food and other services. The current capacity of the centres is 3000.
k. Bus services
48. In May 1996, UNHCR introduced the first of now eleven UNHCR-sponsored cross-IEBL bus lines to improve and encourage freedom of movement between communities. The bus service allows as many as 5 000 Bosnians per week to cross the entity line.
l. Financial incentives for municipalities
49. Municipalities which do not comply with the principles and obligations established by the Dayton Agreement do not receive financial assistance, including reconstruction aid. They are only entitled to humanitarian support. Consequently, Republika Srpska receives only 2% of financial assistance directed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and certain municipalities in the Federation have been "blacklisted" by the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
m. Open cities
50. In March 1997, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched the "Open Cities Initiative" aiming at encouraging and rewarding local communities and municipalities which take concrete steps to welcome back previous residents, whatever their ethnic group. Under its Open Cities Initiative, UNHCR has recognized four Open Cities in the Federation (Konjić, Busovaca, Vogosca and Bihać) and is currently assessing the openness to minority return of eight others. The delegation visited Tuzla, declared an Open City, and met its local authorities and returnees.
n. Human rights institutions
51. Annex 6 to the Dayton Agreement established the Commission on Human Rights which is an independent institution of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of two parts: the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, and the Human Rights Chamber. The mandate of the Commission is to consider violations of human rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and a number of other instruments, including the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. The delegation met Mrs Gret Haller, Ombudsperson, whose office is the first instance to receive complaints, many of them referring to the problems encountered by refugees.
3. OBSTACLES TO RETURN
1. Conditions affecting all returnees
a. Housing gap and lack of infrastructure
52. The estimated cost for the reconstruction and replacement of damaged and destroyed buildings on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the order of US$ 4,000,000,000. For the 4 year reconstruction programme prepared by the World Bank, the European Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, approximately 11,25% has been pledged so far (a total of US$ 450,000,000). There is a massive shortfall of funding to make housing available for returning and displaced persons. To counter this shortfall houses are repaired only to such a level as to provide the absolute minimum requirements for human habitation.
53. There is not enough property to house returnees. Displaced persons are occupying the homes of others. The rate of reconstruction is 30 per cent of the rate of return. In certain regions, particularly in north-eastern Bosnia, and in East Mostar, there is no reception capacity for returnees.
54. Lack of accommodation is one of the main arguments for municipal authorities to refuse the registration of newly arriving returnees. This creates an additional problem of "unregistered" people, deprived of basic social security. There are no statistics on the number of these people, but in Tuzla alone there are 2000-3000 Bosniacs from Republika Srpska without displaced person status.
55. Although the housing gap affects all returns, the situation is obviously more dramatic when this objective obstacle is compounded by a lack of political will to receive repatriates. Cooperation with municipal authorities and good coordination of reconstruction projects are essential.
b. Laws
56. The war-time property legislation (Laws on abandoned property) regarding socially owned apartments is still in force. It prevents the return of many pre-war residents, deprived of their accommodation. It is estimated that before the war there were 100 000 socially-owned flats.
57. The war-time legislation governing privately-owned property has just been amended but the amendments are not yet in force.
58. In addition, the civil and military authorities have allocated some "abandoned" property to new residents in contravention of existing provisions.
59. The Republika Srpska Entity Law on the use of Deserted Property allows for recovery of an occupied property only if the current occupants are able to return to their home in the Federation or receives fair compensation. The High Representative has declared this law a violation of the Dayton Agreement, but it has not been changed so far.
60. The new provisions of the customs law, which result in refugees no longer being exempt from customs duties on their personal and business possessions, also act as a deterrent to return.
61. The Amnesty Law in Republika Srpska has not been amended to cover draft evaders and deserters.
c. Administrative obstacles
62. There are various administrative obstacles to return such as the charging of war taxes and visa and registration fees. As already mentioned, in most areas returnees face serious problems registering with local authorities (in order to acquire social rights and personal documents) if they cannot return to their own homes and have no alternative accommodation thus creating a big group of displaced people in an irregular situation.
d. Economic situation and unemployment
63. Limited employment opportunities constitute a serious obstacle to returns. The unemployment rate is estimated at 52% in the Federation and 60% in Republika Srpska. Approximately 80 per cent of returnees do not get jobs on returning. This dramatic situation is combined with ethnic discrimination in the job market.
e. Freedom of movement
64. There is still no real freedom of movement between the entities or within the Federation. This is one of the main impediments to repatriation and return. Restrictions on freedom of movement are largely enforced through an abuse of administrative authority, particularly by the local police. There has still been no real progress in establishing cross-entity postal and telecommunications services although some cross-entity telephone lines now exist.
65. UNHCR therefore fully supports the establishment of a Freedom of Movement Commission. UNHCR also welcomes the commitment of both Entities contained in the Joint Statement of 21 March 1997 to fully allow safe freedom of movement within the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
66. Both entities have to agree on uniform vehicle registration procedures and the introduction of nation-wide license plates.
f. Mines
67. The presence of mines (estimated at 6 million) is a serious threat to returnees (as well as of course to the entire population). In certain regions, political will for their removal is clearly lacking, and new mines have even been laid to deter returnees.
2. Particular concerns affecting minority returns
a. Lack of political will
68. As mentioned above, the Republika Srpska authorities in particular, but also numerous municipal and cantonal authorities in the Federation, are not cooperative. The principle of "reciprocity" is often invoked when refusing reception of minority returns.
b. Lack of security
69. The security situation is worrying. There are cases of burning of houses of potential returnees, as well as of the remining of whole areas. Crimes committed against members of minority groups are frequently not investigated and go unpunished. Minority returnees are harassed and even persons on assessment visits are often met by groups of protesters who can react violently. If incidents are fairly rare, that is mainly because minority members avoid taking risks to return.
70. Secret lists of persons charged with war crimes, targeting minority groups from a given area, contribute to the fear of return of these population groups.
71. The separate police forces in the Federation contribute to the climate of insecurity. However, the situation has improved in certain municipalities in the Federation where Cantonal Police have been formed composed of joint forces of different ethnic groups.
c. Relocations
72. Relocation is still encouraged (and induced) as a means of ethnic engineering. For example, displaced Bosnian Croats are encouraged to live in areas such as Drvar and Glamoč. Displaced Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska are intimidated and harassed by the Republika Srpska authorities if they openly consider returning to their own homes in the Federation.
73. UNHCR is aware of displaced persons, including very vulnerable groups such as mentally handicapped persons, being moved into uninhabitable housing in the ZOS in order to act as a buffer against minority returns to this area.
d. Media propaganda against reintegration
74. The media are still almost totally controlled by the nationalist parties, particularly in Republika Srpska and, to a lesser extent, in the Croat-controlled areas. They disseminate anti-return and anti-minority propaganda.
4. CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS
75. Progress in the implementation of the provisions of Annex 7 to the Dayton Agreement is undeniable, but its pace is unsatisfactory. In your Rapporteur's opinion the main reason for this is insufficient, and in some cases non-existent, political will on the part of the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in both its Entities. A major breakthrough in minority returns, to a great extent blocked by the authorities, would open new possibilities for the return of displaced people and refugees including in majority areas. Even authorities in the Federation, in general much more cooperative than in Republika Srpska, and despite verbal support at the highest level, create a lot of obstruction at the cantonal, and most often at the municipal level. This has to be changed, and the positive example set by the Mayor of Tuzla shows that it is possible.
76. The results of the municipal elections held in September 1997 leave room for a certain degree of optimism. A high participation rate (2.2 million out of 2.5 registered), in particular massive participation of potential returnees, who voted in their places of origin, is considered to be an obvious expression of the will to return. The forthcoming challenge, implementation of the results, which means installation in office of the elected authorities, has to be supported by the international organisations involved in the peace process.
77. A change in the negative attitude demonstrated by the authorities in regard to minority-returns will have to be accompanied by dialogue and co-operation between the Entities. Then, a multisectoral approach to return issues must be adopted. At present there is no overall framework policy which would include legislative, economic and development aspects to deal with returning people, and to facilitate their reintegration in full co-operation with international agencies involved in the process. Here, the Council of Europe could provide its legal assistance and expertise.
78. Amendments to property law on socially owned housing in both entities, and on privately owned property in the Republika Srpska, should be adopted as soon as possible. It is an urgent matter of correcting committed injustices. Also measures aiming at the enforcement of the laws should be introduced. Full co-operation of local authorities with the Commission for Real Property Claims of Refugees and Displaced Persons is necessary.
79. The question of security is linked with the question of political will, as the process of creating joint police forces is deliberately slowed down by the parties concerned. It has to be accelerated. This is also a matter of punishment of war criminals, and the authorities of both Entities should co-operate fully with the international war crimes tribunal in this respect.
80. Administrative obstacles hindering returns should be removed as a matter of urgency. It is unacceptable that repatriates are forced to pay war taxes; these should be immediately abolished. Also other measures aiming at streamlining returning procedures (issuing of passports by consulates, registration of returns etc) should be introduced in a simplified form as soon as possible.
81. Obviously, real freedom of movement between both entities is an essential factor in the reconstruction and return process, and is dependent to a great extent on the will to co-operate being exercised by the authorities of both entities. A complete change of attitude is required to bring about such measures as the introduction of nationwide licence plates, the establishment of regular transport, proper law enforcement by future joint police, etc.
82. The elimination of the threat of landmines through mine-clearance remains an urgent need. This is the responsibility of the Entity authorities supported actively by the international community.
83. With regard to the material needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have a direct bearing on the return process, the member states of the Council of Europe should substantially step up their contributions to the funding of reconstruction.
84. Whereas additional funding is needed, better use should be made of funds already available. In particular a more rational system for vacating accommodation should be designed. It should be combined with a boost to temporary secondary housing, now being built or planned by organisations involved in the reconstruction process.
85. UNHCR advocates a nation-wide soft loan scheme to bridge the housing gap. This is where the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund could play an important role, using its considerable potential.
86. The extremely important question of destroyed infrastructure hinders the return process in a visible way. The reconstruction of infrastructure rarely goes hand in hand with reconstruction of houses, and yet it constitutes a necessary condition for returns. There are a number of projects pending implementation due to lack of funds. During the visit in Tuzla, the Delegation was informed of a very interesting project prepared by the municipality in cooperation with UNHCR for modernising the city's water supply. This project has already been granted a loan by the Social Development Fund, although it has not yet been disbursed. The municipality of Tuzla proposes that interest on this loan be used to fund further credit. The UNHCR supports this idea and the Rapporteur also urges the examination of this proposal.
87. Small-scale income-generating projects have considerable impact on returns. Such projects include credit schemes to small entrepreneurs and for the revival of the industrial sector. But the slow progress made by the authorities in establishing joint institutions and adopting relevant legislation in the economic field hinders more substantial economic development.
88. UNHCR's "Open Cities" initiative has proved to be successful. However, it also requires financial resources. The Assembly should urge the governments of the member States to make an additional financial effort in order to actively support it.
89. International organisations involved in the reconstruction process do not always provide sufficient information on their projects and plans, as well as sources of financing. That sometimes leads to overlapping and it may happen that two different organisations get money from sponsors to reconstruct the same area. UNHCR as a leading agency should be kept informed in order to coordinate all efforts. Also authorities, in particular at the cantonal level, complain of not being kept informed.
90. The Rapporteur's attention was drawn to the urgent need for reconstruction of the education infrastructure, in particular universities, which would attract young refugees who have started their studies abroad, and also highly educated staff, who are in dramatically short supply as a result of the brain-drain.
91. More attention should be paid to the disabled refugees and displaced persons. Special work therapy projects and appropriate assistance should be provided by relevant institutions.
92. Confidence-building measures must continue to be developed with active support from the international community. The Council of Europe should play an important role here.
93. Finally, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be viewed in the context of the situation in the whole region, as many of the issues of displacement in the region are inter-linked and need to be dealt with in parallel. The idea of regional dialogue and consultation should be encouraged and promoted.
Appendix
Programme of the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina organised by the Sub-Committee on Refugees on 12-16 October 1997
SUNDAY 12 OCTOBER 1997
Early afternoon Arrival at Zagreb airport (for field visit participants)3
4 pm Departure for Bihac (c.2.30 hrs) for night (Hotel"Sedra", Tel.+387.77.513.551)
7 pm Welcome and briefing by UNHCR representatives at hotel
MONDAY 13 OCTOBER 1997
9 am Depart hotel
9.30 am Meeting with Head of UNHCR Office and Head of International Management Group Office
11 am Meeting with Mr VELADZIĆ, Governor of the Una-Sana Canton, Mr HADZIĆ, Cantonal Minister for Reconstruction, and Mr BOTUNIĆ, Cantonal Minister for Refugees and Displaced Persons
12 noon Depart for field visits (two groups)
3.30 pm Transfer to Banja Luka (2h30) for night (Hotel "Bosna", Tel. + 381.78.41521 or 41355)
6 pm Meeting with Mrs Gret HALLER, Human Rights Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jovana Dučica 41)
7.30 pm Dinner hosted by Mrs HALLER, "Castle" restaurant
TUESDAY 14 OCTOBER 1997
8.30 - 9.30 am Meeting with representatives of UNHCR and SFOR
9.30 - 10.30 am Meeting with representatives of Sanski Most displaced persons
10.30 - 11.30 am Meeting with representatives of the "Association of Serbs expelled from former Yugoslav Republic Croatia"
12 noon Depart for Brčko
2 pm Meeting with Ambassador Robert W. FARRAND, Supervisor (Office of the High Representative)
3 pm Meeting with the Mayors of Brčko (OHR)
4 pm Field visit to returnee villages (two groups)
6 pm Departure for Tuzla (l hr) for night at Hotel "Tuzla" (Tel. + 387.75.250.427; Fax 387.75.250.429)
8.30 pm Dinner at Restaurant "Biblioteka"
WEDNESDAY 15 OCTOBER 1997
8.45 am Depart Hotel "Tuzla"
9.00 am Meeting with Mr Sead JAMAKOSMANOVIĆ, Governor of the Tuzla Canton (Governor's Office)
10.00 am Meeting with Mr Selim BESLAGIĆ, Mayor of Tuzla (Mayor's Office)
11.00 am Departure (in two groups) for field visits to returnees
Afternoon Transfer to Sarajevo (Hotel Holiday Inn, Tel.+ 387.71.664.273 or 472.583; fax + 387.71.663.862 or 472.516) for night
THURSDAY 16 OCTOBER 1997
9 am - 5 pm Sub-Committee meeting and Seminar on "Bosnia and Herzegovina: return of refugees and displaced persons" (National Museum (Zemaljski Muzej), Zmaja od Bosne 7, 71000 Sarajevo)
Evening Dinner for members of the Sub-Committee hosted by Mrs FILIPOVIĆ, Delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
FRIDAY 17 OCTOBER 1997
Departure from Sarajevo Airport
Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
Reference to committee: Doc. 7725 and Reference No. 2155 of 27 January 1997.
Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 18 December 1997.
Members of the committee: Mrs Aguiar (Chairperson), MM. Iwiński, Junghanns (Vice-Chairmen), Açba (Alternate: Sungur), Akselsen, Amoruso, Andres, Árnason, Mrs Arnold, MM. Atkinson, Aushev, Beaufays (Alternate : Ghesquière), Billing, Bogomolov, van den Bos, Brancati, Mrs Brasseur, MM. Brennan, Caceres (Alternate : Diaz de Mera), Cardona, Christodoulides, Chyzh, Clerfayt, Debarge, Dinçer, Mrs Fehr, MM. Filimonov, Fuhrmann, Mrs Garajová, Gremetz, Gross, Jakic, Mrs Johansson, Lord Judd, MM. Kalus, Karas, Kukk, Mrs Kusnere, MM. Laakso, Lauricella, Laurinkus (Alternate : Staciokas), Lazarescu, Le Jeune, Liapis, Loukota, Luís, Melo, Mészáros, Micheloyiannis, Minkov, Molnár, Moser, Nogalo, Rakhansky, von Schmude, Sincai (Alternate : Pâslaru), Solonari, Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn, MM. Tahir, Vangelov, Wray , N... (Alternate: Mrs Guirado).
N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries of the committee: Mr Newman, Mr Sich and Mrs Nachilo.
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly on 28 January 1994, and submitted its application for membership of the Council of Europe on 10 April 1995.
2 All figures in this section were provided by UNHCR as at 1 July 1997, unless otherwise indicated.
3 Members of the delegation were Mrs Aguiar (Portugal, EPP/CD), Mrs Fehr (Switzerland, LDR), Mrs Guirado (Spain, SOC), Mr Iwiński (Poland, SOC) and Mr Jurgens (Netherlands, SOC). They were accompanied by Mr Lombardo (UNHCR), Mr Flückiger (Special Adviser to the Secretary General for the former Yugoslavia), Mr Newman and Mrs Nachilo (Secretariat).