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Doc. 7986
19 January 1998
Recent developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their implications for the Balkan region
Report
Political Affairs Committee
Rapporteur: Mr. András Bársony, Hungary, Socialist Group
Summary
Recent developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – in particular the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and tensions between Serbia and Montenegro – risk having serious implications for the stability of the Balkan region.
Only the immediate introduction of democratic constitutional and legislative reforms, guaranteeing, in particular, the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights and rights of minorities, as well as a democratic attitude of the political leadership, will enable the FRY to rejoin the European family. Such reforms are also the only way to prevent extremists from dominating the political scene.
The Assembly calls upon the governments of Council of Europe member states in the region to respect the obligations and commitments resulting from their membership. An increased use should be made of the Organisation as a political forum for discussions on stability and co-operation in the region.
I. Draft resolution
1. The deteriorating political situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) risks having serious implications for the stability of the Balkan region. All of the FRY neighbouring states are members of the Council of Europe, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has requested such membership.
2. The Assembly deplores the failure by the FRY authorities to implement the democratic reforms recommended by Mr Felipe González, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, and endorsed by the Assembly.
3. The Assembly notes with concern the progress made by political extremists in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. It is also concerned about the findings of international observers who described the re-run presidential elections in Serbia in December 1997 as flawed.
4. The Assembly calls on the authorities of the FRY and Serbia to recognize the victory of Mr Djukanovic in the presidential elections in Montenegro last October and to refrain from acts which could further strain the relations between the two federal republics.
5. The Assembly considers that only the immediate introduction of democratic constitutional and legislative reforms, guaranteeing, in particular, the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights and rights of minorities, as well as a fair and clear democratic attitude of the political leadership will enable the FRY to rejoin the European family. Such reforms are also the only way to prevent extremists from dominating the political scene.
6. The Assembly, while supporting the principle of the FRY’s territorial integrity, condemns the continued repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo which has led to the appearance of armed resistance in Kosovo bringing the FRY to the brink of civil war. It calls for the instant and full restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the ethnic Albanian population. The FRY Government should also enable the international community to establish a permanent presence in Kosovo and implement the agreement on education concluded between Mr Milosevic, then president of Serbia and Mr Rugova, leader of the Albanian community in Kosovo.
7. The Assembly expects the political representatives of the Albanian community in Kosovo immediately and unconditionally to condemn and refrain from the use of violence as a means to resolve the conflict with the FRY authorities.
8. It calls on Albania to use its influence on the Albanian community in Kosovo to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict, to continue its dialogue with the FRY, and to prevent smuggling of weapons looted during the events in Albania in early 1997.
9. The Assembly is ready to assist in contacts between representatives of the FRY authorities and the Albanian community in Kosovo. The Council of Europe has considerable expertise in the relevant areas, such as human rights, minority rights and education, which it could put at the disposal of the parties.
10. The Assembly notes with concern the growing tensions between the ethnic Albanian minority and the rest of the population in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It calls on the Albanian minority to refrain from the use of violence and to respect the law. It calls on the authorities to respond positively to the legitimate demands of the Albanian community, on the basis of relevant Council of Europe instruments and principles. It welcomes recent improvements in relations with Albania.
11. The Assembly welcomes the improvements in relations between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia. It calls on the Croatian authorities to improve legislative, administrative, material and security conditions for a voluntary return of Croatian Serb refugees currently on the territory of the FRY.
12. The Assembly considers that the FRY has so far failed to comply fully with its obligations under the Dayton Peace Agreement. It expects the FRY government to use its influence on the Bosnian Serb leadership to ensure their full co-operation in the peace process, to bring the agreement on special parallel relations with the Republika Srpska in line with the Dayton peace agreement and to arrest immediately and hand over all persons on FRY territory, indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
13. The Assembly supports the efforts for an agreement on regional arms control, and welcomes the decision by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to appoint a special representative to help organise and conduct negotiations, as foreseen by Article V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
14. The Assembly welcomes and supports recent inititiatives for multilateral regional contacts, such as the recent Balkan Summit held on Crete, and recent meetings of the South-East European Cooperative Initiative and the Central European Initiative. It considers that a regular and constructive dialogue between the countries concerned is essential in the search for durable solutions to all regional problems.
15. The Assembly calls on the European Union, the United States and other states concerned to agree on a common approach concerning the application of the «outer wall» of sanctions and the use of economic incentives such as preferential trade regimes. Positive steps by the FRY should be rewarded by economic assistance, while sanctions should be kept in place, or increased, in case of persistent failure to comply with the demands of the international community.
16. The Assembly calls on the governments of Council of Europe member states in the region to respect the obligations and commitments resulting from their membership. An increased use should be made of the Organisation as a political forum for discussions on stability and co-operation in the Balkan region.
II. Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur
I. Introduction
1. Under Rule 16 paragraph 3 of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure a debate on general policy may be held at each part-session. In the past the Committee frequently availed itself of this provision.
2. Recent political developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) risk having serious regional implications. They would appear to warrant the presentation of a general policy report on this issue at the January 1998 part-session.
II. Political situation in the FRY
a. The González report
3. The annulment of opposition victories in 14 major cities in the November 1996 municipal elections in Serbia set off a wave of street protests, organised by the “Zajedno Coalition” and by students in Belgrade. Under pressure from the international community, the FRY government asked the OSCE to send a fact-finding mission. An OSCE delegation, led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, visited the country and produced a report asking the Yugoslav authorities to:
- immediately recognise opposition victories,
- enter into dialogue with the opposition,
- ensure the freedom of the press,
- recognise and respect the rights of national minorities,
- abstain from the use of violence against peaceful protests.
4. In Resolution 1110 (1997) on the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted on 29 January 1997, the Assembly endorsed the recommendations made in the González report and called for their full and immediate implementation.
5. Although Belgrade did bow to the pressure and recognised the opposition victories, a report by the OSCE mission observing the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections in September and October 1997 concluded that the serious issues raised in the González report remained unresolved.
b. The parliamentary and presidential elections Serbia
6. The parliamentary and presidential elections in September and October 1997 were of crucial importance to Mr Milosevic. Unable to serve a third term as the President of Serbia, he decided to continue as the President of FRY and was elected by the federal parliament in July 1997. His grip on power largely depends on the complicity of the republican presidents – both to be re-elected in the months that followed his election.
the parliamentary elections on 21 September 1997
7. The parliamentary elections held on 21 September 1997 showed declining support for Milosevic's Socialist party. In the coalition with two minor vassal parties it obtained 110 out of 250 seats in the parliament. The lost votes went mostly to Vojislav Seselj’s Radical Party who obtained 82 mandates. The “Zajedno Coalition”, which combined to win the municipal elections in 1996, fell apart in faction fighting, which all but eliminated any prospects of democratic alternative. Protesting against the non-implementation of the González recommendations, two of the original three coalition parties boycotted the elections, while Vuk Draskovic’s Serb Renewal Movement took part and obtained 45 seats. The remaining 13 seats went to 5 minor parties, including those representing ethnic Hungarians from Vojvodina and ethnic Muslims from Sandzak. The elections made Mr Seselj a possible partner in a future government coalition, pending the outcome of the presidential elections in Serbia.
the presidential elections on 21 September and 5 October 1997
8. The first round of the presidential elections took place at the same time as the parliamentary elections, that is on 21 September 1997 The two front runners, Mr Lilic from Milosevic SPO and Mr Seselj, leader of the Serb Radical Party, who obtained 37,6% and 28,5% of votes respectively, went to the second round on 5 October 1997. Mr Draskovic came third with 23% of votes.
9. Mr Seselj reportedly won the largest share of votes in the second run of the presidential elections on 5 October 1997, against Mr Milosevic’s predecessor as Yugoslav President, Mr Zoran Lilic. The difference between the two candidates was minimal, with Seselj obtaining 49,18 % and Mr Lilic 48,02% of votes cast. However, the elections failed to provide valid results due to insufficient turnout, which was just under the required 50%, namely 49,82%. A re-run was decided for 7 December 1997, with a new Socialist candidate, Mr Milutinovic, at the time the FRY foreign minister.
the re-run of the presidential elections on 7 December 1997
10. In the first round of the repeated presidential elections, Mr Milutinovic came first with 43,7% of votes, the candidate of the Serb Radical Party Mr Seselj came second with 32,19 % of votes and Mr Draskovic third with 15,42 %. Both the candidate of the ruling socialists and Mr Seselj did better than in the invalidated elections in September and October, while Mr Draskovic obtained considerably less votes than during his first attempt. The turnout was just under 52,75 %. The second round took place on 21 December 1997. Mr. Milutinovic won with 59% of the votes, Mr. Seselj obtained 37.5% of the votes.
11. The OSCE described the first round of the presidential elections in Serbia as fundamentally flawed with the potential for vote rigging. Their report said the ruling Socialists of Slobodan Milosevic failed to allow other parties full access to the media or to the vote count. It criticised state media for saying the elections were free and fair, and noted there were worrying irregularities in the southern province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians make up ninety per cent of the population.
c. The presidential elections in Montenegro
12. The two front runners for the Montenegro presidential elections were the current President, - and one of Mr. Milosevic’s closest and most loyal allies - Mr Momir Bulatovic, and the Prime Minister, Mr Milo Djukanovic, a reformer campaigning for a greater political and economic autonomy of Montenegro. Other candidates were presented by the following parties: the Democratic Party of Socialists, the Group of Citizens, the Fatherland Party, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Party of Natural Law.
13. The leaders of the six Montenegrin opposition parties signed a declaration on the presidential elections stating that their parties had decided not to take part in the elections. The opposition leaders unanimously stated that the rigid election rules and the political atmosphere would not allow the free and democratic expression of the citizens’ will. According to the Montenegrin constitution, each party can have only one presidential candidate. Both the current President, Milo Bulatovic, and the Prime Minister, Momir Djukanovic, were members of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Djukanovic’s faction nominated him for president first and Bulatovic was registered as a candidate afterwards. The election commission approved both candidatures ; but the Constitutional Court of Montenegro banned Mr Bulatovic from standing. Mr Bulatovic’s options were limited to two – he could either run as an independent candidate or register his faction as a new party. However, on 12 September the Constitutional Court abolished the limitation of one candidate per party, allowing Mr Bulatovic to run as a candidate for DPS.
14. The ruling Democratic Party of Socialists split into two factions, one supporting Prime Minister Djukanovic and the other President Bulatovic. The two men are diametrically opposed over the direction to be taken by Montenegro. Mr Bulatovic heads the ‘conservative’ wing, which gives unconditional support to Mr Milosevic and calls for an unconditional alliance with Serbia. Mr Djukanovic heads a reformist wing and is accused by Belgrade of undermining the unity of the Yugoslavian federation by seeking the ‘secession’ of Montenegro.
15. There are only two republics left in Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro. The election result might have serious consequences for Mr. Milosevic- his grip on power as the President of the Federation depends upon the loyalty of the two republican Presidents. Montenegro controls half of the upper chamber of the federal parliament, which elects and dismisses the president.
16. The Speaker of the Montenegrin parliament invited OSCE monitors to visit Montenegro and observe all the phases of the two-round presidential elections, called for 5 and 19 October.
17. Mr Bulatovic came first in the first round with 47,4% while Mr Djukanovic obtained 46,7%. The difference between the two candidates was only 2272 votes, out of 460,568 voters registered for the first round.
18. On 19 October, Mr Djukanovic won the presidential election with 50,8% of votes. The defeated candidate, Mr Bulatovic, got 49,2%. The latter called for the election to be cancelled, alleging numerous irregularities and complained to the Constitutional Court. Almost 10,000 voters registered to vote between the two rounds, mostly young people responding to calls from Mr Djukanovic. In addition, the turnout was significantly higher in the second round, 73% compared to 67,5% two weeks earlier.
19. The monitoring mission of the OSCE did not observe any major irregularities at the election. In its opinion Mr Djukanovic’s victory reflected the will of the people. According to the U.S. State Department spokesman, there were some irregularities during the election but they were relatively minor and did not affect the outcome of the voting.
20. Mr Bulatovic’s deputies continued to allege that the Electoral Law and the constitution had been violated. The deputies of the other DPS wing persistently denied such allegations claiming that the elections had taken place in a democratic spirit and that all the rules had been observed.
21. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro, on 27 October, rejected the appeal by Mr Bulatovic. Mr Bulatovic had claimed that there had been a manipulation of the election register. The Court said that, for procedural reasons, it was not in a position to decide on the other parts of the appeal, particularly those relating to the extension of voting at certain polling stations. The legislative committee of the Montenegrin Parliament concluded that there was no constitutional basis for adopting a resolution declaring the results of the presidential elections null and void as proposed by the deputies of the pro-Bulatovic faction of the DPS.
22. Mr Bulatovic’s mandate as President expires on 15 January 1998. His supporters in parliament have stated that Mr Bulatovic is not going to remain in this post in defiance of the constitution but added that the pro-Bulatovic wing of DPS will never recognise the « stolen » presidential elections.
23. Mr Djukanovic’s victory provoked aggressive reactions in Serbia, particularly from the ruling Socialist party of Mr Milosevic. So far, elections results have not yet been officially recognized. The only high ranking FRY official who publicly endorsed the victory of Mr Djukanovic and called for the recognition of results, Deputy Prime Minister Mr Djunic, was reportedly about to be dismissed from the FRY government, on the request of the SPS hardliners.
d. Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
24. On 6 October 1997 ten Croats, indicted for war crimes committed in the Lasva valley in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1993, voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY. SFOR arrested two other indicted Croats on 18 December 1997. As of that date, only 3 of 18 Croats subject to publicly disclosed indictments remain at large and all three indicted Bosniaks are held in The Hague. In contrast, just 3 of 54 Serbs indicted by the Tribunal are in custody, while 2 are deceased. A sealed list of indictments also exist on the basis of which arrests have been made.
25. In spite of repeated demands by the international community, the FRY has not arrested any of the 4 indictees on its territory, namely MM. Miljkovic, Mrksic, Radic and Sljivancanin. On 24 November 1997 the Justice Minister of the FRY, Mr Zoran Knezevic, claimed that under the present circumstances there could be no extradition and that the FRY had not signed any international agreements binding it to extradite any of its citizen to the Hague.
26. However, the newly elected President of Montenegro, Mr Milo Djukanovic, recently said that U.S. President Bill Clinton's decision to keep sanctions on FRY for another year proved that Milosevic's policies were responsible for the country's continuing isolation. According to Mr Djukanovic, Yugoslav leaders had to recognize that co-operation with international institutions, especially with the Hague Tribunal, was a matter of state-interest, and that Montenegro would do all it could to move federal policy in that direction.
e. Kosovo
27. In 1389, the Ottoman Empire defeated the Serb army in the battle of Kosovo Polje. This battle accelerated the fall of the Serbian Empire, the centre of which, at the time, was Kosovo. As a consequence, the Serbs consider Kosovo as the "craddle of the Serbian nation."
28. Kosovo is a region in the south of FRY, with an overwhelming Albanian-speaking majority. Under the 1974 constitution, it was one of the two autonomous regions, the other being Vojvodina. At the end of 1988, Mr Milosevic - who took power in Serbia in 1987 -, took the first steps towards abolishing the autonomous status of Kosovo. In March 1989, the Serbian Parliament, in violation of the Serbian constitution itself, adopted amendments to the Serbian constitution in order to change the status of Kosovo. On 23 March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly, under great intimidation and severe political pressure, voted in favour of these amendments. However, on 2 July 1990, the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo an « independent and equal unit within Yugoslavia » and announced its secession from Serbia. The Belgrade Government then dissolved the Kosovo Assembly, Government and other organs and set up a « special administration ». The Serbian parliament adopted, on 28 September 1990, a new constitution which confirms the status of Kosovo (as well as Vojvodina) as a region within the Serbian republic. In September 1991, Kosovo Albanians organized an unofficial referendum which voted in favour of a sovereign and independent state of Kosovo. As a result of measures adopted by the Serbian parliament, the Kosovo Albanians’ status changed from that of a majority in Kosovo to that of a minority group within Serbia.
29. The Albanians regard Kosovo as an independent republic under occupation, they created a Kosovo shadow state, with parallel institutions to support civil society. Mr Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and "President" of the Kosovo shadow state advocates a peaceful resistance.
30. The Kosovo Albanians have consistently boycotted Serbian and FRY elections, in spite of a call from the international community to support the democratic opposition in Serbia. They considered that this would imply recognition of the Serbian and FRY authorities and their policy towards Kosovo.
31. In the circumstances of continuing repression by the FRY authorities, many Kosovo Albanians are openly questioning the non-violent tactics of Mr Rugova. They consider that it has not led to any progress. The leader of the Parliamentary party of Kosovo - Kosovo Albanians' second strongest party - Mr Adem Demaci called for "active non-violent resistance", while others advocate intifada-type protests.
32. So far the FRY authorities have not agreed to any international mediation, claiming that Kosovo is an internal matter of the FRY. Most Serbian political parties, including those belonging to the democratic opposition, seem to agree with this position. On the occasion of the Bonn meeting of the Peace Implementation Council on 10-11 December 1997, which is responsible for the implementation of the Dayton agreement, the Yugoslav delegation, accompanied by Bosnian Serb leaders Mr Krajisnik and Mrs Plavsic, walked out of the conference in a protest against a reference to Kosovo in the final document.
33. In early January, a terrorist group calling itself the "Kosovo Liberation Army" launched a new offensive, killing Serbs and Albanians accused of collaboration with the Serbian authorities. It claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in mid-January 1997 against the Serbian rector of the official Pristina University. Two more persons were killed on 27 November during an attack on a police station near Decani. The casualties included one policeman and one attacker, two other persons were wounded. In an open letter of 6 December 1997, Mr Demaci expressed sympathy with reasons and objectives for an armed struggle against Serbian authorities in Kosovo. He asked, however, that "the Kosovo Liberation Army" refrain from violent activities for a three-month period, until 15 March 1998, in order to force Belgrade to agree to talks mediated by the United States.
34. On 1 September 1996, Mr Milosevic and Mr Rugova signed an Agreement on the normalisation of Albanian-language education in Kosovo, stating that Albanian-speaking students would "return to the schools". A committee of 3 Serbs and 3 Albanians was supposed to work out details. However, the Agreement has still not been implemented. This caused new street protests by the Albanian-speaking students, which were violently broken up by the Serbian police on 1 October and at the end of December 1997.
35. In a Resolution adopted on 23 October 1997, the European Parliament condemned this violence and called on "negotiations leading to an overall political solution for the situation in the Kosovo region". The "existence of a real dialogue with the Albanians of Kosovo on the status of Kosovo within borders of the FRY" was required as a specific condition for applying to the FRY the European Union (EU) strategy for relations with countries of South-Eastern Europe. The European Union has asked for, but not yet received, authorisation to open an office in Pristina. The OSCE has repeatedly asked for the re-opening of its mission in Kosovo (as well as in Vojvodina and Sandjak.)
36. As for the United States, it made improvement in Serbia's treatment of Kosovo one of its conditions for lifting remaining sanctions in force against the FRY. It also opened a US Information Agency office (USIA) in Kosovo, the only permanent international presence in Kosovo.
37. In a joint letter to the Yugoslav President Mr Milosevic, the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany, Mr Védrine and Mr Kinkel, called for the opening of negotiations with the Albanian community of Kosovo, in presence of a third party, and asked for a special status to be given to Kosovo. These proposals were rejected by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister and candidate in the presidential elections in Serbia Mr Milutinovic, claiming that the question of Kosovo was an internal Yugoslav matter.
38. Although it seems that the change in government in Albania facilitated the dialogue between Belgrade and Tirana, no real progress on the issue on Kosovo was reported from the meeting between the Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano and Mr Milosevic on the occasion of the Balkan Summit on Crete (3-4 November 1997).
f. Vojvodina
39. An issue of similar character is the problem related to the status and position of the province of Vojvodina, which, until 1989, also had the status of an autonomous province. It is inhabited by an ethnically heterogeneous population, with Hungarian speakers as the prevailing minority group. The political powers of the Hungarian minority gathered around the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from Vojvodina are demanding the return of the region's former status. A compromise variant, the establishment of a three-level - cultural-national, administrative, personal - autonomy is also proposed.
g. Sandjak
40. The Sandjak region, divided between Serbia and Montenegro, has a Muslim majority population, which is also calling for a new status. The OSCE has repeatedly asked for the re-opening of its long-term missions in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak.
h. Bulgarian Minorities
41. The Bulgarian government recently raised the problem of the status and rights of the Bulgarian national minority in the Western regions (Bosilegrad and Caribrod) of the FRY.
III. Refugees in the FRY
42. In 1996, a UNHCR-sponsored census of the refugee population in the FRY put the number of refugees at 566,000. This was the largest refugee population in any country in Europe. UNHCR estimates that during 1997 the number has decreased to 548,000 with some 15,000 refugees having found solutions to their situation through voluntary repatriation, resettlement abroad and acquisition of FRY citizenship.
43. Of the 566,000 refugees in the 1996 census, 297,000 were from Croatia (mostly from the so-called Krajina areas) and 253,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rest of the refugee population was from other parts of former-Yugoslavia. The vast majority of refugees in the FRY were of Serb ethnic origin.
44. According to the census of 1996, Serbia hosted 537,000 refugees, making up 6,3 % of the total population of that Republic. The breakdown by regions was as follows: Belgrade area 140,000; Central Serbia 148,000; Vojvodina 230,000; South Serbia 19,000. The number of refugees in the Republic of Montenegro is 28,000 (4,5 % of the population). Approximately 10 % of the refugees live in crowded collective accomodation; the remainder are hosted with friends or relatives or have found their own accomodation.
45. The majority of the refugees arrived during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 and the Croatian reconquest of the "Krajina areas" in 1995. They were registered either as refugees or expellees However, a sizeable minority never registered themselves as refugees, because they thought they would be able to return soon or for other reasons. UNHCR and the Yugoslav authorities consider both groups, with and without status, as refugees with equal rights. Refugees enjoy the same rights as citizens with regard to education and health care. But obtaining shelter, food and employment can be extremely difficult. From January 1997, all refugees from other parts of former-Yugoslavia are in principle eligible for citizenship.
46. In the census of 1996, 60% of refugees in the FRY stated that they would wish to integrate and remain in the host country, while only little more than 9 % registered their intention to repatriate. However, 20 % of them still had not made up their mind whether to repatriate or not and UNHCR believes that many would repatriate, given suitable conditions. Still, repatriation to BH and Croatia has been painfully slow, with only 2,078 people repatriated through UNHCR since the signing of the Dayton Agreement. A few thousand more have returned spontaneously, but the overall number remains insignificant, as political will to receive them back does not exist, or because of lack of accomodation in the country of origin.
IV. Economic situation in the FRY
a. International sanctions against FRY
47. On 1 October 1996, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution immediately terminating all sanctions against the FRY. These sanctions, initially imposed in 1992, consisted of a weapons embargo, trade embargo, flight ban and a prohibition on sports and cultural events. In spite of the UN decision, the United States decided to maintain the "outside wall" of sanctions concerning the country's membership in various international financial organisations.
48. In a letter sent to the US Congress on 4 December 1997, President Clinton announced that the "outside wall" of sanctions against the FRY and the authorities of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be prolonged for another year. To bring sanctions to an end, Yugoslavia must co-operate with the Hague war crimes tribunal, improve its human rights record in Kosovo, make progress in talks on dividing former Yugoslavia's assets, and officially recognize the results of the recent presidential elections in one of its two federal units - Montenegro.
49. The European Union, on the other hand, decided to restore full diplomatic relations between its member states and the FRY in April 1996 and granted a preferential trade regime for the year 1997. This regime was suspended by the Council of Ministers on 29 December 1997.
b. Economy in disarray
50. In 1996, FRY had to face a desperate economic situation caused by the war and the four-year long UN embargo. Between 1990 and 1995, GDP fell by 40 % and industrial capacity fell by about 55 %. Today, a full restructuring of the FRY economy cannot be achieved without the grant of new credits, which supposes normalisation of relations with the international monetary institutions. In 1995, the end of sanctions allowed an agreement with the IMF on FRY's part of the debt of the former Yugoslavia (2.5 bn dollars). However, the first negotiations failed. In 1996, the GDP rose only 3-4 %.
51. The economic situation nevertheless differs substantially between the two federal republics with Montenegro obtaining much better results than Serbia. Industrial output increased by 52.9 % during the first half of 1996 in Montenegro compared to 0.3 % in Serbia. The two components of the FRY have adopted very different strategies in matters of economic policy, Podgorica having launched from mid-1996 a wide-ranging privatisation programme, while Belgrade has followed policies which are much less clear.
52. In 1996, employment decreased by about 6 % and the unemployment rate reached 28 %. In 1995, more than 40 % of those officially recorded as unemployed had been out of work for more than 3 years. At present, the unemployment rate could rise to about 50%. Of the 2.2 million wage earners, 800,000 are laid off and receive only very low salaries.
53. A large proportion of the population is poverty-stricken because of late payment of salaries. As already low wages are paid very late, their purchasing power is often eroded by inflation to the point that they fall below the poverty line.
54. Furthermore, the sanctions have led, in both Republics, to the development of a shadow economy and to its "criminalisation", in which politicians and mafia are often involved. They have also contributed to the impoverishment of a large part of the population. However, the public opinion considers that the responsibility for the disastrous economic situation lies not with the state leadership, but with the international community. Such opinions fuel nationalist sentiments and are a certain vote gainer for extremist parties.
V. Regional implications
a. Albania
55. During a three-day visit to Tirana (19-21 November 1997), a delegation of the political group leaders from the Council of Europe, lead by Lord Russell-Johnston (United-Kingdom, LDR), urged Albanian political parties to strenghten political dialogue to ensure the country's democratic stability. Lord Russell-Johnston said that "four months after the elections, the political climate remains confrontational".
56. In its Resolution 1133, adopted on 24 September 1997, the Assembly recalled that the large number of weapons, still held illegally in private hands, and the precarious economic and social conditions constitute a permanent threat to the stability of the country. The European Community's Monitor Mission (ECMM)1 estimated that over a million weapons are still at large and that it would take a very long time before they could be recovered by the authorities. The ECMM also considered that the borders were still unsafe.
57. It is clear that the precarious political stability in Albania constitutes a risk to the region.
58. Given the tensions between the Yugoslav authorities and the Albanian-speaking population in Kosovo, as well as the situation concerning the Albanian-speaking minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the situation of Albanian minorities in these countries continues to give ground for serious concern for the stability of the region.
59. Although there have been incidents at the FRY and Macedonian borders, ECMM said it had no indications that weapons were being massively transferred from Albania to either Kosovo or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for political purposes. However, the Albanian authorities have not yet recovered the large quantities of looted weapons. The possible transfer of these weapons to Kosovo or former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia represents a particularly dangerous threat.
60. During an official visit to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 24 October 1997, the Albanian Defence Minister announced the normalisation of the border regime between former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia and Albania and the establishment of control of the Albanian border by the Albanian army.
b. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
61. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's position in the southern Balkans attracted considerable international attention since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Efforts were made to prevent the southernmost former Yugoslav republic from collapsing and to bolster its ability to develop a pluralistic civil society. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) troops and civilian OSCE monitors have been deployed. Although such efforts have contributed to the maintenance of relative stability, the country has not overcome many of its political, social and economic difficulties.
62. On 4 December 1997, the Security Council of the United Nations, by adopting Resolution 1114 (1997) decided "to extend the mandate of the UNPREDEP for a final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal of the military component immediately thereafter".
63. According to official figures of 1994, the population of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia consisted of a majority of ethnic Macedonians (66%), followed by ethnic Albanian (23%), ethnic Turks (4%), Roma (under 2%), ethnic Serbs (under 2%), and Aromanians (under 2%).
64. Most of Macedonia's ethnic Albanians are concentrated in the western part of the country, and in certain municipalities - principally around Tetovo and Gostivar -, they represent the majority of the population. The Albanian community considers itself disadvantaged in almost every domain and demands equal status with Macedonians. These demands include free use of Albanian national symbols, recognition and use of Albanian as an official language, recognition of Albanians as a constitutive nation in the Constitution, proportional representation in government, and greater participation in organs of local government, public institutions, police and the armed forces.
65. In July 1997, violent incidents occurred in Tetovo and Gostivar, provoked by the authorities decision to remove by force Albanian and Turkish national flags hanging from the municipal buildings. These incidents resulted in casualities, arrests and court trials against Albanian speaking mayors. On 16 September 1997 Mr Rufi Osmani, the mayor of Gostivar, was sentenced to 13 years and 8 months in prison.
66. The increasing influence of more radical groups among the Albanian-speaking community has fueled nationalist emotions among the Macedonian majority. The mutually re-inforcing nationalism, which radicalised the political situation in the country, is a serious threat to the present government coalition, which includes a moderate ethnic Albanian party and moderate ex-communist Social Democratic Party. It is an obstacle to necessary legislation reforms, including the politically sensitive reform of higher education.
67. These issues have been discussed with representatives of the Macedonian authorities and Albanian-speaking communities during the recent visit of rapporteurs for the Monitoring Committee to Skopje, Gostivar and Tetovo (6-9 November 1997).
68. In a report on the situation of human rights in the country, published on 30 September 1997, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Human Rights Commission, Mrs Elizabeth Rehn, welcomed the progress made by the authorities with regard to the protection of human rights and rights of minorities. She expressed concern, however, with the excessive use of police force during the events in Gostivar, and with the shortcomings observed during the trial against Mr Osmani.
69. In spite of some recent improvements, relations with most of the country's neighbours remain difficult and unresolved issues persist. Although the Macedonian-Albanian border is patrolled by both UNPREDEP troops and civilian OSCE monitors, the crossing of refugees, illegal day labourers and especially gun-runners into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has led to increasing tensions between Tirana and Skopje. It is hoped that a recent series of bilateral meetings between the two Presidents, the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will lead to an improvement in relations between the two countries.
70. The issue of the name has not yet been finally resolved with two other neighbours, Greece and Bulgaria. Greece claims the exclusive historical right to the name Macedonia. Macedonia was therefore admitted into international organisations under the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Bulgaria, for its part, claims that the Macedonian language is only a dialect of Bulgarian and refuses to recognise the Macedonian language as a working language for bilateral agreements.
c. Bosnia and Herzegovina
agreement on special parallel relations between the FRY and the Republika Srpska
71. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), co-signed by Mr Milosevic, allowed the two component entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) – the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) - to establish special parallel relations with neighbouring states. According to the BH Constitution in Annex 4 of the DPA, such relations have to be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Entities may conclude agreements with neighbouring states with the consent of the BH Parliamentary Assembly.
72. An agreement on special parallel relations between the FRY and the RS was signed in Belgrade on 27 February 1997. It has been ratified by the FRY Parliament on 20 March 1997, in spite of warnings by the Office of High Representative in BH and other international agencies that it was not consistent with the DPA and the BH Constitution. The agreement envisaged co-operation in a number of areas which fell, according to the BH Constitution, within the competence of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not of the two entities, such as foreign policy, foreign trade policy, immigration, refugee and asylum policy etc.
73. The Croatian government has recently made a proposal for an agreement on special parallel relations with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also include elements that would, if implemented, undermine the existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as envisaged by the Dayton Agreement.
the political crisis in the Republika Srpska
74. The constitutional and political crisis in the Republika Srpska followed an attempt by RS President Plavsic to sack several RS ministers, members of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) accusing them of corruption. After a refusal by Karadzic loyalists in Pale to comply, the President in July 1997 dissolved the RS National Assembly. The international community, hoping that the rift between Banja Luka and Pale would weaken the Serb hard-liners who continue to hamper the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the functioning of joint political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, decided to support Ms Plavsic. The support included SFOR interventions to ensure Ms Plavsic’s personal security and to take over television transmitters in the eastern RS in response to continued broadcast of war-mongering propaganda from Pale. The SFOR also played the crucial role in preventing the SDS to stage a coup against Ms Plavsic, when it prevented SDS supporters, many of them armed, from participating at a mass rally in Banja Luka in September 1997.
75. President Plavsic, a former member of SDS, was unable to set up her own party in time for the municipal elections in September. In spite of that she gained a considerable number of votes, particularly in the western RS, through ally parties and independent candidates. She set up a new party, the Serb People’s Union (SNS) for the RS National Assembly elections on 22-23 November 1997.
76. Throughout the crises it was evident that Belgrade continues to have a considerable influence on the events in the Republika Srpska. In spite of strong international pressure, Mr Milosevic’s support to President Plavsic was not unequivocal and late in coming, because of a fear that a too open support would be perceived in Serbia as capitulation and abandoning of fellow Serbs.
municipal elections
77. The municipal elections, originally planned for September 1996, were held on 13-14 September 1997. An Assembly delegation of observers concluded that they were technically well organised by the OSCE and that they represented an improvement from last year’s national elections. The election results were to be finally certified by the OSCE only when newly elected municipal councils are successfully set up. The deadline was set for 31 December 1997.
elections for the RS National Assembly
78. Following a series of meetings in Belgrade between President Plavsic, Mr Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serb member of BH Presidency and member of Pale based SDS leadership, and Mr Milosevic, it was agreed that early elections for the RS assembly would be held on 22 and 23 November 1997. Normally, its mandate would last until September 1998. The SDS leadership had to give up its earlier demand that elections for RS president and Serb member in BH Presidency be held on the same occasion. The Foreign Ministers of the International Contact Group on Bosnia endorsed the holding of the elections for the RS assembly at their meeting on 24 September. The Contact Group also endorsed the OSCE supervisory role which President Plavsic has requested.
79. 28 parties, 3 coalitions and 18 independent candidates coming from both entities took part in the elections, including those campaigning for a multi-ethnic and united Bosnia and Herzegovina. An Assembly delegation observing the elections concluded that they were generally conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner and there were no significant technical difficulties or security incidents. However these elections took place with the background of the present situation in the RS, where the continued political influence of Karadzic and his allies is a major obstacle for holding free and fair elections and for progressing in the consolidation of the peace process in general. The official results, published by the OSCE, gave the SDS 24 out of 83 seats in the RS assembly. The votes of displaced persons brought the mainly Bosniak Coalition for Bosnia and Herzegovina to the second place with 16 seats, while the SNS of President Plavsic and the radicals obtained 15 seats each. The sister party of the Milosevic SPO got 9 seats. The last four seats were split equally between two social-democratic parties, one from each entity.
80. Mr Krajisnik’s SDS got almost 50 % less seats that it occupied in the out-going assembly (45), and failed short of obtaining the absolute majority even with the 15 seats of its potential ally SRS. Karadzic's hardliners were exerting intensive pressure on members of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic (SPRS), whose nine seats gave them a pivotal role in deciding whether or not the hardliners could form a viable government to keep Plavsic's faction out. It is very likely that in deciding who to support, the SPRS will follow the instructions from Belgrade.
81. The SDS also filed a formal complaint alleging that results were flawed and that parties from the Federation were in a privileged position.
d. Croatia
Relations between the FRY and Croatia
82. Relations between FRY and Croatia are on the whole improving. However, the changes on the Serbian political scene may have negative repercussions on the normalisation between the two countries. This is particularly worrying because some of the unresolved issues - such as the return of refugees - are a great potential risk for the region as a whole.
83. After signing the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the FRY in August 1996, the foreign ministers of the two countries, Mate Granic and Milan Milutinovic, signed in Belgrade on 15 September 1997 six bilateral agreements on legal assistance, social insurance, road transport, railroad transport, border crossings and local border traffic.
84. The progress made towards normalization of relations between Croatia and FRY has created the conditions for the resumption of international traffic between the west and the southeast of Europe. It has also helped to achieve the peaceful re-integration of the Eastern Slavonia Region.
85. In the light of these developments, a Joint Commission is working on a project of a two-way return of refugees. The procedure for legal property transactions, as part of the two-way process, is controlled by the Government Real Estate Agency in co-operation with the Croatian Government office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, under the supervision of United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Situation in Eastern Slavonia
86. Eastern Slavonia has been administered by the United Nations since the signature of peace accord in December 1995. The UN mandate is due to expire on 15 January 1998 when Croatia should finally resume full control of the region. In a report published on 4 December 1997, the UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan stated that in the recent months the Croatian government had shown more political will to complete the re-integration successfully and had increased its efforts to meet its obligations.
87. The Croatian government agreed to an enlarged OSCE mission in the region after the expiry of the UN mandate. In addition, it had requested that the UN put in place a 180–member UN civilan police force to continue to monitor and assist the Croatian police in the region for a period of 9 months.
88. In order to provide reassurance and to prepare the local population for the full transfer of authority, UNTAES negotiated a number of public agreements with the Croatian government on the post—UNTAES implementation of its commitments and guarantees.
Return of refugees
89. According to the UN, there has been no large outflow of new refugees from the region during the UNTAES mandate. Some 6000 Croats and 9000 Serbs returned to their homes through the latter part of 1997.
90. However, the economic and social situation of returnees is grim. Further return is inhibited by legal and financial obstacles to the recovery of property, unrealistic government deadlines for Serb applications for reconstruction assistance and delays in government funding for reconstruction of Serb houses, as well as uncertain economic and social situation in areas of potential return
91. The UN considers that the Croatian government has not yet responded to the repeated calls by the Security Council to remove legal obstacles to return. Although specific articles of the controversial Law on Temporary Takeover of Property were recently declared unconstitutional, the law remains in effect and municipal authorities have not received instructions on implementing new procedures. Analysis of the proposed changes to the law gives no assurance that Croat and Serb displaced persons will receive equal treatment.
92. The FRY, who shelters the majority of ethnic Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, is vitally interested in avoiding a new flow of refugees provoked by the re-integration of Eastern Slavonia. The FRY authorities would also like to see as many refugees as possible return to their homes.
VI. Relations between the Council of Europe and the FRY
Assembly
93. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly was granted special guest status with the Assembly in June 1989 and became a candidate for full membership in the Council of Europe in February 1990. The special guest status was suspended by the Bureau on 30 June 1992.
94. In Recommendation 1287 (1996), the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers "consider the possibility, subject to the bona fide implementation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the Dayton Agreement and its positive response to the OSCE's demand to re-establish its missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, of inviting representatives of the FRY to meetings organised by the Council of Europe on subjects concerning the country directly."
95. An initiative for a hearing on the situation on the FRY was sent to the Federal Assembly and opposition representatives after Belgrade's refusal to accept opposition victories in the November 1996 municipal elections. However, only representatives of the opposition took part in the hearing organised by the Political Affairs Committee on 28 January 1997.
Committee of Ministers
96. On 8 October 1991, the Committee of Ministers decided to "suspend its co-operation with the Yugoslav authorities, while reminding all bodies concerned that, when the times comes, it maintains at their disposal its experience in the legal and constitutional fields, especially concerning minorities, and that it remains available if an assistance mechanism is created".
97. In September 1992, the Committee of Ministers further "noted that, for the purposes of Council of Europe Conventions and Agreements to which it was a Party, the "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia» had ceased to exist".
98. An application from the FRY is a pre-requirement for the re-establishment of closer relations with the Council of Europe. Belgrade refuses to re-apply, claiming, contrary to the position of the international community, that the FRY is the sole successor of the former Yugoslav state and should therefore have the right to re-assume the status of the former Yugoslavia with the Council of Europe.
VII. International initiatives
a. Agreement on regional stabilisation
99. Annex 1 B to the Dayton Peace Agreement contains an Agreement on Regional Stabilisation between the three signatories of the Dayton agreement – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – as well as the two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The agreement foresees negotiations, under the auspices of the OSCE, on a series of confidence and security building measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region, as well as measures for sub-regional and regional arms control.
100. Agreements on confidence and security building measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on sub-regional arms control have already been concluded. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office has recently appointed a special representative to help organise and conduct negotiations on a regional arms control agreement, with the goal of establishing « a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia ».
b. The strategy on conditionality of the European Union (EU)
101. On 29 April 1997, the EU Council of Ministers adopted a strategy for relations with countries in south-eastern Europe without Association Agreement (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FRY and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), setting general conditions (democracy, rule of law, human rights and rights of minorities, market economy) for concluding bilateral agreements in the field of trade, of financial assistance and economic co-operation as well as of contractual relations with these countries. It also applies specific conditions to Croatia, BH, and the FRY - mainly related to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
102. On 15 September 1997, the EU Council of Ministers decided that the examination of relations between the European Union and the FRY would focus in particular on:
- cooperation by the FRY in the implementation of the peace agreements;
- implementation of the recommendations of the OSCE Special Representative, Mr Gonzales, and the democratisation process;
- situation in Kosovo and definition of specific procedures governing a European Union presence in Pristina;
- existence of real dialogue with the Albanians of Kosovo on the status of Kosovo within the borders of the FRY;
- application of the agreement on education concluded by Mr Milosevic and Mr Rugova, and the possibility of EU financial support;
- the question of the return of the long-term OSCE mission to FRY minority regions;
- continued EU cooperation with the Peace Implementation Council Working Party on ethnic and national communities and minorities
- relations between the FRY and neighbouring States;
- FRY participation in international institutions.
103. On 10 November 1997, the EU Council of Ministers proceeded to a first evaluation of conditions and stressed the insufficiency of progress in Croatia, BH and in the FRY. A new evaluation should be made in six months.
c. Central European Initiative (CEI)
104. The Central European Initiative (CEI), was established in 1989 as a forum for regional co-operation and dialogue. It currently comprises 16 members from Central and Eastern Europe (Italy, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republik, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine). The FRY did not apply for membership.
105. At its annual meeting in Sarajevo on 28-29 November 1997, the head of governments of the CEI decided to work for the cohesion of the European continent, to strengthen regional co-operation politically and economically, particularly with regard to the fight against organised crime and in the protection of minorities. They also expressed their will to establish dialogue with other countries in the region, including the FRY.
d . South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)
106. The SECI was launched by the United States to create a regional association aimed at encouraging co-operation among its member states (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, FYROM, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey) and to facilitate their integration into European structures. An inaugural meeting was held in Geneva on 5-6 December 1996 and Dr Erhard Busek, former vice-chancellor of Austria, was named the co-ordinator of the initiative. The projects agreed upon at the SECI meeting of 29 January 1997 concern trade facilitation, transport infrastructure, energy systems and a "Danube recovery programme". The SECI held its third meeting on 1-2 July
in Crete to discuss border-crossing facilitation.
e. The Balkan Summit (Crete, 3-4 November 1997)
107. A summit in Crete was attended by the Presidents of FRY and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Prime Ministers of Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented by a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a joint communique issued at the end of the Summit, the participants decided to continue co-operating on an economic, cultural and political level. They agreed to work for security, peace and co-operation, within the framework of international treaties, and to co-operate in combating crime, drugs and illegal immigration. They also declared their wish to integrate themselves into Europe and boost trans-Atlantic ties, as well as to respect the rights of minorities.
108. The eight nations also agreed that their foreign ministers meet at least once a year and hold an annual economic summit with their finance ministers. The next summit will be held in Turkey in 1998.
109. In addition to a final declaration on co-operation in the Balkans, the summit resulted in a series of bilateral meetings. The leaders made some progess on difusing tensions. Greece and Turkey pledged to relaunch efforts to normalize relations, whereas President Milosevic and Prime
Minister Nano decided to start the process of normalizing relations between the FRY and Albania. Some progress was reported on the issue of the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but not on the issue of Kosovo. There was no progress either on the "name issue" opposed by Greece.
110. During his meeting with President Milosevic, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria insisted on the respect of the rights of the Bulgarian minority in the valleys of Timok and Strumica - a territory Bulgaria ceded to Yugoslavia under the treaty of Neuilly -.
VIII. Conclusions
111. The situation in the FRY represents a serious and imminent threat to the stability in the region. All of the FRY neighbouring states are members of the Council of Europe, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has requested Council of Europe membership.
112. Eight years after Mr Milosevic came to power, the FRY is internationally isolated, its economy is in disarray and hundreds of thousands of young and educated people are in exile. In the circumstances determined by international sanctions, absence of reforms and poor management, the economy has been brought to a near standstill. All the segments of population directly or indirectly depend on the state – through salaries in state administration and state-owned companies, pensions or through state-fixed prices of agricultural products. In the past the regime skillfully took advantage of this situation to maintain its grip on power. Today, Mr. Milosevic is gradually losing power, but, for the time being, the only one benefiting from that is Mr Seselj and his ultra-nationalist and anti-democratic radicals.
113. In the conditions of a quasi-total media control by the ruling party in Serbia, in particular with regard to the state television as the most influential source of information, democratic opposition is unable to function normally and to provide a viable alternative to either Mr Milosevic or Ms Seselj. Moreover, it is weakened and discredited after factional fights which led to the break-up of the « Zajedno coalition «. Profiting from the situation, the extremist Serb Radical Party made huge gains in the September parliamentary elections in Serbia, while its leader won the presidential elections in October, which were later invalidated because of a too low turnout.
114. After the victory of Mr Djukanovic over an ally of Mr Milosevic in the presidential elections in Montenegro, the relations between the two federal republics are strained. High officials of the ruling Socialist Party in Serbia were making inflammatory statements against the newly elected president, using the support he enjoyed among ethnic Albanians and Muslims as an argument to discredit him. The results of the elections have not yet been officially recognized by the FRY authorities.
115. Mr Seselj’s entering into power, or, alternatively, radicalisation of Milosevic’s policies in an attempt to win back the electorate would inevitably further deteriorate the situation. Such a course of events, in particular with regard to the situation in Kosovo, would risk plunging the country into civil war. The continuation of the status quo over a longer period of time is likely to have the same effect. Only immediate constitutional and legislative reforms in the FRY, ensuring, in particular, adequate protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens, adequate protection of rights of national minorities, freedom of the media, notably the electronic media, and the independence of the judiciary, will stop the present trends.
116. In Kosovo the FRY authorities continue with the repression of the two million ethnic Albanians, representing some 20-25% of the total population in the FRY. Deprived of their rights, they refuse to recognize the authority of the state. Kosovo politicians advocating peaceful resistance are gradually losing ground to those calling for more active fight against oppression. The appearance of armed terrorist groups is a particularly alarming development.
117. The FRY authorities must immediatly restore human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Albanian population, fully implement the existing agreements and engage in a dialogue with representatives of the Albanian community in Kosovo. The international community has a role to play in this process and should be enabled to establish a permanent presence in Kosovo.
118. Political leaders of the Albanian community should immediately and unconditionally renounce the use of violence.
119. The Albanian Government should use its influence to actively support a peaceful resolution of the conflict and continue its dialogue with the FRY. The weapons looted during the recent riots have to be recovered and their smuggling to Kosovo or former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia prevented.
120. Tension existing between the Albanian speaking community and the Macedonian majority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should be resolved through dialogue. The solutions to conflicts concerning the educational, linguistic and other rights of national minorities should be found on the basis of the Council of Europe instruments and principles. Both sides should refrain from nationalistic rhetorics and violence.
121. The return of some 300,000 exiled Croatian Serbs, most of whom are presently refugees in the FRY, is a key issue in the relations between Croatia and the FRY. The Croatian government should create conditions for a safe and speedy return of those who wish to do so. This should include guarantees for a secure environment, and appropriate legislative and administrative measures to facilitate their return .
122. The deteriorating situation in the FRY also has negative implications for the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The refusal to arrest persons indicted for war crimes and the conclusion of the controversial agreement with the RS on special parallel relations show that even present Milosevic’s record of compliance with its obligations under the agreement is far from satisfactory. Seselj’s rising political influence in Serbia has further negative effects on the willingness of Bosnian Serbs to co-operate in the peace process.
123. International sanctions introduced in 1992 were instrumental in bringing about the Dayton Agreement. Milosevic was rewarded for his role in this agreement by a partial suspension of sanctions by the United Nations in October 1996. Since then some countries continue to apply sanctions, while others use economic incentives. The lack of co-ordination led to the situation in which the international communnity has neither an effective stick, nor an attractive carrot to make progress towards a durable solution for regions problems. The international communnity has to agree on a common approach with regard to the use of positive and negative leverages. Progress in the compliance with the demands of the international community should be rewarded, while persistent failure to do so should continue to be sanctioned.
124. The Council of Europe brings together most of the countries in the region The respect of the obligations and commitments resulting from the membership in the Organisation is an essential element of stability in the Balkans. Consequently, an increased use should be made of the Council of Europe as a political forum for discussions on stability and co-operation in the region. Closer relations with the FRY should be established, subject to the authorities compliance with the demands of the international community.
Annex
Joint statement by the Heads of State and government of countries of South-Eastern Europe
We, the heads of state and government of countries of south-eastern Europe, President Kiro Gligorov, President Slobodan Milosevic, Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, Prime Minister Fatos Nano, Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs Mr Ismail Cern, Mr Blagoj Handziski, Mrs Nadezhda Mihaylova, Mr Paskal Milo, Mr Milan Milutinovic, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mr Adrian Severin and the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Mihovil Malbasic, participating as an observer,
representing the freely-elected governments of the south-eastern Europe peoples met for the first time in our history in Crete and agreed on the following:
We shall work together to create in our region conditions for the prosperity of our nations in a framework of peace, security, good-neighbourliness and stability.
We are determined to pursue the south-eastern Europe co-operation, on a mutual and equal basis, in the firm belief that each of us has much to learn from the other.
We shall promote the state of law, the protection of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, including inter-ethnic dialogue, individual freedoms and a market economy that will allow the individual enterprises to flourish and generate employment and opportunities for all and especially for youth.
We affirm our commitment to the UN Charter, the Paris Charter for a new Europe and the Helsinki Final Act, including all ten principles referred to therein, namely sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, co-operation among states, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
We consider that the European orientation of our countries as an integral part of their political, economic and social development.
We aspire to transform our region in an area of co-operation and economic prosperity and, to that effect, we decided to promote good-neighbourly relations and respect for international law.
We believe that Europe cannot be complete without our countries and our peoples representing civilisations and historical traditions which are essential to the establishment of a contemporary European identity.
European and Euro-atlantic integration are essential in promoting the aforementioned objectives.
We shall encourage the co-operation of the genuine representatives of our peoples in our national parliaments, as well as their common intention to create a forum of understanding and friendly relations.
We reconfirmed our support for already existing regional initiatives sharing the same ideals with us such as Royaumont, SECI, BSEC, CE_.
We shall promote scientific, educational, cultural and sport relations as a means of strengthening our mutual understanding and friendship.
We shall co-operate with each other in the field of justice, the combat against organised crime, the halting of illicit drug and arms trafficking and the elimination of all forms of terrorism and take joint action against illegal and irregular migration.
Our cultural and religious diversity cannot be seen as a threat to our co-operation and security. On the contrary we believe it is a powerful source of inspiration, creativity and dynamism.
We shall intensify our efforts for the increase of our economic co-operation, the improvement of infrastructure for transport, telecommunications and energy as well as for the establishment of favourable conditions for investments. We invite the competent ministers to meet at least once a year to assess progress.
We shall promote cross-border co-operation and to that effect we invite officials to meet regularly and ministers of economy or finance, or other ministers responsible for it, to meet at least once a year to review the progress achieved.
We took into consideration different valuable proposals for the establishment of institutes and centres for the promotion of multilateral co-operation in various fields.
We call upon ministers for foreign affairs to meet at least once a year to conduct political consultations and to promote co-operation on issues of regional stability and security. Political directors will meet every three months for consultations and report to ministers.
In order to ensure continuity between the countries undertaking the organisation of summit or ministerial meetings as well as of various technical groups, the idea of establishing a joint secretariat will be discussed by the ministers for foreign affairs.
The heads of state and government of countries of south-eastern Europe expressed their warm thanks for the hospitality of Greece for hosting the Crete Summit meeting. They decided to hold their next summit meeting in Turkey in 1998.
Heracleion, Crete, 4 November 1997
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Reference to committee : standing mandate
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 13 January 1998.
Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairman), Mr van der Linden (Vice Chairman), Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), MM Antretter, Atkinson, Mrs. Belohorska, MM Belyaev (alternate: Mr Lukin), Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzer, Chircop, Chornovil, Davis, Deasy, Diacov, Dokle, Domljan, Evangelisti, Galanos, Gjellerod, Hornhues (alternate: Mr Bühler), Irmer, Iwínski, Kalus, Mrs Kautto, MM Kirilov, Kuzmickas, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Lopez-Henares, Lupu, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martínez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Melescanu, Mota Amaral, Mühlemann, Musto, Mutman, Nallet (alternate: Mr Baumel), Oliynik, Pahor, Palmitjavilo Ribo, Popovski, Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, Mr Risari, Mrs Roudy, MM Schieder, Schwimmer, Séguin, Selva, Sinka, Mrs G Smith (alternate: Mr McNamara), Mrs Stepova, Mrs Suchoka, MM Tan, Thoresen, Toshev, Urbain, Vrettos, Woltjer, Ziuganov (Mr Zhebrovsky).
N.B. The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries of the committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Gruden.
1 See Doc. 7892 of 22 September 1997, report on the situation in Albania, Rapporteur: Mr. van der Linden