Scientific and technological co-operation with central and east European countries
Doc. 7451
9 January 1996
REPORT[1]
Rapporteur: Mrs STIBOROV�, Czech Republic, Socialist Group
Summary
Central and east European countries have the means not only to ensure their own economic survival but also to become serious competitors on the world market, providing they step up innovation efforts in the R&D field and adapt know-how and technology imported from abroad. The fact is, however, that the structural reforms introduced in this area over the last five years have been unable either to stem the brain drain or to overcome resistance to change.
20% of R&D activities in these countries are currently linked to international co-operation. The latter is, however, in need of fresh impetus if it is to co-ordinate efforts, improve the distribution of information and in particular, encourage the conversion of military-industrial complexes to civilian uses.
Despite significant differences, the R&D systems in central and east European countries share a number of common features: they are oversized, universities are often cut off from research and technological innovation does not always respond to the needs of consumers.
In order to remedy these shortcomings, the Assembly proposes generating synergy between research, the universities and industry by making rational use of existing areas of excellence and human potential. All efforts here must be aimed at improving the quality of life and the environment. The continuation of the institutional reforms in central and east European countries should make it possible to establish a new form of co-operation based on mutual benefits, in line with the relations between industrialised countries.
I. Draft resolution
1. The international competitiveness of central and east European countries will depend on their capacity to innovate, based both on their own R&D efforts and on their successful adaptation of external technologies and know-how. If they succeed in establishing the crucial link between the knowledge infrastructure and different sectors of economy, they could become successful competitors in the world markets.
2. R&D systems of central and east European countries need therefore inevitable reforms. The centralised, hierarchical, "top-down" organisation has to be replaced by a new "bottom-up" approach taking into consideration market demands. Reorganisation and restructuring efforts in the period 1990-1995, albeit significant, have not yet led to the desirable degree of transformation in this area.
3. International co-operation has not yet attained an optimum point, although the number of public and private projects are ever increasing and have reached nearly 20 % of all R&D activities in the countries concerned. They remain fragmentary and lack synergy. They also run up against obstacles of political and legislative nature, and suffer from insufficient diffusion of information. There is definitely a need for a "second generation" co-operation.
4. It was hoped that one natural consequence of transition would be to reorient science and technology activities in the area of defence towards civil production applications. The conversion process, so far, has been disappointing. If the potentiality of the military-industrial complex is not used for civil purposes, the temptation will be great to search for military outlets. This area undoubtedly deserves a special attention in international co-operation programmes.
5. Despite substantial differences between countries, the past system in central and east Europe was characterised by an oversized R&D system, a university often cut off from research and above all the subordination of science and technology to ideological and political consideration. This was especially true with respect to human and social sciences. The Assembly thought it was urgent to point out this specific aspect in its Recommendation 1264 (1995) on the social sciences and the challenge of transition.
6. In an effort to further the reflection in this area a conference on scientific and technological co-operation with central and east European countries was organised (Prague, 5-7 June 1995) which brought together members of parliaments of all countries represented in the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as government officials, leading experts, representatives of international organisations and scientific institutes.
7. The Assembly, in the light of this conference, invites all parties involved to pursue the following main objectives in both domestic reforms and international co-operation:
i. to rebuild the science and technology infrastructure in central and east European countries by introducing synergies between research activities, universities and industry;
ii. to make more rational use of these countries' areas of excellence and human potential;
iii. to support conversion of military industries to civil purposes.
8. The Assembly recommends to the countries of central and eastern Europe that the following principles and measures be implemented:
Institutional framework
i. to redefine the role of the government and the public sector in general in the R&D system;
ii. to reduce progressively the number of excess staff, which is necessary in present economic circumstances to reallocate resources more rationally and to favour quality over numbers;
iii. to introduce legislative reforms in order to enhance the role of universities in research;
iv. to stimulate inter-institutional and inter-sectoral co-operation and mobility;
v. to reward merit; egalitarian treatment inhibits creativity and favours brain drain;
vi. to develop per review mechanisms that are preferable to arbitrary decisions both in universities and research institutes;
vii. to lay down proper criteria and rules for the privatisation of R&D bodies to avoid abuses and anarchy in this area;
viii. to develop governmental and parliamentary science and technology assessment schemes and consultation machinery in order to achieve a higher degree of transparency and democratic decision making;
Technology and innovation
ix. to stimulate R&D and innovation within companies and encourage co-operation between them, vertically in co-makership, or horizontally in the pre-competitive development of technology;
x. to remove barriers to the entry of foreign R&D projects by reducing customs duties on scientific equipment;
xi. to facilitate technology transfer through joint ventures by improving corporate-law, industrial property rights, tax reduction and other financial incentives;
xii. to elaborate new intellectual property laws and patenting systems, law enforcement remaining crucial in this area;
xiii. to stimulate research on the needs of the market for new technologies by creating special centres as catalyst between research and industry;
xiv. to make university research more flexible in its operations, by allowing contracts with companies, though within certain rules;
xv. to introduce the dimension of "quality of life" in the R&D activities, giving priority to problem areas such as recycling of toxic waste, rehabilitation of polluted sites, food processing, transport, information and communication sector and health.
9. The Assembly calls on the governments of other Council of Europe member states, as well as on the European Union, the OECD and other major partners of scientific and technological co-operation with central and eastern European countries:
i. to base their action on the following fundamental principles:
scientific and technological co-operation between East and West should be
- focused more on concrete achievements and less on advice;
- modelled on relations usually practised between industrialised nations rather than on assistance procedures;
- aimed at the mutual benefit and the medium-term development of the R&D effort of these countries;
ii. to improve the dialogue with the authorities of the receiving country at all levels, ministerial meetings at regular intervals, as suggested by the European Union, being an excellent example;
iii. to pursue the objective analysis of R&D infrastructure of the countries concerned, as is the case with country evaluation reports of OECD, indispensable for sound co-operation programmes, based on real needs;
iv. to help the development of statistics on main science and technology indicators and data banks on existing institutions and their current capacities;
v. to introduce better targeted selection criteria for the financing of research projects
vi. to support "centres of excellence" or "reeference", top quality research and technology institutes, training centres etc. whose performance would be regularly assessed and which are likely to play a role in bringing about change;
vii. to orient the co-operation programmes towards high priority areas such as the conversion of military science and technology to civil purposes; the satisfaction of consumer needs; clean technologies and sustainable development; rational use of energy;
viii. to design special collaborative arrangements that would help to reduce brain drain, in the form of networks, twinning of laboratories, shared posts, European Chairs, etc. which would allow scientists abroad either to remain in permanent contact with their national institutes or urge them to spend part of the year in their home country.
II. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Lenzer
Contents
III. Difficulties of transition
IV. A special case: brain drain
V. International co-operation: setting up of priorities
1. It is now five years since the transition began in the countries of central and east Europe. The R&D, or S&T (science and technology) system, could not remain immune from these institutional changes. The move towards democratic pluralism and a market economy has necessitated a whole series of reforms, from the re-organisation of higher education to the promotion of countries' innovative capacity. Significant efforts have been made, both at national and international level, but it cannot be said that the period from 1990-1995 has led to a complete transformation in this area.
2. What was once considered as a scientific powerhouse is facing a structural crisis. Purges of academic and scientific staff have taken place in some countries. In others, the long overdue trimming in the research sector has had an impact on the morale. Uncertainty, lack of resources and the brain drain has had a disruptive effect on the R&D system.
3. The resistance to change is still strong in many places. The corporatist traditions, the academies of sciences, which enjoyed a privileged position in a highly centralised system, and a culture of secrecy are all but a few examples of obstacles to the introduction of reforms.
4. However, reforms are inevitable. central and east European countries' competitiveness in the worldmarkets, hence their economic survival, will depend on the research/innovation/technological development chain. Taking the best advantage of the S&T capacity will depend, in its turn, on a number of other reforms in the legal and institutional framework such as the banking and financial system, intellectual property rights etc. It is therefore important to understand from the outset that the transition in S&T should be put into the global perspective of post-communist transition and cannot be studied in isolation.
5. The human resources potential of the central and east European countries in the scientific field remains considerable. There is a large, highly-qualified scientific community. In many areas they have achieved excellence and developed original methods and concepts. The problem is not so much the absence of knowledge base but the lack of know-how to transform research into technological development in conformity with market demands. The innovation process is embryonic and productivity is relatively low.
6. Given the situation as described above, it would appear realistic to assume that central and east European countries will be unable to carry out the technological transformations they need without proper international co-operation. Although bilateral co-operation - albeit modest in scale - did already exist under the old regimes, multilateral co-operation is a recent phenomenon concerning this region. It is still fragmentary and insufficient to meet the needs or the enormous expectations. Until now the co-operation developed often by trial and error. Assistance programmes were dissipated on a multitude of small projects, mainly at academic level, with little or no impact on industrial output. Today, after five years of experience, there is need for a "second generation" co-operation. This should be more precisely targeted.
7. With these considerations in mind the Committee on Science and Technology, in collaboration with the Czech parliament, organised a Conference in Prague (5-7 June 1995) on scientific and technological co-operation with central and east European countries. The present report is based mainly on the documents and deliberations of this Conference[2]. Its basic aim is to depict the situation in central and east European countries as regard to Science and Technology Development and analyses the existing co-operation schemes. The reader should be warned that despite some common features and a general trend, there remain substantial differences between countries, due to historical, cultural and social traditions. Not all of these countries have reacted to change with the same ability or speed, nor with the same enthusiasm.
8. Science and technology were highly valued by the communist regimes, who regarded them as the main driving force for economic and social progress and a key factor in their defence programmes. The funds which were allocated to them generally reflected the appreciably higher level of priority granted to science and technology than on average in the OECD countries. In simple terms the way in which R&D was organised in the former communist countries can be summed up as follows: basic research (both pure and applied) was carried out in institutes attached to the academies of science, while university research was relatively under-developed; the Academy itself acted simultaneously as a learned society, a Ministry of Science and a funding agency, and even as an accrediting agency for academic qualifications. As far as industrial and technological research was concerned, this was conducted within the institutes of the relevant ministries -many of which were defence-related - while the amount of research actually carried out within industry itself remained very limited[3].
9. Whilst avoiding excessive generalisations, one can identify deficiencies which stem from the past communist system, as follows:
- the subordination of S&T to ideological and political considerations, especially with respect to the human and social sciences: as a result no independent discipline of economics or business administration has developed;
- rigid specialisation within COMECON, which prevented countries from developing their own S&T policies in line with world market requirements;
- an oversized S&T system with a far larger number of scientists and technicians than needed, organised through a heavy bureaucracy and a top-down hierarchical system;
- a culture of secrecy and the isolation of scientists at international level, with restricted participation to worldwide publications and meetings;
- a centralised structure with S&T authority concentrated in the academies of science. These latter are somewhat autonomous and quite powerful, but are not sensitive to social needs nor to regional and local problems;
- a university system cut off from research, with almost no links to academies and research institutes, no peer assessment;
- lack of concern for environmental problems and for the human risk factor in important industrial and energy projets;
- low capacity to react to consumer demands, no industrial property rights and no individual patents;
- last but not least a S&T system chiefly geared to military needs and to prestige projects such as space programmes.
10. The S&T sector is thus severely inhibited by the heritage of the past. The pattern described above is undergoing severe changes to varying degrees in different countries. As it is often the case the prospects for radical change cause tensions, confusion and sometimes resistance. The redistribution of power and money is not a smooth operation. The main objectives of both, domestic reforms and international co-operation should be:
- to rebuild S&T infrastructure;
- to make more rational use of these countries' areas of excellence and human potential;
- to support conversion of military industries to civil purposes;
- to introduce synergies between research, universities and industry.
III. Difficulties of transition
11. The difficulties facing central and east European S&T will probably persist for a number of years. Some are specific to the S&T sector, whilst others are of a political, cultural and macro-economic nature. There are also setbacks of a more psychological type. The privileged position of science under the old regime, independent of its economic utility, has led to anti-science attitudes in today's societies, dominated by economic constraints. The poor inter-institute co-operation and the reluctance to share limited equipment and resources can also be interpreted as an over-reaction to the collectivism of the past. The much needed multi-user system is something that is not easily accepted[4].
12. As a general trend the governments have taken charge of S&T policy, setting up ministries with enhanced responsibilities. However, the ideal distribution of tasks between ministries, academies and universities has not yet been found. Limits have been placed on the powers of the academies, while their activities have been refocused on fundamental research. In some countries, academy presidents look back on the "good old days" with a certain nostalgia. The universities, who feel that they had been ill-treated in the past are engaged in a fierce battle for gaining ground. On the whole the academies are declining and the universities are expanding. This evolution, inevitable as it may be, created nonetheless frictions to the detriment of the overall S&T effort of a given country.
13. The strengthening of the activities of universities and their opening up to research require, of course, fundamental changes in higher-education legislation. In my own country, the Czech Republic, for instance a new bill on higher education is before the parliament. It aims to introduce further liberalisation of higher education, possibility of private universities, common accreditation system, democratisation of the fund allocation system and the introduction of peer assessment. This bill will respond to a new situation where several new universities were founded since 1991 and the university education increased from 15% to 30% of the population.
14. As regards the special research institutes, attached to the ministries their size is being cut down. In the Czech Republic for instance the total number was reduced by 25 % and the number of employees to half (from 13,000 to 6,500). These institutes have been deprived not
only of their means but also much of their purpose. Some of them disappeared completely, others attempt to convert their activities to the needs of the emerging market economy, working on a contractual basis. There are also signs of previously unheard interaction between public institutes and universities[5]. The privatisation issue is the next step on the agenda, though very controversial, for it will depend largely on foreign investment.
15. Financing of S&T activities undergoes sharp reductions. In the period prior to 1990 the funds granted to S&T in central and east European countries were superior in average to that of OECD countries (1,4% of GDP)[6]. This figure now has dropped to less than 1% in most of these countries. The economic difficulties and the will to rationalise justify the cut-backs. Paradoxically, the budgetary management has improved, often at the cost of an internal and external brain drain of scientists and technologists. The State now finances the quasi-totality of the national S&T effort. Industry's contribution is very low (about 5% in Russia). This situation is not sustainable in the long run. The development of market-driven R&D will take a long time[7].
16. Finally, in most countries, there are efforts to reorient the defense activities towards civil production applications. The conversion process, so far, has been disappointing. The military-industrial complex needs new partners for producing new goods, based on accurate domestic and foreign market studies. If the potentiality of this complex is not used for civil purposes, the temptation will otherwise be great to search for military outlets at any cost. This area undoubtedly deserves a special attention as regards western aid and joint ventures.
IV. A special case: brain drain
17. Brain drain is usually understood as the loss by a country of trained scientists, lecturers and technologists who leave a country's science base because of serious difficulties in continuing with their professional activities. Brain drain falls into two major categories, namely[8]:
a) Internal brain drain is where scientists and technologists leave their activities for a wide range of other activities within their country. If these activities have nothing to do with their competencies one can also call it "brain waste". Scientists accepting contracts in private enterprises could have beneficial results for the country and should therefore be considered as "brain recycling". This also has the advantage of reducing the over inflated scientific manpower resulting from former policies.
b) External brain drain is the reference to the flow of scientists and technologists to other countries which offer better working and living conditions. In the last few years there are reports that there is a mass "exodus" from central and east European countries. However this is a very poorly documented topic. The number of scientists and engineers who emigrated from Russia (definitively or temporarily) during the period 1990-1994 is estimated in a range of 20.000 to 30.000[9]. The total migration flow from the other central and east European countries is probably of an equivalent size. After the first wave of massive departures the situation appears to be stabilising. On the whole the external brain drain did not amount to more than 10 % of the R&D capacity of these countries.
18. The causes of brain drain are multiple. They can be classified as general causes: difficulties affecting the population as a result of economic and political restructuring, social insecurity, low salaries, little confidence in the future of the regime, aspiration for a better life and career etc. Other causes are more specific for scientists: the deteriorating infrastructure of equipment, lack of information, publications and currency for international meetings, the "top down" command model and no "bottom up" research culture, poor legislation on intellectual property, the partial dismantlement of the military-industrial complex.
19. In addition to these reasons inherent to the period of transition in central and east Europe, the attractive offers made by other countries are often the determinant factor in the final choice. Among the well-established scientists a non-negligible proportion intends to return to the country of origin after a temporary stay. The situation for young specialists and Ph.D. students with scholarships abroad is quite different. They can adapt more easily to the new community and are offered opportunities as their studies come to a close. Thus a young specialist cannot turn down a fellowship in a prestigious laboratory or a 30-40.000 dollars salary a year. The return to his or her homeland will remain remote, if not illusory[10].
20. Brain drain is a highly controversial issue. After a first panic reaction of the early 90's the pros and cons are being weighed in a more objective way. While the central and east European countries are rebuilding their infrastructure and searching a new role for their scientific community, those scientists abroad could continue to enrich the scientific soil in the West. On balance, the entire world would profit from an increased co-operation and exchange of teams. Especially the increase in temporary contracts offers a compromise solution whereby the scientists continue communication with their former institutions. Some governments even appreciate the strong currencies sent to families or invested in the country of origin thanks to these expatriates. It is almost impossible to quantify the overall loss or gain of a particular country. It may be more useful to focus in the future on the situation in particular scientific areas.
V. International co-operation: setting up of priorities
21. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, quite a deal of interesting work was being carried out jointly between east and west European researchers in the fields of particle physics and space research. The Vega programme, which involved investigating the atmosphere of Venus is a good example. The multidisciplinary pan-European Academia Europaea had been set up to improve contacts between scientists from all over Europe and gathered more than 1500 members. EUREKA, which was created to meet the needs of industry and the market, tried to involve central and east European countries in a number of limited projects, namely in the environment sector. These modest programmes, with mostly a symbolic value, had shown however that it was possible to work together[11].
22. Today, international co-operation faces a much bigger challenge: to encourage the re-emergence of the S&T sector in central and east European countries and integrate it into the market economy system. The realisation of this objective would require a great number of measures, from helping these countries with the re-organisation of their R&D structures, to the setting up of commercial information networks upon which the spread of technology depends. Western countries and the European Union, in drawing up their co-operation policies, cannot lose sight of the fact that the countries they will be assisting today may turn into competitors tomorrow. Jobs may be lost to places where wages and social protection standards are lower. The European Union recognised therefore that it had to "endeavour to find the right balance between competition and co-operation"[12]
23. The initial period (1990-1994) of co-operation witnessed a multitude of initiatives and projects, often without an appropriate co-ordination or synergy. The number of projects and the funds are even increasing and today reaches nearly 20 % of all R&D activities in the countries concerned, including both the public (bilateral and multilateral programmes) and private (business, joint-ventures, associations etc.) sectors. The co-operation programmes have not reached an optimum point yet, and still run up against obstacles of political, structural and legislative nature, such as the absence of interlocutor, ironically resulting from institutional diversification and the multiplication of partners or the unduly rapid turnover of the people they had to deal with in correspondent institutions. Customs duties on scientific equipment and other administrative barriers still exist. "Information" also poses a major problem. Western partners spend time and money in information campaigns through universities and research institutes to make scientists aware of the existence of different programmes. It is not possible to review all programmes in this short report. We shall only make a brief reference to the most important ones.
24. The United States and Europe are, by all means, the most important partners of central and east European countries in scientific and technological co-operation. American aid programmes (estimated at about 200 million dollars) are channelled through public agencies (US Agency for International Development, National Science Foundation, National Academy of Science, Environmental Protection Agency, American Association for Advancement of Sciences) or private associations, the most important of which is the Soros Foundation, set up by an American financier of Hungarian origin. This latter started off by paying a 50 dollar per month salary supplement to about 20.000 scientists in the East, selected on the basis of their recent publications (programme estimated at 20 million dollars). The private industrial sector invests considerable amounts, estimated at 200 to 300 million dollars, although the actual amount is not known. The most distinctive US action is however that of the universities and private laboratories. They offer attractive short and medium term contracts to a great number of researchers.
25. Apart from bilateral agreements the bulk of the co-operation between West and East Europe consists of European Union programmes. Major programmes with the general aim of assisting central and east European countries to set up market economy and achieve true democracy, such as PHARE[13], are also partially used to modernise science and technology. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a sister programme was set up under the name TACIS[14] . These two programmes, whose contribution to R&D restructuring was limited, have been supplemented by targeted co-operation activities. Between 1992 and 1994 an annual budget of 250 million ecus was earmarked to fund 3,500 research activities, 2,500 grants, 450 joint projects and 700 schemes to encourage scientists to take part in the specific programmes of the community research activities[15]. Those research activities falling outside the five specific areas would be financed by COPERNICUS[16] as suggested by the European Parliament. A special programme was also designed for young students: TEMPUS[17]. The European Union's fourth framework programme on research and technological development (RTD, 1994-1998) foresees 540 million ecus for co-operation policy, out of a total of 12,3 billion ecus (4,4 %).
26. Though these sums may seem insufficient to some, a qualitative change in the setting up of priority lines and the running of the programmes is expected to bring about more efficiency. Meetings between European Union Ministers and their counterparts from central and east European countries will, for instance, be organised at regular intervals. A targeted selection criteria for research projects, an improved dialogue with the authorities of the receiving country and an increased industrial involvement seem to be along the new policy lines of the European Union. Apart from its own programmes, the influence that the European Union has on the co-operation policies of other organisations such as EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), World Bank, ESA (European Space Agency) and CERN (European Laboratory for Particle Physics) is far from being negligible. Important projects are usually co-financed from different sources. This is the case for instance for nuclear safety programmes.
27. In 1991, following an initiative of the German government, a joint action Europe/USA/Japan was launched for the creation of an International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow (ISTC). The objective was to employ researchers from the military sector in civil projects. In reality it aimed to stop the migration of top level Russian nuclear scientists to countries where a danger of nuclear proliferation existed. The Centre became operational only in 1994 with a relatively important budget (European Union: 20 million ecus, USA: 25 million dollars, Japan: 17 million dollars). It is too early to assess its action. However the early stages were marked by Russian reticence and shortcomings in Western coordination.
28. Another potentially good framework for science co-operation is the European Science Foundation (ESF). This latter, created in the 1970's, as a non-governmental organisation, gathering research councils, academies and other institutions supporting scientific research nationally responded to a real need in Western Europe as a point of contact and exchange of information. Recently the ESF, though cautiously and gradually, is opening up to the new democracies. Scientists from all European countries, participate, in an individual capacity, in different programs and networks. However, as regards country membership, the present structure for the management of science in most central and east European countries, namely the fact that governments retain at the moment most science funding in their hands, restricts the possibilities for an immediate accession to ESF.
29. In concluding this chapter on main structures of co-operation, two activities within the Council of Europe deserve to be mentioned. The first one is the "Legislative reform programme (LRP) on higher education", carried out since 1991 under the authority of the expert Committee for higher education and research. It aims at modernising the structures and functioning of universities. The Assembly Recommendation N� 1264 on social sciences and the challenge to transition gave a new impetus to this project. It is desirable that LRP should put more emphasis, in the future, on the role and organisation of scientific research in universities. The second is a very specific area, described as the European major hazards agreement, whose aim is to reinforce multidisciplinary scientific co-operation for the prevention of natural or technological disasters such a earthquakes. Protection and organisation of relief are also among the objectives. This partial agreement has to date 23 member States and a network of Specialised European Centres. It calls upon the present day knowledge of all contracting states for a more efficient management of major disasters.
30. R&D systems in the planned economies were hierarchical, compartmentalised and insular. Fundamental research was at the top of the pyramid. Academies of science and ministerial institutes were in charge of developing technology, introduced in enterprises through a "top-down" centralised relationship. Since enterprises operated in a monopoly situation they had little incentive to take risks or be innovative. S&T systems now have to satisfy the social and economic needs of the market economies and liberal democracies which are taking shape. This means reversing the system, and setting up new priorities in a "bottom-up" approach[18].
31. There is no such thing as an "ideal model". But there are several paths which can lead to success, as long as the interlinkages between supply and demand for technology are taken into account. The "technology push" system is out. This was an innovation process organised in a linear manner between the knowledge infrastructure and the technology development departments. The innovation chain has changed totally, from a linear process to an interactive interdisciplinary process. The "market pull" determines the technology supply and its timing. Reorganisation and restructuring of S&T are bound to be unsuccessful as long as the interrelations between the knowledge infrastructure of a country and the innovation process in the industry are not understood[19].
32. At the present time most central and east European countries are embarking on a massive reorganisation of their S&T systems. Often they do so with the help and advice of Western countries. They would be well advised not to consider only short-term interests at the expense of long-term advantages. They could rapidly become very competitive in some sectors, due to low wages and poor environmental standards. This however might upset the delicate equilibrium in East-West economic relations and prevent a more harmonious co-operation in the future.
33. Whether on a bilateral or multilateral level, the new scientific and technological cooperation between East and West should be based on three fundamental principles:
- focused more on concrete results and less on advice;
- be modelled on relations usually practised between industrialised nations rather than on assistance procedures.
- aim at the mutual benefit and the medium-term development of the S&T effort of these countries in the interest of the international community.
When determining priorities, partners on both sides should pay special attention to fully using the existing human resource potential of the receiver country but also encourage the emergence of a new generation of scientists better acquainted with the latest innovation and management techniques. One of the criteria for the selection of projects should be the improvement of the quality of life. Though considered as "lower" technologies, recycling of toxic waste, rehabilitation of polluted sites, food processing, transport, communications and the consumer sector correspond more to the needs of the populations and to that of the economy than some prestige projects such as space stations and supercolliders.
34. Lastly, S&T activities in countries in transition must be developed in a context of democracy and transparency. The public, who are, after all, the ultimate users of scientific and technological developments and inventions, should be more involved in decision-making. As the General Rapporteur of our Conference, Professor Curien, said in the end, science should meet the needs of society. Isn't the ultimate aim of "progress" happiness? It is true that the introduction of democratic decision-making slowed down reforms in S&T as in other sectors, because of communication difficulties between the executive and the legislative during the initial phases of transition. However the parliamentary systems in these countries will gradually develop information, assessment and consultation machinery for S&T, vital to the crucial and costly decisions of tomorrow.
35. The central and east European countries have a good quality research potential, a well educated work force, relatively cheap energy and low cost levels. If they succeed in establishing the crucial link between their knowledge base and different sectors of their economy, they could become competitors to be feared in the world markets. Initially, their expectations as regards aid programmes from the West were too high. There was also an unrealistic euphoria in the idea of privatising or self-financing all R&D institutions. The limits of international cooperation and rapid privatisation are now assessed more realistically. The countries concerned will have to provide an important part of the modernisation effort, which cannot be achieved overnight but will be the result of a step-by-step policy. The final success will depend on the strengthening and the smooth running of democratic structures and the free market economy. International co-operation not only injects money but will be needed for finding partners and markets. Foreign investment and joint-ventures are necessary to improve the innovation process, clean technologies and marketing prospects. In order to attract foreign investment not only legislation on industrial property rules and intellectual property rights has to be improved but also law enforcement which is painfully lacking at the moment.
Reporting committee: Committee on Science and Technology.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
R�f�rences: Resolution 827 (1984) and Order No. 422 (1984).
Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 8 January 1996.
Members of the committee: Mr Roseta (Chairman), Mrs Terborg, Mr Birraux (Vice-Chairpersons), MM. About, Bartodziej, Bauer, Beaufays, Benetatos, Berger, Bog�r, Mrs Brenden, MM. Caccia, Cherribi, Cunliffe, Deguara, Galley, Golu, Gregory, Guia, Guidi, Mrs Hoffmann, MM. Hurta, Johansson, Korakas, Leers, Lekberg, Lenzer, L�pez Valdivielso (Alternate: Robles Orozco), Luczak, Maass, Metelko, Mocioi, Moln�r (Alternate: Szalay), Nania (Alternate: Lorenzi), Olrich, Petersen, Po�as Santos, Po_�la, Prokes, Ruka, Mrs Schicker, MM. Sinka, Speroni, Mrs Stiborova, Mr Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Jack Thompson (Alternate: Lord Newall), Tiuri, Toshev, Y�r�r, Weyts.
N.B. The names of those members who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Perin and Miss Theophilova.
[1] by the Committee on Science and Technology
[2] See publication: "Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries" (AS/Science/Conf (1995) 8).
[3] OECD: Presentation by Jean-Eric Aubert to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[4] Ioan Mihailescu "Main Directions of Romania's R&D System Reform" presented to the Parliamentary Conference of scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[5] OECD: Presentation by Jean-Eric Aubert to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[6] More than 2% in Russia.
[7] "Science, technology and innovation policies: Federation of Russia" Evaluation report, OECD 1994.
[8] ICSU: Presentation by Sir Anthony Epstein to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[9] OECD: Presentation by Jean-Eric Aubert to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries (Table R 3).
[10] Boris Galabov: "Brain drain from universities and research organisations in Central and Eastern Europe: specific issues and policies" presented to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[11] Professor Hubert Curien, General Rapporteur to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[12] European Commission. Press Release on Scientific Co-operation, 18 October 1995.
[13] PHARE: initially created as "Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Restructuring" extended later to other Central and Eastern European countries with the exception of ex-Soviet Republics.
[14] TACIS: Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States.
[15] European Commission: Presentation by Reinhart Thomas, DG XII, to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[16] COPERNICUS: Action in support of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and since 1994 for the NIS in the field of research, outside the five specific programmes open to third countries.
[17] TEMPUS: Trans-European Mobility Programme for University Students.
[18] OECD: Presentation by Jean-Eric Aubert to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.
[19] Paul H.A.M. Verhaegen, Director of Economic Affairs, Confederation of Netherlands Industry: "Balancing technology supply and demand". Presentation made to the Parliamentary Conference on scientific and technological co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries.