Council of Europe / Conseil de l'Europe

F-67075 Strasbourg cedex (France)

Tél :+33/ 3 88 41 20 00

Fax : +33 / 3 88 41 27 76

Email : [email protected]

http://stars.coe.fr/

Doc. 8082

21 April 1998

Latest developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the situation in Kosovo

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Mr András Bársony, Hungary, Socialist Group

Summary :

      The latest political developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) – and in particular the situation in Kosovo – represent a threat to the stability of the country and of the Balkan region as a whole. The Assembly is concerned about the growing influence of political extremists in the FRY, as demonstrated by the participation of the Serb Radical Party of Mr Seselj in the new Serbian government. The continuing tensions in Montenegro should be resolved through political dialogue. The parliamentary elections in Montenegro, scheduled for 31 May 1998, will be an important indicator of respect for democratic standards. Without pre-judging the outcome of the negotiations, a long-term solution to the crisis in Kosovo can only be found on the basis of a greater autonomy for Kosovo, within a democratically reformed FRY. Such autonomy should guarantee respect for the rights of all ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Assembly repeats its call for an immediate start of unconditional negotiations.

The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers examine, in close co-ordination with the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union and the Contact Group, ways in which the Council of Europe could facilitate contacts and assist in talks between the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovo Albanian community ; and decide on a follow-up to be given to the Yugoslav request for Council of Europe membership in the light of progress made by the FRY authorities in complying with the requests by the international community, notably with regard to Kosovo.

I. Draft recommendation

1.       The latest political developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) – and in particular the situation in Kosovo – represent a threat to the stability of the country and of the Balkan region as a whole.

2.       The Assembly reiterates its position expressed in Recommendation 1360 (1998) on the Crisis in Kosovo and in Resolution 1146 (1998) on Recent Developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their Implications in the Balkan Region.

3.       The Assembly is concerned about the growing influence of political extremists in the FRY, as demonstrated by the participation of the Serb Radical Party of Mr Seselj in the new Serbian government.

4.       The continuing tensions in Montenegro should be resolved through political dialogue. The parliamentary elections in Montenegro, scheduled for 31 May 1998, will be an important indicator of respect for democratic standards.

5.       The Assembly re-affirms its position that, without pre-judging the outcome of the negotiations, a long-term solution to the crisis in Kosovo can only be found on the basis of a greater autonomy for Kosovo, within a democratically reformed FRY. Such autonomy should guarantee respect for the rights of all ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Assembly repeats its call for an immediate start of unconditional negotiations.

6.       It welcomes the beginning of the implementation in Kosovo of the 1996 education agreement, which should contribute to a more favourable political climate for any future talks.

7.       The Assembly welcomes the constitution of the delegation of the Serbian government, which includes a special envoy of President Milosevic, for talks with representatives of Kosovo Albanian community. The delegation should be authorised to discuss solutions going beyond the existing Serbian constitution. The international community should be represented at these talks.

8.       The Assembly also welcomes the constitution of a negotiating team representing the Kosovo Albanian community. It should accept to open talks with the Belgrade authorities forthwith.

9.       The Assembly re-iterates its offer to assist in contacts between the authorities and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian Community. The Council of Europe has considerable expertise in the relevant areas, such as human rights, minority rights and education, which it could put at the disposal of the parties.

10.       The Assembly considers that the referendum decided by the Serbian Parliament, following a proposal by President Milosevic, on the acceptability of foreign mediation does not contribute to a solution to the Kosovo crisis. The Yugoslav authorities should comply with the requests of the international community, including the mission of Mr Felipe González on behalf of the OSCE and the European Union.

11.       The Assembly fully endorses Resolution 1160 of the United Nation Security Council on the crisis in Kosovo, adopted on 31 March 1998. In the light of the request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for membership, the Council of Europe should be included in consultations between the United Nations, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the European Union.

12.       The Assembly takes note of the Yugoslav government’s request for Council of Europe membership of 18 March 1998. However, this request can only be considered if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respects the principles and values on which the Council of Europe is based, and complies with the requests of the international community, notably with regard to Kosovo.

13.       The Assembly calls on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to:

14.        The Assembly calls on the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians :

15.       The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

16.       The Assembly resolves to remain actively seized on the issue and to send a delegation to visit Belgrade, Pristina and Podgorica as soon as possible.

II.       Explanatory memorandum

I. Introduction

1. In the last days of February and in beginning of March 1998, almost one hundred people, mostly civilians, were killed in operations by Serbian security forces against members of the “Kosovo Liberation Army”. Following these events, a high-level delegation of the Assembly, led by President Fischer and composed of the leaders of the Political Groups, as well as the chairmen of the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, visited Belgrade and Pristina. The aim of the visit, which took place on 12-13 March 1998, was to discuss the crisis in Kosovo in the context of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Council of Europe. For the report on the visit see Addendum I to the progress report of the Bureau (Doc…).

2. On 18 March 1998 the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, adopted Recommendation 1360 (1998) on the crisis in Kosovo. In this text the Assembly expressed its full support to the decisions taken by the Contact Group on 9 March 1998 and called for an immediate start of genuine negotiations on the future status of Kosovo, based on a greater autonomy within the FRY. The Assembly reaffirmed that the development of relations between the Council of Europe and the FRY would depend on compliance with the requests by the international community.

3. On the same day, the FRY government, in a letter by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr Zivadin Jovanovic, officially requested Council of Europe membership. The letter and the related press statements by the Secretary General and the Committee of Ministers are attached as Annex 1.

4. The present report is to be discussed in an urgent procedure debate during the April 1998 part-session, requested in the light of the above developments. The Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr Bronislaw Geremek, has been invited to take part in the debate, as well as a delegation from the Yugoslav parliament. Representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community have been invited for an exchange of views with the Political Affairs Committee.

II. Request for Council of Europe membership

5. The parliament of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was granted special guest status with the Assembly on 8 June 1989. Following the outbreak of the war in June 1991, this status was first suspended on 25 November 1991 and finally withdrawn on 30 June 1992.

6. On the occasion of the Assembly’s high-level visit to Belgrade, the FRY authorities expressed their interest in closer relations with the Council of Europe. They said to be ready to adhere immediately to certain legal instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Local Self-Government.

7. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Jovanovic, confirmed to the Assembly delegation that the request for membership was imminent, and that the authorities intended to resolve the Kosovo crisis on the basis of Council of Europe standards in the field of minorities and local autonomy.

8. On 25 March 1998 the Ministers’ Deputies took note of the formal request for membership. They decided to inform the Council of Europe Assembly of this request, and agreed to resume consideration at a later meeting. On this occasion the Deputies noted that several aspects of the present situation in the FRY, in particular in Kosovo, were a cause for great concern. The Assembly was not asked to prepare an opinion on the request and only an informal exchange of views between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers was prepared for the Joint Committee during the April 1998 part-session.

III. The Bonn meeting of the Contact Group (25 March 1998)

9. Following the expiration of the 10-day deadline for compliance with the requests drawn up at the meeting in London on 9 March 1998, the Contact Group held a second meeting on Kosovo in Bonn on 25 March. The Contact Group’s statement of 9 March had asked for withdrawal of the special police units, access to Kosovo to the representatives of international community, a public commitment to begin unconditional dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian Community and a constructive co-operation with the Contact Group.

10. The Group’s statement of 25 March noted some progress, notably on dialogue and the implementation of the education agreement, but concluded that further progress was necessary.

11. It called for a rapid opening of substantive negotiations with the participation of an outside representative or representatives. Pending this, the Group decided to maintain and implement the measures announced on March 9, including seeking adoption of the arms embargo by the UN Security Council.

12. The FRY authorities were told that the resolution of the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo was a pre-condition to any improvement of country’s international standing. On the other hand, concrete progress on these issues would improve its prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and full rehabilitation in international institutions.

13. President Milosevic was urged to accept the mission of Mr Felipe González, which would open the way to address the potential for FRY participation in the work of the OSCE.

14. The Group decided to meet again in 4 weeks time (on 25 April 1998) to reassess the situation.

IV.       UN Security Council Resolution 1160

15. On 31 March 1998 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 (1998), banning the sale or supply to the FRY of arms and related materiel. The vote was 14 in favour to none against, with one abstention by China. The integral text of the resolution is attached as Annex 2.

16. The resolution endorsed the statements made by the Contact Group on 9 and 25 March 1998 and the decisions of the OSCE permanent Council of 11 March 1998.

17. It called upon the Belgrade authorities and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community to “enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues,” and expressed support for “an enhanced status for Kosovo, which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration”.

18. The UN Secretary General was asked to keep the Security Council regularly informed and to report on the situation in Kosovo in 30 days following the adoption of the resolution and every 30 days thereafter. Secretary General’s reports should take into account the assessments of, inter alia, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the European Union.

19. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was asked to begin gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo that might fall within its jurisdiction.

20. The resolution emphasised that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo would lead to the consideration of additional measures.

V.       The position of the FRY authorities

21. The threat of sanctions after the 9 March meeting of the Contact Group forced the FRY authorities to a number of concessions.

22. The long delayed implementation of the education agreement, signed in September 1996, and was finally agreed on 23 March 1998.

23. A negotiating team, headed by the deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, was set up and sent to Pristina for talks with the Albanian community and other ethnic communities living in Kosovo. While cautiously welcoming this move, the international community expressed criticism concerning the fact that the team represented the government of Serbia and not the federal authorities. This was partially remedied through the appointment of a special representative of President Milosevic to the team, although without specifying what his mandate would be.

24. On 7 April 1998 the Serbian authorities launched yet another (their tenth) public appeal for dialogue. A delegation sent to Pristina was for the first time headed by the Serbian president, Mr Milutinovic. As on the previous nine occasions, the leadership of the Albanian community again refused to meet with the Serbian delegation. It claimed that the other side insisted on talks within the framework of the existing Serbian constitution, which was a pre-condition and thus not in line with the requests of the international community.

25. The authorities agreed to grant unimpeded access to Kosovo, included to the Drenica region, to representatives of the ICRC and foreign diplomats.

26. No security operations on the scale seen at the end of February and the beginning of March have been carried out after the 9 March meeting of the Contact Group. Anti-terrorist police units of the Serbian Ministry of Interior have been withdrawn to the barracks in Kosovo, while special units of the regular police remained deployed throughout Kosovo.

27. However, the acceptance of the extreme nationalist Radical Party as a coalition partners by the ruling Socialists marked the beginning of a more hard-line attitude of the authorities vis-à-vis the international community.

28. The new Serbian government was formally inaugurated on 24 March 1998. The entry of Mr Seselj’s ultra-nationalists came as a last minute surprise, when months long negotiations with Mr Draskovic’s Serb Renewal Party finally collapsed. The ruling Socialists had previously been – at least publicly - categorically opposed to any co-operation with Mr Seselj. The Radicals were given 15 out of 36 ministerial posts, including a Deputy Prime Minister post for Mr Seselj.

29. With the new Serbian Government in place, President Milosevic has become even less co-operative, and has refused to meet with a number of international envoys, including with the United States Special Envoy Mr Gelbard. He also categorically refused any role of the international community in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, including the mission of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and EU Special representative, Mr Felipe González.

30. On 2 April President Milosevic, in an open letter sent to the President of Serbia, President of the Serbian parliament and the Serbian Prime Minister, called for a referendum on foreign mediation in the Kosovo crisis. President Milosevic argued that such a referendum would be an opportunity to prove that the existing policy with regard to Kosovo was not determined by personal or party interests, but based on the interest of all Serbian people. This, according to President Milosevic, would be the best way to refute cynical and interventionist pressures exerted by the international community. President Milosevic finally proposed the wording of the question to be put to voters: “Do you agree to the participation of foreign representatives in the resolution of the problem in Kosovo and Metohija1?”.

31. The initiative was launched accompanied by an aggressive media campaign in state dominated press and notably on the state television. It received immediate support by the ruling Socialists, their coalition partners Radicals and the Serbian Renewal Movement of Mr Draskovic. The three have an absolute majority in the Serbian parliament, which is empowered to decide on the holding of a referendum.

32. The Serbian parliament on 6 April first changed the law on referendums. The delay in which a referendum could be convened was shortened from 30 to 15 days, in order to allow for its taking place before the next meeting of the Contact Group.

33. The following day the parliament decided on the holding of the referendum, now scheduled for 23 April.

34. The President of the Assembly reacted to this decision in her statement of 8 April, which is attached as Annex 3.

35. The referendum was strongly criticised by the democratic opposition parties such as the Democratic Party of Mr Djindjic, the Civic Alliance of Mrs Pesic and several regional parties in Vojvodina.

36. The authorities’ policy on Kosovo has also been widely criticised by the new Montenegrin leadership. While agreeing that Serbia’s borders should not change, the President of Montenegro, Mr Djukanovic, rejected the proposal for a referendum and publicly supported foreign mediation. This position should be seen against the background of the on-going tensions between Belgrade and Podgorica. Many fear that these tensions could culminate on the occasion of the elections for Montenegrin parliament, planned for 31 May 1998. Mr Milosevic, in his new capacity as the federal president, needs a loyal regime in Montenegro. If his ally Mr Bulatovic fails to regain power at the forthcoming elections, President Milosevic’s position would be seriously weakened.

VI.        The position of the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian Community

37. For the second time “presidential” elections and elections for the self-styled “parliament of the Kosovo Republic” were held on 22 April 1998. Boycotted by many of the political parties of Kosovo Albanians, they were dominated by the Democratic Ligue of Kosovo (LDK), led by Mr Rugova, who himself won nearly 100% of the votes in the presidential contest.

38. Mr Rugova continued to refuse to talk to the negotiating team of the Serbian government, insisting on direct talks with the federal authorities and on the presence of international mediators.

39. Pressured by the international community, Mr Rugova on 6 April set up a four- members negotiating team to represent the Kosovo Albanian community in any future talks with the Belgrade authorities. The team included one of Mr Rugova’s closest aides, Mr Fehmi Agani, who had also negotiated the 1996 education agreement. Other members were a former communist leader, Mr Mahmut Bakalli, a journalist and human rights activist, Mr Veton Surroi and the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Kosovo Albanians, Mr Pajazit Nushi.

40. The team did not include representatives of the party of Mr Adem Demaci, who is a rival to Mr Rugova. Mr Demaci is more radical in approach, but more moderate in objectives. He is not a supporter of independence, but proposes instead a confederation of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. However, he recently expressed sympathy for armed resistance against the authorities.

41. Although there have been recently no major confrontations between the security forces and the “Kosovo Liberation Army” (KLA), sporadic incidents, with casualties, have continued. In the latest of such incidents, six ethnic Albanians, known as Serb sympathisers, were found dead on 6 April, allegedly executed by the KLA.

VIII.       Conclusions

42. The position of the international community with regard to Kosovo, as contained in the relevant decisions by the UN Security Council, Contact Group, the OSCE, the European Union and the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as well as other international bodies, may be summarised in the following requests:

- immediate end to the violence and repression by the authorities,

- condemnation of terrorism by the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community,

- independent international inquiry into the recent events,

- implementation of the 1996 education agreement,

- immediate start of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the participation of an international representative (or representatives),

- acceptance by the FRY authorities of the mission of Mr Felipe González on behalf of the OSCE and the European Union,

43. In more general terms, the requests of the international community include the need for immediate implementation of democratic reforms throughout the FRY.

44. The international pressure exerted on the Belgrade authorities has resulted in some, albeit partial concessions with regard to Kosovo. It should be concluded that these concessions, however welcome, are far from being satisfactory.

45. The implementation of the 1996 education agreement should be welcomed as a contribution to a better climate for future talks between the two sides. It should be noted, however, that the agreement was signed almost two years ago. Similar confidence-building measures which would not require constitutional changes and could thus be implemented immediately, would be welcome. Such measures could include the resumption of broadcasting of Television Pristina in the Albanian language.

46. The Serbian government’s offer for talks with the Kosovo Albanian community leadership was positive but not fully adequate as it was limited to solutions within the framework of the existing Serbian constitution. It had been through this constitution, adopted in 1990, that the Albanian community lost most of the rights it previously enjoyed.

47. The participation of the Seselj’s extreme nationalist Radicals in the new Serbian government and the initiative for a referendum on foreign mediation are casting a serious doubt on the sincerity of the ruling party and President Milosevic’s commitment to a search for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis.

48. The continuing tensions in Montenegro, opposing allies of the federal President Milosevic and the supporters of the new Montenegrin President Djukanovic, represent an additional risk to the stability of the FRY. The forthcoming parliamentary elections in Montenegro, planned for 31 May 1998 will be essential for a democratic solution to the existing situation. Both sides should refrain from acts that could compromise the normal conduct of these elections.

49. The interest of the FRY in closer relation with the Council of Europe has to be seen in the context of the Belgrade authorities’ strategy to deal with the Kosovo problem as a minority issue only, which can be resolved without changing the Serbian constitution. However, its declared willingness to accept of Council of Europe standards and legal instruments creates a useful leverage, which can be used by the international community. For this to happen, it is indispensable that the Council of Europe, through its Committee of Ministers, becomes involved in consultations that have been established between the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union and the Contact Group.

50. Pending the start of genuinely unconditional negotiations with the Kosovo Albanian community and compliance with other requests by the international community, conditions are not yet ripe for any formal follow-up to be given to the FRY’s request for Council of Europe membership.

51. The Assembly should continue to be actively seized of the Kosovo issue. A fact-finding mission should be sent to visit Belgrade and Pristina, as well as Montenegro, to discuss the situation in the country in the light of the crisis in Kosovo.

Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be assessed.

Draft recommendation adopted unanimously by the Committee on 21 April 1998.

Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairman), Mr van der Linden (Vice Chairman), Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Baumel(Vice-Chairman), MM Antretter, Atkinson, Mrs. Belohorska, MM Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzer, Chircop, Chornovil, Daly (alternate: Mr Aylward), Davis, Diacov, Dokle, Domljan, Gjellerod, Gül, Hadjidemetriou, Hornhues, Mrs Iotti, MM. Irmer, Iwínski, Kalus, Mrs Kautto, MM Kirilov, Krzaklewski, Kuzmickas (alternate: Mr Zingeris), Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Lopez-Henares, Lupu, van der Maelen, Maginas, Martínez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Mota Amaral, Mühlemann, Musto, Mutman, Nallet, Oliynik, Pahor, Palmitjavilo Ribo, Popovski, Prusak, Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, Mrs Roudy (alternate: Mr Lemoine), MM Schieder, Schwimmer (alternate: Mr Mautner-Markhof), Séguin, Selva, Shokhin (alternate: Mr Lukin), Sinka (alternate: Mr Boka), Mrs G Smith, Mrs Stanoiu, Mrs Stepova, MM Thoresen, Toshev, Urbain, Volcic, Vrettos, Woltjer, Ziuganov (alternate: Mr Zhebrovsky).

N.B. The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries of the Committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich, Mr Gruden

1 Kosovo and Metohija is the official name for the region, in use since the changes of the Serbian constitution in 1989 and 1990