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<p align="justify"><b>Doc. 8131</b></p>

<p align="justify">3 June 1998</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South-East Turkey and North Iraq</b></p>

<p align="justify">Report</p>

<p align="justify">Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography </p>

<p align="justify">Rapporteur: Mrs Ruth-Gaby Vermot-Mangold, Switzerland, Socialist Group</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Summary</i></p>

<p align="justify">This report seeks to understand the reasons for the large-scale displacement of population of mainly Kurdish ethnic origin both within and from northern Iraq and south-east Turkey and to assess their humanitarian situation and needs. Concluding that the lack of security and difficult economic and social conditions which characterise these regions have prompted such population movements, the report recommends that confidence-building measures be introduced in the framework of the Council of Europe programmes, and that the Turkish Government take steps to bring about a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in which it is engaged in the south-east of the country. Moreover, the report calls on the member states of the Council of Europe to use their influence with the European Union to step up its economic development aid in the region, and to increase both their humanitarian aid to North Iraq and their efforts, through the United Nations Security Council, to promote peace between the conflicting parties in that region. The report also calls on the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to draw up a series of measures designed to combat the conditions which foster clandestine migration in all its forms.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Draft recommendation </b></p>

<p align="justify">1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls and reaffirms its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1150"> Recommendation 1150</a> (1991) on the situation of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities,<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1151"> Recommendation 1151</a> (1991) on the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey,<b><i> </i></b>Resolution 1022 (1994) on the humanitarian situation and needs of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population,<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1348"> Recommendation 1348</a> (1997) on the temporary protection of persons forced to flee their country,<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1211"> Recommendation 1211</a> (1993) on clandestine migration: traffickers and employers of clandestine migrants and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1306"> Recommendation 1306</a> (1996) on migration from the developing countries to the European industrialised countries.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly notes that one of the acute problems that most of the member countries of the Council of Europe are facing today is the general question of clandestine migration due to the social, economic and demographic differences between the developing and the industrialised countries and also to humanitarian causes in the regions concerned.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly notes with great anxiety the precarious humanitarian situation of the people of Kurdish and other origins in northern Iraq and in the south-eastern provinces of Turkey.  The lack of security and difficult economic and social situation in these regions have resulted in large-scale internal and external population displacement and movements.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly<i><b> </b></i>strongly condemns the violence perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party (PKK), which has contributed to population displacement and movements,<i><b> </b></i>and urges this organisation to stop all armed activities. The Assembly also condemns the  evacuation and burning of  Kurdish villages by the Turkish armed forces, and considers that the operation of the village guard system raises serious human rights concerns.</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly is concerned that the number of asylum-seekers and illegal migrants of Kurdish origin has increased in certain European countries.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly considers that the scale of the humanitarian plight of the Kurds fully justifies the involvement of the Council of Europe and of other<i> </i>relevant international organisations, and that all governments concerned should be urged to take effective steps to improve the situation, and, in the case of Turkey, to comply fully with the Council of Europe&#8217;s principles.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly underlines once more with great concern that the problem of illegal trafficking in human beings also stirs up racism, xenophobia and intolerance.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly stresses once more that although this phenomenon is of great concern for receiving countries, it is also disturbing for the countries on the transit route.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Parliamentary Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:</p>

<p align="justify">i. take steps to promote dialogue and reconciliation in the provinces of south-eastern Turkey inhabited mainly by Kurdish people, through appropriate action in the framework of the programme of confidence-building measures, and in particular through an immediate and bilateral cease-fire;</p>

<p align="justify">ii. instruct its appropriate committees to intensify their<b><i> </i></b>efforts to remedy<b><i> </i></b>the concrete problems connected with migration movements of Kurds;</p>

<p align="justify">iii. draw up a series of measures designed to combat the conditions which foster clandestine migration in all its forms, with provision for penalties for traffickers and employers who exploit illegal immigrants, in consultation with the Budapest Group;</p>

<p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; invite <i>Turkey:</i></p>

<p align="justify"><i>a. </i>to stop using the armed forces against the civilian Kurdish population;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>b. </i>to expedite and intensify its efforts to promote the economic and social development of the south-eastern provinces;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>c. </i>to sign and ratify the Framework Convention for the  Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>d. </i>to adopt policies and take adequate measures to enable Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin to exercise their cultural and political rights;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>e. </i>to restore the rule of law in the south-east of the country, and in particular to lift emergency rule in the south-eastern provinces, to ensure effective protection of villages, to exercise civilian control over military activity in the region including the keeping of records and observance of human rights, and to prosecute members of the armed forces charged with human rights violations;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>f. </i>to abolish the village guard system;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>g. </i>to undertake additional<i><b> </b></i>effective measures aimed at the reconstruction and revival of the economy in the south-eastern provinces;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>h. </i>to take further<i><b> </b></i>steps to reconstruct schools and hospitals in the area;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>i. </i>to implement, in cooperation with international humanitarian organisations, a major programme with a view to encouraging the return of the Kurdish population to their homes;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>j. </i>to ensure particular protection for returning women, children and elderly people;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>k. </i>to present reconstruction projects to be financed by the Council of Europe&#8217;s Social Development Fund, in the framework of return programmes;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>l. </i>to adopt measures to integrate those displaced persons of Kurdish origin who wish to settle in other parts of Turkey, and provide them, as well as returnees, with compensation for property damaged by the Turkish armed forces where the case arises;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>m. </i>to grant access to the region for international humanitarian organisations, and provide them with support from local authorities;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>n. </i>to continue to<i><b> </b></i>facilitate the  transfer of supplies for humanitarian purposes to Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>o. </i>to lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and in particular abstain from deportation of asylum-seekers without prior consultation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and abolish the 5-day-limit for making asylum applications;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>p. </i>to refrain from all military incursions into northern Iraq, and seek an agreement with the Government of Iraq concerning the security of refugees in that region;</p>

<p align="justify">v.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; urge <i>the member states</i>:</p>

<p align="justify"><i>a. </i>to encourage the strengthening of aid programmes for development in the countries of origin and also in the countries of transit with a view to providing increased economic and technical assistance for migration-related development projects;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>b. </i>to step up their humanitarian aid to northern<i><b> </b></i>Iraq through the appropriate agencies;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>c. </i>to adhere scrupulously to the principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> in accordance with their international obligations;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>d. </i>to offer temporary protection, in consultation with UNHCR, to those who do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol but who have been forced to flee because their lives or safety were endangered;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>e. </i>to ensure that all asylum-seekers are treated with dignity and sheltered in healthy conditions;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>f. </i>to continue efforts to conclude repatriation and readmission agreements with the countries of origin and with the countries of transit, provided that the people concerned are not returned against their will;</p>

<p align="justify">vi.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; use its influence with <i>the European Union</i>:</p>

<p align="justify"><i>a. </i>to ensure that any action taken to strengthen  border controls or to combat clandestine trafficking do not infringe or undermine international law on the protection of refugees;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>b. </i>to resume promised financial cooperation with a view to fostering economic development in Turkey, particularly in its south-eastern provinces, and step up<i><b> </b></i>its provision of humanitarian aid to northern Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify">vii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; set up, together with the European Union, a joint programme of cooperation with Turkey aimed at providing assistance in relation to the Kurdish people;</p>

<p align="justify">viii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; use its influence with <i>the United Nations Security Council</i> to obtain an effective lifting of sanctions on Iraq and more intensive efforts to ensure peace between the parties concerned.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Draft order</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly refers to its Recommendation &#8230; (1998) on the humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South-East Turkey and North Iraq.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly considers that it should play a more prominent role in promoting peace and reconciliation in the Kurdish regions of south-eastern Turkey and elsewhere. For this purpose, it instructs the appropriate committees to study the question more actively within their own areas of competence, and to organise an international parliamentary conference on the Kurdish question in all its aspects&nbsp;with the participation of all parties concerned.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly instructs its Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe to study the issue of the Kurdish minority in the framework of the monitoring procedure concerning Turkey.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>III.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Explanatory memorandum by Mrs Vermot-Mangold</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Contents</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Page</p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 7</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Situation in Turkey&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 8</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a.  Situation in the south-eastern region of the country</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 8</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b.  Internally displaced persons of Kurdish origin and refugees from</i></p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;    Turkey in Iraq</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 10</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c.  Prospects for return; position of the Turkish authorities</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 12</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d.  Role of the international organisations</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 13</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Situation in North Iraq&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 14</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a.  Assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 14</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b.  Activities of the international humanitarian organisations</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 16</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Influx of Kurdish migrants and asylum-seekers in Europe&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 17</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a.  Recent increases</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 17</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b.  Causes</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 18</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c.  Response of the European Union</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 19</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 20</p>

<p align="justify">APPENDIX</p>

<p align="justify">Dissenting opinion of the Turkish members of the Committee on </p>

<p align="justify">Migration, Refugees and Demography presented by MM. Dinçer and</p>

<p align="justify">Mutman&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  23</p>

<p align="justify"><b>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Parliamentary Assembly has followed the humanitarian situation of refugees and displaced persons of Kurdish origin with anxiety for many years now. It has adopted a number of texts relating to the subject, in particular<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1150"> Recommendation 1150</a> (1991) on the situation of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1022"> Resolution 1022</a> (1994) on the humanitarian situation and needs of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population. Moreover, in Order No 460 (1991), the Assembly instructed its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography to follow closely developments in the Iraqi Kurdish refugees&#8217; situation.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, on 4 May 1992 the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography was seized of a motion for a resolution on the situation of the Kurds, which referred directly to the situation in North Iraq and in South-East Turkey. In the preparation of the present report, the Rapporteur visited Geneva on 20-21 November 1996 for meetings with the humanitarian organisations concerned (UNHCR, ICRC, IFRC, UNICEF and the UN Human Rights Commission).</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Rapporteur&#8217;s intention was to visit the region concerned. On her proposal, on 29 January 1997 the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography set up an ad hoc committee for a fact-finding mission to Turkey and Iraq, but the Bureau did not authorise the visit.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In order to gather more information, the Sub-Committee on Refugees organised a parliamentary hearing on 17 November 1997 with the participation of representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations operating in the region. Unfortunately the Turkish delegation to the Committee did not attend. The fact that the Turkish Government did not reply to the invitation sent to it demonstrates its lack of consideration for the Committee. </p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; During the January 1998 part session of the Assembly, Mrs Aguiar, the then Chairperson of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, and others, including the Rapporteur, reacting to the increasing number of arrivals in Italy and Greece of migrants and asylum-seekers of Kurdish origin, requested a debate under urgent procedure on the influx of migrants and asylum-seekers of Kurdish origin in Europe. Since this request was rejected by the Assembly, the Committee subsequently agreed that the Rapporteur should also cover this aspect in her report on the humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Finally, it should be noted that a monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey, under Order No 508 (1995) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe, was opened in April 1996 on the basis of Assembly<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1298"> Recommendation 1298</a> (1996) on Turkey&#8217;s respect of commitments to constitutional and legislative reforms, and that the Committee on the Honouring of obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of Europe is preparing a report which covers certain aspects of the Kurdish question.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Rapporteur is of the opinion that the dramatic humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in south-east Turkey and north Iraq, as well as the influx of Kurdish asylum seekers in Europe, which is one of its direct consequences, stem from the political problems in the region. Thus it proved impossible to discuss, or make recommendations on how to improve the humanitarian plight of the population concerned in abstraction from the political causes.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Situation in Turkey</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>a. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Situation in the south-eastern region of the country</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Martial law was established in the south-eastern provinces of Turkey as early as the 1970s in response to the activities of a variety of Kurdish and leftist political movements, both armed and peaceful. However, serious armed conflict in the region began in 1984, when the Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party (PKK), attacked two police stations. The Turkish armed forces responded with repression and the establishment of the village guard system (Koruculuk). </p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The village guards are a force of approximately 50 000 ethnic Kurdish villagers armed and paid by the Government to fight the PKK. The village guard system continues to raise the most serious human rights concerns expressed on many occasions by human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Human RightsWatch. In February 1997, Mr Unal Erkan, member of the Turkish Parliament (True Path Party- DYP) and former governor of the areas of South-East Turkey under emergency rule, stated that village guards often operated outside the control of the gendarmerie, and that many villagers faced pressure to enter the system.   </p>

<p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In theory becoming a village guard is voluntary, but in practice refusal is followed by reprisals by the security forces, ranging from detention of villagers<sup><a href="#P183_15728" name="P183_15729">1</a></sup> to forced evacuations of whole villages. On the other hand, joining the village guard system entails the risk of retaliation against the whole village by the PKK. The overwhelming majority of the Kurdish population in the region face such a dramatic alternative which allows nobody to remain neutral and uninvolved. </p>

<p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The evacuation of villages refusing to join the village guard system is carried out by the army with extreme brutality and no civilian supervision. It is frequently accompanied by the destruction of property and further violation of human rights such as sexual assault and humiliation, beatings and extrajudicial executions.</p>

<p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Turkish authorities until recently have denied responsibility for these operations, claiming that the PKK was to blame for the destruction of villages and that individuals had left voluntarily, or  under pressure from the PKK. However the complicity of the Turkish authorities was confirmed in two recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights: on 16 September 1996 in the case of Akdivar and others vs Turkey, and on 28 November 1997 in the case of Mentes and others vs Turkey, in which Turkish security forces were found guilty of burning houses in villages in south-eastern Turkey, causing the villagers to flee.   </p>

<p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In another case, that of Isiyok vs Turkey concerning the destruction of a village, both parties accepted on 31 October 1997 a so-called friendly settlement proposed by the European Commission of Human Rights, according to which the Turkish authorities paid compensation to the applicants.<sup><a href="#P190_17596" name="P190_17597">2</a></sup></p>

<p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Undoubtedly, the PKK has some responsibility for the burning of villages, in particular those run by village guards or refusing to support the PKK. Attacks are often targeted against those whom the PKK accuses of  «&nbsp;&nbsp;cooperating with the state&nbsp;» such as civil servants, teachers and village guard families. According to the Amnesty International Report 1997, armed members of the PKK were responsible for more than 40 deliberate and arbitrary killings in 1996. The victims included civilians, as well as captured soldiers and village guards.</p>

<p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However, the responsibility of both parties, the PKK on the one hand, and the  Turkish armed forces on the other, should be viewed in appropriate proportions. In the Rapporteur&#8217;s opinion the Turkish authorities bear more blame for the uncontrolled escalation of violence in the region, first because the provocative nature of their suppression of the rights of the Kurdish minority lies at the origin of the conflict, and secondly because they have at their disposal the whole machinery of the state, which they use abusively against the Kurdish population in the region.</p>

<p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A step towards the clarification of this important question has been undertaken by the Turkish Parliament. At the request of one of its members, Mr Algan Hacaloglu of the Republican People&#8217;s Party (CHP), a former state minister for human rights, the Turkish Parliament set up a Committee on Migration in 1997 to investigate the causes of displacement and to provide aid to the displaced. </p>

<p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 28 July 1997, the Chairman of this Committee, Mr Seyit Hasim Hasimi, held a press conference in Diyarbakir. He announced that forced evacuation of villages and hamlets by the Turkish armed forces in the region had resulted in large numbers of displaced people and potential refugees. He confirmed that 364 742 inhabitants of  3&nbsp;185 villages and hamlets had been forced out since 1990 in the framework of the fight against terrorism. These figures were publicly confirmed later by Mr Bülent Ecevit, Deputy Prime Minister, who said that the villages had been emptied &#8220;for security reasons&#8221;. The US State Department cited 560 000 as &#8220;a credible estimate&#8221; of the number of people deprived of their homes as a result of the evacuations.</p>

<p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to Human Rights Watch the majority of villages and hamlets in the region were forcibly emptied between 1993 and 1995. After that the large-scale evacuations ceased, but smaller operations by the Turkish armed forces continued in 1996 and 1997. The most probable reason for the lower rate of evacuations is that there are now very few «&nbsp;&nbsp;frontline&nbsp;» villages left outside the village guard system and the process of depopulation is virtually complete. </p>

<p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The tragic record of the region would not be complete without giving the number of people killed in the conflict, which illustrates the state of dreadful insecurity that prevails. According to Turkish military sources, some 19 000 people have been killed since the PKK began its campaign in 1984 &#8211; 3 000 members of the security forces, 11 000 «&nbsp;terrorists&nbsp;» and 5 000 civilians. In a speech in October 1995 President Demirel spoke of 20 663 dead and 13 577 injured. Kurdish sources speak of 35 000 dead, including at least 5 000 civilians.</p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Internally displaced persons of Kurdish origin and refugees from Turkey in Iraq</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The dramatic situation in the south-eastern part of Turkey has resulted in the forced displacement of the Kurdish population within the country and outside Turkey. Exact figures for internal and external displacement are impossible to obtain, as no exhaustive statistics are held on the subject. The extent of these movements is so massive that certain human rights organisations do not hesitate to speak of a deliberate policy of dispersal of the Kurdish population carried out by the Turkish authorities.    </p>

<p align="justify">21.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons of Kurdish origin in Turkey range, depending on the source, from 370 000 to 10 million. The big discrepancy results from the difficulty to differentiate between natural migration movements which may be observed in many countries and which have mainly economic causes (eg rural depopulation), and forced displacement. Whereas the Kurdish human rights organisations have a tendency to include all people of Kurdish origin living outside south-east Turkey in the category of forcibly displaced persons, the Turkish authorities limit this number to dislodged inhabitants of destroyed villages and hamlets. The exact definition of a displaced person with regard to the Kurdish population is very difficult to establish. Individual decisions on migration are often based on a number of factors. The armed conflict, general insecurity in the region, economic instability: all these factors contribute to the depopulation of the region, and it is nearly impossible, given the lack of reliable statistics, to distinguish between forcibly displaced population and voluntary migrants who have no intention to come back.  </p>

<p align="justify">22.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to Mr Nezan, President of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, the number of persons displaced within south-east Turkey over the last 20 years amounts to 2.5-3 million. The population of Diyarbakir, for example, rose from 380 000 in 1990 to 1 million in 1996. Concerning displacement throughout the rest of Turkey, the figure is approximately 8 million, of whom some 3 million are in Istanbul alone.</p>

<p align="justify">23.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The majority of the displaced rural population of Kurdish origin now live in urban centres in dramatic conditions and extreme poverty, creating specific integration problems for local communities. The main problem is usually a total lack of financial resources which would enable the displaced population to lead a normal life in new surroundings. They have most often been deprived of their property for which they have received no compensation. They usually have no prospects for employment. Having no means of subsistence they are compelled to live in shanty towns with no health or social care. It is common that children are forced to work. Needless to say these disastrous living conditions have resulted in an increase in crime, in particular among young people, and growing support for radical movements.</p>

<p align="justify">24.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to Médecins sans Frontières, the vast majority of these displaced persons are considered a population at risk from the public health point of view. Primary health care is severely deficient with an almost complete lack of medical services, which may be illustrated by the following statistics: while the average number of consultations per person per year in 1992 was 2.4 for the whole of Turkey, it was 0&nbsp;.26 in Diyarbakir. The infant mortality rate, which was officially 60 per 1000 for the whole country in 1990, was 87 per 1000 in Diyarbakir and 98 per 1000 in Hakkari in the same year. A number of communicable diseases such as typhoid, para-typhoid, trachoma, brucellosis and amoebic dysentery are endemic throughout the region. The vaccination coverage is low and decreasing. The nutritional status of the displaced population is borderline.</p>

<p align="justify">25.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Besides the internally displaced, there are also a number of Turkish refugees of Kurdish origin who fled to North Iraq.  Following the closure for security reasons of the so-called Atrush A refugee camp, close to the Turkish border, in 1995, and of Atrush B in December 1996 due to the presence of the PKK, these refugees now find themselves in several groups. </p>

<p align="justify">26.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; One group of approximately 6 800 people who were refused asylum in Iraq, were until recently in a kind of no-man&#8217;s land between the area of North Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mr Barzani, staying in Ain-Sufni camp<sup><a href="#P219_25494" name="P219_25495">3</a></sup> under the protection of UNHCR, which provided them with basic humanitarian assistance, including food, health care, sanitation and temporary shelter. On 14 February 1997, due to the lack of security, they left the camp, leaving behind only 70 people (who were subsequently assisted by UNHCR and the local authorities to relocate to the Governorate of Dohuk). They tried once again to enter Iraqi territory, but were not admitted. At the time of drafting the present report, they were camped near the Iraqi checkpoint, in the no man&#8217;s land, on the side of the road and on the road itself, surrounded by areas infested with land mines. They are provided with basic assistance by UNHCR, and awaiting the outcome of the UNHCR&#8217;s negotiations both with the Iraqi Government and with the KDP&#8217;s local Government in Dohuk, or some alternative solution in case the Iraqi Government sticks to its negative position.  </p>

<p align="justify">27.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It should be noted that the majority of this group are women and children and constitute a particularly vulnerable category of refugees. They are more often in danger of human rights violations including threats to their physical safety and sexual assault, and have specific health problems and needs. Therefore the greatest importance should be attached to remedying the present dramatic situation.</p>

<p align="justify">28.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Another group of some 4 000 Turkish refugees of Kurdish origin are located in 19 settlements in Dohuk governorate, and one settlement in Erbil governorate. They have received humanitarian assistance from UNHCR which also provides assistance to the host communities in order to facilitate integration. </p>

<p align="justify">29.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Moreover, some 1 000 refugees returned to Turkey in 1997.  However, the prospects for further voluntary repatriation are very limited.</p>

<p align="justify">30.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The security of the refugees in Northern Iraq is highly unsatisfactory, mainly because of Turkish military incursions and non-respect of the so-called «&nbsp;security zone&nbsp;» established after the 1991 Gulf War. In addition, as a result of the recent Gulf crisis, Turkey is reported to have set up a 15 km buffer zone in Northern Iraq. According to the newspaper Sabah, as many as 30 000 Turkish troops have already been sent to Iraqi Kurdistan.</p>

<p align="justify">31.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A considerable number of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin seek asylum in European countries. This question is examined in Section 4 below.</p>

<p align="justify"><b><i> c.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Prospects for return; position of the Turkish authorities</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">32.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to figures released in March 1997 by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, approximately 20 000 internally displaced persons of Kurdish origin returned to their homes in 108 villages and 90 hamlets in the south-east region in 1996. </p>

<p align="justify">33.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As mentioned above only some 1 000 of over 10 000 Turkish refugees of Kurdish origin at present in Iraq returned in 1997. The others are waiting for amnesty in Turkey, and for adequate reintegration assistance measures.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify">34.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The new Prime Minister, Mr Mesut Yilmaz, who took office in July 1997, and many of his ministers have made positive statements about improving the situation. Shortly after taking up his duties, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit led a delegation to Diyarbakir, the centre of Turkey&#8217;s ethnically-Kurdish regions, to announce job creation programmes, housing for the forcibly displaced and increased education opportunities. The aim of the Turkish authorities is to establish 400 regional schools before 2000. Special premiums are paid to teachers willing to come to the region, but out of 6144 teachers designated to teach in the region in 1997, 3173 have already resigned. Since 1992, 122 teachers have been killed and 17 wounded. 2076 schools are closed because the villagers or tutors have left. 117 000 students cannot attend school. </p>

<p align="justify">35.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; All these declarations seem to point to a new policy in south-east Turkey. It should be noted, however, that already in the past, representatives of newly established governments have made promises and declarations concerning the Kurdish population, which have not been subsequently observed. The reason seems to be the lack of civil control over the army and the security forces which, in practice, constitute the only authority in the region. Therefore, it is necessary to judge the Government according to its actions.</p>

<p align="justify">36.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For the time being however conditions in the region do not allow any large-scale returns to be envisaged. The main reason is continuing lack of security. The armed conflict in south-eastern Turkey between the security forces and the PKK is in its 14<sup>th</sup> year with both sides committing serious abuses including torture, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate burning of property. Although at present much of the fighting has moved to remote mountain areas or to northern Iraq, nevertheless repatriation would still mean putting lives at risk.</p>

<p align="justify">37.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Another serious problem results from the disastrous economic and social situation of the whole region. Systematic destruction of the infrastructure, economic resources, livestock, crops, houses, tractors etc. have made large areas of the region uninhabitable. The region has always suffered from a lower level of economic and social development than other parts of Turkey; the conflict has much increased this gap. The rate of illiteracy&nbsp;is 35 % in the Kurdish regions, whereas at the national level&nbsp;it is 19,3%; over 60% of the Kurdish population in the south-east region live below the poverty line compared to approximately 30 % in other regions, and the mortality rate is 50% higher than in other parts of the country. Before mass return could be foreseen, measures to revive the local economy would have to be undertaken. </p>

<p align="justify">38.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition there is a food embargo in the province of Tunceli, and partly in Diyarbakir and Bingol provinces, that limits the amount of food villagers can purchase, allegedly to cut off the PKK&#8217;s access to  supplies.</p>

<p align="justify">39.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the state of emergency begun in 9 south-eastern provinces in 1984 was lifted in 3 provinces in October 1997, the state of emergency decree was renewed for 4 months for all provinces in November.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify">40.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; One may consider all the problems mentioned above as symptoms of a more general political conflict. It must be remembered that a population of 13.2 million (22% of the total population in Turkey) is, despite claims to the contrary by the Turkish Government, denied the right to maintain its cultural identity and traditions, to use its language, and to develop its own links. The position of the Turkish authorities in this respect has not changed: the Turkish Constitution does not recognize distinctions as to race or ethnic origin. This attitude seems to justify the suppression of minorities&#8217; cultural expression.   </p>

<p align="justify">41.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Constitution of Turkey prohibits the use of a «language prohibited by law» (Art. 26 and 28). In fact there are at least 13 laws which forbid the use of the Kurdish language and the expression of Kurdish culture. Articles 8 of the anti-terrorist law and 311, 312 and 159 of the Penal Code restricting freedom of opinion are in force. In particular Article 8 which outlaws advocacy of separatism continues to be used to prosecute and imprison people for peacefully expressing their opinions. Articles 168, 169 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code are used to prosecute writers, journalists and political activists who challenge the government&#8217;s policies in the south-east. Human rights defenders in the area have been tried on manifestly fabricated charges of membership of, or support for, armed opposition groups.<sup><a href="#P252_33037" name="P252_33038">4</a></sup> Since 1995 the European Court of Human Rights has announced as many as 12 judgements regarding violations of human rights of people of Kurdish origin by the Turkish authorities.  </p>

<p align="justify">42.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The detention of 6 Kurdish members of parliament (Mr Sirri Sakik, Mr Ahmet Türk, Mr Mahmut Alinak, Mrs Leyla Zana, Mr Mehmet Hatip Dicle and Mr Orhan Dogan) is a well known fact, now being examined by the European Court of Human Rights.<sup><a href="#P255_33703" name="P255_33704">5</a></sup>  </p>

<p align="justify">43.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; All these violations constitute part of the broader question of the rule of law and human rights. They should therefore be carefully examined by the Monitoring Committee.  </p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>d.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Role of the international organisations</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">44.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The main problem encountered by the humanitarian organisations is lack of access to the south-east of Turkey. For example, Médecins sans Frontières is systematically refused the possibility to give medical assistance in the region. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has no access to Turkey, therefore no possibility to monitor  compliance with international humanitarian law or to visit detainees. At the hearing on 17 November 1997, Mr Kilic from the Red Cross of Kurdistan (not affiliated with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) accused the Turkish  Government of not admitting to the region lorries with medicines sent by  this strictly humanitarian organisation.</p>

<p align="justify">45.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Despite these difficulties a number of humanitarian organisations run projects mainly in the nutritional, health and educational fields. For instance UNICEF, in co-operation with the authorities and local civil society, has introduced income-generating projects and training programmes.</p>

<p align="justify">46.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Other organisations assist displaced persons in other parts of the country and refugees outside Turkey (in particular in Iraq). An interesting example of such activities is the project carried out since 1994 by the Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. It aims at improving interaction and co-operation between local NGOs and those municipalities in Turkey which receive large numbers of Kurdish displaced persons, and therefore are faced with the problems of integration. These efforts have been successful to some extent, which may be illustrated by the example of an Organisation called «&nbsp;Help and Solidarity with the Migrants&nbsp;», effective in its co-operation with local authorities.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify"><b>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Situation in North Iraq</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">47.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The failure of the Kurds to establish a stable government in the exclusion zone in North Iraq after they took control of the area following the Gulf War was followed in 1994 by armed conflict between the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). External pressure and support for both opponents resulting from national rivalries in the region largely contributed to the outbreak of the hostilities. Over 3 000 fighters and civilians were reportedly killed as successive cease-fires were broken by one party or another.  By the end of 1995, the PUK controlled 70 % of Iraqi Kurdistan, including the seat of government, Arbil. Conflict continued throughout 1996 and 1997 despite US attempts to bring about a lasting cease-fire.</p>

<p align="justify">48.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The subsequent incursions of the Turkish armed forces into North Iraq to seek and destroy armed elements of the Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party (PKK) and those of Iraqi Government forces in support of the KDP add to the insecurity of the region. </p>

<p align="justify">49.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There is no effective rule of law in the region. Serious violations including the detention of political opponents, torture, executions following summary trials, unlawful killings, execution of prisoners etc have been committed by the main parties since 1991. Moreover the area is infested with anti-personnel mines.    </p>

<p align="justify">50.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Kurds in North Iraq suffer a double embargo: that imposed by the United Nations on Iraq in 1990 and a partial internal embargo imposed by the Government of Iraq.  Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 986"> Resolution 986</a>(1995) («oil for food») has been implemented since December 1996, but has been subject to delay. Consequently, the Kurdish population in the region live in extreme poverty. It is to be hoped that the benefits resulting from the doubling of the sales limit in February 1998 will reach them. </p>

<p align="justify">51.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Even if humanitarian supplies are exempted from the United Nations embargo, these are still subject to piecemeal approval by the UN Sanctions Committee, and there is a particular problem about deliveries due to insecurity on the roads, including shelling of convoys. Moreover, UNHCR encounters difficulties in shipping supplies (tents etc) from the UNHCR store in Alexandruna, Turkey, since the Turkish Government believes this material will be used to assist Kurds of Turkish origin. </p>

<p align="justify">52.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The population of North Iraq is dependent on foreign humanitarian assistance. The economy is in a disastrous state as a consequence of the political and military situation. The weakness of the economy is characterised by lack of infrastructure and financial resources. </p>

<p align="justify">53.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The health and nutrition situation in North Iraq remains critical: child mortality is very high, malnutrition is common, the health of the whole population is deteriorating. An outbreak of diphtheria has been reported. Deterioration in the quality of drinking water results in an increase in diseases like typhoid and hepatitis. The problem is aggravated by the dilapidated state of hospital infrastructure, the lack of equipment, medicines and staff.</p>

<p align="justify">54.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Renewed armed conflict, sustained insecurity and recurrent displacement of the population have created additional barriers to children&#8217;s access to school, which is a chronic problem in the whole of the country. The number of street children is on the rise, and many other children are out of school. The educational level in the north is thus steadily deteriorating.</p>

<p align="justify">55.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The number of internally displaced people of Kurdish origin in November 1997 stood at over 80 000. They were staying in collective townships, in prefabricated housing or in abandoned public buildings. The main problem of this rural population is the lack of land: the majority of their village lands are still mined or in front line or border areas. Therefore they are totally dependent on continuing relief.</p>

<p align="justify">56.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 4 December 1997 about 20 000 Turkish soldiers entered Iraqi Kurdistan. This was Turkey&#8217;s 57<sup>th</sup> incursion into North Iraq, and obviously contributed to a new wave of displacement of the Kurdish population. Figures are not available.</p>

<p align="justify">57.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Turkish military operations undertaken in 1997 considerably slowed the pace of returns of people displaced during earlier fighting. Moreover every new incursion or operation brought about new uncontrolled movements of population, creating considerable dislocation to rehabilitation programmes as relief agencies sought to assist those directly affected. </p>

<p align="justify">58.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Apart from the internally displaced population of Kurdish origin there are 22&nbsp;600 Iranian refugees of Kurdish origin in North Iraq. Of these, 3 700 are assisted by UNHCR, in collaboration with other agencies and local NGOs. The only durable solution for these refugees which has been envisaged so far is resettlement in third countries. Over 1&nbsp;500 were resettled to Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland in 1997. UNHCR plans 2 000 resettlements for 1998.</p>

<p align="justify">59.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The situation of the Turkish refugees of Kurdish origin in North Iraq was described in Section 2 above. </p>

<p align="justify">60.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recent developments in the Gulf area, and in particular Turkish preparations to create a so called «&nbsp;buffer zone&nbsp;» in North Iraq compelled many people from the concerned areas to seek protection either in Turkey or in Iraq. In their attempts to enter the territory of one of these countries they encounter serious problems. </p>

<p align="justify">61.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It should be mentioned that the Turkish authorities carry out forcible returns of asylum-seekers to their country of origin, including Iraq and Iran. These <i>refoulements</i>, criticised by UNHCR and Amnesty International, result from inflexibility of the asylum procedure in Turkey which allows deportation of asylum seekers who do not submit their applications to the authorities within five days of their arrival in the country. In addition persons entering Turkish territory illegally must submit their application for asylum at the border city. Due to the lack of information and also ignorance of these rules on the part of local authorities, asylum-seekers are not aware of these rules, or are reluctant to contact local authorities. Turkey applies the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol, which means that all non-European asylum applicants are referred to UNHCR. Nevertheless, Turkey is bound by the principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> under international law.</p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Activities of the international humanitarian organisations</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">62.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The United Nations remains committed to the protection of the Kurdish region of North Iraq in accordance with UN Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 688"> Resolution 688</a>, and implements the programme «&nbsp;Provide Comfort&nbsp;» through the intermediary of its agencies, NGOs and national institutions. The Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq is responsible for assisting internally displaced persons, together with ICRC, WFP, United Nations Children&#8217;s Fund  (UNICEF) and some NGOs.</p>

<p align="justify">63.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; UNICEF is the lead humanitarian agency for North Iraq, under overall United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs coordination from Baghdad. UNICEF has developed a map of all human settlements in North Iraq, to show access to basic services, health, education, water, electricity etc. This allows resources to be distributed fairly and according to need, and is especially useful in implementing Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 986"> Resolution 986</a> (1995) («oil for food»). </p>

<p align="justify">64.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; UNHCR is mainly concerned with refugees from Turkey and Iran, although it also helps internally displaced persons in the framework of inter-agency co-operation. The scale of efforts undertaken by UNHCR may be illustrated by the following figures: in late 1996 about 119 000 were assisted in their return to North Iraq from Iran, while in 1997 the number amounted to 8 000. These operations were carried out in co-operation with the Government of Iraq and the local authorities in the North. </p>

<p align="justify">65.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) supports the relief work throughout Iraq of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, which has a branch in Suleimanyah. Although North Iraq has been a battlefield for a number of armed groups, those controlling the area have been in general supportive of the efforts of the Iraqi Red Crescent to establish and operate branches. The most recent relief work started in the aftermath of the Gulf war in 1991. The Iraqi Red Crescent, supported by the Federation, has been carrying out a large scale operation targeting three areas: distribution of food to families, nutritional feeding programme for children, and distribution of medicines and medical supplies to hospitals. Northern Iraq receives 27 % of total assistance provided by IFRC for Iraq.</p>

<p align="justify">66.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Kurdistan Red Crescent Society, created by the PUK in 1993, is now mainly active among the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora outside North Iraq. It has projects in the social, health and educational fields. </p>

<p align="justify">67.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ICRC has been present in North Iraq, including Arbil, Dohuk and Suleimanyah since 1991. Apart from assisting the internally displaced and visiting prisoners, it is in the process of rehabilitating the water distribution and treatment system in Iraq. ICRC has also just opened an orthopaedic centre in Arbil (there is another in Mosul run by the Iraqi Red Crescent) to help the large number of amputees, many of them victims of anti-personnel mines.</p>

<p align="justify">68.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Insufficient and unreliable data make it difficult to assess the joint efforts of national institutions, NGOs and UN agencies. However, given the overall highly precarious situation in the region, the relief and rehabilitation programmes carried out by UN agencies and by local and foreign NGOs &#8211; like Oxfam and Save the Children Fund from the United Kingdom &#8211; have been quite successful.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Influx of Kurdish migrants and asylum-seekers in Europe</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recent increases</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">69.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For many years Turkish or Iraqi migrants of Kurdish origin have been arriving in Europe. Their number is estimated at 3 million, but precise statistical evidence is hard to come by for a number of reasons, including the fact that migration statistics are broken down by national rather than ethnic origin. A significant number of Kurdish migrants are not taken into account in any statistics because of their illegal status.</p>

<p align="justify">70.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Over recent months several member states have reported a significant increase in the number of ethnic Kurds, mostly of Iraqi nationality, arriving as illegal migrants and asylum-seekers, and this despite the overall downward trend since the peak year 1992. Most of them transit through Turkey, and pay large sums of money to traffickers connected with organised crime rings.</p>

<p align="justify">71.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since December 1997 there has been a surge in the number of illegal landings by such migrants on the coasts of Italy, as well as Greece. Some of these have sought asylum in the countries of arrival, others have expressed the wish to continue their journey to other European countries with already substantial Kurdish communities.</p>

<p align="justify">72.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the total number of ethnic Kurds having landed on Italy&#8217;s shores illegally from 1 July 1997 to 1 January 1998 was 2,436. The number of ethnic Kurds whose asylum applications had been registered between 1 January 1992 and 31 December 1997 (not including the 26-27 December landing) was 763. Of these, 528 (69%) were of Iraqi nationality, 205 (27%) were of Turkish nationality, 17 were Iranians, 11 Syrians, 1 Palestinian and 1 Sudanese. Of these asylum applications, 3 had been presented in 1992, 33 in 1993, 43 in 1994, 172 in 1995, 131 in 1996 and 381 in 1997.</p>

<p align="justify">73.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; According to available figures, the total number of Turkish nationals who applied for asylum in Greece in 1997 was 172 (1996: 257), while the number of Iraqi nationals was 3,808 (1996: 993). For the last quarter of 1997 the total number of Turkish asylum seekers was 23 and Iraqi asylum-seekers 1,421.</p>

<p align="justify">74.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Increased numbers of asylum-seekers were reported in the second half of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 notably in the following countries: Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. </p>

<p align="justify">75.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Germany is a pole of attraction for Kurdish migrants arriving in Europe because of the Kurdish community of between 450,000 and 600,000, 80% of whom are Turkish Kurds. There are around 100,000 Kurds in France and between 120,000 and 130,000 in the Benelux countries. Greece, Italy and France allow the Kurds to continue their journey north as long as they do not stop.</p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Causes</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">76.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The precise causes of the increase in influx of migrants and asylum-seekers of Kurdish origin movements are hard to pinpoint. The dramatic humanitarian situation described earlier in the report obviously constitutes an important incentive for migration. Further reasons are the lack of economic prospects and discriminatory policies in both Iraq and Turkey towards the Kurdish minority.</p>

<p align="justify">77.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 6 January 1998 the President of the Turkish Human Rights Association, Mr Akin Birdal, issued a statement to the effect that policies pursued over decades in Turkey had made this massive migration inevitable. The internal migration which had been experienced over the past 5-6 years had now turned abroad.  Those forced to migrate faced serious unresolved problems, with regard to accommodation, nutrition, work, health and education. The recent migrations showed that the Kurdish question had now become an international issue, rather than a problem internal to Turkey.  It was a human rights problem, thus a problem for the international community. </p>

<p align="justify">78.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Mr Kendal Nezan, Director of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, who contributed to the hearing on the humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South East Turkey and North Iraq organised by the Assembly's Sub-Committee on Refugees on 17 November 1997, said in an interview published in Le Monde (8 January 1998) that, given that Turkey was virtually a police state, it was inconceivable that so many Iraqi and Turkish refugees could leave Turkey without the state apparatus being accomplice to the fact, in connivance with the Turkish mafia. Not only was there money to be made through trafficking, but it fitted in perfectly with the policy of depopulating Kurdistan. This policy amounted to cultural genocide. Some 7 million out of a total Kurdish population officially estimated at 12 million Kurds in Turkey, but more likely 15 to 20 million, had been displaced. 4000 members of the intelligentsia had been assassinated and thousands more imprisoned or forced to leave.</p>

<p align="justify">79.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The reason for the recent surge in departures from South East Turkey, according to Mr Nezan, was that the hopes for greater autonomy that its Kurdish inhabitants had pinned on the Refah (Welfare) Party, which was based on the fraternal religion of Islam, had been dashed by the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr Erbakan, and the substantial loss of influence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). </p>

<p align="justify">80.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As for the Iraqi Kurds, who had left in greater numbers, they also saw no future, fearing the return of the Iraqi administration in the North, and disillusioned by the fighting between the main rival Kurdish factions and by repeated Turkish military incursions. For the most part these were young professionals. Some 6,000 had left in 1996 following the incursion into the &quot;exclusion zone&quot; by Iraqi forces in support of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in their fight against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). A few hundred of these had worked for the United States Central Intelligence Agency, but most had simply worked for non-governmental organisations and feared being considered CIA agents.  </p>

<p align="justify">81.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Rapporteur has received a statement on &#8220;illegal trafficking of human beings&#8221; from the Turkish Permanent Representation to the Council of Europe deploring this &#8220;morally repugnant crime&#8221; often linked to &#8220;extremist and terrorist groups&#8221;, specifically to the PKK [Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party] which, according to the statement, finances its operations through extortion, arms and drugs smuggling and trafficking in migrants.  Being a Turkish national of Kurdish origin, the statement continued, was not sufficient to be considered subject to discrimination or persecution as shown by several decisions of the German Administrative Courts and the decision of the European Commission on Human Rights in the case of A.G. against Sweden (application No. 27776/95).  In any case, it was difficult to verify the identity and country of origin of many of the migrants concerned. The root cause of the recent inflow was the economic situation, especially the high unemployment, in northern Iraq and southern Turkey.  This was mainly attributable to the economic embargo imposed on Iraq.  That their main motive was economic could be judged from the fact that most of the migrants did not ask for political asylum.  Turkey was ready to co-operate against all forms of trafficking in human beings, and had concluded security co-operation agreements with 30 countries including Italy.  The problem could only be solved through dialogue and co-operation between the interested countries.</p>

<p align="justify">82.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Turkish Government has criticised the Italian Government for its readiness to consider asylum applications from Kurds favourably, asserting that it was thereby encouraging illegal migration for economic ends. The Italian Government responded by requesting a Turkish commitment to put an end to illegal departures and to deal with the root causes of the problem.</p>

<p align="justify">83.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Both the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) have reacted to the increased flow of Kurdish migrants expressing their concern, and calling on the states concerned to investigate asylum applications case by case.</p>

<p align="justify"><b><i>c.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Response of the European Union</i></b></p>

<p align="justify">84.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 12-13 December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council asked the Justice/Home Affairs Council to work out and rapidly implement an action plan in response to the massive influx of Iraqi migrants.</p>

<p align="justify">85.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 7 January 1998 the European Commission reviewed the situation and called on member states to step up the harmonisation of asylum procedures and to respond favourably to its proposal for a Joint Action on Temporary Protection. It noted Italy's position on asylum and current immigration law reform. It considered how best to use its technical and financial resources in such emergency situations with a view to strengthening external border controls and with regard to the delivery of humanitarian aid and measures to address the root causes of the crisis.</p>

<p align="justify">86.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 8 January 1998 police chiefs and senior officials from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey met in Rome and reached agreement on ways to combat illegal immigration &quot;at preventive and repressive level&quot;. Including intensified surveillance and control of external borders and land and sea routes, thorough investigations of suspected criminal organisations involved in trafficking of migrants, and their assets, greater co-operation regarding policing of readmission agreements, more intensive collection, storage and exchange of fingerprints of illegal immigrants, increased liaison and sharing of information etc.</p>

<p align="justify">87.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 15 January 1998 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on Kurdish refugees and on the position of the European Union. While expressing support for the humanitarian approach adopted by the Italian Government towards the asylum-seekers, the Parliament called among other things for a common Union policy on immigration and refugees, notably the rapid adoption of the Convention on external border controls; a Commission proposal for burden sharing; intensification of the fight against trafficking in migrants; and an international initiative to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem.</p>

<p align="justify">88.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Action Plan requested by the Luxembourg European Council was adopted by the General Affairs Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs) on 26 January 1998. It contains the following main elements: improved analysis of the causes and origins of the influx, development of contacts with the Government of Turkey and with UNHCR, ensuring that humanitarian aid makes an effective contribution, effective application of asylum procedures, preventing abuse of asylum procedures, tackling the involvement of organised crime, combating illegal immigration, ensuring coherent and co-ordinated implementation, monitoring and review.</p>

<p align="justify">89.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The 46-point Action Plan has raised some criticism from the human rights organisations pointing out that it makes no mention of obstacles encountered by asylum-seekers trying to use legitimate means to flee from persecution, such as strict visa requirements and heavy fines imposed on airlines which transport passengers without the required entry documents. Moreover the Action Plan does not mention the fact that Iraqi Kurds may not apply for refugee status in Turkey as a result of the geographical limitation to its application of the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol. Finally, the Action Plan does not propose alternative forms of protection for Turkish Kurds even though the Council acknowledges the causes of their flight. </p>

<p align="justify">90.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The situation was reviewed by the Justice/Home Affairs Council on 19 March 1998, and by the General Affairs Council on 30 March. The latter agreed that overall implementation of the Action Plan was proceeding satisfactorily, and welcomed the co-operation being developed by the European Union with Turkey and with the UNHCR.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions  </b></p>

<p align="justify">91.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Concerning the situation in Turkey, recognition of the rights of the Kurdish minority is a precondition for a return to peace in the south-east of the country. The Kurdish population should have the right to use and sustain their natural language and cultural traditions which is entirely in accordance with the principles of the Council of Europe&#8217;s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.  Therefore the Turkish Government should adopt policies and take adequate measures to enable Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin to exercise their cultural and political rights as a minority.</p>

<p align="justify">92.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Effective restoration of the rule of law in the south-east of the country is a condition without which no mass return of displaced people and refugees can be envisaged. To this end, emergency rule in the south-eastern provinces should be lifted. The authorities should ensure effective protection of villages. At the same time control over military activity should be exercised by the Government. This includes the keeping of records and observance of human rights (medical examinations, respect for rules etc), as well as prosecution of  members of the armed forces for human rights violations. The village guard system should be abolished, as it is highly abusive. At present there is no civil control over it. </p>

<p align="justify">93.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Effective measures aiming at the reconstruction and revival of the economy in the region are indispensable for mass returns. The Government&#8217;s declarations in this respect are most welcome, but they must be followed  by concrete action. Possible loans from the Social Development Fund, if granted, could be used to finance the reconstruction of village housing as part of a major programme of reconstruction and investment with a view to the internationally monitored return of the Kurdish population to their homes in the South-East. </p>

<p align="justify">94.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Measures should also be foreseen to integrate those displaced persons who wish to settle in other parts of Turkey. Villagers whose property has been damaged by the Turkish armed forces should be provided with compensation.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify">95.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Humanitarian organisations should be granted access to the region, and provided with support from local authorities. Also the transfer of supplies for humanitarian purposes to Iraq should not be hindered. </p>

<p align="justify">96.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Turkish Government should lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In particular no deportation of asylum-seekers should be carried out without prior consultation with UNHCR in order to find out whether the persons in question have been found to be persons of concern to UNHCR. Abolishing the 5-day-limit for making asylum applications &#8211; which may result in violations of the principle of non-refoulement &#8211; is essential.</p>

<p align="justify">97.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An agreement between Turkey and Iraq concerning the security of refugees in North Iraq is a matter of urgency. The Turkish military incursions into the territory of Iraq should be stopped. </p>

<p align="justify">98.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Government of Iraq should stop all military incursions to the northern part of the country. It should also be urged to allow entry to the Kurdish refugees seeking asylum on its territory. </p>

<p align="justify">99.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Humanitarian assistance for the population of Kurdish origin in Iraq should be stepped up, and the Government of Iraq should lift the embargo on the North, and co-operate fully in the implementation of Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 986"> Resolution 986</a> (1995) (&#8220;oil for food&#8221;) ensuring that humanitarian relief also reaches the North.</p>

<p align="justify">100.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The situation in South-East Turkey and North Iraq is a direct cause of growing numbers of migrants of Kurdish origin arriving in Europe. Although many of them undoubtedly have economic motives for leaving their countries, many are in genuine need of international protection. The Assembly must urge all member states to ensure that they adhere scrupulously to the principle of <i>non-refoulement</i>, as required by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In deciding to examine applications for asylum on a case-by-case basis, the Italian Government is to be congratulated on fulfilling its international commitments and acting in line with Resolution (67) 14 of the Committee of Ministers which asks the member states to &#8220;act in a particularly liberal and humanitarian spirit in relation to persons who seek asylum on their territory&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">101.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this spirit, those member states concerned are urged to offer protection to all those asylum-seekers deemed not to meet the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status but who have been forced to flee because their lives and safety were seriously threatened.</p>

<p align="justify">102.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly should also urge all member states to ensure that salubrious conditions are maintained in their reception facilities for refugees and asylum-seekers and that these are treated with dignity at all times.</p>

<p align="justify">103.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As for the question of clandestine migration and trafficking, the Parliamentary Assembly in its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1211"> Recommendation 1211</a> (1993) on clandestine migration: traffickers and employers of clandestine migrants called on the Committee of Ministers to draw up a Convention designed to address the problem of clandestine migration. However, the Committee of Ministers replied that such matters were best dealt with by others. No other body has since undertaken this work in the wider Europe, and it is time for it to start.</p>

<p align="justify">104.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; While the European Parliament's Resolution on the Kurdish refugees and on the policy of the European adopted on 15 January 1998 is to be welcomed, all steps to harmonise migration and refugee policies within the Union should be carefully coordinated with third European countries on a multilateral basis in the framework of the Council of Europe. The European Union&#8217;s Action Plan adopted on 26 January 1998 is also generally welcome.  However, it must not result in any attempt to prevent the departure from their countries of those who may wish to apply for asylum abroad on the grounds of well-founded fear of persecution.  </p>

<p align="justify">105.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Moreover, the strengthening of border controls in Europe must go hand in hand with the implementation of a preventive policy consisting in increasing development assistance designed to alleviate the poverty which generates migration, and in stepping up the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.</p>

<p align="justify">106.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this connection, the Assembly should play a more prominent role in promoting peace and reconciliation in the Kurdish regions of south-eastern Turkey and elsewhere. For this purpose, the Assembly&#8217;s Committees should more actively study the question within their own areas of competence. In particular, the Monitoring Committee should continue to examine the Kurdish question in the framework of its monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey.</p>

<p align="justify">107.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Finally, the Assembly should organise an international conference on the Kurdish question in all its aspects, from political to cultural.</p>

<p align="justify">APPENDIX </p>

<p align="justify"><b>Dissenting opinion</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>of the </b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Turkish members of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Presented by Mr Dinçer and Mr Mutman</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</b></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Turkish members of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography disagree with the content of the report, entitled &quot;The humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South-East Turkey and North Iraq&quot; for the following reasons:</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;Th&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; e report deals with separate subjects at one time.&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;Th&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; e report attaches wrong priorities to subjects which do not have relevance within the mandate specified for the study.&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;Th&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; e report contains false elements and insufficient information.Fo</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For all these reasons the conclusions reached in the report are wrong and misleading.</p>

</ul><p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The content of the report in general</b></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The report is a reflection of what the rapporteur seems to have in mind with regard to Turkey.  It is drafted in such a manner that it is contrary to the principle of impartiality, which should govern our work in the committee, and the requirements of objectivity and sincerity in dealing with issues entrusted to us.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The content of the report does not conform with the mandate given to prepare this study.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The mandate is based on Assembly Order No. 460 (1991), which required the monitoring of developments with regard to &quot;the situation of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities&quot;, which was felt necessary following the first Gulf crisis in 1991, which also led the Assembly to adopt two recommendations with regard to the humanitarian consequences of the Gulf crisis.  These were<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1150"> Recommendation 1150</a> on the situation of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1151"> Recommendation 1151</a> on the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the follow-up to Order No. 460 (1991) the Assembly debated the issue again in January 1994 and adopted<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1022"> Resolution 1022</a> (1994) on the humanitarian situation and needs of the displaced Iraqi Kurdish population, in which along with the Kurds in northern Iraq, the Turcomans, the Assyrians and even the Marsh Arabs in the south were given due consideration.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;All these Assembly texts refer only to the situation in northern Iraq, with a view to finding remedies to the humanitarian situation of the Kurds in particular, but also the Turcomans, the Assyrians and even the Marsh Arabs in the south.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The only text which tries to incorporate Turkey into the picture is a 1992 motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Eisma (and others) entitled &quot;The situation of the Kurds&quot;.  The Bureau referred this motion to the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.  The committee appointed Mr Eisma as rapporteur but no follow-up was given until <br>
Mrs&nbsp;Vermot-Mangold volunteered to take over from Mr Eisma in August 1995.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;On the other hand, during the January 1998 part-session, the Assembly voted against a request for the examination under &quot;urgent procedure&quot; of an item entitled &quot;Influx of migrants and asylum seekers of Kurdish origin in Europe&quot;.  This request stemmed from the arrival of two ships of migrants in Italy through illegal means in December 1997.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, during its meeting of 29&nbsp;January 1998, decided to combine this item with the results of the &quot;hearing&quot; held in Paris on 17 November 1997 on &quot;the humanitarian situation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons in South-East Turkey and North Iraq&quot;.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Notwithstanding the importance of the problem of clandestine migration for Europe, which definitely requires the effective co-operation of all parties involved, the aforementioned events, which led the Bureau to request the Assembly to take up the issue under urgent procedure, were seized as an opportunity to justify the long-lasting efforts to bring the so-called &quot;Kurdish question&quot; onto the agenda.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The present report is nothing but the product of this attempt.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Apart from the introductory and the concluding parts, the report is composed of three main sections under the following headings:</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;&quot;S&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ituation in Turkey&quot; (39 paragraphs, plus 13 paragraphs which deal with Turkey in the following sections);&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;&quot;S&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ituation in North Iraq&quot; (15 paragraphs, of which 7 paragraphs are exclusively on Turkey);&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;&quot;I&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; nflux of Kurdish migrants and asylum seekers in Europe&quot; (22 paragraphs, of which 6&nbsp;paragraphs are exclusively on Turkey).Th</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The above breakdown alone is sufficient to indicate that this report deals almost exclusively with Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Because of its content and the context in which it was prepared, this text cannot be accepted by the Turkish parliamentarians.</p>

</ul><p align="justify"><b>III.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Comments on the report section by section</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.<i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introductory section</i></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is interesting to note that in paragraph 1, while there are references to all relevant Assembly texts, there is no mention of Assembly<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1151"> Recommendation 1151</a> on &quot;the reception and settlement of refugees in Turkey&quot;.  It should be mentioned because this recommendation recognises the efforts made by Turkey to remedy the humanitarian situation of the Kurds fleeing from northern Iraq in consequence of the Gulf crisis.  The number of north Iraqis who fled to Turkey for shelter, for food and for all sorts of humanitarian protection during the first Gulf crisis was over 500 000.  Turkey, with all its scarce resources and despite its geographic clause to the 1951 Geneva Convention spared no effort to remedy the humanitarian needs of these people.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is also worth noting that all these Assembly texts date back to 1991 and were relevant to the requirements of those years.  The Eisma motion as well, on which the present report mainly based itself, also dates back to 1992 and even then was not followed up although its author continued to be a member of our Assembly until 1995.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In paragraph 3 it is mentioned that the rapporteur's intention to visit &quot;the region concerned&quot; was not authorised by the Bureau.  As a matter of fact this request was rejected by the Bureau (see meetings in January 1997 and in March 1997).  This is an indication that the appropriate organs of the Assembly did not agree with the rapporteur on the appropriateness of such a visit.  This visit was neither found agreeable by the Turkish parliamentarians, as long as it was meant to be a &quot;mission&quot;.  Nevertheless, there was an offer from the rapporteur's Turkish colleagues to organise a private visit to Turkey, but this was not accepted.  </p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There is a reference in paragraph 4 to the &quot;hearing&quot; organised in Paris in November&nbsp;1997.  The reason neither the Turkish members of the committee nor a representative of the government participated in the hearing was certainly not due to lack of consideration for the committee as it is asserted in the report.  It was due to the fact that the hearing was organised to serve the aims that we criticise this report for.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The majority of the non-governmental organisations invited to take part in the hearing were either those who directly advocate the so-called &quot;Kurdish issue&quot; and/or indirectly affiliated with the terrorist organisation PKK.  It was only natural for the Turkish parliamentarians not to take part in such a forum.  The President of the Assembly, Mrs Fisher, was informed of the concern of the Turkish parliamentarians before the hearing.  In the Council of Europe, as the widest European organisation, we should know perfectly well what such motivations may mean to the security of our continent and to the territorial integrity of member states.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In that &quot;hearing&quot;, as reflected in the records (document AS/PR/Ref (1997) PV 5 revised), with all due respect to the presence of some of the members of this committee, the persons and institutions who are well known for their continuing stance to openly or tacitly defend the cause of PKK terrorism, had found a free playground for themselves.  Now, the present report is nothing but a duplication of the contents of the &quot;hearing&quot; records.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Perhaps the most critical point which is clearly seen in paragraph 7 and reflected throughout the report is that there is a constant reference to a &quot;region&quot;, which is understood to be somewhere encompassing a part of Turkish territory and Iraq.  Added to it is that the report makes a correlation between this &quot;region&quot; and a &quot;political problem&quot; or a &quot;political cause&quot;.  This is where the Turkish parliamentarians are most sensitive since such wordings may imply the questioning of the territorial integrity of a member state.  (The connection of this issue with the PKK is explained in the following section.)</p>

</ul><p align="justify">2.<i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The section on the &quot;situation in Turkey&quot;</i></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;First and foremost it is not in conformity with the above-described mandate to allocate a whole chapter under this title.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As the report itself admits in paragraphs 6 and 43, there is a monitoring procedure going on in Turkey.  The rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee have visited Turkey three times now.  Contrary to the response given (by the Bureau) to a similar request of the rapporteur of this present report, the rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee did not face any difficulty to go to all areas they wanted to and to meet anybody they wished to.  The coverage of the Monitoring Committee is so wide that it makes this present report senseless.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Particularly in this section, and throughout the report as well, mention is made of a &quot;Kurdish issue&quot;.  Apart from Turkey's geographical proximity to the no-man's-land in northern Iraq, and the PKK's terrorist activities in this area, to talk about a &quot;Kurdish issue&quot; with regard to Turkey is either refusing to acknowledge the realities, or an attempt to support the cause of PKK terrorism, or both.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;At the very outset of this section, in paragraph 8, there is a description of being &quot;armed and peaceful&quot;.  This description does not even deserve a comment, except that it perfectly serves as an example to indicate the general quality of the whole study.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The report underestimates the threat of PKK terrorism and instead attempts to place this terrorist organisation on an equal footing with the Turkish state.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Throughout the report there are repeated references to the PKK.  However, not even with a single word does it talk about the fact that the PKK is a terrorist organisation.  As a matter of fact, the rapporteur, whilst presenting her report during the meeting of our committee in Prague on 13 March 1998, clarified her position that she sees the PKK not as a terrorist organisation but as one &quot;fighting for the Kurdish people's rights&quot; (AS/PR&nbsp;(1998)&nbsp;PV&nbsp;2).  This is totally unacceptable.  The report  tries to introduce a political question which endangers the territorial integrity and political unity of Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What Turkey has been encountering and struggling with for years, is the question of separatist terrorism.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PKK terrorism began in 1984 not with an attack on two police stations as it is stated in the report, but with the aim of creating an independent state encompassing Turkey's south-eastern provinces.  As a matter of fact the PKK was established in 1978.  Its systematic campaign of terror has, since then, targeted not only the Turkish security forces, but also many innocent civilians.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The PKK is also described as a terrorist organisation by the United States and many European states such as France and Great Britain, and its activities are banned in Germany.  Our Assembly debated and adopted a report in September 1997 (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 7876">Doc. 7876</a>), in which the PKK is clearly referred to as a terrorist organisation, and Turkey as among the countries which suffers from terrorism.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The PKK's strategy is based on the use of terrorism and violence for a dual purpose: to intimidate and to terrorise the local population and thereby gain some degree of support, and to deter the Turkish Government from bringing more economic and social services to the region.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As a result of the terrorist attacks of the PKK since 1984, some 25 000 people have lost their lives.  More than 5 000 of them are members of the local population, including women, children and in many instances babies.  The PKK kills civilians because it wants to force the local population to accept its demands.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Not only does the PKK kill innocent people, but it also attacks all kinds of civilian targets in order to make the region unliveable for those who remain alive.  The PKK also destroys schools, kills teachers, set forests on fire, blows up railways and bridges, plants mines on roads, burns down construction machinery and demolishes health centres.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To finance its terrorist and propaganda activities the PKK is heavily engaged in various types of illegal undertakings, including extortion of money, arms smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs and human beings.  The illicit activities of the PKK are mostly concentrated in some western European countries.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is true that the south-eastern provinces of Turkey are relatively backward regions.  However, Turkey is determined to resolve this problem of underdevelopment by improving the economic conditions of these provinces which are being violently exploited by the PKK.  That is why the Turkish authorities have been allocating considerable sums for the development of these regions and investing in huge projects such as the South-eastern Anatolian Project (GAP).  That is also why the PKK has been targeting civilians and economic and social installations.  Its aim is both to terrorise the local population and to keep the region economically backward.  By doing this the PKK aims to recruit more militants into its own ranks.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Many local people, as a result of the PKK's indiscriminate terrorist attacks, have moved to other regions of the country which offer better prospects.  It is not possible to give the numbers of such people as there is unlimited freedom of movement within Turkey and no statistics are held on that score.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Consequently it would be extremely unjust to talk about a deliberate policy of dispersal of the local population by the Turkish authorities, as alleged in the report.  To claim that there are up to 10 million internally dispersed Kurds in Turkey is simply absurd.  Perhaps the most striking example to show the lack of seriousness of the report is the statement in paragraph 22 that &quot;some three million&quot; of our citizens of Kurdish origin, who live in Istanbul, are forcibly displaced population.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is true that there are some cases where some villages and hamlets have been evacuated by the Turkish security forces, because they served as shelters for the PKK terrorists.  But such individual cases should not be manipulated to create a false picture of the situation.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Contrary to how it is described in the report, the village guard system was established by the Turkish authorities, in co-operation with the local population, as one of the measures to counter terrorism.  This system is exclusively based on voluntary participation.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is true that we have witnessed some cross border operations by the Turkish security forces in northern Iraq.  But these operations did not aim to endanger the territorial integrity of Iraq.  They were exclusively carried out in self-defence against the PKK terrorists, who are known to be based there, and carrying out hit-and-run attacks and ambushes from there.  Rumours about a security or buffer zone within Iraqi territory are completely unfounded.  The Turkish forces have always returned to their posts in Turkey upon the completion of their operations carried out with the limited specific aim of destroying the PKK camps and terrorists.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The report also distorts the facts about the constitutional and legal system in Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Constitutional citizenship is one of the founding principles of the Turkish nation-state and it clearly determines all the social, political and legal aspects of the state and society.  The Turkish Constitution stipulates that the state and the nation are indivisible, and that all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic, racial or religious origin, are equal before the law.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The citizens living in southern-eastern provinces of Turkey are an integral part of our nation.  They are the individuals of a nation which has shared and is determined to preserve the same values with respect to language, religion, culture, national identity, common history and the will for a common future.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is of cardinal importance to distinguish between militant separatism which resorts systematically to terrorism and all kinds of organised crime and the phenomenon of Kurdish ethnicity.  It is evident that not all the people of Kurdish ethnic origin are militant and seeking separation.  On the contrary an overwhelming majority, widely scattered throughout Turkey, are law-abiding citizens.  Most of them live in western Turkey, the economic attraction of which draws even greater numbers.  This overwhelming majority is totally integrated into society and economic, social and cultural life.  In Turkey there are countless citizens of all ethnic origins who have risen to the highest political positions and ranks such as cabinet ministers and members of parliament.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is also surprising to see in the report an allegation concerning the prohibition of Kurdish language in Turkey.  Presently, there are no restrictions on languages other than Turkish to be used in Turkey.  It is true that following the military intervention in 1980, Law&nbsp;No. 2932 was enacted to prohibit the use of languages other than Turkish as the mother tongue and of activities to publicise them. That law, adopted in that exceptional period in Turkey, had even then no effect in practice.  This law was repealed in 1991.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The social fabric of Turkey is a typical example of the realisation of the internationally accepted principle which stipulates that &quot;not all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences necessarily lead to the creation of national minorities&quot;.  Our citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin are not discriminated against, and they feel themselves to be part of society.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is very important to note that in the context of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, which created the modern Turkish Republic, the minorities in Turkey are defined only in religious terms.  However, thanks to the non-discriminatory stipulations of the Turkish Constitution, everyone in the country enjoys equal rights, obligations and opportunities before the law.  There can be no special treatment in favour of or against any citizen and no one can claim that there is discrimination based on ethnic origins.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In fact, the people of south-eastern Anatolia, like all the other people in other regions of Turkey, actively participate in the political life of the country.  They can make their voices heard in local administration as well as the national parliament and central government through their democratically-elected representatives.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The report also gives false information about the UNHCR camps in northern Iraq.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Atroush Camp was established by the UNHCR.  However, it gradually fell into the hands of the PKK, lost its civil character and became a base of the terrorist organisation.  The UNHCR accepted that Atroush had lost its character of being a refugee camp and decided to close it down on 21 January 1997.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Turkish Government has made several announcements to the people in the Atroush Camp and to those living dispersed in the region who wish to repatriate voluntarily.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The government has recently made the same call for voluntary returns from the Ain-Sufni Camp as well.  For this purpose, the Turkish Government has launched an information campaign in co-operation with the UNHCR.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The UNHCR, upon request, can easily provide all the essential information about this campaign.  According to recent UNHCR statistics, since July 1996, 1 217 Turkish citizens have been voluntarily repatriated and all the necessary accommodations have been provided to them by the Turkish Government.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are also references in this section to the work of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The interpretation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in paragraph 12 on the cases of Akdivar and others and Mentes and others is nothing but a biased attitude since it does not take into consideration the contents and the reasoning of these two judgments, which would otherwise equally lead to different conclusions.  The Government of Turkey had made public its observations on the legal defects of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Akdivar and others which was prior to the judgment in the case of Mentes and others.  The report does not bother to make any reference to the reaction of the government to the said judgments, even for the sake of pretended fairness.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In paragraph 13 the report goes further to misrepresent the process of friendly settlement envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights.  The Commission is one of the most respectable organs of the Council of Europe.  In the conduct of its work, the Commission has several means at its disposal.  It is therefore very disappointing to see the wrong connotation attached to the &quot;friendly settlement&quot; &#8212; in the case of Ysiyok and others &#8212; by implying that the government paid &quot;compensation&quot; to the applicants.  To be accurate in legal terms, the payment made within the context of friendly settlement cannot be referred to as &quot;compensation&quot; because the term &quot;compensation&quot; may come into question only when a party to a litigation is held responsible or a violation is attributed to one side of a legal dispute.  As regards a solution reached in accordance with the process of friendly settlement, none of the parties are held responsible whatsoever.  There is a clear distinction between the implications of a violation as an outcome of a legal dispute and a solution reached as a result of friendly settlement.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The assertion in paragraph 41 that &quot;since 1995 the European Court of Human Rights has announced as many as twelve judgments regarding violations of human rights of people of Kurdish origin by the Turkish authorities&quot; is totally incorrect.  First of all, the total number of the judgments in relation to the allegations arising from the incidents that took place in south-east Anatolia is four.  They are the cases of Aksoy, Akdivar and others, Kaya, Ayd&#305;n, and Mentes and others.  It is noteworthy to state that neither the Commission of Human Rights nor the Court of Human Rights have found any indication that the alleged violations were against people of Kurdish origin.  Moreover, this is a mere allegation raised by the terrorist organisation, PKK, and its affiliates which both the Commission and the Court have dismissed on every occasion.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are other judgments of the European Commission of Human Rights which could be of relevance for this section of the report, but it is disappointing to see no reference to them.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The European Commission of Human Rights, in one of its decisions (Application No.&nbsp;27776/95) (A.G. and others against Sweden), stated clearly that there is no discrimination applied against a part of Turkish citizens in Turkey.  The above-mentioned decision, relating to a request for non-expulsion from Sweden to Turkey, reads as follows: &quot;The Commission concludes that is has not been established that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in Turkey&quot;.  (Article 3: &quot;No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment&quot;.)</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In another recent decision, the European Commission of Human Rights (Application No. 33124/96) (X against Netherlands) stated that the mere fact that the applicant is of Kurdish origin is not in itself sufficient ground to believe that he has reason to fear persecution.  The decision stipulated that, although accepting that the applicant was politically active in the past, it cannot be said that, if expelled to Turkey, the applicant would have reason to fear persecution or would run a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The decisions of the European Commission or Court of Human Rights also affirm that the ethnic origin of Turkish citizens is not a cause of discrimination.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Another example is a ruling of the Karlsruhe Administrative Court.  According to a report published in the <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> on 23 December 1997, the Karlsruhe Administrative Court ruled in its decisions A7K13114/95 and A7K10026/96 on 17&nbsp;September&nbsp;1997, that belonging to the Kurdish community was not in itself sufficient to claim refugee status and that each individual application had to be considered on its own merits.  On the other hand, the Schleswig-Holstein State Administrative Court has ruled in a similar sense more recently by its decisions 5A233/94 and 5A175/96.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Karlsruhe Administrative Court in its above-mentioned decision also stated that: &quot;Because of their ethnic origin, the Kurdish people in Turkey have neither in the past nor today been under persecution and even pressure at the regional level.  Kurdish people in Turkey have the opportunity of moving to the western regions of the country.&quot;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As such, to claim that Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin migrate abroad because of the policies of the Turkish Government, as alleged throughout the report, is equally false.  If such a claim were to be true it would be impossible to explain why so many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin live in the western part of Turkey only because they prefer to.  This fact indicates clearly that the reason for migration from the south-east of Turkey either to the west of the country or abroad is basically the economic situation which deteriorated drastically as the result of the embargo against Iraq.</p>

</ul><p align="justify">3.<i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The section on the &quot;situation in North Iraq&quot;</i></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;With regard to this section it is very disturbing to see the persistent criticism towards Turkey, even though this section should have been the most elaborated part if we recall the mandate given to prepare such a study.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Even in the very limited paragraphs which are devoted to the situation in northern Iraq, there are serious and important mistakes or omissions.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;We in the Council of Europe should be very careful in employing certain terminology, particularly with regard to sensitive areas.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The right description for the area is either north of the 36th parallel, or northern Iraq; but definitely not &quot;North Iraq&quot; as stated in the report, as if we were giving it a separate country status.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A very serious point contained in paragraph 47 is the attribution of &quot;government&quot; status to the people living in the area.  The Gulf crisis resulted in a power vacuum and instability in northern Iraq.  But there has never been a reference in other international fora to a &quot;government&quot; status.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Another false approach is that, while talking about the population in the area the only reference is made to the &quot;Kurds&quot;.  This is another example of how we lose sight of the mandate given to us to prepare this study.  Almost all the Assembly documents upon which this study should have been built refer to &quot;Iraqi Kurdish population and other persecuted minorities&quot;, in which along with the Kurds in northern Iraq, the Turcomans, the Assyrians and even the Marsh Arabs in the south were given due consideration.</p>

</ul><p align="justify">4.<i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The section on the &quot;influx of Kurdish migrants and asylum seekers in Europe&quot;</i></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The migration of &quot;Kurds&quot; to Europe is part of the general problem of immigration.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Global economic changes have made Europe an attractive location for movements of goods, capital and persons.  People of all ethnic origins from all countries which are relatively poorer have moved to western Europe, not only from east to west, but also from south to north.  Although this phenomenon is of great concern for the receiving country, it is also disturbing for the countries on the transit route.  We need to pay particular attention to the countries on Europe's sea or land borders.  It is worth noting here that Spain refused entry at its borders to around 150 000 illegal migrants from North Africa in 1997.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What is important here is not the ethnic origins of migrants but the phenomenon of migration itself.  To reduce the question to an ethnic one will result in overlooking its socio-economic aspects or will fail to find a satisfactory response to the question as to why so many people with a wide variety of ethnic origins are migrating to western Europe.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One of the most acute problems the western European countries are facing today is the question of illegal migration.  The recent incident of two ships bringing migrants to Italy through illegal means is only an example of this question.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This event was a blatant case of illegal trafficking in human beings, an extremely serious form of organised crime.  It is based on the exploitation by international organised crime gangs of people's understandable desire to have a better life.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In fact, the Action Plan adopted by the General Affairs Council of the European Union on 26 January 1998 underscored this problem.  According to the information furnished by the British chairmanship to the press on the Action Plan &quot;it would seem there is an organised trafficking racket&quot; &#8230; &quot;&#8230; given the extent of the current inflow of migrants and the itineraries they are taking, there is no doubt that a large part of the illegal immigration is planned and organised in advance by traffickers, which is why the Action Plan approved by the General Affairs Council provides for all the information relating to the participation of criminal organisations in this field, including the production of false documents, should be collected, analysed and duly exploited&quot;.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has dealt with the same problem before.  The Assembly's<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1211"> Recommendation 1211</a> (1993) reiterated that &quot;clandestine migration is due, in particular, to the growing demand in Europe for unskilled, poorly-paid labour, and can neither resolve employment problems in western Europe nor stimulate economic growth in the less developed countries.&quot;  In the same recommendation it is also stated that &quot;faced with the current restrictions and difficulties in entering western Europe, would-be immigrants are increasingly resorting to traffickers and organised networks &#8230;&quot;, &quot;traffickers and organised networks are generally well-established both in countries of origin and in receiving countries: they put migrants in touch with employers offering clandestine work&quot;, &quot;the migrants, victims of unscrupulous traffickers, are not always aware of their illegal migrant status or of the strict entry conditions in force in the host countries &#8230;&quot;, &quot;the trafficking and employment of clandestine migrants are often linked to other forms of international organised crime&quot;.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Illegal migration has always been a source of concern for Turkey as well.  She has consistently sought multilateral co-operation against all forms of organised crime and international terrorism.  She has drawn attention to their interrelation, to the funding of terrorism by organised crime like human trafficking and to the international networks of crime established in many countries under various guises.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Turkey has been subject to several migration waves during the course of history.  It should be recalled that in 1988 and in 1991 more than half a million refugees from northern Iraq found shelter in Turkey.  Iranian masses fleeing the newly-established radical Islamist regime, Bulgarian Turks and Bosnians were also welcomed in Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The report talks about the geographical reservation of Turkey to the 1951 Geneva Convention.  In the convention, signatory states were given the option of adhering to the convention with geographic preference.   Turkey, in the light of this option, became a party to this convention with a declaration of geographic preference.  It assumed responsibility only for refugees originating from Europe.  The main reason for this preference is our country's geographic location.  In fact, the &quot;safe third country&quot; concept adopted by the European Union in the 1990s made the geographical preference of Turkey all the more important.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Nevertheless, the Turkish authorities are expending every effort to fulfil their responsibilities to &quot;temporary asylum seekers&quot;.  Contrary to what is indicated in the report, asylum seekers from Turkey's eastern borders are being admitted on humanitarian grounds, and solutions to their problems are being sought in close co-operation with the UNHCR.  An exclusive regulation was issued by the Turkish authorities in 1994 in order to facilitate this procedure.  It is a fact that the vulnerable geographic location of Turkey leads to illegal entries from its borders with Iran and Iraq.  The difficulties do not emanate from their entry into Turkey by illegal means but arise from non-compliance with this regulation.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are several factors which make Turkey a transit route in the eyes of the migrants.  The main reasons for this are:</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;co&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; mmon borders (Turkey has a 378 km long border with Iraq, a 529 km long one with Iran, out of a total of 2 875 km long land borders also with Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, Nahjevan, Armenia and Georgia, as well as 6 000 km long sea shores);&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;th&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; e geographically bridging location of Turkey between Asia and Europe;&#8212;</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;ex&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; tremely liberal policies of most European countries (in this respect, Europe has become a magnet for illegal migrants who enter Turkey from neighbouring or far-away countries.  Those who realise that some of their relatives and friends have been easily granted refugee status in some European countries are tempted to follow suit.  These people do not mind using the illegal services of organised crime gangs as long as they are able to reach Europe and acquire refugee status there.  Thus, Turkey inevitably becomes a springboard for them due to its geographic location);an</p>

</ul><p align="justify">and last but not least,</p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8212;th&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; e presence of the terrorist organisation, PKK, hand-in-hand with international crime organisations engaging in trafficking in drugs and human beings.Th</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are some migrants who use Turkey as a transit route to western Europe, by entering Turkey ostensibly as tourists with valid passports and travel documents, and then leaving for the West.  There are others who enter Turkey with the use of forged passports and visas through the legal ports of entry, and some others who arrive on Turkish soil via illegal means.  No matter how they have entered the country, they almost invariably fall into the hands of the international organised crime gangs which are specialised in trafficking them to the West.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In short, on the one hand there are people originating from different countries and seeking a better life in Europe, and on the other, organised crime gangs helping them to achieve their goal.  In between, Turkey becomes a transit route.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The problem should be diagnosed correctly so that the right remedies can be found.  Human trafficking generates huge sums of income which attract the organised crime gangs and terrorist organisations.  In other words, terrorism and organised crime work hand-in-hand.  Turkey has for a long time been not only trying to explain this phenomenon to its friends in Europe, but also fighting with the organised crime gangs with all the means available to her.  At the same time, she has concluded agreements with thirty-two countries, including Italy, in order to combat terrorism and organised crime.  Obviously, more needs to be done in this field at both bilateral and multilateral levels.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In 1996 a total of 18 804 migrants, mainly from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Syria and Rwanda, who had entered Turkey through illegal means, were apprehended by the Turkish security authorities.  67.5% of them were Iraqis.  In 1997, <br>
22 429 such persons were captured, 70.6% of them from Iraq.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There is a huge amount of evidence shared within Interpol underlining the fact that the PKK is actively involved in human trafficking as well as other organised crimes.  Notwithstanding all this evidence, in the case of <i>Ararat</i> it is very important to note a statement issued via the Italian News Agency ANSA by ERNK, the political wing of this terrorist organisation, two days before this ship ran aground near Italian shores, saying that &quot;a ship carrying some 800 Kurdish refugees was on its way to Italy&quot;.  Thus, exactly two days before this ship was detected by the Italian authorities, the PKK had already made this incident public for the first time.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A recent and striking example of the PKK connection in human trafficking was in the &quot;Report&quot; programme aired by the German ARD television channel on 19 January 1998, which included statements by a gang member convicted of human trafficking.  In his own words the convict said: &quot;Our organisation is not directly linked with the PKK, but on several occasions we had to pay ransom to the PKK in order to do our job.  The PKK itself is also involved in human trafficking.  In Greece there is no permission to the others.  My organisation can only smuggle people into Greece, but from Greece onwards it is exclusively a PKK job&quot;.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is indeed important to recall that in the first days of the <i>Ararat</i> incident, there were some reports in the Italian press that the ships carrying illegal migrants were set on course by the PKK in co-operation with mafia groups.  In the following days, however, the incident started to be presented to the public as a manifestation of the Kurdish problem.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Relatively low standards of living and unemployment in certain regions of Turkey initiate emigration from Turkey also, as is the case in many other countries.  In other words, there are also Turkish citizens who migrate to western Europe, almost exclusively to attain a better life in economic terms.  According to the figures announced by the UNHCR spokesperson in Geneva on 6 January 1998, 224 000 new asylum applications were lodged in the European Union in 1996, of which around 116 000 were lodged in Germany alone.  Of this overall number, around 22 000 were Iraqis, half of whom filed applications in Germany.  Around 35 000 Turkish citizens sought asylum in western Europe in the same year.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;These people try to portray themselves as genuine asylum seekers so as to obtain refugee status.  In most cases, declaring that they are Kurds is sufficient to obtain this status.  Such policies on the part of some European countries obviously encourage other economically deprived people to follow suit and illegally migrate to those countries.  So long as such refugee policies are in force, the waves of people flowing into Europe will not cease.  It is an open secret that many of these people, once they have obtained refugee status, visit Turkish consular missions in order to obtain Turkish passports.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As to the <i>Ararat </i>and <i>Cometa</i> incidents, it is hard to understand why the people on board have been referred to as Kurds.  The Turkish citizens on board constituted a small minority and the rest were composed of Iraqis, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Iranians, Afghanis and Azerbaijanis.  If one assumes that all the people coming from Iraq were of Kurdish origin, the percentages would still be too low for the event to be regarded as &quot;influx of Kurdish refugees&quot;.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Besides, those who are coming from northern Iraq are not necessarily of Kurdish origin.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As a matter of fact, on 9 February 1998 the Turkish gendarmerie captured eighty-six Iraqis and three Sri Lankans in Marmaris, Mugla district, aiming at fleeing to Greece and then to other western European countries through illegal means.  The gendarmerie found out that all of these Iraqis were of Turkmen origin.  Or is there also an assumption that all those Turkish citizens were Kurds, so as to present the problem as a political one?</p>

</ul><p align="justify"><b>IV.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Why we oppose the present report</b></p>

  <ul><p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The concern of the Bureau to request the inclusion on the agenda of the January part-session of the Parliamentary Assembly of an item dealing with the recent flow of migration to Europe was justifiable as long as it was meant to look for remedies to the problem of illegal migration.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The real issue is the urgent need for effective co-operation among the countries who directly or indirectly suffer from the illegal flow of migration.  We should not lose sight of the fact that this co-operation cannot be realised without the effective participation of all countries involved, including Turkey.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;We need a clear definition of what we are aiming at.  The report is uncertain whether the main concern can be described in &quot;humanitarian&quot; terms.  As a matter of fact, the inclinations seem to be rather &quot;political&quot; in most parts of the document.  As such, it is a  misrepresentation, is partially and totally misleading, and is thus totally unacceptable.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Last year, during the September part-session, our Assembly debated and adopted a report prepared by Mr López Henarez, with regard to co-operation in the fight against terrorism, in which we once more reiterated our &quot;forceful and unreserved condemnation of acts of terrorism &#8230;&quot;.  This report clearly referred to the PKK as a terrorist organisation, and Turkey as among the countries which suffers from terrorism.</p>

  <p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;We are all here to pursue the aim of the Council of Europe, which is to achieve greater unity among us for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are our common heritage and facilitating our economic and social progress.  No one can argue that supporting the cause of terrorism is among the ideals and principles referred to in Article&nbsp;1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.</p>

</ul><p align="justify">Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.</p>

<p align="justify">Budgetary implications for the Assembly: taken into account in the budgetary appropriations of the Assembly.</p>

<p align="justify">Reference to committee: Order No. 460 (1991), <a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 6604">Doc. 6604</a> and Reference No. 1785 of 4 May 1992.</p>

<p align="justify">Draft recommendation and draft order adopted by the committee on 29 May 1998 with respectively 11 votes in favour, 5 votes against and 0 abstentions and 10 votes in favour, 3 votes against and 3 abstentions.</p>

<p align="justify">Members of the committee&nbsp;: Mr Dí<i>az de Mera</i> (Chairman), Mr Iwi&#324;ski, (Vice-Chairman), Mrs <i>Aguiar</i>, MM. Akselsen, Amoruso, Andres, Árnason, Mrs Arnold, MM. Atkinson, Aushev, Beaufays, Billing, Bogomolov, <i>van den Bos</i>, Brancati, Mrs Brasseur, Mrs Bu&#353;i&#263;, MM. Cardona, Christodoulides, <i>Chyzh</i>, Clerfayt, <i>Connor</i>, Debarge, <i>Dinçer</i>, Mrs Fehr<i> </i>(Alternate: Mrs <i>Vermot-Mangold</i>), MM. Filimonov, Fuhrmann, Mrs <i>Garajová</i>, MM. Gremetz, Jakic, Mrs Johansson, Lord Judd, MM. Junghanns, <i>Kalus</i>, <i>Kozlowski</i>,  Kukk, Mrs Ku&#353;nere, Mr Laakso, Mrs Langthaler, MM. <i>Lauricella</i>, Laurinkus, Làzàrescu, Le Jeune, Liapis (Alternate: <i>Korakas, </i>Vice-Chairman), Loukota, <i>Luís</i>, Melo, Mészáros, <i>Micheloyiannis</i>, Minkov, Molnár, <i>Mutman</i>, Rakhansky (Alternate: <i>Khunov</i>), <i>Ruffy</i>, von Schmude, Sincai, Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn, MM. Tahir, Vangelov (Alternate: <i>Tripunovski</i>)<i>,</i> Wray (Alternate: <i>Lord Ponsonby</i>), N&#8230; (Alternate: Mrs <i>Guirado</i>, Vice-Chairperson).</p>

<p align="justify"><i>N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.</i></p>

<p align="justify">Secreta&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ries of the committee: MM. Newman and Adelsbach.</p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="200" noshade>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P183_15728" href="#P183_15729">1</a> </sup> For example in January 1997 there were reports of large-scale detentions by the gendarmerie in the Lice district of Diyarbakir based on the refusal of villagers to become village guards (1997 Human Rights Watch Report). Journalists and human rights monitors were not permitted to enter the village. </p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P190_17596" href="#P190_17597">2</a> </sup> Currently the UK-based Kurdish Human Rights Project has assisted over 50 applicants in their applications to the European Commission of Human Rights.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P219_25494" href="#P219_25495">3</a> </sup> Sometimes referred to as Ninive or Ninova Camp</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P252_33037" href="#P252_33038">4</a> </sup> eg. Dr Seyfettin Kizilkan, President of Diyarbakir Medical Association, or Sanar Yurdatapan, spokesman for the organisation promoting reconciliation  in the south-east «&nbsp;Together in Peace&nbsp;»&nbsp;, charged under Art.169 with supporting the PKK.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P255_33703" href="#P255_33704">5</a> </sup>  On 26 November 1997&nbsp;the Court decided  that the Turkish authorities had violated Articles  5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 of the European Convention relating to the excessive length of detention pending trial.</p><!-- TRANSIT - INFOAFTER -->
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