<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<title>Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</title>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="HTML Transit 7.0 by Stellent (tm), Inc. www.stellent.com">
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/PortailStyle.css">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff"><a name="TopOfPage"> </a>
<!-- TRANSIT - INFOBEFORE -->
<table width="100%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0">
  <tr>
    <td><div align="left"><img src="/Documents/LogoText.jpg" width="218" height="48"></div>
    </td>
    <td><div align="right"><img border="0" SRC="/images/logos/Logo130X120.jpg" width="130" height="120"></div>
    </td>
  </tr>
</table>
<hr size="1">

<p align="justify"><b>Doc. 8204</b></p>

<p align="justify">22 septembre 1998</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Federal </b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Republic of Yugoslavia</b></p>

<p align="justify">Report</p>

<p align="justify">Political Affairs Committee</p>

<p align="justify">Rapporteur: Mr András Bársony, Hungary, Socialist Group</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Summary:</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In spite of the assurances by the Belgrade authorities, military operations affecting the civilian population in Kosovo continue. Tens of thousands of people are displaced and without any shelter and basic provisions.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;An international peace force should be deployed to provide minimum security, necessary for the return of displaced persons and the beginning of meaningful negotiations on a political solution to the conflict.</p>

<p align="justify">A future political solution should be based on the highest level of autonomy for Kosovo within a democratically reformed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It should receive international guarantees that its terms will be respected by the two sides.</p>

<p align="justify">A clear and unequivocal position of the international community on the future political status of Kosovo could bring forward the beginning of genuine negotiations between the two sides. The Committee of Ministers should organise an international conference, with the participation of all interested parties, governments and all relevant international bodies, to discuss proposals for such a future status.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>I.  Draft recommendation</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly strongly condemns the continuing escalation of violence in Kosovo, which has already driven more than 280 000 people from their homes and brought the region to the brink of war.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly reiterates its position expressed in<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1146"> Resolution 1146</a> and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendations 1360"> Recommendations 1360</a>, 1368 and 1374 (1998), adopted since January this year. It calls for an immediate cease fire and the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. International observers should have  unimpeded access to all parts of Kosovo, to assess the situation and investigate allegations of war crimes and other violations of human rights.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly considers the following elements to be essential in reaching a lasting peaceful solution to the crisis:</p>

<p align="justify">i. security &#8211; guaranteed to all people living in Kosovo and achieved through the  withdrawal of the Serbian security forces, the disarmament of armed groups of ethnic Albanians and the deployment of an international peace force;</p>

<p align="justify">ii. a new political status for Kosovo &#8211; based on a high level of autonomy within the Yugoslav federation and including:</p>

  <ul><p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a. </i>the highest possible form of self-government for Kosovo in the fields of law-making and the executive, judiciary, public order, economy, education and culture,</p>

  <p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b. </i>respect of the rights of Serbs and other minorities living in Kosovo,</p>

  <p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c. </i>direct participation of Kosovo representatives in the federal institutions;</p>

</ul><p align="justify">iii. democratic reforms &#8211; implemented throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and  guaranteeing full compliance  with the Council of Europe standards concerning the functioning of a democratic political system, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and the rights of national minorities, notably in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak;</p>

<p align="justify">iv. international guarantees &#8211; ensuring respect for the future agreement and preventing any attempts to return to the status quo or to secede. </p>

<p align="justify">4. The Assembly considers that, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal position of the international community on the future status of Kosovo, the political and military pressure exerted on the two sides to engage in negotiations remains largely ineffective.</p>

<p align="justify">5. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers  organise an international conference on the future status of Kosovo, with the participation of all interested parties, governments and all relevant international bodies. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>II.   Explanatory memorandum</b></p>

<p align="justify">I. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in late February, an estimated 600-700 civilians have been killed in the fighting. Some 280 000 people have been displaced from their homes and a considerable number of them are facing the approaching winter without any basic accommodation, food or medical assistance. Without an immediate cease fire and the creation of conditions for a safe return to homes or alternative shelters, a major humanitarian catastrophe  seems inevitable. The situation of Kosovo refugees and displaced persons is dealt with in more detail in the report by MM Dinçer and Iwinski, presented by the Committee on migration, refugees and demography.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since January, the Assembly has adopted three recommendations and a resolution dealing with the situation in the FRY and Kosovo in particular.<sup><a href="#P68_4584" name="P68_4585">1</a></sup> In these texts, it condemned the excessive use of force by the Serb security forces, condemned the use of violence and called for immediate negotiations with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict. It stressed the importance of the respect of human rights and the rights of minorities, and the need for democratic reforms throughout the FRY, as an essential part of any future solution.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In July, August and September the fighting continued, spreading for the first time also to urban areas. In spite of the assurances by the federal government that the situation was returning to normal, the evidence from the ground demonstrates to the opposite. The units of the Yugoslav army and the Serb security forces continue with operations affecting civilian population. They are also preventing international observers and humanitarian workers access to conflict areas.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the present situation, it is imperative to create minimum security conditions to allow the return of displaced persons and the beginning of meaningful negotiations on a peaceful solution to the conflict. Such negotiations should also include talks on a future political status for Kosovo.</p>

<p align="justify">II. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Security</p>

<p><b>5.</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A<b>s the Assembly has repeatedly stated, the primary responsibility for the violence in Kosovo lies with the authorities of the FRY and Serbia. There is abundant evidence of excessive use of force. In addition, numerous allegations of serious crimes committed by the army and the police could not be fully investigated due to the obstruction by the authorities. It is therefore inconceivable that the federal and the Serb troops alone could the minimum security in Kosovo, necessary for a genuine peace process to begin.</b></p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On the other hand, armed groups of ethnic Kosovo Albanians are also not in position to guarantee such security. Their exact numbers, political platform, organisational and command structure are not known.. In addition, they were also accused of killings and abductions of a number of Serb, Kosovo Albanian and Roma civilians. Their presence in the border region with Albania is an additional destabilising factor to the already volatile situation in this country.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the present circumstances, it would therefore seem necessary to deploy an international peace force, which should be preceded by a withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army to the barracks and the special police troops from Kosovo, as well as by disarmament of armed groups of ethnic Albanians. Such peace force should be deployed in sufficient strength to guarantee its own security and the security of all people living in Kosovo. Their deployment should also allow unimpeded investigation  of violations of human rights committed by the two sides, which is a</p>

<p align="justify">pre-condition to any future reconciliation.</p>

<p align="justify">III. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Future political status of Kosovo</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly has repeatedly stated that, in its opinion, a future political solution should be based on autonomy for Kosovo, within a democratically reformed FRY. It has clearly pronounced itself both against the preservation of the status quo, as well as against secession.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The present constitutional framework deprives Kosovo Albanians of the rights they had enjoyed before 1990, and has served as a mechanism for their systematic persecution.</p>

<p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An independent Kosovo would have inevitable destabilising consequences for the region. It would in all likelihood trigger secessionist demands in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would also risk to increase tensions in Albania, with a negative spill-over effect to other countries in the region.</p>

<p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A future political status for Kosovo should therefore consist of the highest possible level of autonomy for the province, based on the prerogatives the province enjoyed according to the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. These prerogatives should of course be adapted to the new situation and, where necessary, enlarged.</p>

<p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The new autonomous status should give Kosovo the right of self-governing at the level recognised to the two federal republics. It should also contain the highest possible guarantees for the rights of Serb and other minorities living in Kosovo.</p>

<p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If the new autonomous status of Kosovo as a part of the FRY is to be sustainable in the long term, it is necessary that it is co-operative and integrative in its nature.  It should therefore provide for the participation of representatives of  non-ethnic Albanian minorities at all levels of the government within Kosovo. It should also provide for the participation of Kosovo representatives in the federal institutions. Without such co-operative and integrative mechanisms the autonomy would inevitably lead to a political and economic (self) isolation of Kosovo, and finally to secession. It is clear that in the present circumstances the co-operation with Belgrade is difficult to conceive. Following the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that considerable pressure would have to be exerted on all parties involved to make it</p>

<p align="justify">work.</p>

<p align="justify">IV. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Democratic reforms</p>

<p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A comprehensive programme of democratic reform throughout the FRY is another pre-condition for a sustainable long term political solution for Kosovo.</p>

<p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Kosovo crisis has been used by the present regime of President Milosevic as an instrument to seize and maintain power . The tensions have been repeatedly used to consolidate the support and divert the attention of public opinion from political and social problems provoked by the disastrous economic situation and international</p>

<p align="justify">isolation of the FRY.  In order to be able to act as a credible partner in a future political solution, Serbia and the FRY have to be democratically reformed to bring the functioning of its political system in line with the international standards. Failing that, the risk of the present situation repeating itself in the near future would be</p>

<p align="justify">unavoidable. </p>

<p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Secondly, the request for immediate democratic changes in the FRY is necessary for the legitimacy of the international community's insistence that Kosovo should remain a part of the FRY.</p>

<p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Thirdly, the continuation of the status quo not only blocks any long term solution for the crisis in Kosovo, but also carries the risk of the secession of Montenegro, as well as the aggravation of other existing tensions in the FRY, such as in Sanjak and potentially in Vojvodina.</p>

<p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Finally, the request for democratic reforms should also apply to Kosovo. Its future political status should be based on the full respect of Council of Europe standards concerning democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the rights of minorities.</p>

<p align="justify">V. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; International guarantees</p>

<p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Belgrade authorities have, until now, categorically refused any foreign mediation in the crisis. They have continued, however, albeit selectively, to maintain contacts with the international community, including with the Parliamentary Assembly.</p>

<p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the international community has so far not being successful in bringing the two sides to the negotiating table, it should continue with its efforts. It should take an active role in future negotiations and be a co-signatory  of any future agreement, in order to provide an additional guarantee for its respect by the two sides. Without such guarantees and continued political pressure, any agreement would in all likelihood not survive as both sides would continue to pursue their diametrically opposed policies of hegemony versus secession.</p>

<p align="justify">VI. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions</p>

<p align="justify">21.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In spite of the assurances by the Belgrade authorities, military operations affecting the civilian population in Kosovo continue. Tens of thousands of people are displaced and without any shelter and basic provisions. Houses, livestock and fields are being  destroyed. Without an immediate cease fire and the creation of minimum security allowing these people to return home or alternative shelters, a humanitarian</p>

<p align="justify">catastrophe seems inevitable.</p>

<p align="justify"> 22.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Belgrade authorities, primarily responsible for the escalation of violence, should withdraw its troops and allow the representatives of the international community and humanitarian organisations an unimpeded access to all parts for Kosovo, to assist refugees and investigate allegations of crimes committed during the fighting.</p>

<p align="justify">23.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Armed groups of ethnic Albanians should cease their military operations and disarm. An international peace force should be deployed to provide minimum security, necessary for the return of displaced persons and the beginning of meaningful negotiations on a political solution to the conflict.</p>

<p align="justify">24.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A future political solution should be based on the highest level of autonomy for Kosovo within a democratically reformed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It should receive international guarantees that its terms will be respected by the two sides.</p>

<p align="justify">25.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A clear and unequivocal position of the international community on the future political status of Kosovo could bring forward the beginning of genuine negotiations between the two sides. The Committee of Ministers should organise an international conference, with the participation of all interested parties, governments and all relevant international bodies, to discuss proposals for such a future status.</p>

<p align="justify">Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee</p>

<p align="justify">Reference to committee:<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1133"> Resolution 1133</a> (1997)</p>

<p align="justify">Budgerary implications for the Assembly: none</p>

<p align="justify">Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 22 September 1998</p>

<p align="justify">Members of the committee:  <i>M. Bársony (Chairman), M. van der Linden (Vice-Chairman), Mrs&nbsp;Ojuland (Vice-Chairman), MM Antretter, </i>Arzilli,<i> Atkinson, </i>Mrs&nbsp;Belohorska<i>,</i> MM Bergqvist<i>,</i> Björck, Bloetzer, Chircop, Chornovil (<i>alternate: Tsybenko), </i>Daly, Davis, <i>Dokle, Domljan</i>, <i>Gjellerod</i>, <i>Gül, Hadjidemetriou</i>, Hornhues, Mrs Iotti, Irmer<i>, Iwínski, </i>Kalus,<i> Mrs&nbsp;Kautto, MM Kirilov</i>, Krzaklewski, <i>Kuzmickas,</i> <i>Mrs Lentz-Cornette,</i> <i>MM Lopez-Henares</i>, <i>Lupu,</i> van der Maelen, <i>Maginas,</i> Martínez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier, Mota Amaral,<i> Mühlemann,</i> <i>Mutman,</i> Nallet (<i>alternate:</i> <i>Mr Baumel (Vice-Chairman)</i>, <i>Nedelciuc,</i> <i>Oliynik</i>, Pahor, <i>Palmitjavila Ribo</i>, Popovski, Prusak, Mrs<i> </i>Ragnarsdóttir, Mrs Roudy, <i>MM Schieder,</i> <i>Schwimmer</i>, Seguin, Selva, <i> </i> <i>Sinka,</i> Mrs G Smith, <i>Mrs Stanoiu</i> <i>Mrs Stepova, </i>MM <i>Surjan,</i> <i>Thoresen, Toshev</i>, <i>Urbain,</i> <i>Volcic,</i> <i>Vrettos,</i> Woltjer, <i>Ziuganov</i>.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>N.B. The names of the members who took part in the vote are printed in italics</i></p>

<p align="justify">Secretaries of the committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich, Mr Gruden</p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="200" noshade>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P68_4584" href="#P68_4585">1</a> </sup> See<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendations 1360"> Recommendations 1360</a> (1998), 1368 (1998), 1376 (1998) and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1146"> Resolution 1146</a> (1998)</p><!-- TRANSIT - INFOAFTER -->
</body>
</html>
