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<p align="justify"><b>Doc. 8380</b></p>

<p align="justify">20 April 1999 </p>

<p><b>Return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Croatia</b></p>

<p align="justify">Opinion<sup><a href="#P15_105" name="P15_106">1</a></sup></p>

<p align="justify">Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee</p>

<p align="justify">Rapporteur: Mr Gyula Hegyi, Hungary, Socialist Group</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Introduction</b></p>

<p align="justify">1. The Committee on Social, Health and Family Affairs would like firstly to congratulate Mr Akselsen, Rapporteur of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, for his well founded and remarkably detailed work. The report is mainly based on information obtained during visits undertaken in the country, and on the most recent data and information collected by the UNHCR.</p>

<p align="justify">2. One remark has to be made as regards the positions and reactions of Serbian public opinion. As Mr Akselsen quotes it in his report, the international community is blamed for using &quot;double standards&quot; when judging the question of the several hundred thousand Serbians driven out of Croatia, on one side, and the Croatians, Bosnians, Albanians and refugees of other nationalities displaced by the Serbians on the other.</p>

<p align="justify">3. For the present, with the Kosovo tragedy and its 500.000 refugees driven from their homes and welcomed in the neighbouring countries in precarious conditions, Mr Akselsen&#8217;s report brings to light the long-term dramatic consequences of the last conflict, and allows us to show the progress that still needs to be made to allow a better future for the hundreds of thousands of refugees. </p>

<p align="justify">4. The aim of the present opinion does not consist in dealing with political or military questions. It will leave to others to decide whether the Serbians and their opponents have been treated equally by the international media and the western powers. Probably only historians will be able to piece together the complex reality of the bloody disintegration of &quot;great Yugoslavia&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>The social dimension of the crisis</b></p>

<p align="justify">5. It has to be observed sadly that while the people of western and central Europe are working towards integration, in Balkan Europe new borders and trends of confrontation are being raised. It is frightening that these negative processes may further deepen the breaking away of this region from the western and central part of the continent. </p>

<p align="justify">6. Apart from political and military instability, there is a real threat of social explosion. If Europe is not able to save this region from a social catastrophe, then it may face its unforeseeable consequences: waves of refugees, poverty and unemployment, violence of the young made wild during the war, renewed illnesses, regions and whole countries living off aid. The longer a political solution and comprehensive help are delayed, the more acute will be the threat of a social explosion. If the necessary help does not arrive social instability could suddenly change into political and military instability. The danger of war and quasi-war could initiate new waves of refugees, cripple the economy and tie up Europe's energy at the time of world-wide competition. As long as Europe is not able to ensure political, military and social stability in this region, it will have difficulty in competing with the United States and the leading powers of the Far East. </p>

<p align="justify">7. An important part of the resettlement of the refugees is the reduction of social tragedies and  in the long term the creation of peace, although the wounds of history in this region through several generations will do not easily heal. </p>

<p align="justify">8. The present opinion is aimed at completing the reports and information of the Rapporteur, Mr&nbsp;Akselsen. It has, indeed, to be emphasised that the regions mentioned in the report each have different problems. In reality there is a decisive difference between the resettlement of the Serbians who escaped from the territory of Croatia and the return of the Croatians who had left the territories now regained by the Croatians. If the international conventions are the same in both cases, we should nevertheless be aware that we are talking about the resettlement of the losing opposition in the first case, and in the latter case about the resettlement of the winning ethnic group.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>The return of refugees and the creation of new homes</b></p>

<p align="justify">9. The international community is decisively against and has already condemned the practice of &quot;ethnic cleansing&quot;. But the breaking up of the old Yugoslavia has gone hand in hand with enormous movements of people. Because of nationalist hatred a significant proportion of the refugees was only able to imagine a secure future in the state of its own ethnic group. </p>

<p align="justify">10. In this respect, the irreversible movements of millions people following World War II could be recalled, in particular in the case of the Eastern European Germans. In the same way there is also no real hope for the resettlement of the Palestinians escaping from Israel around 1948.  </p>

<p align="justify">11. Beside the resettlement of the refugees, large scale international aid needs to be given to those Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Albanian and other refugees who do not wish to return to their old homes, and who imagine their future in one of the other successor states of the old Yugoslavia. </p>

<p align="justify">12. Moreover some of the refugees would only return if they received a sufficient guarantee from a representative of their own ethnic group of their safety.</p>

<p align="justify">13. As Mr Akselsen points out, and in accordance with the historic background of the region, both the resettlement of refugees and the settlement of those selecting a new home country has to be supported. Mr&nbsp;Akselsen is right when he states that every Serbian who escaped from Croatia has the right to decide between resettlement and settlement. </p>

<p align="justify">14. Discussions on a multicultural and multiethnic society, however, have to be called wishful thinking. It is a noble aim, but if the people of the region do not want any part of it, then it will be difficult to force it on them from the outside. </p>

<p align="justify">15. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina it can be supposed that the majority of the Serbians imagine their future in the territory of Republika Srpska. In the case of the Serbians driven out from the Knin area the return home of those wishing to be resettled has to be ensured. At the same time those who do not wish to return to the Croatian State should be helped to settle in Serbia, and provided with financial compensation for the assets they have left behind.</p>

<p align="justify">16. The situation of the Danube Region is partly different, as from here many Croatians also escaped at the time of Serbian occupation. According to UNCHR data, since the return of the region to Croatia, 45,000 Serbians have left, among them 12,000 had lived there before the war events. The majority of these people have settled in Vojvodina, turning the ethnic relations of the province to the disadvantage of the Hungarians living there. This is the case for example in the area of Temerin.</p>

<p align="justify">17. We also have information that some of the Serbian refugees took Yugoslavian citizenship, voting accordingly in the elections of their new home country, and at the same time they continue to register themselves as refugees. Of course this can also happen with people belonging to other ethnic groups.</p>

<p align="justify">18. Despite international pressure, resettlement is going very slowly. According to official data about 20,000 people, mostly Croatian, have returned to the Danube Region of Croatia. However, as far as I know, this data was prepared on the basis of the return permissions issued and not on the basis of the actual number of people resettling. A condition of receiving permission to return is an empty residence that can be moved into. There are many people who keep putting off resettlement because of the limited living conditions; others want to sell the property they were returned that they have renovated, so that they can afford to make a fresh start at their new place of abode. </p>

<p align="justify">19. In practice the region did not get the international aid it was promised. The &#8220;donor&#8221; conferences organised in Paris on 14<sup>th</sup> March 1997 and in Zagreb on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1998 did not result in a breakthrough. </p>

<p align="justify">20. Moreover, the danger of landmines, which will be present for a long time in the future, is also another serious obstacle to the return of refugees. The removal of mines in the region requires superhuman efforts and important financial means.</p>

<p align="justify">21. At present in the Danubian region there is 80% unemployment. All this makes the resettlement of Croatian refugees difficult, too, while in the case of Serbian refugees the goodwill of the Croatian government can also be doubted. This is the reason why any international aid programme would assist these states to stand on their own feet in economic terms.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Economic and political possibilities</b></p>

<p align="justify">22. Obviously the returning of the refugees is also made difficult by objective factors. Restoration of the Croatian economy can only be successful if it is joined with an in-depth reform. Croatia's economy, not with respect to how well-developed it is, but with respect to its structure, is presently at the stage which the Central-European reform countries were at the very beginning of the nineties, that is before making structural decisions. The war economy resulted in relative prosperity. Due to intensive national feeling, this put off making the necessary economic decisions that would have been unpopular in the short term. If the Croatian economy does not open up towards foreign countries and no radical reforms are made, then after war prosperity it may decline rapidly. Foreign capital will wait and see; for it to appear en mass the democratic constitutional state should be strengthened and the economic structure should be reformed. Presently there is 17-18% unemployment in Croatia, which is on the border of tolerance, and obviously it prevents refugees from returning.</p>

<p align="justify">23. According to the Croatian minister of reconstruction the country can be rebuilt in ten years from its own resources, or in two years only with international support. However, appropriate political conditions, among others acceleration of the return of Serbian refugees and refugees of other nationalities, would be needed to get international support. In a certain sense this seems to be a vicious circle. </p>

<p align="justify">24.  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Croatia must also know that if it wants to join European co-operation more intensely, it has to satisfy more and more democratic norms. On the part of a Hungarian Rapporteur it should not be taken as preaching, but as describing his own experiences. Transformation involves suffering and sacrifices, but even countries richer than Croatia could not do without this cost.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>A lesser known situation: the Hungarian refugees</b></p>

<p align="justify">25. I have no intention of exaggerating the specific situation of the 6,000 Hungarian refugees. But because neither the Akselsen report nor the other international documents deal with this question sufficiently, it is my task to contribute to the present debate with my knowledge. </p>

<p align="justify">26. At the time of the census held in 1991 there were 13,000 Hungarians living in the Danube Region. They belong to the native population, they used to live in the territory of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, then continuously on the territory of Royal Yugoslavia, Ustascha Croatia, the Hungarian Kingdom and then Yugoslavia under Tito. They suffered from the permanent annexation of the region many times. Not being Slavs they did not interfere in the Croatian-Serbian conflict, they always tried to remain loyal to the current state. But not even this could save them from becoming refugees. At the time of the Serbian occupation 7,000 of them remained in their homeland, most of them elderly people. They put up with the forced labour they had to carry out on the front line, with the appropriation of their machines and other property, with harassment and the termination of education in Hungarian. Now they are justified in expecting their lives to take a turn for the better, but in reality very little has been done to that end. </p>

<p align="justify">27. According to Croatian data 1,899 Hungarian have returned to the region so far, and another 2,564 are waiting to return home. But according to the data known by UNCHR and my own sources only 600 people, that is about 10% of the refugees, have returned. Compared to other nationalities, this is a very low rate of return.</p>

<p align="justify">28. There are some pleasing exceptions. From the 748 inhabitants of Kórogy (an ancient Hungarian village) 378 people have returned to the village where 42 new houses have been built and 68 have been renovated. In another Hungarian village, Szentlászló, the houses are being renovated at a reasonable rate, but as there is no power and water supply, permanent return has not yet started. The re-opening of Hungarian education institutions is slow in starting. The Hungarian language is so different from the Serbian and Croatian languages, which are similar to each other, that for Hungarian children the lack of education in their mother-tongue could make it impossible for them to catch up with their contemporaries.</p>

<p align="justify">29. In Hungary at the peak of the crisis there were 3,000 Croatian refugees, most of them of Hungarian nationality. By the end of 1998 the number of registered refugees decreased to 286, and then they were no longer registered. Many of them returned to Croatia, but a significant part of those of Hungarian nationality decided to settle down in Hungary. In February 1999 the Hungarian government put aside 200 million HUF (about 1 million USD) to promote the rebuilding of Hungarian settlements in Croatia. This amount is for the restoration of the cultural and religious institutes of the Hungarians living there.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Conclusion</b></p>

<p align="justify">30. It would be irresponsible to promise an easy solution. Even in Western Europe the cohabitation of people and religions, the &quot;multicultural&quot; society, involves enormous amounts of tension, sometimes leading to political crises or acts of terrorism. It would be an illusion to expect a miracle from people of the former Yugoslavia. </p>

<p align="justify">31. The refugees who want to return must be helped; the international community and countries concerned should support and join this process. At the same time the final settling down of those who choose to live in a new country must also be supported. An end should be put to poverty, unemployment, the lack of housing, schools and medical care. Only in this way can the social explosion and the huge wave of refugees be avoided. These solutions imply important means, but if no help is provided, the social explosion will cost Europe even more.</p>

<p align="justify">32. I do no undertake to draw political conclusions now. But I would like to add one idea. It is not unworthy that the costs of the rebuilding are to be covered by those who added fuel to the fire with their ambiguous messages, contradictory reassurances, the encouragement of separation and staying together at the same time, by provoking the opposing parties.</p>

<p align="justify">33. The Committee on Social, Health and Family Affairs shares the concerns expressed by the Rapporteur of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, and fully agrees with the draft recommendation. Nevertheless, it had to stress that the return of the refugees relies on two basic conditions. </p>

<p align="justify">34. The first one is the establishment of favourable political and social conditions, the creation of trust and feeling of security for Serbian refugees and refugees of other nationalities. This is the task of the Croatian authorities. The international community must be strict and call the Croatian government to respect the obligations it undertook.</p>

<p align="justify">35. The other condition is basically of an economic character. One of its elements is rebuilding which is decisively the Croatian state's task again. However, the development of the region struck by the war, by means of foreign investment, creation of workplaces, comprehensive economic projects, is just as important. This is mainly the task of the western countries. Large aid, development programmes and investment are needed in Croatia. </p>

<p align="justify">36. The combination of both conditions - economic development and political settlement - seems the most efficient solution to make as many refugees as possible settle back in their home country.</p>

<p align="justify">*</p>

<p align="justify">*     *</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Reporting committee:</i> Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 8368">Doc. 8368</a>)</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Committee for opinion:</i> Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Reference to committee:</i> <a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 7818">Doc. 7818</a> and Reference N° 2185 of 28 May 1997 and modified by Reference N° 2239 of 7 November 1997</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Opinion</i> approved by the committee on 14 April 1999</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Secretaries to the committee:</i> Mr Perin, Mrs Meunier, Mrs Clamer</p>
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<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P15_105" href="#P15_106">1</a> </sup> See <a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 8368">Doc. 8368</a></p><!-- TRANSIT - INFOAFTER -->
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