Ad Hoc Committee to observe the presidential elections in Ukraine (31 October and 14 November 1999)

Doc. 8603

21 December 1999

Ad Hoc Committee to observe the presidential elections in Ukraine (31 October and 14 November 1999)

Report

Bureau of the Assembly

Co-rapporteurs: Ms Jenny Jones, United Kingdom, Socialist Group and

Mr Andreas Gross, Switzerland, Socialist Group

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This was the third presidential election held in Ukraine since independence in 1991. The Parliamentary Assembly received invitations to observe the election from the Head of State, President Leonid Kuchma (who was standing for re-election), and from the President of the Parliament, Mr Olexandre Tkachenko (also a candidate until his very late withdrawal on the eve of first round voting).

On proposals from the Political Groups, the Bureau of the Assembly appointed an Ad Hoc Committee, of which the following constituted the Delegation for the first round of voting:

Pilar Pulgar, Chairperson Spain EPP/CD

Hanne Severinsen*, Vice-Chairperson Denmark LDR

Charalambos Angourakis* Greece UEL

Ioan Ardelean Romania EDG

Andreas Gross* Switzerland SOC

Jose Francisco Herrera* Spain EPP/CD

Jenny Jones United Kingdom SOC

Irmtraut Karlsson * Austria SOC

Olga Keltosova Slovakia EDG

Liobov Oleinik* Russia UEL

Flavio Rodeghiero Italy LDR

Yvette Roudy France SOC

Juris Sinka Latvia EDG

Francesco Speroni* Italy LDR

Those who also served as members of the Delegation for the second round are shown with an asterisk. At meetings in Kiev, Mmes PULGAR and SEVERINSEN were elected as Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, Mrs JONES and Mr GROSS as Co-rapporteurs. Mr John Hartland, Mr Pavel Chevtchenko and Mr Jean-Pierre Guglielmi (first round only) formed the secretariat.

2. Prior to their observations of each round of voting, the Delegations held meetings with presidential candidates, political party leaderships, the central election commission, the prime minister and some members of his cabinet, media representatives (including independent journalists), representatives from NGOs including human rights groups, and with Council of Europe ambassadors.

Both for the organisation of these meetings and for observation of voting, the Delegations received logistic support from the Parliament of Ukraine and from the International Observation Mission (director: Simon Osborn) of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The quality of this support was exemplary. In particular, thanks to support from OSCE/ODIHR’s long-term observers, all members who wished to observe in cities or regions outside Kiev were enabled to do so.

3. Statements on each round of voting were issued by our Delegations and by OSCE/ODIHR at press conferences presided over, for the first round, by Mme PULGAR and, for the second, by Mme SEVERINSEN. There was mutual consultation in the preparation of these statements. In each case the Delegations endorsed the OSCE/ODIHR statements. These statements are presented in full in Annexes A, B, C and D. The programmes of the Delegations are in Annexes E and F.

II. THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

4. The Constitution was adopted in 1996. Executive power is vested in the President and Prime Minister. Legislative power is vested in the 450-seat single-chamber Parliament (Verkhovna Rada). The President is elected by direct universal suffrage for five years. The territory of Ukraine, with its 52 million people, is divided into 24 oblasts or provinces plus one autonomous republic (Crimea) and two metropolitan areas (Kiev and Sebastopol). The Parliament is elected half by proportional representation of party lists, half by “first-past-the-post” voting in 225 territorial constituencies. In each of these constituencies there was formed a Territorial Election Commission (TEC) for the Presidential election. Shared between them were just under 33 000 Polling Stations, each with a Commission of its own (PSC). All report to the Central Election Commission, based in Kiev, which has 15 members proposed by the President and approved by Parliament. The electorate numbers 37 million, including 55 000 returned Crimean Tatars who were disenfranchised for the 1998 parliamentary elections but have since received Ukrainian citizenship.

5. The law for the presidential elections was promulgated on 25 March 1999. It was then amended on 8 September. It provides a good administrative framework and sound general principles. It provides, however, only part of the legal basis for the election. It needs to be interpreted in the light, of course, of the Constitution but also of the law on the Central Election Commission and of “other laws” (Article 8). The Committee was told there were 15 such laws in all. Hence part of the reason for confusion regarding procedures for complaints - as illustrated abundantly below.

6. Most revealing, however, of the current political culture of Ukraine - as much of mental dispositions as of the political polarisation which has paralysed the workings and normal interactions of State institutions - was the effort of Parliament to amend the law on the Central Election Commission, between the two rounds of voting, with a view to making it easier to remove members.

7. Equally revealing in a different way was the failure of the Central Election Commission to foresee the technical and administrative challenge of the legal requirement to print the assigned number of each of 33 000 polling stations on ballot papers for the second round of voting. Parliament rightly turned down the request, made on 29 October, for an amendment of the law to this effect. By working round the clock for several days running, the Central Election Commission met the challenge - and its staff deserve commendation for this effort and achievement.

III. THE CAMPAIGN UP TO THE FIRST ROUND OF VOTING

Jenny Jones

8. Four candidates - three of them members of parliament - made representations mid-September to the Council of Europe that the campaign was being grossly manipulated to their disadvantage by the outgoing President. These representations were subsequently endorsed by the Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation. Accordingly the co-rapporteurs of the “Monitoring Committee”, Mr Kelam and Mrs Severinsen, made a special fact-finding visit 4-6 October. They reported negatively on the conduct of the campaign up to that point, in the hope that matters might be corrected. On 18 and 19 October, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe made a visit to Kiev in the context of current questioning of Ukraine’s compliance with obligations as a Member State of the Council of Europe and with commitments agreed to upon accession. On 27 October a counter-representation was made from within the Parliament to the Secretary-General, to the effect that inadequacies in the legal and administrative framework for the election were being exploited by forces within the Parliament and by tax-evading media companies to discredit the outgoing President.

9. In fact, the campaign and the general circumstances of the election were open to international observation as from mid-September when the OSCE/ODIHR established its International Mission and its long-term observers began to take up their regional deployments. Media monitoring was carried out by the European Institute for the Media (Dusseldorf), also from mid-September. What follows is also based on the Institute’s findings.

10. Media coverage was grossly biased in favour of the outgoing President. The State-run television channel is accessible to 96% of electorate, which relies mainly on television for information about the candidates and their policies. Publicly funded media are required by law to provide voters with information about the candidates “without prejudice or preference”, and all but one of the candidates took up their allocations of free time. But even on State-run television, the legally provided 10-minute airtime broadcast slots of candidates running against the outgoing President were preceded and followed by negative satirical comment. One candidate complained to the Supreme Court. It upheld his complaint and ordered a right of reply. Nothing was done. Another appeal was made to the Supreme Court. A second broadcast was finally made but only within hours of the deadline for the end of the campaign.

11. There was a greater plurality of views in the private print media. However, there was much evidence of harassment by the tax authorities and by safety inspectorates of private-sector media which were critical of the outgoing President.

12. As subsequently documented by the OSCE/ODIHR Mission, there were instances of forgery of newspapers and of wide-scale distribution of anonymous defamatory leaflets and other printed materials, allegedly sponsored by the supporters of the outgoing President - with no action by the authorities in response to these allegations. The most serious incident of violence was a grenade attack upon one candidate at a political rally early October. Forty people including the candidate were wounded. There were other incidents, including one involving a Member of Parliament.

13. There were also many complaints presented to the Delegation by the chairman of the ad hoc parliamentary committee set up to monitor the elections, Olexsandr Yeliashkevitch, of direct involvement by State officials at all levels in the campaign in favour of the outgoing President. He reported cases of intimidation in the event of voting against the outgoing President, and also of direct appeals, if not orders, to vote for him.

14. The Central Election Commission received over 100 complaints up to the first round of voting, mainly about biased coverage in the media. Procedures for dealing with them were inadequate. The organisation primarily responsible, the National Television and Broadcasting Council, did not have a quorum to function because the President had not made the necessary appointments. No clear role was specified by law for the Central Election Commission in its relation to the Council, nor in the event of the Council not functioning in the course of an election - which is in itself a deplorable situation.

IV. FIRST ROUND VOTING

Jenny Jones

15. The Delegation formed nine teams:- Andreas Gross and Olga Keltosova - Simferopol (Crimea); Irmtraut Karlsson and Pavel Chevtchenko - Odessa; Liobov Oleinik – Poltava; Hanne Severinsen - Dnipropetrovsk; all others - Kiev and outlying regions. All teams stayed on at the last polling station which they visited in order to observe the count.

16. Generally, voting and counting was carried out in an orderly and peaceful fashion. Observers were welcomed at polling stations and the Chairs of the local electoral bodies were ready to discuss proceedings with us. Observers representing the candidates were present. Local electoral bodies were helpful to voters and they did their best to implement procedures. In general, voters appeared to be able to exercise their right to vote freely and without intimidation.

17. Irregularities occurred, but not on a scale to cause difficulties except in a small number of stations - for example: treatment of ballot boxes and ballot papers, the presence of the militia, disregard for voting secrecy, and campaigning inside some stations. Some ballot boxes were unsealed and put in a side-room until they were needed; mobile ballot boxes used for home voters were sealed at different times; some were sealed in the morning along with the ordinary boxes, and others were sealed later in the day just prior to use. Some ballot papers were not counter-signed or stamped by the local electoral body; some voters left with their ballot papers and returned later to put them in the box. Militia personnel were present inside most polling stations visited - a possible factor of intimidation, particularly when too close to the voting booths and ballot boxes.

18. Traditions persist of “family voting” (where two or more members of a family go into the voting booth together) and of “open” voting (where voters place their ballot papers unfolded into the box). Toleration of these traditions amounts to a disregard for secrecy. In most stations, however, local officials discouraged “family voting”.

19. Most counts observed were according to procedure. There were incidents, however, where observers were denied copies of the “protocol” on which the results were recorded. There were occasional variations in the interpretation of counting procedure - which led to some inconsistencies between counts.

20. There were also variations across the different regions of Ukraine in the proportions of voters requiring the mobile ballot box to be taken to their home. In urban areas the percentage was usually less than 1%, but observers in some rural areas it was up to 30% of registered voters.

21. All irregularities observed were taken up with the Chairs of the local electoral bodies. The explanations given indicate that the procedures were being interpreted in different ways. Rules and procedures for polling day should be clarified in time for the next election.

V. THE CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND ROUNDS

Andreas Gross

22. It was difficult the day following the first-round voting to know what weight to attach to the many serious complaints and allegations about the conduct of the campaign, a fortiori to assess impact on voting behaviour. From media monitoring alone it was clear that the choices before the electorate had not been freely and fairly presented. Nonetheless, even with a biased and intimidatory campaign, not more than one-quarter of the electorate voted for the candidate, outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, in whose benefit intimidation and bias were predominantly exercised. One may well conclude that Ukrainian people are not that easily fooled and intimidated.

23. However, between the first and second round, a disturbingly high proportion of these complaints and allegations were substantiated - in some cases, with documentary proof in the hands of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission. Many concerned abuses of public office, stemming from the Presidential Administration itself. As we said in the statement which we released the day following second-round voting, the supposedly “voluntary” resignations of three governors whose provinces had returned majorities against the outgoing President “defies belief”.

24. Our verdict on the campaign is totally negative. The circumstantial evidence to this effect is overwhelming. It is summarised in our own statement, to be found in Annex A, and in the second roundstatement of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission (Annex C), which we examined in advance and endorsed as fully concordant with our own impressions and actual observations.

VI. SECOND ROUND VOTING

Andreas Gross

25. Though less numerous, the Delegation was present in Kiev and outlying regions (Mrs Oleinik, MM. Angourakis, Herrera, Speroni, Chevtchenko and Hartland), in Crimea (M. Gross), in Lviv (Mrs Severinsen) and in Odessa (Mrs Karlsson). Observations were made of more than 100 polling stations, including the count at the last stations visited, as well as of aggregation of the results at some Territorial Commissions and also at the Central Election Commission.

26. Generally speaking, our observations and impressions were not significantly different from those of the first round in regard to polling day procedures and behaviours.

27. Voting was again generally calm and orderly, the most widespread irregularities being family voting and disregard for secrecy. The presence of uniformed militia was more apparent than during the first round, as was also the presence of local government officials and unidentifiable civilians. With only two candidates left in the race, the counts were conducted more quickly and easily.

28. Although we made no direct observations of serious violations, we have since received much testimony and complaints - as also the OSCE/ODIHR Mission - which are sufficiently documented and credible to be brought to the attention of the Bureau.¹ There is also the curious fact that during the processing and progressive presentation of results by the Central Election Commission, the proportion of votes for each candidate scarcely changed throughout the night whereas significant variations might well have been expected as the results came in from different regions. It is also curious that the officially announced 76% turn-out should have been so much higher than virtually all turn-outs at the polling stations we visited - except for the very few where it was actually given as 99% or as more than 100%.

VII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Jenny Jones

29. The election was held in difficult conditions, at a critical time in the history of Ukraine. The economy is in decline, reform is slow, and there are signs of disillusionment amongst the hard pressed population.

30, The economy is in decline partly because of factors which are beyond Ukraine’s control - not least the financial crash in Russia in August 1998. Cuts in public spending by 30% have left public sector workers and pensioners in social hardship. Many public sector workers had not received wages for up to 6 months prior to the election. The State pension of $10 per month is not enough to live on. The “unofficial” economy or “black market” has grown to substantial proportions (some say 60% of total economic activity), depriving the State of tax revenues. Such conditions inevitably lead to criminalisation of economic activity and corruption.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

31. Election administration in general and efforts to follow polling-day procedures have continued to improve. Despite the irregularities which we observed, most polling-station officials - of whom a substantial majority were women - showed great personal commitment and did admirable work. As compared to the parliamentary elections of 1998, 55 000 returned Crimean Tatars, then disenfranchised, have received Ukrainian citizenship and could vote. It must also be said that the election was fully open to international observation, notwithstanding much evasiveness by State and Government officials in response to questioning.

32. The election campaign, which we characterized as “highly questionable” following the first-round vote, was in fact a disgrace. Not only is Ukraine in breach of its OSCE Commitments in this regard. It is also in breach of its obligations under the European Human Rights Convention (Protocol 1, Article 3). The abuse and instrumentalisation of State power in the interests of one candidate - through pressure on regional, local, hospital, school, university and military authorities whose leading representatives are made to feel personally responsible for “correct” voting of their subordinates - is unacceptable and in violation of Council of Europe rules.

33. An analysis of why this should be the case is beyond the remit of our Ad Hoc Committee.

34. Nonetheless, with a view to the future, one must not forget that Ukraine has been in a continuous period of “election politics” since the run-up to the March 1998 parliamentary elections - in other words, almost a year and a half. During all this time, the political climate has been poisoned by allegations of corruption and large-scale embezzlement of State funds. It was hardly to be expected therefore that the predominant organized group² in Parliament led by Presidential candidate Symonenko should soften its stance in regard to legislative initiatives of the Executive, which - if passed - would inevitably be exploited by the media, heavily influenced by the Presidential Administration, to improve the image of the outgoing President as a candidate for his own succession.

35. This has, of course, been disastrous for the people of Ukraine; and now that the Presidential election is over, the least the international community can expect is a vastly overdue sense of responsibility on both sides of the hitherto bitterly divided leadership of the State, not only in the Executive but in Parliament. If this transpires, there could be quick positive change. There should be no intrinsic political difficulty for Ukraine to clarify, rationalize and reform its overall legal framework for elections and the proper functioning of the media, including proper procedures for handling complaints. Indeed, given the balance of political forces, which has led to paralysis of decision procedures foreseen by the Constitution, both sides should have the sense to recognize that this is a common interest - as well as representing progress towards a politically neutral State administration.

36. The Ad Hoc Committee considers that the new leadership of the State of Ukraine - both Parliament and Executive - would be ill-advised to rely much longer on the international community’s indulgence for what has been called the “geopolitical bluff”. Yes, Ukraine is a big country and a major factor for stability in the region. Yes, there is much to admire in how, first President Kravchuk, then President Kuchma in the early years of his first presidency handled the delicate relationship with Russia and the issues of nuclear weapons and the Crimea. Some states of affairs are not however that easily reversible and - to Ukraine’s credit - it may be said that today concerns for regional stability are focused beyond Ukraine’s borders. It follows that geopolitics will no longer be generally perceived as a reason for patience if Ukraine does not rapidly introduce a new style of politics and serious reforms.

37. Meanwhile the Assembly is poised, by virtue of Resolution 1194 (1999), to consider taking measures against the Ukrainian Parliament’s Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly in the absence of “...further developments regarded as substantial progress...” in the sense of Resolution 1179 (1999). In this regard, the Ad Hoc Committee submits three remarks to the Bureau:

i. however critical we have been of the campaign, we take the view that such “further developments” are not to be discounted, though not realistically to be expected in the time-frame between the reinstatement of President Kuchma (30 November) and the opening of our Parliamentary Assembly’s January part-session;

ii. measures against the Legislature would be difficult for the people of Ukraine to understand, in the absence of accompanying measures against the Executive;

iii. there is a certain paradox in the contemplation of measures against the democratic representation of the people of Ukraine at European level - i.e. the Verkhovna Rada’s Delegation to the Council of Europe - when the people have just shown their somewhat desperate commitment to the democratic process by turning out in millions to take part in this election, even if the official turn-outs 70% and 76% may have been “inflated” by a few percentage points.

Annex A

Press release

Ukraine Presidential election 2nd round

Council of Europe Parliamentary Observers : "Impressive turn-out despite bad campaign shows the people's commitment to democracy. Rapide action on reform, with a new spirit of cooperation between Parliament and Executive, is now urgently needed to restore international credibility".

KYIV, 15.11.99 – A delegation from the COUNCIL OF EUROPE Parliamentary Assembly, led by Hanne SEVERINSEN (Denmark, LDR) and Andreas GROSS (Switzerland, SOC), returned to observe the second round of voting in the Ukrainian presidential election.

The 7-member delegation made observations in Kyiv and outlying regions, in Lviv, Odessa and Simferopol (Crimea).

As for the first round of the election, the delegation shared its observations with those made since mid-September 1999 and between the two rounds of voting by the International Election Observation Mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It endorsed the Executive Summary of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission.

Delegation leaders Hanne SEVERINSEN and Andreas GROSS made the additional 6-point statement :

1. The conduct of the campaign got worse between the two rounds of voting. Access to and coverage by the media were grossly unequal. The apparatus and resources of the State were mobilised quite unacceptably to the advantage of one of the two candidates.

2. The election law was prepared and finalised at far too late a stage. It made no adequate provision for the handling of complaints. Proposals for its amendment were made in Parliament in the course of the election. This reflects the lack of development of Ukraine's political culture. Though arrangements for the technical administration of the election were satisfactory, it is absurd that a new law should have to be drafted and voted for each election.

3. Despite widespread irregularities and some evidence of attempts at intimidation – including the presence of militia inside some polling stations – voting was again in general relaxed and orderly. Neither a grossly unfair campaign, nor attempts at intimidation, nor abuse of State power can account for or detract from the fact that people turned out to vote in impressive numbers. The Ukrainian people have shown their trust in the democratic process.

4. But the non-neutrality of the State in an election process must soon destroy this trust. The "voluntariness" of the resignations of three regional governors between the first and second rounds, their regions having returned results unfavourable to the outgoing President, defies belief. So do some polling station turn-out figures of 99 % - with figures of 98 % support for one or the other candidate. Polling station officials – especially women – showed great personal commitment and did admirable work. Many could now feel betrayed.

5. Ukraine is in breach not only of its OSCE Commitments but of its obligations – in international law – to secure the right to free elections for its people, as provided for in the European Human Rights Convention (Protocol 1, Article 3).

So long as Ukraine is a Member of the Council of Europe, this obligation is underwritten by 40 other European States.

This cannot continue to be the case, unless a radical new direction is taken by the leadership of the State.

There must be an end to the statemate between Parliament and the Executive. It is this which is blocking progress towards reform. Only new laws, rapidly adopted and with clear provisions for enforcement, together with the clear expression of a new common will for democracy, will convince the Ukrainian people – and the international community – that real progress is under way to introduce a culture of "the rule of law".

Democracy based on the separation of powers cannot function in a political climate which is poisoned by allegations of personal corruption and self-enrichment at the State's expense. It must however be brought to function at all levels of society – in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

6. Social and economic conditions are precarious, even dramatic. So are the finances of the State. Support for Ukraine from the International community (IMF, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe…) must be conditional on the passing of new laws, on an end to abuses of the State administration, and on the establishment of a common ground for democracy. There are international programmes to help Ukraine in this direction. Now that a six-month period of electoral politics is over, so is the time for excuses

--------------------------

The delegation, composed to give a balanced reflection of the main political forces in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, was as followed :
- Charalambos ANGOURAKIS, (Greece, UEL);
- Andreas GROSS, (Switzerland, SOC) ;
- José Francisco HERRERA (Spain, EPP/CD)
- Irmtraut KARLSSON, (Austria, SOC);
- Liobov OLEINIK, (Russia, UEL);
- Hanne SEVERINSEN, (Denmark, LDR) ;
- Francesco Enrico SPERONI, (Italy, LDR).

Annex B

Press release

Ukraine Presidential election 1^st round

Council of Europe Parliamentary Observers : "A questionable campaign, orderly and apparently free voting – no reason to doubt the Ukrainian people's commitment to democracy"

KYIV, 02.11.99 – A delegation from the COUNCIL OF EUROPE Parliamentary Assembly, led by Pilar PULGAR (Spain, EPP/CD) and Jenny JONES (United Kingdom, SOC), observed the first round of voting in the Ukrainian presidential election.

The 14-member delegation made observations in Kyiv and outlying regions, in Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Poltava and Simferopol (Crimea).

The delegation shared its observations with those made since mid-September 1999 by the International Election Observation Mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Delegation leader Pilar PULGAR made the following 6-point statement :

1. The election is taking place in difficult conditions, at a critical moment in the history of Ukraine.

2. We endorse the Executive Summary of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission. The election campaign is a cause of concern. But because of the current crisis of confidence in the Ukrainian State's ability to honour its commitments to the Council of Europe, we draw attention to the context of the election.

3. Context : The economy is in decline, partly because of factors which are beyond Ukraine's control but substantially because slow reform discourages international investment. Social hardship has been increasing – with pensions, wages and salaries unpaid or in arrears. Much economic activity is "unofficial", depriving the State of taxe revenue. Political life has been paralysed by antagonism between Parliament and the Executive.

The Ukrainian people is suffering the consequences of these failures of leadership with great patience and fortitude.

The effect of this election – whoever wins – must be to revitalise Ukraine's political processes, its commitments to reform, and its integration into international and European structures.

We are confident that this can be the case, if action is taken immediately to rectify the errors of the campaign.

4. Campaign : There have been incidents of serious violence. Newspapers have been forged. There has been inadequate access to and biased coverage of candidates in the media. Allegations of harassment of the media by national and regional State bodies are numerous and specific.

These incidents and allegations must be the subject of an independent inquiry with international observation. It is unacceptable for the National Council for Television and Radio not to be able to function for lack of a quorum owing to failure to make appointments. It is unacceptable for tax and safety inspections of media outlets to be authorised during the course of an election campaign.

Legislation on the media must be clarified and brought into line with European standards. It must also be implemented.

5. Election day : Voting and counting was, in general, orderly and relaxed – with some exceptions.

The presence of representatives of candidates at 33.000 polling stations was substantial if uneven and did not give rise to any general difficulties.

There remain traditions of disregard for secrecy and of family voting. Casualness in treatment of ballot papers and ballot boxes caused many irregularities, but not on a scale to cause difficulties except in a small number of stations. It is wrong that militia personnel continue to have access to the interior of polling stations.

Although gaps, "grey areas" and weaknesses remain –notably in regard to complaints procedures – the legal and administrative framework for elections (with the exception of matters relating to the media) was satisfactory.

55.000 returned Crimean Tatars, disenfranchised for the March 1998 parliamentary elections, have since received Ukrainian citizenship and can vote.

6. Provisional assessment : This is the third Presidential election since Ukraine declared its independence.

Election administration and respect for procedures in general have improved since the previous presidential (1994) and parliamentary (1998) elections.

Although the campaign was highly questionable, voting – in general – was orderly and relaxed.

There is no reason to doubt the Ukrainian people's commitment to democracy.

There is – subject to the usual verifications – no immediate reason to doubt that the outcome of the first round of the election reflects the will of the Ukrainian people.

_________________________

The delegation, composed to give a balanced reflection of the main political forces in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, was as followed :
- Charalambos ANGOURAKIS, (Greece, UEL);
- Ioan ARDELEAN (Romania, EDG) ;
- Andreas GROSS, (Switzerland, SOC) ;
- José Francisco HERRERA (Spain, EPP/CD)
- Jenny JONES, (United Kingdom, SOC);
- Irmtraut KARLSSON, (Austria, SOC);
- Olga KELTOSOVA, (Slovakia, EDG) ;
- Liobov OLEINIK, (Russia, UEL);
- Pilar PULGAR, (Spain, EPP/CD) ;
- Flavio RODEGHIERO (Italy, LDR) ;
- Yvette ROUDY, (France, SOC) ;
- Hanne SEVERINSEN, (Denmark, LDR) ;
- Juris SINKA, (Latvia, EDG) ;
- Francesco Enrico SPERONI, (Italy, LDR).

Annex C

Election Observation Mission in Ukraine

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (SECOND ROUND)

14 NOVEMBER 1999

Preliminary Statement

Kyiv, 15 November 1999 - This is the preliminary statement of the observation of the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine held on 14 November 1999, issued by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) Election Observation Mission and endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conduct of the campaign for the second round of the presidential election in Ukraine was in breach of the election law and the relevant OSCE commitments on democratic elections and shows no improvement over the first round of the election.

State administration and public officials were again observed campaigning for the President and against his challenger. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission uncovered clear evidence that this campaign by State institutions was systematic and co-ordinated across the country.

The electronic and State-owned media comprehensively failed to live up to their legal obligation to provide balanced and unbiased reporting on the candidates and the campaign in their news coverage of the second round.

During the second round of these elections voting day procedures according to the law were not followed as closely as they were in the first round. Observers saw instances of more serious violations. Observers in Lviv oblast in particular saw voters given several ballot papers and casting more than one vote in a number of rural polling stations visited. They also noted instances of family voting and breaches of the secrecy of the vote.

THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES

As during the first round of election on 31 October 1999, State administration and public officials were observed campaigning for the President and against his challenger. Furthermore, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission uncovered clear evidence that this campaign was systematic and co-ordinated across the country. The orchestrated abuse of state structures and organs in favour of the President is in clear breach of the law and related OSCE commitments for democratic elections.

The violations included a sustained campaign to coerce state employees in medical and educational facilities to vote in favour of the incumbent and for those employees to urge patients, parents and students to do likewise. Verified reports of these campaigns were observed in eleven oblasts throughout the country.

The Militia were also observed disseminating campaign material and campaigning door-to-door in favour of the President, which could be perceived by voters as intimidation.

These activities and those of other institutions including the ZhEK³ were co-ordinated by rayon and city authorities reporting directly to the Ministry of Interior. It is extremely disturbing that State officials meant to uphold the law, have been observed breaking it.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Once again, the electronic and State-owned media comprehensively failed to live up to their legal obligation to provide balanced and unbiased reporting on the candidates and the campaign in their news coverage of the second round. The monitoring of the media by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission clearly shows the level of imbalance and bias from both these sources.

The news coverage on UT1, the State-owned national television channel, promoted the incumbent throughout the first and second round. In comparison, Inter and 1+1, two private national television channels, gave less time to the President but the nature and tone of their coverage was still overwhelmingly one-sided and supportive of the incumbent President. STB, the most balanced of the national broadcasters, did not provide a level playing field for the two candidates.

Throughout the election period, before the first and second round, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission received reports and allegations of pressure on certain media outlets to provide better and greater coverage of the activities of the incumbent. These outlets complained of an unwarranted number of inspections by numerous authorities including tax, fire and safety inspectors. At the national level, STB, in particular, was singled out for attention. Regional private television channels also encountered similar difficulties. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Chernomorskaya TV, was allowed back on air only by 12 November 1999. In Kharkiv, Simon TV was also subject to such inspections, as was Kanal 5 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Allegations were also received that independently minded press in the regions found it difficult to print their papers, as printing houses either refused to publish them or delayed publication.

These inspections and restrictions on media outlets created an atmosphere of self-censorship in which editors and journalists concluded that critical comment on the incumbent President’s campaign would invite unwarranted impediments to the publication of their paper or broadcasting of their programmes.

In conclusion, the media coverage of the 1999 presidential election in Ukraine did not live up to the required legal provisions and OSCE commitments, and shows no improvement over the coverage of the campaign for the 1998 parliamentary elections.

THE CAMPAIGN

The beginning of the campaign for the second round of voting was marked by the “resignation” of Heads of State Administration in three oblasts. In the days following, at least another eleven Heads of Rayon State Administration also “resigned”. In their resignation statements, some of these public officials intimated that the relatively low results for the incumbent President in the first round reflected badly on their administration. Clearly their resignations have particular significance given the observed level of interference in the campaign by State administration.

In the first round, the Observation mission reported that numerous false, libellous and anonymous leaflets and newspapers had been circulated. In the second round, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission received copies of false versions of Communist newspapers this time, being distributed in at least three oblasts. At the time of writing, the Mission understands that the relevant authorities have failed once again to halt the distribution of these false versions of newspapers, nor were any copies impounded.

COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission received a number of complaints prior to the first round related to campaign activities. Between the two rounds, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission received additional complaints, mostly concerning violations of election day procedures for the first round of voting and counting.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will continue to monitor the election process until official results have been published and will also monitor any complaints submitted after the second round.

COMPOSITION OF ELECTION COMMISSIONS

The Law on Election of the President of Ukraine stipulates that polling station commissions are composed of nominees of each candidate. However the ODIHR Election Observation Mission noted that in a number of areas, commission members were nominated by a State institution and not by the candidates or the parties. In these cases, the commission members were assigned their party affiliation after their nomination, irrespective of their own political preferences.

ELECTION DAY

The observation of the second round of these elections has revealed that voting day procedures according to the law were not followed as closely as they were in the first round. In the first round, observers were generally satisfied with the conduct of voting although some minor irregularities were seen. In the second round, observers saw instances of more serious violations. Observers in Lviv oblast in particular, saw voters given more than one ballot paper in a number of polling stations visited in rural areas. They also noted instances of family voting and breaches of the secrecy of the vote.

In general, observers noted an increase in the number of unauthorised persons present in polling stations. This is of particular concern, given the observed level of interference by State officials and institutions during the campaign. Furthermore, observers noted the presence of members of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in a number of polling stations in both rounds. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission has raised this issue with SBU headquarters and sees no reason for their presence in polling stations or at Territorial Election Commissions on election day, unless expressly invited to be there by members of these commissions.

Although most reports are still being processed, particularly those on counting procedures, the ODIHR has not been informed of any widespread or systematic irregularities at the time of this writing. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will continue to monitor the aggregation procedure until official results have been published.

The Election Observation Mission would like to thank the Central Election Commission (CEC) and officials at all levels, as well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for their assistance and co-operation throughout the mission.

____________________________________________________

This preliminary statement is based on the findings of 26 ODIHR long-term observers and core staff deployed from 15 September 1999 and 160 international short-term observers. The international observers included 8 members and staff from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, individuals sent from OSCE participating States, members of the diplomatic community in Ukraine as well as other international organizations present in the country, representing in total 26 participating States. The PACE delegation was led by Ms. Hanne Severinsen M.P. (Denmark) and the ODIHR Election Observation Mission was headed by Mr. Simon Osborn (UK). No final assessment can be reached until the counting and aggregation of votes have been completed and the official results published. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will continue to follow developments until the election process is completed. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will issue a final report in December.

For further information, please contact Simon Osborn, Head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission in Ukraine (phone: 380 44 220 14 69, fax: 380 44 229 77 77) or Elsa Fenet, ODIHR/Warsaw (phone: 48 22 520 06 00, fax: 48 22 628 69 67), and for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, John Hartland or Pavel Chevtchenko (phone: 33 3 88 41 38 35, fax: 33 3 88 41 27 17).

Annex D

Election Observation Mission in Ukraine

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (FIRST ROUND)

1 NOVEMBER 1999

Preliminary statement

The 1999 Elections: OSCE/ODIHR Kyiv, 1 November 1999 - This is the joint preliminary statement of the observation of the first round of the Presidential Elections In Ukraine held on 31 October 1999, by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). No final assessment can be reached until the counting and aggregation of votes have been completed and the official results published. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will remain in country until the election process is completed. A second statement will be released after the second round of voting, scheduled for November 14.

The Election Observation Mission would like to thank the Central Election Commission (CEC) and officials at all levels, as well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for their extensive support and co-operation throughout the mission.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first round of the Ukrainian Presidential Election held on 31 October 1999 failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments.

The coverage of the campaign by the media and the widespread involvement of public officials in the campaign breached both the legal framework governing these elections and the relevant OSCE commitments. Although the Laws showed improvement, implementation and enforcement was often selective and did not provide a level-playing field for all candidates in the pre-election period. Moreover, the election disputes and appeal procedures generally did not provide the complainants with effective means to seek redress prior to the election.

The Law on Elections of the President of Ukraine was adopted on 25 March 1999 and amended on 8 September 1999. Despite significant improvements, drawbacks remain. The Presidential Election Law and the Law on the Central Election Commission have increased transparency. However, the legal framework continues to fall short of adequate provisions on a number of critical issues. Moreover, it is also the selective interpretation and enforcement of the legal provisions at the various levels of the state structure that prevented the uniform application of the law.

Both the publicly funded electronic and print media, and private broadcasters comprehensively failed to meet their obligations and it can be concluded that the media coverage of the campaign and of the candidates in the first round did not live up to the required legal provisions and OSCE commitments.

Observers reported that election day procedures were carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner, despite minor irregularities in very few polling stations. The ODIHR received several reports of wrongly printed/stamped ballots, which seem to reflect poor organisation rather than intentional misconduct in these locations. Although most reports are still being processed, particularly those on counting procedures, the ODIHR has not been informed of any widespread irregularities at this stage.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will continue to monitor the aggregation procedure until the official results have been published and will monitor any complaints submitted.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING ELECTIONS

The Law on Elections of the President of Ukraine was adopted on 25 March 1999 and amended on 8 September 1999. Despite significant improvements, drawbacks remain.

Additional and more detailed procedural rules have clarified the legal framework regulating the electoral process. The Presidential Election Law and the Law on the Central Election Commission have increased transparency through the adoption of multi-candidate election commissions and the supply of protocols to all members of those commissions. The regulatory power of the Central Election Commission has been reinforced and this is reflected in the passage of over 400 regulations, including on sensitive areas such as the mass media.

However, the legal framework continues to fall short of adequate provisions on a number of critical issues. Most importantly, the law is incomplete with regard to the regulation of campaign activities and their media coverage. Moreover, the legal framework does not secure enforcement mechanisms for the Central Election Commission to effectively apply the law in areas such as the abuse of state office for campaign purposes. Additionally, there are still discrepancies and lacunae with regard to the definition of electoral offences and legal remedies associated with them. Despite improvements in the regulation of campaign finance (establishment and limitation on personal election funds), the law still fails to ensure fair and equal campaigning conditions. The law also takes a regressive step on the issue of domestic non-partisan observers, in that they no longer have the right to observe the election process.

Moreover, it is also the selective interpretation and enforcement of the legal provisions at the various levels of the state structure that prevented the uniform application of the law.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Publicly funded media in particular is required by law to provide voters with information about candidates and their programmes free from prejudice or preference. Moreover, in CEC resolution number 96, the electronic media, the most important source of information for most voters, is obliged to provide news which does not express bias or give preference to any of the candidates. The ODIHR Election Observation Mission found that, at national and regional level, both the publicly funded electronic and print media, and private broadcasters comprehensively failed to meet these obligations - an annex including all the data on this monitoring is available and will be released with the final report.

In accordance with the law, 14 out of the 15 candidates took full advantage of their allocation of free time in the media. However, on the national state television, UT1, these candidate broadcasts were preceded, and in one case followed, by critical comments. Presidential candidate Oleksandr Moroz complained to the CEC, which upheld his complaint and instructed UT1 to allow Mr. Moroz the right to reply. The spirit of the law requires that candidates should reasonably expect their own broadcasts to air free from comment immediately prior, during and after, so that voters can make up their own mind about the content.

There was a plurality of views in the private print media. Although legal, the news coverage in the national private print-media showed strong bias in favour of their chosen candidate to the extent that it was almost impossible for a voter to rely on any one source of information to gain an objective view of the campaign.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission was told that the CEC received some 130 complaints from candidates regarding the coverage of the campaign by the media. However there is a lack of clarity between the various laws as to which institution – CEC or National TV and Broadcasting Council – has the power to enforce the provisions governing media coverage of the election campaign. The National TV and Broadcasting Council, which could sanction breaches of the Law by fining media outlets, remained in-quorate throughout the period of the first round.

In conclusion, the media coverage of the campaign and of the candidates in the first round did not live up to the required legal provisions and OSCE commitments.

THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES

The Ukrainian Election Law (Article 33.1) prohibits state and publicly owned institutions, and public officials and their employees from participating in campaign activities.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission received numerous verified reports that public officials in state institutions were campaigning in favour of the incumbent President. For example observers noted that Heads of State Administrations in 8 Oblasts at various levels openly urged voters to vote for the President. Public officials and employees in Educational and Medical facilities were reported to be campaigning for President Kuchma in a further 6 Oblasts.

Allegations were raised about state security forces actively involved in politically motivated interventions. In Vinnytsia, observers witnessed members of the police handing out banners for President Kuchma to his campaigners. In L’viv, observers reported that law enforcement agents evicted a candidate’s campaigners from their local headquarters, enforcing a local court decision only two weeks before election-day.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission recognises the need for the Ukrainian authorities to uphold the law and enforce legal decisions. However, all necessary steps should be adopted to ensure that such measures are not applied in a discriminatory manner, nor perceived as being partisan.

Furthermore, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission received numerous allegations that postal workers were distributing campaign materials for President Kuchma and that ZhEK⁴ employees were canvassing support for the incumbent President in 4 Oblasts. In the latter case, their involvement in an election campaign could easily be perceived as intimidation.

Clearly these activities, where verified, are in breach of the legal provisions and the OSCE commitments.

CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE

The campaign was regrettably affected by a violent attack on presidential candidate Natalya Vitrenko on October 2^nd. It was, and remains totally unacceptable that any candidate or their supporters should be confronted with violence or the threat of violence. As stated by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission in a press statement on October 5, such actions run completely contrary to both the letter and the spirit of OSCE Commitments on elections.

It is also of concern that there was a further case of violence, this time against Vasyl’ Hara, a Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) and supporter of another candidate, allegedly for his involvement in the campaign.

THE CAMPAIGN

The Presidential Election Law governs the campaign activities of candidates and their supporters. In the law, candidates enjoy the right to campaign free from administrative hindrance and under equal conditions. As has been already noted, the definitions of electoral offences within the law still lack clarity.

In 7 Oblasts, observers reported that the relevant authorities either selectively denied or obstructed access to public buildings to certain candidates and their supporters to hold campaign meetings. Furthermore, local authorities selectively denied certain candidates equal opportunity to publicly display and disseminate materials.

In 5 Oblasts, observers received complaints that the Militia impounded candidate campaign literature. The law indeed specifies that details of the print run and the publisher of campaign materials must be printed on each and every item. Furthermore, it prohibits anonymous campaign materials. In the above cases, the Militia claimed that the number of campaign materials impounded exceeded the print number stated. The observers could not verify this information, and in one case, they were denied access to the materials.

In contrast, substantial numbers of anonymous materials against four candidates – Oleksandr Tkachenko, Natalya Vitrenko, Oleksandr Moroz and Yevhen Marchuk – were distributed throughout the country. Unlike the cases mentioned above, the Ministry of Interior did not halt the circulation of these anonymous materials.

In addition, 3 false editions of the private newspaper Silski Visti were printed, published and sold throughout the country by persons unknown. The relevant authorities did not halt the distribution of these false versions of this newspaper nor were any copies impounded.

The Presidential Election Law limits candidates’ campaign expenditure to their personal election fund. However, the law does not limit the substantial amounts of money spent by unofficially affiliated bodies that campaign in favour or against a candidate.

PRE-ELECTION DAY COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

During the campaign period, the election commissions, and the CEC in particular, received a large number of complaints, mostly concerning the campaign coverage of candidates in the media and abuse of public office by state officials for campaign purposes. Although election commissions at all levels are mandated by law to address complaints, the decisions they adopted rarely resulted in satisfactory remedies for the complainants. However, contrary to the 1998 parliamentary elections, the problem of competing jurisdictions of election commissions and the judiciary appears to have been reduced significantly.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission collected 145 complaints. Regrettably, at the time of writing, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission has been informed that only 17 of these complaints have been resolved, of which 7 have been enforced.

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

The Central Election Commission made commendable efforts to improve the level of transparency of the election process through the provision of information to candidates, their representatives, observers and the voters. Furthermore, they made strenuous efforts to provide a unified and comprehensive training programme for election officials. This was of particular importance given that over 70% of election officials have had no previous experience. Unfortunately, the CEC did not seem to enjoy the complete confidence of all the candidates, despite the inclusion of candidate representatives with deliberative vote on the CEC.

According to the law, the formation of Territorial and Polling Station Election Commissions (TECs and PSCs) is the responsibility of the relevant Rada (local assembly) based on candidate nominations. Their formation caused some critical comments: firstly, the legal but large numbers of Kuchma supporters who secured the Chairmanship of TECs; and secondly the method in which PSC members were nominated.

Observers received complaints that the Head of State Administration forced the relevant Rada to revise the appointment of Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Secretaries of PSCs.

More worrying, the ODIHR Observation Mission verified that the Chairmen of TEC numbers 133 and 134 received over 3,000 extra ballots each that should have been delivered in the presence of a quorum of the TECs. This issue has now been referred by the overwhelming vote of TEC 133 to the Prosecutor General.

ELECTION DAY

Observers reported that election-day procedures were carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner, despite minor irregularities in very few polling stations. The ODIHR received several reports of wrongly printed/stamped ballots, which seem to reflect poor organisation rather than intentional misconduct in these locations.

Although most reports are still being processed, particularly those on counting procedures, the ODIHR has not been informed of any widespread irregularities at this stage. It is also encouraging to note that open and family voting were observed on a smaller scale than during the more complex 1998 parliamentary and local elections.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission will continue to monitor the aggregation procedure until official results have been published and will monitor any complaints submitted.

Annex E

Draft Programme

Friday / Vendredi 12 November

Afternoon: Arrival in Kiev / Après-midi : Arrivée à Kiev

16.30 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee / Réunion de la Commission ad hoc

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

17.15 Meeting with Mr Tkachenko, President of Parliament /
Rencontre avec M. Tkatchenko, Président du Parlement

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

18.00 Meeting with leaders of parliamentary political groups
Rencontre avec les dirigeants des groupes politiques parlementaires

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

19.15 Meeting with Ambassadors of the Council of Europe member countries /
Réunion avec les Ambassadeurs des pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe

[Address : Embassy of Italy, Sichnevoho Povstannya 3, 6^th floor, Appt. 228]

Saturday / Samedi 13 November

8.00 Private breakfast / Petit déjeuner privé

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 18]

9.00 Meeting with Mr Ryabets, Chairman of Central Electoral Commission (CEC) /
Rencontre avec M. Ryabets, Président de la Commission électorale centrale (CEC)

[Address : Lesi Ukrainki Sq. 1]

11.30 Meeting with Mr Symonenko, Candidate to the Presidency
Rencontre avec M. Symonenko, candidat à la Présidence

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

12.30 Meeting with representatives of OSCE ODIHR / Rencontre avec des représentants de l’OSCE-BIDDH

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

14.00 Private Lunch / Déjeuner privé

Departure for places of deployment / départ vers les lieux de déploiement

Sunday / Dimanche 14 November

Visits of polling stations (open from 8.00 to 20.00) /
Visites de bureaux de vote (ouverts de 8.00 à 20.00)

Observation of counting procedures / Observation du dépouillement

Monday / Lundi 15 November

Return to Kiev / Retour à Kiev

10.30 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee / Réunion de la Commission ad hoc

[Address : Hotel Dnipro]

Drafting of a Statement / Rédaction d’un Communiqué

14.30 Press Conference / Conférence de presse

Departure from Kiev / Départ de Kiev

Annex F

Draft Programme

27.10.99

Thursday / Jeudi 28 October 1999

Afternoon: Arrival in Kiev / Après-midi : Arrivée à Kiev

19.00 Information meeting / Réunion d’information

[Dnipro Hotel lobby]

Friday / Vendredi 29 October

8.00 Private breakfast / Petit déjeuner privé

9.00 Meeting with Mr Tkachenko, President of Parliament /
Rencontre avec M. Tkatchenko, Président du Parlement

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

10.00 Meeting with leaders of parliamentary political groups and parties not represented in Parliament
Rencontre avec les dirigeants des groupes politiques parlementaires et des partis non représentés au Parlement

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

11.00 Meeting with representatives of the media / Rencontre avec les représentants des médias

[Address : tbc]

12.30 Meeting with representatives of OSCE ODIHR / Rencontre avec des représentants de l’OSCE-BIDDH

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 18]

13.30 Private Lunch / Déjeuner privé

15.00 Meeting with Mr Pustovoitenko, Prime Minister of Ukraine
Rencontre avec M. Poustovoïtenko, Premier ministre de l’Ukraine

[Address : Grushevsky 12 / 2]

16.00 Meeting with candidates for the Presidency / Rencontre avec des candidats à la Présidence

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

17.30 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee / Réunion de la Commission ad hoc

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 5]

19.30 Briefing with Ambassadors of the Council of Europe member countries /
Réunion avec les Ambassadeurs des pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe

[Address : Embassy of Hungary, Reytarska Str. 33]

Saturday / Samedi 30 October

7.30 Private breakfast / Petit déjeuner privé

8.30 Meeting with human rights NGOs / Rencontre avec des ONG de défense des droits de l’homme

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 18]

10.00 Meeting with Mr Ryabets, Chairman of Central Electoral Commission (CEC), with participation of representatives of presidential candidates /
Rencontre avec M. Ryabets, Président de la Commission électorale centrale (CEC), avec participation des représentants de candidats à la Présidence

[Address : Lesi Ukrainki Sq. 1]

11.00 Meeting with Mr Orel, Deputy Head of President Administration
Rencontre avec M. Orel, Chef adjoint de l’Administration présidentielle

[Address : Bankova 11]

13.30 Private Lunch / Déjeuner privé

Departure for places of deployment / départ vers les lieux de déploiement

Sunday / Dimanche 31 October

Visits of polling stations (open from 8.00 to 20.00) /
Visites de bureaux de vote (ouverts de 8.00 à 20.00)

Observation of counting procedures / Observation du dépouillement

Monday / Lundi 1 November

Return to Kiev / Retour à Kiev

10.30 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee / Réunion de la Commission ad hoc

[Address : Verkhovna Rada, Grushevsky 18]

Drafting of the press statement / Rédaction du communiqué de presse

15.00 – 16.00 Press Conference / Conférence de presse

Tuesday / Mardi 2 November

Meeting with CEC officials (to be confirmed) /
Rencontre avec les responsables de la CEC (à confirmer)

Meeting with representatives of OSCE ODIHR (to be confirmed) /
Rencontre avec des représentants de l’OSCE-BIDDH (à confirmer)

Departure from Kiev / Départ de Kiev

¹ A list of specific allegations addressed to the Council of Europe by candidate Symonenko is presented in a separate Addendum.

² Although with only 122 members in a 450-seat legislature, the group has been far better organized and disciplined in its action than any other; it has accordingly regularly managed to block legislative initiatives which did not serve the interests of its leadership.

³ The ZhEK have responsibility for buildings and public services in publicly owned housing, administration of civil status and the management and distribution of certain social welfare provisions.

⁴ The ZhEK have responsibility for buildings and public services in publicly owned housing, administration of civil status and the management and distribution of certain social welfare provisions.