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Doc. 8706
5 April 2000
Conflict in Chechnya
Opinion1
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography
Rapporteur: Mr Tadeusz Iwiński, Poland, Socialist Group
Introduction
The present Opinion is based on the findings of the fact-finding visit to Moscow and the North Caucasus carried out by the Parliamentary Assembly’s delegation in which the Rapporteur participated, on 9-13 March 2000. Moreover it takes into account the conclusions of the hearing on the population displacement in the Caucasus held by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography on 24 March 2000, as well as the up-dated information provided by the international organisations involved in the humanitarian action in the region, in particular by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
I. Recommendations of the Committee
Concerning humanitarian assistance:
i. call on the Russian authorities to minimise bureaucratic obstacles which may have considerable impact on the quality of humanitarian assistance, and in particular to lift taxes and customs duties on humanitarian goods, and allow radio communications in the field;
ii. welcome the decision by the Russian authorities to allow access to Chechnya to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and call on them to allow access for all humanitarian agencies wishing to operate in the region;
iii. call on the Council of Europe member States to step up financial aid in response to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus of 15 March 2000;
iv. call on humanitarian agencies operating in the region to ensure that all internally displaced persons (IDPs), including those remaining in Chechnya, have access to relief and assistance;
v. call on the Russian and Georgian authorities to keep all borders open;
vi. call on the Council of Europe member states to step up their assistance to the Chechen refugees in Georgia, bearing in mind that this country has for several years been accommodating a large number of IDPs from Abkhazia, Georgia;
vii. call on the Russian Federal Migration Office to register without delay all IDPs who arrived in Ingushetia after 1 March 2000.
Concerning future reconstruction and repatriation:
i. call on the Russian authorities to refrain from any form of forced or hasty repatriation before the conditions for return in safety and dignity are fulfilled;
ii. call on the Government of Russia and the donor countries to begin elaborating a future long-term reconstruction plan for Chechnya and in particular for Grozny, in co-operation with relevant financial institutions and international organisations;.
iii. call on the Council of Europe Development Bank to examine ways in which it could contribute to such reconstruction;
iv. call on the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe to examine the possibilities of supporting Chechen refugees and displaced persons through partnerships between European towns and the municipalities in the Northern Caucasus hosting refugees and IDPs, along the lines elaborated during the Kosovo crisis;
v. call on the Russian authorities to find a solution for the question of compensation payments for the destroyed houses and property;
vi. call on the Russian authorities to allow for an international independent investigation of war criminals, whose prosecution is one of the preconditions for the return of refugees and IDPs in safety and security.
II. Explanatory Memorandum
1. Overview of the humanitarian situation in the region
1. According to estimates, the last armed conflict in Chechnya displaced some 400 000 people within and out of the republic.2 Of this figure, over 200 000 are in Ingushetia, 100 000 are in other republics, and 100 000 persons are displaced in Chechnya. There has also been some movement out of the country, mainly to Georgia, where the number of Chechen refugees is estimated at about 6 000 persons.
2. Civilians continue to flee villages in southern Chechnya; there are reports of widespread destruction of property and a continuing military push by Russian troops. The number of people fleeing Chechnya has remained steady at about 1000 people a week.
3. At the same time some returns are taking place. About 50 000 registered displaced persons have returned to the Chechen Republic, mainly to Urus Martan and Gudermes, since January 2000. A majority of displaced people declare their desire to go back. However, widespread destruction in Chechnya, as well as reports of beatings, detention and rape prevent a larger return movement, despite free transport provided by the Russian authorities, and sometimes cause those who had already gone back to leave again. There have been reports of forced repatriation (see below). On the other hand, the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia is often closed causing undue hardship and danger for people fleeing the conflict areas, and often splitting up families stranded on different sides of the border. Those travelling between Ingushetia and Chechnya also complain about being harassed at numerous military and police checkpoints.
4. As the population movements into and out of Chechnya continue, it is very difficult to give exact updated figures on the displacement of the population. However, according to estimates released on 24 March, the latest arrivals in Ingushetia brought to about 214 000 the total number of Chechen IDPs in that republic.
5. The Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya has received over 3 000 people; the Republic of Dagestan hosts over 6 000 people. The Stavropol region has accommodated over 3 000 persons.
6. Over 60 000 people have left for other parts of the Russian Federation to stay at the centres of the Federal Migration Service of Russia or with their relatives or friends.
7. About 70% of the total number of IDPs are living with host families, 20% in spontaneous settlements and 10% in camps.
8. Despite a growing relief effort, sanitary conditions in makeshift shelters and tented camps continue to be very difficult, resulting in continued worry about the threat of possible epidemics, in particular tuberculosis which is endemic to the area of Northern Caucasus. The situation there is further exacerbated by the lack of sufficient heating and interruptions in electricity supply.
9. The situation in private accommodation is also very difficult. IDPs are often expected to pay for their accommodation, and if they have no financial resources they are obliged to leave and sometimes to return to active war zones. It is very important to channel humanitarian relief to host families through the intermediary of the local authorities.
2. Humanitarian aid
10. On the whole, the Russian Ministry of Emergencies (Emercom), UN agencies, ICRC3 and NGOs are meeting basic emergency needs in all areas outside Chechnya where IDPs and refugees are accommodated, although gaps still exist. Agencies are continuing to provide emergency food rations, medicines, warm clothing, water and sanitation. They will also start now to focus on programmes such as education, income generation, and psycho-social rehabilitation. According to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the Russian assistance amounts to 53.5 % and that of the international community: 46.5%.
11. In addition to programmes implemented by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and ICRC, some 20 NGOs are now working in Ingushetia. Some, such as the DRC and World Vision, have implementing arrangements with UN agencies in addition to their own programmes.
12. The division of labour between agencies targeting IDPs and agencies targeting host families has been complicated by the fact that population groups are intermingled and are located in 261 places. Emercom, World Food Programme (WFP), UNHCR, ICRC, and DRC are working out new arrangements to address this issue.
13. The situation of IDPs within Chechnya is much more precarious, as security conditions do not allow for regular distribution of emergency relief aid.
14. The interim administration of the Chechen republic, appointed by the Government of Russia, has indicated its readiness to work with the international aid agencies, but the situation on the ground remains very difficult.
15. There are huge security concerns. The security situation throughout the northern Caucasus continues to hamper humanitarian action. Staff movements and presence has to be limited, complicating the management and monitoring of aid operations. Clashes between Russian and rebel forces, including in the area of Grozny, show clearly that the security situation in the area is extremely volatile. There is also continued danger from mines and unexploded ordnance.
16. On 29 February the first UNHCR relief convoy arrived in Grozny, where an estimated 21 000 civilians remain, primarily women and children. The team of UNHCR local staff who accompanied the convoy reported widespread devastation in Grozny, which has neither gas nor electricity. The city’s civilian population is confined to four city districts. Apart from this single trial run, UNHCR is cautious about the prospects of sending convoys into Chechnya itself for security reasons.
17. Co-operation between the humanitarian agencies and the Russian authorities has not met any major obstacles, although some points need clarifying. On 9 March, a Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Government of the Russian Federation on humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus, including Chechnya, was initialled .
18. Among the problems to be solved, there is still the question of custom duties and taxes (VAT) imposed on the humanitarian goods. The Russian authorities have agreed to change this highly unsatisfactory situation, but so far the problem persists.
19. Some humanitarian agencies complain about administrative issues which hamper their work in the region. These include the need to obtain permits for radio communications, necessary for the security of humanitarian workers in the field.
20. On 15 March the United Nations launched the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus. It outlines programmes in the food, shelter and relief, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, psycho-social, education, and income generation sectors. The appeal notes two possible scenarios for the next four months: an increase in the present level of return to Chechnya, which will require assistance to facilitate reintegration in the republic; and a continuation of the population movements into and out of Chechnya, i.e. a prolongation of present programmes.
3. Prospects for return and existing obstacles
21. At present, the prospects for massive repatriation seem to be rather distant. The security in the area is extremely volatile, including the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance. According to the Russian Interior Ministry’s estimates, conditions for the IDPs to return to Grozny will be met in about 6 months, but given the scale of destruction this seems unduly optimistic.
22. Repatriation is foreseeable in the right conditions and should not be pursued at all costs. Premature repatriation can be disastrous. However, according to reports from the humanitarian organisations, the Russian authorities have forced refugees to return to Chechnya by denying them food in the camps, or by rolling their train compartments to Chechnya. In particular, there was the case of the train moved to the Chechen border. According to the explanation provided by the FMS this was an isolated case due to a misunderstanding. However, many other witnesses have spoken of other incidents involving different forms of pressure, from persuasion and intimidation to withdrawal of benefits for IDPs.
23. Strictly related to the security question is the need for investigations of and accountability for reported abuses. This is one of the preconditions for refugees and IDPs to feel safe to return to their homes. The absence of justice perpetuates a cycle of violence, with whole groups being defined as perpetrators of abuse, and former victims setting out to exact their own justice.
24. At present, the Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor is examining the complaints of citizens as to crimes reportedly committed by the military and law enforcement bodies. Since the beginning of the armed conflict, the military prosecuting agencies have been investigating 8 cases of crimes committed by soldiers against the local population. Three of these cases have been dismissed due to the amnesty or lack of corpus delicti. These measures seem to be completely inadequate in view of the scope of reported human rights violations.
25. The Committee will closely follow the co-operation between the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on securing human rights and freedoms of citizens in the Chechen Republic established in mid-February 2000 and the Council of Europe, and in particular the work of the joint Office aimed to collect the evidence of human rights violations.
26. The Committee fully supports the recommendation urgently calling for the Council of Europe member states, as high contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, to use Article 33 and refer to the European Court of Human Rights alleged breaches by Russia of the provisions of the convention and its protocols.
27. Another question which needs to be solved is that of compensation payments for destroyed houses, and social payments.
28. The Russian Duma has established a parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Displaced Persons and Normalisation of the Social, Political and Economic Situation in the Chechen Republic. The terms of reference of the Committee include the elaboration of legislative proposals relating to the normalisation of the situation and the protection of human rights in the Chechen Republic. The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography hopes that this body will play a positive role in future stabilisation of the region.
29. Whatever happens, emergency relief must be followed by a comprehensive reconstruction and rehabilitation programme. Although the Russian government has promised money for this, it is clear that wider international assistance will be required. There are no indications that the international community is doing any serious thinking on this subject.
30. The international community must recognise that refugee/IDP situations are long-term problems. Thus early emergency relief must be closely followed by programmes that help the refugee community to work itself out of dependence with dignity. Programmes that promote the transfer of skills will help individuals whilst in refugee situations and later when they are successfully repatriated or integrated. A continued large scale programme of assistance to refugees is needed.
31. The refocus of assistance from early emergency relief to long-term self-sufficiency must not be used as an excuse to reduce the scale of assistance. Donors must also forsake visibility for more effective low-impact but long-term programmes such as skill transfers that would help the recipient both whilst in exile, as well as they return.
o
o o
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 8697).
Committee for opinion: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.
Origin: Recommendation 1444 (2000).
Opinion approved on 5 April 2000.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Newman, Mrs Nachilo, Mr Adelsbach.
2 Unless indicated otherwise, the figures come from UNHCR, and are based on a UNHCR-Danish Refugee Council (DRC) registration exercise.
3 On 30 March the ICRC obtained authorisation to operate in Chechnya itself.