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Doc. 8871

13 October 2000

Impact of electoral systems on the political process

Report

Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations

Rapporteur: Mr Sören Lekberg, Sweden, Socialist Group

Summary

The impact of electoral systems on the political process and citizens’ participation interest is an important topic.

In fact, the electoral system, whether it is plural-majority, semi-proportional or proportional, can have an effect on how minorities are represented.

The Assembly therefore suggests that the parliaments of the member countries study the effects of the electoral systems and take the necessary steps to stimulate citizens’ participation in the political process.

I.       Draft resolution

1. The electoral system is one of the most fundamental elements of representative democracy. A crucial moment in representative democracies is how elected officials are elected.

2. Within the member states of the Council of Europe several electoral systems are in use. These different systems can be categorised into three main types: plural-majority systems, semi-proportional systems and proportional systems. 30 member countries apply various proportional electoral systems.

3. The impact of electoral systems on the political process and on citizens’ commitment to the political process is an important topic to be taken into consideration.

4. A large turnout at elections is an important element of democracy.

5. The proportion of women parliamentarians is increasing in western democracies. According to several studies the list-proportional representation system provides the best opportunity for women to take their place in parliament.

6. The electoral system can also have an effect on the way ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities are represented. It is important to guarantee that minorities are not discriminated.

7. The Assembly considers that citizens’ participation in the political process is a topic of fundamental importance and should be debated recurrently by the Assembly in order to stimulate a broader European debate.

8. The Assembly proposes to set up statistics and to keep them updated, possibly within the framework of the International Institute of Democracy, in order to be able to compare turnout at elections in the member states and factors characterising the elected members, such as women’s representation, length of parliamentary service, age and profession, thus evaluating the development of democracy.

9. The Assembly suggests that the parliaments of member countries pay attention to issues regarding the effects of the electoral systems on the political process.

10. The Assembly as well as national parliaments, should promote research on how to stimulate citizens’ participation in the political process.

II.       Explanatory memorandum by Mr Sören Lekberg

Introduction

A crucial moment in representative democracies - where elected officials make decisions on behalf of the people – is how these officials are being elected. This translation of the citizen’s votes into representative seats is performed by the electoral system. Hence, the electoral system is one of the most fundamental elements of representative democracy. Which dimensions of the electoral system, then, are the most important? The case of proportionality, for example, has many aspects; how proportional, strictly speaking, is a proportional system? Is proportionality something to strive for or avoid because of the risk of producing weak governments? In this memo we shall, very briefly, run through the major electoral systems and then mention some of the properties that constitute an electoral system.

1. Electoral systems in the member states of the Council of Europe

Within the member states of the Council of Europe several electoral systems currently are in use. These different systems can be categorised into three main types: plural-majority systems, semi-proportional systems and proportional systems. Characteristic of plural-majority systems is that the candidate who gains the most votes in a district wins all seats in that district. In a proportional system, the parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. Five of the Council of Europe member states apply plural-majority systems (United Kingdom, France, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and five apply semi-proportional systems (Croatia, Russia, Albania, Lithuania and Andorra). In the remaining 30 countries there are various proportional electoral systems. (See Appendix)

2. Political consequences of electoral system

2.1 Proportionality

One of the major subjects (and cause of disagreement among scholars) is how the electoral system effects the proportionality: how proportional is a proportional representation system (henceforth referred to as PR)? The question may sound very simple but unfortunate this is not the case. Three independent variables, explaining the degree of proportionality, are discussed here: district magnitude, ballot structure and electoral formulae.

There are general agreements about the importance of district magnitude; the larger number of seats in the constituency the more proportional is the system (Rae 1967; Lijphart 1994). Sometimes treated as another dimension of this variable is the electoral threshold. Low magnitudes and high threshold have the same effect in lessening the proportionality and the opportunities for small parties to be represented in parliament (Lijphart 1994). To continue, there are also general agreements when it comes to the unimportance of the ballot structure. However, there is far more uncertainty about how to rank the different electoral formulae regarding the proportionality. Nevertheless, in most of the comparative studies of electoral systems the ranking of the main PR-formulae has the following order, from most to least proportional:

(1) Largest remainder-Hare; Saint-Laguë.

(2) Largest remainder-Droop; STV; modified Saint-Laguë.

(3) D´Hondt; largest remainder-Imperiali (for more detailed information, please note the appendix).

2.2 Representation of women

When it comes to women’s parliamentary recruitment the type of electoral system is considered to be the most significant predictor, even when compared with socio-economic variables like education and income. According to several studies the list-proportional representation system provides the most political opportunity for women to take place in parliament (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Rule 1987). In western democracies the proportion of women parliamentarians is increasing, and the greatest increase being in proportional systems (Norris 1996).

2.3 Representation of minorities

The electoral system can also have an effect on the way ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities are represented in so-called « heterogeneous » societies. In a plural-majority system, minorities are rarely able to muster enough votes to get their representatives elected. Proportional systems, on the other hand, diminish the influence of the dominant parties and political groups and grant minorities a means of access to the political stage by guaranteeing them some measure of representation. Proportional systems thus provide a truer picture of society. The use of proportional voting as a way of securing representation for minorities dates back to the days of the French Revolution. Proponents of the system included the British philosopher John Stuart Mill, who believed that it might protect the interests of ethnic and linguistic minorities in the new national states, at a time when such groups were seriously threatened by the domination of the majority.

Gauging the direct impact of the electoral system on minority representation today can be a complex task, however, owing to the spread of hybrid systems and measures designed to influence this representation. In a plural-majority system, for example, a certain number of seats may be reserved for minorities, as is the case in New Zealand with the Maoris (Lijphart 1986).

2.4 Party systems

Another important consequence of the electoral system is the effect on the number of parties. The connection between the non-proportional system and two-party system, respectively PR-system and multiparty system is well established, first stated in a seminal study by Duverger 1954. There are of course some exceptions, as with the case of Austria with fewer parties then expected and France with more parties then expected (Sartori 1996; Farrell 1997).

On the other hand, maybe the important question here is not so much the connection between a certain electoral system and the party system but rather what comes first, the party system or the electoral system? The problem over causality can be illustrated by the historic progress in for example Belgium, Norway and Denmark, where a multi-party system preceded the decision for a proportional system (Farrell 1997).

Furthermore, despite the increasing number of studies in this field since the 1980s there are disagreements about the usefulness of this kind of research. Is it possible to yield any generalisations around party systems and electoral systems or do we have be satisfied with pointing out what is unique within each system (Bogdanor and Butler 1983).

2.5 Voter participation

It could be assumed that in non-PR systems, where voting has a clear impact on the government formation, the participation should be higher compared with PR system where the final outcome of the voting is more difficult to forecast. However, this is not the usual situation. On the contrary it seems like the PR-system contributes to a higher voter turnout compared to non-PR systems. A study conducted by IDEA shows that average voting participation is about nine percentage points higher in PR systems then in non-PR systems. ¹ The lower turnout in non-PR system is usually explained due to the fallout among voters who do not support a party with a real chance of winning the election and therefore do not participate at all (Powell 1982). It is worth noting, however, that in terms of turnout, neither system appears to work very well since whatever the method of voting, there is a mounting tendency to shun the ballot box, especially among young people. This is particularly apparent in national or European elections. At local level, however, some countries, like Sweden, have a fairly high turnout.

This growing public disenchantment with the electoral process is giving cause for concern. Many blame the inflexibility of the voting system which, in numerous countries, requires people to travel to polling stations and calls for a highly developed sense of civic responsibility. Granted, postal voting has been introduced in some member states (cf Switzerland where 70% of the population uses this method), but its applicability and ease of use varies from country to country. In the United Kingdom, for example, the system is very complicated because it entails obtaining written statements from witnesses. There is no firm evidence, moreover, that more accessible voting automatically results in significantly higher voter participation. Witness the example of the United Kingdom where, at the last elections in the spring of 1990, various systems were trialled, including supermarket voting, weekend voting, round-the-clock voting, written voting and even week-long voting, yet in none of these cases did the poll ever exceed 50%.

3. Government performance and democracy

When combining the consequences of proportionality, representation of women and minorities and party system it is possible to discuss a very important trade-off effect of the electoral system, namely the stability of the government. The common conclusion here is that either the electoral system is proportional and produces unstable governments or the electoral system is non-proportional and the governmental situation is more stable (Sartori 1996).

With non-proportional system the result of the election gives direct consequences for the construction of the government. Also, the matter of responsibility is more clear: the winner takes it all, and in the next election it is quite obvious for the voter whom to credit or blame for what has happened during the term of office. Competition is the keyword for understanding how the parties interact with the voters, who in this game have the decisive importance for the government formation (Downs 1957).

The instability of the PR-system is often explained by the common situation where a weak coalition government of several parties is formed after the election. There is often no clear winner to take responsibility for a possible reconstruction of the government, a matter which in case has to be solved by deals between the speaker and the party leaders out of control of the voters.

Also the PR system (particularly when not combined with electoral threshold) promotes the entry of small extremist parties which can result in instability, especially if they are able to hold the balance of power in the parliament. Even more, one argues, the complexity of the system adds an extra burden to the voter with the difficulty to ponder upon the effects of voting. And when it’s really bad, PR-system can be, if not the cause, but one of the conditions for numerous change of government, so called horse-trading and corruption (se for example Hine 1993).

However, on the credit side for PR there is the qualities mentioned before: high representation of women and minorities, high level of voter participant in elections. Moreover, instead of the instability with regards to the coalition government it is possible to emphasise on the necessity of agreements formed by several parties. The “consensus democracy”, as it has been called, is the solution, where no one is able to monopolise the power and where no one is left outside (Lijphart 1994; 1998). In Swedish political culture, for instance, representativeness is the central norm and the government shall represent the people’s opinion (Westerståhl and Johansson 1981). And even if almost every Swedish government is a minority government the ambition is often to find policies that are liked by a plurality (Lewin 1998). In terms of moral agreement around principles of mutuality, publicity, responsibility and with emphasis on the public debate, this type of performance of the PR has been called the “deliberative democracy” (Gutman and Thompson 1996).

4. Social representation and further research

Apart from the effects of electoral system mentioned above there are some issues connected to representation in parliament worth discussing. The question of social representation can not directly be seen as consequences of electoral system, but the implications are nevertheless of great importance for the performance of a parliamentary democracy.

The question in what way the MPs reflects the electorate in socio-economic terms is well documented, especially when it comes to countries like Sweden and England. The findings are quite easy to summarise. Legislators around the world are recruited first and foremost from the privileged, as they tend to come from a more affluent background and to be better educated than the voters they represent (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

However, most of the studies concerning social group affiliation try to explain why patterns of recruitment look as they do, when instead it is as important to analyse the effects of different recruitment patterns. Therefore it could be of great value, not only to promote research on how social representation has changed, but also how social recruitment, or gender recruitment for that matter, can explain what attitudes or position of influence representative hold (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Wängnerud 1998).

References

Aberbach, J., Putnam, R., and Rockman B. (1981) Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge Mass.: Harward University Press.

Bogdanor, V and Butler, D. (1983) Democracy and elections : electoral systems and their political consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P.

Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row.

Duverger, M. (1954/57) Political Parties. New York: John Wiley & Sons. (First edition in French 1954).

Esaiasson, P. and Holmberg, S. (1996) Representation from above. Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Farrell, D. (1997) Comparing Electoral systems. Prentice Hall.

Gutman, A. and Thompson, D. (1996) Democracy and disagreement. Why moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics, and what should be done about it. Belknap: Harward University Press.

Hine, D. (1993) Governing Italy. The politics of Bargained Pluralism. Oxford University Press.

Lewin, L. (1998) “Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy: the Swedish Experience”, in Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 21 1998.

Lijphart, A. (1986) “Propornationality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Represenatation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon; New Zealand, West Germany and Zimbabwe”, in Grofman, B and Lijphart, A. (eds) Electoral laws and their political consequences. New York: Agathon Press.

Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral systems and party systems. Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1998) “Consensus and Consensus Democracy: Cultural, Structural, Functional, and Rational-Choice Explanations”, in Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 21 1998.

Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. (1993) Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage Publications.

Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (1995) Political Recruitment. Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P. (1996) Legislative Recruitment”. In LeDuc, L., Niemi, R. and Norris, P. (eds) Comparing Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Powell, B. (1982) Contemporary democracies: participation, stability, and violence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P.

Rae, D (1967) The political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rule, W. (1987) “Electoral systems, contextual faxtors and women’s opportunity for election to parliament in twenty-three democracies”, in Western Political Quarterly, 40:477-86.

Sartori, G. (1996) Comparative constitutional engineerin: an inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes. Basingstoke : Macmillan

Voting Turnout from 1945 to 1997: a Global Report on Political Participation. International IDEA. Stockholm 1997.

Wängnerud, L. (1998) Politikens andra sida. Om kvinnorepresentation i Sveriges Riksdag. Göteborg Studies in Politics 53.

Westerståhl, J. and Johansson, F. (1981) Medborgarna och kommunen. Studier av medborgerlig aktivitet och representativ folkstyrelse. Rapport 5 från kommunaldemokratiska forskningsgruppen. Ds Kn 1981:12.

APPENDIX

Plural-Majority systems

First Past the Post (FPTP) is the simplest form of plurality-majority electoral system. It stipulates that, in single-member districts, voters can cast one vote each and the winning candidate is the one who gains the most votes – not necessarily a majority of votes.

Block Vote (BV) is a system used in multi-member districts in which electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seat(s).

Two-Round system (TRS) (or the Two-Ballot system) is a system in which a second election is held if no candidate achieves an absolute majority of votes in the first election. In the second round, the candidate with the most votes wins.

Semi-Proportional system

Parallel system is a proportional representation system used in conjunction with a plurality-majority system. The PR seats do not compensate for any disproportionality arising from elections to the plurality-majority seats.

Proportional systems

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) is a system in which one part of the parliament is elected from plurality-majority districts, while the remaining members are chosen from PR lists. The PR seats compensate for disproportionality produced by the district seat results.

List Proportional Representation (List PR) is a system that in its most simple form involves each party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate. Voters vote for a party and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. Winning candidates are taken from the lists. There are variations between different list systems in the way seats are distributed:

1) Largest remainder (LR): Seats are allocated by subtraction. The counting process is done in two rounds. In the first round parties with votes exceeding the quota are awarded seats and the quota is subtracted from their total vote. In the second round, those parties left with the greatest number of votes are awarded the remaining seats in order of vote size. The quotas are worked out in different ways. The most common are: Hare (votes/seats) and Droop (votes/seats+1).

2) Highest average system: Seats are distributed among the parties using a divisor method. Each party’s votes are divided by a series of divisors to produce an average vote and the party with the ‘highest average’ after each stage wins a seat. Its vote is then divided with the next divisor etc. until all the seats are filled. There are two systems: the d’Hondt system (with divisors 1, 2, 3, 4 etc.) and the modified Sainte-Laguë system (with divisors 1.4, 3, 5, 7 etc.).

Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a preferential proportional representation system used in multi-member districts. To gain election, candidates must surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes. Voters’ preferences are re-allocated to other continuing candidates if a candidate is excluded or if an elected candidate has a surplus.

Electoral system		Country	Voter turnout
1) Plural-Maj.	First Past the Post	United Kingdom	69 %       (-97)
	Two-Round system	France Macedonia Ukraine	60 %       (-97) 71 %       (-94) 68 %       (-98)
2) Semi-Proportional	Parallel system	Croatia Russia	72 %       (-95) 63 %       (-95)
(with combinations)	Parallel system – Two-Round system	Albania Lithuania	63 %       (-97) 50 %       (-96)
	Parallel system – Block vote	Andorra	81 %       (-97)
3) Proportional	Mixed Member Proportional	Germany Italy Hungary	72 %       (-94) 87 %       (-96) 59 %       (-98)
	List Proportional Representation	Austria       LR-Hare Belgium       LR-Hare Bulgaria d’Hondt Cyprus       LR-Hare Czech Republic       LR-Droop Denmark       LR-Hare Estonia       d’Hondt Finland       d’Hondt Greece       LR-Droop Iceland       d’Hondt Latvia       Mod. S-L Liechtenstein       LR Luxembourg       d’Hondt Moldova       d’Hondt Netherlands       d’Hondt Norway       Mod. S-L Poland       d’Hondt Portugal       d’Hondt Romania       LR San Marino       d’Hondt Slovakia       LR-Droop Slovenia       d’Hondt Spain       d’Hondt Sweden       Mod. S-L Switzerland       d’Hondt Turkey       d’Hondt	79 %*       (-95) 83 %*       (-95) 67 %       (-97) 76 %*       (-96) 77 %       (-98) 83 %       (-98) 49 %       (-95) 71 %       (-95) 84 %*       (-96) 88 %       (-95) 51 %       (-95) 54 %       (-97) 60 %*       (-94) 57 %       (-98) 75 %       (-94) 77 %       (-97) 48 %       (-97) 79 %       (-95) 78 %       (-96) 75 %       (-98) 76 %       (-94) 76 %       (-96) 81 %       (-96) 81 %       (-98) 36 %*       (-95) 79 %*       (-95)
	Single Transferable Vote	Ireland Malta	67 %       (-97) 98 %       (-96)

*: compulsory voting

Sources: IDEA 1997, http://www.idea.int/; IPU – Parline Database; Lijphart 1994; representations in Sweden

Reporting committee: Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations

Reference to committee: Doc. 8167 and Reference No. 2315 of 21 September 1998

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 26 September 2000

Members of the committee: MM. Mignon (Chairman), Loutfi (Vice-Chairman), Michel (Vice-Chairman), Wielowieyski (Vice-Chairman), Adam, Attard Montalto (Alternate: Debono Grech), Ms Auken (Alternate : Mrs Soendergaard), Bartoš, Mrs Belohorska (Alternate : Mrs Angelovicova), MM. Browne, Brunhart, Sir Sydney Chapman, MM. Christodoulides, Dagys, Dokle, Dimas, Dzasokhov, Eversdijk, Gogava, Gross, Haupert, Kuptsov, Laakso (Alternate: Korkeaoja), Lacão, Lauricella, Lekberg, Mularoni, Myrvoll, Nagy, Niculescu, Mrs Paegle, Pahor, Popescu, Mrs Postoico, M. Provera (Alternate: Mrs Pozza Tasca), Mrs Ragnarsdottir, MM. Santkin, Skrabalo, Mrs G. Smith (Alternate: Hancock), MM. Tanik, Westenthaler, Wodarg, Yanez-Barnuevo, N ... ("the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia") (Alternate: Mrs Markovic-Dimova)

N.B. The names of those members who were present at the meeting are printed in italics

Secretary to the committee: Ms Nolllinger

¹ Voting Turnout from 1945 to 1997: a Global Report on Political Participation. International IDEA. Stockholm 1997.