<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<title>The euro and the Greater Europe</title>
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="HTML Transit 7.0 by Stellent (tm), Inc. www.stellent.com">
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/PortailStyle.css">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff"><a name="TopOfPage"> </a>
<!-- TRANSIT - INFOBEFORE -->
<table width="100%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0">
  <tr>
    <td><div align="left"><img src="/Documents/LogoText.jpg" width="218" height="48"></div>
    </td>
    <td><div align="right"><img border="0" SRC="/images/logos/Logo130X120.jpg" width="130" height="120"></div>
    </td>
  </tr>
</table>
<hr size="1">

    <blockquote><ul><p align="justify"><b>Doc. 8906</b></p>

    <p align="justify">12 December 2000</p>

    <p><b>The euro and the Greater Europe</b></p>

    <p align="justify">Report</p>

    </ul></blockquote><ul><ul><p align="justify">Committee on Economic Affairs and Development</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">Rapporteur:  Mr Claude Frey, Switzerland, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers&#8217; Group<sup><a href="#P17_200" name="P17_201">1</a></sup></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Summary</i></p>

    <p align="justify">Twelve of the fifteen EU countries since January 1999 share a single currency, the euro. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has led to the disappearance of currency uncertainty in &#8216;Euroland&#8217;, greater market transparency and a new, EMU-wide, horizon for doing business.</p>

    <p align="justify">The report examines these positive developments, but also takes up the complex, and still poorly understood, reasons behind the considerable erosion in the euro&#8217;s value against the dollar and other currencies such as the Japanese yen. It concludes that what Euroland now needs - in order to redress the situation and avoid the many drawbacks that attach to a weak currency - is to implement true economic union, without which monetary union cannot work. Cooperation must also be stepped up with EU candidate countries on EMU matters.</p>

    <p align="justify">Finally, the report welcomes the intention of the European Central Bank to publish regular forecasts for the EMU area, and asks it to set up a &#8216;Consumer Information Office&#8217; in order to respond to citizens&#8217; many questions about the euro&#8217;s physical introduction in January 2002.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>I.  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Draft resolution</b></p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">1. The Assembly, assessing the first two year&#8217;s of the European Union&#8217;s Economic and Monetary Union in conformity with Order No. 481 (1992), its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> Recommendation 1195</a> (1992) and its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1997), views with concern the continuing serious erosion of the euro vis-ā-vis the dollar and other currencies.  It sees a weak euro as adding to inflation, reducing confidence in the economy on the part of citizens and investors and distorting international trade and investment.    </p>

    <p align="justify">2. The Assembly believes that a lastingly strong euro can only result from efforts within the EMU area itself, not from variations in the economic fortunes of other countries or world regions.  For the euro to be allowed to fulfil its mission, it must be the expression of true EMU unity in all fields of relevance to it.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify">3. The Assembly recalls its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> Recommendation 1195</a> (1992) on European Economic and Monetary Union, in which it noted that the EMU would &#8220;greatly affect all other countries in Europe and beyond&#8221; and pointed to the Assembly&#8217;s duty to &#8220;enhance a constructive cooperation between member states of the European Community and the rest of Europe&#8221;.  This is all the more important as the EMU forms an integral part of the Treaty on European Union and as, in the words of Assembly<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1999) on the Implications for Europe of Economic and Monetary Union, the latter &#8220;should have as its goal to heal rather than widen the economic divisions in Europe&#8221;.</p>

    <p align="justify">4. The Assembly draws attention to the major challenges that await the European Central Bank and EMU governments in connection with the introduction of euro notes and coins, not least in order to assist and protect vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the blind and the young.  </p>

    <p align="justify"><i>EMU participating countries</i></p>

    <p align="justify">5.  The Assembly, in conclusion, calls on EMU participating countries, in the interest of all Council of Europe member states:</p>

    <p align="justify">i. to follow up on their establishment of monetary union by implementing a  true economic union;</p>

    <p align="justify">ii. to pursue, toward this end, convergent fiscal and budgetary policies in harmonised fashion, in order to counter any future economic downturn and in order to enable them to face the major budgetary requirements that will follow from, in particular, EMU governments&#8217; pensions obligations to their rapidly ageing populations.</p>

    <p align="justify">iii. to seek real and substantial convergence and synchronisation between their economies, especially as concerns inflation;</p>

    <p align="justify">iv. to step up political cooperation, leading to one voice rather than several speaking on matters relevant to the EMU and permitting improved communication with markets and citizens;</p>

    <p align="justify">v. clearly to state the will, direction and pace towards further political-economic integration so that markets regain confidence, in particular through a reform of EU institutions.</p>

    <p align="justify">vi. to pursue regulatory reform with vigour in sectors ranging from the labour market to those for goods and services which have often so far not been fully exposed to international competition; and to heed in this context the OECD&#8217;s recommendations for regulatory reform and the organisation&#8217;s Jobs Strategy&#8211; including measures to enhance intra-EMU area labour mobility.</p>

    <p align="justify"> </p>

    <p align="justify">vii. to intensify cooperation on EMU matters with the thirteen EU candidate countries, and to consider in particular their debt situation in view of the conversion of much of their foreign debt into euros.</p>

    <p align="justify">viii. to ensure that the European Central Bank remains independent in conformity with the provisions in the Treaty on European Union, and that it better informs parliamentary instances whether at European or at national level, as well as the general European public, about its policies;</p>

    <p align="justify">ix. to assist the European Central Bank in its analytical and forecasting work by providing more speedy, precise and mutually comparable national data than at present;</p>

    <p align="justify">x. to undertake every effort to counter the risk of counterfeit euro bills; the theft of software permitting access to cash dispensers; and the distribution of counterfeit bills in outgoing national currencies to unsuspecting citizens or to non-EMU countries.</p>

    <p align="justify"><i>European Central Bank</i></p>

    <p align="justify">6. The Assembly, concerned for the general efficiency of the ECB:</p>

    <p align="justify">i. welcomes the ECB&#8217;s intention to publish regular economic forecasts for the EMU area, including those for inflation; and hopes that this will permit the ECB better to explain the underlying reasons for its decisions to citizens and markets, in the interest of higher transparency.</p>

    <p align="justify">ii. calls for the establishment of an ECB &#8220;Consumer Information Office&#8221;, the task of which should be to inform EMU area citizens about the many aspects of the euro&#8217;s physical introduction of which they need to be aware.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>II. Explanatory Memorandum by the Rapporteur</b></p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify"><b>CONTENTS</b></p>

    <p align="justify"><b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Page</b>    </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;      5</b>    </p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Assembly<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> Recommendation 1195</a> (1992)</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Assembly<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1997)</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>And now a third Assembly report</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>A dream becoming reality?</i></p>

</blockquote></ul><p align="justify"><b>II&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1999&#8211;2000: THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE EURO&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;   8</b>  </p>

<p align="justify"><b>III&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK : </b>      </p>

    <blockquote><ul><p align="justify"><b>HOW ACCOUNTABLE IS IT?&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;      13</b> </p>

</ul></blockquote><p align="justify"><b>IV&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; THE IMPACT OF THE EURO ON INDUSTRY AND </b></p>

  <blockquote><p align="justify"><b>PEOPLE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT </b></p>

  <p align="justify"><b>POLICIES&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;         14</b></p>

      <ul><ul><p align="justify"><i>Industry and the people</i></p>

    </ul><p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Financial markets</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The policies of Euroland governments</i></p>

</ul></blockquote><p align="justify"><b>V&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO </b>    </p>

    <blockquote><ul><p align="justify"><b>AREA AND ITS SURROUNDINGS&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;     17</b></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>General considerations</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>The economic situation and prospects for individual EMU countries</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Non-EMU countries of the European Union</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>EFTA members: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; EU candidate </i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Countries.</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><b>VI&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE CALL FOR A </b></p>

      <ul><p align="justify"><b>SINGLE-VOICE, SINGLE ACTION EUROLAND&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;   22</b></p>

    </ul><p align="justify"><b>APPENDIX: </b> </p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Speech by Mr W.F. Duisenberg, President of the </i></p>

      <ul><p align="justify"><i>European Central Bank on 30 April 1999</i><b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;     25</b></p>

</ul></ul></blockquote><p align="justify">&nbsp;</p>

    <blockquote><ul><p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION</b></p>

    <p align="justify">1. For more than 20 years many European politicians and civil servants have harboured dreams of closer monetary integration between their respective national economies.  Some were attracted by the idea of forming an alternative to the world's dominant currency, the US dollar.  Some have been attracted by the advantages that a single currency would bestow.  Others have argued for it on the grounds of political symbolism, while yet others have seen as a way to import an economic model that has worked successfully in the major economy of Europe, Germany.  Whatever the motivation, this dream was partly realised when the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) began on January 1, 1999.  The purpose of this report is to look at the impact of the launch of the euro and at the euro zone economy during the first two years of its existence and up until<b> </b>October<b> </b>2000, when these lines were written.  It will also look at the constitution, organisation and decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB) and it will present some views on the likely impact of the euro on key financial markets.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>Assembly Recommendation 1195 (1992)</b></p>

    <p align="justify">2. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 41 member states Council of Europe has for a long time debated<b> </b>the issue of the European Union's Economic and Monetary Union.  Thus, in October 1992 it adopted<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> <i>Recommendation 1195</i></a><i> on &quot;European Economic Monetary Union - Consequences of the European Community's Treaty on European Union&#8221;</i> (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 6652">Doc. 6652</a>; Rapporteur: Mr Jessel, United Kingdom). <a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> Recommendation 1195</a> was brief and yet generic.  The EMU was seen as having &quot;far-reaching consequences for its member states, for it foresees the replacement of national currencies by a single European one as well as the latter's management under a European central bank&quot;.  </p>

    <p align="justify">3.<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1195"> Recommendation 1195</a> (1992) goes on to say that the EMU &quot;will also greatly affect all other countries in Europe and beyond&quot; and pointed to the duty of the Council of Europe to take up the issue, given its mission to &quot;enhance a constructive co-operation between member states of the European Community and the rest of Europe&quot;.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the recommendation goes on to say, has a special duty to &quot;promote economic co-operation at the level of all its member states, in conformity with the aim of the Council of Europe's statute to facilitate the economic and social progress of its members&quot;.</p>

    <p align="justify">4. The text also argued that the &quot;pronounced economic divisions in Europe and the sense of exclusion on the part of countries left outside the Union should not be further exacerbated&quot;.  It also urged that the &quot;richer countries or regions, to which investments are likely to be increasingly concentrated as a result of EMU, show sufficient support for poor countries and regions&quot;.  Finally the recommendation asked that &quot;Community institutions should be made sufficiently democratic and should always remain so - democracy's hallmark being that parliament, and not government or commissions, has legislative power and control&quot;. The Rapporteur quotes this 1992 recommendation<b> </b>because<b> </b>so many of its predictions and proposals are still valid today.  </p>

    <p align="justify">5. There were to be another five years before the Parliamentary Assembly again returned to the matter, by dint of <i>Order No. 481</i>, also dating from October 1992. The Order said: &quot;The Assembly &#8230; considering the major importance of this treaty for the future of European construction, instructs its Political Affairs Committee and its Committee on Economic Affairs and Development to monitor closely the evolution of this question [the EMU] and to report back to the Assembly in due course&quot;.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>Assembly Resolution 1109 (1997)</b></p>

    <p align="justify">6. This the Assembly did in January 1997, that is, two years before the entry into force of the EMU.  In<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> <i>Resolution 1109</i></a><i> on the Implications for Europe of Economic Monetary Union</i>, the Assembly stated its belief that &quot;the single currency can facilitate trade, investment and economic growth in many regions by eliminating currency uncertainty and reducing transaction costs where relevant; permit European countries better to face fluctuations in other world currencies; and, to the extent it remains stable, contain inflation and attract foreign capital.  Above all, a single currency will require, and therefore rapidly lead to, common economic policies among the participating countries and the formation of a federal Europe&quot;.</p>

    <p align="justify">7.<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> went on to say that a &quot;single currency area &#8230; requires a close correlation between the economic performance of each state both on joining and continuing thereafter&quot;.  The Assembly drew particular attention to the need to have the national economies of the member states &quot;adjust to differences of performance by means of mobility of the work force, or by financial transfers through regional aid and unemployment support&quot;.  The Assembly was also anxious that &quot;arrangements &#8230; be made for ensuring democratic accountability to national electorates for the management of the single currency area&quot;.  The EMU, continued the Assembly, &quot;should have as its goal to heal rather than widen the economic divisions in Europe&quot;.  </p>

    <p align="justify">8. The text called on the member states of the European Union to &quot;ensure democratic accountability of the European Central Bank&quot;; to &#8220;ensure that the important task of European Union enlargement is not hampered by parallel progress towards EMU and that economic relations between the European Union and other European countries, whether European Union applicants or not, are not made to suffer&quot;.  The Assembly also asked member states to &quot;ensure that a single currency amongst some European Union member states is not allowed to disrupt the principles or functioning of the Internal Market resulting from the 1987 Single European Act&quot;.  Finally, the Assembly said that the EMU should serve &quot;not only political but also economic and social goals, of which the most fundamental are economic growth, employment and rising living standards for all&quot;.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>And now a third Assembly report</b></p>

    <p align="justify">9. Now, in late 2000 and two years into the life of the euro, the Assembly's Committee on Economic Affairs and Development presents a new report on the subject.  The Rapport will try to portray the present state and future prospects of the EMU from as European a perspective as possible, covering also the EMU as seen from the horizon of the countries in central and eastern Europe, many of which are indeed candidates to join the European Union and, eventually, the EMU.  </p>

    <p align="justify">10. The Rapporteur wishes in this context to pay tribute to his late co-Rapporteur, Mr Michael Colvin, who died tragically together with his wife in a fire in his family home in February 2000, at the very early stages of our work which he carried out with great energy and expertise. Furthermore, the Rapporteur thanks not only the previously mentioned Mr Jessel, Rapporteur for the report of 1992, but also Mr Mikko Elo of Finland and Mr John Townend of the United Kingdom, who served as Rapporteurs for<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1997). He is also grateful to his Committee colleagues for the valuable input they have given during the Committee&#8217;s first consideration of the report in the course of 2000.  Finally, he wishes to thank Mr Wim Duisenberg for the presentation he gave the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development when it visited the European Central Bank in Frankfurt on 30 April 1999.  The statement by Mr Duisenberg on this occasion is given in the Appendix.</p>

    <p align="justify">11. The purpose of this report will be to describe the current state of the euro and its prospects over the near to medium-term future. The report will also raise the implications for the 12 EU member states that will make up Euroland when Greece joins on 1 January 2001<sup><a href="#P144_14827" name="P144_14828">2</a></sup></p>

    <p align="justify"><b>A dream becoming reality?</b></p>

    <p align="justify">12. In continental Europe the EMU is seen overwhelmingly as a political project &#8211; a necessary step towards further political integration, a step towards a United States of Europe.  This political imperative partly explains the relaxation of the Maastricht criteria to enable so many countries to enter the euro in the first wave.  It also suggests that politicians will pull out all the stops to ensure the euro survives, despite its problems, which will lead to further relaxation of the rules when member states face difficulties, as some now are.</p>

    <p align="justify">13. Many European politicians are quite explicit about the political objectives of the EMU.  The then Chancellor Kohl was the leading architect of the EMU in the 1990s and he carried the project through in the face of considerable popular opposition in Germany.  He made it clear that he wanted &quot;a European Germany, not a German Europe&quot;, with Germany locked into an integrated Europe.  Speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 1995, Mr Kohl said that &quot;we want the political unification of Europe.  If there is no monetary union, there cannot be political union, and vice versa&quot;.  The EMU, with its central management of the main policy levers of economic control, is a huge step towards political integration.  Reinforcing this view Mr Prodi, President of the European Commission, has said: &quot;The euro can only lead to closer and closer integration of countries' economic policies &#8230; this demands that member states give up more sovereignty&quot;. </p>

    <p align="justify">14. When the euro - the name chosen for the EMU single currency - came into effect among eleven EU member countries<sup><a href="#P153_17087" name="P153_17088">3</a></sup>, a 30-year old dream began to become reality.  Already in 1970, the so-called Werner Plan was presented, setting out a path towards economic and monetary union by 1980.  Derailed and abandoned only three years afterwards due to insufficient co-ordination among the then<b> </b>six EU member countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands) and the disruptive effects of the 1973 oil crisis, it nevertheless survived as an ambition through the European Monetary System (EMS), which tied various European currencies together within a relatively narrow band of fluctuation.  At times, the EMS enjoyed relatively wide membership, at times it was reduced to only Germany and a few other EU countries whose economies were closely tied to it.<sup><a href="#P154_18306" name="P154_18307">4</a></sup></p>

    <p align="justify">15. However, with the completion of the EU's Internal Market in 1993 (i.e. the realisation of the 1987 European Single Act), the quest for an EMU took on new vigour.  How, it was argued, could you have a single market worthy of the name if the currencies of EU countries could change unpredictably vis-ā-vis each other, or indeed be changed wilfully in order to gain export advantages?</p>

    <p align="justify">16. Indeed, the future EMU formed the cornerstone of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union.  The first stage had begun already in 1990, when capital movements were freed among the majority of EU member states.  The second stage started in January 1994 with the creation of a European Monetary Institute.  The EMI - the fore-runner of today's European Central Bank - would have no responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy in the European Union, but only to strengthen central bank co-operation and monetary policy co-ordination.  It would also prepare for an eventual European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  </p>

    <p align="justify">17. The third stage on the road to an EMU would come at the end of 1996, when the EMI and the European Commission would report to the EU's Council of Ministers on the state of &quot;convergence&quot; of the economies of the member states.  &quot;Convergence&quot; stood for the extent to which economies were beginning to resemble each other in areas such as interest rates, inflation, fiscal policies and budget deficits. (For a more detailed account of the &quot;convergence&quot; criteria see Assembly Document 7711, containing the Explanatory Memorandum underlying<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1997).</p>

    <p align="justify">18. Two &#8216;Scenarios&#8217; were envisaged in the Treaty.  In Scenario One, at least a majority of the member states would have been deemed ready to enter Stage Three, that is, the introduction of the single currency, and the date would have to be chosen when EMU would begin.  As it happened, such a majority of at least eight of the fifteen EU member states was not reached, and so Scenario Two was followed.  In that scenario, the EMU would start even if fewer than a majority were considered ready.  In May 1998 the Council of Ministers of the EU agreed that eleven countries were indeed qualified for participation. The indicative exchange rates established between them were meant to be essentially the same as those which would become definitive when the EMU would come into effect on 1 January 1999.</p>

    <p align="justify">19. Some people foresaw exchange rate turbulence between the participating countries between May and the end of December 1998.  However, they were proved wrong, both in the sense that the indicative exchange rates among the eleven countries were largely those retained, and in that not even the Russian financial crisis - let alone the lingering weakness of various Asian currencies - proved able to rock the stability of some of the weaker currencies in the EMU to be.</p>

    <p align="justify">20. This led to the start of Stage Three on the 1<sup>st</sup> (or rather the 4th) of January 1999 becoming something of a non-event.  For a development of such enormous significance - perhaps only matched in the economic field by the post-war Bretton Woods Agreement - there was precious little to report.  For instance, private sector banks and the Bank of England were able to send their personnel home early on the changeover weekend.  The massive redenomination exercise, covering over one billion bonds, securities, contracts, etc was in many countries completed hours ahead of schedule.  </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>II. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1999-2000: THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE EURO</b></p>

    <p align="justify">21. Thus, on 1 January 1999, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain irrevocably tied their currencies to the new currency, the euro. A dream harboured for decades by many European politicians (and, importantly, civil servants) had come true.  Some had been attracted by the idea of forming an alternative, indeed a rival, to the influence of the world's dominant currency, the US dollar.  Others were inspired by the advantages that a single currency could bestow in terms of easier and more predictable trade and investment.  Others again wanted it on the grounds of political symbolism, indeed as a necessary condition for a politically integrated EU, a United States of Europe.</p>

    <p align="justify">22. Over the summer and autumn of 1998, as the &quot;Euroland-to-be&quot; area was seen to hold firm in the face of in particular the Russian financial crisis, confidence in and expectations from the EMU were rising, bringing the value of the future currency up toward 1.18 euro to the dollar, a value it would have on the day of its introduction in January, 1999.  Soon, however, its value began to sink.  By February it had reached 1.15 to the dollar, by March, 1.09, by May 1.06 and by July around 1.03.  There followed, during the summer months of 1999, a recovery to 1.08 in early August and 1.09 by mid-October. </p>

    <p align="justify">23. As from mid-October 1999, however, a decline began toward the monetarily insignificant but symbolically and psychologically important value of parity to the dollar.  By early November 1999, the euro stood at 1.06 to the dollar, whetting the appetite of those who wanted to see it driven down further.  By the latter half of November 1999 it had sank to 1.03, hitting parity with, and indeed shortly going below, the dollar on 2 December 1999.  This represented a fall of over 15% over the course of 1999.</p>

    <p align="justify">24.  The decline would continue. By mid-April 2000, the euro stood at $ 0.95, by early May at </p>

    <p align="justify">$ 0.88. After a brief recovery in June (to $ 0.96), it fell to less than $ 0.90 in August and to just under $ 0.86 on 20 September. Following coordinated interventions by the ECB,<sup><a href="#P178_24470" name="P178_24471">5</a></sup> the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the central banks of Canada, Japan and others on 22 September, the euro was brought up temporarily to $ 0.90.<sup><a href="#P179_24908" name="P179_24909">6</a></sup> However, it then slipped again to around $ 0.87, even after the ECB raised its bench mark money market rate to 4.75% on 5 October &#8211; the seventh such rise since November 1999, when it had stood at 2.25%. After a brief drop to $ 0.84 in  November 2000, it recovered in early December (when this report had to be sent for publication), with the potential to recover additionally in the wake of post-election uncertainty in the US and a perceived slowing-down of the US economy that might make the dollar less attractive.</p>

    <p align="justify">25. The failure of the euro to react to the interest rate hike reflected the ECB&#8217;s fresh dilemma. Leaving the rate unchanged risked detracting from the currency&#8217;s value due to the prospect of higher inflation and due to a wider interest differential with the US dollar (with an interest rate at 6.5%). However, a higher interest rate risked being seen as choking Euroland economies and undermining the prospect of growth. The ECB&#8217;s dilemma was, in other words, as the English saying goes: &#8220;Damned if I do, damned if I don&#8217;t&#8221;.</p>

    <p align="justify">26. Some people in this situation pinned their hopes on a &#8216;landing&#8217; &#8211; whether &#8216;soft&#8217; or &#8216;hard&#8217; &#8211; of the US economy, so that the euro could be lifted, as it were, &#8216;by default&#8217;. However, it is not certain that even a marked economic slowdown in the US will make the euro more attractive. The reason is that the US will still be considered a country with great future potential, in terms of technological development, entrepreneurship, political stability and leadership. In other words, Euroland cannot look to others for salvation, only to itself, by putting its own house in order.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify">27. A few observers persist in believing that the present rate is not particularly worrying.  They point out that, at various times before the introduction of the euro, the composite value of the currencies of the 11 countries that would later form Euroland had represented only 0.70 dollars.  They <b>&#8211; </b>together with the ECB and Euroland political leaders<b> - </b> also maintain that, the euro is now clearly undervalued and that the market will eventually correct itself by buying more euros and thereby raise its value.  Also, they argue, as the euro goes down, exports from Euroland will go up due to more favourable terms of trade.  Furthermore, they maintain that since Euroland does most of its trade and investment within itself, a weaker euro is not felt by ordinary Euroland citizens, except when they travel, buy their petrol or other dollar-denominated commodities, or do business with non-Euroland countries.</p>

    <p align="justify">28. However, the widespread blockades of oil refineries around Europe in August and September 2000, in a protest against high petrol prices, were also indirectly a reflection of the weaker euro, since oil is denominated in dollars. Indeed, a weaker euro means that all imports into Euroland become more expensive, adding to inflation. The October 5 interest hike was already a reflection of the ECB&#8217;s worry about higher inflation, even as a higher interest rate risked depressing some Euroland economies, such as Germany and France, thereby further detracting from the euro&#8217;s attractiveness.</p>

    <p align="justify"> </p>

    <p align="justify">29. To the Rapporteur, the comforting explanations for the euro&#8217;s eroded value are less than convincing, for they were made a year ago &#8211; and a year before that - with even greater conviction by the same people.  We must ask ourselves <i>why</i> the Euro has undergone such a slippage in 1999 and 2000<b> </b>and <i>why</i> it is, as alleged, so undervalued.  What if the forces &#8211; irrational or rational &#8211; guiding the $1.5 trillion&#8211;a-day world currency markets cannot be made to believe in the euro?</p>

    <p align="justify">30. This raises the question whether the EMU participating countries or the ECB has established any sort of failure criterion, in addition to the earlier Maastricht criteria for joining EMU or the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact criteria for Euroland economic policy orthodoxy.  If not, is it not high time that this be done? If so, what might be the criterion or criteria? Should it be the passage below a certain external value of the euro vis-ā-vis other important currencies?  Or a certain percentage drop in the currency's value vis-ā-vis the dollar, when compared with its introductory value on 1 January 1999?  Or should it be the exceeding of a certain overall inflation rate in Euroland?  The Rapporteur would like to know.</p>

    <p align="justify">31. One tentative explanation for the euro's weakness is given in Mr Elo's and Mr Townend's explanatory memorandum accompanying<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1109"> Resolution 1109</a> (1997).  &quot;The most basic question&quot;, they said, &quot;is whether nations participating in the EMU are in fact sufficiently politically united in order to be able to follow one and the same economic and monetary policy, and this not only during the brief post-EMU honeymoon period but, more importantly, afterwards.  At present there is no European government ... The ESCB is supposed to be independent, that is, not politically accountable.&quot;</p>

    <p align="justify">32. The European Central Bank (ECB), to which we shall return in greater detail later, is somehow 'alone' at the top of the euro, without any political correspondence, as is the case, say, in the United States.   </p>

    <p align="justify">33. This is in a way what Mr Elo and Mr Townend predicted.  It is enough for the euro to weaken, if any one political or banking leader of any of the Euroland countries criticises one or the other aspect of ECB management.  Conversely, if Mr Duisenberg or another member of the ECB's Governing Council or Executive Board says something, there is always the risk of its being misinterpreted.  The US Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, can lean on the US Treasury Secretary for key aid in coordinating policy. However, the ECB President, Mr Wim Duisemberg, has to try to lean as best he can on 12 finance ministers &#8211; a support which is as good as none if they move differently, as is the case at present, for instance in the highly different national responses to the rise in oil prices in the fall of 2000.</p>

    <p align="justify">34. More generally, however, it is difficult for the European Central Bank to criticise the actions of an EMU-area government for doing - on the basis of that government&#8217;s democratic legitimacy - whatever it likes in order to, say, take over an ailing company or resist a given take-over bid.  Indeed, Chancellor Schröder was given much credit in Germany from his own party, the SDP, from Holzmann workers and from trade union members dancing in the streets after the Holzmann rescue.  In conclusion then, it may not, in this cacophony of supposedly authoritative voices speaking out on the EMU, be easy to 'talk the Euro up', but a thousand ways of 'talking it down'.  This is worrying and should be remedied.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify">35. The Euroland area in the first half of 2000 registered a current account deficit of $ 11.8 billion (after a $ 14.9 billion surplus in the first half of 1999), mainly due to higher import prices, especially of oil and gas, paid for with a weaker euro. Moreover, the euro-zone today suffers a major net capital outlflow, as European companies invest increasingly in the United States and elsewhere, and as international investment funds &#8211; in view of the weakening euro &#8211; have switched into yens and dollars. This trend is assisted by higher US interest rates and higher US growth.</p>

    <p align="justify">36. The question of where the outflow of funds from the euro area might have gone was raised at the Economic Committee's first discussion of the report in early 2000.  It is impossible to give an exact answer, but the United States has probably received the lion's share, as the rising dollar and confident US stock market would indicate. The US attracted $ 125 billion in net foreign investment in 1999 and the trend has continued in 2000. Between March 1999 and March 2000, European investment in the US amounted to $ 535 billion, or 5.7% of US GDP.<b> </b>  Some Euroland funds may also have found their way to Japan, especially at a time when that country's somewhat brightening economic prospects are manifested in a stronger yen.</p>

    <p align="justify">37. Could it also be that international markets consider other differences between Euroland and, in particular, US?  Mr Elo and Mr Townend take up three such factors.  The first is the much lower labour mobility in Euroland compared with the US.  In the US, nearly a fifth of the workforce move in a typical year from areas in recession to areas in expansion, whether from the east coast to California or from the 'rust-belt' states in the north to the 'sun-belt' states in the south.  Three per cent of the US population, some 7.7 million people, change their state of residence any year.  Europe needless to say - for linguistic, cultural but also pension rights reasons - does not have the same workforce mobility.  This means that countries or regions in Euroland that are expanding &#8211; say, Ireland or the Netherlands at the present time &#8211; cannot count on, say, Finns or Italians to move there readily there and be capable of, through language skills particularly, to take up jobs immediately in the way that, say, a Californian can move to New York and use the same language.  Countries in recession will therefore essentially have to take care of a greater number of unemployed, rather than see them move to and take work in more expansive countries.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify">38. This brings us to a second characteristic of the US, namely the stabilising proprieties of its federal tax system.  If, say, California expands, it will attract labour from other US states.  California will therefore pay more in federal taxes to Washington, which can then be redistributed to states in difficulties.  In Europe, however, not only is there much less workforce mobility, but there can be no stabilising tax payments. This is so both because people move much less and because the budget of the European Union is so small in comparison with the combined GDP of its member states &#8211; only slightly over 1% &#8211; whereas in the United States the federal budget is over 20% of US GDP.  In addition, since about half of the EU budget is used for the Common Agricultural Policy, the stabilising properties are even weaker.</p>

    <p align="justify">39. No doubt, however, international markets also look at things such as the pace of structural reform in different Euroland<b> </b>countries, where it is often found wanting, and things like mergers in financial and non-financial sectors.  True, corporate restructuring in Euroland (as elsewhere in the EU) is proceeding rapidly and can be expected to be translated into economic gains in due course. Furthermore, there are bank mergers, but often they take place only among banks <i>within</i> a given country, to the exclusion of foreign interested banks, whether within or outside the EMU area.  This will likely not be taken lightly by international markets, which have long memories.  Nor will markets look kindly upon efforts, however laudable, to maintain, say, the &quot;Rhineland model&quot; as practised by particularly Germany and as exemplified in the government rescue of Holzmann.</p>

    <p align="justify">40. Europe&#8217;s low birth rates and rapidly ageing population also pose a danger to the euro. As fewer people in active ages have to support more, and longer-living, old-age pensioners (including a growing number of early retirees), public finances in Euroland countries will come under enormous strain, starting around 2010. The situation is aggravated by the fact that almost all the EMU countries rely almost exclusively on taxpayer financed, &#8216;pay-as-you-go&#8217; types of pension systems. Either taxes will have to rise to levels unprecedented in peacetime, impeding growth; or government spending will have to be drastically cut, threatening social peace.</p>

    <p align="justify">41. Furthermore, since the single currency has locked the economies of the EMU countries together, increased pensions payments in a country in a demographic crisis, such as for example Italy, will raise inflation also in a country with a younger population, such as Ireland. If, say, France spends its way into a deep deficit to assist an ageing population, Dutch homebuyers may end up paying higher mortgage interest, since big government budget deficits tend to raise interest rates by increasing competition for capital. Ireland and The Netherlands may protest, but there will be little they can do, since Italy and France are sovereign in their budgetary decisions - the EMU&#8217;s Stability and Growth Pact notwithstanding. Governments in Europe, especially those resulting from coalitions or with weak majorities, are more likely than not to delay or dilute the necessary reforms. The cost of Euroland-wide single currency management may well find itself put before, not the horse, but the horses, of national politics.</p>

    <p align="justify">42. What international markets seem to be telling Euroland is that, now that it has signed up to be in the rough-and-tumble of the international economy through the introduction of the euro, it must abide by all the rules of this merciless game.  However, here monetary ambitions come into conflict with altogether worthy and respectable political, social or even cultural goals, which the Rapporteur is the first to recognise.  On the other hand, to the extent you want to pursue them, can you really do so within a single currency area involving over 300 million people?</p>

    <p align="justify">43. One feature that functioned flawlessly as from day one was the EMU's new banking payments system.  Called TARGET, the system connects national payments systems in all EU member states and allows settlements between institutions to be made gross at any time of the day.  (It differs from the earlier system, which simply cleared claims at the <i>end</i> of the day.)  Gross, instantaneous settlements means that each of the 15 markets will need more liquidity.  Hence, the risk increases that any one sector could fail and cause the entire system to collapse.  However, thanks to TARGET there were few problems, only a few hours of delay on the 4<sup>th</sup> of January 1999 and minor delays in the ensuing days.  The inclusion of the City of London into the system helped the overall operation.</p>

    <p align="justify">44. The start of the euro also saw the creation of a new Exchange Rate Mechanism, the ERM II. It replaced the system that had existed during Stage Two in the run-up to the euro, and which had lain at the origin of the convergence test for EMU membership.  It was meant for all the &quot;pre-ins&quot;, but currently only two EU member states &#8211; Denmark and Greece (until its joining the EMU on </p>

    <p align="justify">1 January 2001)<b> </b>&#8211; participate in the ERM II &#8211; the former within a +/- 2.25% fluctuation band against the euro and the latter within a +/- 15% band.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>III. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK : HOW ACCOUNTABLE IS IT?</b></p>

    <p align="justify">45. The European Central Bank (ECB) came into existence on 1 June 1998, building upon the work of its predecessor, the European Monetary Institute.  The ECB is the central body of a broader organisation structure called the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  The ESCB includes not only the national central banks of EMU members but those of all EU member states.<sup><a href="#P225_40266" name="P225_40267">7</a></sup> </p>

    <p align="justify">46.  The primary objective of the ESCB, as set out in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, is to maintain price stability. (Price stability is defined as inflation for the Euro area of below 2%.) It is also meant to support the general economic policies in the EU.  It defines and implements the monetary policy of the EU, conducts foreign exchange operations, holds and manages the official foreign reserves of the member states and promotes the smooth operation of the payments systems.  The work of the ESCB is carried out by three main decision-making bodies: a Governing Council responsible for general guidelines; the Executive Board consisting of the ECB President (currently Mr Wim Duisenberg), the ECB Vice-President (currently Mr Christian Noyer of France) and four other members; and the General Council, a wider body that also includes the governors of the national central banks (NCBs) of non-EMU countries in the EU. The ECB is wholly owned by the NCBs of EMU participating member states, currently with a capital at 5 million Euros.</p>

    <p align="justify">47.  The ECB is required both in the Treaty on European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty to be independent.  This raises the question of whether the ECB has its own 'democratic deficit', similar to that which is said to characterise other EU institutions.  The argument here is that no institution in a democracy should be unaccountable to the people, directly or through their electoral representatives.  In fact, the national governments and the EU institutions themselves have given the ECB the power, indeed the obligation, to set monetary policy in the interests of the euro zone as a whole, independent of formal political influence and national interests.  Additionally, its decisions are not to be made fully and readily available to the member states or to the EU institutions. Nor can members of the ECB governing council be removed from office by EU institutions. To some all this is worrying, whereas to others it is just an inevitable step on the road to EU supranational institutions, which will in due course acquire their own democratic legitimacy.</p>

    <p align="justify">48. The question how the ECB's independence can be reconciled with the need to have it democratically accountable gives rise to others.  What effect could secrecy, or for that matter openness, have upon the euro's stability?  How will monetary policy be separated from the political arena?  (One comes to think of the statement by the German Chancellor, Mr Gerhard Schröder, to the effect that a weak euro &#8220;is more of a reason to be happy than concerned&#8221;, due to better export opportunities.)  Conversely, who provides political guidance to the ECB?  Germany's former Finance Minister, Mr La Fontaine, tried to do so in the first half of 1999 and was driven to resign, partly as a result of his statements on the need for the ECB to relax its policies.  By contrast, neither the German Chancellor nor the French Prime Minister seem to be willing to talk much about the euro these days.</p>

    <p align="justify">49. Beyond the above is there is the question of citizen trust in the ECB.  If the ECB takes decisions that are unpopular in the short-term, how can citizens trust that it does so in their best long-term interests?  Similarly, when the ECB President speaks about the need for structural reform or more flexible labour legislation in the EMU member states, is he not infringing upon the preserve of democratically elected parliaments and their appointed governments? </p>

    <p align="justify">50. As far as access to information is concerned the ECB, in line with the tradition in most continental European countries, do not publish the minutes of Governing Council meetings.  In the UK and the US they do.  The Rapporteur believes that monetary policy will be more effective and constructive if experts and the public understand <i>why</i> the central bank is following a certain course.  If economic agents understand the reasoning of the central bank, the need for monetary policy measures may themselves be reduced.</p>

    <p align="justify">51. The ECB governing council does publish summaries of their monthly meetings, supplemented by regular economic reports. The summaries do not, however, show how individual governors have voted, since this might reveal national preferences, thus undermining EMU unity.  The ECB also argues that the publishing policy had been decided by politicians and not by the ECB itself.</p>

    <p align="justify">52. As from 2001, the ECB will publish regular economic forecasts for the euro-zone, especially as regards inflation. The ECB has in the past encountered problems in making accurate forecasts quickly, due in part to slow, uncertain and sometimes incomparable data coming from EMU countries. The ECB is also concerned that forecasts of, say, a high euro inflation will leave markets to expect a rate hike, and <i>vice versa</i>. This is so especially since it has set an upper acceptance limit of 2% for inflation. In other words, if a higher than 2% inflation is forecast, markets &#8220;know&#8221; that an interest rate hike is coming. (By contrast, the US Federal Reserve has never made such a statement of tolerance, thereby forcing markets to be on their toes.)</p>

    <p align="justify">53. This Rapporteur will argue in favour of anything that can add to ECB transparency. He would in particular favour an ECB &#8216;Consumer Information Office&#8217;, whose task it would be to inform Euroland citizens about the many aspects of the euro&#8217;s introduction on which they need to be aware.</p>

    <p align="justify">54.  The European Parliament is seeking to enhance ECB accountability to it.  Thus, the ECB has to provide it with regular reports and the ECB President appears frequently both before the plenary EP and EP Committees.  However, the ECB is not directly accountable to the EP, since the latter is not responsible for the whole range of economic and other policies of EMU or EU member states.  In addition, the EP, as is the case in some countries, cannot cause the dismissal of the ECB President or a member of its Governing Council.  Nor can the EP itself modify an ECB-governing treaty.  The existence of an EP ombudsman in 1996 has yet to make an impact on ECB openness.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>IV.  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; THE IMPACT OF THE EURO ON INDUSTRY AND PEOPLE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES</b></p>

    <p align="justify"><b>Industry and people</b></p>

    <p align="justify">55. As was to be expected, the impact of the euro has varied depending on the type of business.  Multinational companies were of course affected most.  Smaller companies operating only or exclusively in their home country were the least concerned.  A study was undertaken by the European Commission of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in all the fifteen member states, representing a wide variety of economic sectors. </p>

    <p align="justify">56. The European Commission study produced some surprising results. Thus, its impact on a medium size grocery store in Ireland in terms of employee time and resources devoted to the changeover proved greater than that on an Italian insurance company.  This may be due to the perception of the changes expected rather than the actual changes necessitated by the euro once it arrives physically. For many companies the advent of the new currency provided an opportunity to review their entire way of operating, including their business strategy.  However, there can be no doubt that the euro has given rise to a revolutionary new way of doing business in Euroland countries. Competition has increased among Euroland enterprises, breaking down formidable national barriers and forcing managers to think &#8216;eurowide&#8217;, akin to what happened in the United States already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.</p>

    <p align="justify">57. More recently, however, the decline in the euro&#8217;s value has had pronounced and highly varying effects on different types of economic activity. Euroland exporting companies have seen golden days, while importing companies have suffered from higher import prices. American companies exporting to Euroland &#8211; but also, say, British, Swiss, Swedish and Lithuanian (whose currency is tied to the dollar) &#8211; are also having difficult times. Meanwhile, the profits of Euroland affiliates of many foreign multinationals have seen their revenue decline when these have been repatriated and expressed in stronger currencies. If the weak euro persists, international trade thus risks being seriously distorted.</p>

    <p align="justify">58. A strong currency is over time always to be preferred to a weak one. A strong currency inspires confidence in the economy; reduces the price of imports; and avoids overheating of the economy as imports replace domestically produced products or services for which there is insufficient domestic production capacity. Exports may be suffering, but that is encouragement for exporting companies to produce more efficiently.</p>

    <p align="justify">59. Conversely, the current weakness of the euro makes imports into Euroland more expensive. It thereby reduces purchasing power and adds to inflation. An excessive part of the domestic production capacity risks being devoted to exports, to the neglect of home markets. Companies producing for export find the going easier but have less of an incitement to streamline operations, thus hampering their future competitiveness. A weak currency may attract foreign investment, as acquisitions become cheaper for investors with stronger currencies. However, investors may be frightened by prospects of a further weakening of the currency &#8211; as appears to be happening in Euroland, which suffers from a major net outflow of capital to, especially, the strong-currency USA. Reduced capital flows to Euroland will also lead to higher borrowing costs for companies in the area, and thus to potentially lower credit ratings for these companies. Finally, the political-financial revolutions now rocking at least one major Euroland country also risks having a negative impact on the single currency, especially if the imbroglio is not sufficiently cleared up or sanctioned. To international financial markets, public probity in a country or a group of countries sharing a currency is essential for that currency to maintain its strength.</p>

    <p align="justify">60. Furthermore, there is the psychological impact on the population of a weak currency. The German &#8216;economic miracle&#8217; was in large measure built on the strong D-Mark and the national self- esteem it produced. One wonders how the Germans now feel about the weak euro against this background.</p>

    <p align="justify">61. This is not the place to discuss at length the difficulties that many people will face in trying to adapt to the euro at its introduction in 2002. However, authorities and citizens alike must be alert to certain risks. One stems from computer software that could be &#8216;pirated&#8217; by some programmers who have been involved in the adaptation by authorities and banks to the changeover. The risk includes illegal access to automatic cash dispensers. Another risk concerns false money. Many people will not know the new bills right away, including their texture. This opens the door to a potential spread of counterfeit money. Similarly, false, outgoing national bills and coins risk being circulated among an unsuspecting public, in a desperate attempt by counterfeiters to rid themselves of their soon-to-be-obsolete falsifications that would be rejected or detected at the official exchanges. This risk also concerns non-euro countries, where false notes could be sent for bank deposits before the July 2000 deadline to avoid detection. </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>Financial markets</b></p>

    <p align="justify">62. In contrast to businesses, financial markets in Euroland and outside it have felt the arrival of the single currency much more distinctly.  After all, the national currencies in Euroland member states have ceased to exist, becoming simple denominations of the euro.  Furthermore, the euro itself is a new tradable currency, with a new behaviour that has to be studied and learnt.  Moreover, Euroland is rapidly becoming a truly single market in the eyes of investors and borrowers.  National and regional markets are<b> </b>undergoing rapid integration, with increased liquidity and economies of scale in its wake.  Market participants no longer have to worry about currency risk when operating within Euroland.  New types of markets will develop that previously were not competitive or economical.  Financial centres and market participants face much increased competition, both in defending their turf and in expanding onto those of others.</p>

    <p align="justify">  </p>

    <p align="justify">63. The challenge to the City of London, as the largest centre for foreign exchange activity in the world, was particularly pronounced, although (or perhaps because) the UK is not part of Euroland.  Some $1,500 billion are transacted daily in London, representing 32% of the world total and well ahead of the US with 18% of the market.  (This is also because - due to its geographical position - London enjoys a brief period of the day when the financial centres of New York and Tokyo are also open).  </p>

    <p align="justify">64. The evidence suggests that London has maintained or even increased<b> </b>its market share in the foreign exchange markets since the launch of the euro.  This, needless to say, concerns global euro transactions, since transactions between Euroland currencies naturally have disappeared.  Even in the futures markets, London has on the whole held its own.  Furthermore, euro-denominated corporate bonds have increased in number, reflecting the preference of companies to use the market as an alternative to bank finance.  Cash bonds are also being used to fund mergers and acquisitions in the European economy, where a greater deal of industrial consolidation, encouraged by both the single market and the EMU, is taking place. Finally, various European stock exchanges are planning or perfecting alliances such as the &#8216;Euronext&#8217; exchange between France, Belgium and the Netherlands, even though counter bids are constantly being made to challenge them. Through such alliances or mergers, members of the exchanges concerned are given common access to each market.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>The policies of Euroland governments</b></p>

    <p align="justify">65. Budget deficits have come down from earlier levels in all EMU countries. This is largely due, firstly, to the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union and, secondly, to the post-Maastricht Stability and Growth Pact with its promised fine for &#8216;sinning&#8217; countries. However, there are, more recently, disturbing signs of a loosening of fiscal discipline in certain Euroland countries such as Italy and France, precisely at a time when disciplines should rather be tightened in anticipation of possibly harder times to come. In its monthly report of September 2000 the ECB states: &#8220;Spending pressures seem to be increasing in some countries at the level of local governments and social security funds, and with regard to government consumption and social benefits. &#8230; Furthermore, there is a risk of an upward drift in public wages associated with the buoyancy of the economy.&#8221; It can only be hoped that the countries concerned will be spared any '&quot;discipline fatigue'; governmental crises with some political parties calling for too high spending in the name of 'euro fatigue'; or recessions that make discipline more difficult to maintain.</p>

    <p align="justify"> </p>

    <p align="justify">66. The Stability and Growth Pact inspires particular hope in this regard. Discipline may well encourage further discipline, as reduced budget deficits permit repayment also of the accumulated debt. This in turn can permit eventual tax reductions and more spending on things other than repaying of debt.  One must hope that the fines foreseen in the Stability and Growth Pact will never have to be applied, not only because they take away budgetary resources especially needed in recession times, but also because fines could whip up anti-euro sentiments in an already smarting population.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>V.   &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA AND ITS SURROUNDINGS</b><sup><a href="#P279_56136" name="P279_56137">8</a></sup></p>

    <p align="justify"><b>General considerations</b></p>

    </ul></blockquote><ul><ul><p align="justify">67. In the first half of 2000, growth in Euroland was strong and broadly based geographically, as strong domestic demand was reinforced by continuedly healthy exports. Growth is expected, however, to slow moderately in 2001, reflecting stricter monetary conditions and the loss of purchasing power on the part of households, resulting not least from an increase in energy prices. Still, growth is projected at about 3.5% in 2000 and 3% in 2001. The growing pressure on resources is, however, already a concern in several Euroland countries that have more or less overheated economies. Here, cyclical unemployment has been substantially reduced or completely eliminated. Non-EMU countries in the European Union have enjoyed  strong growth during 2000 (3.4%), but the latter is likely also to come down over the next two years (to around 3%).</p>

    <p align="justify">68. Euroland exports have been helped by the weakening euro, but import prices have risen, such as for energy (now at around $33 per barrel). This increases inflationary pressure. However, inflation has been remarkable benign in Euroland considering the high oil prices and the depreciation of the euro. (Indeed, the high oil prices may have taken some of the inflationary pressure out of the general economy by reducing disposable income.) Inflation could pick up somewhat if spare capacity both in the labour and in the factor markets is exhausted, such as is already happening in a country like Ireland.</p>

    <p align="justify">69. One should not underestimate the industrial streamlining resulting from the fact that we now have a single currency in the EMU area. Productivity growth is also likely eventually to accelerate from the creation and diffusion of new technology. Finally, structural reforms over the past decade in various Euroland countries have raised overall economic efficiency. It is therefore possible that the ECB may not have to raise interest rates further in order to ensure that inflation stays below the upper limit of 2% in the medium-term. Even though one cannot exclude further ECB interest rate hikes, these may no longer be necessary, as the continued increases of 2.25% since November 1999 are already beginning to show effect.</p>

    <p align="justify">70. However, there are two risks. Firstly, interest rates would have to rise further if wage earners or producers try to recover their income losses incurred due to higher oil prices. So far, wage demands have been limited, but the real test will come when existing wage contracts are renegotiated, especially if unemployment goes below a certain level. </p>

    <p align="justify">71. Secondly, further declines in the value of the euro would add even more to inflation and increase the risk of overheating in the area. The ECB would, in this situation, have to tighten monetary conditions. At the time of writing, the prospects for the euro are highly uncertain, especially since we know so little why it has fallen so much since its launch.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">72. Basically, Euroland shows three groups of countries: those, such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Greece and Finland where the present 4.75% ECB interest rate is rather too low to stop inflationary pressure; those where it may be about right such as France,  Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria; and those where it is felt to be a little too high, such as Germany, Euroland&#8217;s largest economy.</p>

    <p align="justify">73. It is still too early to tell whether real convergence is taking place in Euroland - above all in the still relevant Maastricht convergence criteria of public financial discipline and inflation (or rather inflationary pressure).<sup><a href="#P296_59753" name="P296_59754">9</a></sup>  The Rapporteur in this context wish to draw particular attention to the &#8216;non-Maastricht criterion&#8217; of unemployment and the no-longer Maastricht inflation criterion, as these are likely also to determine the success of the EMU. </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>The economic situation and prospects for individual EMU countries</b></p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">74. Economic activity in <b>Germany</b> was strong in 2000, assisted by heavy investment in machinery and equipment and a rapid expansion in private consumption. Growth is expected to remain rather strong in 2001 and 2002, in part because of a major income and business tax reform to come into effect in 2001. Higher oil prices coupled with the weaker euro is, however, projected to slow down growth somewhat as from 2001. Since growth in world trade is also expected to slacken, the contribution to the economy from exports is expected to decline, bringing GDP growth down from 3% in 2000 to about 2.5% by 2002.</p>

    <p align="justify">75. Proceeds from the sale of mobile phone licences will generate a considerable general government surplus in 2000. However, as income tax cuts are introduced, the deficit will reappear in 2001 and continue in 2002. Unemployment, estimated at 7.7% in 2000, is forecast to go below 7% in 2001 and to 6.3% in 2002. Any further weakening of the euro would be unwelcome, since it may force about a further rise in the ECB interest rate, which Germany recovery can ill afford.</p>

    <p align="justify">76. <b>France</b> enjoyed robust economic growth and low inflation in 2000. Many new jobs were created and unemployment dropped to its lowest level, 9.7%, in ten years. Strong world trade growth, strong exports due to the weak euro, accommodating monetary conditions and high consumer confidence all helped economic activity. The economy works at capacity, leading companies to step up investments but also causing labour shortages in various sectors. Higher oil prices have, however, led to a less helpful economic environment over the last few months. They have reduced household income and consumer confidence. As a result, the pace of economic expansion now appears to have slowed somewhat.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">77. It would now seem important for France to maintain a prudent policy, at least in order to stay within the confines of the growth and Stability Pact. Spending restraint is also required in view of the still high public indebtedness and large unfunded pension liabilities that will only accelerate in coming years as the population ages. It would seem that the current ECB interest rate is about right for France at this moment.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">78. GDP growth in <b>Italy</b> in 2000 is expected to have been 2.6%, due to strong domestic demand and favourable export conditions. Higher oil prices are, however, adding to inflation and eroding business and consumer confidence, leading to somewhat slower growth in 2001. Unemployment, at 10.8% in 2000, is forecast to come down to 9.4% by 2002.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">79. Italy will need to pursue structural reform, especially that leading to increased competition in sheltered sectors of the economy, whence inflation can easily spread to the rest of the economy and thereby weaken competitiveness vis-ā-vis the rest of the euro area. Much will depend on the wage negotiations of 2001, when wage earners may wish to recuperate the losses caused by higher oil prices and the higher-than-expected inflation in 2000.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">80. <b>Spain</b>&#8217;s economy grew at the healthy pace of around 4% in 2000, helped by buoyant exports. Growth is forecast to come down somewhat over the next few years, to 3.5% in 2001 and 3.1% in 2002. Also unemployment, the perhaps highest in Euroland at 14% in 2000, is forecast to come down to around 12% by 2002. On the worrying side is inflation, which reached close to 3% in 2000, above the Euroland average. This is due not only to higher oil prices, but also to wage developments. Overall, however, the general government budget is in balance and should reach a slight surplus in 2002, permitting the national debt to be reduced.</p>

    <p align="justify">81. <b>Austria </b>experienced accelerated economic growth in 2000, largely thanks to increasing exports following the depreciation of the euro, but also as a result of stronger private consumption. The present growth of 3.5% is forecast to come down to 2.5% in 2002 as exports moderate and private consumption slows. An ambitious fiscal consolidation effort is under way, much helped by this period of high growth. Higher revenue may also, however, have to be accompanied by reduced expenditure. A tightening labour market may also call for structural reform in the labour market in order to avoid inflation.</p>

    <p align="justify">82. <b>Belgium</b> is another Euroland country that has benefited from a weaker euro driving up exports. GDP growth in 2000 is estimated at around 3.8%, but the prospect of weakening exports and a less accommodating monetary stance is forecast to lower growth to 3.1% in 2001 and 2.9 in 2002. Belgium was one of the most indebted countries at the start of the euro in 1999. It is therefore all the more heartening that the debt-to-GDP ratio may fall to 100% in 2002, continuing its strong downward path of recent years. Continued structural reform, not least to tap the large pool of benefit recipients not in employment, will be necessary if this trend is to continue.</p>

    <p align="justify">83. <b>Finland</b> is experiencing strong growth at 5.4% in 2000, far above the Euroland average. This is producing a general government surplus of 4% in 2000, expected to rise to over 5% in 2002 and permitting a rapid reduction of government debt. The electronic equipment industry has become a mainstay in the nation&#8217;s economy. There are, however, signs of overheating, with inflation, at 3.2% in 2000, standing well above the euro area average. Much will depend on forthcoming wage negotiations.</p>

    <p align="justify">84. <b>Greece</b> joins the EMU on 1 January 2001 in a condition of robust growth, at about 4%. Growth is forecast to accelerate to around 4.5% in 2001 and 2002. This is expected to bring down unemployment &#8211; at 11.4% much higher than the euro average &#8211; to around 10% in 2002. However, there is risk of overheating as inflation rose to 3% in late 2000, reflecting higher oil prices, the depreciation of the drachma and lower interest rates to prepare for the country&#8217;s entry into EMU. As in several other Euroland countries, much will depend on moderation in future wage agreements, as well as continued structural reform, especially of sectors sheltered from international competition. Nevertheless, the government deficit, currently at around 1% of GDP, stands a good chance of moving into a small surplus by 2002.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">85. The economy of <b>Ireland</b> is the fastest growing in Euroland. It stands at 11% in 2000, although it is forecast to slow down somewhat, to around 8% in 2001 and 7% in 2002. The strong growth has come at the price of an inflation rate of over 5%, far above the Euroland average. Inflation has been particularly pronounced in services and real estate, but also the labour market is extremely tight, with unemployment down to around 4%. The main challenge for the government will now be to ensure that price and wage increases do not get out of control. In brief, much of the economic growth is caused by the weaker euro permitting an increase in exports, not least in the consumer &#8216;economy&#8217; sector where Ireland, with its young, English-speaking work force and proximity not only to the British but also to Euroland markets, enjoys an obvious advantage.</p>

    <p align="justify">86. <b>Luxembourg</b> is also growing rapidly for much the same reasons as Ireland. Standing at 8% in 2000, growth is forecast to slow to around 5.5% by 2002. Inflation is slightly higher than the Euroland average, standing at around 3%, mainly due to higher energy prices. It is forecast to fall back to around 2% by 2002. As in many other countries, inflation is key. If wage agreements can be kept within limits and energy prices moderate, projections for this wealthy country at the heart of Euroland will continue to be upbeat.</p>

    <p align="justify">87. <b>The Netherlands</b> economy, too, is growing at a healthy pace - by 4.5% in 2000 - aided by strong exports resulting in part from the euro weakness. Growth is forecast to cool to around 4% in 2001 and 3.5% in 2002, as export markets may weaken and as labour shortages accentuate. Unemployment now stands at only around 2.8%, among the lowest in Euroland. Even though this could cause inflation to go up, higher import prices are expected to have a cooling effect. The shortage of labour could still, however, ignite inflation, and so the government may well look into further ways of tightening welfare programmes, especially to the still large pool of working age benefit recipients without a job.</p>

    <p align="justify">88. Growth in <b>Portugal</b> is expected to have stood at 3.2% in 2000, with approximately the same rate forecast for 2001 and 2002. Again, exports aided by the weaker euro are one of the main factors behind the brisk growth. Unemployment is low, at around 4%. Labour scarcity has presumably combined with higher oil prices to edge inflation up. It reached over 3% towards the end of 2000. One worrying factor is the current account deficit, which exceeded 10% of GDP in 2000 and is forecast to rise to 12% by 2002. This situation will force the government to pursue structural reforms in the health and social security sectors and to restrain public spending. Wage increases will also have to be kept moderate to avoid higher inflation and a corresponding loss of competitiveness vis-ā-vis other countries, including those in Euroland.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>Non-EMU countries of the European Union</b></p>

    <p align="justify">89. In non-EMU countries of the European Union, economic growth is on the whole satisfactor<b>y. </b>These countries of course have the possibility of raising their interest rate whenever necessary in order to counter inflationary pressure.  With higher interest rates the currency tends to strengthen, making exports less competitive. This, however, prevents over-heating of the domestic economy, while imports become cheaper, thereby further relieving domestic production capacity.  Higher interest rates also means that investment becomes more expensive, further reducing inflationary pressure.  This, then, is an option no longer open to the &quot;one-size-fits-all&quot; interest rate policy in the Euroland countries.</p>

    <p align="justify">90. Growth in the <b>United Kingdom</b> continues at the healthy pace of 3% in 2000, with a forecast reduction to 2.6% in 2001 and 2.3% in 2002. It is driven mainly by household consumption, and not by exports, which have been punished by a strengthening against the euro (even though there has also been a depreciation of the pound against the dollar). Unemployment is low, at about 5.5%, but this has not resulted in major wage inflation, as reforms have been underway for several years aiming to raise the employability of the workforce and to increase work incentives. Increased competition in the product and services markets has had the same beneficial effect on price inflation. Finally, inflation is kept at bay as a stronger pound vis-ā-vis the euro reduces import prices and avoids overheating of the economy. If the euro were to firm in the future, UK exporters would be helped but domestic prices could pick up.</p>

    <p align="justify">91. <b>Denmark</b> may have rejected participation in the euro in the referendum of September 2000, but its currency is fixed narrowly to the euro and its interest rate closely shadows that of the ECB. The Danish economy grew at around 2.8% in 2000, with a moderate slowdown to 2.5% foreseen for 2001 and 2002. The economy is operating close to its potential and unemployment is low, at around 5%. Inflation is nevertheless moderate, at less than 3%, although it may accelerate due to rising wage demands and higher import prices, not least of oil. A government surplus of 2.4% of GDP in 2000 will allow the government further to reduce its public debt, to around 40% by 2002, well below the Maastricht requirement.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">92. <b>Sweden</b> is another EU member state not belonging to Euroland. Unlike Denmark, its currency is not tied to the euro. The Swedish economy expanded vigorously, by 4%, in 2000, although a slight cooling to 3.2% in 2001 and 2.4% in 2002 is forecast, reflecting somewhat less rosy export opportunities and a tightening of the labour market, where unemployment now stands at less then 5%. Consumer demand is strong, but inflation continues to be low, at 0.7% in 2000, although it is forecast to pick up to close to 2% in 2001 and to 2.7% in 2002. </p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">93. The Swedish Central Bank has kept the repo rate unchanged at 3.75% since February 2000, or 1% lower than the ECB rate. This has improved the economic potential, especially given the still low inflation. The Swedish budget and its current account are both in comfortable surplus and the economy suffers no serious imbalances. Risks could come from upcoming wage negotiations and their impact on inflation, as well as inflation resulting from high oil prices. Continued tax cuts could also add to inflation, especially if not accompanied by spending cuts. It is likely that the monetary authorities will have to raise interest rates by perhaps 1.5% to 5.25% by the end of 2001 in order to avoid having the economy overheat.</p>

    <p align="justify"><b>EFTA members: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. EU candidate countries.</b></p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">94. <b>Iceland</b> may be neither an EMU nor an EU member, but it shares the overheating tendencies experienced by many Euroland countries, though for different reasons. The economy largely depends on the fishing industry, which has expanded in recent years, but is now becoming, at least temporarily, less buoyant due to a cut-back in the allowable fish catch. Iceland&#8217;s economy grew at around 3.6% in 2000, with a forecast reduction to 1.3% in 2001 and a slight pick-up to 2.4% in 2002. Inflation is comparatively high, at 4.2% in 2000, and with a forecast increase to around 5% for 2001 and 2002. To counter this, the Icelandic Central Bank has had to raise the repo rate to over 11% at the end of 2000, especially after a threatening decline in the currency&#8217;s exchange rate. Unemployment is very low, at slightly over 1%, with an increase to around 2.6% forecast for 2002 in response to lower catches.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">95. <b>Norway</b> is another non-EU and hence non EMU country whose economy, like Iceland&#8217;s, remains on the brink of overheating. This is largely due to its major oil production and exports, which have benefited from the recent price rises. Thus, the government surplus stands at 14% and the country&#8217;s current account surplus at about 20% of GDP. Growth in 2000 stood at around 3%, with a cooling to 2.4% in 2001 and 1.9% in 2002 being forecast, as the Government tries to avoid further overheating. With labour supply tight (unemployment stands at slightly over 3%) and political demands to spend more of the surplus strong, the Norwegian Central Bank has increased its key deposit rate to 7%, that is, considerably higher than that of Euroland. Such a stance seems necessary since inflation remains well above that of the euro area and those of neighbouring non-EMU countries. Norway&#8217;s overall situation, though envious in view of its rich oil resources, remains difficult to handle, since the booming offshore oil economy will  somehow have to reconciled with the country&#8217;s more traditional mainland economy.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">96. <b>Switzerland</b>&#8217;s economy is growing at a healthy pace, at slightly over 3% in 2000, with a gradual slowdown to 2% foreseen until 2002. This reflects a tightening of monetary policy but also the rise in oil prices. Unemployment is very low, at 2%, as is inflation, at 1% in 2000 and with only a slight increase to around 1.7% forecast for 2001 and 2002. The Swiss franc has risen somewhat against the surrounding EMU area, but not so much as to hurt exports overly. The Swiss Central Bank, while pursuing an independent policy vis-ā-vis the ECB, has nevertheless allowed a certain depreciation of the Swiss franc vis-ā-vis, in particular, the dollar. This has permitted it to observe a 3-month Libor fluctuation margin of 3 to 4 per cent, that is, lower than the ECB rate.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify">97. For Switzerland a successful EMU is vital.  The country had feared that the Swiss Franc would become a refuge currency in the event of euro instability and therefore become too strong. However, this fear has not materialised.  Instead, the two currencies had shown a very high degree of stability vis-ā-vis each other.  Switzerland's interest in a healthy EMU is highlighted by the fact that over 60% of Swiss exports are destined for the European Union, while over 80% of the country's imports come from the EU.  Fortunately for Switzerland, interest rates have remained much lower than in Euroland, favouring economic development.</p>

    <p align="justify">98. Finally, many of the countries in <b>central and eastern Europe</b> show impressive economic growth and must be expected to be EMU candidates once they have joined the European Union. Especially Poland and Hungary show annual growth figures in the vicinity of 4-5%, while other countries in the region are not far behind. No doubt the EMU will be subjected to certain strains as these countries join, but one should not overlook the dynamic effects of having a larger single currency area stretching increasingly into central and eastern Europe.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">99. It came as something of a damper, however, when the finance ministers of the European Union, in November 2000, told countries seeking EU membership not to adopt the euro unilaterally but instead to comply with the EU&#8217;s treaty conditions for joining the EMU. The ECOFIN Council said that candidate countries would not be able to join the euro immediately after accession to the EU, but that &#8220;euroisation&#8221; will have to respect the conditions laid out in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The EU standpoint seems to be that candidate countries would first have to join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System for two years, before possibly joining the euro. The ECOFIN statement cannot have been particularly welcome to candidate countries. Estonia, for example, has pegged its currency to the euro in the hope of rapidly joining the EMU. </p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify"><b>VI.  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE CALL FOR A SINGLE-VOICE, SINGLE ACTION EUROLAND</b></p>

    <p align="justify">100. The EMU is ultimately a political project and those in favour of a stronger political integration, including in the security and defence areas, can rejoice in the major progress reached within the EU in this field since the December 1999 EU Helsinki Summit.</p>

    <p align="justify">101. As has been seen, numerous countries in Euroland experience considerable inflationary pressure. There is nothing, however, that these countries can do by way of monetary and interest rate policies. Their only recourse is structural reform, which some are now undertaking with vigour. If inflation-prone countries would have preferred a much higher ECB interest rate, then countries in a weaker phase of the business cycle would have liked to see a lower interest rate than the one currently observed by the ECB. The internal monetary tensions within Euroland should not be underestimated. However, they may also be transitory as economies may become more synchronised under the weight of EMU-led integration.</p>

    <p align="justify">102. As has been mentioned the Danes, in a referendum on the euro in September 2000, pronounced themselves against entry by a 53% to a 47% majority. Denmark will therefore, for the foreseeable future, stay outside the EMU (with the &#8216;krone&#8217; closely shadowing the euro), while clear majorities in the United Kingdom and Sweden &#8211; no doubt influenced by the Danish &#8216;nej&#8217; &#8211; are, at least for the moment, against their countries&#8217; joining. This poses an additional risk to the euro, in that three comparatively strong EU economies are staying out, while a, still, somewhat weaker one &#8211; Greece &#8211; is joining and the economically relatively fragile candidates for EU (and hence EMU) membership are knocking on the door.<b> </b></p>

    <p align="justify">103. As for the EU candidate countries, some can be expected in due course to join the so-called ERM II and eventually, after becoming members, the EMU itself. They all now have a goal, which is to join the European Union, of which the EMU is an integral part. For that to happen, the candidates will have to show continued determination to pursue structural reform and to maintain fiscal and other discipline. In so doing, they must be helped by the most open possible trade with the EU and by EU assistance, both material and immaterial.</p>

    <p align="justify">104. The EMU does not only represent a step towards political union.  The history of currency unions shows that, on the whole, they do not survive without political union.  The only possible exceptions were the Belgian-Luxembourg Union (now subsumed into the euro) and the West African Franc Zone (which has little in common with the EU and can therefore be discounted).  In the case of the USSR, the monetary union collapsed once the political union fell apart.  Two nineteenth century monetary unions - the Latin Monetary Union between France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece, and the Scandinavian Monetary Union between Denmark, Sweden and Norway - both disintegrated once unacceptable pressures developed.  As Dr Otmar Issing, the Chief Economist of the European Central Bank, has said: &quot;There is no example in history of a lasting monetary union that was not linked to one state&quot;.</p>

    <p align="justify">105. The EU therefore has little time left to show that it is a real union. The euro has not yet taken root in the sense of truly converging national economies although many economic actors now seem to think in more &#8216;euro-wide&#8217; terms. Indeed, divergence between several overheating economies and other more &#8216;under-heating&#8217; ones, seems if anything to have widened. For some EMU countries &#8211; the stronger ones &#8211; the euro seems to be considered as a means of <i>managing</i> the economy. For others &#8211; the weaker ones &#8211; it all too often, however, seems to be a means for <i>sharing </i>equitably the resources of the stronger economies.</p>

    <p align="justify">106. A single currency calls for <i>converging, coordinated financial and budgetary policies</i>. A clear <i>direction</i> of policies must be pronounced, as well as the pace for the journey to the destination.</p>

    <p align="justify">107. Above all, a single currency calls for a &#8211; indeed <i>one</i> &#8211; <i>clearly pronounced political will, expressing a true unity that is perceived by the world as such</i>. This requires a high degree of <i>efficient communication</i> between, and from, policy-makers in EMU countries. The countries in the EMU said yes to monetary unification in advance of political-economic unification - an order that appeared unorthodox to those who would have preferred the opposite order. However, since they bravely chose that order in what one must expect to have been full cognisance of the situation, one must now<b> </b>also hope and expect that they will not hesitate in doing the necessary in the political-economic field, at the peril of otherwise seeing their great enterprise suffer unduly and future historians treat them harshly. It is in the interest of all Europeans, and in particular the political leaders of EMU countries, to ensure that such a turn of events never comes about. </p>

    <p align="justify"><b>APPENDIX</b></p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify">Speech delivered by President W. F. Duisenberg to the members of the</p>

    <p align="justify">Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Parliamentary</p>

    <p align="justify">Assembly of the Council of Europe on occasion of their visit on 30 April 1999.</p>

    <p align="justify">Thank you, Ms Degn, for your introductory remarks. First of all I should like to welcome you to Frankfurt and the European Central Bank (ECB). It is indeed a pleasure to engage with you in an exchange of information and views today, especially in view of the wide membership of your Committee. It is all the more important, since&nbsp;&#8211; as you rightly pointed out &#8211; the advent of the euro will have repercussions way beyond the confines of the EU. Our understanding of the implications of EMU and the challenges which lie ahead cannot and must not be restricted exclusively to the euro area &#8211; and exchanges such as this one today will increase awareness of the pan-European dimension of the single currency.</p>

    <p align="justify">In addition to myself, Mr. Padoa-Schioppa will be attending this meeting, and as the member of the Executive Board in charge of the ECB&#8217;s European and international relations, he will join in the debate which we shall have later and which I hope will be a lively one. Specialists from our Directorate General &#8211; International and European Relations will also be available for a detailed discussion.</p>

    <p align="justify">* * *</p>

    <p align="justify">On 1 January 1999 the euro became a reality of the European economic and political landscape. The ECB assumed full operational responsibility for the management of this currency for 11 countries, with the primary objective of maintaining price stability. The much celebrated launch of the euro was the culmination of a long period of diligent preparation, not only on the part of the ECB itself, its precursor organisation the European Monetary Institute, and the national central banks, but also on the part of the banking and financial sectors, EU legislators and many others. This experience reveals that participation in a monetary union requires an extended preparatory period, even among highly developed and integrated countries such as the Member States of the EU.</p>

    <p align="justify">Indeed, the thorough preparation has paid off: the euro got off to a smooth start and quickly established itself in the global financial markets. The ECB has started to fulfil its functions within the Eurosystem, which comprises the ECB and the 11 national central banks of the countries participating in the euro. The decision-making bodies have already established a certain routine, and the decentralised system of monetary policy is being implemented, along with new rules and procedures. This applies equally to the wider scope of activities of the ECB, for example those related to the collection of statistics, the preparations for the issuance of banknotes or the operation of payment systems.</p>

    <p align="justify">However it would be altogether wrong to assume that, from now on, the successful running of monetary policy and the management of the new currency will be routine and &#8220;business as usual&#8221;. <u>In fact, the opposite is true</u>. </p>

    <p align="justify">The ECB and its role are in a process of evolution and face a number of challenges. Although the ECB has been endowed with full independence and its objectives and competencies are clearly enshrined in the Treaty establishing the European Community, the ECB will have to bring substance to its assigned role in order to make the euro a lasting success. A reputation such as that of the Deutsche Bundesbank, for instance, is not acquired overnight. While building up its reputation, the ECB has to grow in stature, and face up to the challenges ahead. Allow me to outline a few of those challenges.</p>

    <p align="justify">* * *</p>

    <p align="justify">First, there is the internal consolidation process which any new institution, especially a multinational organisation such as the ECB, has to go through. The advent of the euro transferred responsibility for monetary policy&nbsp;&#8211; overnight &#8211; from the national to the European level. Yet shifting the focus of monetary policy-makers, economic operators and the public to this new setting will be a more gradual process. It is in this context that a major challenge for the newly established <u>Eurosystem</u> will be to develop a truly European outlook and a perception of its responsibility for the euro area as a whole. </p>

    <p align="justify">* * *</p>

    <p align="justify">Second, there is the crucial task of further developing and sustaining a &#8220;stability consensus&#8221; among the governments and the public in Europe, without which it will be more difficult for the ECB to fulfil its mandate to pursue a monetary policy oriented towards the primary objective of price stability.</p>

    <p align="justify">Monetary policy is not conducted in a political vacuum. The independent ECB cannot take its decisions as if the Eurotower is an ivory tower. In order to gain support and credibility for its monetary policy, the ECB has to explain its decisions to Europe&#8217;s elected politicians and the European public at large. Developing and sustaining a &#8220;stability consensus&#8221; among the citizens of Europe becomes all the more important as direct experience of the damaging effects of inflation on expectations, savings, growth, employment and income distribution fades away, and a new generation grows up &#8211; fortunately &#8211; in an environment of stable prices. </p>

    <p align="justify">Winning and maintaining public support for a stability-oriented monetary policy requires accountability and transparent decision-making. The ECB aims to achieve this by means of a number of regular publications, frequent public speeches by members of the Executive Board and extended monthly press conferences. In addition to this direct communication with the public, the ECB is also involved in an ongoing dialogue with the policy-makers of the EU. Hearings at the European Parliament, participation in formal and informal meetings of EU Ministers of Finance and Economy all serve to communicate the ECB&#8217;s point of view and share the ECB&#8217;s appreciation and analysis of the current economic situation. In addition, a number of other channels of communication are available, on both the political and technical levels, to ensure that the ECB&#8217;s monetary policy is conducted in full knowledge of the orientation of other policies in Europe.</p>

    <p align="justify">Ultimately, there is no trade-off between accountability and credibility; on the contrary, accountability and transparency are crucial ingredients for the ECB&#8217;s credibility with economic operators and the general public. Yet at the same time there are, of course, certain limits to the ECB&#8217;s openness which simply derive from the operational necessities of the conduct of monetary policy. Financial markets react to the signals sent out from the Eurotower&nbsp;&#8211; usually with great speed and effectiveness. In view of the market reactions which central bank comments can generate, it is only natural that the ECB has to take this into account in its communications policy.</p>

    <p align="justify">We are convinced that the ECB will build up and maintain the public support so crucial to its policies if it steadily pursues its primary objective of price stability. Successfully &#8220;safeguarding the currency&#8221; is the best service which the ECB can provide to the citizens of Europe. This is no easy task, requires a longer-term perspective and therefore sometimes clashes with the more short-term objectives of politicians. It is precisely in order to avoid the possibility of monetary policy being used to obtain short-term political advantages&nbsp;&#8211; and experience suggests that there are, on occasions, such ambitions&nbsp;&#8211; that the ECB has been endowed with the independence to pursue its objective without the interference of politicians. This independence is of particular importance in economically difficult situations. </p>

    <p align="justify">* * *</p>

    <p align="justify">Third, the greatest challenge in Europe today, and thus also for the ECB, is the unemployment problem. With its exclusive competence for monetary policy in the euro area, the ECB undoubtedly has a role to play in the provision of the economic conditions which are conducive to growth and employment. Yet there should be no misunderstanding about what monetary policy can and should do to remedy the plight of the unemployed.</p>

    <p align="justify">Throughout the past decades, European unemployment rates have been ratcheting up with each recession, without ever falling back to their earlier levels in the subsequent recoveries. This points to the largely structural nature of Europe&#8217;s stubbornly high unemployment. Over-regulation of labour markets, perverse incentives created by the welfare systems and rigidities throughout the economy, to name only the most pertinent causes, are certainly at the root of the problem. </p>

    <p align="justify">If the diagnosis of Europe&#8217;s unemployment points to structural factors, then the prescribed remedies should focus on tackling these, the causes of the problem, rather than tinkering with the symptoms. </p>

    <p align="justify">Let me be more explicit. Experience in, for example, the Netherlands and Britain shows that a successful fight against unemployment requires a bold agenda of structural reform. This sometimes painful process should, preferably, be implemented with the consensus of all involved (as, for example, in the Netherlands), but attempts to push through measures on deregulation and flexibility have frequently hit strong opposition from deeply entrenched sectoral interests. The structural reform process is all the more difficult since its success does not immediately become apparent. Yet it would be an illusion to believe that postponing the necessary reforms again and again would eventually make them avoidable altogether.</p>

    <p align="justify">Under these circumstances, the fight against unemployment is primarily in the hands of governments and regulators, trade unions and employers. The best contribution which monetary policy can make to growth and employment creation is to maintain price stability, to provide a clear horizon for expectations and investment decisions. It is precisely this which is the primary objective of the ECB. </p>

    <p align="justify">The Treaty establishing the European Community also confers upon the ECB the task of supporting the general economic policies of the Community, provided that this is possible without prejudice to the objective of price stability. At the present juncture, this task certainly does not imply a more relaxed monetary policy. Especially since the decision on 8 April to reduce the main refinancing rate to 2.5%, we can confidently assert that neither the level of interest rates nor a lack of liquidity are responsible for Europe&#8217;s rather modest investment levels and employment record. Alternatively, referring to the metaphor once used by former German Federal Minister for Finance Karl Schiller: &#8220;we have led the horse to the water, but we cannot make it drink&#8221;. </p>

    <p align="justify">Further increasing the money supply could, potentially, bring about a short-lived improvement in the economic situation and create the illusion that painful structural reforms could be postponed or even avoided altogether. But this should not cloud our understanding that jobs are created in what economists call the &#8220;real economy&#8221;, and that tinkering with nominal variables, such as interest rates and the money supply, will only worsen the situation of the real economy in the long run.</p>

    <p align="justify">Therefore, it is altogether <u>misguided, both in Europe and elsewhere, to demand of monetary policy more than it can perform</u>. </p>

    <p align="justify">Let me underline this point with one more argument. The Treaty assigns competence and responsibility for monetary policy to the ECB and sets a clear objective &#8211; to maintain price stability. Governments have the &#8220;power of the purse&#8221;, controlling public finances and setting, to a great extent, the macro- and microeconomic parameters of the national economies. Labour and management, for their part, are assigned the task of setting wage levels &#8211; in full autonomy and with responsibility in relation to the wider economic context. </p>

    <p align="justify">If decision-makers in all areas assume their respective and clearly defined responsibilities, this will almost certainly lead to an &#8220;appropriate&#8221; policy mix and, at the same time, make it possible to identify clearly those policies which are inadequate. By contrast, any amalgamation of fiscal, monetary and wage policies into an ex&nbsp;ante determination of an allegedly &#8220;appropriate&#8221; policy mix would only blur the lines of responsibility and thereby lead to a situation in which the blame for policy failures could easily be shifted. </p>

    <p align="justify">* * *</p>

    <p align="justify">So far, I have mentioned some of the challenges facing the ECB. Let me now briefly comment on the impact of the euro on Europe as a whole and the integration process in a wider perspective.</p>

    <p align="justify">Many observers have criticised the EU for its &#8220;obsession with its own internal dynamics&#8221;, in particular in the context of EMU. With all our energies focused on meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria and the preparation for the launch of the euro, Europeans outside the EU have often wondered whether EMU and EU enlargement are not mutually exclusive objectives. </p>

    <p align="justify"> </p>

    <p align="justify">Let me briefly comment on this issue. After the historic decision to complete the European Single Market in the 1980s, it was felt that economic integration should not stop at that point. To fully reap the rewards of economic integration within the Community, a single currency was felt to be necessary &#8211; a logic neatly summarised in the title of the Delors Report study: &#8220;One market, one money&#8221;. </p>

    <p align="justify">Hence, the idea underlying Economic and Monetary Union was to advance European integration and to ensure that full use would be made of the economic potential of the Single Market. This idea continues to be the focus of European policy-makers, as evidenced by the association agreements and the ongoing accession negotiations with a number of European countries. Good and mutually beneficial economic relations with third countries in Europe and further afield are a pillar of EU policy orientations. In recognition of this, the principles of an <u>open</u> market economy with free competition are enshrined in the Treaty. EMU will not weaken this commitment, but rather reinforce it. Closer co-operation in Europe and adherence to common principles in the political, economic and social fields are likely to form the basis for further integration &#8211; to which the ECB will contribute within the scope of its responsibilities.</p>

    <p align="justify">However, countries wishing to deepen their monetary co-operation to the greatest possible extent by forming a monetary union will have to adapt their economic and legal systems to the standards required by the Treaty and aim at a sufficient degree of economic convergence. In the absence of these conditions, adjustment costs for both existing and new participants could be tremendously high. Any premature decision on the adoption of the euro could have severe repercussions on a country&#8217;s competitiveness and trigger painful economic adjustment. Therefore, the implementation of the necessary institutional reforms and the attainment of a sufficient degree of convergence should not be considered as an obstacle preventing further integration in Europe, but rather as an essential part of ensuring the lasting success of EMU.</p>

    <p align="justify">Meanwhile, even at the current juncture, EMU in part of Europe is already having appreciable effects throughout the whole region. Let me briefly mention a few: </p>

    <p align="justify">&#8226; If the euro emerges &#8211; as I believe it will &#8211; as a strong and stable currency, it will provide the countries in the region with an important reference currency and an anchor towards which &#8211; should the intention arise &#8211; monetary policy could credibly be oriented. </p>

    <p align="justify">&#8226; Furthermore, EMU is set to bring about the development of a truly unified European financial market, approaching that of the United States in terms of depth and sophistication. The competitive pressures of this euro area financial market will create more favourable financing conditions for borrowers, including public and private entities from the non-EU countries. A number of central and eastern European countries have already successfully tapped this market; I note, for instance, the Hungarian government&#8217;s e500 million bond issue or that of Slovenia, worth e400&nbsp;million. </p>

    <p align="justify">In view of these effects, it is only natural that the ECB has started to follow economic and financial developments in the wider Europe with great interest, particularly in those countries which have applied for EU membership and which can eventually be expected also to participate in EMU. Moreover, the ECB monitors closely the exchange rate developments of those countries which have established some form of exchange rate link to the euro. </p>

    <p align="justify">Let me finally add that in my view, the euro is far more than just a new currency for almost 300 million people in 11 countries, it is also a unifying symbol, a sign of identity and of common values for the peoples of Europe. Consequently, the public perception of the euro could endow the single currency with a role in the process of European integration going beyond monetary policy in the strict sense. As you will be aware, the preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Community makes reference to an &#8220;ever closer union among the peoples of Europe&#8221;. Therefore, many expect &#8211; not unjustifiably &#8211; that economic and monetary integration will exercise a positive influence on the integration process in other policy fields.</p>

    <p align="justify">I am now at your disposal should you have any questions.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify"><i>Reporting committee</i>: Committee on Economic Affairs and Development</p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Reference to committee:</i> Order No. 481 (1992)</p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Draft resolution</i> adopted by the committee on 3 November 2000.</p>

    </blockquote><ul><p align="justify"><i>Members of the committee</i>: <i>Valleix </i>(Acting Chairman), <i>Elo, </i>Brunhart  (Vice-Chairmen),  <i>Akgönenį</i>, Aliko, Arnau, Attard Montalto, Behrendt, <i>Billing,</i> <i>Blaauw, Blattmann</i>,<i>&nbsp;</i>Bojars, <i>Bonet Casas</i>, <i>Braun, Budisa</i>,<i> Calner,</i> Clinton-Davis (Alternate: <i>Ponsonby</i>), <i>Cunliffe</i>,&nbsp;Cusimano (Alternate: <i>Turini</i>),  Eyskens,  <i>Frey,</i> Freyberg,  Gryzlov,  <i>Gül</i>, Guma,  Gusenbauer, Haupert (Alternate: <i>Calmes</i>), Hoffmann, Jung (Alternate: <i>Durrieu</i>), Kacin, <i>Kestelijn-Sierens</i>, <i>Kirilov, </i>Kittis, Lazarenko, Leers (Alternate: <i>Duivesteijn</i>), <i>Liapis</i>, Lopes Cardona, <i>Lotz, </i>Makhachev, Mateju, Mitterrand, Moynihan-Cronin (Alternate: <i>Connor</i>), Niculescu, Nikologorsky,<i> </i>Patarkalishvili, Pereira Coelho (Alternate: <i>Cesário</i>), <i>Popescu</i>, Popovski, Prokes, <i>&nbsp;Puche</i>, Ragnarsdottir, <i>Riccardi</i>, <i>Rigo</i>,  Schmitz,  <i>Squarcialupi</i>,<i> Stepova</i>, Stoyanova,<i> </i>Tallo, <i>Townend</i>, Tsekouras, Vasile (Alternate: <i>Gabrielescu</i>), Westenthaler (Alternate: <i>d'Aron</i>), <i>Wielowieyski</i>, Zapfl-Helbling.</p>

    </ul><blockquote><p align="justify"><i>N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.</i></p>

    <p align="justify"><i>Secretaries of the committee</i>:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MM. Torbiörn, Mezei and Ms Ramanauskaite.</p></blockquote></ul>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="200" noshade>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P17_200" href="#P17_201">1</a> </sup> Mr Michael Colvin, former Co-Rapporteur, died with his wife in a fire in his family home on 24 February 2000. </p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P144_14827" href="#P144_14828">2</a> 2</sup> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Rapporteur welcomes Greece&#8217;s entry into the EMU, recognising the country&#8217;s great efforts to join.  Greece was admitted in spite of a debt burden in excess of the EMU requirements (104% of GDP, as against the 60% required in the Treaty on European Union). However, such dispensation was also granted countries such as Italy and Belgium, which had similar debt burdens. There were also concerns in the ECB and elsewhere as to whether inflation in Greece, currently at around 2%, could be kept low also in the future, and as to the need to pursue deregulation of domestic markets. </p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P153_17087" href="#P153_17088">3</a> </sup> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The EU member countries participating in the EMU are:  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and, as from 1 January 2001, Greece. Three countries &#8211; Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom &#8211; do not participate in the EMU. In September 2000, Denmark held a referendum on whether to join. 53% were against, and 47% in favour. Denmark will therefore not join the EMU in the foreseeable future.)</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P154_18306" href="#P154_18307">4</a> </sup> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The early discussions regarding a European single currency were strongly influenced by the thinking of Robert Mundell, who would later be awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics for his research into the matter. Mundell recommended single currencies for regions with much in common, regardless of whether they spanned national borders. Mundell&#8217;s theories were used by single currency proponents who said the EU was such a region: and by single currency opponents who argued that the project was doomed since the EU area was not an optimal currency region.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P178_24470" href="#P178_24471">5</a> </sup> The European Central Bank itself holds around &#8364; 42 billion in reserves. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB), that is, the ECB and the central banks of the participating countries, have additional reserves of some &#8364; 220 billion (&#8364; 381 billion if gold is included).</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P179_24908" href="#P179_24909">6</a> </sup> The &#8216;G-7&#8217; communiqué of 23 September 2000 justified the intervention on the grounds of &#8220;shared concern &#8230; about the potential implications of recent movements in the euro for the world economy&#8221;. It is, however, uncertain whether there were many &#8216;currency speculators&#8217; for the intervention to punish, since the flow away from the euro is mainly of longer-term funds.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P225_40266" href="#P225_40267">7</a> </sup> The national central banks (NCBs) of non-EMU member states participate in the general work of the ESCB but not in the decision-making regarding the single monetary policy for the euro area.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P279_56136" href="#P279_56137">8</a> </sup> Statistical data source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2000.</p>

<p align="justify"><sup><a name="P296_59753" href="#P296_59754">9</a> </sup> The other Maastricht convergence criteria - exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates - have of course disappeared with the introduction of the Euro.</p><!-- TRANSIT - INFOAFTER -->
</body>
</html>
