Doc. 9000

19 March 2001

Freedom of expression and information in the media in Europe

Report

Committee on Culture, Science and Education

Rapporteur: Mr Gyula Hegyi, Hungary, Socialist Group

Summary

      Freedom of expression and information in the media continues to be violated throughout Europe. Censorship is exercised through violence, trial and imprisonment, or economic harassment. New threats arise from globalisation of the media market and commercial challenges to media pluralism.

      Media freedom is felt to be an essential indicator of the maturity of democratic society. The report and recommendation urge practical measures to defend freedom of expression in media including public pressure in individual member countries and a Council of Europe media rapporteur as an ombudsperson.

I.       Draft recommendation

 

1.       The Assembly believes that free and independent media are an essential indicator of the democratic maturity of a society. The right to freedom of expression and information is intrinsically linked to the citizens' right to know, which is the basis for making well-informed decisions. The possibility to express freely ideas and opinions enhances public dialogue and therefore stimulates the development of the democratic process in society.

 

2.       Now that there are 43 member states in the Council of Europe, almost all the continent is covered by the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Article 10 which guarantees everybody freedom of expression, including “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. Rapid progress towards democratisation in that respect is expected in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Belarus remains the country where the deeds of the authorities most blatantly go against the values and principles in the media field defended by the Council of Europe.

 

3.       As was stated in Assembly Recommendation 1407 (1999) on media and democratic culture, enormous progress in the field of freedom of expression and information has been achieved in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism. However, serious and unacceptable violations of this freedom are still committed in a number of countries. At the same time new challenges arise and they have to be faced by the whole of Europe.

 

4.       Censorship is still practised and in its most appalling form, violence and murder. Journalists continue to die, not only when covering events on the battlefield, but mainly because of their profession when they try to throw light on darker sides of the society such as corruption, financial abuse, drug trafficking, terrorism or ethnic conflict. Most perpetrators of such crimes have not been caught and brought to justice, which casts serious doubts as to the independence of the judiciary and as to the real willingness of the authorities to disclose the truth. The Assembly has recently drawn attention to this problem in Ukraine in Resolution 1239. Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine are the countries where the greatest number of journalists have been subject to physical aggression over the last years.

 

5.       Governments continue to use provisions in legislation, such as defamation, and regulations pertaining to territorial integrity, national security or public order in order to harass undesired critics. Prison sentence for defamation is still practised in several former communist countries and Greece, and also features in the criminal codes of other Western legislations, although it is no longer used there. In Turkey, scores of journalists are still imprisoned or brought to trial, most having been accused of having links with terrorist groups. Elsewhere even where libel has been decriminalised, disproportionately heavy fines often deter free expression and lead to self-censorship. A very high number of court trials also characterises the transition of new democracies from the “one party, one truth” system to pluralism of opinions.

 

6.       In several countries access to official information is to a great extent left to the discretion of the authorities. Particularly unacceptable are the restrictions imposed on access to information in areas of conflict such as Chechnya, despite many Assembly appeals to the Russian authorities to guarantee free access to journalists, and in regions officially declared to be under state of emergency in Turkey. Some aspects of the information policy of NATO during the Kosovo War also deserve criticism.

 

7.       Attacks against freedom of expression can take many other forms, such as threats, intimidation, arbitrary closure of media outlets, power cuts, bomb alerts, police searches and confiscation of material, damage of printing facilities or television and radio transmitters, heavy taxes, monopolies on paper and distribution, unequal conditions for state media as opposed to other media and pressure on advertisers.

 

8.       Administrative harassment is also commonplace in several former communist countries, especially through tax and other financial regulations. Such practices, for instance in Russia, are currently used in an apparent attempt to bring all nation-wide TV stations under governmental control.

 

9.       Precarious economic conditions and a low level of democratic culture represent in themselves a serious threat to freedom of expression since they make the media an easy prey to mighty political, economic and other interests. Instead of performing their role of a public watchdog, the media become instruments for settling scores and are transformed into mercenaries acting upon orders.

 

10.       Independence of public service broadcasting and the need to provide a genuinely independent regulatory authority for the broadcasting sector, as prescribed in the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2000) 23, remain a serious challenge for almost all former communist countries and is not completely taken for granted even in established democracies. This was well illustrated during the recent events concerning the Czech public TV and the Bulgarian national radio. In Hungary only the ruling parties are represented in the TV and radio boards, despite the constant complaints of two opposition parties. Recently a new law on radio and television was adopted in Croatia without taking into account the reservations in that respect of the Council of Europe. It is equally important to establish a fair and transparent licensing procedure, as it can be witnessed in the case of the problems that private broadcasters in Azerbaijan are facing.

 

11.       Throughout Europe, freedom of expression and information is facing new challenges resulting from the ongoing process of globalisation of the media market along with the revolution provoked by the convergence between broadcasting, computing and telecommunications. The current market restructuring, leading to new alliances and mergers between traditional media companies and new service providers, might lead to further concentration and vertical integration of multimedia corporations and thus restrict media pluralism. The Committee of Ministers, in their Recommendation (99) 1, stressed that states should promote political and cultural pluralism by developing their media policy in line with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

 

12.       There is a growing trend for the media to be considered as a purely commercial product rather than a specific cultural and democratic resource. Even if certain journalists are willing to live with it, this trend puts the majority of them under unacceptable pressure to sacrifice quality journalism to “infotainment” and therefore restricts freedom of expression and information. The merciless competition between media enterprises puts increasing pressure on editorial boards to ensure immediate coverage, at the expense of in-depth analysis and research. Cuts in editorial budgets and new ownership policies result in a decline of editorial standards and to increasing reliance on freelance journalists and consequent damage to professional responsibility. Investigative journalism is becoming unprofitable. Sensational stories and “advertorials” or “Big Brother”-style programmes are replacing independent editorials.

 

13.       Taking into account these considerations, the Assembly considers that freedom of expression and information is and will remain be a major challenge for democracy in Europe and should continue to be a primary concern for the Council of Europe.

 

14.       In this respect, the Assembly reiterates its position, stated in Recommendation 1407 (1999) on media and democratic culture, that the Council of Europe should “exert moral and political pressure upon governments which violate freedom of expression". The Assembly will pursue this issue, and on a country-by-country basis. It deplores the fact that the Committee of Ministers has still failed to reply to the Recommendation, and this in a period when it is striving to acquire a stronger political presence in Europe.

 

15.       Therefore the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

i. consider as a priority the defence of freedom of expression and information in member and candidate states;

ii. set up a more efficient system of defending freedom of expression and information in Europe, involving all relevant sectors of the organisation dealing with this issue and allowing it to increase pressure on governments;

iii. make public the findings of its monitoring procedure in the field of freedom of expression, formulate on this basis specific recommendations to individual member states and make these states publicly accountable for their implementation;

iv. ensure that the expertise provided by the Council of Europe in the field of media legislation is duly taken into account by member states, particularly on points challenging attempts at political control over the media; 

v. instruct its relevant bodies to step up work on challenges to freedom of expression and information and to media pluralism and diversity stemming from globalisation and from the further development of the information society

vi. enhance public debate within its specific bodies on necessary changes and improvements in the field of freedom of expression and information in member countries;

vii. provide the necessary means for the implementation of assistance programmes and make governments better aware of the urgent need for voluntary contributions;

viii. ensure coordination and complementarity of the above-mentioned activities with other international institutions, and in particular the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the European Union and Unesco, as well as with relevant journalist associations and trade unions;

16.       The Assembly welcomes the decision of its Committee on Culture, Science and Education to appoint a General Rapporteur on the Media and requests the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General to give him/her their support, in particular as regards information and secretariat assistance.

II.        Explanatory memorandum by Mr Hegyi

Contents

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I.       Foreword

1.       A commonly known anecdote says that Frederick the Great, king of Prussia, delightfully read the posters abusing him while riding his horse in the streets of Berlin. When he found that the master working under the cover of the night stuck any of them too high on the wall, he had his servants move them lower so that the good Berliners could read the prints attacking him. Frederick the Great – as an ardent fan of Enlightenment – respected the freedom of the printed press and condemned backward despotism. It is another thing, though, that he required iron discipline in the army, in his public administration, in education and the entire state mechanism. Having a strong army and a state apparatus controlled by strong hands, some posters displayed in the streets of the capital meant no danger whatsoever for his reign. The gesture of adjusting the posters insulting him to the eye level of pedestrians was considered to be rather stylish in his environment sporting the French mentality.

2.       To be somewhat cynical we could say that the relation of the political and economic elite to the press has not changed much since then. The difference between the “fans” and the fierce opponents of freedom of the press is much more than between being willing to repeat the Prussian king’s gesture when it comes to low circulation newspapers and ripping down the posters and our anecdote. The chain of commercial TV channels spread around the whole world are concentrated in the hands of a few large multinational companies, and through these economic power centres, their influence on the media and on politics are connected. This model is a hundred times more vast and efficient than that of Frederick the Greats at the peak of his power.

3.       The enlightened mighty of our age can easily afford to make a stand for the freedom of the press in the non-commercial sector while the petty local sharks and thick-headed governments are quite aggressive to filch the tiniest sound bites. On top of that, they do believe that something irreparable would happen to them if as many as one criticising poster stayed glued to the street wall. These latter are the open enemies of freedom of the press, and are regarded as pathetic amateurs by the professionals who own ninety per cent of the electronic media market. However, they are also secretly grateful to them, since while the Eastern-European despots behead journalists and the Eastern-European governments occupy the public channels, few talk about the monopolies leniently liquidating extensive news coverage.

4. Last spring, the Cultural Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked me to prepare a comprehensive survey on the status of the freedom of opinion in forty-three countries of the organisation. As a first step, I sent out a detailed questionnaire to my fellow representatives, which was answered in twenty-three countries. Some of them complained about the dominance of government as perceived in public TV channels (and not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also, for instance, in France and Spain). Certain right-wing politicians blamed the left-wing liberal conditioning of journalists. Surprisingly enough, these voices were the loudest in Switzerland. However, the issue they practically all agreed on was that politics is unable to influence the giant media concerns while the commercial media moguls regularly affect politicians.

5. In modern democracies, significant political affairs tend more and more to be created by the media and the financial group backing them up – politicians, in the best case, can only swim with the current. Corruption scandals are generally sparked off by businessman linking economic and political life. Even in protest marches expressing some “spontaneous” outcry the same standard English language boards are carried from Manila through Minsk to Kosovo Mitrovica. Politics can assert its influence only if its interests overlap with those of the business elite. The conflict in Kosovo offered an expressive example of that. Johann P. Fritz, head of the Vienna-based International Press Institute, recorded in a case study those obvious lies which flooded the media at the time of the bombing of Yugoslavia.

6. While the Serbs dumbfounded their own audience with classical hoaxes about the alleged shooting of dozens of NATO aeroplanes, the NATO propaganda topped the real crimes of the Serbs with false news they made up. The persecution of Rugova’s family, herding ten thousand Albanians in the Pristina stadium, the execution of Kosovo teachers in front of their students – not one word was true among them. The war in Kosovo was a really juicy morsel for researchers of modern media, because here not so much the two armies but rather the two types of propaganda mechanisms measured swords with each other. On the Serb side stood the classical state propaganda mechanism with the government media at its front. On the side of NATO, the big television companies in private ownership played the main role, which, due to complicated systems of interests, carried the coverage of NATO headquarters essentially without criticism. The printed press and some independent TV companies have only recently started to explore the real truth, long after the events actually took place.

7. Of course, the war in Kosovo was only a colourful oil stain in the world- wide sea of the influence of the commercial media. The real innovation of this media is that it links entertainment and newsreel with the almighty commercial. Feature films and reports more and more adopt the language of advertisements, and commercials persuade viewers not only to buy physical goods but also drill its audience to a form of life, a certain view of the world, and a massively consumer and uniform mentality. Berlusconi, a leader of the Italian right wing, is the first who would like to unify power over politics, economy and media capping all these by sports. Such a personality cult is not in fashion in other countries, and the owners of the media do not all crave for a political career. Whatever way it is, freedom of opinion and the versatility of different views are forced lower and out of the giant media concerns into papers with low circulation.

8. The fact that the public media has been taken over by the government all over Central Europe may seem a pathetic memory from the past in the shadow of the media-empires representing the concentration of economic and political power. In spite of the Frederick the Greats of modern media politics, old Prussian sergeants rule here, who would tear off all the posters with their own hands. However, even while fighting for the freedom of serving the public we should not forget about the fact that all types of monopoly threaten the versatility of opinion. From that point of view it makes no difference whether the machine cramming in uniform opinion panels is owned by the state or a private entity.

9. The violation of the most basic norms of the freedom of the press – kidnapping, imprisonment, murder and public beheading of journalists – characterises those countries in Eastern Europe which were appointed “democratic” by the West partly out of strategic considerations, partly intoxicated by the euphoria of the political changes in 1989/90. We probably cheat ourselves if we take the authoritarian states making up the bulk of the Soviet successor countries as democracies. In their case, we need to speak up for the journalists as individuals and victims persecuted innocently while trusting mainly the modest strength of sanctions. No matter if the government, the Mafia or the armed opposition pursue them, they are the victims of oppression all the same. For real freedom of the press, journalists should be independent not only from the ruling power but also from the economic elite involved in a complicated game with those in power. The distance between the cut-off heads of Eastern European journalists and the gestures of modern Frederick the Greats encouraging poster-freedom is long, but real freedom of the press is quite far away too.

II.       Introduction

10.       With the recent accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, almost the whole continent is covered by the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular its Article 10 which guarantees everybody freedom of expression, including “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”.

11.       This unprecedented expansion of human rights and the rule of law, along with the latest developments in modern communication technologies which provide seemingly unlimited access to information, raise the question: has freedom of expression at last become a stable and irreversible reality across our continent?

12.       There is no doubt that immense progress has been achieved in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism. However, alerts regarding violations of media freedoms in different countries reach the Council of Europe every day.

13.       Journalists in Europe still die while fulfilling their professional duties. Not only on the battlefield (in 1999, six journalists died in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and three in Chechnya) but also when they try to illuminate some of the darker sides of modern society such as corruption, financial abuse, drug trafficking, terrorism or ethnic conflict. Censorship through murder is still a reality in Europe.

14.       It is most preoccupying that a few European governments are still able to keep the media under their control and use all methods – threats, repression, violence, legal charges, imprisonment etc. – in order to silence independent voices. Until recently, under the dictatorship of Mr Milosevic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the most blatant example of continuous media repression, and the situation remains not much better now in Belarus. But even in countries members of the Council of Europe violations systematically occur.

15.       It is also a matter of great concern that in several European countries which publicly declare their attachment to freedom of expression and which have indeed made significant progress in this respect over the last years, journalists can still be sent to prison under existing legislation for the opinions that they have expressed, for instance in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Romania or Ukraine. According to Reporters sans Frontičres, at least 19 journalists in Turkey were sent to prison in 1999 and 87 others were arrested.

16.       We can also see the media being used as propaganda tools, spreading words of hate, racism and xenophobia. This continues to be the case for instance in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Russia towards the Chechens.

17.       Even where the legal texts are in line with European standards, sometimes striking discrepancies can be witnessed between words and deeds. The most powerful means of mass communication – radio and television – in certain countries are still under government control and public service broadcasting is non-existent. Financial and political pressure, threats and other forms of harassment with regard to the media are still commonplace in some of the younger European democracies, while pressures from mighty financial conglomerates and media concentrations can be a serious problem also in many western countries.

18.       The European Court of Human Rights continues to sentence western governments with long-established democratic traditions for violations of Article 10. Amongst the most recent cases: Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21.01.1999, Bladet Tromsř and Stensaas v. Norway, 20.05.1999, New Verlqgs GmbH & CoKG v. Austria, 11/01/2000, Bergens Tidende and others v. Norway , 2 May 2000 , Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, 28/09/2000, Du Roy et Malaurie v. France, 03.10.2000. (See European Court of Human Rights database: http://www.echr.coe.int).

19.       But even where such violations do not exist, freedom of expression and information cannot be taken for granted, since new problems appear. They are related to the ongoing process of globalisation of the media market, spurred on by the new communication technologies, and therefore represent a challenge for the whole of Europe. Media production is increasingly becoming a tradable commodity rather than a specific cultural product and competition constraints take precedence over journalistic deontology. Tasteless sensationalism and stupid “Big Brother”-style entertainment get better ratings than careful analysis and investigative journalism. Standardisation of information becomes a threat to cultural diversity.

20.       In April 1999 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1407 on media and democratic culture in which it asked the Committee of Ministers to monitor closely the state of freedom of press in European member and non-member countries, so as "to exert moral and political pressure upon governments which violate freedom of expression"; " defend and protect journalists who are victims of such violations".

21.       It is regrettable that the Committee of Ministers has been unable in two years to reply to this recommendation. Moreover, several sectors of the Council of Europe are working on the issue of freedom of expression and the need for a well-coordinated, flexible and efficient mechanism of reaction to violations of freedom of expression is greater than ever if the organisation is to enhance its political role.

22.       For its part, the Committee on Culture and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has held many hearings on freedom of expression with journalists and NGOs (see full list in Appendix) and is considering appointing a General Rapporteur on the media.

23.       This report does not have the ambition to draw an exhaustive picture of the press freedom situation in Europe but is rather based on examples and findings from its recent work. Many countries are still to be examined and this should be done on a systematic basis in the future by the Sub-Committee on the Media.

III.        Censorship through violence

24.       Journalism continues to be one of the most dangerous professions, not only because journalists find themselves caught in the crossfire while covering conflicts and wars, but mainly because their professional activities make them target of aggression. By eliminating undesired investigators and critics, governments and interest groups try to deprive the public of the right to know about their own wrong-doings and to prevent people from acting as informed voters. As Nesib Mandzic, the Mayor of Srebrenica told an OSCE-sponsored meeting of journalists and municipal officials, "I cannot accept [the idea] that an attack on a journalist is an attack on everyone".

25.       Violence, although directed towards specific persons, also has a powerful multiplication effect since it creates an atmosphere of fear and terror: the breeding ground for self-censorship.

26.       The report on media and democratic culture gave examples of such censorship through murder. Unfortunately, new appalling examples can be given in this report. It is difficult to say precisely how many journalists have died since the previous report, because the authorities use every pretext to claim that the aggressions were not politically motivated. A favourite excuse is that in the transition period the media often become part of clans fighting with one another. But this is a complacent stance if it is not accompanied by appropriate action. As a matter of fact, most perpetrators of such crimes have not been caught and brought to justice, thus casting serious doubts as to the independence of the judiciary and as to the real willingness of the authorities to disclose the truth. When such willingness is not present, one is forced to think that there are things to hide.

27.       Over the last two years, two names have become the symbol of repression against free speech - Slavko Curuvija in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Grigoriy Gongadze in Ukraine.

28.       Slavko Curuvija, owner and publisher of the Belgrade daily Dnevni Telegraf, was a prominent Yugoslav intellectual and a harsh critic of the regime of Milosevic. In April 1999 he was shot in central Belgrade by two masked gunmen. There was a lot of evidence suggesting that the regime of Milosevic was responsible for his death and it was not surprising that the investigation into his murder at the time gave no results.

29.       New evidence appeared in October 2000, when a document circulated in Belgrade revealed that State Security agents had been tracking Curuvija on the day he was murdered and that they were withdrawn deliberately on the order of the head of the Security Service minutes before the murder "so that they would not see the assassins."

30.       It is very important that the new Serbian government makes rapid progress in the investigation.

31.       In Ukraine, Mr Georgiy Gongadze ran the Internet newspaper "Ukrainska Pravda" (www.pravda.com.ua), which was harshly critical of the President and his entourage. The journalist disappeared on 16 September 2000 on his way home from work in Kyiv. A detailed account of the ensuing events can be found in the report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) (See Doc. 8945) and a more detailed description of the general media situation in the country was presented by the Committee on Culture and Education in Doc. 8946.

32.       Following an urgent procedure debate at its January 2001 part-session, the Assembly deplored "the fact that the authorities’ ostentatious efforts to investigate the case seem incompetent, unimaginative and heavy-handed". The Assembly called on the relevant Ukrainian authorities to conduct an expeditious, full and transparent investigation as regards the disappearance or death of Mr Gongadze, to make known the results of this investigation as quickly as possible and bring to justice those responsible for committing this crime.

33.       At least two other journalists died in Ukraine during that time. Igor Bondar, director of the ATM television station was shot and killed in May 1999 while driving in a car in Odessa together with the judge presiding the court in Odessa, who was also killed in the attack. The death in November 2000 of Yuliy Mazur, the 63-year-old editor of the independent Russian-Ukrainian daily Yug, was attributed to "ethyl alcohol intoxication," but Mr Mazur's colleagues suspected their editor had been poisoned. He had recently received telephone death threats, which they believed were provoked by articles in Yug about corruption in local law-enforcement agencies.

34.       Russia is another country where it is extremely dangerous to be a journalist. According to the Union of Russian Journalists, quoted by AFP, more than 120 journalists have been killed in the country since the end of 1991. Many of these murders or aggressions have not yet been elucidated.

35.       One of the most appalling cases concerns the twice-weekly Moscow paper Novaya Gazeta, known for its independent and critical stance against the government.

36.       In May 2000 Igor Domnikov, 42, a reporter and special-projects editor for the paper, was attacked at the entrance of his block of flats in Moscow and died after two months in a coma. As he used to cover social and cultural issues, it was believed that the assailant had mistaken him for a Novaya Gazeta investigative reporter named Oleg Sultanov, who lived in the same building. In early autumn the police downgraded the case's high-priority status and "archived" it. At the same time Mr Sultanov, who had had published stories of corruption in Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company, close to the government, filed an official complaint with the Prosecutor General's office alleging he was being harassed and threatened. Meanwhile the newspaper had to protect him with bodyguards. In December, another investigative reporter for the same newspaper, Oleg Lurye, was attacked and severely beaten on returning home. The assailants were not thieves, since they did not take his jewellery or mobile phone.

37.       In July 2000, Sergey Novikov, 36, owner of the only independent radio station in Smolensk, Radio Vesna, was killed in the staircase of his block of flats. Radio Vesna often criticised the government of Smolensk Province, especially for corruption. Mr Novikov was said to have received death threats earlier in the year after announcing his intent to run for the provincial governorship.

38.       Iskandar Khatloni, a reporter for the Tajik-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), died in September 2000, after been attacked in his Moscow flat. A RFE/RL spokeswoman said that Mr Khatloni had been working on stories about human-rights abuses by the Russian military in Chechnya. In October 2000 unknown gunmen killed Sergey Ivanov, 30, director of the largest independent television company Lada-TV in Togliatti, a town in Samara Province. Lada-TV, which Mr Ivanov had headed since 1993, was a significant player on the local political scene. In both cases, the motives are still unknown.

39.       Another well-known journalist was killed in Kosovo in September 2000. The ethnic Albanian journalist Shefki Popova had contributed for 26 years numerous articles to the Albanian-language daily Rilindja and had also reported for the newspaper's radio station. It was unclear whether Mr Popova's death related to his work at Rilindja. The murder followed an attempt on the life of Serbian journalist Valentina Cukic, editor of Serbian-language programming on Pristina's Radio Kontakt in June.

40.       Reports of harassment of journalists in Azerbaijan are routine. On 18 January 2001, Zamin Haji, a journalist and correspondent for the independent daily Azadliq, was reportedly attacked and beaten by three unknown persons. On 6 February Namiq Ibrahimov, a journalist from the newspaper Echo who was covering a police raid on an unauthorised market in Baku was beaten by the police despite showing them his press card. These are only two very recent examples in a very long list of cases of aggression and intimidation.

41.       Press defence organisations keep sending alarming signals about beatings and other forms of brutality, including torture, perpetrated by Turkish state agents against journalists. The IPI estimates the number of tortured journalists in Turkey to at least 16 in 1997, at least 9 in 1998 and at least 5 in 1999 and claims that no disciplinary action has been taken against the officers responsible for these acts.

42.       In Belarus, mystery still surrounds the disappearance in July 2000 of Dmitry Zavadsky, a cameraman with the Russian public television network ORT. He was last seen in the airport in Minsk but never came to meet, as planned, his ORT colleague and friend Pavel Sheremet flying from Moscow. The two men had recently travelled to Chechnya to film a documentary. On his return Mr Zavadsky started receiving anonymous calls from a person insisting on a meeting. Two men were spotted trailing the journalist near his home on the day he disappeared. In November 2000, local independent media organisations received an unsigned e-mail which alleged that most of the people who had been arrested in relation to this crime were current or former officers of the Presidential Security Service. The e-mail further claimed that the case was later transferred from the Prosecutor's Office to the Interior Ministry in order to sabotage the investigation. The Belarusian State Security Council denounced the allegations and Mr Zavadsky's disappearance was blamed on Chechen kidnappers, allegedly in retaliation to his pro-Russian coverage of the war. Sources of the Committee to protect Journalists (CPJ) in Belarus suspect that Mr Zavadsky was abducted because he had film material that showed Belarus security agents fighting against Russian forces in Chechnya.

43.       But Eastern Europe is not the only scene of violent retribution against journalists. In May 2000 José Luis López de la Calle, a regular contributor to the Basque edition of the Madrid-based daily El Mundo, was shot dead outside his home in Andoain. Though no arrests were made, Spanish Interior Ministry officials attributed the crime to the Basque separatist group ETA, which had been conducting a series of violent attacks. The journalist had been an outspoken critic of ETA's violent campaign for independence, and had received death threats from the group in the past. His murder came several weeks after two Spanish journalists received letter bombs, which were safely disarmed by the police, and another bomb exploded at the home of a third journalist. Other journalists also figure on ETA’s "black lists".

IV.        War and conflict

a.       Physical safety

44.       Since their adoption, the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation N° R 4 (1996) and Declaration on the Protection of Journalists in Situations of Conflict and Tension have, sadly, been several times challenged by events on the spot.

45.       A round table on the protection of journalists in conflict zones organised by the OSCE with the participation of the Council of Europe in November 2000 in Berlin identified several important issues and reasons for the increased insecurity of the profession. The media market is becoming more and more competitive which means more pressure on media to be present in conflict zones, a presence often provided by young and inexperienced freelance journalists willing to risk their lives in order to gain recognition. The nature of conflicts has also changed. More and more of them are within states rather than between states. Participants in such separatist or terrorist wars do not always respect the rules of the game as laid down for example in the Geneva Conventions. This also poses a problem for international organisations wishing to help as it is difficult to address and deal with non-state actors.

46.       Three Chechen journalists were killed during Russian air raids on civilian targets in October 1999. Supian Ependiyev, a reporter with Groznesnsky Rabochy, died in Grozny when he was caught in a Russian rocket attack on the central market, while Ramzan Mezhidov of Russia's TV Tsentr and Shamil Gigayev from Grozny's Nokh Cho TV were killed during an air raid on refugees fleeing Chechnya.

47.       Aleksandr Yefremov, a photographer for the west Siberian newspaper Nashe Vremya, was killed in May 2000 in Chechnya when the military jeep he was travelling in was blown up by a remote-controlled mine. Adam Tepsurgayev, a 24-year-old Chechen cameraman who had contributed at the beginning of the year to Reuters, was shot dead at a neighbour's house in the village of Alkhan-Kala in Chechnya in November 2000. In highly controversial circumstances in October 2000 Antonio Russo was killed some 40 kilometres east of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. He worked for the Italian Radio Radicale, based in Rome and was affiliated to the Transnational Party. The Georgian authorities did not rule out the theory that Mr Russo had been killed because of his coverage of the war in Chechnya and interviews with Chechen military commanders and former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov.

48.       Another highly condemnable practice developed in Chechnya is kidnapping. At the height of the kidnapping "epidemic" in 1997 21 journalists were abducted, mostly for ransom, but all were freed by early 1998. According to the Moscow-based Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations, nine journalists whose disappearances were never fully accounted for during the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya remain on the missing list.

49.       The kidnappers have often resorted to violence against hostages, sometimes including videos of torture sessions with their ransom demands. As a result, foreign and especially Russian journalists have stayed out of Chechnya, further isolating the region.

50.       In February 2000, Russian photographer Vladimir Yatsina with the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS was shot by Chechen rebels who had been holding him hostage since the summer of 1999. According to eyewitnesses the rebels shot him because he was in poor health and unable to complete a mountain trek to a new hideout. Said Isayev, a Chechen reporter working for the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS in Grozny, was held hostage twice in 1999. Also in October 1999, rebels kidnapped Dmitry Balburov, Grozny correspondent for the paper Moscow News and held him in captivity for four months.

51.       Brice Fleutiaux, French free-lance photographer also went missing in Chechnya for several months. At a hearing held by the Assembly in Strasbourg in June 2000 he spoke of indiscriminate bombing by the Russian military and no respect for civilians.

52.       Two cases deserve a special mention because they might constitute dangerous precedents. One is the NATO bombing of Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) studios in Belgrade during the Kosovo war, in which sixteen RTS employees died. Although it is claimed that these people were deliberately sacrificed by Milosevic, the use of media as military targets is unacceptable.

53.       The other incident was when police in Luxembourg disguised themselves as a TV-crew in order to lure a hostage-taker out of a nursery school. The man was shot, reportedly using a gun concealed in a fake camera. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) reacted sharply to the use of the media in this manner in police or warfare operations. The IFJ recalled that cameramen are potential targets in filming in dangerous conditions and thought that risks for them would be even greater if police started pretending to be journalists.

b.       Access to information

54.       Access to information was one of the greatest problems in Chechnya and in Kosovo. How could it happen that in an era of unlimited technical possibilities for exchange of information, the truth about the war remained the hostage of governmental press offices and of carefully designed propaganda strategies?

55.       Recommendation N° R 4 (1996) clearly states that "the freedom of the media and the free and unhindered exercise of journalism must be respected in situations of conflict and tension, since the right of individuals and the general public to be informed about all matters of public interest and to be able to evaluate the actions of public authorities and other parties involved is especially important in such situations".

56.       It is normal that in a situation of war any government will seek to present events in their most advantageous light and try to impose restrictions on grounds of protection of national security, although, according to Recommendation N° R (96) 4 the protection of national security, while constituting a legitimate aim, cannot be used as a reason for restricting all fundamental rights and freedoms. Certain derogations are equally admissible "in situations of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed".

57.       However, no war and no state of emergency have ever been officially proclaimed in the present Chechen conflict. On the contrary, Russia has several times officially declared the end of the military operations. Moreover, Russian law grants accredited journalists’ access to the entire Russian territory and officially Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation.

58.       In reality, since the beginning of the present conflict additional accreditations were required for foreign journalists. Immediately after his appointment, the new presidential aid Serguey Yastrjembsky replaced the previous accreditations with one issued by his administration under very complicated rules. Since then, journalists have not been allowed to move freely across Chechnya and have only been allowed to cover the events there as part of "guided tours" organised by the authorities (see further information in Assembly Doc. 8707 of 5 April 2000).

59.       These requirements are in clear contradiction with Recommendation No. R (96) 4 and the Assembly has repeatedly called on the Russian authorities to allow Russian and international media to visit Chechnya freely and independently and to perform their professional duties without any hindrance. But the restrictions are still in place, in violation of the constitutional right of access to information.

60.       The case of Andrey Babitsky, correspondent for the American-run Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Moscow office, is unique in terms of a state violating the rights of its own citizen. His reporting from Chechnya has been internationally praised as objective and balanced and has won him several awards, including the "OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy" of 2000. Nevertheless, the Russian authorities accused him of "conspiracy with Chechen rebels". He was arrested in January 2000 by Russian military while fulfilling his professional duties in Chechnya and his whereabouts were unknown for weeks. The Russian authorities then showed film of his being handed over to Chechen rebels in exchange for several Russian prisoners of war, an exchange that Babitsky has said was only staged for the cameras.

61.       A criminal case was launched against him on the grounds of carrying false documents. For several months he was denied even identity documents, which prevented him from attending a hearing to which the Committee on Culture and Education invited him during the Assembly part-session in April 2000. The General-Procurator sent the case to be tried in a regional court in Daghestan, where in October 2000 the RFE/RL correspondent was found guilty of violating Russian passport regulations. In December 2000 an appeals court in Daghestan upheld the verdict.

62.       After he was finally reissued a passport allowing him to travel abroad, Andrei Babitsky and his family continued his work with RFE/RL's Russian Service in Prague, Czech Republic. At a hearing in Strasbourg in January 2001 he said that the new Russian President, rather than trying to focus public attention on the huge humanitarian problems in Chechnya, wanted the Russian media to support the creation of a government system in Chechnya and if they did not show understanding of this goal, they were seen as saboteurs.

63.       A new worrying incident was reported very recently: according to RSF, Anna Politkovskaya from the Russian daily Novaya Gazeta was arrested by Russian soldiers in Southern Chechnya in February 2001 upon accusations of “violating the accreditation procedures and regulations imposed by the military command.

64.       In Turkey, access of journalists to regions under a state of emergency is also limited (IPI reports, for instance, in February 1999 the detention in Diyarbakir and forceful sending back to Istanbul of a British correspondent with the Reuters press agency and of two Swedish journalists with the daily Göteborgs-Posten) and there are reports that journalists on the spot are subject to police harassment. Access to material or broadcasting in the Kurdish language is also problematic. Heavy restrictions on reporting of were imposed on reporting the arrest and trial of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. According to RSF, the RTÜK (the broadcasting regulatory authority) and the Istanbul State Security Court Number 4 imposed restrictions in December 2000 on television and the printing press concerning the latest incidents in Turkish prisons. The court stated that all media "publishing or broadcasting statements from illegal organisations or information liable to incite hatred, hostility or crime" and which would show the state "in a state of weakness" would be banned. This statement forced the Turkish medias to put out only information from official sources.

65.       NATO, for its part, has become the target of harsh criticism by the media for its information policy during the war in Kosovo. Its methods were very well described at the hearing in Budapest by the Director of the International Press Institute (IPI) Johan Fritz: spreading rumour, exaggerating wildly and drip-feeding false and speculative stories. Every effort had been made to present the bombing campaign in a sanitised, euphemistic fashion, while the briefings had been sprinkled with lies or incorrect information. Courting a fickle public had been a core part of war strategy. US President Clinton made military decisions with the aid of daily opinion polls.

66.       Both sides had sought to bend the news coverage for their own benefit, subtle calls had been made to journalists to act patriotically or to fall in line with the perspective of either NATO or Serbia. Even Prime Minister Tony Blair had blamed the media for failing to focus on the government line and had told the House of Commons that BBC correspondent Robert Simpson’s reports "were compiled under the instruction and guidance of the Serbian authorities”.

67.       According to IPI, an examination of the media war in Kosovo provided a terrible insight into the way the media might be treated in future wars. The entire media profession was in danger of being co-opted to act as an extension of government information departments. What was most worrying, media organisations might not even be aware of this in the future.

68.       Unfortunately, NATO seem not to have learned all the lessons, as it recently became clear in the still unresolved issue about the use of depleted uranium in the missiles in FRY.

V.        The multiple faces of censorship

69.       Limitations to freedom of expression are not always accompanied by violence. They can even be enshrined in media laws or imposed by applying certain provisions of the general legislation to the media. In many former communist countries the taxman has replaced the censor. But other administrative measures are also regularly misused, as for instance, in Ukraine where a media outlet can be shut down upon the orders even of the Fire Safety Department or the Health and Anti-Epidemic Service.

70.       Governments and interest groups show an incredible amount of "imagination" in inventing pretexts to harass the media - power cuts, bomb alerts, police searches and confiscation of material, damages of printing facilities or television and radio transmitters etc. A recent striking example: 25 journalists and editors from 12 private owned media in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia complained that their telephone conversations with some politicians had been wiretapped and recorded. Despite that government denies any involvement, subjects to these measures were journalists and media critical of the authorities.

71.       The Committee on Culture and Education had itself "a taste" of censorship when during the September 2000 Assembly part-session a teleconference between Committee members and Ukrainian journalists was prevented from taking place by an alleged bomb threat in the building in Kyiv where it should have been held (a detailed account of this incident and other forms of pressures on the media in Ukraine can be found in Doc 8946).

72.       Economic levers are also a method widely used by detractors of press freedom. Certain governments still maintain monopolies on paper, print and distribution and put pressure on advertisers.

a.       Media legislation

73.       An important element of the case-law on the European Court of Human Rights is the finding that since “…freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders”, “…the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance” (§42).

74.       In societies where until recently there was only one party and one (the official) truth, politicians still find it very difficult to face public criticism and to accept a plurality of opinions. This is why abusive defamation provisions have sprung in legislations all over Central and Eastern Europe and have become a common tool for silencing critics. It is revealing that almost all new democracies go through a period of a huge number of court cases (in 1999 Ukrainian media were sued over 2000 times for the total of almost three times as much as the country’s whole budget!). Reforming such laws has become one of the most important battles that the media in these countries have had to fight.

75.       But defamation provisions have not disappeared from the criminal codes of Western countries, either, as for instance in the EU member Greece. There have been several court cases involving journalists accused of insult or defamation in connection with their professional activities. According to the CPJ, not only has the former Minister of Justice brought charges against journalists who have been vocally critical of him, but he has also publicly insulted them, including calling a journalist a “stool” during a trial.

76.       Of course, certain limitations to freedom of expression are necessary in a democratic society, as it is stipulated in the second part of article 10 of the ECHR. However, it is a matter of the democratic culture of a nation to interpret them in a non-discriminatory way and not to abuse them. A critical problem in certain countries in transition is that the courts are not independent and they have to interpret the law in the most suitable way for their masters.

77.       Moreover, as the representative of the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) warned at the hearing in Budapest, so-called “insult laws” still remain embedded in the legislation of well-established Western democracies, unwittingly providing negative examples for post-Communist countries where they are often used as a legal basis for harassing the media (see (AS/Cult (2000) 31).

78.       Probably the worst example in terms of legislation was the Serbian Information Law adopted in October 1998 (see a detailed description in Doc. 8310. It imposed drastic fines meted out by government-appointed magistrates. The media had to pay within 24 hours, otherwise their property was confiscated. This Information Law has been in practice ineffective since the democratic change in the country in October 2000 and was eventually suppressed in February 2001 by Parliament.

79.       In Azerbaijan, article 19 the Law on Mass Media, adopted in 1999, enables the authorities to close down media organisations if they violate the law three times in one year. Such a ruling was recently pronounced against the newspaper Uch noqte. Apparently, the three violations were all because of defamatory statements and two of the cases involved senior officials who were not happy with criticism voiced in the newspaper.

80.       In many Central and East European countries libel is still a criminal offence, in others such provisions were removed recently, as for instance in Bulgaria (after strong pressure from the Assembly Monitoring Committee) and in Georgia. But decriminalisation of libel is not enough because excessive fines imposed on media outlets for defamation can make them bankrupt and therefore also lead to their closure. Such dispositions run also against the case-law of the ECHR which has stated that excessive sanctions can represent a threat to freedom of expression and that “an award of damages for defamation must bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered” (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, § 46 ss).

81.       Another serious legal problem in some countries, for instance in Russia, is the unacceptable principle that the defendant should bear the burden of proving a statement to be true.r.

82.       In 1999 a ECHR judgement concerning Romaniahas set an important and long awaited precedent in this respect. The Court held that the country had violated Article 10 of the ECHR when it found Romanian journalist, Ionel Dalban, who ran a local weekly magazine, Cronica Romascana, guilty of criminal libel. The Court noted that "It would be unacceptable for a journalist to be debarred from expressing critical value judgements unless he or she could prove their truth".

83.       Equally damaging could be restrictions on the expression of opinions or disclosure of information on domestic or foreign policy of the State for reasons linked to the protection of certain public interests such as territorial integrity, national security, public order.

84.       Such practices are for instance constantly used in Turkey, mainly under several restrictive provisions of the Penal Code and of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Reports on criminal prosecution of journalists, suspension, closure or ban of newspaper publications, radio and TV stations, seizure of books a routine in that country. According to RSF, in 2000 the RTÜK, suspended tens of radio stations and television channels for a total of over 4200 days on accusations mostly of "incitement to violence, terror and ethnic discrimination".

85.       One Istanbul station, Özgür Radyo , was suspended for two and a half years, mainly for claiming that Rauf Denktash, president of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, owned "a very substantial amount of real estate in the north of the island" and received money from "gangs involved in prostitution".

86.       An unrecognised "criminal court" in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus started hearings on 75 lawsuits against the Turkish Cypriot daily Avrupa for "instigating hatred against the Turkish republic of North Cyprus and the Turkish army". For each lawsuit the military and the police demand five years imprisonment for the editor-in-chief Sener Levent and five other journalists of Avrupa. In July, Mr Levent and two of his colleagues were detained and accused of treason and espionage.

87.       The Committee on Culture and Education has been actively involved in the case of the Russian military reporter Grigorii Pasko. He was arrested in 1997 for giving Japanese television journalists information about the Russian Navy's dumping of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan and about accidents with nuclear submarines. He was held in a labour camp for almost two years and was released under an amnesty programme. Mr Pasko was acquitted last year of treason but found guilty of abuse of office. At the Committee hearing in Strasbourg in January 2001, Mr Pasko over the telephone from Moscow complained he was constantly harassed by the FSB, his telephone was tapped, appeals to different instances were ignored and he was not given a passport to travel abroad. At the same time he was not allowed to leave the military ranks and his articles were not being published.

88.       Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the adoption of new media legislation is not yet necessary a guarantee of improvement of the existing one. A recent example of that was the draft Law on Public Information of “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. The draft was eventually withdrawn after having being severely criticized by international press defence organisations and also by Council of Europe experts who feared that several provisions would undermine freedom of expression and would be misused by public authorities. The newly adopted Information Security Doctrine in Russia also is a matter of very serious concern, as is the very presence of the term “information security” in the political discourse, also in Ukraine.

b.       Other legal provisions used to intimidate media

89.       Financial regulations have become the most common tool of intimidation of the media. It is worth mentioning in this respect the case of Magic, practically the only independent publishing house in Belarus printing a number of democratic opposition newspapers. The company was initially submitted to several of “visits” by law enforcement structures who were looking for bombs, for machine for printing false money etc. Then the director of Magic, Yuri Budzko, was charged under the Administrative Violations Code (violation of electoral legislation) for publishing a special issue of Rabochy, as independent newspaper, in which the justice had found dissimulated calls for boycott of the parliamentary elections. He was acquitted by the court but then the tax authorities closed Magic and confiscated its equipment in order to cancel some debts that the Soros Foundation (whose equipment was leased to Magic) allegedly owed the state.

90.       Nothing however can rival with the saga of the so-called “oligarchs” in Russia.

91.       Vladimir Gusinsky is the owner of Media Most, the company controlling the only nation-wide government-independent television station NTV and a series of other media outlets in Russia. In 1996, the sympathetic presidential campaign coverage of NTV helped Yeltsin against a strong communist challenge. The media outlets of Media Most have been critical of the present Kremlin administration, have denounced corruption in the country and were amongst the very few that dared show the events in Chechnya in their true light.

92.       Mr Gusinsky was briefly jailed in June 2000, accused of embezzlement in the privatisation of a regional TV company. He was freed under a secret agreement with state-dominated gas giant Gazprom, signed by the Minister of Information. The agreement guaranteed dropping of charges in return for a majority stake to the state-run company. Mr Gusinsky publicly denounced this agreement and flew to his Spanish home. Since then prosecutors have filed a new case, accusing him that Media Most and its daughter companies have assets lower than required under the Civil Code (a situation which is common to an overwhelming majority of Russian media companies, but for which they are not being prosecuted). Mr Gusinsky has been under house arrest in Spain fighting extradition to Russia. His media empire is threatened by a take-over. Gazprom-Media says a recent freezing of 19 percent of shares of NTV gave it at least temporarily a majority stake and is planning to replace the current board of directors supporting Mr Gusinsky.

93.       Meanwhile, the financial mogul George Soros and the CNN founder Ted Turner have expressed interest in investing in Media Most. In a recent meeting with NTV journalists the Russian President rejected complaints of prosecutors witch-hunting the station and said he did not object to such foreign investment. However, he ignored Mr Turner’s plea for guarantees of non interference in NTV’s operations.

94.       The fraud investigation and the struggle for control of Media-Most has been punctuated by more than two dozen searches of the company headquarters, arrests and short-lived deals.

95.       The alleged fraud charges cannot deprive the Russian authorities of their political responsibility to guarantee the independence of the only private national broadcaster.

96.       The other oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, who masterminded Mr Putin’s accession to power through his partially-state-owned television channel ORT, also had to flee into exile in November 2000. The former kingmaker disagreed with Mr Putin over the president's efforts to limit the power of regional leaders. Then Moscow investigators began looking into Mr Berezovsky's alleged misdeeds in connection with the national airline Aeroflot. In August 2000 Mr Berezovsky denounced the fact that the State seemed determined to take over control of ORT and decided to entrust the management of the shares to a group of personalities in favor of maintaining the channel's independence. According to RSF these shares were sold in early 2001 to the oil corporation, Sibneft, a state-run company, meaning that the television station de facto came under the State's control. RSF quotes the Russian daily, Kommersant, according to which ORT's board of directors is to be rearranged, making room for the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Information, the Minister of Culture, two deputy ministers and a deputy head of the presidential administration.

97.       In Azerbaijan, the Council of Europe had to intervene in the case of the editor-in-chief of the Azeri opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat, Raif Arifoglu, which is symptomatic. In August 2000 a person who was attempting to hijack an Azeri aeroplane called Mr Arifoglu and detailed his demands. Mr Arifoglu contacted the police and told it what had happened. He was arrested and charged with complicity in organising the hijack. His arrest coincided with a government-sponsored campaign against his party through government controlled media. Following pressure from the President of the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, he was released from prison in October 2000.

98.       Often, however, even before exterior political pressure has materialised in its toughest forms, the media have to restrict themselves. The journalistic community has for instance reacted very sharply to the case of Gerhard Marschall, a journalist at the leading Austrian regional paper Oberösterreichische Nachrichten, who was sacked on the day that the new Austrian government was sworn in. According to the IFJ Mr Marschall, who has written critically about the new right-wing political coalition in Austria, said the editor and the paper's owner had told him that "due to the new political situation I could no longer be afforded". He was told that his style is no longer acceptable, even though he was highly acclaimed for more than five years, not only by readers but also by the paper itself.

c.       Vulnerability of the media

99.       Pressures against the media are not something which only happen to new democracies. The freedom of the press is in fact a matter of a balance between the desire of the authorities to control the media and the ability of the media to resist such attempts.

100.       This is why a fragile democracy and a weak economy put many obstacles to free speech. The precarious economic situation in several former communist countries has indeed drastically reduced the possibilities of the population to buy newspapers and have made them heavily dependent upon television which is still government-controlled. When newspapers cannot rely on subscriptions, and when advertising revenues are too low to cover the needs of editors and broadcasters, the media inevitably have to find a “master”, be it a political party or an economic group.

101.       This is how journalists become mercenaries and the media are transformed into weapons in the hands of political or other opponents. No wonder then that such media are full of “information” which is far from meeting any criteria of free and objective journalism. The need to meet requirements in order to survive is often coupled with low professional standards and taking every “revelation” by the powerful persons of the day at their face value.

102.       This is partly an explanation for the huge number of court cases for slander. It is regrettable, however, that courts normally rule against the journalists without even wanting to know who ordered or leaked deliberately the wrong information.

103.       When journalists feel not free to report the truth or are reduced to carrying out orders, this may damage severely their sense of responsibility. At the same time, when the media are nothing but tools in the hands of interest groups, they lose their credibility and seize to perform their vital function of a society “watchdog”. This is a situation which can be witnessed for instance at present in Albania.

104.       Journalists making their first steps in a freer environment also often have a mistaken perception of their own mission and they believe that journalism is about “fighting” for one cause or another. They see themselves as militants.

105.       For all these reasons, in new democracies professional solidarity is very low, and this makes journalists even more vulnerable and defenceless in cases of intimidation. It is extremely important that the Council of Europe and other relevant organisations provide further assistance in order to promote self-regulation and the setting up of efficient journalistic professional organisations.

VI.       Broadcasting

106.       Regulation of broadcasting is one of the crucial elements of transition towards free and independent media in new democracies. Maintaining a strong and good quality public service broadcasting in the era of digitalisation and globalisation is a challenge that applies throughout Europe.

107.       The power of television in countries in transition to democracy is well understood and used by the authorities. Both in legislation and practice, regulation of broadcasting is the “last bastion” that they are the most reluctant to open to free and independent functioning. Their strong ally is public misunderstanding of the role of a public service broadcasting. Public opinion (and even that of the journalistic community) is often unable to put pressure on the authorities in the right direction because in people’s minds, television remains some sort of a mouthpiece of the state, the only difference from the old times being that now several political parties should control it, possibly on a quota basis. The debate over regulation of broadcasting is therefore too political and not professional enough.

108.       Funding is another serious problem. For instance, the National Television in Moldova is still entirely funded by the State. But the State budget can only provide about a quarter of what is really needed, thus broadcasts are limited to a few hours a day and quality is poor. Professional circles in the country admit that this situation amounts de facto to a violation of the citizens’ right to information since the majority of the population cannot afford alternative sources of information.

109.       The Council of Europe has often provided expertise for the reforming of legislation in the broadcasting sector. Unfortunately, governments tend to take into account mostly formal considerations while carefully avoiding the core matter: guaranteeing a genuinely independent regulatory broadcasting authority.

110.       The example has come from the Croatian Parliament which on 6 February 2001 adopted a new law on radio and television despite the reservations formulated by the Council of Europe. Both the Board of management and the Director of HRT will under the new law be appointed and can be dismissed directly by parliament. This might prejudice the independence and the future development of HRT as a genuine public service broadcasting organisation, transforming it de jure into a parliamentary body.

111.       In October 2000 a new Law on Television and Radio was adopted in Armenia. Council of Europe experts had criticised the law when it was being drafted on various grounds, inter alia because it gave the President of the Republic too much power over the broadcasting media. For example he alone decides who sits on the board of the Public Broadcaster and who are members of the National Commission for the private broadcasting sector. The Law gave some limited powers to the Parliament in overseeing the broadcasting media and thus counterbalancing the powers of the President. Most of these provisions were repealed by the Constitutional Court of Armenia in a decision on 11 January 2001 as not being in conformity with the Constitution.

112.       In a Workshop in Yerevan, organised by the Council of Europe and OSCE on broadcasting regulation, which incidentally took place on 11 and 12 January 2001, private broadcasters voiced heavy criticism of the new law. Not so much because of the powers given to the President, but rather because of details related to their day to day work and lack of consultation with them in preparing the law. It remains to be seen whether the Armenian authorities take this criticism from interested circles and from the Council of Europe into account. Guaranteeing the independence from political influences of the board of the public broadcaster and of the National Commission which oversees the private broadcasting sector, continues to be the main concern for the Council of Europe.

113.       Another means of pressure is the licensing procedure. Slobodan Milosevic, for instance, used it on several occasions in order to neutralise the media outlets grouped in the Association of Independent Broadcasters in Yugoslavia (ANEM).

114.       The licensing procedure for private broadcasters continues to be a huge problem in Azerbaijan. Many of them have not been able to secure a licence and therefore they have no legal protection against arbitrary closure. The situation is particularly worrying in the regions where commercial broadcasters still depend on the good will of local authorities.

115.       On the very day when Azerbaijan became a member of the Council of Europe, an independent regional television station, Mingechevir TV was forced to stop broadcasting after being warned by the police that continuing to operate would result in criminal charges. Mingechevir TV, as well as DMR TV which ceased broadcasting on 8 January 2001, have been denied an official broadcasting frequency over several years.

116.       The situation was reversed only after the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in a public statement called on the Azeri authorities to allow these broadcasters to continue operating, pending the preparation of an adequate broadcasting legislation.

117.       It is now necessary to establish a fair and transparent licensing procedure as well as an independent regulatory authority overseeing the implementation of the law in the broadcasting field.

118.       The recent events in the Czech Republic, however, provide the best example of challenges that broadcasting faces even in countries that are on the doorstep of the European Union. On 12 December 2000 Jiri Hodac was appointed as new general manager of the National TV. Several dozen journalists, seeing this as a political appointment, went on a strike. Hodac in particular is considered to be too close to the right-wing Civic Democratic Party whose leader is the parliamentary Speaker and it is parliament who appoints the nine members of the board of the public television station. The dissident journalists demanded the resignation of Mr Hodac and asked that the parliament review the conditions for the appointment of the board. Their demands met with incredible public support, with several tens of thousands of people demonstrating in the streets of Prague. The new management sent letters of dismissal to the striking journalists, interrupted broadcasting on 28 December and threatened to use force to expel the strikers from the offices of the station.

119.       Following this public pressure, the manager resigned and the parliament urgently amended the law.

120.       Recently, the International Federation of Journalists sent a mission of experts to Hungary to examine what they qualified as a “crisis” in public broadcasting. “There is no agreement between rival political parties over the administration of the system," said Aidan White, General Secretary of the IFJ. “It is urgent that there is an end to all direct political involvement in the running of broadcasting". Only the governmental parties are represented in the TV and Radio boards, despite the constant complaints of two oppositional parties.

121.       According to the IFJ problems over broadcasting and difficulties in the creation of independent, accountable and transparent structures exist throughout the region.

VII.        Globalisation

122.       The convergence between broadcasting, computing and telecommunications has created new ways of disseminating information and has resulted in two major new features, digital television platforms (terrestrial, satellite and cable) and the Internet. The development of the Internet and the creation of a global media market have created unprecedented possibilities for new sources of information, for free expression and exchange of ideas.

123.       Paradoxical as it may seem, these unlimited possibilities in themselves can also represent a threat to media pluralism and access to information. As the Assembly has pointed out in the reports on media and democratic culture and on media education, the huge number of sources of information present a serious problem of choice while, at the same time, does not necessarily mean a rise in pluralism of content.

124.       Several developments in the media market over the last years also raise some concern and are currently under careful scrutiny by the Council of Europe Steering Committee on the Mass media (CDMM).

125.       The media market is in the process of transformation, with a high number of new alliances and mergers between traditional media companies and new service providers, best illustrated in the recent merger between AOL and Time Warner. These mergers are prompted by the fact that Internet companies need more media content whereas the traditional media companies need wider distribution. A development which might lead to negative consequences is the ongoing vertical integration: multimedia groups which control the whole chain of audiovisual products and services to start with rights holding through production, broadcasting and distribution.

126.       The increased number of delivery platforms and channels represents a chance for the so-called content industry (programme and film-makers) but is Europe ready to meet the challenge and provide more quality products? For the moment, the digital providers also feature mainly American productions. The ongoing process of restructuring the market has lead to a situation whereby the global media system is dominated by fewer than ten global conglomerates, with another 50-odd companies occupying regional and niche markets. When such a small number of corporations is controlling the major proportion of media outlets, diversity and pluralism are restricted.

127.       Two viewpoints are clashing: the American is that media are solely economic products and thus concentration or expansion of ownership should only be submitted to the general anti-trust legislation. Most of Europe is trying to defend a different viewpoint which the Rapporteur fully shares: the media represent a special cultural and democratic resource and should be protected as such.

128.       Unfortunately, it is not easy to defend this principle in the present conditions, when the growing competition created by the globalisation of the media market is resulting in growing and even excessive commercialisation. The challenges for the media in this new environment were well outlined at the hearing in Budapest by Mr White, Secretary General of IFJ and by Mr Gröbel, Director General of European Institute for the Media. The Rapporteur cannot but subscribe to their words.

129.       According to them, the processes of integration and convergence resulting from the new information technologies is creating a revolution in journalists’ working practices. Immediacy is becoming the rule of the game. Pressure to cover events live or in the shortest deadlines is growing and is increasing the risks of presenting issues to the public on which the journalists have not been able to do enough research. Sensational, « image-worth » information is preferred to in-depth analysis. Access to text and image information through mobile phones (UMTS) and interactivity are also increasing immediacy and make it possible for anybody who has witnessed an event to report back on it to the media, thus diminishing the role of professionally trained journalists and reducing control.

130.       At the same time social conditions and employment rights for journalists are under extreme pressure. IFJ’s World Survey of Freelance Employment Conditions 2000 reveals that cuts in editorial budgets and new ownership policies are increasing insecurity, with the media referring more and more to freelancers. At the same time, editorial standards are in decline, especially as far as the frequency, range and quality of investigative journalism are concerned. As IFJ points out, serious political and social debate is eclipsed by tasteless voyeurism and prurient entertainment. Ideas unpopular to media owners, advertisers and their political friends are effectively silenced. Journalists are increasingly expected to produce material to suit the interests of sponsors and advertisers. Investment in professional training has fallen. The capacity for research has decreased while “advertorials” are replacing independent editorials.

131.       These new trends further exacerbate old moral dilemmas about the balance between freedom of expression and the right to privacy and human dignity. The best example was the cases of News of the World daily in the UK which decided to publish the names and addresses of paedophiles. These reports, defended by the newspaper as satisfying the citizens’ right to know and characterised by many as a mere profit-raising exercise, resulted in mob violence and even suicides.

132.       However, IFJ also points out an encouraging trend that at a European level progressive political forces were making media issues part of their political platforms. The only possible way to generate viable media reform would be as part of a broader movement to diminish the anti-democratic elements of globalisation and to create structures that would ensure wider recognition and respect for the cultural, professional and democratic dimensions of media activity.

VIII.        Action of the Council of Europe

133.       International institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Union and the OSCE, through their political action and assistance programmes, have done a lot to help put in place and develop independent media and appropriate legal frameworks in which they can operate, and also to promote media self-regulation. These efforts could bear even more fruit if it can be ensured that co-ordination between them and co-operation with politicians, NGOs and media professionals is as good as it can be.

134.       Currently, the issue of freedom of expression in its multiple aspects is a main preoccupation for several sectors within the Council of Europe. The Monitoring Department is working on a major overview of restrictions included in the penal code and other legal texts. It seems bizarre, however, for such a comprehensive and serious study on freedom of expression, to be confidential, according to the rules established under the monitoring procedure of the Committee of Ministers. The Rapporteur would therefore strongly recommend that the findings of this study are made public.

135.       The Steering Committee on the Mass Media (CDMM) is also examining new challenges to freedom of expression. The 6th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, held in Cracow on 15 and 16 June 2000, agreed that the human and democratic dimension of communication should be at the core of the Council of Europe media policy, focusing on the following four essential axes: the balance between freedom of expression and information and other rights and legitimate interests; pluralism of media services and content; the promotion of social cohesion; and the adaptation of the regulatory framework for the media in the light of the ongoing changes.

136.       Practical assistance to countries is also provided. The media programmes cover a large range of questions such as the rights and responsibilities of journalists; regulation of sectors of press, radio and television; access to information etc.

137.       Although there is a general understanding that serious problems remain in the field of freedom of the media and that new challenges arise, the present budgetary restrictions within the Council of Europe have led to severe difficulties in implementing the assistance programmes in the media field. Most of the planned activities for 2001 have no funding yet and are entirely dependent on voluntary contributions by member States, as are also the activities within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, funded by Germany and Luxembourg.

138.       The Media Division also provides valuable expertise concerning legislation in the media sector but has no means of requiring that the country to which the expertise is intended actually implement it. The Assembly should therefore renew its call on the Committee of Ministers to consider a more effective means of requiring compliance with the requirements formulated by experts.

139.       Within the Parliamentary Assembly, the Monitoring Committee also deals with freedom of expression. The new procedure of post-monitoring dialogue should make it easier to react promptly to severe violations and crisis situations.

140.       For its part, the Committee on Culture, Science and Education has decided to appoint a General Rapporteur on the media in Europe, in order to follow closely media developments in member countries and react publicly, thus mobilising public opinion inside the country in question and internationally. In order to exercise his function in the most efficient way, he will need a constant supply of information and secretariat assistance.

141.       There should be much better coordination, exchange of documents etc. between the different sectors of the Council of Europe in order to avoid duplication of work, to capitalise on synergies and to enhance the political role of the organisation in the media field.

Further references

Conflict in Chechnya – Opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education – Rapporteur : Mr Gyula Hegyi, Hungary, Socialist Group

(Doc. 8707)

Freedom of the media in Russia – Teleconference with Andrei Babisty (Strasbourg – Moscow, April 2000)

(AS/Cult (2000) 26)

Discussion in the Sub-Committee of the Media with Russian journalists (Strasbourg, 6 April 2000)

(AS/Cult/Media (2000) 1)

Freedom of the media in Russia – Joint Hearing with the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Strasbourg 27 June 2000)

(AS/Cult (2000) 29)

Hearing on freedom of expression in Europe (Budapest, 4 September 2000)

(AS/Cult (2000) 31)

Report on the cancelled teleconference on freedom of press in Ukraine (Strasbourg – Kyiv, 28 September 2000)

(AS/Cult (2000) 38)

Discussion on the media in Ukraine (Full Committee, Paris 13 December 2000)

(AS/Cult (2000) 2)

Freedom of expression in Ukraine - Opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education – Rapporteur: Mr Andrzej Urbanczyk, Poland, Socialist Group

(Doc 8946)

Statement on the situation in Czech Television by Josef Jarab, January 2001

(AS/Cult (2000) 44)

Hearing on the media in Russia (Strasbourg, 22 January 2001)

(AS/Cult (2000) 45)

Committee for report : Committee on Culture, Science and Education

Reference to committee : Doc. 8557 and Reference N° 2247 of 4 November 1999

Draft recommendation : Adopted by the committee, with one abstention, on 12 March 2001

Members of the committee : MM. Rakhansky (Chairman), de Puig, Risari, Billing (Vice-Chairmen), Akhvlediani, Arzilli, Asciak, Bartumeu Cassany, Berceanu (Alt. : Baciu), Berzinš, Birraux, Castro (Alt. : Varela i Serra), Cherribi, Damanaki, Dias, Dolazza (Alt. : Martelli), Duka-Zólyomi, Fayot, Mme Fernández-Capel, Goris, Hadjidemetriou, Haraldsson, Hegyi, Henry, Higgins, Irmer, Mme Isohookana-Asunmaa, Ivanov, Jakic, Kalkan, Katselli, Kofod-Svendsen, Kutraité Giedraitiené, Lachat (Alt. : Mme Nabholz-Haidegger), Mme Laternser, Lekberg, Lemoine (Alt. : Legendre), Lengagne, Libicki, Liiv, Mme Lucyga, MM. Maass, Marmazov (Alt. : Baburin), Mateju, McNamara, Melnikov, Mignon, Minarolli, Nagy, Nemcova, Nigmatulin, O’Hara, Pavlov (Alt. : Mme Poptodorova), MM. Pingerra (Alt. : Gnaga), Plattner, Prisacaru, Pusic, Rapson (Alt. : Hancock), Roseta, Saele, Saglam, Schicker, Schweitzer, Seyidov, Shaklein, Sudarenkov, Symonenko (Alt. : Khunov), Tanik, Tudor (Alt. : Ionescu), Turini (Alt. : Olivo), Urbanczyk, Vakilov, Valk, Wilshire, Wittbrodt (Alt. : Luczak), Wodarg, Xhaferi.

N.B. The names of those present at the meeting are in italics.

Secretariat of the committee : Mr Grayson, Mr Ary, Mrs Theophilova-Permaul and Mr Torcătoriu