Doc. 9296

18 December 2001

Air transport and terrorism: how to enhance security ?

Report

Committee on Economic Affairs and Development

Rapporteur: Mr Knut Billing, Sweden, European Democratic Group

Summary

The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 illustrate the need for the European and world air industry to reach an even higher level of security than in the past. Strict European Union legislation, building on, in particular, longstanding work by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) but also by Eurocontrol, is now forthcoming, signifying improved measures both at airports and on aircraft. The report examines what needs to be done and calls for rapid implementation throughout Europe and the world in view of air terrorism’s global reach.

I.        Draft recommendation

1.       The hijacking of four US airliners in the United States on 11 September 2001, resulting in the killing of nearly 3500 people in New York and Washington, highlights the need for reinforced security measures in air transport.

2.       The Assembly salutes the longstanding work against air terrorism pursued by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) on behalf of its 38 member states and recalls its own steadfast support for this work, as expressed in its Resolution 1099 (1989) on aviation security.

3.       The Assembly welcomes the close co-operation established since the events of 11 September between ECAC and the European Union, and the latter’s subsequent draft legislation, largely based on ECAC’s aviation security measures (AVSEC).

4.       The Assembly recalls the importance of the following guiding principles underlying the new security level required:

       On the ground

i.        100 % ‘reconciliation’ between checked-in baggage and passengers to ensure that no luggage travels unaccompanied;

ii.        reinforced security control of passengers and their hand baggage, as well as of all those with access to restricted areas;

iii.       100 % screening of checked-in luggage as soon as possible and at the latest by the end of 2002;

iv.       pre-departure checks in the interior and on the exterior of aircraft;

v.       the special security regime developed by ECAC for cargo, mail and express parcels;

vi.       the prevention of any attempt by an unauthorised person to gain access to the cockpit, for example through the instalment of doors equipped with bars and locks capable of withstanding bullets and explosives, while at the same time permitting crew members to have access to and control over the rest of the aircraft, as well as to be able to escape in the event of an emergency;

vii.       the maintenance of contact at all times between the ground and the aircraft as regards voice communication; transponder communication informing about plane location, under the authority of Eurocontrol as the ‘European Regional Focal Point’ for air traffic management information of a civilian and military nature; and the ‘press-button’ alert possibility of a terrorist attack in the making;

viii.       the presence, at countries’ discretion, of armed in-flight security personnel, and the international acceptance of such a presence through international agreements;

Implementation

ix.       the implementation and ongoing respect of the new security level should be ensured by audit (inspection) teams at European and worldwide level, preferably through an expansion of the already operational ECAC Aviation Security Airport Audit programme.

5.       In view of the fact that air terrorism knows no national frontiers, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which includes all EU, ECAC and Eurocontrol member states as well as five additional countries, to ensure that the totality of the above measures, as called for in ECAC’s AVSEC recommendations and in the forthcoming EU legislation, are introduced as a matter of urgency in the entire 43-member state Council of Europe area.

6.       The Assembly furthermore calls for the rapid development of further means to identify passengers, such as through computer recognition of facial and eye (iris) characteristics and handprints.

7.       Finally, in recognition of the global reach of terrorist attacks in the air, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers, ECAC, Eurocontrol and the European Union to work in favour of the most rapid possible worldwide introduction of the above measures, through the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

II.        Explanatory Memorandum by the Rapporteur

Contents

I.        The terrorist attacks of 11 september 2001 : a watershed in air transport’s approach to terrorism

II.        The first and foremost barrier: the ground

III.        After bad has happened: preventing the worst in the air

IV.        Concluding remarks: making sure the new rules are followed by all

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I.        THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 :        A WATERSHED IN AIR TRANSPORT’S APPROACH TO TERRORISM.

1.       On 11 September 2001, four American airliners were hijacked by teams of four or five terrorists each. After killing passengers and members of the crew, the terrorists forced their way into the cockpits and took control of the planes. They then rammed two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in downtown New York, while crashing a third into the Pentagon building in Washington. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers, apparently realising what had happened in New York and Washington, managed to regain control of the cockpit and force the plane, which was probably headed for the White House, into the ground near Pittsburgh. All in all, nearly 3 500 people met a violent death at the three sites.

2.       The author of these lines, in his capacity as Assembly Rapporteur for European air transport policies, immediately presented a Motion for a resolution on “The Need for a New Level of Air Transport Security Following the Recent Terrorist Attacks in New-York and Washington D.C.”. The motion, co-signed by 39 Assembly colleagues at the Parliamentary Assembly’s part-session in Strasbourg at the end of September 2001, called on the air transport industry “radically to improve security in order to forestall new types of particularly callous and well-planned forms of terrorism”. It went on to say that “necessary measures include still stricter security controls of passengers and luggage, more careful screening of air industry employees, tighter protection of passengers and crews and rendering impossible any control by perpetrators of the cockpit”. Finally, the motion called for “the most rapid possible implementation of such measures, in co-operation with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)1, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the European Union and other competent institutions”.

3.        The present report, which the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Parliamentary Assembly wants to see taken up by the Assembly already at its January 2002 part-Session, will deal exclusively with ways of improving air industry security against terrorism. It will, by contrast, not take up any other current issue, however meritorious, such as the economic crisis of the aviation industry or the pros and cons of government assistance to it. This being said, it is clear that our Assembly will have to return in the near future to the difficult state of the aviation sector in a separate report.

4.       The Rapporteur is particularly grateful to the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), its President Alfredo Roma, its Executive Secretary Mr Raymond Benjamin and Mr Gerry Lumsden, his Deputy, for the valuable consultations he was able to have with them in preparing his report. He also wishes to thank Mrs Isabelle Durant, Belgian Minister for Mobility and Transport and Chairperson (at the time of writing) of the EU’s Council of Ministers on transport matters; Mr Victor Aguado, Chairman of Eurocontrol; and Mr Joachim Puff, Chairman of the Security Committee of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA). All of the above-mentioned persons indeed participated in a Hearing organised by the Economic Committee on the subject in Brussels in December 2001, in connection with the adoption of the report.

5.        The report will not enter into any ‘guesstimates’ about what the measures required for a new, acceptable level of security may eventually cost, as they are being implemented around Europe and the world. Nobody truly knows, just as nobody could even state with any certainty what measures introduced in the past have cost - the reason being that they have taken place at so many airports, on so many planes and within so many national administrations and international organisations. All we know is that they will have to be introduced, and urgently, since we must never, if we can at all avoid it, permit a repeat of the horrible experience of 11 September 2001 in which, unlike what has been the case in the past, the terrorists were ready to commit suicide and use the planes they had hijacked as moving bombs.

6.       We all need to learn lessons from what happened on 11 September, for it could have taken place anywhere in the world including Europe. Even as we do, we must humbly recognise that future terrorists will presumably not be at their wit’s end as they try to find new weak spots in our systems. What we must do is, however, to stack the odds so high against them as to dissuade them from even trying.

7.        The European Civil Aviation Conference – ECAC – started work on air security against terrorism nearly three decades ago. Until recently, it was the only intra-European aviation body dealing with civil aviation security in Europe. In this context should be noted that the European Union, which legislates in so many areas and has such an extensive ‘acquis communautaire’, had not prior to 11 September introduced any air security legislation. Since that date, however, it has become extremely active, building extensively on ECAC findings as these are set out particularly in a report known to experts as ‘Document 30’. ECAC is co-operating fully with, and offering its professional expertise to, the European Commission in its current work.

8.        Let it also be said that ECAC, though it has no legislative authority, can nevertheless, together with ICAO, point to a significant reduction in the incidences of “acts affecting the security of air transport” over the last 30 years, when air terrorism began in earnest. Thus, while passenger numbers in Western Europe increased fourfold and flight numbers doubled between 1970 and 1999, the number of security incidents fell from 100 to 6 and the number of victims from 92 to 0.

9.        The Community legislation foreseen to be announced by the European Union in December 2001 will be stringent, based as it is on ECAC’s aviation security (AVSEC) measures. The account below is, then, a summary of what is proposed by ECAC and ordained by the EU, with a number of additional suggestions proffered by the Rapporteur. It is for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to endorse and support this forthcoming EU legislation, and to ensure that it is not only effectively transposed into the legislation and practice of the fifteen EU member states, but also adopted at the level of the 38 ECAC member countries and at that of the remainder of the Council of Europe’s 43 member states and observer countries. The reason is evident: a hijacked plane can fly as far its fuel lasts, that is more often than not to basically any place in Europe. We must also examine how parliaments can exert pressure on governments and national authorities to speed up this process.2

10.        One final comment before we embark on the subject. Whatever security measure we contemplate or introduce, we must always do our utmost to preserve human rights and fundamental freedoms – and especially the right to privacy and personal dignity and integrity. We must not grant terrorists any backdoor victory, by sacrificing the freedom and human dignity which form their first targets.

II.        THE FIRST AND FOREMOST BARRIER: THE GROUND.

11.        The first and most important barrier is, needless to say, the ground, that is, the airport. This is so especially now, when a new breed of terrorists has arisen, determined to die rather than negotiate. Terrorists must be kept off aircraft at all costs. (Ideally they would be apprehended already before they reach the airport through general anti-terrorist surveillance.) It should be said that immediately after the events of 11 September and in most cases on that same day, ECAC Member States implemented extra security measures on the ground.

12.        The boundaries between the ‘landside’ at airports – that is, before the check-in point – and the ‘airside’ – that is, beyond the check-in point – must be clearly defined, with access protected by guarded or securely locked gates or doors. These must be inspected at irregular intervals. Surveillance should be maintained over all terminal areas that are accessible to the public. Terminals are to be controlled and passengers and any other persons present kept under surveillance by security staff. Access to public areas close to ‘aircraft movement areas’ – such as spectator terraces and car parks – must be controlled. It must be possible to close such public areas at short notice in the event of a threat.

13.        Access to airside and other restricted areas must be controlled at all times to ensure that neither an unauthorised person nor a prohibited article reaches it. Airport employees are to wear identity cards including a photograph and indications as to the areas of the airport into which they are allowed. The same applies to vehicles moving between landside and airside. The apron, or station area of aircraft, must be frequently controlled, adequately lit and with secure fences. Planes are to be thoroughly checked, first to discover any sabotage act, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices that may have been placed on board. Such checks should also be undertaken when planes stop for transit, with some passengers disembarking and others embarking. Any transit passenger who disembarks and fails to reboard the aircraft must be identified, and his or her hand baggage and checked-in luggage not transported. Furthermore, there must be no mixing of, on the one hand, passengers who depart or arrive and, and on the other, passengers who have already been screened.

14.       It must be impossible for a passenger to take on board any instrument that can be used for terrorist purposes. This now includes even manicure scissors and fingernail clippers. Persons with reduced mobility are to be screened privately if they so wish and any wheel chair or stretcher is to be searched. If, as a result of extra screening of hand baggage, the operator is not satisfied, than he or she will have to hand-search the baggage. In this connection, the wish was expressed in the Economic Committee that a full list of banned items be made known to the general public as soon as possible to avoid unwelcome confiscation of objects on boarding.3

15.        There must be a 100 per cent ‘reconciliation’ between passengers and their checked-in baggage. That is, it must be certified which checked-in baggage belongs to which passenger, and that no checked-in baggage travels unaccompanied. Although

many airports and airlines subject 100 per cent of checked-in luggage to security

check to X-ray or hand search, 100 per cent of all checked-in baggage will be security checked by the end of 2002 at the latest.4 The special security regime developed by ECAC for cargo, mail and express parcels should be fully implemented.5

16.       Security at airports in Europe have long been under government supervision, whereas in the United States, prior to 11 September, this was left to the air carriers. (Security at airport is now coming under federal supervision also in the United States.). What matters in airport security is that those responsible for it meet all the demands made by governments, regardless of who employs them.

17.       At present, the identification of passengers at check-in is often made through passport control, at least on international flights, and a comparison between passports and tickets. In the near future new techniques will be available such as ‘biometrics’, that is, the identification of passengers through their facial characteristics, or by handprint or iris recognition. Such methods will also permit legitimate travellers to pass more quickly through customs and immigration checks.6

III.        AFTER BAD HAS HAPPENED: PREVENTING THE WORST IN THE AIR

18.        If, in spite of all security on the ground, one or more terrorists manifest themselves after take-off, they must be prevented from gaining access to the cockpit and, if this happens nevertheless, prevented from bringing the aircraft down. Airlines in Europe and around the world are at present working around the clock to install safer doors to the cockpit – doors equipped with bars and locks and which are strong enough to withstand bullets and even explosives. These are short-term measures to respond urgently to the new situation. Longer-term solutions are being worked on by aircraft manufacturers in co-operation with government agencies. The task is made more difficult by the numerous aircraft models – around 40 – currently in use. There are also technical obstacles in that, for example, even heavy doors could be ripped from the walls with explosives or as a result of a sudden loss of cabin pressure. Doors that are locked too tightly could also make it impossible for the crew to escape in the event of fire, or prevent rescue workers getting into the cockpit. (Europe’s pilots were opposed to locked doors to the cockpit, arguing that they needed to know at all times what was happening in the passenger section so as to be able to enter it to help quell any disturbance, and also in order to be able to leave the plane in an emergency.)

19.        Meanwhile, passengers will no longer be allowed into the cockpit. The same is in principle also to hold also for non-flying pilot peers and members of their families who have often in the past been given a so-called “jump seat” in the cockpit as a act of courtesy by the pilot in charge. It has also been suggested in some quarters but not in Europe that pilots should be permitted to carry small arms or electrical stun guns to overcome terrorists trying to get into the cockpit. It must also be ensured that the sale of penknives and other such objects is banned at airport stores, at which it has been possible to purchase them after having passed security controls.

20.        It has been suggested that cameras should be installed aboard aircraft to permit relay of information to the flight crew and to the ground about what is happening inside. However, although this would bring advantages from the security point of view, it also raises serious questions related to the right to privacy.

21.        Terrorists must no longer be able to switch off either the transponder, which permits the location of aircraft, In future, the ground must always be able to connect to the cockpit and listen in to what happens there, and to maintain voice contact with it. The Rapporteur would further suggest that – just as in a bank an employee can press a button to inform the outside world that a robbery is taking place – pilots should be able to do the same to inform the ground about a high jacking in the making.

22.       It has also been suggested that pilots should have the option of ceding control of the aircraft to ground controllers (with no possibility for a terrorist-controlled cockpit to regain it), and that it should be possible to check a flight pattern against particular features on the ground, so as to prevent a plane from intentionally flying into a building. This is, however, further off in the future from a technological point of view. The pilots’ representative at the Hearing also argued against ceding control of the aircraft to the ground. Not only would this mean having two crews (one on the plane and one on the ground) but it would also bring with it the risk that a ‘hacker’ on the ground could take over the controls, as often happens through hackers in ordinary computer operations.

23.        As regards the presence of armed in-flight security personnel - sometimes referred to as air marshals - ECAC leaves this for member states to decide, even as some airlines are reported already to employ them. ECAC does, however, recommend that in the event that a member state permits such personnel, it should make it clear to all parties concerned that the pilot of the plane remains in command, not the air marshal. There must also be adequate provisions for the use of such personnel in national legislation and international agreements. Work on these complex issues continues.

24.        It is finally important that the ground be able at all times to locate a high-jacked aircraft geographically. ECAC – with the assistance of Eurocontrol - and the EU suggest ways in which this can be done, such as a better sharing of civil and military radar information, the establishment of a ‘European Regional Focal Point for Air Traffic Management’ (under the authority of Eurocontrol) that would incorporate civil and military interests. (Eurocontrol has a very important role to play in this regard and is currently working intensely in a specialised ECAC Task Force, inter alia, on methods of air traffic management during such a crisis.)

25.       It must be agreed internationally as from what size an airplane the various devices described above would be obligatory. This consideration is certainly not in disregard of the interests of passengers and crews on smaller planes. However, if the aim of terrorists is to fly the planes to some distant destination, the fuel in the tanks of a smaller aircraft is less likely to suffice. Furthermore, in the likely case that the terrorists will seek maximum publicity and the maximum number of victims among passengers, smaller planes would be less preferred targets. Finally, it must be remembered that any and all of the investments discussed in this report will ultimately be paid for by the consumer. This cost consideration – for the industry directly and for the consumer interest in flying indirectly - is likely to be an important factor when it comes to deciding on the lower size limit of planes on which the totality of onboard security investments will be made.

IV.        CONCLUDING REMARKS: MAKING SURE THE NEW RULES ARE FOLLOWED BY ALL

26.        As was pointed out at the outset, the new security measures briefly described in the foregoing would be of little use if they are not respected around the world. It therefore behoves ICAO and all its member states to make sure this occurs. For the immediate purposes of the present report - established within the 43-member state Council of Europe - the priority is of course our own continent. It is vital that each national aviation authority – on the basis of reports from airports and airlines – inform ECAC, the EU, ICAO and other institutions of the state of implementation of the new measures as well as of any difficulties encountered. Audit – or inspection –teams at European and international level should carry out audits and checks in order to assess the state of implementation of the added security measures at airports. Such teams already exist and function within the framework of the ECAC Aviation Security Airport Audit Programme.

27.        The rather draconian measures advocated in this report are likely to leave the reader with an eerie sentiment that we are approaching a “Big Brother” society. We certainly are at airports. However, it must be remembered that this is a state of affairs not of our choosing. In an Alfred Hitchcock movie the Rapporteur saw recently, Doris Day and James Stewart are seen merrily leaving their luggage on the tarmac by the plane, with no checking whatsoever of passengers or luggage. Those carefree days are, alas, forever gone, due to terrorism. Today’s and tomorrow’s air transport security has been forced upon us by ruthless, merciless perpetrators bent on causing as much destruction to our societies as possible, and with no regard for human life. We must defend ourselves, and we will be able to do so by, in the end, apprehending or at least inhibiting those who harbour evil intentions. Meanwhile, we shall have to accept the added costs of security, whether they show up on our tickets or in the government taxes we pay. We shall do so for the higher cause of protecting our fellow citizens and ourselves, as well as the civilisation we cherish.7 And our Assembly, via its Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, must continue to ensure that the new security level outlined will go from legislation to reality as speedily as ever possible, and throughout the entire Council of Europe area.

Reporting committee: Committee on Economic Affairs and Development

Reference to committee: Standing mandate and Doc. 9255, Reference No. 2672 of

8 November 2001.

Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 4 December 2001

Members of the committee: Mrs Zapfl-Helbling (Chairperson), Mrs Stepova (Vice-chairperson), Mr Kirilov, Mr Blaauw (Vice-chairmen), Mr Adam, Mr Agius, Mr Agramunt, Mrs Akgönenç, Mr Aliyev, Mr Anusz, Mr Arnau, Mr Aylward, Mr Berceanu, Mr Billing, Mr Braun, Mr Brunhart, Mr Budin, Mr Budisa, Mrs Burbiené, Mrs Calner, Mr Cerrahoglu, Mr Cosarciuc, Mr Crema, Mr Elo, Mr Eyskens, Mr Felici, Mrs Freyberg, Mr Galoyan, Mr Gülek, Mr Gusenbauer, Mr Haupert, Mrs Hoffmann, Mr Hrebenciuc, Mr Jung, Mr Kacin, Mrs Kestelijn-Sierens, Mr Kosakivsky, Mr Leers, Mr Liapis, Mr Lotz, Mr Makhachev, Mr Mateju, Mr Mitterrand, Mrs Mortensen, Mr Naumov, Mr Palis, Mrs Patarkalishvili, Mr Pavlidis, Mr Pereira Coelho (Alternate: Mr Cesário), Mrs Pericleous-Papadopoulos, Mrs Pintat Rossel, Mr Popa, Mr Popescu, Mr Popovski, Mr Prokes, Mr Puche, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, Mr Ramponi, Mr Reimann, Mr Rivolta, Mr Schmitz, Mrs Schoettel-Delacher, Mr Schreiner, Mr Seyidov, Mr Stefanov, Mr Suslov, Mr Tallo, Mr Texeira de Melo, Mr Ustiugov, Mr Valleix (Alternate: Mariot), Mr Wielowieyski, ZZ .. (Alternate: Etherington), ZZ .. (Alternate: Djupedal).

Head of secretariat: Mr Torbiörn

Co-secretaries to the committee: M. Bertozzi, Ms Ramanauskaite and Ms Kopaçi-Di Michele

1 ECAC is composed of the following 38 member states: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the "former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia" and the United Kingdom. Future ECAC membership may extend to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bosnia Herzegovina. A future Russian membership would greatly assist European aviation.

2 By virtue of the European Union’s association agreements with various European states – such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway within the European Economic Area and with Switzerland through the Community/Switzerland agreement – the incorporation of the new EU legislation into the Community ‘acquis’ will extend the same level of protection to the wider area in question. It should be added that the European Union is introducing the new measures in the form of a Regulation, since this permits immediate enactment and imposes uniform application, rather than through a Directive, which would have taken longer to implement.

3 Subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, diplomats and other privileged persons and their personal baggage are to be searched just like those of any other passenger. However, “diplomatic bags” are exempted. This could constitute a safety risk, in that a ‘rogue state’ may choose to send a diplomatic courier (that is, a messenger carrying with him or her the diplomatic bag on board) on a suicide mission, with a weapon or explosives in the diplomatic bag.

4 Development is under way of a new type of scanner capable of detecting explosives, narcotics, alcohol or environmentally hazardous materials by detailing the chemical composition of a bag’s content. First the cargo is bombarded with pulses of fast-travelling neutrons, which cause the contents of the luggage to emit gamma rays. Gamma detectors then collect the ‘elemental signals’ from the cargo and transform the information into a high resolution image. Finally, the ‘elemental signals’ are compared to those of different elements stored in a data base. The scanner then displays the image and ‘colour codes’ the display to indicate the absence or presence of any given material.

5 It may soon be possible to use so-called ‘intelligent’ baggage tags to replace the bar-coded paper tags that are today attached to luggage at check-in. Thanks to such electronic baggage tags it will be possible to know at all times during air travel where a passenger’s checked-in luggage is. Apart from improving security, such tags will also reduce delays in take-off, or in finding lost baggage.

6 Thought is now being given in the US to offering ‘pre-screening’ to willing passengers using such new techniques. This could reduce waiting time for them considerably, while allowing security officers to pay greater attention to remaining passengers.

7 An Israeli observer to the Economic Committee in this connection pointed to his country’s particularly elevated costs for air security. Although these were of course onerous for the airlines concerned and obliged passengers to arrive extra early at the airport, they had nevertheless clearly proven themselves to be a strong deterrent against terrorists.