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Doc. 9399
27 March 2002
Religion and change in central and eastern Europe
Report
Committee on Culture, Science and Education
Rapporteur: Mr Mihai Baciu, Romania, Socialist Group
Summary
The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe has opened the door to competition between state and religion for the hearts and minds of the people. The report analyses the political and socio-cultural changes in individual countries and highlights the pressures of competing religions and of new religious movements, of cultural identity and respect for diversity, of eastern and western approaches. Ways forward are proposed based on the principles of human rights and respect for the different roles and responsibilities of religion and state.
I. Draft recommendation
1. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has frequently had occasion to consider questions relating to the preservation and development of traditional religious cultures, and ways of creating the conditions needed for them to interact and develop successfully together. In Resolution 885 (1987) on the Jewish Contribution to European culture, Recommendation 1162 (1991) on the contribution of Islamic civilisation to European culture, and Recommendation 1291 (1996) on Yiddish culture, the Assembly expressed its sense of the need to safeguard and develop Europe’s shared cultural heritage, in all its richness and diversity.
2. The Assembly has also persistently expressed its awareness of the need to ensure or restore harmonious relations between religious institutions and states. This is an essential part of securing such basic human rights as freedom of conscience and religion, religious tolerance and the protection of individuals and communities against all forms of religious persecution. These issues are specifically dealt with in Resolution 916 (1989) on redundant religious buildings, Recommendation 1202 (1993) on religious tolerance in a democratic society, Recommendation 1222 (1993) on the fight against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, Recommendation 1396 (1999) on religion and democracy, and Recommendation 1412 (1999) on the illegal activities of sects.
3. The collapse of communism has given religious institutions in central and eastern Europe an opportunity if not responsibility to renew their social potential and focus on their basic, historical tasks (e.g. the spiritual education of the individual, the ethical improvement of society, and charitable, cultural, educational and other projects).
4. More recently, socio-religious developments in the post-communist countries have been marked by the emergence of fundamentalist and extremist tendencies, active attempts to make religious slogans and religious organisations part of a process of military, political, and ethnic mobilisation in the service of militant nationalism and chauvinism, and the politicisation of religious life.
5. The emergence of independent states has encouraged certain national Orthodox churches to seek independence for themselves or transfer their allegiance - aspirations which are sometimes strongly resisted by the Orthodox centres to which they were previously subject. This has led to a worsening of relations between Churches and, in some cases, Governments. It is important to exclude all possibility of governmental interference in questions of dogma, church organisation and canon law.
6. The new religious freedom and the removal of barriers to the dissemination of ideas and beliefs, including religious beliefs, have forced the Churches of central and eastern Europe to face religious differences. Weakened in the past and never having functioned in a climate of political, cultural and religious pluralism, the traditional churches of the region now find themselves in conflict with newly- arrived foreign missionaries and new religious movements. So far, the problem remains unsolved of striking a balance between on the one hand the principles of democracy and human rights, of freedom of conscience and religion, and on the other the preservation of national cultural, ethnic and religious identity, .
7. The disappearance of the “Iron Curtain” has made the religious and cultural divide in Europe more apparent, and has even aggravated it. Europe’s two Christian cultures - Western and Eastern – know very little of each other, and this ignorance is a very dangerous obstacle on the path to a united Europe. As Pope John Paul II has repeatedly said, Christian Europe must breathe with both its lungs, eastern and western. Similarly, adherents of the two Christian traditions show little interest in Jewish culture, such an integral part of the European heritage, or in Islamic culture, which is becoming increasingly a part of the European scene.
8. The Assembly accordingly recommends that the Committee of Ministers call on the governments of the member states, the European Union, and also the authorities and organisations concerned:
Legal guarantees and their observance
i. to promote conformity of national legislation with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, paying special attention to Article 9, which states that religious freedoms shall be subject only to limitations prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, and to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (1983) that restrictions on human rights must be motivated by a “pressing social need”, and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”;
ii. to guarantee all churches, religious associations, centres and communities the status of legal entities, if their activity does not violate human rights or international law and in particular to press the Government of the Republic of Moldova to register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia according to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 13 December 2001;
iii. to take effective action to guarantee the freedom of religious minorities, especially in central and eastern Europe, with special emphasis on protecting them against discrimination or persecution by religious majorities or other groups practising aggressive nationalism and chauvinism;
iv. to activate the normal procedures provided for in national law in all cases where religious freedoms are proved to be abused in a manner harmful to the community, or to the rights, freedoms and health of individuals;
v. to guarantee to religious institutions, the assets of which were nationalised in the past, restitution of such assets within a certain time or, in cases where this is impossible, fair compensation; due care must be taken to prevent privatisation of nationalised church property;
vi. to offer to mediate between conflicting parties, in cases where the latter accept this, for the purpose of settling disputes, while taking care to ensure that government bodies do not interfere in dogma or other internal religious matters;
vii. to ask the European Convention to include European religious and Christian traditions into the Preamble of the future European Constitution, as the foundation of human dignity and human rights and of the ethical roots of European identity;
Culture, education and exchange
viii. to devise communication strategies and to develop the necessary activities in the field of cultural exchange, making people in different countries mutually aware of their cultural achievements;
ix. to co-operate with the church authorities in identifying and sharing their responsibilities, such as in maintaining historic buildings and in religious education, and in promoting joint discussion of the major social, moral, ethical and cultural issues which modern societies face;
x. to include information on Europe’s main religious cultures and practices in school curricula;
xi. to support the activities of non-governmental organisations working to strengthen mutual understanding between religious groups, and protect the religious cultural heritage;
xii. to take action to secure equal access to the media, education and culture for representatives of all religious traditions;
xiii. to encourage the setting-up of special centres to promote interconfessional relations, and also the exchange of exhibitions and fairs, centred on cultural heritage, masterpieces of religious art and books, and helping people to familiarise themselves with Europe’s various religious cultures.
xiv. to promote exchange programmes to give students, research workers and artists a full picture of the ethical, moral and cultural values of Europe’s religions.
xv. to encourage the development of cultural itineraries in Europe and linking Europe with neighbouring countries so as to reflect and develop past perspectives and new possibilities of cultural communication.
xvi. to provide public libraries with publications, which detail the cultural achievements and beliefs of the various religious traditions;
xvii. to promote scientific research aimed at uncovering the shared roots of Europe’s various cultures and fostering a better understanding of the ways in which they interrelate and complement one another;
II. Explanatory memorandum1
by Mr M. Baciu
Introduction
Socio-religious development in the 20th century: the main trends
1. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, many thinkers expected religion to vanish in the 20th century. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many sociologists predicted that religion would last no longer than the start of the 21st century. Religion itself was identified with superstition, seen as a refuge from fear, etc.
2. The main factors which have made today’s sociologists change their minds on the future of religion are: the two world wars, and the unparalleled destruction they entailed; the mass murders perpetrated in so-called “death factories” by totalitarian régimes, with Auschwitz and the Gulag as their symbols; the invention of weapons of mass destruction and their use against peaceful civilian populations; and the genocide wreaked on Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians and others in this century. Today, global problems are envisaged more clearly - especially the threat of ecological disasters affecting the whole planet.
3. These disasters have made the sociologists reject the old theory that humanity is evolving towards perfection. It is becoming ever clearer that scientific and technological progress, without moral progress and spiritual development, brings humanity to a dead end. Hence the reborn sense of the need for reliable ethical indicators and a return to values which are deeply rooted in human nature. Throughout the world, religion is being rediscovered, in what D. Bell has called a “return of the sacred”.
4. The 20th century has at least given us two lessons in the religious and social spheres, which are vital to an understanding of the basic nature of human beings and human communities:
5. The prediction that, as a result of globalisation, urbanisation, social differentiation, modernisation, and erosion of traditional cultural archetypes, religion would ultimately withdraw from the public arena and become a purely private matter has not been confirmed. In various parts of the world, religion continues to play a major role on the political, social and cultural scene.
6. The various attempts to eliminate religion by force and replace it with pretentious ersatz cults (e.g. the ideologies propagated by the totalitarian Communist and Nazi régimes) have come to nothing.
7. The experiment with atheism conducted with varying degrees of intensity and determination in both central and east European countries proved a failure. None the less, the church policy of the communist régimes in the region effectively deformed religious culture, and has decisively shaped the special features of post-communist socio-cultural development in that part of Europe.
Religion in Central and East Europe before 1989
8. The policies of the communist régimes on religion developed in much the same way in most of the countries concerned. At first, religious institutions came under general attack in a “Leninist/Stalinist” spirit. Senior and ordinary clerics were arrested wholesale, religious activists were intimidated, church property was nationalised, and the church as a social institution was banished from the public scene.
9. However, the régimes’ desire for legitimacy and broad popular support, and also the realisation that their uncompromising onslaught on religion had gained them nothing, led to a gradual change in their policies. In their relations with the churches, they now aimed at a modus vivendi, trying to use them to realise their own aims at home and abroad, and even - in some cases - making them a kind of extension of the party and government apparatus. They decided that they could safely allow religious institutions to undertake certain kinds of charitable work and even play a part in the moral education of children and young people. The churches secured certain improvements in their situation – but only by promising to refrain from all unauthorised political activity and swearing loyalty to their governments. The latter kept religious institutions under constant, rigid control, infiltrating the church leadership with secret police agents and hounding religious dissidents.
10. The differences between the religious policies pursued by the régimes in different countries remained consistent throughout the whole communist period.
11. In Albania, for example, the dictator Enver Hoxha announced, in September 1967, that the country’s 2,169 mosques, churches and places of worship would be closed, making it “the world’s first atheistic nation”.
12. In Poland, on the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church acted as a kind of substratum of civil society, often co-operating with the state when this proved necessary in specific case – but, even more often, competing fiercely with it. Tempered and hardened in the stateless period following the division of Poland, when it had served as a bulwark of Polish identity against Russian Orthodoxy and German Protestantism, it acquired a new and vital function under the Communists – standing in for civil society as the régime’s most organised, consistent and skilful opponent. On the one hand, it used its authority to make Communism seem alien, something outside the national tradition. On the other, it engaged in dialogue with the authorities on the whole community’s behalf, negotiated and made - but also won - concessions. With the people’s active backing, it opposed the government on issues which were totally non-negotiable between church and state in other Communist countries. One can think here of the attitude adopted in 1975-1976 by Cardinals Wyszyński and Wojtyła, who spoke out against constitutional amendments referring to "unbreakable and fraternal ties with the Soviet Union" and "the leading and governing role of the Polish United Workers' Party". Even when Solidarnosc, which certainly had its support and encouragement, came to prominence, the Church resolutely refused to play "co-pilot" to the famous trade union. Arguably, it emerged from the communist era with the greatest authority it had ever wielded in the whole of its history.
13. In Bulgaria and Romania, the régimes ultimately fused the state and the majority church in an unequal coalition. In both cases, the state used “its” church to legitimise its existence, encourage nationalism and justify its actions. There were three stages in the process. In the first (the People’s Front period in Romania and the National Front period in Bulgaria), the state prepared to attack the churches. Next came Stalinist terror directed against the churches. Finally, rigid control was established over the majority church, but the latter enjoyed special status and was given vast privileges. Unlike the Soviet leaders, both Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceausescu stressed the role of the Orthodox Church in their countries’ history, made it a rallying point for patriotic feeling, and turned its structures into an appendix to the party’s ideological department and the state’s machinery. It is important to remember that this was achieved by exerting great pressure on the church, purging the clergy, and censoring theological ideas.
14. In the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, a relatively liberal approach was adopted to the functioning of religious institutions and to their relations with the state. After World War II, however, the churches had also been subjected to brutal pressures - arrests, tortures, purges, etc. – and this liberal (the word here is very relative) attitude sometimes took decades to emerge. In Hungary, for instance, severe restrictions on religious activity in 1945-1948 were followed by Stalinist terror against the churches in 1949-1956. The 1956 revolution sparked a brief period of liberalisation, but reaction then set in, and lasted until 1963. Only then could it be said that church-state relations were relatively normal in the "socialist camp’s liveliest barracks".
In the German Democratic Republic, an attempt to establish a more or less equal relationship between the "first workers’ and peasants’ state on German soil" and the churches was made in the first four years after the war. This was followed, however, by a 30-year campaign against the churches, and it was only in the last decade of the GDR’s existence that the situation started to become more normal, and religious freedoms were in some ways extended.
Obviously, churches in the countries we have been talking about enjoyed (at least from the 1960s on) freedoms and possibilities unthinkable in the USSR. They received subsidies from government, were allowed to do charitable work and provide religious instruction, and were relatively free to publish religious works and prayer books. (One interesting detail: in the last twenty-five years of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia’s existence, the Bible outsold all the Marxist publications.) The churches were allowed to go their way comparatively unmolested, provided that they steered clear of unauthorized political activity. The state found it useful to encourage them to provide moral education, especially for young people, and do charitable and voluntary work, but kept a close watch on them, placed secret servicemen on their governing bodies, and persecuted religious dissidents. It is clear, however, that religious freedoms in these countries were merely restricted, while non-religious forms of “deviant” activity were savagely repressed.
15. In the Soviet Union and throughout its existence, separation of church and state was rigidly and aggressively enforced. Soviet religious policy was a policy of extremes, ranging from bloody terror (resulting in the deaths of over 130,000 Orthodox priests, not to mention other clergy) to an imperial policy of making the "greatest nation’s main church” a part of the political system, from serious attempts to implement a "final solution of the religious problem" to a "new religious policy", using priests to educate their flock in the principles of Soviet patriotism. Reduced to its "mean content", this policy spelt total control of religious activity, restricted religion to worship, suppressed religious dissidence, and set up a powerful infrastructure to eradicate "religious prejudices".
We should note one point: in the end, the Soviet authorities admitted – albeit unofficially - that the religious policy they had pursued in the Slav republics could not be enforced in the Baltic region or Central Asia. In fact, although some school principals who had served as mullahs, and some regional party secretaries who had taken part in religious ceremonies in predominantly Muslim areas, were dismissed, the central authorities were eventually forced to admit that they could not change the Islamic way of life. Behind a decorous socialist facade, polygamy, the payment of bride-money, circumcision of nearly all boys, and blood feuds remained current in the Islamic republics of the Northern Caucasus.
In Lithuania and West Ukraine, Soviet Church policy was staunchly opposed by both clergy and faithful. In fact, the Soviet Act on Religious Cults was never fully implemented in either, and the Catholic clergy of Lithuania declared roundly in a letter to Leonid Brezhnev that they rejected it as contradicting the Gospel.
In West Ukraine, with its population of 5 million, the authorities were also forced to allow 1,200 Orthodox parishes to continue functioning, whereas the Soviet Union as a whole, with its 280 million people, had only 6,000 such parishes.
In other words, even in the Soviet period, when the central authorities were waging a relentless war on religion, and the eradication of religious feeling was a cornerstone of state policy, the actual status of religious institutions and socio-religious development were very largely determined by the nature of local religious culture, as it had emerged through the centuries.
The post-communist socio-religious transition: cultural aspects
16. Various changes have taken place on the religious scene in the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe. Firstly, of course, reprisals and restrictions have ceased, and church infrastructure, the monastic life, theological instruction and church social work have all expanded. These changes are probably the easiest to spot, since they can at least be quantified. The dramatic increase in the number of churches, monasteries, seminaries, church schools, missions, etc. cannot be denied.
17. Less obvious are the widespread longing for the sacred, and the radical increase in the number of converts – although these changes, too, can be quantified. In nearly all the post-communist countries, the number of people declaring their personal belief in God has increased (with the probable exception of Poland, where the figure was already as high as it could be). Interestingly, the growth figures do not seem particularly striking in countries (Slovenia, Hungary), which have been conducting careful sociological surveys for a long time. Interestingly, too, the figures on religious behaviour remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1990s.
18. The changes in areas where religion has become a serious factor in rallying support for specific political and ethnic causes are more obvious.
19. Pan-European opinion polls (e.g. the European Value Programme), carried out in the 1990s in central and east European countries which had been exposed to varying degrees of atheistic indoctrination, showed marked differences between people in those countries in terms of belief in God, religious practice, church membership, knowledge of major religious doctrines, confidence in churches, etc. This may seem a little strange, given that the régimes that ruled those countries for decades were similar, both in themselves and in their treatment of religious institutions. However, the reasons become plain when one compares the results of these surveys with those of surveys carried out in Western Europe.
20. This comparison shows that the post-communist societies now free of totalitarian pressures are returning to the natural patterns of their own religious culture - patterns shaped through the centuries by their historical development, cultural heritage, distinctive socio-psychological features, and sense of belonging to a certain culture and civilisation. To understand the problems better, one needs to grasp the role played by specific religions in the history of specific countries – the extent to which they helped to preserve ethnic and cultural identity, particularly in countries long subjected to foreign rule. It is only by weighing all these complex factors that one can see why, for example, Poland’s socio-religious profile today is closer that of Ireland than that of the Czech Republic, with which it shares a frontier; why East Germany is closer in this respect to Denmark than West Germany; or why Slovakia is closer to Austria than the Czech Republic, with which it previously formed a single state.
21. What we are seeing, therefore, is the rebirth of religious cultures - a process that will vary in its duration and will require the active participation of communities and governments.
22. Christians in the West and in the East originally had a common enemy in the shape of the totalitarian régimes. Christians in the free world believed that they had a duty to support their suffering brothers and sisters in the Communist countries, and denounced the violations of religious and human rights which took place there, while Christians in the East regarded their western co-religionists as reliable allies in their opposition to the anti-religious policies of the pro-Soviet régimes.
The downfall of their “common enemy” has revealed many divisions between the former allies, some of them dating back centuries, others of very recent date.
23. An especially important point seems to be the situation regarding the eastern Catholic churches - the churches of eastern origin which, at various times (e.g. the Ukrainian Church in the 16th century, the Armenian Church in the 18th century) entered into communion with Rome. (It should be noted that the term “Uniate”, often applied to the eastern Catholic churches in the past, is now generally considered pejorative). Their resurgence in the post-communist countries has generated tensions with Orthodox believers, who find it hard to acknowledge their very existence. Legalisation of the eastern Catholic churches after more than 40 years of prohibition and humiliation has also sparked feelings of triumph, and even revenge. In Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in Romania, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches have clashed over questions of authority and property. At the wish of the Orthodox hierarchy, Orthodox/Greek Catholic dialogue has focused on the question of union with Rome – an issue discussed at the meetings of the Joint Orthodox–Catholic Commission for Theological Dialogue in Vienna (1990), Freising (1990), Aricci (1990) and Balamand (1993). Although the Catholics have made some concessions, the problem has not yet been solved, and has negative effects on inter-church relations.
24. The attitude of Orthodox believers to Catholics and Protestants is rooted in deep-seated prejudice and suspicion, which are nurtured by memories of the past, decades of isolation and the fear of being absorbed into the mighty ocean of western Christianity and losing their identity. This has been underlined by reaction to Pope John Paul’s visits to Greece and Ukraine.
25. Behind these fears lies an even greater problem: each side’s ignorance of, and failure to understand, the other. This applies equally to eastern and western Christians, and to the cultures spawned by both traditions.
26. Outside closed academic circles, Orthodoxy remains little known in western and northern Europe. It gets little media coverage, if any, and so has a negative public image. In the Orthodox countries, on the other hand, Catholicism and Protestantism are still associated with the spirit of the Middle Ages, while the considerable financial, organisational and intellectual resources of the western churches give rise to fears that western religions may expand eastward and threaten Orthodox identity.
27. Mutual understanding and exchange between the three religions - Christian, Jewish and Muslim - which trace their roots to Abraham’s heritage are another, no less serious, problem.
28. This problem is particularly marked in those central and east European countries, which made anti-Semitism state policy, denouncing all expressions of Jewish ethnic and religious feeling as “militant Zionism”. The events of 11 September 2001 renewed in certain strata bygone prejudices, gave rise to anti-Muslim sentiments, suspicion and hostility towards Muslims.
29. The situation in this area needs to be assessed with special care. It is true that religious diversity is a fact in central and eastern Europe – but this does not mean that religious pluralism (which is not the same thing) is increasing, at the same time and to the same extent, in all the countries of the region. Religious pluralism means, not simply that numerous beliefs are held in a given area, but also that those beliefs are recognised in law and by the community as valid expressions of the religious life (the case which concerns us here), and that friendly – or at least peaceful - relations exist between different churches and between people with different beliefs. The transition from “diversity” to “pluralism” – inhibited by sad memories of age-old ethnic and religious conflicts in the area – may well be a long one, and will probably keep pace with the progress of democratic reform.
30. In a “globalised” context, religious cultures cannot develop in isolation. When the “iron curtain” disappeared, the countries of central and eastern Europe were flooded by religious missionaries from outside. The influx was especially dramatic in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An East–West church and ministry survey carried out in 1996 showed that the number of foreign missionaries in the former Soviet Union alone had risen by 31% in just one year. According to reports produced in the mid-1990s, there were over 1,900 full-time missionaries from North America and South Korea in that area.
31. Competition from well-funded, mobile and experienced missionaries became a serious cause of concern to the hierarchy and clergy of the region’s traditional churches, who repeatedly expressed their fears that the faithful would be lured away, their communities’ cultural profile transformed, and their identity lost. These fears were partly due to the traditional churches’ rejection of cultural and religious pluralism, and the whole idea of a “free market” in beliefs. Mainly, however, they were roused by the missionaries themselves, who displayed little tact or sensitivity – plainly failing to grasp the fact that the people they were trying to evangelise were not pagan primitives, but the heirs of a thousand-year Christian tradition, with an unusually rich spiritual and cultural heritage.
32. It is very important to remember that, at various times in the past, many nations in central and eastern Europe were subjected to foreign rule. This makes them particularly sensitive to even the slightest affront to their ethnic and religious dignity, and to any threat to their identity.
33. Both of these factors fuelled a series of quite dramatic conflicts, as the church hierarchy started to insist that the state must restrict, not just the presence and mobility of foreign missionaries on its territory, but also the religious freedoms of members of the religious communities they had founded.
34. At about the same time, the new religious movements (NRMs, i.e. the various new-style religions which emerged after 1959) started to gain a foothold in central and eastern Europe, where they found a ready market for their ideas. In the East, they also found it easier to overcome the problems caused by generation change, as the first fiery impulse was lost and the charismatic founders died (e.g. А.С. Bhaktivedanta Prabhupada, founder of ISKON, in 1977; L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, in 1986; Osho, in 1990).
35. In central and eastern Europe, the NRMs found people, and especially young people, with a vital desire for spiritual improvement, for answers to the major questions of existence. They also found a certain disillusionment with the forms of religion purveyed by the traditional churches. The strategy they adopted in central and eastern Europe differed significantly from the one they had initially followed in the West. Instead of aiming at the misfits and outsiders, they targeted all young people, promising them, not just keys to “the meaning of life”, but material prosperity too. The success of the NRMs has been dramatised and exaggerated by the media and anti-cult groups, but is still significant. It has also obliged the traditional church hierarchy to mobilise in defence of the nation’s cultural and religious identity, striking back at the NRMs, and often dragging government agencies into the struggle.
36. Generally speaking, there is, in central and eastern Europe, an increasing trend away from "national” to “free choice” religion. The churches in the region are not prepared to accept or engage in free competition with other religious traditions, are very sensitive to the activities of NRMs and sects, and are often extreme in their reactions. This has provoked a number of incidents and is creating a whole series of problems. Some countries have adopted repressive approaches to solving them – with human rights violations and outbreaks of xenophobia and religious intolerance as the consequence.
Religious freedom and cultural identity
37. And so Europe today finds itself facing a wholly new problem – that of striking the right balance between protecting freedom of belief and preserving the religious identity of communities and societies. The individual’s right to hold any belief (or none), to change his/her religion or belief, and to manifest that religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance, without any interference by a state, community or other individual - all of this is protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the UN Declaration on Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, the CSCE texts, etc. However, the right of religious communities to defend their religious identity is far less well protected, and fear of being deprived of religious or ethnic identity (the two types are often synonymous) is the cause of tension in various parts of Europe.
38. While the countries of western Europe already have legal instruments which allow them to reconcile preservation of national traditions (including religious traditions) with the personal rights and religious choices of individuals, the countries of central and eastern Europe are having to introduce them. Freedom of religion includes freedom to maintain one’s own religious identity. Many Christian churches are agreed that a church-member’s religious identity should be protected against the efforts of any other church to make him/her switch allegiance. Specifically, this point is emphasised in the Study Document of the Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches (1995). On the other hand, a traditional religion, which has played a major role in shaping a nation’s identity, may not be protected by restricting the freedoms of individuals. The devising of instruments which reconcile the right of individuals to change their religion or belief with their right to preserve their religious traditions and identity (as one aspect of their personal identity) is vital for Europe’s development in the 21st century.
39. Striking this balance is not just desirable, but perfectly possible in view of the radical changes in theologians’ understanding of human rights in the second half of the 20th century (notwithstanding the serious disagreements which exist between Christian churches on a number of anthropological and social issues). Theologians now derive their conception of human rights from certain basic principles, such as recognition of the human being’s transcendental essence, embodied in the concept of human dignity; the freedom enjoyed by the human being as a God-created person; the social nature of the human being, created to live in a community.
40. In the same way, Jewish and Muslim theologians warn against simplified conceptions of human rights in Judaism and Islam. This whole concept is rooted, not in Scripture, (it would be naďve to look for the sources of modern democratic ideas in the old texts), but in a certain conception of human nature and in the determination not to deprive human beings of the rights conferred on them by God.
41. In fact, religious institutions played no pioneering role in developing human rights. Although Judeo-Christian tradition was (with Greco-Roman culture) one of the sources of our modern conception of human rights, the churches were slow to accept them. Today, however, religious institutions (we obviously exclude those fundamentalist tendencies and movements which exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in all religious traditions) can contribute significantly to development of the concept of human rights. That contribution may be all the more valuable for the fact that the religious understanding of human rights, and of ways of developing and protecting them, is grounded in a moral awareness of the things done by individuals, not by government and other public agencies. At the same time, secular human rights organisations are still rather sceptical when it comes to co-operating with religious institutions on human rights issues.
42. The human rights movements launched by churches and lay communities have powerful moral and ethical components. Secular human rights movements are focused on the individual’s right to act in accordance with his/her beliefs, regardless of whether those beliefs are endorsed by a state, community or church. Religion reminds democratic society that the individual’s human rights must be respected simply because he/she is a human being, and that those rights are rooted in something unique which lies beyond merely human experience. In return, democratic society provides religion with information on the instruments used to protect human rights and the rights of groups (e.g. women, the disabled, children, etc.), whose freedoms were restricted for centuries “as a matter of course”. By co-operating and complementing each other in this way, both sides can help to promote human dignity, from which human rights naturally derive, and so hold out effectively against dehumanisation of society and culture.
Socio-religious changes: the political dimension
43. The entry of religion into the socio-political arena in the countries of central and eastern Europe is a highly significant and also controversial development. On the one hand, religious institutions have played a major part in the non-violent demolition of totalitarian régimes, and in the development of civil society. On the other, religion in some countries has been used, or has actively helped, to mobilise public support for military aggression, and stoke the fires of nationalism and chauvinism, which have destabilised certain parts of Europe.
44. This trend was very clear in some of the episodes, which marked the first post-communist decade. Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia, which had nothing to do with religion at starting, were subsequently given a strong religious emphasis. Religion can be exploited for military-political purposes in two ways: by turning a religious doctrine into a military-political programme, and by bringing religious symbols, rhetoric and concepts into politics. The second approach was classically exemplified in the interaction of religion and politics during the Yugoslav conflict. Key political concepts were given a strong religious colouring: there was talk of "Holy Serbia", "God-saved Croatia" and a "sacred struggle" against the holders of other beliefs. In the public mind, conflict becomes a collision between different “breeds” of people, and the other side is demonised. "Friends" are seen as servants of God’s will, "enemies" as agents of the Devil. This kind of rhetoric always goes with a sense of being victimised. The war in the former Yugoslavia resulted in massive loss of life, the destruction of countless places of worship, and the redrawing of political and confessional boundaries. It also seriously undermined dialogue between Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and between Christians and Muslims.
45. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabach also led to an objective worsening of Christian-Muslim relations. It developed into a large-scale war, in the course of which Azerbaijan lost 20% of its territory, and 1.1 million people in both countries became refugees or lost their homes. The attempts of religious leaders on both sides – the former Armenian Catholicos, Vazgen, and Sheikh Allahsukur Pasha-Zade - to help settle the crisis in its early stages not only received no support, but also were sharply criticised in radical circles.
46. The attempts of the Georgian Orthodox hierarchy to stop the civil war in that country by excommunicating Georgians who took up arms against their fellow-countrymen also came to nothing.
47. In the same way, the appeals against bloodshed in Moscow made by the supreme leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in October 1993 went unheeded. The pattern of church involvement in the Yugoslav conflict was actually duplicated in the first Chechen war. The Church seemed unable to stem the aggressive wave of chauvinist and nationalist feeling, and many priests actively called for “unification of the Russian lands”. As a result, the calls of the Russian Orthodox leadership for an end to the war, once it had started, were seen as a mere empty gesture. Later, during the second Chechen war, the Orthodox hierarchy unconditionally supported the Russian government’s policy, urged it to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion, and justified the army’s actions. In the same way, the hierarchy was demonstrative in its support of the military operations which began in the northern Caucasus in summer 1999: Patriarch Aleksei II spoke of them as a war between states, not an anti-terrorist operation, and completely ignored the very real sufferings of the non-combatant civilian population – all of them citizens of Russia.
48. In other words, although the church leadership took certain steps toward resolving these disputes peacefully at various stages, they still bear much of the blame for letting them develop into armed conflicts. This applies primarily to churches, which claim to be national, and see themselves as embodying the national identity.
49. When various countries in central and eastern Europe regained their independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their Orthodox churches were also tempted to seek independence or change their allegiance. While wholly legitimate in terms of canon law, this wish was strongly resisted by some Orthodox capitals, and provoked an upsurge of nationalist feeling, creating new areas of conflict in Europe. The situation was aggravated by state involvement and recognition of the fact that the whole issue had a bearing on international relations (as in Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova and "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia").
50. The Macedonian Orthodox Church had already been trying, since the late 1950s, to sever its links with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Even when “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” became an internationally recognised, independent state, this issue had not been resolved. Under Orthodox canon law, the limits of church jurisdiction should normally coincide with administrative boundaries. As a result, the refusal to recognise the independence of the church which commands the allegiance of most of the newly independent country’s believers is seen as an indirect denial of its statehood – and so relations between the Serbian and Macedonian national churches have a negative effect on relations between their two countries.
51. Equally baneful in its effects on Russo-Estonian relations is the conflict concerning jurisdiction over Estonia’s Orthodox parishes (is the Constantinople or the Moscow Patriarchate to control them?). The conflict has dragged on for over four years and has entered a critical phase.
52. The problems raised by the Bessarabian Orthodox Church in Moldova have remained unsolved since 1992. It was founded in that year, when a number of priests broke away from the Moldavian Orthodox Church, which is answerable to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Bessarabian Orthodox Church sees itself as the lawful successor of the pre-war Romanian Orthodox Church in Bessarabia, and has attached itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of that church, whose primacy its leaders acknowledge. The Moldovan Government has repeatedly (October 1992, March 1996, August 1996, March 1997) refused to register the Bessarabian Church, giving unresolved property claims as its reason and declaring that the church itself is a "breakaway movement.". In June 1998, the church took its case to the European Court of Human Rights. On 13 December 2001, European Court of Human Rights decided unanimously that there had been violations of Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court also awarded the applicants EUR 27.025 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and for legal costs and expenses.
53. The Orthodox churches in Ukraine have been in conflict for over a decade. This conflict is rooted in differing attitudes to the question of severing links with the Moscow Patriarchate. While some Orthodox believers reject the latter’s authority and regard subordination to Moscow as offensive, others accept it totally. There are now three Orthodox churches in Ukraine, and the conflict between them is causing serious social and political problems. The Ukrainian Government’s attempts to mediate have so far proved unsuccessful. In August 2000, President Leonid Kuchma asked the Russian Orthodox Council of Bishops to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is answerable to the Moscow Patriarchate, the status of an autonomous church. This request was rejected.
54. It is true that questions of church government and canon law lie outside the Council of Europe’s province, but the conflicts we have mentioned (and others we have not, e.g. the dispute between the Orthodox Churches of Serbia and Montenegro, the refusal of the Belarus authorities to recognise the Belarus Autonomous Orthodox Church) show how serious the problems can be, and how easily they can acquire a socio-political dimension. This is why there is a pressing need for a general reconciliation strategy, which can be applied, in specific cases. At the same time, any such strategy must exclude all possibility of governmental interference in questions of dogma, church organisation and canon law.
55. One of the most serious and controversial problems is the association of religion with politics. Ultimately, the two can never be totally separated – nowhere and at no time in the past has this ever proved possible. Religion, which aspires to tell individuals how to live, and ideally wants a social order which accords with its doctrines, cannot stand aloof from the public sphere. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to expect religious institutions, which bring together millions of believers, to restrict themselves entirely to organising worship.
56. Occasionally, however, in the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe, church participation in the processes of social and political change – natural enough in itself – has acquired some dubious features. In a situation where party systems were under-developed and trade unions weak, the churches stood out as well-organised structures, with reliable means of communication, and tried-and-tested methods, developed over the centuries, of putting quite sophisticated ideas over to ordinary people. This was what made them so attractive to individuals and groups seeking, or trying to hang on to, positions of power. And this is why religious life in the region has been abnormally politicised, giving rise to schisms and conflicts, which seriously hamper the economic, political and social development of the countries concerned.
57. Some churches, having left the “social ghetto” to which the totalitarian régimes confined them, did not fully understand the recent changes. At the end of the century, they found themselves having to operate in societies that bore no resemblance to those that existed at the beginning of the century. In many countries, they had none of the social structures needed to function effectively in the new situation. This, and the lack of what might be called a “post-communist theology”, led to serious tensions between churches and societies.
58. In the meantime, the pattern of political, social and cultural development in central and eastern Europe has suggested ways in which the problems raised by the interaction of religion and politics can be solved. Many opinion polls show that people in the post-communist countries want the churches to reduce their party political involvement and become more active in tackling acute social problems - especially those with a definite ethical dimension.
Church-state relations
59. Most of the post-communist countries base their attitude to religion and the churches on the values proclaimed by the international community. These values are: freedom of conscience and religion, and the right to profess the religion of one’s choice, to worship freely (alone or as part of a community), to act in accordance with one’s religious beliefs, or indeed to profess no religion. Equality before the law is guaranteed to all (not just the citizens of a given country) regardless of their religious beliefs, and any restrictions on religious freedom must be provided for in law, and be necessary to protect the life and health of citizens or public order. States undertake to respect the internal structures of religious organisations, and not to interfere in their internal affairs, and also guarantee the rights of religious minorities.
60. At the same time, church-state relations in every central or east European country are determined by the distinctive features of that country’s social, political and cultural development – which is why there are some differences.
61. Thus, some countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia) refer to the majority church in their constitutions, while others (Armenia, the Russian Federation) have laws recognising the special status of a particular church (or churches).
62. Some central and east European countries (Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland) have concluded concordats with the Holy See, providing extra protection for the Roman Catholic Church, as compared with minority religions.
63. Some countries (Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) have “recognised churches”, with more legal rights than others. Other countries (Lithuania) have a probation period for religious associations seeking state recognition.
64. Slovakia traditionally funds the “recognised churches”, but direct state funding of churches does not exist in most of the former Soviet-block countries.
65. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, the restitution of church property is nearly complete. In many other countries, the problem has yet to be solved, and progress varies. In Russia, Ukraine and some other countries, only the restitution of items used in worship and places of public worship is still on the agenda.
66. In most of the countries that concern us, the legal status of religious institutions does not depend on their spiritual centres’ location. In some cases (Estonia), churches based in other countries may not own real estate.
67. Some countries impose next to no restrictions on the propagation of religious beliefs. Others (Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, etc.) restrict the activities of foreign missionaries, and others again (Armenia, Moldova) ban proselytism on their territory.
68. The problems of guaranteeing and respecting religious freedoms also vary in their scope and intensity. In some central and east European countries, violations of religious freedoms are minimal, but in countries ravaged by war and ethnic cleansing, they can be serious. In most of the latter, discrimination is both ethnic and religious, since the two aspects have merged (this applies in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).
69. Some governments recognise the legal equality of all religions, but fail to take the action needed to protect religious minorities against attacks and violations of their rights by members of the religious majority.
70. The experience of Western democracies and the last ten years of post-communist development both suggest that guaranteeing religious freedoms is more a matter of respecting human rights and effecting democratic reforms, than of following any set pattern in church-state relations, which can take various forms in a democracy (separation of church and state, established churches, recognised churches, co-operation, agreement, etc.).
71. When the state recognises one or more churches as having special status, it must not support such churches in exerting pressure on individuals or discriminating against minority churches. Churches active in the armed forces, prisons, old people’s homes, schools, etc. may not impose religious obligations on individuals against their will.
72. Conversely, the separation of church and state introduced by most governments in central and eastern Europe must not result in the churches’ being excluded from any social role, prevented from undertaking active social work, and deprived of state protection when they need it. Guaranteeing religious freedoms also means protecting the existence and structures of religious communities.
73. Inevitably, the need to guarantee religious rights and freedoms has brought the central and east European countries, which had no previous experience of democracy, face to face with the highly delicate problem of deciding just how far religious freedom should be allowed to go in a democratic society.
74. In fact, there is no country that denies the necessity of restricting religious freedom in some of its manifestations. From time to time, European societies find themselves confronted with groups that cite religious conviction as their reason for encouraging suicide, refusing medical treatment, or sacrificing human beings or animals.
75. National law must prohibit these aberrations. At the same time, as Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates, freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs should “be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. In its 1983 interpretation of this provision, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that all restrictions on religious freedoms must be motivated by a “pressing social need”, and must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.
Conclusion
76. In the more than ten years which have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the governments and countries of central and eastern Europe have made definite progress in protecting freedom of conscience and religion, and in renewing and strengthening the resources and public role of churches and religious institutions.
77. Religious cultures have undergone an impressive revival, and the previously occluded spiritual heritage has again been opened up.
78. However, the problems ahead seem even more daunting than those already solved. Dealing with them effectively will require new ideas, a willingness to make the necessary changes and decisive action on the political, social and cultural fronts.
Reporting committee: Committee on Culture, Science and Education
Reference to committee: Doc 8793 and Reference No. 2526 of 25 September 2000
Draft recommendation adopted with one abstention by the committee on 13 March 2002
Members of the committee: MM. de Puig (Chairman), Saglam, Baronne Hooper, MM. Prisacaru (Vice-Persons), Akhvlediani, Asciak, Barjrami, Banks, Barbieri, Berceanu (alternate : Baciu), Berzinš, Billing, Birraux, Mrs Castro, MM. Chaklein, Cherribi, Mrs Cryer, MM. Cubreacov, Dalgaard, Mrs Damanaki (alternate : Kontogiannopoulos), Mrs Delvaux-Stehres, MM. Dias, Duka-Zólyomi, Felici, Mrs Fernández-Capel (alternate: Mrs Agudo), MM. Gadznowski, Galoyan, Gentil, Gierek (alternate : Smorawinski), Goris, Haraldsson, Hegyi, Higgins, Ianuzzi (alternate: Gaburro), Irmer, Mrs Isohookana-Asunmaa, MM. Jakic, Kalkan, Mrs Katseli, Mrs Kutraité Giedraitiené, MM. Lachat, Legendre, Lekberg, Lemoine, Lengagne, Libicki, Liiv, Mrs Lucyga, MM. Maass, Malgieri, Marmazov, Marxer, Mateju, Mrs Melandri (alternate : Bianco), MM. Melnikov, Mestan, Mrs Milotinova, M. Nagy, Mrs Nemcova (alternatee : Stepova), MM. Nigmatulin, O’Hara, Mrs Pintat Rossell, MM. Radic, Rakhansky, Roseta, Schellens, Mrs Schicker, MM. Schweitzer, Seyidov, Mrs Skarbovik, MM. Sudarenkov, Symonenko, Theodorou, Tudor, Vakilov, Valk, Wodarg, Yürür.
N.B. The names of those present at the meeting are printed in italics
Secretariat: MM. Grayson, Ary, Mme Theophilova, M. Torcatoriu,
1 The Rapporteur is grateful to Dr Yelenskyi, Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, for his valuable assistance in the drafting of this report.