Doc. 9418

23 April 2002

Functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova

Report

Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

Rapporteurs: Mrs Josette Durrieu, France, Socialist Group, and Mr Lauri Vahtre, Estonia, Group of the European People’s Party

Summary

The Assembly expresses grave concern about the events which have been occurring in Moldova since January 2002 – demonstrations organised by the Christian Democratic People’s Party, lifting of the parliamentary immunity of its leaders, disappearence of Vlad Cubreacov, situation in the mass media, situation in Gagaouzia, etc – and about the worsening and radicalisation of the political climate there, which threaten the country’s stability.

It takes note of the proposals made by Moldova political forces for a way out of the political crisis, and expects them to pursue a constructive dialogue and to agree on a compromise. It calls upon the Moldovan authorities to take a certain number of measures without delay.

I.        Draft resolution

1.        The Assembly expresses grave concern about the events which have been occurring in Moldova since January 2002 and about the continuous worsening and radicalisation of the political climate there, which is a threat to the country’s stability.

2.        Demonstrations organised by the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) have been going on now in the town centre of Chisinau for three and a half months. After a period of confusion, these demonstrations, which the governmental authorities and the courts have branded illegal, have been met with manifestly disproportionate sanctions. The Assembly considers that the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the CDPP leaders is of rather doubtful propriety in a democracy.

3.        The Assembly acknowledges and welcomes the fact that the authorities have not used force against the demonstrators and have seen fit to halt the process of certain reforms. It notes, however, that the organisers held to have acted illegally and several participants in the demonstrations have been prosecuted and convicted by the courts, and others, put under pressure, as it reportedly happened to minors.

4.        The Assembly recalls that in a democracy every citizen and every elected representative have both rights and duties, beginning with the obligation to abide by the law. The political opposition has rights which are not respected. The Assembly also recalls that legislation must be in conformity with the Council of Europe’s standards and principles.

5.        The Assembly is profoundly disturbed by the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov, a member of the Parliamentary Assembly since 1996, and calls upon the Moldovan authorities to conduct a speedy, transparent and full investigation into this case, and to keep his family, parliament and the Council of Europe regularly informed of the progress of investigations.

6.        The absence of progress in the investigations which have now been under way for a month may cast doubt on the declared intention to elucidate the case as quickly as possible. The credibility of the Government, and even the President, is at stake.

7.        The Assembly notes that the scale of the protest movement by journalists and staff of Teleradio Moldova underlines the need to carry out reforms quickly, so as to guarantee freedom of expression and promote a public broadcasting service. It urges the authorities to end the practice of censorship of television programmes and to afford all opposition political parties, both inside and outside parliament, generous access to discussion programmes. It asks the Moldovan government and parliament to embark without delay on work to transform Teleradio Moldova into an independent public corporation.

8.        It is concerned about the worsening of the domestic situation in Gagauzia and the deterioration of institutional relations between Comrat and Chisinau. It warns the authorities on both sides of the risk of a new hotbed of instability in Moldova. Any escalation must be avoided.

9.        Having noted the absence of real dialogue between the ruling party and the political opposition, the Assembly also notes the strong opposition from civil society.

10.        The Assembly expects the Moldovan political forces to pursue genuine, constructive dialogue and to agree on a compromise which should include the following elements:

i.       a moratorium simultaneously covering the cessation by the CDPP of its demonstrations, so that political dialogue may be initiated, and the suspension of criminal proceedings against Iurie Rosca and Stefan Secareanu, being understood that the Moldovan authorities should refrain from further lifting the immunity of parliamentarians;

ii.       extension of the existing moratorium on the teaching and status of Russian language, and changes to the history curriculum;

iii.       revision of the 1994 Act on the status of member of parliament, regarding the provisions governing the lifting of immunity and removal from office;

iv.       revision of radio/television legislation and amendment of the status of Teleradio Moldova to make it an independent public corporation: an immediate start of work by the relevant parliamentary committee; possible resumption of consideration of the draft legislation examined by the previous legislature; assistance of Council of Europe experts in defining the public service status of the Moldovan radio and television corporation; completion of work by the end of the current parliamentary session, on 31 July 2002;

v.       execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case: immediate registration of the Church through the adoption of a government decision by 24 April 2002; definition of implementing arrangements under Council of Europe supervision; deadline for completion of application measures: 31 July 2002;

vi.       Council of Europe assistance concerning the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov and judicial co-operation from member states and their specialist investigation bodies;

vii.       revision of parliament’s rules of procedure in order to widen the opposition’s rights;

viii.       organisation of a round table between all the political parties, not only those represented in parliament, with the assistance of the Council of Europe.

11.        The Assembly calls upon the Moldovan government and parliament to take the above measures without delay.

12.        Moreover, it invites Moldovan political forces to urgently discuss solving the present crisis and if needed put the solution to a referendum.

13.        The Assembly acknowledges that encouraging efforts have been made very recently to start dialogue, and welcomes the adoption on first reading of a bill including a number of measures to improve safeguards for the parliamentary opposition.

14.        The Assembly calls upon the Moldovan authorities to co-operate fully with the Council of Europe and its bodies, and in particular to:

i.        take into account and apply the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe for improving local self-government in Moldova;

ii.        submit for Council of Europe expert appraisal the future bills to reform broadcasting and transform the state company Teleradio Moldova into an independent public service corporation;

iii.        revise the 1994 Act on the status of member of parliament taking account of recommendations made by the experts of the Council of Europe;

iv.        give effective priority to the action plan for legal and judicial reform;

v.        undertake no reform concerning the judicial system, the status of the judiciary, the High Judicial Council or the Constitutional Court without having previously obtained and taken into account the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s experts.

15.        The Assembly calls upon the member states of the Council of Europe to afford Moldova increased assistance , in particular :

i.        by contributing to the country’s economic recovery and the struggle declared by the President of the Republic against corruption and arms trafficking from Transnistria and all other kinds of trafficking – in women, children, human organs - from or via Moldovan territory. Such trafficking is run by powerful and increasingly numerous mafia networks, which must be dismantled;

ii.        by asking the countries directly concerned by Moldova’s problems to contribute to the stabilisation of the democratic process in this country whilst respecting Moldova’s integrity and sovereignty.

II.        Draft recommendation

1.        The Assembly refers to its Resolution … (2002) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova, in which it expresses its concern about the continuous worsening and radicalisation of the political climate there, which is a threat to the country’s democratic stability.

2.        It recommends that the Committee of Ministers :

i.        invite the Moldovan authorities to inform it about the progress of investigations into the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov ;

ii.        invite the governments of Council of Europe member states to offer their judicial co-operation by sending specialist investigation teams at the request of Moldova.

3.        It asks the Committee of Ministers to monitor closely Moldova’s execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case.

4.       The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers pursue co-operation with the Moldovan authorities on the following points :

i.        expert appraisal of the criminal code, code of criminal procedure, civil code and code of civil procedure;

ii.        drafting of precise, detailed recommendations on all reforms affecting judicial bodies – eg reform of the prosecution service, the status of the judiciary, the High Judicial Council – under the action plan signed with the Moldovan Ministry of Justice or any other appropriate framework ;

5.        The Assembly also asks the Committee of Ministers to step up co-operation with the Moldovan authorities concerning :

i.        speedy expert appraisal of coming bills to reform broadcasting and transform the state company Teleradio Moldova into an independent public service corporation ;

ii.        implementation of the recommendations to be made shortly by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe for improving local self-government in Moldova, in the light of the reforms under way;

iii.        the provision of assistance in preparing the local elections due in 2003, particularly with regard to revision of electoral law and implementation of the recommendations made in 2001 by the Parliamentary Assembly’s ad hoc committee on the observation of the elections, and by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) ;

iv.        provision of assistance in preparing a possible referendum ;

v.        expert appraisal by the Venice Commission of any draft legislation affecting the status of the Constitutional Court ;

vi.        clarification of the legal status of Gagauzia by thorough expert appraisal of the various applicable legislation and framing of proposals for removing existing contradictions ; this appraisal could be entrusted to the Venice Commission;

vii.        organisation of a round table of all political parties.

6.        The Assembly further requests the Committee of Ministers to urge the member states to undertake actively, and jointly with Moldova, to combat corruption and the many kinds of revolting trafficking – arms trafficking from Transnistria, trafficking in women, children and human organs - from or via Moldovan territory. This trafficking is run by powerful and increasingly numerous mafia networks which must be dismantled. The Assembly refers in this connection to its Recommendation 1526 (2001) and its Recommendation 1545 (2002).

III.        Explanatory memorandum by the co-rapporteurs

Contents

I.       Introduction

II.       Political developments

A. Political context prior to recent events

B. Recent political events

i. the demonstrations and the government’s reaction

ii. the lifting of the CDPP leaders’ parliamentary immunity

iii. the mysterious disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov

C. A way out of the crisis: proposals by Moldovan political forces

D. Position of the co-rapporteurs on ways out of the political crisis

III.       Functioning of pluralist democracy

A. Political regime

B. Freedom of expression and situation of the media

IV.       Rule of law and functioning of institutions

A.       Local self-government

B. Situation in Gagauzia

C. Links with the Transnistrian question

D. The Russian language issue

E. Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case

F. Independence of the judiciary

Final observations

Appendices:

I. Programme of the co-rapporteurs’ visit to Moldova (8-9 April 2002)

II. Programme of the co-rapporteurs’ visit to Moldova (27-31 January 2002)

III. Letter of Mrs Durrieu addressed to Vladimir Voronin, President of the Republic of Moldova

I.       INTRODUCTION

1.       Moldova joined the Council of Europe over six years ago, on 13 July 1995. Since 25 January 1996, Moldova has been subject to a monitoring procedure concerning the obligations and commitments it accepted on becoming a member of the Council. It has now lasted the abnormally long time of 6 years, owing to the repeated difficulties the country has encountered over the last ten years.

2.        On 27-30 January 2002, the co-rapporteurs made their fifth visit to the country since monitoring began¹.

3.        The visit took place in a particularly troubled and tense political context. The effect of these events on the functioning of pluralist democracy is so serious that, at its meeting on 11 March 2002 in Budapest, at the proposal of the co-rapporteurs, the Committee asked its Chair to write to the Bureau proposing a debate at the Assembly’s April 2002 part-session on the functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova.

4.       At its meeting on 25 March, the Bureau of the Assembly agreed to this proposal. On 26 March, the Standing Committee asked the co-rapporteurs to make a further visit to Moldova. This visit took place on 8-9 April 2002².

5.       In this context, this report focuses solely on current events possibly indicative of a deficient functioning of democracy. It is by no means a report on the obligations and commitments entered into by Moldova, which will be submitted to the Assembly later.

II.       POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A.       Political context prior to current events

6.       It will be remembered that there was a serious constitutional crisis in 1999-2000 between the then President of the Republic, Petru Lucinschi, who favoured the establishment of a presidential republic, and the Parliament. This crisis resulted in July 2000 in a revision of the Constitution whereby the President is now elected by the Parliament and no longer by direct universal suffrage.

7.       President Lucinschi’s term being due to end on 15 January 2001 - he did not stand for re-election in protest against this reform which he fought in vain - the Parliament held elections to appoint his successor. After three ballots held between 1 and 21 December 2000 and marred by numerous incidents, neither candidate - the President of the Constitutional Court, Pavel Barbalat, and the leader of the Communist Party, Vladimir Voronin - polled the required majority. On 31 December, President Lucinschi dissolved parliament and called elections, according to the law. The Constitutional Court ruled on 14 December 2000 that his term would end when his successor was appointed.

8.       The general elections of 25 February 2001 – the third since independence – resulted in a clear victory for the Communist Party with 50.07 % of the vote and an overwhelming majority of 71 out of 101 seats in Parliament (having held 40 out of 101 seats in the previous parliament) ³.

9.       The parliamentary opposition is reduced to only two parties, the Braghis Alliance led by Dumitru Braghis, a former Prime Minister (19 seats), and the CDPP led by Iurie Rosca  (11 seats). None of the other ten political parties and 4 electoral blocs attained the representativity threshold of 6 %.

10.       On 4 April 2001, Vladimir Voronin became the third President of the Republic of Moldova. All the reforms embarked upon since them were in his electoral manifesto.

B.       Recent political events

11.        A number of reforms undertaken in recent months by the ruling Communist majority (and which we shall deal with in the following sections) – in particular the introduction of compulsory teaching of Russian in schools and its elevation to the rank of official language in the country’s Constitution, reform of the history curriculum (replacing the “History of Romanians” by the “History of Moldova”), the legislation on local public administration and territorial organisation (which has entered into force) – have provoked the fury of the opposition parties, in particular the Christian Democrat People’s Party (CDPP).

12.       Since 9 January 2002, the CDPP (led by its President Iurie Rosca) has organised almost daily rallies in Chisinau. These rallies, vigorously anti-Communist and nationalist in tone, were attended by thousands of opponents, people coming mostly from the provinces.

13.        The authorities considered these demonstrations illegal, contrary to public order, a threat to public safety and involved children.

14.        The authorities’ strong reaction was manifestly disproportionate:

- at first, after issuing a warning to the CDPP on 14 January 2002, the Minister of Justice decided on 22 January to suspend the party for one month⁴;

- on 25 January 2002, Parliament voted to lift the parliamentary immunity of the three principal leaders of the CDPP parliamentary party (Mr Rosca, its President, Mr Cubreacov and Mr Secareanu), at the request of the Prosecutor General. Their appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected on 29 January and they were accordingly convicted on 21 February and fined.

15.        During their January visit, the co-rapporteurs firmly expressed their dismay about the harshness and the political implications of these measures and conveyed to the authorities their extreme concern over the disturbing prospect of the other measures they might take in pursuance of the current legislation if the parliamentary faction of the CDPP continued its demonstrations (as it has done).

16.        The measures taken attracted firm disapproval in international circles, beginning with the Council of Europe and the European Union, whose official reactions were prompt in coming⁵. On 4 February, Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, wrote a warning letter to President Voronin⁶. The rapporteurs note with surprise that the Secretary General sought neither information nor advice before doing so, although the rapporteurs were in Chisinau from 27-29 January and in Moscow on 30 January to meet Mr Trubnikov, first Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs with responsibility for Transnistria, who was himself leaving for Chisinau the same day after our talks.

17.        The authorities took into account these representations, as well as the rapporteurs’ firm direct intervention with the President of the Parliament, Ms Ostapciuc, and the President of the Republic, Mr Voronin. They have clearly sought to calm things down:

- on 8 February, the Justice Minister’s decision to suspend the CDPP was rescinded;

- on 21 February, the government decided to rescind the decisions concerning the introduction of compulsory Russian teaching in schools and declared a three-month moratorium on the decision taken on 13 February to introduce a new Moldovan history curriculum ;

- on 26 February, President Voronin dismissed the Minister of Education, Ilie Vancea, and appointed the leader of the Social Democratic party, George Sima, in his place.

i.        the demonstrations and the government’s reaction

18.        The situation remains extremely tense in the capital, where the demonstrations continue. They attract varying numbers of sympathisers every day – several hundreds or thousands during the week and many more on Sundays –, reaching as many as the (unverifiable) 50,000 to 100,000 (claimed by the organizers) at the mass rally of 24 February.

19.       The co-rapporteurs had already conveyed to the authorities they met during their January 2002 visit their complete disapproval of the first measures taken against members of parliament. They expressed their extreme concern about the political implications of these measures and these methods based on confused and debatable legislation.

20.        The co-rapporteurs asserted at that time that the suspension of a political party is an extremely serious and rare occurrence in a democracy and was unacceptable in this instance. The suspension of a political party for organising unlawful demonstrations and the lifting of parliamentary immunity are unacceptable except in reponse to reprehensible acts duly established by a judicial body. Democracy requires greater rigour and prudence. The rapporteurs found the methods and words employed on both sides, and the measures taken by the authorities, gravely disturbing because they are clearly reminiscent of times and regimes which were thought to belong to the past.

21.       The co-rapporteurs indicated, as regards the lifting of CDPP members’ parliamentary immunity, that, lawful though the procedure might be, it was hard to believe that in a democracy elected MPs could deprive other elected MPs of their political rights on the grounds of having organised street demonstrations whose lawfulness was open to debate.

22.       The co-rapporteurs had also made it clear to the authorities that they must refrain from exploiting certain existing legal provisions to take certain measures against CDPP parliamentarians if they persisted in their actions. They had urged the authorities not to avail themselves of the procedure provided for in section 2.8 of the Act of 7 April 1994 on the status of member of parliament, whereby the parliament can dismiss a member of parliament, in order to expel Christian-Democrat members⁷.

23.       It was desirable for the Council of Europe experts to look at this legislation, particularly the amendments made since its enactment. This 1994 Act ought to be revised in order to remove clearly undemocratic provisions from it.

24.        The demonstrations are continuing today but are no longer directed against the reforms and government initiatives, but directly against the Head of State, the government and parliament. In addition to the usual anti-Communist slogans, the demonstrators are now demanding the overthrow of the current regime, the resignation of President Voronin and the holding of fresh general elections.

25.       A ‘grand popular assembly’ called by the CDPP was held on 31 March, attended by 30,000 people (according to police figures) or 80,000 (according to the organisers). The participants adopted a resolution on “abolition of the Communist dictatorship and restoration of pluralist democracy” and calling in 48 hours for the resignation of the President, the departure of the government, the resignation of the present legislative assembly and the holding of early general elections.

26.       The authorities, particularly the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, have unceasingly repeated that these demonstrations were illegal and a breach of public order. They allege inter alia violation of the 1995 Act on the organisation of public meetings and the Minors Protection Act, because large numbers of children and adolescents have taken part in them. They also refer to the disruption of public transport and road traffic.

27.       The authorities said they have received no prior application that meets the requirements of the 1995 Act, the CDPP parliamentary faction having submitted an application based on different legislation (the 1994 Act on the status of members of parliament, which requires municipalities to provide parties with a place to meet the electorate) which they claimed was not applicable in this instance. In fact, the Mayor of Chisinau had authorised the demonstration, but only in the Opera Square for a specified length of time. But the demonstrations have been taking place since 9 January in the larger, and highly symbolic Parliament Square. The authorities regards this as provocation. The CDPP leaders claim they have complied with the law and submitted repeated applications for each day’s demonstration. They point out that the Opera Square is not suitable for large gatherings in the required conditions of safety. This is a rather specious argument.

28.        On 22 February, Parliament adopted a decision concerning «measures to remedy the socio-political situation caused by the unlawful demonstrations in the municipality of Chisinau », and condemning «the unlawful anti-state activities of the CDPP and other extremist political forces, which are destabilising the socio-political situation and endangering civil peace and national security (…)⁸.

29.        As to the lawfulness of the demonstrations that have been going on for over three and a half months, the co-rapporteurs do not intend to reproduce in detail here the legal arguments lengthily expounded by both sides during their visits. Such argument is a matter for the courts.

30.        On 25 February, the Supreme Court ruled the demonstrations unlawful and ordered their immediate cessation. The Minister of Justice declared that he would take more coercive measures against the organisers if they refused to abide by that decision. On 15 March, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court again confirmed the ban and ordered that the demonstrations be ended. On 10 April, the CDPP announced that it was taking the case to the European Court of Human Rights.

31.       Since 1 April, the demonstrators have maintained a continuous presence, day and night, on the road and concourse between the Parliament and the Presidency. They have set up a rostrum and pitched camp tents. Speeches and music alternate all the time.

32.       The demonstrations which have been taking place in Chişinau since 9 January 2002, and which have not been officially authorised by the authorities and by the city in particular, are in themselves a test of how far this freedom is upheld and respected in the country. So far, there has been no public use of force or any police intervention, except when the police allegedly confiscated equipment for several hours on 17 March. It would appear that the authorities are attempting to contain the protest movement within Chişinau, and to “discourage” any spread to the provinces.

33.       Order is maintained by a substantial police presence. The first police cordons facing the demonstrators and protecting the capital’s public institutions are not armed. The army and police patrol the surrounding district. The composure of the law enforcement agencies should be emphasised. So far, disturbances – which have been rare – have been controlled without violence. Apart from the demonstration site, the streets and the town as a whole are quiet.

34.       The co-rapporteurs stated their view last January that the sanctions imposed on the leaders of the political party which organised the demonstrations seemed disproportionate in view of the alleged facts involved and the controversy over whether or not they were legal. However, all citizens are required to comply with the law, including elected officials and parliamentarians. Some demonstrators and speakers have been given fines by the courts⁹. There have also been allegations of the arrest and detention minors for several hours, who were then fined without having had the benefit of counsel in court. The co-rapporteurs conveyed their indignation to the authorities concerned, ministers and the Prosecutor General. The prosecutor assured us that these stories were untrue and that no minors had been arrested or fined. However, he confirmed that some fifty children had been ‘questioned’ in schools, as provided for by law, and in their teachers’ presence.

ii.       lifting of CDPP leaders’ parliamentary immunity

35.       On 28 February, the Prosecutor General, Vasile Rusu, again asked Parliament to lift the immunity of eight of the eleven CDPP members of parliament, including the party’s three leaders (Rosca, Cubreacov and Secareanu), so that they could be prosecuted under Articles 203, 214 and 224 of the Criminal Code for repeated breaches of public order and the participation of minors in unlawful activities, and failure to obey a court order. The offences carry a penalty of 1-5 years’ imprisonment.

36.       The Prosecutor General repeated his request on 14 March, and again on 20 March, adhering strictly, he said, the legal requirements and procedure. Preliminary formalities were completed. On 22 March, the Parliament’s Committee on Appointments and Immunities considered this application and the evidence put forward by the Prosecutor. The CDPP leaders concerned, although summoned to appear, did not attend the meeting. Vlad Cubreacov had disappeared the previous evening. On 2 April, meeting in extraordinary session, the parliament lifted the immunity of Mr Rosca and Mr Secareanu.

37.       The Immunities Committee refused to lift the immunity of three other Christian-Democrat members of parliament, finding the evidence insufficient, and deferred consideration of the three remaining cases.

38.       During their recent visit, the co-rapporteurs questioned the Prosecutor General about the possible arrest of the members of parliament concerned, which was among the possible “preventive measures”. However, the Prosecutor had decided not to arrest them and had so informed the Parliament. Both the Prosecutor General and the Chisinau prosecutor denied having written to Mr Secareanu about his imminent arrest, as Iurie Rosca had told the co-rapporteurs. They assured the co-rapporteurs that they would not have any of the CDPP leaders arrested. They would remain at liberty until appearing in court. They would be invited to report to the prosecution service to be charged. If they failed to do so voluntarily, they would be brought in by force, “escorted” but not “arrested”. The two leaders concerned have naturally lodged a fresh appeal with the Supreme Court.

39.       The same authorities also stated their intention to prosecute Iurie Rosca on other charges: he allegedly assaulted and injured two police officers on 2 April. He categorically denies this accusation.

40.        The co-rapporteurs repeatedly emphasised during their visits that the two parties were playing a dangerous game likely to take them beyond the point of no return. Controlled political confrontation has its place in a healthy democracy, but the methods being used on both sides are dubious, not to say deserving of condemnation. If the opposition’s rights need to be asserted, this must be done in obedience to established rules.

41.       Elections were held a year ago, bringing a new regime to power by a considerable majority. In a democracy, power is won through the ballot-box, not in the streets. The opposition must abide by the electorate’s verdict. However, the opposition, even if they are only a small minority, have rights and the government has obligations. The opposition must be able to make themselves heard in parliament. But they must also be able to express themselves through the media and peacefully in the streets. The CDPP is doing what any opposition does: exploiting the government’s mistakes and defending its point of view.

iii.       the mysterious disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov

42.        However, it is an event of quite a different nature – the mysterious disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov on his way home on the evening of 21 March – which added turmoil to a complex situation.

43.       Vlad Cubreacov has been a member of the Moldovan parliament since 1994 and a member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly since 1996. In this capacity also he enjoyed immunity. He is vice-president of the CDPP. As an adviser to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, he committed himself fully to its case before the European Court of Human Rights (see below).

44.       At present, no-one knows what has happened to Vlad Cubreacov. The circumstances of his disappearance are unexplained. Speculation of all kinds is rife¹⁰.

45.       Iurie Rosca accuses the government and claims that Cubreacov’s disappearance is an attempt by the ruling Communists to intimidate the opposition, discourage and neutralise their leaders, and demoralise their sympathisers. He alleges a return to Stalinist oppression. He does not rule out a plot by the Transnistrian authorities because of his party’s line in favour of Moldovan reunification, or an operation by Russian special services. He thinks that Voronin would find interest in accusing Smirnov. Other members of the CDPP are more moderate.

46.       The authorities vehemently deny being behind Vlad Cubreacov’s disappearance, having nothing to gain from it. President Voronin sees the case as a challenge to democracy and an act of provocation intended to destabilise the country. Certain persons or groups, seeking to regain their lost “power base”, stand to gain from it. Either Cubreacov was abducted by those behind the present situation, or he will soon re-appear.

47.       For obscure reasons, several of those we spoke to, including President Voronin and Iurie Rosca, seemed convinced that Vlad Cubreacov was alive. The only one really upset and worried about him is his wife, Natalia, whom Ms Durrieu met. She suspects manipulation by the government to cast suspicion on the Transnistrian authorities and increase Russian and international pressure on Smirnov. But she, too, wants to believe her husband is alive and expects the Council of Europe to exert pressure on the Moldovan leaders to clear up the mystery. She has every confidence in the CDPP and Iurie Rosca.

48.       The investigations have so far produced no evidence to support any particular thesis.

49.       The rapporteurs emphasised the gravity of the situation. Apart from the human aspect, the person who has disappeared is an elected representative of the people and a political leader.

50.       The authorities must carry out thorough investigations to gather all possible information. Their credibility is at stake. President Voronin fully appreciates this. He has ordered the prosecutor and the police to redouble their efforts and is kept informed day by day. The authorities appear to have taken the necessary steps for a serious investigation both inside and outside the country: inquiries began very quickly as soon as the disappearance was reported and a search task force was set up; help was requested from Interpol; a special parliamentary committee of inquiry has been set up (chaired by Mihai Plamadeaca, a former Minister of the Interior); a reward of 500,000 lei (38,000 USD) has been offered for information; the investigators meet daily. The only certainty is that criminal activity has been ruled out.

C.       A way out of the crisis: proposals by Moldovan political forces

51.       During their most recent visit, every political movement offered the co-rapporteurs various proposals. But in the absence of real, organised and constructive dialogue between the parties each side’s proposals will go unheard by the others. For the time being, nothing was being done in parliament or between the opposing parties, CP and CDPP. However, the center parties tried to meet for a round table.

52.       Dumitru Braghis, leader of the Braghis Alliance and a former Prime Minister, put forward the following ideas:

- the CP and the CDPP agree to a one-month moratorium , with simultaneous cessation of the demonstrations and suspension of criminal proceedings against the two CDPP leaders and restitution of their parliamentary immunity;

- cessation of censorship in Moldovan state television;

- organisation of a live public debate live on television;

- organisation of a round table of all democratic political parties open to dialogue, with Council of Europe assistance;

- preparation of a grass-roots referendum on amendment of the electoral law (particularly concerning the representativity threshold)¹¹;

- application of a long-term moratorium on the Russian language issue and the history curriculum;

- discussion of the foreign debt issue, IMF and World Bank aid;

- greater involvement of European institutions, the Council of Europe and OSCE, as mediators between the authorities and the demonstrators;

- demilitarisation of the conflict zone on both sides of Moldova and Transnistria and reinforcement of frontier controls by OSCE or UN peace-keeping forces;

- definition of a solution to ensure lasting stability for Moldova, by means of a “Yalta” agreement between Russia, Romania, Ukraine and Europe.

53.       Iurie Rosca confirmed to the co-rapporteurs that the demonstrations will continue – he continues to mobilise and obviously has the resources. He maintains the radical positions stated in the resolution adopted by the ‘Grand National Assembly’ at the demonstration of 31 March: resignation en bloc of the members of parliament and the calling of early elections; resignation of President Voronin and the government. He does not think compromise is possible. His radical position is judged totally unrealistic by the other political parties. In fact, they merely isolate the CDPP further in its confrontation with the CP.

54.       President Voronin told the rapporteurs that a referendum could possibly be organised (instead of dissolving parliament, which the Constitution does not empower him to do). He presents this as a compromise offered to the CDPP as a way out of the present deadlock. The possible wording was not directly raised by him, but by the President of the parliament. The question might be “Do you have confidence in the present government ?” The rapporteurs cannot contest that this is democratic, but must point out the dangers.

55.       What happens after the crisis will also depend on the political centre, both inside and outside parliament. The centre took a beating at the last election, but is now re-forming. The centre parties organised a round table which the rapporteurs attended in part. It was held on 8-9 April at the instigation of D. Braghis and D. Diacov and composed of some twenty political parties and NGOs (the Social Democratic “Braghis” Alliance, Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Independents’ Alliance, the Centrists’ Union, Socialists’ Party, Council for the Defence of Democracy (set up after the demonstrations on 31 March), Moldova Women’s Association, etc). Their demands and proposals constitute the new reality which the CP, whether it likes it or not, will have to face up to. But it has yet to realise and accept the fact and to change tack accordingly.

56.       Hitherto, only the radical forces have had a platform: the extreme left in parliament, the extreme right in the street. The CP and the CDPP will perhaps soon no longer be at the centre of the political debate. The political debate will be focussed more on the regrouping forces that will seek to change the approach, the methods and to some extent the political reforms of the CP, especially in economics. President Voronin realises this and accepts our analysis. He has a realistic and rational view of events and is lucid about the present situation. He will not repeat certain mistakes and accepts the need for change and greater openness.

D.       The co-rapporteurs’ position on ways out of the political crisis

57.       The present political situation is difficult because both the government and the CDPP have painted themselves into a corner. It is difficult to clarify the situation because both sides seek to minimise their responsibility in the current events with legal sophistry.

58.       What are the possible ways out of the crisis ? Attrition: the government can obviously play for time. Force ? It has not used force so far. That is one of the positive points in President Voronin’s attitude. Dialogue ? It is advocated by some, particularly by the centrists. Do the others want it ? Does President Voronin ? Does the CDPP ? It is in any case urgently needed. President Voronin is looking for a peaceable way out of the crisis.

59.       It is up to President Voronin to take the initiative in opening consultations with all his country’s political forces. He says he intends to undertake wide consultation of the population and to use a referendum for this purpose. Far be it from the co-rapporteurs to dispute this democratic, constitutional course of action, but they drew attention to the risks.

60.       Would the sole purpose of this referendum be to seek the people’s renewed expression of confidence in the Communist Party and President Voronin ? Such a course is always risky, especially following a crisis; the result is always in doubt. President Voronin is aware that a referendum is a dangerous and unpredictable weapon, an instrument of plebiscite or protest. He realises the risks. But he wishes to act responsibly towards the citizens of his country. He wants the people to decide. He is prepared, he says, to lose power. Perhaps it is true.

61.       Observers on the spot think that the CP, which was very much in the majority a year ago, would still win comfortably. The upturn in the economy and the social measures introduced strengthen its position. That probably explains the President’s apparent assurance and his confidence in the proposed referendum.

62.       The co-rapporteurs wished to impress upon President Voronin that after the crisis, the political situation in Moldova will never be the same. He accepts this. He has not had recourse to force, which is a good thing. He must now resort to dialogue. The protest movement is wider than the parliamentary opposition currently centred on the CDPP and Iurie Rosca. It also embraces much of the media (press and television), civil society, intellectuals and young people. The Communists, who came to power in different circumstances, will have to face up to this new reality. They will have to agree to a change of course and open up more to democracy.

63.       President Voronin is less obviously aware of other necessary changes, particularly concerning freedom of expression and reform of radio and television, sometimes digging his heels in, for example when denying the existence of censorship in the media. But he will need all his authority to make his party change. Is the CP capable of change ? Some Communist leaders gave the rapporteurs the opposite impression. But the country’s political stability and the consolidation of democracy in Moldova depend on the CP’s ability to change. The reforms it introduces will be the test of that ability.

64.       When this crisis is over, the political situation in Moldova will necessarily be different. Debate has still to be initiated between opposing partners, and compromise to overcome the present deadlock. The rapporteurs are doing what they can, so is the Council of Europe. Our political help and that of our experts is being sought by all concerned, including President Voronin. We must be ready and watch developments closely.

65.       On 16 April, the three leaders of the parliamentary parties, Victor Stepaniuc (CP), Dumitru Braghis (Braghis Alliance) and Iurie Rosca (CDPP), traveled to Strasbourg at the invitation of the Secretary General of Council of Europe. After their various talks with Walter Schwimmer and the CLRAE rapporteurs, a meeting with Ms Durrieu, co-rapporteur, was organised by Bruno Haller, Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly.

66.       This meeting produced a summary of possible points of agreement as a basis for a compromise to end the crisis. The points on which the leaders agreed in our presence were as follows:

- a moratorium simultaneously covering the cessation of demonstrations and the lifting of sanctions against the parliamentarians concerned and suspension of criminal proceedings;

- extension of the existing moratorium on the teaching and status of Russian, and changes to the history curriculum;

- revision of the 1994 Act on the status of member of parliament, regarding the provisions governing the lifting of immunity and removal from office;

- revision of radio/television legislation and amendment of the status of Teleradio Moldova to make it an independent public corporation: an immediate start of work by the relevant parliamentary committee; possible resumption of consideration of the draft legislation examined by the previous legislature; assistance of Council of Europe experts in defining the public service status of the Moldovan radio and television corporation; completion of work by the end of the current parliamentary session, on 31 July 2002;

- execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case: immediate registration of the Church through the adoption of a government decision by 24 April 2002; definition of implementing arrangements under Council of Europe supervision; deadline for completion of application measures: 31 July 2002;

- Council of Europe assistance concerning the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov and voluntary judicial co-operation from member states by sending specialist investigation teams;

- revision of parliament’s rules of procedure concerning provisions that restrict the opposition’s rights and its participation in standing committees;

- organisation of a round table between all the democratic political parties, not only those represented in parliament, with the assistance of the Council of Europe.

67.       The leaders of parliamentary parties not included in Moldova’s delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly were invited to come to Strasbourg as observers for the next Assembly session.

III.        FUNCTIONING OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

68.        Over the last three years, Moldova has witnessed a succession of political events which have indisputably weakened the country’s emerging democratic foundations.

A.        Political regime

69.        The arrival in power of the Communist Party raised fears of a return to hard-line communism and democratic centralism. To those who feared dictatorial tendencies, Voronin replied that « a return to dictatorship is impossible, what I want is the dictatorship of the law » (address to Parliament on 1 December 2000).

70.        It is clear that the government in power since a year ago is endeavouring to change the political and economic policies pursued by previous governments in keeping with its electoral manifesto. But we had the impression that it was going much further and that the Communist Party, led by the President, was also seeking to reform the state itself and the exercise of power. Voronin’s electoral programme clearly stated his determination to consolidate democracy and establish a parliamentary republic (as opposed to “presidential governance”) and, with this in mind, formulated a number of projects which he has sought to implement since he was elected.

71.        However, the reforms undertaken are reminiscent of ideas that were current during the 70 years of Communist rule, such as democratic centralism and a vertical power structure. The territorial reform and the new local divisions could be the most striking example. The disappearance of the 10 judets (regions) created in 1998 to be replaced by 32 raioane (districts) and the creation of 240 new local councils are in a certain manner a return to old administrative division inherited from the soviet era. They allegedly seek to facilitate central government pressure on local government (see below, section IV. A). It should not be forgotten, however, that at the time criticism of the 1998 Act was widespread .

72.        The opposition parties we met were scathing about the absence of genuine parliamentary democracy, the destruction of existing democratic institutions and the « re-sovietisation » of the state and society. On this point, we were surprised to learn that Vladimir Voronin was still President of the Communist Party, despite being Head of State. This lends somewhat more credence to the opposition claim.

73.       Moldova’s Communist Party is aware of its strength in parliament and in the country. The results of the February 2001 general elections are indisputable – and undisputed. This position of strength established a year ago, made possible by the electoral legislation in force and the voting system, which has the effect of amplifying a majority (50% of the vote = 70% of the seats) will last for another three years, until 2005, unless the President decides otherwise. The moderate opposition does not argue with this and bows to legality. Only the the CDPP and its leader Iurie Rosca, spurning the expression of universal suffrage, demand the resignation en bloc of parliament. Fresh elections would probably produce the same result, albeit perhaps with a reduced majority.

74.       With an overwhelming parliamentary majority and “popular” support (indisputably real, but now “organised”), the Communist leaders believe they need no other support. Political dialogue appears superfluous to them. But politics is a matter of delicate balance.

75.       We expected the present leadership to clarify the functioning of the institutions. On paper, Moldova is a parliamentary regime, but there is no denying that in practice everything is decided by the President. The government is not in a very strong position on the institutional chessboard. The February reshuffle illustrates this: the Economic Minister, Andrei Cucu left the cabinet on 7 February, the Minister of Education was dismissed on 26 February, and the Interior Minister, Vasile Draganel, resigned on 27 February, to be replaced by Gheorghe Papuc.

76.       Concerning the reforms undertaken in recent months by the ruling Communists, the authorities have sought to calm things down by withdrawing some. Officially, “mistakes” were made and the ministers responsible were to blame. This was the case with the teaching of Russian, for example. But it is clear that, although these reforms are no longer on the agenda for the time being, they have not been abandoned. If the present rulers obtain public support for their policy – whether through a referendum or through thousands of “petitions” which it receives or it solicits –, the question of the status of Russian, the history curriculum and territorial reform will very likely once again become topical issues.

B.       Freedom of expression and situation in the media

77.        The journalists’ protest movement contributed further to the reigning confusion. During the co-rapporteurs’ most recent visit, the situation appeared worrying and the climate particularly negative.

78.        During the co-rapporteurs’ January visit, the representatives of the media met were generally speaking very critical of the government in power; some spoke of limitations to the freedom of expression and the lack of journalists’ independence, others of the draconian censorship, pressure brought to bear on certain newspapers and even threats against journalists. A number of people raised the problem of poor or non-existent access to information and the restrictions placed on certain sectors of the press, out of favour with the Presidency and apparently “excluded” from official press conferences. However, we should point out that the editorial policy of the media attending the meeting seemed manifestly anti-communist, which might go some way to explaining the critical nature of the comments made.

79.       As regards freedom of expression, one should make a distinction between the press and other medias including television. We do not suppose that the press, which is party-oriented, would be subject to censorship as such. There is a clear division between the “pro-Russia” and “pro-Romania” media, crystallised moreover by the issue surrounding recognition of Russian as an official language and the political argument with the CDPP ¹².

80.       Regarding national television, representatives of the opposition parties confirmed that they had no access to state television, which they claimed was merely a means for the communists in power¹³ to manipulate public opinion. The journalists we met said the same thing.

81.       On 27 February, a protest movement and a work-to-rule was started by journalists from the state-run Teleradio-Moldova. In a public declaration of 26 February, some 250 journalists from Teleradio-Moldova criticised the authorities’ information policy, denouncing the “Russification”, censorship, the lack of any pluralist content in programmes, the use of the state-run media as a means of propaganda, and called for the company’s being transformed into an independent broadcasting body. This appeal was echoed the following day by the Journalists’ Union.

82.       Some 500 journalists and employees of Teleradio Moldova are said to be following the work-to-rule now. During their most recent visit, the co-rapporteurs met representatives of the strike committee, as well as the Director-General of Teleradio Moldova¹⁴. The strike committee complained of intimidation: several journalists had been disciplined by the management and four editorialists were reported to have been dismissed and police (the “Fulger” battalion of the Interior Ministry) had intervened on the first day of the strike. Censorship was everywhere and programme content was strictly controlled. On 19 March, the strike committee filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights, claiming violation of freedom of expression by the Moldovan authorities.

83.       The Moldavian parliament has set up a special 8-strong parliamentary committee including representatives of civil society and the media, chaired by V. Dragomir, with whom the co-rapporteurs were not really able to establish dialogue. The strike committee contests the composition of this committee (two of its members are journalists from the Communist press) and demands that it be enlarged to include a journalist, a lawyer and a representative of the strike committee. As the committee has already been set up, this demand seems impossible.

84.       The strike committee also sent a message to the Council of Europe on 18 March, seeking support in the struggle against censorship in the Moldovan public media and the transformation of the company Teleradio Moldova into an public corporation independent of the authorities and financed by a licence fee. This latter demand seems legitimate. The Council of Europe might offer its assistance in this matter. On 15 April, the striking journalists sent the co-rapporteurs a further appeal to the Council of Europe.

IV.        RULE OF LAW AND FUNCTIONING OF INSTITUTIONS

A.       Local self-government

85.       The reforms enacted at the end of 2001 have prompted sensitive controversy. Two laws – one on territorial organisation and the other on local public administration – were adopted on 27 and 28 December respectively, amended at the President’s request on 24 January 2002 and promulgated by him the next day.

86.       These laws have prompted harsh criticism, both as to their content and as to the manner of their enactment.

87.       Regarding the substance, the main criticisms have been levelled by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE). The CLRAE rapporteurs studied the bills as regards their conformity with the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, and issued a sharp warning to Moldovan authorities. Their criticisms concern the new territorial division of the country, which complicates the territorial structure (which the previous 1998 legislation had sought to simplify) and risks causing inflation in local finances. Another criticism relates to one provision laying down a procedure whereby local councils can dismiss mayors. This provision of the Local Public Administration Act is dangerous because it is bound to destabilise the councils and is undemocratic

88.       The Congress will be considering a report at its next plenary session, on 4-6 June.

89.       Concerning the manner of their discussion and adoption, the criticism came from the opposition parties, especially the Braghis Alliance, who told the co-rapporteurs that the two laws had been enacted precipitately and completely without transparency. The CDPP sees in this reform the intention of the central government to exercise tight control over local government. Moreover, the CLRAE rapporteurs observed that the manner in which the new legislation was enacted breached certain provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, in that representatives of the country’s local and regional authorities ought to have been consulted beforehand. The National League of Mayors’ Associations has confirmed that none of Moldova’s 627 mayors was consulted. The authorities rejected these accusations, underlining the fact that the majority of the mayors in the country are communists.

90.        The National League of Mayors’ Associations also contests another measure which deprives local authorities of some of their powers. A decision of 22 June 2001 ended their financial autonomy, transferring control of local finances to the representative of central government. The Law on local public administration of 28 December 2001 seems to allow limited competencies to local councils on budgetary matters. The local councils would thus be weakened and appear to have become the executive bodies of higher authorities.

91.       The authorities argue that the aim of the legislation was to bring government closer to the individual. The rapporteurs formed the impression that the government set great store by this comprehensive territorial reform. Its determination seems just as great as the general opposition.

92.       On 19 February the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the Parliament’s decision of 5 February 2002 to end the terms of office of mayors, deputy mayors, chairmen and vice-chairmen of district councils, and to hold early local elections on 7 April 2002.

93.       On 14 March, it ruled that the Local Public Administration Act was contrary to the Constitution, particularly its provisions concerning the election procedure and the dismissal of local executives. On 5 March, the Court ruled that the Territorial Reform Act was constitutional, except for one provision.

94.       The parliament has yet to declare that it will comply fully with these decisions.

B.       Situation in Gagauzia

95.       Our two visits coincided with a crucial moment in relations between Chişinau and Comrat, which have continued to deteriorate badly since then. We met representatives of Gagauzia, Dumitru Croitor, the Bashkan (governor), Mihail Kendighelean, Speaker of the Gagauz People’s Assembly, as well as three opposing parliamentarians, and spoke with them of the political and legal dispute with the central state

96.       Legally speaking, the situation is unclear. The representatives of Gagauzia we met refer to two distinct laws: the Law of 23 December 1994 on the special status of Gagauzia which provides the basis for Gagauzia’s status; the “constitution” adopted by the Gagauzia People’s Assembly in 1998. These two laws contain contradictory provisions.

97.       The situation is extremely tense and serious incidents have occurred. Since 31 January 2002, the bashkan has been under repeated attack from a group of members of the Gagauz People’s Assembly. This group, on the basis of a report by the Auditor-General’s Department (which the rapporteurs did not have the opportunity to see) implicating the bashkan and members of the Gagauz executive committee in a case of misappropriation of public funds, attempted to bring about his dismissal first on 31 January by passing a motion of censure (which failed to obtain the necessary majority) and subsequently by a decision of 8 February to hold a referendum¹⁵ to remove the bashkan from office¹⁶.

98.       The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, which sent a delegation to the area, described this decision as unlawful and not in compliance with the procedure laid down in law. The central electoral board, to which the bashkan and the speaker of the People’s Assembly referred the matter, did not confirm the illegality of the measure. The referendum took place on 24 February. However, as the appropriate organisational arrangements had not been made (polling stations were opened in less than half of localities) and given the particularly low turn-out, a second referendum would have to be organised once the cases pending in the courts have been tried.

99.       On 27 February, the Prosecution Service opened criminal investigations against Dumitru Croitor, Mikhail Kendigelean, the President of the People’s Assembly, and Ivan Burgudji, a Gaguzia People’s Assembly official, reputedly close to Dumitru Croitor, for obstructing the organisation and conduct of the referendum. The Bashkan has in turn taken the case to the Court of Appeal, where it is now pending.

100.       Since then, the group of opposition members of parliament has repeatedly mounted schemes against the bashkan and his supporters.

101.       Another incident occurred in this context: the arrest on 7 March by the security forces (in suspicious circumstances) of Ivan Burgudji. He is accused of abuse of authority and impairing the proper operation of the institutions. He was released and placed under judicial supervision on 17 April. The rapporteurs do not wish to draw any conclusions for the time being, particularly as to the observance of judicial procedures, pending further information.

102.       Central to the debate is, firstly, Chisinau’s determination to combat corruption at local level and, secondly, Comrat’s clearly expressed aspiration to greater autonomy. In December 2000, the President of the People’s Assembly and a large number of members of parliament had requested more power-sharing between Comrat and Chisinau (particularly in domestic and foreign policy), full financial autonomy and more seats for Gagauz representatives in the Moldovan parliament. These requests were repeated to the co-rapporteurs.

103.       The Chişinau authorities intimated that they intended to finalise the legal status of Gagauzia, which was not fully settled, and grant greater autonomy. According to our information, draft amendments to the constitution to bring the status of Gagauzia onto a constitutional footing are apparently in the pipeline. The draft was submitted to the Moldovan Constitutional Court in October 2001. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has prepared an expert opinion on the text.

104.        The rapporteurs pointed out the dangers to the ministers concerned and President Voronin. It would not be in Moldova’s interests to have a new unstable region set up in Gagauzia.

C.       Links with the Transnistrian question

105.       The de facto situation in Transnistria (secession, presence of foreign troops, mafia-type system) is not unrelated to many of the current developments in Moldova.

106.       Transnistria is a complex problem to which no political solution has been found for more than 10 years. The Russian 14^th Army, which put a stop to the violent armed clashes in 1992, is still stationed there.

107.       Several agreements have been signed for the withdrawal of Russian troops and the removal and destruction of the Russian 14^th Army’s weapons, military equipment and munitions (agreement of 21 October 1994; agreement of 20 March 1998; protocol of 15 June 2001). But negotiations have been at a standstill for over 6 months.

108.       Under the terms of OSCE’s Istanbul Declaration of 19 November 1999 (§§ 18 and 19), Russia undertook to withdraw its armed forces and military equipment from Transnistria by the end of 2002.

109.       Heavy weapons were removed on time, at the end of 2001. Men and munitions remain. Admittedly, the Russian troops stationed in Transnistria (belonging to the “Russian Forces Operational Group”) have been reduced. But they still number 2,600 men. And the quantity of arms and munitions is still some 43,000 tonnes. Certain recent incidents (refusal by the Tiraspol authorities to allow through arms evacuation convoys; appropriation by Transnistria of some 5,000 hectares of Moldovan land) make demilitarisation increasingly unlikely. Especially since Smirnov, the self-proclaimed president of Transnistria puts a value of 2 billion USD on compensation and Moscow puts the cost of destroying and withdrawing armaments at 40 million USD.

110.       In addition to the stocks of weapons inherited from the Russian 14^th Army, there are weapons retrieved from the former Soviet countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc) and those which continue to be manufactured in massive numbers in Transnistria. The PRIBOR factory at Bender, for example, produces conventional anti-tank weapons, grenade-launchers, etc. Igor Smirnov appears to own a number of arms factories. His son Vladimir runs SHERIF, the only company authorised to trade abroad, said to have an annual turnover of 4 billion USD. At the same time, he is “director” of the Customs Service. The regime appears to be completely corrupt.

111.       The weapons stockpile is the largest in Europe (excepting Russia). Some sites are known (Cobasna), others have reportedly been identified (the Ottoman fortress in the centre of Bender or Tiraspol airport). There are conventional arms, but also nuclear (missile warheads) and chemical weapons. Transnistria is a powder keg.

112.       Transnistria has become a centre for all kinds of trafficking, but especially arms trafficking. Ukraine and Romania are concerned by this problem. The traffic between Tiraspol and Odessa is estimated at 2 billion USD per year. It supplies the regional conflicts in the Caucasus (Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh) and Africa. The customers are, of course, Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Q’aida. Customs control is obviously a problem for Europe and the whole world.

113.       There is keen controversy on this point because on 1 September 2001 Chisinau tightened border controls, introduced new customs seals and withdrew Tiraspol’s right to use the previous seals which it had been allocated under a February 1996 protocol on customs activities.

114.       President Voronin discussed clearly and courageously with the co-rapporteurs the question of Transnistria and its mafia networks, which are highly organised and powerful, with branches in Moldova and support especially in Ukraine and also in Russia. He remarked that Ukraine continued to allow goods from Transnistria to transit through its territory, demonstrating its complicity with the traffickers.

115.       The question of the future status of Transnistria is also at the centre of negotiations (currently suspended) between Moldova, Transnistria, Russia and Ukraine. It is not unrelated to events in Moldova. Several opposing political hypotheses may be put forward:

- “common state” for Smirnov, implying separate armies and currencies; idea shared with the Russians until recently, to judge from statements by Evgeni Primakov, in charge of this dossier until 2001;

- “federation or confederation with wider autonomy”, hypothesis accepted by Moldova and particularly by President Voronin; also at present accepted by the Russians, according to what was told to the co-rapporteurs by Mr Trubnicov, first Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs with responsibility for Transnistria, when they met him in Moscow on 30 January 2002.

116.       Mr Trubicov, and some others, thought that one way of re-starting negotiations on the status of Transnistria might be to begin with the adoption of Russian as an official language so as to give the Russian (200,000 in Transnistria) and Russian-speaking population the feeling that their “rights” were recognised. President Voronin (whose relations with Smirnov are poor) took a similar view and had made a start on this process, probably in agreement with the Russian authorities.

117.       This measure was part of a wider approach to resolving the question of Transnistria and was intended to facilitate dialogue. This hypothesis, though its chances of success were limited, was coherent. That is no longer the case today.

118.       However, the problem of Transnistria is not necessarily ethnic. It is even less and less political and more and more economic, because of its relative commercial strength and the trafficking.

119.       The impossibility of settling the status of Transnistria by negotiation demonstrates the power of the mafia networks in Tiraspol and Odessa, and their supposed links with the Russian and Moldovan mafia.

120.       The Transnistrian problem goes back to the Soviet era. Today, it divides Moldova and is the cause of a situation of permanent crisis. These problems spill over the frontiers of this small country and are now of direct concern to Russia, Ukraine and Romania. In view of their nature and the recent turn of events, Europe is concerned. It is not in Europe’s interests to ignore a potentially explosive powder keg. Co-operation by Moscow and Kyiv on this question will be an indication of how much they wish to ensure Europe’s stability. The Council of Europe has an important part to play and it is being asked to contribute.

D.       The Russian language issue

121.       According to the most recent population census in 1989, 65% of the 4.3 million inhabitants of Moldova (including Transnistria) are Romanian-speakers and over 35% belong to national minorities. The Ukrainian minority, the largest, accounts for 14% of the population (ie 600,000 people) and the Russian minority 13% (562,000 people including 200,000 in Transnistria) and the Gagauz minority 3.5%.

122.       During our January visit, we spoke with representatives of the national minorities (the Ukrainian, Russian, Gagauz, Polish and Bulgarian minorities) who adopted a very different point of view from that of the CDPP and of the governmental authorities we met. For example, the majority of the people with whom we spoke were in favour of introducing a course on Moldovan history into the school curriculum. In their view, the history of a country should not be identified solely with the history of a single population even if it were in the majority (Romanian-speaking).

123.       The Russian language question is a particularly sensitive and highly symbolic issue, which has extremely political repercussions. There are two aspects to the question: (i) obligatory teaching of Russian in schools and (ii) recognition in the constitution of Russian as an official language in Moldova, alongside Moldovan as the state language, which would enable it to be used in the state institutions and in the administrative authorities.

124.       At national level, clearly the decision taken by the Minister for Education in August 2001 to make the teaching of Russian compulsory in schools, as from 9 January 2002, from the second year of primary school upwards (at age 8) could not but ignite the fuse, provoking an immediate and virulent reaction from the Christian Democratic People’s Party, which had always refused any interference with the status of the Moldovan language. It was this measure which brought thousands of demonstrators onto the streets. The Moldovan language (even if from a philological point of view, Moldovan language is identical to Romanian language¹⁷) is a symbolic feature of the country’s being firmly rooted in Europe.

125.       At international level, this measure was presented to the co-rapporteurs by the Moldovan authorities as a symbolic gesture vis-à-vis the Russian minority and Russian-speaking minorities and a possible solution to the Transnistrian problem. The commitment to respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minority and to giving Russian the status of official language in the constitution appears in the political treaty signed with Russia.

126.       The adoption of these measures was part of President Voronin’s election manifesto. Even though the reform has been withdrawn, there is no doubt that it remains very much on the agenda. President Voronin still plans to hold a referendum on the question.

127.       The second proposal – to give Russian official language status in the constitution – has been invalidated by the Constitutional Court which has just ruled that certain provisions in the bill introduced by a group of Communist members of parliament on 6 December 2001 to amend Article 13 of the constitution were unconstitutional.

128.       The overwhelming majority of the Moldovan population can speak Russian, particularly in Chişinau and the cities. It is also the language of commerce. Several people with whom we spoke drew our attention to the fact that the teaching of Moldovan was the poor relation in schools and that the Ministry of Education did not allocate sufficient resources for this purpose. The representatives of the Russian-speaking national minorities also expressed their regret that the level of knowledge of the Moldovan language was very weak or non-existent and that this was a considerable obstacle for people belonging to these minorities in their relations with the administrative authorities, and for the younger members in respect of the employment market.

129.       Moldovan is the state language. Russian (according to the planned reform) would have been only an “official language”. The co-rapporteurs scarcely grasped the difference. The introduction of Russian might perhaps have facilitated certain political developments; in fact, it caused the situation to explode. Russian, although a minority language in a unitary state – the mother tongue for 13% of the population and the language of regular use for a much higher proportion – has preserved its position as the common language. To grant Russian official status would place it in a privileged position.

E.       Execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case.

130.       The fact that Moldova does not recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia is a problem which was raised frequently in the report on Moldova’s accession. It is a live issue today.

131.       The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (“Mitropolia Basarabiei şi Exarhatul Plaiurilor”) is an independent orthodox church founded in September 1992 which was affiliated to the patriarchate of Bucharest in December 1992. It claims at present to have almost 1 million believers and around 160 clerics in 125 communities in Moldova and other countries in eastern Europe.

132.       Pursuant to the law of 24 March 1992, all faiths active in Moldova have to be officially recognised by the government. Responsibility for the registering of religious organisations lies with the State Secretary for religious affairs.

133.       Every application for recognition submitted by the Church since October 1992 has been rejected by the government or has not received a response. Following several successive appeals before the national courts, the church referred the matter to the European Court of Human Rights.

134.       The European Court of Human Rights’ judgment of 13 December 2001 in the case of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia ruled that Moldova had violated Article 9 (freedom of thought, belief and religion)¹⁸ and Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective appeal). To date, this is the sole Court judgment against Moldova.

135.        To begin with, the authorities sought to contest the judgment by appealing to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, as provided for in Article 43 of the Convention.

136.       On 27 March, the Court rejected the Moldovan government’s application for referral to the Grand Chamber. The judgment is accordingly fully enforceable.

137.       The government authorities maintained before us their position of principle that recognition of the church would represent state interference in the affairs of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and in the conflict which has emerged within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova¹⁹.

138.       Clearly, this conflict has an obvious patrimonial dimension insofar as both churches – the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia – claim in their statutes to be the successors to the Church of Bessarabia which existed between 1925 and 1944.

139.       There is also a political dimension to this conflict between the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and the government, owing to the links between the church and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP). Some of the authorities we met had no qualms about openly referring to the support allegedly provided to the church by the neighbouring state of Romania.

140.       The co-rapporteurs have no intention of entering into the legal or theological arguments. The problem of the Church of Bessarabia – from the standpoint of the commitments entered into by Moldova – relates primarily to the freedom of association.

141.       During our most recent visit, the Minister of Justice told us clearly that the authorities intended to abide by the judgment of the Court and to bring this case to an end. The co-rapporteurs expect the Moldovan authorities to apply the decision of the European Court of Human Rights without delay.

F.       Independence of the judiciary

142.       This subject needs to be briefly raised in this report, firstly because of the severe criticisms expressed in the country about the judiciary’s independence from the political authorities and financial spheres and, secondly, because of the supposed reform projects in this sphere, about which we are bound to have some misgivings.

143.       The reforms of the status of judges and of the High Judicial Council, in particular, are not very clear. It was frequently pointed out during our visits that the reforms sought to increase centralisation of the judicial system and that certain provisions, such as the removal of judges’ immunity, could seriously jeopardise the independence of the judiciary. The authorities were less than frank, emphasising that no reform had yet been introduced concerning the status of the judiciary or the appointment of judges.

144.       A bill on the Prosecution Service is being debated in Parliament and should pass into law in March or April 2002. Its main provisions concern the role and powers of the prosecution, but there, too, the explanations given were not very clear²⁰.

145.       The authorities also informed us that the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure would be adopted by summer 2002. The Civil Code is undergoing expert appraisal by the Council of Europe.

146.       Lastly, it appears that the authorities intend altering the status of the Constitutional Court, which has on three occasions invalidated government reforms. If they do so intend, we expect them to seek the expert advice of the Venice Commission in due course.

147.       We urge the authorities not to embark on precipitate reforms, to co-operate fully with the Council of Europe concerning expert appraisal of the texts and codes being drafted or adopted, the implementation of the reforms adopted, and in particular to act positively on the action plan for judicial reform signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Council of Europe.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

-       political situation

148.       Moldova is faced with the immediate prospect of political instability, sinking further into economic crisis and the spread of mafia networks engaged in trafficking of all kinds. On all these questions, the parties concerned attempted to draw international observers into a primarily legal discussion. The co-rapporteurs believe that all these problems derive from a process of internal political opposition and external influences (or interference) which could have an uncontrollable snowball effect on an already vulnerable country. The consequences of this would be significant. The politicians and other key players whom the co-rapporteurs met during their visits did not appear to appreciate the significance and immediate implications of Moldova’s present position at national, international and especially European levels.

149.       Clearly, the fundamental concepts of a democratic government are still very vague. Progress towards democracy is difficult and chaotic. The outcome will depend on the Communists’ ability and will to change.

150.       The co-rapporteurs, as they clearly told those whom they met during their visits, appeal to all involved to refrain from provoking or seeking to outdo their opponents, which could get out of control. These events are reminiscent of those that marked the previous events in 1989-1992 which degenerated in an armed conflict. The problems are the same but the situation is even more serious (splitting the country, Russian presence in Transnistria, serious economic crisis, corruption).

151.       The authorities, who have repeatedly – rightly or wrongly - accused Bucharest of supporting the CDPP, do not want Moldova to be turned into « a theatre of confrontation between geopolitical interests », and demand an end to attempted outside interference in the country’s domestic affairs, in order not to exacerbate tensions. Romania categorically denies these allegations.

152.       Moldova is a sovereign state, even if it does not control all its territory. Its sovereignty was recognised by Romania in 1991 and has not been contested for more than ten years. It was even affirmed in 1994 by a pseudo-referendum organised by President Snegur. Any outside intervention, whether by institutions, states or political parties would carry heavy responsibility. This young democracy is still struggling for stability. We have a critical situation of confrontation between pro-Romanian and pro-Russian tendencies, which entails serious risks. The situation in Moldova demands clearsightedness and prudence to foster a return to calm. The Council of Europe must take its position clearly in speaking out for the rule of law and democratic principles.

-       Economic situation

153.       An overview of the current situation in Moldova would not be complete without a reference to the extremely critical, not to say catastrophic, economic and social situation in the country. That is where the priority lies.

154.       Moldova is probably the poorest Council of Europe member state at present. The GNP has reduced by two thirds since independence. The country is struggling to survive and the vast majority of its 4.3 million inhabitants live in extreme poverty.

155.       According to the World Bank, in May 1997, 35% of the population lived below the poverty line. In late 1999, the figure stood at 53.4% and today it is 55%. In the year 2000, half of the population lived on less than USD 1.5 per day. This poverty has prompted young people to leave the country. The number of retired people is rising. The birth rate has plummeted and life expectancy has fallen to 66 years. There are 500,000 unemployed.

156.       The country has not been spared by natural disasters. We remember the rain and ice that stuck the north and centre of the country in November 2000, wiping out agriculture and industrial production and destroying electricity and telecommunications networks.

157.       The country is unable to honour its debt to foreign lenders. The IMF froze its loans to Moldova since 1999 because of the slow and insufficient pace of reform and said that its aid would resume only if a tight budget was adopted. The country has been on the brink of bankruptcy since the year 2000. The country’s enormous debt is a burden on the national budget: 75% of the 2002 budget is taken up with debt servicing alone.

158.       There are certainly some positive signs. The authorities we met welcomed the signs of economic recovery which have emerged in recent months and are confident of their ability to bring about a reversal of the previous trend. The GDP rose 1% in 2000 and 6% in 2001. This limited but real improvement has encouraged President Voronin in his determination to turn round the country’s economic and social situation.

159.       The country’s population is just about managing to survive. Poverty engenders all manner of decline and has helped make, Moldova a focus for numerous types of trafficking – trafficking in children, prostitution networks²¹, trafficking in human organs (a kidney can be re-sold for 100,000 euros), and a country where corruption rules. Interpol estimates at over 300,000 the number of women from eastern Europe engaged in prostitution and most of them are reportedly Moldovan. According to Pharmaciens sans Frontères this traffic earns Moldova 100-200 million dollars a year.

160.       In this regard, Moldova’s accession to the Stability Pact, and its signature of the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption and Criminal Law Convention on Corruption are positive points. An anti-corruption committee, chaired by President Voronin, has been set up. President Voronin’s commitment is determined and courageous. But the scale of corruption and of the domestic and foreign networks makes the task extremely difficult without proper resources.

161.       Ridding the country of its mafia networks is a priority. That requires determination, courage, and resources. Co-operation with neighbouring countries and will all the European countries concerned, is indispensable.

162.       The change of political power has also given rise to a new economic policy. That is probably where the first answer lies. The process of privatisation undertaken by the previous governments has been slowed down. Some politicians make no bones about saying that the privatisations were a share-out among “brigands”. There may be some truth in that … However, under pressure from international lenders and because of the imperative budgetary requirements to deal with the public deficit, Moldova is obliged to pursue a liberal economic policy. The process of privatisation has therefore been resumed (albeit rather cautiously). Ideological opposition is still strong in this sphere. International financial institutions have expressed their concern at the slow pace of economic reform. An agreement has been signed with the World Bank, stipulating that several commitments must be honoured before further funds are released. The co-rapporteurs emphasise the scale of Moldova’s debt and the remoteness of international financiers. Lasting economic recovery will be difficult, not to say impossible in these circumstances.

163.       It is vital that the European countries contribute to Moldova’s economic recovery and help it to regain the confidence of the financial institutions.

-       Moldova’s position in Europe

164.       The co-rapporteurs noted that the comments made by the authorities in respect of Europe were often ambiguous and ambivalent. This mirrored the concerns expressed by international observers in situ.

165.       Moldova is a country surrounded on all sides. Its territorial integrity is jeopardised by the secession of Transnistria. And yet, its sovereignty and territorial integrity are recognised by all countries, including Russia and Romania. Moldova’s geographical position, at a cultural and linguistic moving border, sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine and not far away from its near neighbour Russia and the “concentric circle” to use the term coined in the 1990s, is becoming increasingly difficult with each passing day. Such a situation divides and weakens Moldova. The country is reluctant to determine its place in Europe. Over 85% of its trade depends on Russia. In this situation, there is a great temptation to speak with two voices. But Moldova will soon have to make a clear choice.

166.       With the arrival in power of President Voronin (a communist and still the President of the Moldovan Communist Party) and a communist majority in the parliament, the political tendency is apparently pro-Russian. Moldova, which has been a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since it was set up in December 1991, and which relies economically and commercially on Russia, signed a friendship and co-operation treaty with Russia in November 2001, together with a gas agreement. On 28 December 2001, the Moldovan parliament ratified the treaty with Russia. Russia’s influence is obvious. But have Moldova and President Voronin decided that their future lies with Russia and the “common state” which some people advocate? They deny this and strongly assert that the path they are taking is a European one.

167.       What are the direct relations between Romania and Moldova today, as illustrated by recent events ? Historical links bind the two countries. Nearly 65% of the population of this state are Romanian. For ten years, Moldova’s complete sovereignty was accepted by the vast majority, and the pro-Romanians, who continue to hold dear to the idea of “Greater Romania” were in the minority. However, the links of a part of this people and this country (Bessarabia) with Romania are a historical reality, as clearly shown by the dominant language and culture.

168.       The Romanian government provides financial aid for Romanian-Moldovan cultural projects: television programmes and support for the teaching of Romanian. The Romanian authorities have criticised the planned reforms concerning Russian and the revision of the history curriculum. But so far, Romania has taken a discreet stance and distanced itself from events. There has been no support for the demonstrations or for the leaders of the Christian Democratic People’s Party from the Romanian authorities who believe that destabilisation of Moldova and President Voronin is dangerous. They are hoping that the situation will calm down.

169.       Moldova’s accession to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, supported in particular by France and earnestly called for by the rapporteurs, was an event of major significance. Moldova is also receiving aid from the European Union. It is to be hoped that Moldova will make better use of these various forms of aid.

170.       Moldova occupies a key geographical position in this unsettled area, in the East for Europe and in the West for Russia. Its stability depends on what response is made, particularly by Russia, to stabilise the eastern fringe of its boundaries with Europe and to deal with hotbeds of instability ranging from the Caucasus to Belarus, and including Moldova.

APPENDIX I

Programme of the visit of the co-rapporteurs

(Chişinău, 8-9 April)

Co-rapporteurs :       Mrs Josette Durrieu (France, SOC)

Mr Lauri Vahtre, (Estonia, EPP/CD)

Secretariat :       Mrs Valérie Clamer

Monday 8 April

16.00       Arrival of Mr Vahtre, Mrs Durrieu and Mrs Clamer

Accommodation at the hotel Dacia

17.00       Meeting with Mr Ion Morei, Minister of Justice

18.00       Meeting with the Parliamentary Delegation of Moldova to the Council of

Europe

18.50       Meeting with Mr Dumitru Braghis, and the members of the parliamentary faction of the Electoral Bloc “Braghis Alliance

19.45       Dinner offered by Mr Andrei Neguta, Head of the Parliamentary Delegation of Moldova to the Council of Europe

21.30 Meeting with Mrs Dominique Gazuy, French Ambassador

Tuesday 9 April

8.00       Meeting with Mrs Natalia Cubreacov, wife of Mr Vlad Cubreacov

8.30       Meeting with Mr Rosca, and members of the parliamentary faction of the Christian Democratic People’s Party

9.30       Meeting with the representatives of Mass Media

10.30       Meeting with Mr Vasile Rusu, Prosecutor General, and the Prosecutor of Chişinău

11.30 Meeting with Mr Gheorge Papuc, Minister of Interior

12.30       Meeting with Mr Serafin Urechean, Mayor of Chişinău

13.30       Lunch offered by H.E. Mrs Eugenia Ostapciuc, President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

14.10       Participation on the Round table of political parties

14.50       Meeting with Mr Victor Stepaniuc, and the members of the parliamentary fraction of the communist Party of Moldova

15.40       Meeting with the representatives of Gagauzia

16.30       Meeting with Mr Vadim Misin, Vice-President of the Paliament,

17.30       Meeting with H.E. Mrs Eugenia Ostapciuc, President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

18.30       Meeting with HE M. Vladimir Voronin, President of the Republic of Moldova

19.15 Press Conference

20.00       Dinner hosted by H.E. Mrs Eugénia Ostapciuc, President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

Wednesday, 10 April

Departure of the delegation

APPENDIX II

Programme of the visit of the co-rapporteurs

(Chisinau, 27-30 January 202 – Moscow, 31 January 2002)

Co-rapporteurs :       Mrs Josette Durrieu (France,SOC)

Mr Lauri Vahtre, (Estonie, EPP/CD)

Secretariat :       Mr Egbert Ausems

Mrs Valérie Clamer

Saturday, 26 January

17.35       Arrival of Mr Vahtre

Accommodation at the hotel Dacia

Sunday, 27 January

18.05       Arrival of Mrs Durrieu, Mr Ausems and Mrs Clamer

Accommodation at the hotel Dacia

19.00       Dinner hosted by Mr Andrei Neguta, Chairman of the Parliamentary Delegation of Moldova to the Council of Europe (Restaurant of the Parliament)

Monday, 28 January

8.30       Meeting with the Ambassadors of the Council of Europe’s member states represented in Chisinau and Mr David Swartz, Ambassador Head of the OSCE Mission, hosted by His Excellency Mr Támas Mikecz, Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary in Moldova (Embassy of Hungary)

10.00       Meeting with the representatives of national minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, Polish communities)

10.45       Meeting with the leaders of religious communities (Metropolitan Church of Chisinau and entire Moldova, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, roman-catholic Church, Union of the Evangelic-Baptist Churches, Federation of Hebrew communities)

11.35       Meeting with the representatives of Mass Media

12.25       Meeting with Mrs Valeria Stirbet, Chair, and the members of the Supreme Court and of the High Judicial Council

13.15       Working lunch hosted by Mr Ion Stavila, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Restaurant Codru)

14.15       Meeting with Mr Ion Morei, Minister of Justice

15.05       Meeting with Mr Vasile Rusu, Prosecutor General

16.00       Meeting with Mr Alexei buzulan, Deputy Minister of Interior

16.45       Meeting with Mr Victor puscas, Chairman, and the members of the Constitutional Court

17.40       Meeting with NGO’s representatives

18.30       Meeting with the National League of Mayor’s Associations of Moldova

20.00       Working dinner hosted by the National League of Mayor’s Associations of Moldova

Tuesday, 29 January

8.00       Working breakfast with Mr Claude Cassagrande and the members of the delegation of the Congress of local and regional authorities of Europe

8.50       Meeting with the Parliamentary Delegation of Moldova to the Council of Europe

9.50       Meeting with the Chairmen of the parliamentary Committees:

- Mr Andrei Neguta, Chairman on the Committee of External policy,

- Mrs Maria Postoico, Chair of the Committee on national security

- Mr Mihail Sidorov, Chairman of the Committee on human rights and national minorities

- Mr Vladimir Dragomir, Chairman of the Committee on culture, science, education, youth and mass media

- Mrs Lidia Gutu, Chair of the Committee on social protection, health and family

10.50       Meeting with Mr Dumitru Croitor, Bashkan (Governor) of Gagauz-Ieri, and Mr Mihail Chendighelean, Chairman of the People’s Assembly of Gagauz-Ieri

11.40 Meeting with Mr Vasile Tarlev, Prime Minister, and Mr Pantelei Tiltu, Director of State Chancellery

12.30        Meeting with Mr Vadim Misin, Vice-Chairman of the Parliament, Chairman of the Committee on problems regarding to Transnistria, Chairman of the Committee on the questions pertaining to Gagauzia

13.00       Working lunch hosted by Mr Vadim Misin

14.00        Meeting with the parliamentary faction of the Christian

      Democratic People’s Party

15.00       Meeting with the parliamentary faction of the Electoral Bloc “Braghis

       Alliance”

16.15       Meeting with His Excellency Mr Vladimir Voronin, President of the Republic of Moldova

17.00       Meeting with the parliamentary faction of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova

18.00       Meeting with Her Excellency Mrs Eugenia Ostapciuc, Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

19.00       Visit of the wine cellars of Cricova

20.00       Dinner hosted by Her Excellency Mrs Eugenia Ostapciuc, Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova

Wednesday, 30 January

7.25       Departure of the delegation to Moscow

11.00       Arrival of the delegation at Moscow

13.00       Meeting with Mr Dmitri Rogozin, Chairman of the Parliamentary Delegation of Russia to the Council of Europe, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs

14.15       Meeting with Mr Vyacheslav Trubnikov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in charge with Transnistria

15.15       Meeting with Mr Tikhonov Chairman, and the members of the State Duma Committee on the settlement of the political and economic situation in Transnistria

21.00       Dinner hosted by Mr Leonid Slutsky, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Delegation of Russia to the Council of Europe

Thursday, 31 January

Morning       Departure of the delegation

APPENDIX III

Letter sent by Mrs Durrieu, co-rapporteur, to Mr Vladimir VORONIN

President of the Republic of Moldova

Strasbourg, 18 April 2002

Dear Mr President,

You will no doubt be aware that on 16 April I met with three leaders of partliamentary factions, Victor Stepaniuc, Dumitru Braghis and Iurie Rosca, at the Council of Europe. I went to Strasbourg in great hope and confidence that the political forces could overcome their division. The fact that these three personalities should sit around the same table was, in my view, a positive sign.

During the course of this meeting, concrete possibilities were raised which would have enabled your government, should it have the willpower, to solve the present political crisis. We worked out together a synthesis of points for a possible compromise and the three leaders agreed in my presence to the following:

- a moratorium simultaneously covering the cessation of demonstrations and the lifting of sanctions against the parliamentarians concerned and suspension of criminal proceedings;

- extension of the existing moratorium on the teaching and status of Russian, and changes to the history curriculum;

- revision of the 1994 Act on the status of member of parliament, regarding the provisions governing the lifting of immunity and removal from office;

- revision of radio/television legislation and amendment of the status of Teleradio Moldova to make it an independent public corporation: an immediate start of work by the relevant parliamentary committee; possible resumption of consideration of the draft legislation examined by the previous legislature; assistance of Council of Europe experts in defining the public service status of the Moldovan radio and television corporation; completion of work by the end of the current parliamentary session, on 31 July 2002;

- execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case: immediate registration of the Church through the adoption of a government decision by 24 April 2002; definition of implementing arrangements under Council of Europe supervision; deadline for completion of application measures: 31 July 2002;

- Council of Europe assistance concerning the disappearance of Vlad Cubreacov and voluntary judicial co-operation from member states by sending specialist investigation teams;

- revision of parliament’s rules of procedure concerning provisions that restrict the opposition’s rights and its participation in standing committees;

- organisation of a round table between all the democratic political parties, not only those represented in parliament, with the assistance of the Council of Europe.

I regret that after our meeting this compromise, which should have been proposed to you, was questioned by those politically responsible who had accepted it.

      Those leaders of the parliamentary factions who had so requested, have been invited by the Secretary General of the Assembly to come to Strasbourg for the session of the Parliamentary Assembly.

      I hope that a truly constructive dialogue can follow and I hold great hopes in your wise decision.

      I will personally continue with confidence and determination, together with my colleague Lauri Vahtre, to carry on the discussions.

Yours respectfully,

Josette DURRIEU

Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)

References to committee: Resolution 1115 (1997) of 27 January 1997, Doc 9355 and Reference No 2701 of 26 March 2002

Draft resolution and draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 23 April 2002

Members of the committee: Mr Bársony (Chairperson), Mr Pollozhani, Ms Severinsen, Mr Frunda (Vice-Chairpersons), Mrs Akgönenç, Mr Akhvlediani, Mr Aliyev, Mr Arzilli, Mr Atkinson, Mr Attard-Montalto, Mr Bartoš, Mrs Belohorska, Mr Bindig, Mr van den Brande, Mr Budin, Mr Cekuolis, Mr Christodoulides, Mr Cilevics, Mr Davis, Mrs Delvaux-Stehres, Mr Demetriou, Mr Dobelis, Mrs Durrieu, Mr Einarsson, Mr Enright, Mr Eörsi, Mrs Feric-Vać, Mr Frey, Mr Glesener, Mr Gligoroski, Mr Gross, Mr Gürkan, Mr Gusenbauer, Mr Hancock, Mr Haraldsson, Mr Holovaty, Mr Irmer, Mr Jakic, Mr Jansson, Mr Jaskiernia, Mr Jurgens, Mrs Kautto, Lord Kilclooney, Mr Kirilov, Mr Kostytsky, Mr Landsbergis, Mr van der Linden, Mr Lintner, Mr Luis, Mr Magnusson, Mr Marmazov, Mr Martínez Casañ, Mr Mota Amaral, Mr Neguta, Mr Olteanu, Mr Pangalos, Mr Popescu, Mrs Ringstad, Mr Rogozin, Mr Rustamyan, Mr Saglam, Mrs Sehnalova, Mrs Shakhtakhtinskaya, Mr Shishlov, Mr Slutsky, Mr Smorawinski, Mr Soendergaard, Mrs Stoyanova, Mr Surjan, Mr Tepshi, Mrs Tevdoradze, Mr Vahtre, Mr Vella, Mr Weiss, Mrs Wohlwend, Mr Yáñez-Barnuevo, Mr Zacchera, Mr Zierer

N.B. The names of those members who were present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries to the committee: Mr Ausems, Mr Mezei, Mrs Clamer, Ms Mathey

¹ The programme of the visit will be found in Appendix II. The co-rapporteurs express their thanks to the Moldovan parliamentary delegation for the excellent organisation of their visit, and to everyone they met for the frank and direct exchanges of views they had, including at the highest level. Thanks also to Mr Tamás Mikecs, Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary in Moldova, for his valuable assistance during the visit, and to Ms Dominique Gazuy, French Ambassador, for her constant readiness to help.

² The programme of this visit will be found in Appendix I.

³ See report of the ad hoc committee on the observation of the general elections (Doc.9037), rapporteur Mr Gross (Switzerland, SOC)

⁴ The first step in the scale of penalties is a suspension not exceeding 6 months; the next is a one-year suspension. The ultimate penalty – dissolution of the party and confiscation of its assets – is a matter for the courts to decide upon application by the Chief State Prosecutor. During the co-rapporteurs January visit, the Minister of Justice was determined to press on with sanctions, step by step, ie starting with a one-year suspension. This has not happened.

⁵ See Declaration of the Presidency of the European Union on 30 January 2002 and the Resolution adopted on 14 March 2002 by the European Parliament on the human rights situation in the Republic of Moldova.

⁶ At the same time, the Secretary General invoked Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights, asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs for explanations about the effective implementation of the Convention and Moldovan legislation’s compliance with it. The Minister’s reply was received on 29 March.

⁷ During the rapporteurs’ January visit, the authorities, including the President of the Parliament, Ms Ostapciuc, had made no bones about their intention to convene an extraordinary session of parliament if necessary and to expel the Christian-Democrat members concerned, if the situation warranted it.

⁸ The Parliament also urges the various public authorities - President of the Republic, ministers, chief public prosecutor, mayor of Chisinau - to use their powers to guarantee the application of the law and the continuity of the state and ensure public order. It calls upon the CDPP’s members of parliament « to cease organising unlawful protest demonstrations and to refrain from actions which destabilise the socio-political situation of the Republic ». Lastly, the Parliament calls upon the Council of Europe and other international organisations to « assess the situation objectively and impartially ».

⁹ One referred to the alleged number of 100 persons. Teachers who had taken their pupils to the demonstrations have also been prosecuted. According to the authorities, some ten teachers have been convicted. Apparently, very strict instructions had been given to teachers in secondary schools, not to allow their pupils to attend the demonstrations. Most of Chisinau secondary schools were on strike on 1 and 2 April. According to our own observations, schoolchildren’s presence was mostly spontaneous, often in the evenings after school.

¹⁰ The many rumours include: Vlad Cubreacov disappeared of his own accord, or was abducted; the kidnapping was ordered by the Moldovan mafia, by the Transnistrian authorities, by the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, by members of the CDPP, by the Moldovan intelligence and security service, or by uncontrolled Communist elements.

¹¹ Let us not forget, however, that on 20 February Braghis also called for the resignation of the Tarlev government.

¹² Tension among the media is all the more visible and competition all the more fierce in view of the fact that their economic survival depends less on sales and subscriptions than on advertising and subsidies from investors. However, since November 2000 any financing for political newspapers and magazines by foreign governments is prohibited (except where such financing is explicitly provided for in a bilateral agreement between states). Many people are of the opinion that this provision is directed towards the pro-Romanian media. There was also harsh criticism for the requirement for newspapers and press agencies to be registered before being able to operate.

¹³ Dumitru Braghis took part in two TV broadcasts; it should, however, be pointed out that the CDPP leader, Iurie Rosca, refused on 27 February to take part in a live debate on Moldovan television with Dumitru Braghis (Braghis Alliance) and Victor Stepaniuc (Communist Party), demanding an hour’s broadcasting time to address the nation alone.

¹⁴ The Director General thought that what he had done was “constructive” and democratic. He had organised metings with both the strike committee and the anti-strike committee. He regretted these dissensions and called for strict observance of the radio-tv legislation, which was “satisfactory”.

¹⁵ According to the 1994 Act, removal requires a two third majority of the members of the Popular Assembly; the 1998 “constitution” requires simple majority. There are 34 members to the Assembly, upon which 21 voted the censure. A vote with a two-third majority would have required 23 votes.

¹⁶ The OSCE mission in Moldova has expressed its concern at these serious events and at an attempt to take control of Gagauz television by men belonging to the Moldovan security service who tried to interrupt the live transmission of the debates in the People’s Assembly.

¹⁷ This principle could be found in a Law of 1 September 1989 on the functioning of languages spoken on the territory of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova.

¹⁸ The Court notes that only religions recognised by government decision may be practised in Moldova. “Not being recognised, the applicant church cannot operate. In particular, its priests may not conduct divine service, its members may not meet to practise their religion and, not having legal personality, it is not entitled to judicial protection of its assets.” (…) “Only a recognised denomination has legal personality, may produce and sell specific liturgical objects and engage clergy and employees.” (…) “in the absence of recognition the applicant church may neither organise itself nor operate. Lacking legal personality, it cannot bring legal proceedings to protect its assets, which are indispensable for worship, while its members cannot meet to carry on religious activities without contravening the legislation on religious denominations.”

¹⁹ However, the Moldovan State did not respect its duty of neutrality in religious matters since, in a decision of 26 September 2001, the Government approved the modification of Article 1 of the statute of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova which reads as follows: “the Orthodox Church of Moldova is an independent Church and is the legal successor to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia”. The 1992 statute of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, however, clearly states that the Church is the canonical successor to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia which existed till 1944.

²⁰ Since an Act of July 2000, the prosecution has lost the powers of general supervision it had enjoyed under an Act of 1992. It retains traditional duties of State Counsel, which relate mainly to criminal law. It would appear that while the State Prosecutor is responsible for directing criminal investigations, he will no longer be able to issue arrest warrants.

²¹ See Recommendation 1526 (2001) adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 2001 further to the report presented by the Committee on Social, Health and Family Affairs (Doc 9112, rapporteur: Ms Pozza Tasca) on a campaign against trafficking in minors to put a stop to the east European route: the example of Moldova.