Doc. 9472

28 May 2002

Reducing environmental risks by destroying chemical weapons

Report

Committee on the Environment and Agriculture

Rapporteur: Ms Lisbeth Fehr, Switzerland, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group

Summary

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997 provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under a universally applied verification mechanism. The Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, retention, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons. It requires each state party to eliminate its stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities before 2007.

To date, the CWC has been ratified by 145 states. Unfortunately, the convention’s implementation is progressing only slowly. This is particularly true with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

This report underlines the risk of the delay in implementing the CWC leading to a general standstill of the chemical disarmament process, which would have a negative impact not only on human health and the environment on the spot but also on disarmament and security at a global level.

The report therefore concludes that major efforts need to be made without delay to stop the proliferation of chemical weapons and the related technology. It also highlights the risk of disaster coming from the remaining stockpiles. The danger of major accidents involving large numbers of victims and severe pollution increases as the stockpiles grow older. Moreover, the risk of chemical weapons being stolen will remain as long as stockpiles exist. There is a particular concern here about small artillery shells that can easily be used for terrorist acts or in regional conflicts.

For these reasons, the report urges Council of Europe member states to make a greater commitment to rapid chemical disarmament, since that is the best method of preventing disasters and much less expensive than the efforts that would be required to cope with disasters once they have occurred.

I. Draft recommendation

1.       The stocks of chemical weapons and munitions built up over the 20th century pose a serious threat to humanity. The deliberate or accidental release of toxic biological agents into the biosphere would have tragic consequences both for human health and life and for the environment.

2.        In this connection, the Assembly underlines the threat posed by stockpiles of old chemical weapons and by unexploded munitions abandoned in First World War battlefields.

3.        It is concerned about possible damage to the marine environment and the food chain resulting from chemical weapons dumped at sea, especially those dumped in the North Sea and the Baltic at the end of World War II.

4.        The proliferation among states and non-state entities of chemical weapons and toxic substances and the technologies with which they are produced would seriously undermine the efforts to bring about disarmament, peace and security at global level.

5.        The Assembly believes that the total destruction of chemical weapons and toxic combat substances is the only reliable means of preventing potentially fatal disasters for humankind and nature. Although aware of the fact that chemical disarmament requires significant financial efforts, it nevertheless believes that the price to be paid in the event of a disaster involving such substances would be much higher.

6.        The Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997, is an essential part of the international community’s efforts to bring about chemical disarmament and is a major contribution to international peace and security. The Assembly accordingly welcomes the fact that 43 Council of Europe member states are parties to the convention.

7.        It is, however, concerned by the fact that certain states that have research and development capabilities in the chemical field are not yet parties to the convention.

8.        It also notes with regret that implementation of the convention is progressing only slowly, in particular in the Russian Federation because of a lack of the financial resources needed to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles.

9.        The Assembly believes that it is necessary to increase the resources available to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for supervising compliance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and setting up effective assistance machinery, in particular in the face of the threat of terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons.

10.        The Assembly takes note of and supports the recently adopted Western European Union Recommendation 701 on the new challenges of chemical and biological weapons control.

11.        The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

i.       ask all Council of Europe member and observer states that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention;

ii.       ask Council of Europe member states that still hold chemical weapons stocks to destroy them in accordance with the provisions and timescales provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention, and call upon other countries to do the same;

iii.       urge Council of Europe member states to intensify, within the appropriate forums, their political efforts aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in general and to increase and render more effective – by establishing appropriate control mechanisms – their joint financial and technical assistance to the Russian Federation’s chemical weapons destruction programme;

iv.       encourage exchanges of information, e.g. on the exact locations, and co-operation among Council of Europe member states in connection with the disposal of old and abandoned chemical weapons with a view to taking any measures necessary to prevent any environmental damage;

v.       encourage the setting up of assistance machinery among Council of Europe member states in connection with chemical weapons control issues and the threat that the use of toxic chemical substances in terrorist attacks presents;

vi.       encourage Council of Europe member states sitting on international committees and groups responsible for monitoring and strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention to propose joint actions in this field and, as far as possible, in co-operation with other countries, particularly the United States and Canada, observer states to the Council of Europe;

vii.       keep the Assembly regularly informed of any information received with regard to chemical weapons control;

viii.       include in its work programme, in particular in the work programme of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement, the monitoring of chemical weapons issues with a view to identifying the risks involved and the measures needed to protect civilian populations more effectively against them.

ix.        encourage Council of Europe member states to support public information campaigns especially in the countries most affected;

x.       urge Council of Europe member states to make every effort to clean up their own contaminated sites, in particular the soil and water resources and especially drinking water supplies.

II.       Explanatory memorandum by Ms Fehr

Contents

1.       Introduction/historical background

2.       The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

3.       Implementation of the CWC endangered

4.       Recent developments

5.       Conclusion

Appendix:: States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

1.       Introduction/historical background

1.       So-called modern chemical weapons were used for the first time on 22 April 1915 at Ypres. The waves of chlorine gas released by the German army left 5 000 dead and 10 000 injured. 1916 saw the first attack with a combat gas as such, in other words, a substance especially developed for military use (phosgene, a toxic gas). New substances were subsequently developed at a growing pace and used increasingly frequently. A total of 125 000 tonnes of chemical substances were used during World War I. They killed or injured 1.3 million people.

2.       The pressure of international public opinion arising from the terror provoked by the use of combat gases during the war that had just ended led to the signing of the Geneva Protocol on 17 June 1925. This prohibited the first-strike use of chemical weapons. However, the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their use for the purpose of retaliation continued to be allowed.

3.       The Allied occupation forces’ discovery of facilities for the production of nerve gases, which were unknown to them at the time, had two impacts. Firstly, many countries set up research programmes on chemical weapons to improve their means of protection or develop their own nerve gases. Secondly, they began destroying several hundreds of thousands of tonnes of chemical weapons dating from World War I, as the discovery of nerve gases meant that they were no longer of any interest from a military point of view. The disposal of large amounts of these weapons was carried out over a very short period of time, often as quickly and as cheaply as possible, i.e. by incineration, burying or underwater dumping. According to Professor Albert L. Bikmullin, more than 300,000 tons of German chemical weapons, captured by the Allies in World War II, have been dumped in the Baltic sea, in the straits of Skagerrak and Kattegat. Nobody can tell exactly to what extent they have already polluted the habitat of fish that is being eaten all over Europe.

4.       Chemical weapons have been used frequently since World War II, most recently during the Iran-Iraq war, against the Kurdish settlement of Halabdja in Iraq and in Tokyo, in 1995, in the first large-scale terrorist attack with chemical weapons (sarin).

2.       The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

5.       The development of the atomic bomb gradually led to the disappearance of chemical weapons from the military doctrines. Negotiations on a new convention on chemical weapons were started in the late 1960s. However, the tense atmosphere during the Cold War meant that progress was exceedingly slow. It was not until 13 January 1993 that the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, and on their Destruction” (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was signed in Paris. The CWC, which is of unlimited duration, is the most progressive global disarmament agreement to date. For this reason, some of its aspects ought to be incorporated into the conventions on biological and nuclear weapons. The new approaches are as follows:

-       The principle of a total and non-discriminatory ban, i.e., unlike the situation with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, none of the States Parties is entitled to possess or hold chemical weapons.

-       Direct supervision of compliance with the Convention by means of on-site inspections and regular and thorough inspections of stockpiling and destruction facilities and the chemical industry.

-       (Although it has never been activated so far) the instrument of challenge inspections that can be carried out any time, anywhere and which cannot be refused.

-       The exclusion of states that are not parties to the Convention from world trade in certain chemical products.

6.       With the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention on 29 April 1997, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for the implementation of the CWC, began work in The Hague. Each member state submits a declaration on production facilities potentially capable of producing chemical weapons and on any previous offensive weapons development programmes to the OPCW. On the basis of these declarations, the OPCW monitors the destruction of any chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facilities and carries out regular inspections of declared chemical plants that could be used to produce chemical weapons.

7.       By the end of December 2001, 145 states had acceded to the CWC (see Appendix). The OPCW employs a staff of approximately 500, including over 200 inspectors. It conducted its 1000th inspection in summer 2001. Four member states (India, Russia, South Korea and the United States) have declared that they possess stockpiles of chemical weapons and three of them have begun destruction programmes. http://www.opcw.org

3.       Implementation of the CWC endangered

8.       Some chemical weapons can be manufactured easily and at low cost and still have devastating effects. Thousands of people could be killed with small numbers of these weapons. The huge quantities of chemical weapons that were dumped underwater during the 20th century or that are still stockpiled on land since the Cold War pose a major problem and a real threat to the people on the spot.

9.       In an address to the Swiss Parliament on 12 December 2000, the former Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, said in substance that we had all made the mistake years ago of dumping thousands of tonnes of chemical weapons into almost all of the world’s oceans. Trying to recover the relevant containers from the ocean bed or leaving them and their contents to rust away over time was another challenge that we had not yet addressed. The threat of people using these terrifying weapons in regional conflicts, as we had seen during the Iran-Iraq war or in the terrorist attack on the Tokyo underground five years ago, would haunt us and our children for years to come.

10.       Under the 1993 CWC, all chemical weapons stockpiles have to be destroyed by 2007. This deadline can, in exceptional cases, be extended until 2012 at the latest. At this moment, however, it looks uncertain whether the CWC can be implemented according to its schedule and in a manner that does not threaten the environment or public health. On the one hand, there is a lack of financial resources for eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles, especially in Russia. On the other hand, there is a lack of political will or pressure to allocate the necessary funds. The collapse of the CWC would not only be a setback for global security and stability but would also mean a risk of proliferation of chemical weapons and the related technology. In addition, the regions concerned could suffer economic disadvantages (no investment in areas that are contaminated or where there is a risk of disaster). Finally, the stockpiles involve major risks for the health of the communities concerned because of the long-term contamination of water and soil.

4.       Recent developments

11.       According to its own declarations, Russia is the country that possesses most chemical weapons, inherited from the former Soviet Union. These weapons are stockpiled at seven locations:

- In Gorny and Kambarka, there are a total of 7 520 tonnes of old arsenic-based vesicants stockpiled in tanks with a capacity of 80 tonnes each. The leaking of these tanks would be a major environmental hazard.

- In Shchuch’ye, Kizner, Maradikova, Leonidovka and Pochep, there are a total of 32 480 tonnes of nerve gases in munitions ready for use. Various inspections of these munitions have shown that large quantities of them are in excellent condition and will remain so for the next 10 to 20 years.

12.       The Russian government adopted the country’s chemical disarmament programme on 21 March 1996. In 1999, they estimated the cost of the programme at some 4.7 billion Euro. On 4 November 1997, the Russian parliament ratified the CWC, thereby submitting the destruction of the country’s chemical weapons to international inspection. The ratification came after the international community had signalled that it was willing to provide substantial support for this disarmament programme. However, the support was slow in coming. Following the collapse of the rouble in August 1998, the decreasing support from the international community plunged the Russian disarmament programme into a severe crisis.

13.       In order to put it back on a credible footing, the Putin government decided to transfer responsibility for the programme from the Defence Ministry to the new Munitions Agency. At the same time, a new destruction plan was drawn up, which is supposed to reduce costs by 30 to 50%. It provides for the building of only three of the seven destruction sites originally planned.

14.       Russia now regards chemical disarmament as one of its most important international obligations, and included an amount corresponding to 120 million US dollars in its 2001 budget for the implementation of this disarmament programme.

15.       Several countries, first and foremost the United States of America, have already provided support for the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme. However, the US government has provisionally frozen its financial assistance, arguing that the assistance provided by European countries is inadequate in overall terms. The European contribution to date stands at about 60 million Euro with a further 10 million Euro currently under discussion in various European countries. Apart from the EU itself, the countries committed to this task are: Germany, Finland, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Norway and − from 2003 onward and with a substantive amount of funds and expertise − Switzerland.

16.       Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, it has become more obvious that the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons is a priority for Europe, given the potential terrorist use of these weapons.

17.       It is essential for efforts to be stepped up if the potential risks are to be reduced as quickly as possible.

5.       Conclusion

18.       The report calls for:

-       Council of Europe member states to be urged to step up their financial and political efforts with regard to the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles in general¹,

-       Council of Europe member states to be asked to step up their joint assistance to the Russian destruction programme for chemical weapons,

-       all states that have not yet joined the Convention to be encouraged to ratify it,

-       Council of Europe member states to support public information campaigns especially in the countries most affected,

-       Council of Europe member states to make every effort to clean up their own contaminated sites and regions, in particular the soil and sources of drinking water supplies.

Signatory States to the Chemical Weapons Convention

List of all 29 States which have signed, but have not yet ratified as per 26 June 2001

1. Afghanistan signed 14-01-93

2. Bahamas signed 02-03-94

3. Bhutan signed 23-04-97

4. Cambodia signed 15-01-93

5. Cape Verde signed 15-01-93

6. Central African Republic signed 14-01-93

7. Chad signed 11-10-94

8. Comoros signed 13-01-93

9. Congo signed 15-01-93

10. Democratic Republic of the Congo signed 14-01-93

11. Djibouti signed 28-09-93

12. Dominican Republic signed 13-01-93

13. Grenada signed 9-04-97

14. Guatemala signed 14-01-93

15. Guinea-Bissau signed 14-01-93

16. Haiti signed 14-01-93

17. Honduras signed 13-01-93

18. Israel signed 13-01-93

19. Kyrgyzstan signed 22-02-93

20. Liberia signed 15-01-93

21. Madagascar signed 15-01-93

22. Marshall Islands signed 13-01-93

23. Myanmar signed 14-01-93

24. Rwanda signed 17-05-93

25. Saint Kitts and Nevis signed 16-03-94

26. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed 20-09-93

27. Samoa signed 14-01-93

28. Sierra Leone signed 15-01-93

29. Thailand signed 14-01-93

*

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Reporting committee: Committee on the Environment and Agriculture.

Reference to committee: Doc. 9089 and Reference No. 2612 of 22 May 2001.

Draft recommendation adopted unanimously by the committee on 25 April 2002

Members of the committee: Mr Martinez Casañ (Chairman), MM. Behrendt, Hornung, Stankevic (Alternate: Mrs Burbiene)(Vice-Chairmen), Mr Agius, Mrs Agudo, MM. Akçali, Akselsen (Alternate: Ms Konglevoll), Mrs Angelovicova, MM. Annemans, Apostoli, Bartos, Bockel, Briane, Browne, Carvalho, Sir Sydney Chapman, MM. Churkin (Alternate: Sudarenkov), Ciemniak, Cosarciuc, Duivesteijn, von der Esch, Etherington, Frunda, Giovanelli, Gonzalez de Txabarri, Graas, Grachev, Grignon (Alternate: Dhaille), Grissemann, Gubert, Hajiyeva, Haraldsson, Ilascu, Janowski, Juric (Alternate: Torbar), Kalkan, Mrs Kanelli (Alternate: Mr Pavlidis), MM. Kharitonov, Lord Kilclooney, MM. Kostenko, Kostytsky, Kurucsai, Kurykin, Lachat, Libicki, van der Linden, Lotz, Manukyan, Mariot, Mauro, Meale, Monteiro, Müller, Oliverio, Podobnik, Pollozhani, Popov, Salaridze, Mrs Schicker, MM. Schmied, Skopal, Skoularikis (Alternate: Floros), Ms Stoejberg, Mr Stoica, Ms Stoyanova (Alternate: Mr Toshev), MM. Theodorou, Timmermans, Tiuri, Truu, Vakilov, Velikov, Volpinari, Yürür, Mrs Zetterberg, Mr Zierer.

N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretariat to the committee: Mrs Cagnolati, Mr Sixto and Ms Odrats.

¹ The Rapporteur asked the national parliaments of all member states to provide information on these efforts. A number of countries have submitted their reports, which have been taken note of during the finalisation of this report.