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<p align="justify"><b>Doc. 9572</b></p>

<p align="justify">24 September 2002</p>

<p><b>Threat of military action against Iraq</b></p>

<p align="justify">Report</p>

<p><b>Political Affairs Committee</b></p>

<p align="justify">Rapporteur: Mr Guillermo Martínez Casañ, Spain, Group of the European People&#8217;s Party</p>

<p><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  Draft resolution </b></p>

<p align="justify">1. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly notes with satisfaction Iraq&#8217;s acceptance of the unconditional return of the UN disarmament inspectors, in accordance with Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> (1999). This is an essential first step towards ensuring that Iraq no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction.  The Assembly notes, however, that Iraq has reneged on its commitments on several occasions in the past and expresses reservations about the intention of the Iraqi authorities to honour their promises. </p>

<p align="justify">2. The international community must continue to demand that the Iraqi authorities comply in full with the United Nations Security Council&#8217;s resolutions concerning the prohibition of Iraqi programmes to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations inspectors and disarmament experts must be permitted to resume their on-site work immediately, with unlimited access and with guarantees, in order to be able to report to the Security Council on whether or not Iraq has complied with these resolutions.</p>

<p align="justify">3. The Assembly emphasises its conviction that any armed conflict must be avoided prior to examination of this report by the Security Council. The Assembly is deeply concerned at the rift that could open between the West and the Islamic world in the event of an armed conflict.  In this respect the Assembly welcomes the stance taken by the Arab countries which have put pressure on the Iraqi authorities to accept the UN&#8217;s demands.</p>

<p align="justify">4. Accordingly, the Assembly disapproves that the United States is indicating a willingness to move towards armed conflict without a mandate from the Security Council. Such an attitude is not in accordance with the principles of international law.  The Assembly encourages the continued efforts by members of the Security Council to secure the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq.</p>

<p align="justify">5. In the absence of explicit approval by the Security Council, any unilateral action by the United States, even where supported by other countries, would be likely to destabilise peace severely and deal a serious blow to the authority of the United Nations. A unilateral approach could also lead to divisions within the democratic countries and compromise the international community&#8217;s cohesion in the fight against terrorism.</p>

<p align="justify">6. The Assembly calls on: </p>

<p align="justify">i. the Baghdad authorities :</p>

<p align="justify">a. to match their promises with action, by co-operating fully with the United Nations inspectors and disarmament experts so that they can carry out their work, and by conforming to the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> (1999);</p>

<p align="justify">b. to publicly condemn terrorism and to refrain from any kind of action that might cast doubt on Iraq&#8217;s claim not to be involved in terrorism.</p>

<p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; all Council of Europe member States, observers and special guests to step up their efforts to avoid a new war in Iraq and to find a solution to the Iraqi problem within and through the United Nations&#8217; principles and mechanisms, including if necessary by adopting a new Security Council resolution.  At the same time, it calls on them to support mediation efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution, particularly those by the Secretary General of the United Nations.</p>

<p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the members of the United Nations Security Council to resort to military intervention only after having exhausted all other approaches, and only if a flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions is confirmed by the inspectors&#8217; future report.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Explanatory memorandum</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</b></p>

<p align="justify">1. The situation as regards Iraq is a matter of serious concern. The threat of military action in Iraqi territory is increasingly present. Despite the Iraqi Government&#8217;s acceptance of the United Nations&#8217; demand that international inspections should resume, the United States is continuing to prepare for military action with the avowed aim (not only) of dismantling the arsenals and manufacturing capacities of weapons of mass destruction which it claims Iraq still possesses, but also of toppling Saddam Hussein&#8217;s regime.</p>

<p align="justify">2. The Assembly is aware that the anti-democratic regime of Iraq constitutes a potential danger for the Iraqi people and for the whole region. The Iraqi leaders have in the past used chemical weapons against Iran and have even not hesitated to use such weapons against the Iraqi population of Kurdish origin.</p>

<p align="justify">3. Nevertheless, the Assembly must firmly warn the United States against any military intervention in Iraq outside the UN framework and record its profound concern about the potential rift between the West and the Muslim world in the event of armed conflict.</p>

<p align="justify">4. The Council of Europe member States, observers and special guests should all intensify their efforts to prevent any fresh war in Iraq and to identify a solution to the &#8220;Iraq problem&#8221; drawing on the principles and mechanisms of the United Nations. They should simultaneously back up all efforts at mediation, particularly those of the Secretary General of the United Nations, geared to securing a peaceful settlement.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Background</b></p>

<p align="justify">5. Just after the &#8220;Gulf War&#8221;, the United Nations Security Council adopted<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 687"> Resolution 687</a> demanding that<b> </b>Iraq destroy its NBC (nuclear, bacteriological and chemical) weapons as one of the ceasefire conditions. This Resolution also set up UNSCOM (Special United Nations Commission) responsible for co-operating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supervising the dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.  The UN experts have the twofold mission of inspecting Iraqi sites to ascertain the county&#8217;s biological, chemical and ballistic capacities and then destroying all NBC weapons and missiles with a range of over 150 km.</p>

<p align="justify">6.<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 715"> Resolution 715</a> of 11 October 1991 made supervision of Iraq&#8217;s disarmament a permanent procedure.  UNSCOM&#8217;s task was no longer to ensure the dismantling of stocks of weapons of mass destruction but to prevent any reconstruction of such arsenals.</p>

<p align="justify">7. In December 1998, however, following a series of mounting crises between the UNSCOM inspectors and Iraq, Operation Desert Fox was implemented.  This operation led to the departure of UNSCOM and the discontinuation of the disarmament procedure.</p>

<p align="justify">8. On 17 December 1999, Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> authorised the suspension of the sanctions imposed on Iraq in exchange for a new system of inspection of Iraqi weaponry.  The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was to replace UNSCOM and introduce a &#8220;permanent supervision and verification system&#8221;.  However, this Resolution was rejected by Baghdad.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>III.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The reasons and aims of military intervention in Iraq</b></p>

<p align="justify">9. The events of 11 September 2001 re-prioritised the Iraqi issue for the United States. In December 2001 Hans Blix, UNMOVIC Chairman, stated in an interview with the Kuwaiti agency KUNA, &#8220;<i>September 11 created a feeling that the matter of weapons of mass destruction had to be urgently dealt with. The hijackers turned their planes into missiles,</i> <i>rather than weapons of mass destruction in the usual sense of the term. However, people genuinely wondered what would happen if a state actually used weapons of this kind</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">10. The American Administration suggested a number of justifications for an attack on the Iraqi regime: Iraq&#8217;s efforts to produce chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons in breach of the UN resolutions, Saddam Hussein&#8217;s links with Iraqi terrorism, and even a claim that Baghdad belonged to the &#8220;Axis of Evil&#8221;. However, no substantial evidence has yet been advanced to justify these claims.</p>

<p align="justify">11. Moreover, the White House has published a report entitled &#8220;A decade of deception and defiance&#8221; which fails to present any fresh evidence of a nuclear arms race in Iraq. It merely systematically lists Baghdad&#8217;s violations of the 16 Security Council resolutions since the early 1990s.</p>

<p align="justify">12. In his speech delivered on 12 September 2002 to the 57<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly President Bush presented examples of Iraq&#8217;s violations of UN resolutions over the past 10 years or more. The President did not mention the return of the UN disarmament inspectors to Iraq in his address.  Without mentioning any deadline, he issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein comprising 5 points which Iraq must &#8220;<i>unconditionally</i>&#8221; respect: dismantling of all its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, termination of all support for terrorism, discontinuation of persecution of the civilian population, settlement of disputes bequeathed by the invasion of Kuwait (return of prisoners and compensation), and immediate stoppage of all illegal trade beyond the limits of the &#8220;oil for food&#8221; programme put in place by the UN.  &#8220;<i>If all these measures are taken this could pave the way for the United Nations to help form a government to represent all Iraqis - a government based on respect for human rights, economic freedom and elections supervised by the international community</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">13. In a report published on 9 September 2002 the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) considered, to its knowledge, that Iraq was not in a position to develop nuclear weapons in the near future.  &#8220;<i>Iraq could assemble an atomic bomb with months if it obtained fissile material from a source abroad, but as its technology stands its seems unlikely that it possesses such material or is close to producing it within the next few years</i>&#8221;. On the other hand, the report points out that Iraq possesses sufficient basic skills and industrial capacities to design biological weapons in the near future and in the requisite quantities. Lastly, it mentions that Iraq is in a position to produce chemical weapons at short notice in limited amounts, using existing civilian installations.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>IV.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Iraq&#8217;s acceptance of the return of the UN inspectors</b></p>

<p align="justify">14. Having opposed the return of the UN disarmament inspectors for 4 years, Iraq finally as a result of the firm position taken by the international community, including the Arab States, unconditionally agreed to their return in a letter signed by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nadji Sabri, and presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 16 September 2002.  The Iraqi authorities also agreed to immediately open discussions on the practical arrangements to enable the inspectors to return and resume work. The letter was forwarded to the Security Council, which must now decide on the next step.</p>

<p align="justify">15. An initial encounter has taken place in New York between the head of the disarmament inspectors and Iraqi officials on the practicalities of resumption of inspections in Iraq. The UN-Iraq discussions will continue in Vienna in the first week of October, the Iraqi authorities having stated that they needed time to study the practical arrangements. Hans Blix, the chief inspector, estimates that fresh inspections will take at least one year.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>V.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The American position</b></p>

<p align="justify">16. Washington reacted very sceptically to the letter from the Iraqi Government, and pointed out that a fresh UN resolution was still required to ensure that Iraq respects its undertakings on the disarmament front.  Colin Powell has in fact stated that &#8220;<i>the only way to ensure that things do not go as usual and the past is not repeated is to set it all out in a new resolution</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">17. So the Americans are doing their utmost to oblige the Security Council to adopt a new resolution before any inspectors are sent off.  Washington wants a text adopted imposing &#8220;<i>more restrictive</i>&#8221; conditions on Baghdad so that the disarmament experts can carry out their work. The Americans argue that the provisions of<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> are &#8220;<i>too vague</i>&#8221;. They have therefore decided to co-operate with London in preparing a text threatening Saddam Hussein with &#8220;<i>severe consequences</i>&#8221; if he does not accept the return of the inspectors &#8220;<i>unconditionally, without delay and without manoeuvring</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">18. For the Americans, this new resolution must set out precise deadlines. This requirement apparently goes hand-in-hand with the threat of military intervention. However, reservations must be expressed about any over-rigid schedule in that delays could arise just as easily from technical difficulties as from Iraqi ill-will.</p>

<p align="justify">19. The Security Council is presently discussing a new resolution on Iraq.  The major area of disagreement, which the Security Council is continually deferring, concerns the consequences of this text: the military sanction awaiting Iraq if it refuses to co-operate with the inspectors. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has repeated that such consequences would be severe and decisive. France is opposed to giving America any &#8220;blank cheque&#8221; in advance.  One of the key votes on this matter is liable to be that of the United Kingdom, which is hoping for a strong resolution, albeit with a view, precisely, to averting military action.</p>

<p align="justify">20. The United States have nevertheless warned that they are keeping open the option of launching unilateral military action against Iraq if they fail to secure a coalition to topple Saddam Hussein&#8217;s regime. In practical terms the American President has asked the UN to work on a new resolution to secure the disarmament of Baghdad, &#8220;<i>though there must be no doubts about the aims of the United States. The Security Council&#8217;s resolutions will be implemented and the just requirements of peace and security will be fulfilled, or else action will be unavoidable</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">21. George W Bush has persuaded Congress to adopt an early resolution on a possible military operation against Iraq, specifying exactly the risks incurred by Saddam Hussein if he hampers the smooth running of the inspections, but he still faces reticence on the part of the Security Council. &#8220;<i>This is an important signal for the country but also for the world, which sees that this country is united and resolved to face up to threats</i>&#8221;.</p>

<p align="justify">22. On 19 September the White House forwarded to Congress the draft resolution which President Bush would like to see adopted in order to be formally authorised, as he said, &#8220;<i>to use force</i>&#8221; against Iraq. This text is the first written formulation by the executive of what it wants to be able to do.  It states that the &#8220;<i>President is authorised to use any means he deems appropriate, including force, to secure implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (&#8230;), defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat constituted by Iraq and restore international peace and security in the region</i>&#8221;. Mr Bush has declared that if the Security Council will not settle the problem, the United States and a number of their friends will take care of it.</p>

<p align="justify">23. The grounds set out in the text propose that Congress affirm that Iraq possesses and is developing chemical, biological and nuclear means of action; is supporting and sheltering terrorist organisations; is inflicting brutal repression on its population; refuses to release foreign nationals from its custody or to provide information on their fate; and refuses to restore property seized during its occupation of Kuwait. The text also accuses Iraq of having demonstrated its hostility to the United States during the &#8220;Gulf War&#8221;. Lastly, the draft refers to the resolution adopted by Congress after Saddam Hussein&#8217;s expulsion of the UN inspectors in 1998, coming down in favour of a &#8220;regime change&#8221; in Baghdad.</p>

<p align="justify">24. The United States has therefore warned that they would act to disarm Iraq if the UN failed to do so, whereas Baghdad, where the first UN inspectors are likely to arrive in October, is adamant that it possesses no banned weapons.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>VI.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The European position</b></p>

<p align="justify">25. The differences of analysis between European countries on the means of settling crises in the region due to their historical alliances, economic interests and armement industries are obstacles to any joint initiative. The need to speak with one voice vis-à-vis the United States is a constantly recurring challenge to Europeans.</p>

<p align="justify">26. The official position adopted by the German Chancellor Mr Schröder before the elections is the most radical in that it rejects any involvement in military action in Iraq with or without a UN mandate. </p>

<p align="justify">27. The United Kingdom along with other allies constitute America&#8217;s most steadfast and faithful support. However, British public opinion is far from favourable to a war against Iraq. Even though they consider that the military option is still valid because of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, they add that military intervention would be less justified if there were another way of facing up to the threat.</p>

<p align="justify">28. By proposing a &#8220;French plan&#8221; to break the current deadlock, the French President Jacques Chirac has openly distanced himself from his main European partners. Jacques Chirac is not against the adoption of a new resolution on the return of the disarmament inspectors to Iraq, but would like to see the adoption of a second resolution possibly providing for military action should the first resolution be flouted. France in this way would like to play the role of constructive critic of the United States.</p>

<p align="justify">29. For Russia the most important thing is for the inspectors to be able to start work as quickly as possible. Adoption of a new resolution should not have suspensive effect, as the international community&#8217;s priority task is to ensure that the inspectors return to Iraq without delays or artificial obstacles.</p>

<p align="justify">30. While there is no unanimity among other European states as regards the need for a military action, most of them favour the multilateral approach.</p>

<p align="justify">31. This being the case, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe must speak with one voice. In the event of violation by Iraq of the obligations to discontinue all programmes of manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, the international community must act in a co-ordinated manner and implement the machinery provided for the purpose by the United Nations Charter, with strict respect for international law.</p>

<p align="justify">32. If possible military intervention has to be initiated in Iraq, it must be channelled by the United Nations Security Council, given that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that only the United Nations Security Council has the necessary legitimacy to act in the event of threats to international peace and security.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>VII.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Possible consequences of war</b></p>

<p align="justify">33. In the absence of explicit Security Council approval, any unilateral action by the United States against Iraq, even with possible support from other countries, is liable to seriously undermine the authority of the United Nations and peace in the world.</p>

<p align="justify">34. The unilateral approach is also liable to jeopardise the cohesion of the international community in its fight against terrorism and to strengthen the extremist milieus fuelling the terrorist networks.</p>

<p align="justify">35. A fresh war will produce new innocent victims and further aggravate the sufferings of the Iraqi civilian population.</p>

<p align="justify">36. Furthermore, the world economy will undoubtedly suffer a fresh shock, which will affect Europe extremely heavily.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>VIII.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions</b></p>

<p align="justify">37. The Assembly welcomes the Iraqi acceptance of the unconditional return of the UN disarmament inspectors in accordance with Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> (1999). This is a vital first step towards ensuring that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction and a step in the right direction for preventing any new war.  The Assembly notes, however, that Iraq has reneged on its commitments on several occasions in the past and expresses reservations about the intention of the Iraqi authorities to honour their promises.</p>

<p align="justify">38. The international community must demand that the Iraqi authorities strictly comply with the United Nations Security Council resolution on the elimination and the prohibition of Iraqi programmes for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations inspectors and experts must be permitted to resume their work <i>in situ</i> immediately and with guarantees, in order to inform the Security Council of whether Iraq is complying with these resolutions.</p>

<p align="justify">39. The Baghdad authorities must now back up their promises with actions by fully co-operating with the United Nations inspectors and experts and complying with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1284"> Resolution 1284</a> (1999), which requests Iraq to provide the disarmament inspectors with unlimited access to sites.</p>

<p align="justify">40. The members of the United Nations Security Council should not have recourse military action until they have used all other options, and should do so only if a flagrant violations of the United Nations is confirmed by the inspectors&#8217; future report.  All armed conflict should be avoided before this report has been examined. Accordingly, a second resolution, which should only be considered after confirmation that the first one has not been respected, must be adopted to give the go-ahead for any military action.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>Appendix</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>United<br>
Nations</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b><img src="edoc9572-1.jpg" border="0" width="101" height="87"><br>
Security<br>
Counsil</b></p>

<p align="justify"><br>
S/RES/1284 (1999)</p>

<p align="justify">17 December 1999</p>

<p align="justify"><b>RESOLUTION 1284 (1999)</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting,<br>
on 17 December 1999</b></p>

<p align="justify">The Security Council,</p>

<p align="justify">Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998, 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998, 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999 and 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999,</p>

<p align="justify">Recalling the approval by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in pursuance of paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),</p>

<p align="justify">Welcoming the reports of the three panels on Iraq (S/1999/356), and having held a comprehensive consideration of them and the recommendations contained in them,</p>

<p align="justify">Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and the need for Iraqi compliance with these resolutions,</p>

<p align="justify">Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991),</p>

<p align="justify">Concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and determined to improve that situation,</p>

<p align="justify">Recalling with concern that the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), have not yet been fully carried out by Iraq,</p>

<p align="justify">Recalling that in its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property it had seized, and noting with regret that Iraq has still not complied fully with this demand,</p>

<p align="justify">Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution,</p>

<p align="justify">Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States,</p>

<p align="justify">Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account that operative provisions of this resolution relate to previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter,</p>

<p align="justify"><b>A.</b></p>

<p align="justify">1. Decides to establish, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which replaces the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 687 (1991);</p>

<p align="justify">2. Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification;</p>

<p align="justify">3. Reaffirms the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC;</p>

<p align="justify">4. Reaffirms its resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolutions and statements of its President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard to cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information will apply in respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMOVIC may fully discharge its mandate;</p>

<p align="justify">5. Requests the Secretary-General, within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, to appoint, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the Council, an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC who will take up his mandated tasks as soon as possible, and, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC which will meet regularly to review the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions and provide professional advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including on significant policy decisions and on written reports to be submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General;</p>

<p align="justify">6. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, within 45 days of his appointment, to submit to the Council, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General, for its approval an organizational plan for UNMOVIC, including its structure, staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training procedures, incorporating as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, and recognizing in particular the need for an effective, cooperative management structure for the new organization, for staffing with suitably qualified and experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from international arms control organizations, and for the provision of high quality technical and cultural training;</p>

<p align="justify">7. Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise;</p>

<p align="justify">8. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA, drawing on the expertise of other international organizations as appropriate, to establish a unit which will have the responsibilities of the joint unit constituted by the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996), and also requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in consultation with the Director General of the IAEA, to resume the revision and updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applies;</p>

<p align="justify">9. Decides that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of UNMOVIC and the IAEA in relation to their work under this and other related resolutions on Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify">10. Requests Member States to give full cooperation to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates;</p>

<p align="justify">11. Decides that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets, liabilities and archives of the Special Commission, and that it shall assume the Special Commission&#8217;s part in agreements existing between the Special Commission and Iraq and between the United Nations and Iraq, and affirms that the Executive Chairman, the Commissioners and the personnel serving with UNMOVIC shall have the rights, privileges, facilities and immunities of the Special Commission;</p>

<p align="justify">12. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every three months on the work of UNMOVIC, pending submission of the first reports referred to in paragraph 33 below, and to report immediately when the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational in Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify"><b>B.</b></p>

<p align="justify">13. Reiterates the obligation of Iraq, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals referred to in paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), to extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and calls upon the Government of Iraq to resume cooperation with the Tripartite Commission and Technical Subcommittee established to facilitate work on this issue;</p>

<p align="justify">14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, to report every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq, and to appoint a high-level coordinator for these issues;</p>

<p align="justify"><b>C.</b></p>

<p align="justify">15. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;</p>

<p align="justify">16. Underlines, in this context, its intention to take further action, including permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;</p>

<p align="justify">17. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions taken;</p>

<p align="justify">18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995), decides that this group will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee for each individual project, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify">19. Encourages Member States and international organizations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an educational character to Iraq;</p>

<p align="justify">20. Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995);</p>

<p align="justify">21. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximize, drawing as necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian organizations, the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the humanitarian programme are utilized as authorized, to bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of this paragraph;</p>

<p align="justify">22. Requests also the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of the United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995);</p>

<p align="justify">23. Requests further the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995);</p>

<p align="justify">24. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs which have been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services;</p>

<p align="justify">25. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the Secretary-General, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to the nature of the items to be supplied, and requests the Secretary-General to notify the Committee of all applications for humanitarian items which are included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;</p>

<p align="justify">26. Decides that Hajj pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and resolution 670 (1990), provided timely notification of each flight is made to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995);</p>

<p align="justify">27. Calls upon the Government of Iraq: </p>

<p align="justify">(i) to take all steps to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid delays at its warehouses;</p>

<p align="justify">(ii) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill among others, and to allow freer access, without any discrimination, including on the basis of religion or nationality, by United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to all areas and sections of the population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition;</p>

<p align="justify">(iii) to prioritize applications for humanitarian goods under the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;</p>

<p align="justify">(iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six months in their places of temporary residence;</p>

<p align="justify">(v) to extend full cooperation to the United Nations Office for Project Services mine-clearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq and to consider the initiation of the demining efforts in other Governorates;</p>

<p align="justify">28. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector, not later than 60 days from the date of the adoption of this resolution and updated thereafter as necessary;</p>

<p align="justify">29. Expresses its readiness to authorize additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 28 above, in order to meet the humanitarian purposes set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;</p>

<p align="justify">30. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, including oil industry experts, to report within 100 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on Iraq&#8217;s existing petroleum production and export capacity and to make recommendations, to be updated as necessary, on alternatives for increasing Iraq&#8217;s petroleum production and export capacity in a manner consistent with the purposes of relevant resolutions, and on the options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq&#8217;s oil sector, including investments, subject to appropriate monitoring and controls;</p>

<p align="justify">31. Notes that in the event of the Council acting as provided for in paragraph 33 of this resolution to suspend the prohibitions referred to in that paragraph, appropriate arrangements and procedures will need, subject to paragraph 35 below, to be agreed by the Council in good time beforehand, including suspension of provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;</p>

<p align="justify">32. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraphs 15 to 30 of this resolution within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;</p>

<p align="justify"><b>D.</b></p>

<p align="justify">33. Expresses its intention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and from the Director General of the IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfilling the work programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the Council is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Council&#8217;s resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Council, and subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other than those referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or those to which the mechanism established by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;</p>

<p align="justify">34. Decides that in reporting to the Council for the purposes of paragraph 33 above, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will include as a basis for his assessment the progress made in completing the tasks referred to in paragraph 7 above;</p>

<p align="justify">35. Decides that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA reports that Iraq is not cooperating in all respects with UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited items, the suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council decides to the contrary;</p>

<p align="justify">36. Expresses its intention to approve arrangements for effective financial and other operational measures, including on the delivery of and payment for authorized civilian commodities and products to be sold or supplied to Iraq, in order to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items in the event of suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above, to begin the elaboration of such measures not later than the date of the receipt of the initial reports referred to in paragraph 33 above, and to approve such arrangements before the Council decision in accordance with that paragraph;</p>

<p align="justify">37. Further expresses its intention to take steps, based on the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 30 above, and consistent with the purpose of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, to enable Iraq to increase its petroleum production and export capacity, upon receipt of the reports relating to the cooperation in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA referred to in paragraph 33 above;</p>

<p align="justify">38. Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that resolution;</p>

<p align="justify">39. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and expresses its intention to consider action in accordance with paragraph 33 above no later than 12 months from the date of the adoption of this resolution provided the conditions set out in paragraph 33 above have been satisfied by Iraq.</p>

<p><b><i>Reporting committee</i>&nbsp;: Political Affairs Committee</b></p>

<p align="justify"><i>Reference to committee</i>&nbsp;:  Request for urgent procedure debate, Reference 2766, 23.09.02</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Draft resolution  </i>adopted by the committee on 24 September 2002  with 1 vote against and  2&nbsp;abstentions</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Members of the committee</i>&nbsp;: <i>Jakic </i>(Chairman), <i>Feric-Vac</i> (Vice-Chairperson), Spindelegger (Vice-Chairman), <i>Aguiar,</i> Aliyev, Andican, <i>Atkinson,</i>&nbsp;Azzolini, Bakoyianni <i>(alternate: Liapis)</i>, Behrendt <i>(alternate: Lörcher)</i>, Berceanu, Bergqvist, Bianco, Björck, Blaauw <i>(alternate: van der Linden)</i>, Blankenborg, Bühler, <i>Cekuolis</i>, Clerfayt, <i>Curdova,</i> Davern, <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt, Durrieu,&nbsp; Frey</i>, Glesener, Gligoroski, Gönül, Goulet, Gross, Henry, Hornhues, Hovhannisyan, Hrebenciuc, <i>Iwinski, Judd</i>, Karpov,&nbsp;<i>Kautto,</i> Klich, Koçi, Kostenko, Lloyd <i>(alternate: Chapman)</i>, Loutfi, Margelov, <i>Martinez-Casan</i>, Medeiros Ferreira, Mignon <i>(alternate: Loncle)</i>, <i>Mutman,</i> Naudi Mora, <i>Neguta,&nbsp;Nemeth</i>, Oliynyk, Ouzky, <i>Paegle</i>, Pangalos, Pourgourides, Prentice, Prisacaru, <i>de&nbsp;Puig, Ragnarsdottir</i>, Ranieri <i>(alternate: de Zulueta)</i>, <i>Rogozin,</i> Schloten, <i>Severinsen</i>, Tabajdi, Timmermans, <i>Toshev, Turjacanin</i>, Vakilov, Vella, Volpirani, Voog <i>(alternate: Klaar)</i>, Weiss, <i>Wielowieyski, Wohlwend, Wurm</i>, Yarygina, Zacchera, Ziuganov <i>(alternate: Slutzky)</i>, <i>Zhvania</i> </p>

<p align="justify"><i>N.B.  The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics </i></p>

<p align="justify"><i>Secretaries of the committee</i>: Mr Perin,  Mr Chevtchenko, Mr Dossow, Ms&nbsp;Entzminger, Ms Alleon</p>
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