Doc. 9684 revised

31 January 2003

Marine pollution

Report

Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs

Rapporteur: Mr Daniel Goulet, France, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group

Summary:

 

The Assembly considers that it is no longer acceptable that disasters with drastic consequences for the environment, like the wreck of the Prestige tanker off the coast of Galicia, in November 2002, still happen.

 

It recalls that it has already put forward proposals for concrete action, aimed at improving the existing international regulations, which, unfortunately, are not always observed. New rules must be formulated, but it is essential that existing ones be applied first.

 

I.       Draft resolution

1.        Three years after the Erika accident and its drastic consequences for the environment, the tanker Prestige sank off the coast of Galicia (Spain) with its cargo of 77 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, causing major pollution of the sea and coasts.

 

2.        The Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Regional and Local Affairs, whose delegation visited Galicia on 17 and 18 January 2003 and made a direct appraisal of the situation in the region most stricken by the effects of the Prestige sinking, was dismayed to realise the extent of the ill-effects on the environment and socio-economic position.

 

3.       The Assembly expresses its solidarity with the worst affected regions, in Spain and in France, and hopes that international co-operation relating to the environment will continue and be stepped up in future.

4.        Subsequently, maritime accidents certainly no less tragic and intolerable, though with less far-reaching implications for the environment, have happened in the North Sea and the Mediterranean.

 

5.        The Assembly considers it no longer acceptable merely to express regret over such disasters, and that rather it is indispensable for states and the international community to act without delay in order that the risk of these accidents, and their consequences, may be reduced to a minimum. For this purpose, it emphasises that clear regulations exist and must be applied, and that new rules must be formulated if need be.

6.        The Assembly recalls that it has already put forward definite proposals for action, particularly following the Erika accident, in its Resolution 1229 (2000) on accidents causing damage to the environment and in its Resolution 1295 (2002) on the state of the environment of the Baltic Sea.

 

7.        The Assembly invites the governments of the Council of Europe member states to implement without delay the measures advocated by itself, the European Union and many competent international organisations, in order to improve the safety of maritime transports and drastically reduce all marine pollution.

 

8.        It particularly emphasises the need, first and foremost:

 

i. to speed up the scrapping of potentially dangerous single-hulled vessels;

 

ii. to widen the shipping lanes whose narrowness encourages collisions of ships, while ensuring this does not impede access to fisheries for fishing boats, and make control of sea traffic more stringent;

 

iii. to identify an adequate number of shelter areas (ports or bays) so that ships in distress may quickly take shelter there, in order to contain the risks of pollution;

 

iv. to provide existing harbours with infrastructures for receiving vessels in distress and with adequate means of intervention for these vessels, and compel the authorities concerned to accept them at any time;

 

v. to lay down a procedure for ships in distress and the authorities concerned to follow;

 

vi. to identify plainly the respective and/or joint liability of all intervening parties, whether those owning, fitting out or chartering ships, the classification companies and insurers, the crews, the authorities concerned, etc.;

 

vii. to make use of detection and monitoring methods which make it possible to identify and to impose severe penalties for cases of intentional hydrocarbon pollution resulting from degassing and ballast discharge operations;

ix. to ensure that the European Maritime Safety Agency functions properly by granting it the requisite means to become fully operational;

 

x. to take care that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is amended to afford coastal states better protection against the risks associated with the transit of dangerous shipping, particularly by moving it further from the coasts;

xi. to take care that all measures taken at European level are supported within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) so that they are included in the international rules drawn up by that organisation;

9.       The Assembly invites the governments and the national parliaments of the member States that have not yet signed and ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172, 1998) to do so.

10.       The Assembly undertakes to keep this subject under examination, together with the methods and actions which it might deploy to aid the implementation of a more certain and effective European maritime policy, and to give its full support to the European and international organisations working towards this goal.

II.       Explanatory memorandum by Mr Goulet

1.       On 13 November 2002 the tanker Prestige, belonging to a Greek shipowner, carrying a Russian cargo and flying the Bahaman flag, signalled Mayday off Cape Finisterre (Galicia, Spain). It was listing badly and asked for the crew to be taken off; they were promptly winched to safety by helicopter. The vessel was no longer under control and was drifting at the mercy of the weather and the waves.

2.       On 19 November it broke in two while being towed further out to sea by tugs in an effort to limit damage along the shores of Galicia, a region that derives the bulk of its earnings from fisheries and tourism. The wreck now lies at a depth of 3 500 metres, 270 km from the Galician coastline.

3.       The decision to move the stricken tanker away from the coast has been a subject of controversy. According to the ship’s captain and other expert sources, it would have been much wiser to admit it to a small harbour or a natural inlet so that the geographical extent of the damage could be limited while assisting operations to salvage the oil on board. The authorities say that, according to the opinion of experts, the meteorological conditions, the configuration of the land (natural and engineered), the always changing and impossible to assert condition of the tanker and the technical apparatus available at the time did not admit of such an operation.

4.       The Prestige was carrying 77 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. 4 000 tonnes were spilled before the ship sank, and an additional 6 000 tonnes were released at the moment when it broke up. The quantities of fuel oil in the sea have nevertheless been a matter of dispute: 11 000 tonnes in all, the Spanish authorities stated at the end of November; 20 000 tonnes according to the claims of the ecological associations. Madrid subsequently acknowledged oil seepage from the wreck (about 125 tonnes per day according to an official statement issued on 11 December) and the Spanish, French and Portuguese coasts have been more or less significantly affected. Some 27 300 tonnes of fuel oil and residues had already been recovered at sea and on the shores of Galicia up to 14 December. It has since been possible to have several rents in the tanker’s hull plugged by the special-purpose French submarine Nautile, but on 13 January there were still 80 tonnes leaking from the wreck daily.

5.       In 1999 the same dispute had arisen in France at the sinking of the Erika. The authorities then estimated at 10 000 tonnes the amount of payload released from the Erika when it broke open. Today the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund estimates that in fact 19 800 tonnes were spilled.

6.       The comparative insignificance of these tonnages (the Amoco Cadiz lost 220 000 tonnes in 1978) is deceptive. The fuel oil from the Prestige, similar to the Erika’s according to the French experts at Cedre, the centre for documentation, research and experimentation on accidental water pollution, does not evaporate as do more volatile fractions of petroleum.

7.       It is a heavy fuel oil substantially consisting of aromatic hydrocarbons and in particular polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), whose toxicity, especially in the long term, is well known: they are carcinogenic. This product is used for industrial combustion (thermal power plants, furnaces, cement works) and to fuel merchant ships powered by slow-revving, high-yield diesel engines. Heavy fuel oils are the leftovers from the distillation of crude oils. The fuel oil carried by the Prestige is highly viscous and deemed insoluble. This sticky substance is emulsified in sea water which inflates its volume and allows it to remain suspended in mid-water, invisible until it reaches shore.

8.       As to the fuel oil remaining in the holds of the tanker, some experts think it might solidify on the sea bed of the area and become stabilised owing to the pressure and low temperature (2.4 °C) of the water which prevail at extreme depths. Others think that it will spread and form slicks. In any case, there is a lack of knowledge and of a standardised approach for predicting the behaviour of such pollutants under such conditions and for minimising the environmental risks.

9.       Fuel oil has known environmental effects: when deposited on the sea bed, it destroys corals, fish and crustaceans; washed up on the beaches, it devastates animal life (according to a report the ecological organisation SEO/Birdlife, after the Prestige accident up to 16 January 2003 13.221 oil-soaked birds of 62 species – some threatened – had been picked up; these are thought to represent only 10-20 % of the total number of birds affected, ie about 130.000 individuals) and jeopardises tourism for many years. Fishing, an essential activity for the coastal population, must suffer severely, first of all as a result of the immediate drop in demand then thanks to the loss of market shares which are hard to regain. The socio-economic features of the coastal areas are lastingly impaired

10.       Built in 1976, the Prestige was one of the oldest tankers still in commission. It was a single-hulled tanker, not double-hulled as stipulated by the new regulations. It was last inspected in 1999.

11.       Its sinking will go down in history as the third great black tide borne by Galicia, after the spills from the Urquiola (1976) and Aegean Sea (1992). It is also the third heavy fuel oil incident in European waters in under 4 years, following those caused by the Erika (1999) and the Baltic Carrier (2001).

12.       Since the loss of the Prestige, there have been other maritime accidents, fortunately without such disastrous consequences for the environment. On 14 December 2002, the Tricolor, carrying 2 862 new cars, collided with the Kariba and went down in the North Sea 35 km from Dunkirk in a thirty metres deep zone. The next day, the wreck was struck by a cargo ship, the Nicola, which was able to get clear without sustaining major damage. On 1 January 2003, the Turkish tanker Vicky, laden with 66 000 tonnes of kerosene and diesel fuel, again hit the wreck of the Tricolor. Here too the damage was limited, and a further ecological catastrophe was narrowly averted.

13.       In none of the accidents itemised above was there any loss of life (“miraculously indeed”, according to a representative of the French National Marine Rescue Company, the SNSM, in the loss of the Tricolor which had a crew of 24). However, it can never be over-emphasised that the safety of seamen should receive greater attention.

14.       On 21 January, the single-hulled vessel Spabunker IV, with 900 tonnes of fuel oil and 100 tonnes of diesel oil on board, sank in the Mediterranean in the small Bay of Algeciras adjacent to Gibraltar. The shell of the 12 year old tanker lies 50 metres deep and to date the environmental implications are still hard to quantify. Alas, the ship’s captain died as a result of the mishap.

15.       The most spectacular and thus most notorious spills are those caused by accidents at sea. Yet we ought not to forget the cases of deliberate marine pollution by hydrocarbons, commonly referred to as “degassing” (discharges of used lubricating oil and fuel residues from ships’ engines). A recent study made by the World Wildlife Fund gives a figure of between 700 000 and 1 500 000 tonnes for annual hydrocarbon spills in the Mediterranean alone, to which are added approximately 500 000 tonnes of “conventional ballast discharges” (sea water mixed with oil, originating from the cargo tanks of tanker vessels). These figures equate to 75 Erikas per year in aggregate.

 

16.       This pollution, made up of discharges of used lubricating oil and fuel residues generated by ships’ engines, is the largest in quantity. Furthermore, it is predictable, calculable and fully controllable, hence avoidable.

17.       Furthermore, oil tankers are not the only dangerous vessels; there are also the chemical carriers and the bulk transporters. In fact, in November 2000, the chemical carrier Ievoli Sun sank off the coast of Normandy with its cargo of about 4 000 tonnes of styrene, 1 000 tonnes of methyl ethyl keton and 1 000 tonnes of isopropanol. In March 2001 the chemical tanker Balu sank in the Bay of Biscay with its cargo of 8 000 tonnes of sulphuric acid.

18.        The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has already adopted around 40 conventions and protocols and over 800 collections of rules, codes and recommendations relating to maritime safety, the prevention of pollution and other associated matters.

19.       The Parliamentary Assembly welcomes the recent decision by the Council of the European Union to deny entry to Community ports to single-hulled tankers carrying heavy fuel oil, but regrets that another disaster had to occur in order to bring about this decision. It wants a suitable package of coherent measures to be applied, at least in the context of the “Europe of the 44”, to prevent the recurrence of such dramatic events.

20.       The Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs has already reacted to the disaster caused by sinking of the Prestige in its Declaration of 26 November 2002 on the urgent need to speed up action to prevent marine pollution (Appendix 1). Recalling Resolution 1229 (2000) on accidents causing damage to the environment (Appendix 2), the Committee expressed its dissatisfaction with the slow progress made in implementing the recommendations adopted by the Assembly two years earlier.

21.       A delegation of the Committee visited Galicia on 17 and 18 January 2003 to make a direct appraisal of the situation on the spot and hear the Spanish authorities (Appendix 3: programme of the visit).

22.       On 17 January the delegation went to the Maritime Traffic Control Tower at La Coruña, which has the task of dispatching and organising the whole of the operations. While there, it was acquainted with the technical and human resources deployed to date and with the position regarding the coastal cleanup operations. Members spoke with representatives of the Commissioner recently appointed by the Spanish Government to co-ordinate the action. The delegation could notice the high degree of coordination between the state and regional administration, the Navy, the Army and the associations of fishermen, under the supervision of the Spanish government’ commissioner.

23. The delegation could notice the big improvement achieved in the environment thanks to the enormous cleaning task accomplished.

24.       Also on that day, the delegation had an encounter with the Galician Regional Government officials responsible for the environment and the management of natural resources.

25.       On 18 January the delegation went to the Fisterra municipality where it met representatives of the fishermen’s guilds and the local authorities. It had talks with them and took note of their feelings about the disaster and their proposals regarding the urgent action required, not only under a preventive policy but also to make good the damage done by the disaster to the region’s chief economic activities, viz. fishing and tourism.

26.       On the same day the delegation met volunteers assigned to the Fisterra scene of operations and specifically a delegation from the Canary Islands. This highlighted the extraordinary movement of solidarity which grew up at national and international level, including in particular French and Portuguese authorities, following the catastrophe. Thousands of people are regularly arriving on the scene to offer their services and thereby help clean up the region stricken by this oil spill. The Spanish Army and Navy are equally exercising an extraordinary task.

27.       The Committee has taken note of the measures which need to be applied as a priority and without delay at all levels concerned, and specifies these measures in the draft resolution which will be put to the Parliamentary Assembly following the urgent procedure debate.

28.       In this respect, it has expressed the hope that the Council of Europe will prepare an audiovisual document testifying to the state of the environment in the regions affected, reporting on the work done and drawing conclusions about the best practical ways of combating this kind of disaster.

APPENDIX 1

Prestige disaster – urgent need to speed up action to prevent marine pollution

Declaration by the Committee, adopted during its meeting in Paris on 25-26 November 2002

The Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs is deeply concerned by the recent sinking of the Prestige oil tanker, which may become one of the worst oil-related environmental disasters in recent years, and which has caused enormous prejudice to Galicia and the livelihood of its people.

The Liberian-owned, Bahamian-flagged Prestige spilled around 20 000 tonnes of its highly toxic cargo, causing a more then 120-kilometre slick that has contaminated much of Galicia’s coast and rich fishery, and subsequently sank taking another 50 000 tons of viscous fuel oil to the sea floor some 130 nautical miles off the coast. More than 7 000 fishermen have been thrown out of work, some 28 000 related businesses affected, seabirds have been coated in oil and shellfish production destroyed.

The committee is alarmed by the possibility of long-term pollution from hydrocarbons. Even if low temperatures and high pressures at the seabed prevent the fuel oil from reaching the surface as a slick, slow release of the oil beneath the sea over time is likely to have a negative impact. Hydrocarbon molecules, which are thought to be carcinogenic and affect human hormones, could enter the food chain, contaminating fish and mammals for years to come.

It is deplorable that ten years after the Aegean Sea disaster in the same region, causing 30 000 tonnes of oil to spill at the mouth of the Galician port of Coruña, and three years after the sinking of the Erika oil tanker off the French Brittany coast, resulting in severe damage to fauna, flora, fisheries and tourism along a 400-kilometre stretch of coastline, no effective measures have been put in place to prevent such disasters occuring again.

In the 20th century, more than 200 petrol tankers have sunk - many of these resulting in ecological disasters. On any given day, it is believed more than 6 000 tankers are at sea, some of them in a dangerous condition.

The sinking of the Prestige highlights once again the problems indicated by the Assembly in its Resolution 1229 (2000) on accidents causing damage to the environment, adopted on 29 September 2002, concerning the regulation of maritime transport of oil and petrol.

The inadequacy of the inspection system for seafaring vessels and the lack of enforcement of international shipping laws can be blamed for contributing to this major accident, which has shown yet again how half-hearted the various parties concerned are in their commitment to the environment.

In the light of this disaster, the committee expresses its dissatisfaction with the slow progress made in implementing the Assembly’s recommendations from two years ago. Despite the stated intention of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to raise standards of international shipping safety and pollution-prevention, international maritime law enforcement has become increasingly difficult as companies and ship-owners cut costs by registering their vessels in tax-havens and hiring cheap, but often poorly-trained, crews. 

Following the Erika incident, the European Commission decided to accelerate the phasing-out of ageing, single-hulled vessels. However, this has now been blocked until the year 2015. Plans to set up a European Maritime Safety Agency or “coastguard” to enforce effective safety inspections have also been put on hold. Its noble objectives have got bogged down by a dispute over where to locate it.

The committee welcomes international solidarity and co-operation with the affected region and expresses the hope that growing concern about the environment will increase such international co-operation in the future.

In the light of the above, the committee calls on:

a.       governments worldwide to take urgent and firm action to adhere to IMO conventions on the Safety of Life at Sea and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, to raise international shipping safety standards, and to review and improve ship maintenance and crew training. This must include more careful consideration of the routes that ships carrying dangerous or toxic materials are permitted to take as well as complete transparency regarding the nature of the cargoes being conveyed.

b.       the European Commission to speed up the enforcement of new inspection rules, to bring forward as a matter of urgency the date for a ban on single-hulled vessels to come into force, and in the meantime to establish an agreement allowing European ports to prohibit single-hulled ships from entering, trading or being serviced. It should also speed up the establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency.

c.       member state governments to undertake a comprehensive risk assessment of their coastlines to identify areas which are particularly sensitive and vulnerable to shipping disasters. These areas should be designated as IMO Particularly Sensitive Seas Area (PSSAs) and be subject to measures such as a ban on single-hulled vessels, the designation of areas to be avoided or requiring ships to take recommended routes,. Other measures could include requiring ships to have an experienced pilot on board when passing through these areas, mandatory reporting of transit, restrictions on vessels with a poor safety track record, or the banning of ships flying “flags of convenience”.

d.       the relevant authorities to draw up international regulations requiring full liability for environmental damage and restoration and liability for losses to the economy as a result of damage to local livelihoods. The committee believes it important that governments  and national parliaments should enforce the “polluter pays” principle in their legislation and encourages them to sign and ratify:

These legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe have still not come into force owing to the government’s lack of any real commitment.

e.       member state governments and European institutions to provide assistance to Spain, France and Portugal, and in particular the affected region of Galicia, to inspect the sea-bottom to monitor the state of pollution in the long term.

The committee deplores the negligence of governments and their lack of any real determination to provide themselves with the means of preventing such disasters – or at least minimising their impact. The committee therefore recalls in particular the opportunities offered by the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement of the Council of Europe, which is a suitable platform for co-operation for the whole of Europe in the field of major natural and technological disasters.

The committee also believes that the full environmental damage of the Prestige incident, including damage to marine and coastal habitats as well as bird populations and local livelihoods, must be comprehensively assessed and full financial compensation paid.

APPENDIX 2



APPENDIX 3

Delegation of the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs

Visit to Galicia, 17 and 18 January 2003

Programme

17 January

5 pm       Arrival of the delegation at La Coruña Airport

5.30 pm       Tour of the installations and explanations concerning various aspects of the “Prestige” affair

7 pm       Transfer to Santiago de Compostela and accommodation in the Hostal de los Reyes Católicos

9.30 pm       Dinner at the “Calderón” restaurant

18 January

8.30 am       Departure for the municipality of Finisterre (Fisterra)

10.15 am       Arrival and transfer to the headquarters of the Professional Association of Fishers

1.30 pm       Visit to other parts of the coast before returning to Santiago de Compostela

Persons met

Mr César MANTECON, Adviser to the 1st Vice-President of the Government, representing the Government Commissioner

Mr José Luis ROSELLO, Special Ambassador for environmental issues

Mr Miguel BELTRAN, Vice Admiral, private secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence

Mr Javier GARATE, Director of SASEMAR (maritime rescue and safety society)

Mr Ricardo BABIO, Ministry of the Environment official responsible for the La Coruña coastal zone

Mr Aníbal CARRILLO, Head of the SASEMAR co-ordination centre in Las Palmas

Mr Francisco GARCIA BOBADILLA, Director General of Nature Conservation, regional Ministry of the Environment

Mr Francisco SANCHEZ, Head of the Provincial Nature Conservation Department, Province of La Coruña

Mr José TRABA FERNANDEZ, Mayor of Fisterra, Mr Leoncio OLVEIRA, Deputy Mayor, Mr Ramón REDONDO, Deputy Mayor, Mr José Manuel MARTINEZ ESCURIS, President (Patrón Mayor) of the fishermen of Finisterre, Mr Evaristo LAREO, President of the Association of Fishermen, Mr Marcial SAR, Shipowner, MM. Juan Bautista RODRIGUEZ and Juan Bautista LOUZAN, shellfish farmers, Mr Román RODRIGUEZ, President of the Canary Islands, accompanied by a group of volunteers from that region.

Other representatives of the sectors affected by the disaster

During the visit to Galicia, the delegation was accompanied by Mr Manuel MORAN GARCIA, Deputy Director General for Relations with the European Union of the “Xunta de Galicia” General Secretariat for Relations with the EU and Foreign Relations.

Composition of the delegation

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Reporting committee: Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs

Reference to committee: Request for urgent procedure and Reference No. 2787 of 27 January 2003

Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 28 January 2003

Members of the committee: Mr Martinez Casañ (Chairman), Mr Meale, Mr Gubert, Mr Schmied (Vice-Chairmen), MM. Açikgöz, Agius, Mrs Agudo, MM. Akselsen, Andov (Alternate: Nasufi), Annemans, Ates, Blaauw, Çavusoglu, Sir Sydney Chapman, Mr Churkin, Mrs Ciemniak, MM. Cosarciuc, Deittert, Delattre, Dokle, Duka-Zolyomi, Ekes, Etherington, Frunda, Giovanelli (Alternate: Nessa), Gonzalez de Txabarri, (Alternate: Fernandez Aguilar), Götz, Graas, Grabowski, Grachev, Grissemann (Alternate: Donabauer), Ms Hajiyeva, Mr Haraldsson, Mrs Herczog, MM. Hladiy, Högmark, Ilascu, Mrs Jäger, Mr Juric, Mrs Kanelli (Alternate: Mr Pavlidis), Mr Kharitonov, Lord Kilclooney (Alternate: Mr O’Hara), MM. Klympush, Lachat, Libicki, Lobkowicz, Loncle (Alternate: Lengagne), van der Linden, Manukyan, Masseret, Mauro, Mrs Mesquita, MM. Meyer (Alternate: Goulet), Mincevic, Nazaré Pereira, Mrs Ohlsson, MM. Podeschi, Oliverio, Podobnik, Popov (Alternate: Sudarenkov), Rafaj (Alternate: Maštàlka), Salaridze, Ms Schicker, MM. Sfyriou, Steenblock, Ms Stoejberg, Mr Stoica, Ms Stoyanova, MM. Tabajdi, Theodorou, Timmermans, Tiuri, Truu, Vakilov, Velikov, Wright, Zhevago,

N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretariat of the committee: Mrs Cagnolati, Mr Sixto, Mr Torcătoriu and Ms Odrats.