Doc. 9687

28 January 2003

Evaluation of the prospects
for a political solution of
the conflict in the Chechen Republic

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Lord Judd, United Kingdom, Socialist Group

Summary:

The economic and human cost of the conflict in the Chechen Republic continues to be intolerably high for the people of the Republic and for the people of Russia. A real lasting solution to the Chechen conflict will have a positive message with immense significance about the potential for building peace through reconciliation across the world. A failure will play into the hands of the dangerous forces of relentless extremism.

The human rights and humanitarian issues are central to the prospects and viability of any settlement if it is not to prove phyrric. The growing recognition of the indispensability of a political solution is important. However, before any referendum takes place conditions must be fulfilled such as proper information and transparency, and constitutional proposals must be the logical outcome of a “realistic” political process.

I.       Draft Resolution

1. The Assembly recalls that, as expressed in its Opinion No. 193 (1996) on Russia’s request for membership of the Council of Europe, the Chechen conflict cannot be resolved by the use of force and there will be no peace in the region, nor an end to terrorist attacks, without a political solution based on negotiation and on European democratic values. The absence of such a political solution has for too long been a painful and cruel experience for the people of the Chechen Republic and for the people of Russia as a whole. The Council of Europe cannot be what it claims to be while this grave situation continues. We are all diminished.

2. The Assembly notes the statement by the State Duma of the Russian Federation of 24 December 2002, which proposes 2003 as a year of peace and national accord and which calls for the rebuilding of the Chechen Republic and for a comprehensive political settlement. The Assembly also notes the recent statements made by the President of the Russian Federation in favour of moving from military operations to a political process.

3. Strongly deploring the loss of lives in the latest terrorist acts in Moscow and Grozny, the Assembly reiterates that the political process must not be abandoned. It believes that anything other than an unremitting commitment to the rule of law, human rights and humanitarianism which are central to the purpose of the Council of Europe would be both wrong and counterproductive.

4. With regard to the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic, the Assembly remains distressed by the number of killings of politically active individuals, by repeated disappearances and the ineffectiveness of the authorities in investigating them, as well as by the widespread allegations and indications of brutality and violence against the civilian population in the Republic.

5. Therefore, the Assembly calls upon the competent authorities of the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic to ensure:

6. The Assembly notes the intention of the Russian federal and Chechen authorities to hold a referendum on a draft constitution for the Chechen Republic on 23 March 2003. While recognising the role of a referendum in deciding the future democratic structure and constitution of the Republic the Assembly believes that the necessary conditions for holding such a referendum cannot be met by this date. The Assembly, therefore, calls upon the competent authorities to postpone the referendum and to take the essential steps to achieve such conditions, in particular:

7. The Assembly welcomes the pledge of the President of Ingushetia to allow all internally displaced people from the Chechen Republic to stay in Ingushetia and to recognise the right of those who wish to do so to take up residence in Ingushetia. Therefore, the Assembly calls upon the Russian Federal Migration Service and other competent authorities never to use direct or indirect force or undue pressure of any kind to coerce displaced people to return to the Chechen Republic against their will. The Assembly reaffirms that coercion is a breach of fundamental rights and believes that it will aggravate instability.

8. The Assembly calls upon the competent authorities of the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic together with the European and wider international community urgently to draw up a coordinated collaborative plan of action for reconstruction and humanitarian aid and ensure the fair, proper and transparent use of such aid. The Assembly stresses the importance of free access of humanitarian agencies to the Chechen Republic and calls upon all such relevant agencies to consider what contribution they should make.

9.       The Assembly calls on those within the Chechen Republic, who have taken up arms against the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, to lay down their arms and commit themselves to a serious political process; it also calls on them to distance themselves convincingly from terrorist acts and other crimes committed as part of the conflict in the Chechen Republic; it further calls for the immediate release of all kidnapped people. The Assembly reiterates that violence has no part in the cause of a political solution in the interests of all the people of the Chechen Republic.

II.       Draft Recommendation

1.       The Assembly refers to its Resolution ... concerning the evaluation of the prospects for a political solution of the conflict n the Chechen Republic.

2.       The Assembly requests the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to increase its practical assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic in all relevant spheres including the rule of law, human rights, the functioning of democracy, cultural cooperation and humanitarian priorities; it further requests the Committee of Ministers in response to any specific and convincing requests to provide appropriate support for the Consultative Council and other relevant political, social and youth organisations; it also requests the Committee of Ministers together with Mr Sultygov, the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, to consider ways in which the work of the Council of Europe experts could be still more effective.

3.       The Assembly calls upon the Committee of Ministers to take urgent steps to bring this Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to the attention of the Government of the Russian Federation and to press for expeditious action on all its recommendations.

III.       Draft Order

1.       The Assembly refers to its Resolution ... and Recommendation … concerning the evaluation of the prospects for a political solution of the conflict in the Chechen Republic.

2.       The Assembly requests the Political Affairs Committee, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human and Rights and the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography together with their rapporteurs on its behalf to maintain their direct concern and active involvement in the issues surrounding the future of the Chechen Republic. In particular, it requests them to consider ways in which they can assist in encouraging an effective European and international humanitarian response and in providing a forum for wider dialogue towards a political solution.

IV.       Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur

A.       Background

Global Significance

1.       Why should a conflict in one small part of Russia so preoccupy us? And why should we in the PACE have felt so frustrated that our governments have not given it the priority we believe it deserves? For the people of the Chechen Republic the long saga has been a cruel disaster. For the people of Russia as a whole, not least the families of servicemen, it has been a painful cancer which could spread. The Council of Europe cannot be what it claims to be while such a grave situation exists within its midst. We are all diminished. But what of the fight for global stability? A real lasting solution to the Chechen conflict will have a positive message with immense significance about the potential for building peace through reconciliation across the world. A failure will play into the hands of the dangerous forces of relentless extremism. As moderates become undermined and isolated, failure could accelerate the advent of a new world wide Dark Age of confrontation between Islamic peoples dominated by extremists and non-Islamic peoples dominated by increasingly intransigent leadership. That our governments must never allow to happen. The Chechen Republic should always be high on their agendas of mutual concern with the Russian government.

A Fundamental Principle

2.       The economic and human cost of the conflict in the Chechen Republic continues to be intolerably high for the people of the Republic and for the people of Russia. My conviction remains as strong as ever that the way forward and the solution can only be found by the Chechens and the people of Russia themselves. As deeply anxious and concerned friends, the rest of us in the PACE are there to assist and constructively comment. But a solution to be a solution must be “theirs” not “ours” although, hopefully, it will be one which as fellow members of the PACE we shall all feel able to endorse and to help guarantee.

The Context for a Political Solution

3.       The growing recognition of the indispensability of a political solution is important. However, before any referendum takes place constitutional proposals must be the logical outcome of what is agreed as necessary in a “realistic” political process. There must be a widespread sense of ownership. “Realistic” means demonstrably inclusive. What is also inescapable is the need for an overall strategy covering effective but just security, fair administration of justice, human rights, pluralist and free media, reliable information, freedom of movement, freedom of association, the role of NGOs, and the preparation of a convincing franchise. There is also the question of how Chechens, who are not resident within the Chechen Republic, can be meaningfully involved. Context will be crucial to success.

4.       Several draft constitutions have been prepared by different groups and the Constitutional Commission of the Chechen Republic has produced a composite text which has been forwarded to the Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In his covering letter of 14 January 2003, Mr Kadyrov, Head of Administration of the Chechen Republic, wrote “ I ask you to provide assistance in the expertise of the Draft on the issue of its conformity with the democratic values of Europe” (See Appendix I). However, it is far from evident just how many people have been involved in the process, how representative they were and to whom they were accountable. In its first clause the text is explicit. It reads as follows:

“We, the multinational people of the Chechen Republic, recognising our historic responsibility for the establishment of the social order and accord in the Chechen Republic, striving to protect human rights and liberties as the supreme value and strengthen democratic foundations of the society, guided by the generally-recognised principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, based on the responsibility for the past, present and future of our society and nation, affirming our historical unity with Russia and its multinational people, reaffirming the best traditions of the peoples of the Chechen Republic and the entire Russian Federation, honouring the memory of our ancestors, who have given us our love and respect for the Fatherland, our belief in good and fairness, hereby proclaim and adopt this Constitution of the Chechen Republic.”

The words “affirming our historical unity with Russia and its multi-national people” are obviously significant.

5.       Work has also been undertaken on preparing a register of voters, but, again, the credibility of this register is hard to establish. There remain questions about the number of military entitled to vote and also about the arrangements for Chechen citizens resident outside the Republic to vote. Complaints were made to me that the census on which the register was based was not comprehensive and that, for example, some neighbourhoods had gone unregistered.

6.       While there has been limited coverage of the plan for the referendum in the media many people still remain uninformed about the contents of the proposed constitution. Indeed, in the two IDP camps in Ingushetia which we visited my colleagues and I could detect nobody who had either seen a copy of a draft constitution or who had been involved in any kind of discussion about what it contained or entailed.

7.       It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the contextual priorities which are essential for a valid referendum have yet to be convincingly addressed.

8.       The central element for any successful outcome will necessitate a combination of the cultural and political identity of the Chechen people, including their meaningful self-governance, with the preservation of the integrity and security of the Russian Federation. That is why it is imperative to prepare the ground well with a process which involves a convincing cross-section of the Chechen people and as many of the key players as possible.

The Chechen Fighters

9.       I detect at least three elements amongst the fighters in the Chechen Republic. (The reality is certainly even more complex.) There are the extremists, largely indistinguishable in their motivation, if not essentially part of, Al Quaida. There are the criminals and opportunists with a vested interest in the war because of what they can materially gain from it. There are the “political” players who, however misguided or unjustified in having done so, (and that can obviously be argued either way) have taken to arms in desperation to seek a political and cultural identity for the Chechen people whom they perceive as unbearably humiliated and oppressed. The differences between these elements are not always clear-cut. At times there is overlapping. The “political” element must constantly feel the extremist element breathing down its neck and setting an uncompromising pace. A further complication in the situation is that some of the factional fighting may well have more to do with internal Chechen conflicts than with conflicts between the Chechen people and the rest of the Russian Federation. Corruption is rampant and all pervasive. It is not limited to any one side in the conflict.

10.       If any settlement and lasting peace are to prevail it is essential to win as many of the fighters as possible back into the political process and to avoid driving them into the arms of the extremists. Those extremists have no interest whatsoever in any objective which most of us would recognise as an acceptable political outcome. If the leadership of the “political” element amongst the fighters speaks out categorically to condemn and dissociate itself from events like those in Moscow in October and Grozny in December (See Appendix II), and if it makes plain its willingness to renounce violence and to join a political process which is recognised by the Council of Europe, that same leadership should feel able to look to the moral protection and encouragement of the Parliamentary Assembly.

11.       In this context, I must make reference to Mr Zakayev. I do not know what he has done or not done. I am not legally qualified to pronounce on whether he is or is not covered by any amnesty. What I can say is that, of those associated with the Chechen fighters with whom I have met and spoken, it is with him that I have been able to have some of the most intelligent discussions about the

global realities as they affect the people of the Chechen Republic and about the need for a political settlement. His removal at this stage from even tentative steps towards engagement in a political settlement does not seem to me self-evidently to help.

12.       My argument about the importance of striving to win the “political” element of the fighters back into a political process is, I believe, strengthened by experience in the Middle East and Ireland. Of course, the situation in the Chechen Republic is different from that in both places, but there are lessons from which to learn. In Ireland, whatever the setbacks, it has been recognised that the peace net has to be cast wide. In the Middle East it has never, in my view, yet been cast wide enough.

Recent terrorist action

13.       Nothing can justify either the cold blooded taking of innocent hostages in the Moscow theatre last October or the indiscriminate and ruthless attack on the offices of the administration of the Chechen Republic in Grozny in December. Both events were a grave violation of everything for which the Council of Europe stands. They must be unreservedly condemned. All those responsible should be brought to justice. Our thoughts and sympathies will continue to be with the victims, their families and friends.

14.       It seems clear that those who cynically planned these atrocities, whoever they are, have no interest in a political process towards a peaceful, viable and enduring solution to the conflict. It is difficult to believe that both events were not directly in response to the initiatives which were seen to be developing towards such a political process. It is therefore essential that the PACE does everything possible to support the President, government and all those with relevant responsibilities in Russia in refusing to be diverted from their expressed commitment to a political solution. This commitment was of course underlined by the President himself in his significant meeting with the President and Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 November 2002. It is precisely at a time of such calculated provocation that the need to demonstrate a transparent commitment to the values of the Council of Europe becomes more important than ever. Any temptation to take over-simplified, indiscriminate and disproportionate retaliatory action would be wrong and would play straight into the hands of the manipulating extremists. The objective of the extremists is to destroy the credibility of the language of human rights, the rule of law, justice, democratically accountable government and the rest. They must be denied the fulfilment of that objective. There really is a battle for hearts and minds!

The Relationship of Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues to a Political Solution

15.       If hearts and minds are to be won, and if a sufficiently sound basis is to be established for a political settlement, the evenhandedness of the Russian administration is a critical factor. The human rights and humanitarian issues are central to the prospects and viability of any settlement if it is not to prove phyrric. They are not separate issues. That is why the stand of the PACE and the recommendations repeatedly endorsed by the Assembly have been and remain as valid as ever.

16.       The abuse of human rights clearly remains widespread and disturbing. Reports of disappearances and allegations of unlawful action, abuse and killing by disguised military personnel are too numerous and well documented by organisations like Memorial to be dismissed. It is difficult to assess how far such action is part of a covert security policy or how far it is undertaken by personnel on their own initiative. What is beyond doubt is that intimidation remains real. The rate and scope both of the investigations and also of the legal action taken against those identified as suspects is still totally inadequate (See Appendix III). My colleague, Rudolph Bindig will undoubtedly have more to say on this.

Economic and Social Reconstruction

17.       Political stability is inevitably related to economic and social stability. The economy of the Chechen Republic is shattered. The humanitarian condition of people in the Republic and of the displaced remains grim. Apart from what decency demands, in their preoccupation with the stand

against international terrorism the governments of Europe and of the international community would be unwise to ignore the urgent part they must play, together with the Russian government, in rebuilding the Chechen Republic. On this my colleague Tadeusz Iwinski will certainly have more to say.

B.       Visit to Moscow, Grozny and Nazran from 20 to 24 January 2002

18.       As agreed by the respective committees, I participated in a mission to Moscow, Grozny and Nazran (Ingushetia) from 20 to 24 January 2003 (See Appendix IV) as Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee on the conflict in the Chechen Republic and was accompanied by my colleagues Rudolf Bindig as Rapporteur responsible for preparing a draft opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and by Tadeusz Iwinski as Rapporteur responsible for preparing a draft opinion of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. The questions in my memorandum discussed at the meeting of the Political Affairs Committee in Paris on 15 January 2003 (See Appendix V) were pursued with those I met.

19.       I must put on record my appreciation of the tireless hard work by our colleague, Leonid Slutsky, in endeavouring to ensure that the mission was able to do all it wanted to do. He generously accompanied us throughout our visit. The Secretariat of the Russian State Duma also made an invaluable contribution. Special thanks are due to Rüdiger Dossow who was the only member of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Secretariat allocated to travel with the mission. In a demanding schedule he had to meet all the needs of three rapporteurs and attend to all the administrative demands that inevitably arose. His professionalism, patience and cheerfulness are something special. On the last day we were joined in Moscow by Angus MacDonald of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Press Department, who made a first class job of coordinating media relations. Denise McDonnell who provided support in Strasbourg and who has worked over the weekend until very late on Sunday evening to help prepare this report has my unstinted admiration and gratitude

APPENDIX I

Unofficial translation

Head of the Administration of the Chechen Republic

Mr Bruno HALLER

Secretary General

of the Parliamentary Assembly

of the Council of Europe

Strasbourg

14 January 2003

Dear Secretary General!

      I am forwarding to you the Draft Constitution of the Chechen Republic proposed by the initiative group to the referendum which will take place in March 2003! This Draft of the basic law is a result of collective work of a wide range of experts, public figures and the Constitutional Commission of the Chechen Republic.

      I ask you to provide assistance in the expertise of the Draft on the issue of its conformity with the democratic values of Europe.

      Please accept, Mr Secretary General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Head of the Administration of the Chechen Republic

A. Kadyrov

Appendix: Draft of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic

APPENDIX II

Unofficial translation

Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ch. R. I.

Akhmed Zakayev


N/Ref.: 42

To the Special Rapporteur on Chechnya,

Chairman of the Duma-PACE joint working group

Lord Frank Judd

24th October 2002

Dear Lord Judd,

      I would like to confirm in writing the official view of the leadership of the Ch. R. I., as expressed to you during yesterday morning’s meeting in the UK Parliament.

      The Chechen leadership, under President A. Maskhadov, utterly condemns any action targeted against civilians. We do not accept terrorist methods as the way to solve any problems whatsoever.

      As for yesterday’s hostage-taking in one of Moscow’s theatres by a group of armed people, presumed to be Chechens, we confirm that none of our official institutions are in any way involved with this action.

      We urge both sides, both the armed people in the theatre and the Russian leadership, to find a way out of this grave situation avoiding bloodshed.

(signature)

A. Zakayev

Vice-Prime Minister of the Ch. R. I.,

Special Representative of the President of the Ch. R. I. for negotiations

APPENDIX III

Information on criminal cases

instigated by the prosecutor's office concerning crimes

committed against the civilian population in the Chechen Republic

(during the period from 1 January 2002 to 1 January 2003)

provided by the Secretariat of

the Russian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly

1.       Number of cases instigated by

Since the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation, military prosecutors instigated 162 cases, 97 of which were closed and 57 referred to military courts. 46 servicemen (6 officers out of them) were indicted. During 2002, 23 servicemen were indicted (4 officers out of them).

During the whole period of the counter-terrorist operation, military prosecutors investigated 16 cases on missing persons. 1154 cases were instigated on kidnapped and missing persons (1669 people). 674 investigations were opened.

A criminal case was instigated on 26.06.02 by the Shali prosecutor's office concerning the disappearance of Mr. Imakayev. It was established that on 2 June 2002 an unidentified armed group of people in camouflage arrived on armored vehicles at Novy Atagi of the Shali district, detained Mr Imakayev and left in unidentified direction. The case was referred to the military prosecutor's office and is still under investigation.

2.       During 2002, the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic on the crimes committed by members of police and special forces against the civilian population:

Instigated        -       77 cases

Referred to court       -       7 cases

Suspended       -       37 cases

Referred to military prosecutor's office       -       20 cases

Number of cases under investigation       -       12 cases

Number of cases closed       -       1

3.       During 2002, the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic on the crimes committed by members of illegal armed formations:

Instigated       -       311 cases

Number of cases referred to court       -       29

Number of cases suspended       -       213

Number of cases under investigation       -       69

4.       Current results of the investigations concerning the alleged massacres of civilians:

1)       On 3 May 2000, the criminal case (№ 12038) was instigated on the fact of the discovery of corpses of civilians in Novy Katayama of the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. 28 witnesses were interrogated. On 10 November 2002, the preliminary investigation was suspended because the persons who had committed the crime were not identified. At present, the investigation of the case was resumed and is under investigation.

2)       On 5 March 2000, the criminal case (№ 12011) was instigated on the fact of the execution (shooting) of civilians in Novy Aldy in Grozny. More than 100 witnesses were interrogated. Medical expertise was carried out. On 15 April 2002, the preliminary investigation was suspended because the persons who had committed the crime were not identified. At present the investigation of the case was resumed and is under investigation.

3)       In May-June 2002, 14 criminal cases were instigated by the Shali prosecutor's office on the fact of the appeals of civilians about the disappearance of people as a result of a special operation. Later, one criminal case (№ 59113) was opened and referred to the military prosecutor's office.

APPENDIX IV

Programme of the visit of the Rapporteurs

to Moscow, Grozny and Nazran

(20-24 January 2003)

19 January, Sunday       Arrival in Moscow

20 January, Monday

       Meeting with the First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service

21 January, Tuesday

22 January, Wednesday

23 January, Thursday

24 January, Friday

APPENDIX V

Extract of the Memorandum

presented to the Political Affairs Committee

on 15 January 2003

1.       With Reference to a Political Solution and Democratic Stability

a.       How is the issue of reconciling the demand by the Chechen people for cultural and political identity and meaningful self-governance with the preservation of the integrity and security of the Russian Federation being approached?

b.       What is the state of the political dialogue? Who is involved? How broadly based is it? Where does it take place?

c.       What is the current role of the Public Consultative Council established under the aegis of the Joint Working Group of the PACE and the Russian State Duma? How representative and effective is it? What has happened about the financial support for the Public Consultative Council which the PACE requested the Committee of Ministers to provide? Is the European Commission providing support?

d.       How many proposed draft constitutions are in circulation? What do they contain? By whom were they drafted and on what basis of preparatory consultation? Is there an official governmental draft text already in preparation? If so, when will it be available to the public? Will it be discussed with the Council of Europe?

e.       How far advanced are any plans and arrangements for a referendum? What will be the franchise? What will be the position of Chechens not currently residing within the Republic? How many Chechen people resident in the Chechen Republic have been registered and have received identity cards or passports by the end of 2002? How many Chechens living outside the Republic have been registered and have received identity cards or passports by the end of 2002?

f.       Is the work of the Political Affairs Committee of the PACE on autonomous regions of Europe of relevance?

g.       Is the report prepared by the Council of Europe on a Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters to be implemented?

h.       What is the state of the media in the Chechen Republic? How many media outlets are there? How many are independent of government? How is the media financed?

i.       What is the availability of reliable public information?

j.       What progress is there to freedom of movement in the Chechen Republic?

k.       Is there freedom of association in the Chechen Republic? How many political parties are there? How freely do they operate? (See Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights)

l.       What currently is the part played by genuinely independent NGOs in the Chechen Republic? How many are there?

m.       How can the work of the Council of Europe on programmes and guidelines concerning education for democracy be of use?

n.       IN GENERAL, HOW CAN THE PACE AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE BE OF ASSISTANCE?

2.       With Reference to Public Security and Human Rights

a.       How many cases of missing people have so far been brought to the attention of the law enforcement authorities? How many of them have been processed? In how many cases has the fate of missing people been established?

b.       How effective are now the complaints procedures for registering and dealing with reports of missing people and allegations of abuses of human rights? How can they be strengthened? What is currently the role of the office of the Special Representative, Mr Sultygov, and the Council of Europe “experts”? How could this be strengthened? How effective are they able to be? Could there be a role for the Public Consultative Council established under the aegis of the PACE?

c.       How many criminal prosecutors have been allocated to the Chechen Republic and how many criminal cases have been dealt with by ordinary criminal courts in 2002? How many criminal investigations are being currently pursued by military prosecutors and how many have led to indictments before military or criminal courts in 2002?

d.       How confidently independent is the justice system?

e.       Should military prosecutions be transferred to criminal prosecutions by the ordinary courts? If so, how?

f.       How can reasonable time scales for the length of proceedings and the possibility of review by superior courts be ensured? What has been the average length of criminal investigations and criminal court proceedings in the Chechen Republic in 2002?

g.       How and how far are penal sanctions against criminal behaviour enforced?

h.       What is being done to ensure openness of the work by prosecutors and the courts so that justice can publicly be seen to be done?

i.       What further assistance in the development of the judicial system could the Council of Europe offer?

3.       With Reference to the Activity of the Military and Security Forces within the Chechen Republic

a.       What progress has there been in the investigations concerning the alleged killings of civilians in Staropromyslovski in January 2000, Aldi in February 2000 and in Mesker-Yourt in late May 2002?

b.       What progress has been made in the investigation concerning the disappearance of Mr Said-Magoved Imakayev from Novye Atagy on 2 June 2002?

c.       What were the circumstances surrounding the trial and its outcome of Colonel Yuri Budanov charged with the rape and murder of a young Chechen girl?

d.       How many weapons are estimated to be in the possession of Chechen fighters at the end of 2002? What measures have been taken in 2002 against the proliferation of new weapons to Chechen fighters? What measures have been taken in 2002 in order to encourage the voluntary surrender of the existing weapons?

e.       How many policemen now serve in units of mixed ethnicity in the Chechen Republic? How many policemen have so far received anti-terrorist training? How many policemen have so far received human rights training?

f.       Has a code of conduct for the police in the Chechen Republic been drawn up and, if not, could the Council of Europe assist in this process?

g.       In how many cases have military forces pursued law enforcement activities in 2002? In how many cases have regular law enforcement authorities been involved in 2002?

h.       What is the division of responsibility between military forces and civilian law enforcement authorities for law enforcement activities?

i.       Have complaints, investigation and control mechanisms been established for abuses by security forces? If so, in how many cases have they been used in 2002? If not, when will they be established?

j.       How many violations of Order No. 80 on military search operations have occurred in 2002? What measures have been taken or will be taken in order to ensure compliance with Order No. 80?

k.       When will the report of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) be published? What measures have been taken by the federal and regional authorities in 2002 as a consequence of the latest CPT report in order to prevent cases of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment?

4.       With Reference to the Humanitarian Situation in the Chechen Republic

a.       How many family dwellings are fully habitable and supported with essential infrastructure?

b.       How many schools and hospitals are fully operational? Is there adequate educational equipment? How many teachers are there? How many school children and students are there? What proportion of eligible children and young people are at school? How many doctors are there? How many qualified nurses are there? How many in-patients are there? How many outpatients are there? How many people do not have access to medical care? What is the availability of medicines and surgery? Are teachers and medical staff being paid?

c.       What is the state of nutrition of the population as a whole and, in particular, of the elderly and young?

d.       What is the estimated percentage of the population of working age receiving salaries from employment? How is this divided between different sectors of the economy? What percentage of the population of working age is without employment?

e.       How far is the Republic agriculturally self-sufficient? On what incoming food is it dependent?

f.       What, if any, is the current economic investment from outside in the Republic? Where and in what sectors is this taking place?

g.       How are welfare payments made to the population? How many people receive these? What percentage of the population, eligible by age, physical condition and unemployment, receive these?

h.       How is humanitarian aid distributed to the population? How is fairness in distribution achieved? How is misappropriation dealt with and prevented?

i.       Which humanitarian agencies are operating within the Republic and which are operating with the displaced still outside the Republic?

j.       What is the condition of the displaced outside the Republic in Ingushetia and elsewhere?

k.       How can access by humanitarian agencies be improved?

l.       What is now the position of returnees in the Republic? Are they receiving assistance with the rebuilding of their homes?

m.       Is the return of displaced people now genuinely voluntary?

5.       Concerning the Joint Working Group of the PACE and the Duma

Does the JWG still have a valid role to play? Is its membership the right membership? Has the time come to replace it with some other arrangement? If so, what would make sense?

Reporting Committee  : Political Affairs Committee

Reference to Committee : Res. 1227 (2000), Res. 1240 (2001), Res. 1270 (2002)

Members of the Committee : Jakic (Chairman), Rogozin (Vice-Chairman), Feric-Vac (Vice-Chairperson), Spindelegger (Vice-Chairman), Aguiar, Aliyev (alternate: Seyidov), de Aristegi, Ates, Atkinson,  Azzolini, Berceanu, Beres, Bianco, Blaauw, Blankenborg (alternate: Kvakkestad), Cekuolis, Clerfayt, Davern, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Druviete, Durrieu,  Eörsi, Frey, Glesener, Goulet (alternate: Rochebloine), Gross, Hedrich, Henry, Hörster, Hovhannisyan, Iwinski, Judd, Karpov, Kautto, Kirilov, Klich (alternate: Markowski), Koçi, Kostenko, van der Linden, Lloyd, Loutfi, Magnusson, Margelov (alternate: Popov), Martinez-Casan, Medeiros Ferreira, Mercan, Mignon, Muratovic, Naudi Mora, Neguta, Nemcova, Nemeth (alternate: Braun), Oliynyk, Ouzky, Pangalos, Petrova-Mitevska, Pourgourides, Prentice, Prisacaru, de Puig (alternate: Puche), Ragnarsdottir, Ranieri (alternate: de Zulueta), Roth, Severin, Severinsen, Tekelioglu, Tritz, Vakilov (alternate: Mollazade), Vella, Volpinari, Voog, Voulgarakis, Westerberg, Wielowieyski, Wohlwend, Wurm, Yarygina, Zacchera, Zhvania, Ziuganov (alternate: Slutsky).

N.B. : The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics

Secretariat of the Committee : Mr Perin, Mr Chevtchenko, Mr Dossow, Mrs Entzminger, Ms Alleon