Doc. 9690

28 January 2003

Iraq

Report

Political Affairs Committee

Rapporteur: Mr Guillermo Martínez Casań, Spain, Group of the European People’s Party

I.       Draft resolution

1.       The Assembly refers to its Resolution 1302 (September 2002) on the threat of military action against Iraq, and notes that the Iraq crisis more than ever remains a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, as well as throughout the world.

2.       UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), unanimously adopted on 8 November 2002, was the expression of the common will of the international community to achieve the disarming of Iraq by political and diplomatic means. It notes that the UN has repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations. It set up a strengthened inspection regime making it possible to verify whether Iraq is complying with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

3.       The chief United Nations' international inspectors, Mr Blix and Mr ElBaradei, presented to the Security Council on 27 January 2003 an interim report at the end of two months of inspections. According to this report, the Iraqi authorities are not co-operating sufficiently with the inspectors and have not presented credible evidence of the dropping of all the prohibited programmes or of the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction, particularly the stocks of VX paralysing agent and of substances enabling anthrax to be produced. In spite of the promises made by the Iraqi government, the inspectors have not yet been able to conduct interviews with scientists and experts who have participated in the country's weapons programmes. Furthermore, Iraq has denied the inspectors the possibility of flying over its territory in the U2 reconnaissance aircraft placed at their disposal.

4.       Therefore the inspectors have neither confirmed that Iraq has disposed of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, nor concluded that it has ceased to produce them as required under Resolution 687 (1991) and Resolution 1441 (2002).

5.        However, the inspectors have been able to carry out their work in Iraq since 27 November 2002 without major hindrance and, to date, have found nothing to prove that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles, or that it is preparing to produce these.

6.        The Assembly also notes that no link between Iraq and international terrorist networks has been able to be substantively established.

7.        The Assembly concludes from this that, in the current circumstances, the use of force against Iraq would not be justified. The inspectors must continue and intensify their work one last time, objectively and impartially and without external pressure, so as to conclude the inspections within a reasonable time. They must be provided with all necessary personnel, equipment and logistic support.

8.        Public opinion in the member states of the Council of Europe is mostly in favour of the solution of the Iraq crisis through political means, and against unilateral intervention in Iraq. American public opinion increasingly favours a multilateral solution in accordance with international law.

9.        However, the Assembly notes with great concern that the United States declares its readiness to take unilateral action even in the absence of an explicit Security Council decision authorising the use of force.

10.        The United States and United Kingdom affirm that they have information such as to prove that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction and/or the intention and capacity to produce these. The Assembly points out in this respect that, in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 1441, any state is requested to provide to the inspectors any information related to prohibited Iraqi programmes.

11.        The Assembly reiterates its firm conviction that the solution of the Iraq crisis must be in accordance with the principles of international law and be based on specific United Nations Security Council authority and on broad international support, including that of the countries of the region. The Assembly welcomes in this context the efforts of all the governments which are working for a peaceful solution to the crisis, and particularly those of the government of Turkey with a view to finding a common position among the main countries of the region so as to avoid war and to obtain full and complete co-operation of Iraq with the United Nations.

12.        The Assembly takes the view that Saddam Hussein’s regime is responsible for the sufferings of the Iraqi people and is guilty of the human rights violations of which a very large number of Iraqis have been victims. It expresses its solidarity with those in Iraq who are fighting against the dictatorship and for the establishment of democracy.

13.        The Assembly calls on:

i.       the Iraqi authorities:

ii.       all Council of Europe member states, observer states and candidate states:

Table of contents

II.       Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur ………………………………………………5

Appendix I

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441…………………………………………………….7

Appendix II

United Nations Security Council Press Release of 27 January 2003……………………………..14

II.       Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur

Introduction

1. On 26 September 2002, the Assembly held an urgent debate on the threat of military action against Iraq, and adopted Resolution 1302 (2002). This resolution and the explanatory memorandum1, analysing the causes, circumstances and possible consequences of the Iraq crisis, retain all their relevance. The rapporteur will therefore confine himself to reminding the main developments since the adoption of the aforementioned resolution.

The latest developments in the Iraq crisis

2. On 30 September and 1 October 2002, in Vienna, Mr Hans Blix and Mr Mohammed ElBaradei, heads respectively of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met the representatives of the Iraqi authorities and finalised the arrangements for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The conclusions of this meeting were sent to the Iraqi authorities on 8 October 2002, and the Iraqi authorities accepted them in writing on 10 and 12 October 2002.

3. On 8 November, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which provides for an enhanced inspection system, giving the UN disarmament inspectors revised and additional powers. The resolution lays down a timetable for the resumption of the inspections in Iraq and imposes an obligation on Iraq to supply, no later than 30 days after the date of the resolution, a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The inspections were to resume at the latest 45 days after adoption of the resolution. The inspectors were asked to update the Security Council within the ensuing 60 days. Furthermore, they were to report immediately to the Security Council if Iraq failed to comply with its obligations.

4. On 13 November, Iraq accepted Resolution 1441 and welcomed the return of the United Nations inspectors.

5.        On 18 November, a reconnaissance team led by Mr Blix and Mr ElBaradei travelled to Baghdad prepare for the practical implementation of the inspections.

6.        The first team of inspectors arrived in Iraq on 25 November. The first inspection took place on 27 November. Subsequently, the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors have made more than 300 visits to sites which could be used for the prohibited Iraqi programmes, including presidential palaces hitherto declared to be "sovereign sites" and excluded from the list of sites subject to inspections. They have also questioned several Iraqi scientists with previous connections to the programmes relating to weapons of mass destruction.

7.        On 7 December, the Iraqi authorities transmitted to the United Nations inspectors the declaration on their programmes relating to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles for which Resolution 1441 provided. Several countries took the view that this declaration was incomplete and that Iraq was continuing to conceal the truth about its weapons.

8.        On 16 January 2003, an inspection team discovered at a munitions depot 11 empty chemical warheads not mentioned in the Iraqi report. However, the inspectors took the view that these warheads were not in themselves a major problem. A few days later, Iraq declared that it had discovered another five warheads of the same type in a different depot.

9.        On the same day, an inspection team found at the home of an Iraqi scientist some 3 000 pages of documents not declared to the UN and relating to an uranium enrichment technique.

10.        On 20 January, the leaders of the inspectors agreed with the Iraqi authorities on a number of measures intended to improve the efficiency of the inspections and to solve certain problems which had been noted. However, other problems remain outstanding.

11.        On 27 January 2003, Mr Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Mr Mohammed ElBaradei, Director-General of the IAEA, presented to the Security Council the report on the preliminary findings of the 60 days of inspections. According to this report, the Iraqi authorities are not co-operating sufficiently with the inspectors and have not presented credible evidence of the dropping of all the prohibited programmes or of the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction, particularly the stocks of VX paralysing agent and of substances enabling anthrax to be produced. In spite of the promises made by the Iraqi government, the inspectors have not yet been able to conduct interviews with scientists and experts who have participated in the country's weapons programmes. Furthermore, Iraq has denied the inspectors the possibility of flying over its territory in the U2 reconnaissance aircraft placed at their disposal. However, the inspectors have been able to carry out their work in Iraq since 27 November 2002 without major hindrance and, to date, have found nothing to prove that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles, or that it is preparing to produce these. On 29 January 2003, the Security Council is to begin its informal discussion of this report.

The different countries' positions

12.        The United States and United Kingdom declare that Iraq is continuing to deceive the world's about its military programmes and that it is hiding weapons of mass destruction. These two states are demanding that Saddam's regime disarm immediately, failing which they state their readiness to lead an international coalition which will disarm it, with or without the explicit approval of the Security Council. Both of the countries mentioned take the view that Resolution 1441 provides a sufficient legal basis for the use of force, and do not see any need for another Security Council text. They have begun to deploy their armed forces in the regions neighbouring Iraq, and it is estimated that towards the middle of February 2003, the United States will have five aircraft carriers and some 150 000 troops in the region. At the same time, they have set themselves the objective of changing the political regime in Baghdad, and are working actively with the different Iraqi opposition groups.

13.       Iraq continues to deny that it has weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and that it has any plans in this respect. It accuses the United States of trying, on the pretext of disarmament, to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime so as to obtain control of Iraq’s oil resources.

14.        France emphasises the need to comply with international law and the role of the Security Council, which alone may authorise the use of force. It also considers that there is nothing to justify such use at the moment, and that the disarmament of Iraq must be achieved through political and diplomatic channels. It will be willing to join a possible coalition against Iraq only if the United Nations inspectors prove that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and is refusing to dismantle these.

15.        Russia also states that it can see no reasons for considering the possible use of force against Iraq. According to Russian leaders, there is no evidence that Iraq is concealing weapons of mass destruction. The UN inspectors' conclusions are vital to the decision on further international action against Iraq. Any decision to authorise the use of force is for the Security Council to take. If the Americans begin action in Iraq in the absence of such a decision, Russia will demand that it be halted.

16.        China opposes immediate military action against Iraq and is in favour of the continuation of the inspectors' mission.

17.        Germany, which will take the Security Council chair in February, has confirmed its opposition to a military solution to the Iraq crisis, with or without a UN mandate, and has already announced that it will not support the military option in the Security Council.

18.        Spain, which has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council since 1 January 2003, considers that another Security Council resolution is not legally indispensable, but would be preferable. It has indicated its support for a possible United States-led operation.

19.        The European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy takes the view that, in the present circumstances, a war against Iraq is not justified, and that a decision on the use of force against Iraq must be made through the UN.

20.        Turkey favours a political solution to the Iraq crisis which complies with international law, and fears that a war would destabilise the Middle East region. On 23 January 2003, it organised a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, who urged the President of Iraq fully to co-operate with the United Nations inspectors in order to avoid war.

Appendix I

United Nations

S/RES/1441 (2002)

Security Council

8 November 2002

Resolution 1441 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting,
on 8 November 2002

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting that the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon , ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such

weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:

8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

Text of Blix/El-Baradei letter

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

International Atomic Energy Agency

The Executive Chairman

The Director General

8 October 2002

Dear General Al-Saadi,

During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq’s acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.

During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.

In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed “sensitive sites” in the past.

As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.

We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.

H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi

Advisor

Presidential Office

Baghdad

Iraq

Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed except in the presence of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to choose the mode and location for interviews.

The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.

The NMD will provide free of cost: (a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and communication with personnel to be interviewed; (b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis; (c) support in terms of personnel and ground transportation within the country, as requested; and (d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at inspectors’ request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.). NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.

Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and appropriate escort personnel.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC or IAEA communications.

Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.

Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.

On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of charge.

On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.

Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for medical evacuation.

On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights. The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.

As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq’s national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.

We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.

Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in such matters, as with the above, Iraq’s co-operation in all respect.

(Signed)

Hans Blix

(Signed)

Mohamed ElBaradei

Executive Chairman

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Director General

International Atomic Energy Agency

Appendix II

27/01/2003

Press Release
SC/7644

Security Council

4692nd Meeting (AM)

SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFED BY CHIEF UN WEAPONS EXPERTS

ON FIRST 60 DAYS OF INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

The Security Council this morning heard formal briefings by the heads of the weapons inspections regime in Iraq, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, on the first 60 days of their work, fulfilling a requirement of resolution 1441 (2002), on which the current inspections are based.

The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, said UNMOVIC shared the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, the verifiable disarmament of Iraq.  Recalling that Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) had emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate, he said it would appear that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on substance in order to complete the disarmament task through inspection.

At the same time, he drew attention to some outstanding issues and questions.  On the nerve agent VX -- one of the most toxic ever developed -- he recalled Iraq had declared that it had produced VX only on a pilot scale and, with poor quality, had never weaponized it.  But, UNMOVIC had conflicting information, including indications that the agent had been weaponized.  A number of chemical bombs containing some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were unaccounted for, and several thousand chemical rockets were unaccounted for.

On biological agents, he said Iraq had provided little evidence for its declared production of 8,500 litres of anthrax and no convincing evidence of its destruction, which it stated it had unilaterally done in 1991.  There were strong indications that Iraq had produced more anthrax than it had declared, and that at least some of that had been retained after the declared destruction date.  A significant quantity of imported bacterial growth media sufficient to produce about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax had not been declared.

Pointing to a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years, which had been presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities, he said that significant questions remained as to whether Iraq had retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War.  Also, Iraq had refurbished its missile production infrastructure.  In particular, it had reconstituted a number of casting chambers that had been destroyed under United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) supervision.  Whatever missile system those chambers were intended for, they  could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than  150 kilometres, Mr. Blix said.

The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, told the Council that to date the Agency had found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of its programme in the 1990s.  However, the Agency’s work was steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course.

Good progress had been made in the past two months in the Agency’s  knowledge of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at   some 106 locations to date, he said.  While the Agency was continuing with its reconnaissance work, inspections were now well into the “investigative” phase, with particular emphasis on determining what, if anything, had occurred in Iraq over the past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities.  Thus far, no prohibited nuclear activities had been identified during inspections of those buildings and facilities identified as having been modified or constructed during that period.

A particular issue of focus, he continued, had been the attempted procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of   whether those tubes, if acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges.  From the Agency’s analysis to date, it appeared that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.  While inspectors were still investigating that issue, it was clear that the attempt to acquire such tubes was prohibited under Council resolution 687 (1991).

Another area of focus, he said, had been to determine how certain other “dual use” materials had been relocated or used –- that was, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses.  A fourth focal point had been the investigation of reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991, which Iraqi authorities had denied.

“With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able, within the next few months, to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme”, he said.  “These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war.”

He had emphasized to Iraqi officials the need to shift from passive support -– that is, responding as needed to inspectors’ requests -– to proactive support  –- that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation, people and other evidence that would assist in filling the remaining gaps in the Agency’s information.  Iraq's proactive engagement would be in its own best interest and was a window of opportunity that might not remain open for very much longer, he said. 

Secretary-General Kofi Annan attended today’s meeting.  The representative of Iraq had been invited to participate.  Before the briefings, a letter was circulated to Council members from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq concerning interviews with Iraqi scientists.  It would be circulated as a Security Council document.

The meeting began at 10:40 a.m. and was adjourned at 11:36 a.m.

Statements by Chief Inspectors

HANS BLIX, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), cited the three important questions before the Council today:  how much in the way of prohibited weapons and related materials might remain undeclared and intact from the period prior to 1991, and, possibly thereafter; what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors left; and how to prevent the production or procurement of any weapons of mass destruction in the future.

He said that resolution 1441 (2002) emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate.  Indeed, it required that cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active.  The resolution contained many provisions, which were welcomed as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime.  The unanimity with which it was adopted had sent a powerful signal that the Council was “of one mind” in creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.

The UNMOVIC shared the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq, he said.  Under the relevant resolutions, that would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council felt would be required.  The resolutions also pointed to a zone free of mass destruction weapons as the ultimate goal.  The UNMOVIC was fully aware of and appreciated the close attention, which the Council devoted to the inspections in Iraq.  While today’s “updating” was foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council could and did call for additional briefings whenever it wished.  One was held on 19 January and a further one was tentatively set for 14 February.

Turning to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq’s response to it, he said that cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process.  It would appear from his experience so far that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on substance, in order to bring the disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course.  An initial minor step would be to adopt the long overdue legislation required by the resolutions.  Concerning cooperation on process, “Iraq has, on the whole, cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field”, he said.  Access had been provided to all sites he had wanted to inspect and, with one exception, that had been prompt.

Two problems he said he wished to register related to two kinds of air operations.  Iraq had refused to guarantee the safety of a U-2 plane placed at UNMOVIC’s disposal for aerial imagery and surveillance, unless a number of conditions were fulfilled.  As those conditions went beyond the stipulations in resolution 1441 (2002) and what had been practised by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and Iraq in the past, he noted that Iraq was not so far complying with that request.  Another air operation problem concerned the use of helicopters flying into the no-fly zones.  Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of its own to accompany UNMOVIC’s, but as that would have raised a safety problem, the matter was solved by an offer on UNMOVIC’s party to take the accompanying Iraq minders in the inspectors’ helicopters to the sites.

There had been some recent disturbing incidents and harassment, he continued.  For instance, some far-fetched allegations had been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of an intelligence character.  Iraq knew that the inspectors did not serve intelligence purposes, and Iraq should not say so.  On a number of occasions, demonstrations had taken place in front of UNMOVIC’s offices and at inspection sites.  Those did not facilitate an already difficult job, in which the inspectors tried to be effective, professional and, at the same time, correct.

Discussing cooperation on substance, Dr. Blix referred to the 12,000-page declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December 2002.  In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contained a “good deal” of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward.  That had been welcome.  One might have expected that in preparing the declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding many of the open disarmament issues.  Among them –- UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January 1999 and the so-called “Amorim Report” of March 1999 (document S/1999/356) -– were questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators had often cited.

He said those reports did not contend that weapons of mass destruction remained in Iraq, but nor did they exclude that possibility.  They pointed to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raised question marks that must be straightened out if the weapons dossiers were to be closed and confidence was to arise.  Regrettably, Iraq’s declaration did not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number.

Turning to some examples of outstanding issues and questions, he began with chemical weapons.  The nerve agent VX, he said, was one of the most toxic ever developed.  Iraq had declared that it had only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes, and that the quality was poor and the product unstable.  Consequently, it said, that agent had never been weaponized.  Iraq had said that the small quantity of the agent remaining after the Gulf War had been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.  The UNMOVIC, however, had information that conflicted with that account.  There were indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than had been declared.  Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicated that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.  There were also indications that the agent was weaponized.

On the so-called “Air Force document”, found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and providing an account of the expenditures of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, he was encouraged by the fact that Iraq had now provided that document to UNMOVIC.  The document indicated that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq had declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during that period.  Thus, there was a discrepancy on the order of about 1,000 tonnes.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he must assume that those quantities were now unaccounted for.

Regarding the discovery of a number of 122 millimetre chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot south-west of Baghdad, he said that that was a relatively new bunker and, therefore, the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.  The investigation of those rockets was still proceeding.  Their discovery did not resolve, but rather pointed to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that were unaccounted for.  Their finding showed that Iraq needed to make more effort to ensure that its declaration was currently accurate.  Inspectors had also found, at another site, a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.

On biological weapons, he recalled that Iraq had produced about 8,500 litres of anthrax, a biological warfare agent, which it stated it had unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.  Iraq had provided little evidence for that production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.  There were strong indications that Iraq had produced more anthrax than it had declared and that at least some of that had been retained after the declared destruction date.  That might still exist.  Either it should be found and destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision, or convincing evidence should be produced to show that it had been destroyed in 1991.  Also, Iraq had not declared a significant quantity of bacterial growth media, which had been acknowledged as imported in Iraq.  The quantity of media involved would suffice to produce about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax, he said.

Concerning missiles, there remained significant questions as to whether Iraq had retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War, he went in.  Iraq had declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s, yet no technical information had been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of missiles.  There had been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities.  The inspectors were trying to gain a clear understanding of them.  Meanwhile, Iraq had been asked to cease flight tests of two missile systems.  It had refurbished its missile production infrastructure; in particular, it had reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.  Whatever missile system those chambers were intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres, Mr. Blix said.

Also associated with missile development had been the import of a number of items, despite the sanctions, he said.  Foremost among them was the import of 380 rocket engines for the Al Samoud 2, a liquid-fuelled missile.  Iraq had also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control systems.  Those items might well be for proscribed purposes, but that was yet to be determined.  What was clear was that they were illegally brought into Iraq, indicating that Iraq, or some company in Iraq, had circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.  He emphasized the presumptions did not solve the problem; evidence and full transparency might help.

Specifically, he said that information provided by Member States about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production would certainly be followed up.  On the question of documents, he said that when he had urged Iraq to present more evidence, the response had often been that there were no more documents.  The recent inspecting finding in the private home of a scientist of a box of 3,000 pages of documents, much of it related to the laser enrichment of uranium, supported a long-held concern that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals.  The Iraqi side, however, claimed that research staff sometimes brought home papers from their work places.  He could not help but think that that case might not be isolated, and that such placements of documents was deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents.

He said that when Iraq claimed that tangible evidence in the form of documents was not available, it ought, at least, to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience.  Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes, as well as their missile programmes, had been provided by the Iraqi side.  That could be compared to more than 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources.  At his recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list, and some 80 additional names had been provided.

In the past, much valuable information had come from interviews, he said.  To date, 11 individuals had been asked for interviews in Baghdad.  The replies had invariably been that the individual would only speak at Iraq’s monitoring directorate or in the presence of an Iraqi official.  At his recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews “in private”.  Despite that, the pattern had not changed.  He hoped that further encouragement from the authorities would permit knowledgeable individuals to accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.

On UNMOVIC’s capability, he said that in the past two months UNMOVIC had built up its capabilities from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries.  Furthermore, the roster of inspectors would grow as the training programmes continued.  In the past two months, the inspectors had conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites.  Of those, more than 20 had not been inspected before.  By the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters, both for the transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work.  Those had already proved invaluable in helping to “freeze” large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and around the area.  Setting up a field office in Mosul had facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq.  Plans were under way to establish soon a second field office in the Basra area. 

MOHAMED ELBARADEI, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), began by recalling what had been accomplished during inspections from 1991 to 1998.  The Agency’s conclusion at that time was that Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme had been neutralized, and there was no indication that Iraq had retained any physical capability to produce weapon-usable nuclear material.  During the intervening four years of the Agency’s absence from Iraq, the IAEA had continued its analytical work to the best of its ability, using satellite imagery and other information.  But no remote analysis could replace on-site inspections, and the Agency was, therefore, not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq’s compliance with its Council obligations in the nuclear field after December 1998.

Against that backdrop, he continued, when Iraq agreed last September to reopen its doors to inspection, and following the adoption of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA’s authority and the inspection process, the first goal of the inspection activities was “reconnaissance”.  In that phase, the Agency sought to re-establish rapidly its knowledge base of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key facilities had not been reopened, to verify the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to identify and begin interviewing key Iraqi personnel.

Over the first two months of inspection, good progress had been made in the Agency’s knowledge of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at some 106 locations to date, he said.  The bulk of those inspections had taken place at State-run or private industrial facilities, research centres and universities -– either at locations where Iraq’s significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past, or at new locations suggested by remote monitoring and analysis.  All inspection activities had been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where notification was needed to ensure the availability of required support.  IAEA inspections had taken –- and would continue to take –- full advantage of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441.  In doing so, the inspectors had been instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.

While the Agency was continuing to some extent with that reconnaissance work, he said, inspections were now well into the “investigative” phase, with particular emphasis on determining what, if anything, had occurred in Iraq over the past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities.  Those investigative inspections focused on areas of concern identified by other States, facilities identified through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, and other inspections leads identified independently by the IAEA.

In parallel with those inspection activities, the IAEA had been conducting exhaustive analysis of supporting information obtained from various sources, he said.  In that context, it had integrated the new information submitted by Iraq –- including its recent declaration -– with the records that had been accumulated between 1991 and 1998 and the additional information that had been compiled through remote monitoring since 1998.  The Iraqi declaration was consistent with the Agency’s existing understanding of Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear programme.  However, it did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that had been outstanding since 1998 –- in particular, regarding Iraq’s progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development.  While those questions did not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless needed further clarification.

In addition to on-site inspections and off-site analysis, IAEA inspectors had employed a variety of tools to accomplish their mission, he noted.  Taking advantage of the “signature” of radioactive materials, the Agency had resumed the monitoring of Iraq’s rivers, canals and lakes to detect the presence of certain radioisotopes.  A broad variety of environmental samples and surface swipe samples had been collected from locations across Iraq and taken to IAEA laboratories for analysis.

The inspectors had also conducted a great number of interviews of Iraqi scientists, managers and technicians -– primarily in the workplace in the course of unannounced inspections -– as a valuable source of information about past and present programmes and activities.  The information gained had been helpful in assessing the completeness and accuracy of Iraq’s declarations.  Resolution 1441 also clearly gave to the IAEA and UNMOVIC the authority to determine the modalities and venues for conducting interviews with Iraqi officials and other persons.  The first two individuals whom the IAEA requested to see privately had declined to be interviewed without the presence of an Iraqi government representative.  That had been a restricting factor.

Although the Iraqi Government recently had committed itself to encouraging Iraqi officials and other personnel to be interviewed in private when requested, regrettably, the third request, two days ago, for a private interview was again turned down by the interviewee, he said.  The IAEA would continue to determine the modalities and locations of the interviews, including the possibility of interviewing Iraqi personnel abroad.  He would continue to report to the Council on the Agency’s efforts to conduct interviews according to the Agency’s preferred modalities and venues, and its degree of success in that regard.

He then summarized some of the findings thus far from the inspection activities.  First, the Agency had inspected all of those buildings and facilities that had been identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed over the past four years.  IAEA inspectors had been able to gain ready access and to clarify the nature of the activities currently being conducted in those facilities.  No prohibited nuclear activities had been identified during those inspections.

A particular issue of focus, he noted, had been the attempted procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of whether those tubes, if acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges.  Iraqi authorities had indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer conventional rockets.  To verify that information, IAEA inspectors had inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents.

From the Agency’s analysis to date, it appeared that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.  However, he said the inspectors were still investigating that issue.  It was clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes was prohibited under Council resolution 687.

Another area of focus, he said, had been to determine how certain other “dual use” materials had been relocated or used –- that was, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses.  A fourth focal point had been the investigation of reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991.  The Iraqi authorities had denied any such attempts.  The IAEA would continue to pursue that issue.  Currently, however, it did not have enough information, and he would appreciate receiving more.  He was also making progress on a number of other issues related, for example, to the attempted importation of a magnet production facility.

Over the next several months, inspections would focus ever more closely on follow-up of specific concerns, as the Agency continued to conduct visits to sites and interviews with key Iraqi personnel.  It had begun helicopter operations, which increased the inspectors’ mobility and their ability to respond rapidly to new information, and allow wide-scale radiation detection surveys.  Laboratory analysis of environmental samplers was continuing, and the Agency would be re-installing air samplers for wide-area environmental monitoring.  The Agency would also re-introduce surveillance systems with video cameras in key locations to allow near-real-time remote monitoring of dual-use equipment.

He had begun in the last few weeks to receive more information from States of direct and current value for inspection follow-up.  He continued to call on States that had access to such information to provide it to the inspecting organizations, so that the inspection process could be accelerated and additional assurances could be generated.

He had urged Iraq, once again, to increase the degree of its cooperation with the inspection process.  In support of the IAEA inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities had provided access to all facilities visited -– including presidential compounds and private residences -– without conditions and without delay.  The Iraqi authorities had also been cooperative in making available additional original documentation, in response to requests by IAEA inspectors.  In his discussions with Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad, he emphasized the need to shift from passive support –- that is, responding as needed to inspectors’ requests –- to proactive support –- that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation, people and other evidence that would assist in filling the remaining gaps in the Agency’s information.

The proactive engagement on the part of Iraq would be in its own best interest and was a window of opportunity that might not remain open for very much longer, he said.  Iraq should make every effort to be fully transparent -– with a demonstrated willingness to resolve issues rather than requiring pressure to do so.  The international community would not be satisfied when questions remained open regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.  The world was asking for a high level of assurance that Iraq was completely free from all such weapons, and was already impatient to receive it.  The sooner such assistance could be provided by the inspecting organizations, the sooner the prospects of a peaceful resolution would translate into a plausible reality.  Inspections were time-consuming, but if successful, could ensure disarmament through peaceful means.  The presence of inspectors today continued to serve as an effective deterrent to and insurance against resumption of programmes to develop weapons of mass destructions, even as he continued to look for possible past activities.

To date, the Agency had found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s, he stated.  However, the Agency’s work was steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course.  “With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able, within the next few months, to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme.  These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war.”

Reporting Committee  :Political Affairs Committee

Reference to committee : Ref. 2786, 27 January 2003 (request for urgent procedure)

Draft Resolution adopted by the Committee on 28 January 2003 with 1 vote against.

Members of the Committee : Jakic (Chairman), Rogozin (Vice-Chairman), Feric-Vac (Vice-Chairperson), Spindelegger (Vice-Chairmant), Aguiar, Aliyev, de Aristegi (alternate: Puche), Ates, Atkinson,  Azzolini, Berceanu, Beres, Bianco (alternate: Provera), Blaauw, Blankenborg, Cekuolis, Clerfayt, Davern, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Druviete, Durrieu (alternate: Rochebloine),  Eörsi, Frey (alternate: Fehr), Glesener, Goulet, Gross, Hedrich, Henry, Hörster, Hovhannisyan, Iwinski, Judd, Karpov, Kautto, Kirilov, Klich, Koçi, Kostenko, van der Linden, Lloyd, Loutfi, Magnusson, Margelov (alternate: Popov), Martinez-Casan, Medeiros Ferreira, Mercan, Mignon, Muratovic, Naudi Mora, Neguta, Nemcova, Nemeth, Oliynyk, Ouzky, Pangalos, Petrova-Mitevska, Pourgourides, Prentice, Prisacaru, de Puig (alternate: Lopez Gonzalez), Ragnarsdottir, Ranieri (alternate: de Zulueta), Roth, Severin, Severinsen, Tekelioglu, Tritz, Vakilov (alternate: Mollazade), Vella, Volpinari, Voog, Voulgarakis (alternate: Liapis), Westerberg, Wielowieyski (alternate: Jaskiernia), Wohlwend, Wurm, Yarygina, Zacchera, Zhvania, Ziuganov (alternate: Slutzky).

N.B. : The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics

Secretariat of the Committee: Mr Perin, Mr Chevtchenko, Mr Dossow, Mrs Entzminger, Ms Alleon

1 Cf Doc 9572 of 24 September 2002.