“In serving the best interests of children,
we serve the best interests of all humanity.
Carol Bellamy, former Executive Director of the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, 1995-2005)”
1. Introduction
1. International efforts to promote and protect children’s
rights have undergone significant change since the beginning of
the 20th century. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) of 1989 has provided an invaluable contribution
to this shift in paradigms. Articles 3 and 4 of the CRC respectively
provide that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration” and require Parties
to “undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized”.
2. Even though legislative action alone does not ensure the translation
of children’s rights into national policy, the inclusion of children’s
rights in national constitutions may represent a strong signal and
starting point for reinforcing national legislation and mechanisms
in favour of child protection and development. In this respect,
the CRC provides a strong basis for the inclusion of children’s
rights in constitutions among national measures for the protection
of children, without, however, explicitly requesting this.
3. The present report aims at exploring the question of how children’s
rights could be inscribed in national constitutions, and how to
ensure that relevant provisions, as well as children’s rights more
generally, are effectively implemented in the national context.
The subsequent outcomes of this activity may serve as a basis for
a continued exchange of best practice and give orientation to national
governments.
4. By letter of 25 March 2013, the Committee on Social Affairs,
Health and Sustainable Development seized the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) with the following question:
“How can children’s rights be included in national constitutions
with a view to thus promoting their effective implementation?” The
Venice Commission agreed to undertake a study on this question,
involving several of its members as experts, and adopted the final
report at its 98th Plenary Session on 21 and 22 March 2014. This
study was fully taken into consideration for this report, to ensure
that the activities of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice
Commission in this area are fully co-ordinated and that any recommendation
resulting from the present report is based on substantial expert
analysis.
2. Children’s
rights as constitutional rights – general observations
2.1. History and status
of children’s rights in constitutions
5. A study conducted in 1978
revealed that 82% of national
constitutions drafted between 1788 and 1948, and 93% of the constitutions
drafted between 1949 and 1975, provided some form of protection
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the beginning of the
21st century, UNICEF estimated that there were just over 20 constitutions
worldwide that expressly guaranteed or protected the rights of children
according to the approach promoted by the CRC (as set out below).
These constitutional provisions
display five main characteristics, namely: universality; inalienability;
accountability; participation; and opportunity for redress. Provisions
concerning children’s rights would generally show concern for the
following principles: non-discrimination; best interest of the child;
the right to survival and protection; access to basic social services
and protections; the primary role of family; protection from violence;
abuse and neglect; and respect for the views of the child. The most
broadly protected rights afforded to children are generally related
to education, labour or equality before the law (see further details
in chapter 4 on the study undertaken by the Venice Commission).
6. UNICEF distinguished three different categories concerning
constitutional status of children according to the time period in
which constitutions were drafted and adopted: 1) the “invisible
child” constitution; 2) the “special protection” constitution; and
3) the “children’s rights” constitution which, in some cases, seem
to be linked to the history of relevant texts.
Accordingly, children are mostly
invisible in texts adopted prior to 1945, even though some of them
contain a range of human rights provisions that may assure their
application to children.
7. National constitutions following the protection approach,
often adopted in the post-war period, generally reflect a perception
of children not so much as individuals bearing rights on their own
behalf as persons entitled to special care or assistance, thus assigning
a special responsibility for their care and education to parents. This
approach is reflected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1948, as well as the International Human Rights Covenants of
1966. According to UNICEF, the “special protection” constitutions
are not incompatible with the CRC approach; they do however fall
short of the ideal approach reflected in this later universal text.
Although they show a growing concern for human rights more generally,
with moderate concern for children as a discrete category, the language
in use belies a view of children as “objects” in need of protection
rather than active rights holders.
8. Those constitutions adopted or revised since 1989, year of
adoption of the CRC, are the ones most likely to adopt a fully fledged
approach. The latter is often premised upon the recognition of children’s
rights
per se, including a
shift to a rights-based discourse on constitutional treatment of
children.
However,
the level of penetration by the CRC in the text of each provision
dealing with the rights of children differs for each constitution.
Whilst the increasing prevalence of such constitutional guarantees
for children’s rights is to be welcomed, it must be accompanied
by a critical discussion about the status and implementation of
such rights. As rapporteur on this issue, I am convinced that the
lack of explicit provisions in a national constitution does not
mean that children’s rights are not respected, as they may also
be covered by more general provisions on human rights. Nevertheless,
the fact that specific provisions have not been considered necessary
in the past does not prevent the States concerned from re-examining
the issue in the light of evolving perceptions and standards.
2.2. Why include children’s
rights in constitutions?
9. A written constitution is the primary and superior
codicil of law in a State and generally consists of a single written
text that serves as a reference point for the formulation of all
other national laws and regulations. Constitutional rights thus
enjoy an elevated position in which all other laws are made in compliance
with them. Such status and influence may be mobilised in favour
of children by the inclusion of specific protection for the rights
of children in national constitutions.
10. Constitutions may also express policy priorities of a State.
Several common law jurisdictions constitutionally prioritise policies
through “Principles of State Policy”.
These
provisions are generally broad, serving as general standards against
which State action may be judged. Such non-binding policy priorities, while
they may serve as an encouraging step towards securing explicit
guarantees of children’s rights in the constitutional text at a
later date, offer little substantive guarantee, largely due to the
demonstrable reluctance of courts to utilise such implicit guarantees,
and thus be perceived to engage in judicial activism.
11. The Directive Principles of Social Policy included in Article
45 of the Irish Constitution, for example, are intended for general
guidance but “whose application in the making of laws shall be the
care of the Oireachtas (parliament)
exclusively, and shall not be justiciable before any Court under
the Constitution”. The principles include the equality of all citizens
and their entitlement to welfare, the operation of free competition
and the duty of the State to pay particular attention to the needs
of those sections of the community which are particularly vulnerable.
12. Not all States have a written constitution or a single constitutional
text, one example being the United Kingdom. This does not prevent
them from seeking to comply with the convention provisions by other
means. Furthermore, the inclusion of children’s rights in national
constitutions does not in itself guarantee their actual implementation:
additional legislative and political measures will always be necessary.
Lastly, constitutional texts differ in nature from one country to
another, and this may also influence the implementation of the rights contained
therein. It is important, therefore, to take account of specific
national circumstances when exploring the usefulness of including
children’s rights in constitutions, before making any recommendations
to this effect.
2.3. How to include
children’s rights in constitutions?
13. The predominant method of “constitutionalisation”
of children’s rights currently takes the form of incorporation by
reference to other texts, such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. However, certain legal experts claim that such guarantees
offer a false security and lend a rhetorical strength to the vindication of
children’s rights that is not always sufficient to ensure actual
or adequate protection.
When
using this form of “constitutionalisation” of children’s rights,
the stringent implementation through specific legislation and political
mechanisms will therefore be of utmost importance. Children’s rights
may also be incorporated directly in the constitutional text. This
is the case in a number of European countries including my own,
Romania (Article 49 of the Romanian constitution provides special
protection to children and young people in the pursuit of their
rights by prohibiting their employment in any harmful activity).
14. Some experts, such as the current Mediator (Ombudsman) of
Luxembourg, regularly promote the idea not to inscribe children’s
rights as such in constitutions given that constitutional majorities
are difficult to obtain. Instead, it is recommended that national
human rights institutions dedicated to children be anchored in constitutional
texts, thus obliging these institutions to follow minimum standards
in any action in favour of children, based on the original “3 Ps”
–
prevention, protection, prosecution –
later completed by a 4th “P” designating
publicpolicies.
Making
use of national human rights institutions for children as a means
of enforcing children’s rights is also one of the key recommendations
put forward by the Venice Commission (see chapter 4 developing more
specific proposals in this respect).
3. Arguments surrounding
the constitutional status of children’s rights
15. Constitutions can concretely induce change if they
provide binding standards for legislative, policy and regulatory
measures. More generally speaking, constitutionalisation promotes
awareness of children’s rights and provides such rights with a legitimacy
and foundation they may otherwise lack. It also creates a political incentive
for increased spending allocations for children in budgets and can
strengthen children’s standing before the courts. However, studies
of the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
indicate that one of the main problems in this regard is still a
lack of recognition and promotion at national level. As regards
the budget allocations needed to enforce children’s rights, some
only require limited resources (for example, the right to have one’s
own name or citizenship), while others are more costly and the degree
to which they are implemented depends on the will of each State
(for example, the right to education and cost of schooling).
3.1. Why constitutionalisation
over other means?
16. UNICEF qualifies the constitutional recognition of
children’s rights as a “springboard” from which to launch a concerted
effort to change legal and policy frameworks and to challenge parent-centred
child welfare laws that are not always in the best interest of the
child.
The introduction of a children’s
code has been put forward by the organisation as an alternative
to constitutionalisation.
The
benefit of such a mechanism lies largely in its immediate effect
as it creates a comprehensive body of law dealing with children’s
issues. However, such breadth may in itself create difficulties,
as the implications of a volume of new law may be hard to assess.
In common law countries, codes will not be easily enforced due to
unfamiliarity of legal and other professionals with codified systems
as well as the incompatibility of codes with elaborate case-law
and constitutional structures.
17. However, the alternative, of relying on change through precedent,
is equally untenable. The system of stare decisis (the doctrine
of judicial precedent) in operation at common law favours a retrenchment
of the status quo, thus change is gradual and occurs over extended
periods of time. More worryingly, it takes only a single judgment
in a higher court to undo the progress made in a particular area
and revert to a previous position. Where change is to occur there
must also be a concrete source of law on which a judge may rely
lest the bench be accused of engaging in judicial activism and overstepping
its role. In the presence of such uncertainty and piecemeal remedying
of the problem, constitutionalisation offers a uniform means of
protection in all jurisdictions operating under a constitutional
system.
3.2. Express versus
implied inclusion
18. In the context of arguments that seek to question
the inclusion of children’s rights in national constitutions the
primary contention is that additional, explicit guarantees are unnecessary
as children are already guaranteed rights as citizens of that jurisdiction.
More simply put, the rights afforded to citizens are also implicitly
afforded to children of the State in their role as citizens. Thus,
the only situation in which the inclusion of additional guarantees
of children’s rights in the constitution could be required would
be if one believed that children were not citizens, or for children
who are evidently not citizens, thus nationals of a given country. Additionally,
it might be contended that by guaranteeing specific rights for children
in State constitutions, there is an implicit exclusion of children
from the broader and more established guarantees afforded to adult
citizens.
19. The corollary argument is that specific groups of the population,
including children, may be vulnerable to victimisation and could
face increased obstacles in representing and vindicating their legal
rights, and thus may need protection in addition to that afforded
to the majority of citizens. Among the most vulnerable groups of
children, I would like to mention refugee or migrant children, as
well as children with disabilities, who often require special protection
and support.
3.3. The separation
of powers
20. There are concerns that the constitutional incorporation
of the specific socio-economic rights listed in the CRC would lead
to unacceptable conflicts in the separation of powers, as it would
not only permit but require courts to make orders directing the
State to implement particular policies or services thus encroaching
on the roles of the legislature and executive.
21. Experts have, for example, noted that the South African model
(of enshrining extensive lists of socio-economic rights into their
constitution through incorporation of the CRC by reference) has
led to a situation in which the interpretation and application of
children’s rights are unpredictable, inconsistent and frequently create
tensions between the rights of children and society more generally.
Such unpredictability of enforcement is largely linked to the socio-economic
nature of the rights that the judgments seek to enforce: there may
be insufficient resources to allow for enforcement, or one court
may be less willing than others to engage in policy formulation
or resource allocation involved in its enforcement.
As
regards the enforcement of international treaties, it may also be
observed that courts are reluctant to enforce provisions having
the status of principles without including more objective implementation
criteria.
3.4. The State’s ability
to supplement or supply the role of parents
22. The potential of constitutionalisation to expand
the State’s power to interfere in family life, thus usurping the
place and authority of the family unit, is of concern for some.
The risk of parents’ rights being reduced is, by the way, one of
the major reservations expressed by the United States with regard
to ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, fearing,
for example, that parents might be prevented from raising a child in
accordance with their religious faith or from using minor corporal
punishment. Generally, there is thus a need to establish clear rules
and procedures for intervention by State authorities and public
services.
23. Recommendations for interventions by social services, notably
when it comes to the removal of children from their families if
their well-being is under threat, was dealt with in an Assembly
report entitled “Social services in Europe: legislation and practice
of the removal of children from their families in Council of Europe member
States”.
A topical example from
France shows that, increasingly, States are expected to set clear rules
for the education of children in the private context (including
families and schools): On 3 November 2014, and following complaint
No. 92/2013 put forward by the Association for the Protection of
all Children (APPROACH) against France, the European Committee of
Social Rights notified a violation of Article 17.1 of the European
Social Charter, due to the lack of “sufficiently clear, binding
and precise prohibition of corporal punishment set out in French
law”.
4. Constitutional
protection of children’s rights: findings by the Venice Commission
24. In 2013/2014 and at the initiative of the Committee
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, the Venice
Commission conducted a study on “How can children’s rights be included
in national constitutions with a view to thus promoting their effective
implementation?” (see introduction), also provided as a contribution
to the Council of Europe Strategy for the Rights of the Child (2012-2015).
4.1. General status
of children’s rights
25. The Venice Commission firstly notes that the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child constitutes the baseline
of the protection of children’s rights through international law
and the recognition of children as autonomous rights-holders. It
also emphasises that the impact of State legislation for the protection of
children’s rights and needs cannot be underestimated, not least
due to the fact that children often require representation, assistance
and support to exercise their rights.
26. Nevertheless – and here a shift in paradigms is still underway
– children should not primarily be seen as “victims” but as bearers
of individual and autonomous rights who may also contribute to the
realisation of their substantial protection rights through additional
participation rights. As with all human rights, the State is seen as
the primary duty-bearer under the CRC whilst parents as carers may
take a role in the vindication of children’s rights either directly
or in their role as advocates.
27. According to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
the Child, four general principles in particular should be given
legal standing and effect in national legal systems: non-discrimination
(Article 2); the best interests of a child as a primary consideration
in all action (Article 3); the right to life, survival and development
(Article 6); and the right to be heard in all decisions affecting
children (Article 12).
28. However, the United Nations Committee also notes that constitutionalising
children’s rights does not automatically ensure respect for the
rights of children. Against this background, as well as recent evolutions
of European societies (new threats to well-being, austerity measures
disproportionally affecting children in times of economic crisis
and leading to increasing child poverty
),
the analysis of the constitutional protection of children’s rights
in Council of Europe member States, as well as their enforcement,
was judged most useful by the Venice Commission at the outset of
their study.
4.2. Different forms
of child protection
4.2.1. Incorporation of
international law into the domestic law order
29. One of the ways of protecting children’s rights is
indirect constitutional protection through international law, namely
the incorporation of the CRC and children’s rights provisions under
Article 24 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights into
the domestic law order. In this case, a constitutional type of protection
may only be achieved if the CRC and Article 24 of the Charter are
awarded constitutional status and effect.
30. However, the status and effect of international law in national
legal systems vary from one country to another. In purely formal
terms, their normative effect would therefore be less powerful than
that of a constitutional clause on children’s rights, even though
conventions may also deploy direct effects (according to relevant
decisions taken by national law-applying authorities). For example,
the direct effect of the best-interest of the child provision in
Article 3 has been addressed quite differently by various domestic
courts, some opting in favour (France, Bulgaria), others against
direct effects (Belgium).
31. Whilst, up until now, the CRC has often been weakened by reservations
expressed by member States (often with regard to provisions of Article
14 (freedom of religion) and 21 (adoption)), there is a trend towards an
increasing number of States withdrawing reservations. Nevertheless,
the implementation of children’s rights anchored in the CRC is not
facilitated by the fact that the convention provides a fairly weak
monitoring mechanism, limited to periodic State reports. However,
much hope is currently set in the new Optional Protocol of the CRC
on a communications procedure (providing children with an individual
complaints mechanism and foreseeing inter-State communications and
systematic inquiry procedures).
32. Further children’s rights provisions are contained by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 24), but their priority over
domestic law, whilst fully recognised by the European Court of Justice,
is refused even by certain European Union member States who do not
accept that EU law infringes their “constitutional identity”. The
European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), for its part, does
not mention children’s rights explicitly but guarantees their rights
through its case law. The Convention presents the advantages of
being open to individual applications, leading to legally binding
decisions and of evolving with changes of social and family structures;
it can therefore be considered as a dynamic instrument.
4.2.2. Provisions on children
or their rights in national constitutions: scope and forms of protection
33. Only three Council of Europe member States, France,
Norway and the United Kingdom, currently have no constitutional
provision regarding children rights, for various reasons: In France,
international treaties, including the CRC, have a superior authority
to that of national legislation; the United Kingdom does not have a
written constitution, however, through the 1998 Human Rights Act
and national jurisdiction, it finds other ways of giving effect
to children’s rights; Norway’s Constitution for its part has remained
silent on children’s rights until now, but possible reforms are
currently being discussed.
34. All other member States’ constitutions do contain some sort
of provisions relating to children or their rights. The most widespread
is the right to education, which can be found in 43 constitutions.
The presence of a constitutional right to education has significant
potential to advance the indivisible rights of children, and particularly
their right to development, as education is a pre-requisite to the
enjoyment of other rights. The second most common provision concerns
the equal status of children irrespective of parentage, which can
be found in 18 constitutions, closely followed by the protection
of children from economic exploitation. Another frequently found
provision at constitutional level is the right to protection from
harm. The requirement that children should have equal status before
the law, irrespective of the marital status of their parents, is
present in the constitutions of 16 States.
35. Some Council of Europe member States have already given constitutional
expression to the general principles of the CRC, including the principle
of non-discrimination (Article 2, the most commonly represented), the
child’s right to survival and development (Article 6), the right
to be heard (Article 12) and the bests interests of the child as
a primary consideration (Article 3). However, in its study, the
Venice Commission expresses great surprise at the fact that especially
the latter “best interest principle” was set out in very few national constitutions.
36. The Venice Commission takes stock of three possible approaches
of protection of children’s rights in national constitutions: 1) children
as objects of special protection provisions; 2) children as rights-holders;
and 3) children’s rights being explicitly referred to the legislator.
Of course, referring back to the CRC as the main standard, it recommends
that all member States should follow the “modern” approach of acknowledging
the status of children as autonomous rights-holders.
37. For the experts of the Venice Commission, the highest form
of compliance with international standards would be “constitutions
that express children’s rights in a manner reflecting the indivisibility
of rights, enshrining the general principles of the CRC, recognising
the status of children as rights-holders with an entitlement to have
those rights vindicated against the State”, whilst the lowest level
of protection would be “constitutions that enshrine general human
rights protection, use merely a protection, rather than a rights-based
expression of children’s needs, and commit to weak justiciability”.
However, given that States rarely choose a single approach, but
often combine approaches, good practice in constitutionalising children’s
rights may be found in many member States.
4.2.3. Children as objects
of special protection
38. Constitutions following this approach present children
as objects of concern and give little, if any, recognition to their
agency or autonomy, but often group them with other vulnerable groups
like mothers or families. Different national approaches may be regrouped
along the following lines, some of which may appear as quite “abstract”:
- “mothers and children” are entitled
to special protection under the Constitutions of Montenegro, “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Serbia (“mothers, children and
families” in Ukraine);
- some countries tend to protect “childhood” rather than
children, for example Azerbaijan, Italy, Lithuania, and the Russian
Federation;
- “parenthood” or “the family” are protected in Portugal
and Bulgaria or the Republic of Moldova respectively;
- Croatia and Montenegro foresee the parental duty to protect
children, while the Czech Republic and Hungary assign to parents
a right to the upbringing of children, whereas many join parents’
rights and duties (Croatia, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro
and Romania).
39. Such approaches assigning a strong role to parents are not
always consistent with the CRC, which provides the State with the
responsibility of being the ultimate duty bearer. Constitutions
providing that the State also has a responsibility to support parents
and the family are therefore judged as a positive approach in this
area. Also perceived as consistent with the CRC are those constitutions
which consider that parents’ rights with regard to children are
not absolute and may be revoked from parents if it is in the best
interests of the child (as for example in Ireland, Italy and Portugal).
4.2.4. Children as autonomous
rights-holders
40. For this approach, the Venice Commission identified
different examples of rights-based language to express children’s
entitlements and needs in conformity with the CRC, but constitutions
referring explicitly to children’s rights do not seem to be numerous
across Europe. A positive example is the rights-based language of
the Hungarian Constitution, which stipulates that every child “shall
have the right to the protection and care necessary for his/her
development”.
Equally
strong formulations seem to be contained in the constitutions of Austria,
Montenegro, Slovenia and Poland. A slightly different formulation
is used by the constitution of my own country, Romania, providing
that “children, the young … have the right to special protection
by the State”. However, all these formulations reflect the status
of children as rights-holders, while making it clear that there is
an onus on the State to vindicate those rights.
41. Whilst noting these examples of a strong rights-based discourse,
the Venice Commission also notes that only a few States take such
an approach in an exclusive manner, whilst most States would follow
a mixed approach combining protection-need and rights-based expressions
(to be seen clearly in the Constitutions of Ireland, Portugal and
in particular Serbia, for example).
42. The third approach to enshrining children’s rights in constitutions
would be their referral to the legislator by undertaking, requiring
or mandating legislative or other action to protect children’s rights,
for example by requiring that the law guarantee care and protection
to children (Iceland), by providing that children are protected
by law (Lithuania), by providing that any violence against a child
shall be prosecuted by law (Ukraine) or by prescribing the supervision
of the implementation of rights of a child by the State (Azerbaijan).
Whilst such approaches stop short of giving full constitutional
status to children’s rights, their value resides in the fact that they
provide a vehicle for bringing children’s rights closer to the level
at which they may be implemented.
43. In addition to the Venice Commission’s most interesting study,
a survey undertaken by the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development via the European Centre for Parliamentary
Research and Documentation (ECPRD) in 2013 on specific child-protection
mechanisms at national level found that the Austrian, Slovenian
and Turkish Constitutions contained quite innovative provisions
on children’s rights (see respectively Articles 1-6 of the Austrian
Constitution, Articles 54-57 of the Slovenian Constitution and Articles 10,
41 and 61 of the Turkish Constitution).
5. Ensuring that practice
follows legislation
5.1. Various issues
related to the enforcement of children’s rights
44. In its comprehensive study, the Venice Commission
rightly notes that the inclusion of provisions on children’s rights
in a constitutional document only “tells part of the story” and
that a key indicator in assessing the level of constitutional protection
of children’s rights, thus their effectiveness, is the extent to
which those rights are justiciable, through courts or other mechanisms,
or enforced through other institutions ranking from specific ministries
to specialised bodies at the local level.
45. Litigation in the courts is the most obvious way of enforcement.
However, children are unlikely to know about their constitutional
rights and how to enforce them. The institution of an Ombudsperson
for Children is one possible way around this difficulty; other options
include the possibility of standing being afforded to special interest
groups. Finally, the role of parents and guardians should not be
disregarded or undermined, as long as their interests run parallel
to those of the children.
46. With regard to the practical implementation of children’s
rights through political and administrative action, we have to keep
in mind, however, that enforcing the principles of participation
and inclusion promoted by the CRC or similar standards (the Council
of Europe Guidelines on child-friendly justice, for example), will
have possible cost implications for States as they may require the
appointment of a counsel or a guardian ad
litem to present the views of the child in proceedings.
Where this is not the case, the best interests are simply to be ascertained
and held in due regard by the judge.
47. However, as highlighted by legal experts,
the best-interest
test raises additional issues: although it has a strong intuitive
appeal, the best-interest principle in reality may sometimes be
seen as inviting a court or individual involved to impose their
values or views on the child. The benefits of this standard and
its desirability as a constitutional value are therefore questionable
for some. In order to make it better known and promote it, the principle
is therefore regularly looked at in international exchanges, such
as most recently at a Council of Europe conference (co-organised
with the Belgian Chairmanship) which certainly represents a major
step forward in this matter.
48. The principles of equality and non-discrimination may also
involve some changes in resource allocation where disparities in
treatment exist, but are likely to receive significant popular and
political support initially and thus prove easier to implement following
initial analysis of existing provisions and remedying of inequalities.
49. More generally speaking, additions to, or amendments of, constitutions
in some countries require referenda. Thus, the provisions finally
constitutionalised may not reflect the precise guarantees desired
under the CRC, but more politically popular protections that are
likely to be accepted by the electorate. Even in situations in which
the guarantees have been subject to compromise, amendments may still
fail to pass at the ballot box. No politician or party wishes to
guarantee rights that it cannot be sure of being able to enforce, exposing
them to unnecessary popular and legal challenges. Post-constitutional
reforms, including dissemination of information through appropriate
means regarding the new rights and how they might be vindicated
and monitoring of implementation of the new provisions, must also
be considered. Although criminal sanctions for breach of attendant
legislation would be required, constitutional rights themselves
are largely self-executing, thus the main challenge is to ensure
that the public is aware of these rights.
50. As regards implementation of the CRC, both the State and civil
society play an important role, and effective co-ordination of the
different players is essential. The government departments responsible
for children’s rights often form part of the ministries responsible
for women’s rights, the rights of the family or social protection.
There are some States, however, which already have a ministry dedicated
exclusively to children’s rights. In my view, this is a good practice,
which other countries should adopt.
51. As rapporteur and a parliamentarian, I would also like to
recall the significance of parliamentary committees or sub-committees
relating to children’s rights within national parliaments which,
according to the ECPRD survey on specific child-protection mechanisms
(quoted above) only exist in very few Council of Europe member States,
especially in the format of standing committees.
5.2. Enforcing children’s
constitutional rights through independent human rights institutions
for children
52. Alongside other experts (see chapter 2.3 above),
the Venice Commission identifies the institution of ombudspersons
for children’s rights as an effective tool for enforcing children’s
constitutional rights, and recommends that one should be set up
by all member States. Such institutions, also denominated “independent
human rights institutions for children” have been examined and promoted
by UNICEF for a number of years; the most recent UNICEF findings
in this respect can be found in the 2012 study “Championing Children’s
Rights”.
53. In its study, UNICEF notes that independent human rights institutions
for children, such as child commissioners, ombudspersons and child
advocates, have emerged globally as influential bodies promoting and
protecting children rights. By monitoring actions by governments
and other entities, receiving complaints, providing remedies for
violation of rights and creating a space for dialogue, they act
as “champions for children” and contribute to progress in the implementation
of children rights.
54. UNICEF recommends that governments and parliaments ensure
that institutions are founded on adequate legislation. They should
also be independent, represent the best interest of the child and
be given adequate investigatory powers to perform their monitoring
role. Obviously, they should be accessible to all children and promote
child participation both in their own work and in society as such.
Obviously, governments should instruct relevant administrative departments
and public bodies at all levels to fully co-operate with them, and
should hold them accountable if this does not happen. Similarly,
parliaments should engage actively with these institutions, for
example by consulting with them when developing and adopting legislation
affecting children.
55. Moreover, UNICEF recommends that these institutions, especially
those that are a part of a broad-based human rights institution,
should review their effectiveness with regard to encouraging child
participation, in particular regarding younger and marginalised
children. For the agency, meaningful child participation must be based
on the evolving capacities of the child, that it to say different
methods need to be used and participation may have differing scope
and objectives depending on the age and situation of the child.
The institutions should also be proactive in finding methods to
increase awareness of their role among children and adults with responsibilities
towards children and be in a position to draw attention to child-accessible
complaint mechanisms.
56. Finally, UNICEF puts forward that civil society should support
these independent institutions by co-operating with them, sharing
information, supporting children and other actors in making complaints, supporting
the follow-up of recommendations and sharing technical expertise.
In particular NGOs should be “critical friends”. Likewise, donors
and intergovernmental organisations should provide technical assistance
in establishing and strengthening the institutions, raise awareness
of their role, advise on their legislative mandate and build supportive
capacities around the country.
57. Alongside the work by UNICEF in this field, other interesting
references exist for member States wishing to set up or to reinforce
such institutions. A more general reference in this field is the
Handbook on the establishment and accreditation of National Human
Rights Institutions in the European Union
, which defines the concept and
specifies the so-called “Paris Principles” also recommended by the
Venice Commission. In this Handbook, a national human rights institution
is defined as an independent body established by domestic law with
a mandate to protect and promote human rights in a State. As stated
by the United Nations Secretary-General in 2009, “[w]hen properly
established and well-functioning, these institutions are key elements
of a strong effective national human rights protection system”.
58. The Paris Principles put forward the following criteria, amongst
others, that could apply to such institutions dedicated to children:
- independence from governments;
- independence guaranteed by constitution or legislation;
- adequate powers of investigation;
- pluralism, including through membership and/or effective
co-operation;
- adequate human and financial resources.
6. Conclusions
and recommendations
59. In the light of the above in-depth exploration of
the constitutionalisation of children’s rights, including thanks
to the most valuable study undertaken by the Venice Commission upon
my committee’s request, I would like to conclude that the incorporation
of children’s rights into national constitutions is indeed an essential component
of national child policies. However, the question whether these
policies are effective or not, not only depends on the constitutional
or legal coverage of children’s rights, but mainly on how constitutions
and domestic laws protecting and promoting children’s rights are
enforced.
60. As a main recommendation to member States, I would therefore
like to propose that all governments and parliaments examine the
current state of their own constitutions and domestic laws with
regard to children’s rights, notably to see if all possibilities
for protecting children and supporting them in their development
through equal life chances have been exploited and if current legal
provisions still correspond to the reality children are facing in
their specific national context today. Wherever a need for constitutional
or legal reform processes emerges, these should be initiated as
soon as possible, ideally based on a broad approach carried by all stakeholders
concerned: public authorities, civil society and, last but not least,
children themselves in order to guarantee their right to participation.
61. However, given that the usefulness and effectiveness of constitutionalising
children’s rights also very much depends on the national societal
context, as well as legal traditions and frameworks, I would not
be in favour of prescribing the constitutional anchorage of children’s
rights for all member States, but rather incite them to consider
this as one option. I would nevertheless urge member States to re-examine
the current enforcement of children’s rights in their domestic context
and take legislative and political action wherever appropriate,
and notably where loopholes or new challenges require such action.
62. Whilst the CRC, the European Convention on Human Rights and,
since 2000, also the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
remain the main international references, both for constitutionalisation
and the enforcement of children’s rights, some inspiration may be
drawn from the most interesting studies carried out by the Venice
Commission and by UNICEF, quoted above.
63. Based on the recommendations of these two bodies, the following
action by member States therefore seems essential:
- analyse current constitutional
provisions in the light of international standards and recent developments in
a given national context;
- implement international standards through the most comprehensive
and up-to-date national legislation;
- develop appropriate and accessible enforcement mechanisms,
including access to judicial remedies and courts and specific complaint
mechanisms;
- provide constitutional guarantees for the protection and
recognition of children’s rights by:
- addressing children as autonomous rights-holders,
- ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary
consideration (Article 3 of the CRC);
- giving children the right to be heard in all decisions
affecting them (Article 12 of the CRC);
- provide strong guarantees for the enforcement of children’s
rights, including by setting up an independent human rights institution
for children (set up according to the Paris Principles);
- ensure that efficient mechanisms – judicial and non-judicial
– are in place to remedy possible violations of children’s rights,
coupled with adequate procedural safeguards
- in the light of the numerous examples of good practice
identified in many countries, continue to organise international
exchanges in this field, so that States can learn from each other
in promoting higher standards;
- ensure effective implementation of children’s rights through
specific national policies and an appropriate framework of administrative
services.
64. From a Council of Europe perspective, I would like to complete
this list by the need to further promote existing international
instruments and mechanisms in this field, such as the new Optional
Protocol of the CRC on a communications procedure, the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights, the Additional Protocol to
the European Social Charter providing for a system of collective
complaints (ETS No. 158), as well as amongst the non-binding instruments,
the Council of Europe Guidelines on child-friendly justice.
65. To conclude, I would, however, like to emphasise that acting
in the best interest of children must not be limited to positive
legal provisions and a public discourse on child protection and
development; it must be followed by concrete, real-life action showing
positive and measurable effects for our children’s well-being and their
development into fulfilled adults, based on equal opportunities
in all areas from an early age onwards, and, of course, based on
sufficient budgetary allocations to policies aimed at protecting
and promoting the rights of children.