1. Introduction
1.1. The
role of whistleblowers in an open and transparent democracy
1. Whistleblowers play a key role
in any open and transparent democracy. The recognition they are
given and the effectiveness of their protection in both law and
practice against all forms of retaliation constitute an important
democracy indicator. Their protection is essential to freedom of
expression (Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights),
without which democracy cannot function. In a genuine democracy, everyone
must be able to express themselves without fear of reprisal, within
certain limits that prohibit hate speech and intentional defamation
in particular. However, this protection requires specific legislation
that goes beyond the legislation guaranteeing freedom of expression
and of information. Effective protection of whistleblowers also
makes it possible to reduce recourse to leaking documents under
the cloak of anonymity via platforms such as WikiLeaks, which leads
to saturating the public domain with information that is often unverifiable
or manipulated and adversely affects the quality of democratic debate.
2. Moreover, the role of whistleblowers in the fight against
corruption, organised crime and money-laundering has become indisputable,
as was very clearly shown by the Assembly’s report on “Laundromats”
and
as illustrated by various scandals that have arisen in recent years
(for example, Panama Papers, LuxLeaks and Football Leaks).
3. Lastly, the role of whistleblowers has also proved crucial
in the field of security and the protection of everyone’s privacy,
as Edward Snowden demonstrated. In particular, it is the new democratic
challenges linked to the protection of personal data, risks to health
or the environment, or the misuse of new technologies, that make
it urgent for progress to be made on protecting whistleblowing.
4. Revealing serious failings in the public interest must not
remain the preserve of those citizens who are prepared to sacrifice
their personal life, and in many cases that of people close to them,
as has too often happened in the past. Sounding the alarm should
become the normal reflex of every responsible citizen who has become
aware of serious threats to the public interest.
5. It is today essential to strengthen and harmonise the legal
protection of whistleblowers throughout Europe. This must be based
on the previous work done by the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers
and take into account the “Global Principles on National Security
and the Right to Information” (the Tshwane Principles),
and also on sharing good practices
that ensure better protection of whistleblowers in practical terms,
in all sectors.
6. A major step in this direction is the European Commission
proposal for a directive on the protection of whistleblowers,
which was inspired
by the work and recommendations of the Council of Europe on this
issue. The proposal was endorsed by the European Parliament on 16
April 2019
after
difficult negotiations in the context of the “trilogue” between
the Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. The directive seeks
to guarantee a high level of protection to whistleblowers who report
breaches of EU law. It puts in place a three-channel reporting system
– internal, external and public – and effective protection against
any retaliation towards whistleblowers who have duly used one of
these reporting channels. According to the directive, whistleblowing
is a means of feeding "national and EU enforcement systems with
information leading to effective detection, investigation and prosecution
of breaches of Union law".
7. The recitals of the proposal for a European directive describe
the protection of whistleblowers in EU member States as being “fragmented”.
This description also applies to the other member States of the
Council of Europe. Large disparities remain between the different
national laws. While some national laws offer broad recognition
and protection, others provide only limited and very heterogeneous
recognition and protection, depending on the sectors concerned,
or
offer no specific protection at all. A comparison between the results of
the surveys conducted by the rapporteur of the 2015 report on the
subject, Mr Omtzigt, and by myself, via the European Centre for
Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD), shows that progress
has been made since 2014, but there is still a long way to go (see
paragraphs 89-94 below).
8. In France, until 2016, the protection afforded to whistleblowers
was only applicable on a sectoral basis, for example in the context
of fighting corruption
or conflicts of interest
and in the context of the protection
of health and the environment.
Since the entry into force of the
“Sapin II” Law,
the status of whistleblowers has
been broadly recognised in France under a general law.
This
is one of the most advanced laws of its type but will need to be
further improved to meet the requirements of the new European directive.
9. Everywhere in Europe, the protection of whistleblowers still
remains under threat because of the protection of certain interests
which may be perceived as contradictory. For example, exceptions
to the protection for whistleblowers in the interests of ensuring
secrecy of issues related to national security,
trade secrets
and the protection of personal data
may all be a threat to the status
and protection of whistleblowers. In addition, certain militant
activities, such as Greenpeace entering French nuclear power stations
to highlight security failings, raise questions about the definition
of whistleblowers.
10. When applied to the protection of whistleblowers, the European
regulation on the protection of personal data
which
recently entered into force raises, for example, the question of
striking a balance between the right to respect for private life
and to the lawful, fair and transparent processing of personal data
and the obligation to deal with
whistleblower reports,
especially by storing and processing
personal data. By introducing provisions requiring the consent of
a data subject before processing their personal data,
or by allowing them to obtain from
the controller the erasure of their personal data,
the regulation reduces the ability of
the relevant authorities to carry out an effective investigation
of the facts reported by whistleblowers.
11. Moreover, certain shortcomings and grey areas remain, even
in the legislation of member States whose protections for whistleblowers
can be generally described as well-developed. This is the case when
the information disclosed does not concern an illegal act, but one
that is morally questionable. For example, in the LuxLeaks scandal,
the tax agreements between the audit
firms and the Luxembourg tax authorities revealed to the press by
Antoine Deltour complied with Luxembourg and international law.
However, these arrangements were harmful to the general interest
as they unfairly deprived other States of substantial tax revenues
without their knowledge.
12. Similarly, the safeguards aiming to discourage malicious or
unwarranted reporting and to prevent unjustified attacks on a person's
reputation can unintentionally weaken the protection afforded to whistleblowers.
The fact that whistleblowers are
not protected against dilatory or vexatious proceedings, so-called
“gagging lawsuits” or “strategic lawsuits against public participation”
(SLAPPs) designed to intimidate them or wear them down financially
with lengthy and repetitive judicial proceedings, also remains a
problem in Council of Europe member States (with the exception of
France).
1.2. Plan
and objectives of the report, acknowledgements
13. The main part of my report
will first of all set out the “acquis” of the Council of Europe
with regard to the protection of whistleblowers (section 2). I will
then describe the new elements introduced by the recent proposal for
a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
subject, which primarily concerns EU member States (section 3).
While setting out the key aspects of the draft directive, I will
develop several proposals aimed at clarifying and supplementing
the future regulations at national level that will hopefully result from
the transposition of the directive throughout Europe.
14. My analysis and proposals are broadly inspired by the “48-hour
whistleblower challenge” that I organised with regional civil society
in Strasbourg on 14-15 March. During those two days, meetings took
place with numerous whistleblowers, lawyers, researchers from the
University of Strasbourg and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration,
NGO representatives, trade unionists and local and regional councillors.
I naturally also took account of the contributions made by the experts
participating in the two hearings which I organised for the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, in January 2019 with Ms Anna
Myers and Mr Christophe Speckbacher and in May 2019 with Ms Virginie
Rozière, Ms Nicole-Marie Meyer and Mr Jean-Philippe Foegle. I wish
to thank all these experts for their contributions and their co-operation
throughout the preparation of this report.
15. As a French member of parliament, I would briefly like to
describe the legal situation in my country following the adoption
of the Sapin II Law and the law transposing the European Trade Secrets
Directive (section 4). In the conclusion, I will summarise the results
of the survey I conducted among Council of Europe member States
via the ECPRD network. This will show the extent of the work that
remains to be done and to which our draft resolution makes a modest
contribution.
2. The “acquis” of the Council of Europe
with regard to the protection of whistleblowers
16. The “acquis” of the Council
of Europe is based on the previous work done by the Assembly and
the Committee of Ministers and, in particular, on the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights.
2.1. Previous
work of the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers on the subject
of whistleblowers
17. On several occasions the Assembly
has asserted the importance of whistleblowing in democratic societies.
It has played an active part in the development and promotion of
guiding principles on the protection of whistleblowers and worked
to ensure that member States adopt a comprehensive and consistent
approach on this issue in their legislation.
18. In 2010, its
Resolution
1729 (2010) invited all member States of the Council of Europe to
review their domestic legislation concerning the protection of whistleblowers,
keeping in mind a number of guiding principles.
In its
Recommendation
1916 (2010), the Assembly also recommended that the Committee of Ministers
draw up a set of guidelines
for the protection
of whistleblowers.
19. In 2013, in its
Resolution
1954 (2013) and its
Recommendation
2024 (2013) on national security and access to information, the
Assembly expressed its support for the “Global Principles on National
Security and the Right to Information” (Tshwane Principles)
in
order to ensure the protection against retaliation of whistleblowers
who in good faith disclose wrongdoing in the area of national security
which is contrary to human rights and the public interest.
20. In 2015
the Assembly welcomed the adoption
by the Committee of Ministers of
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)7 on the protection of whistleblowers, which “recommends that member States have in place
a normative, institutional and judicial framework to protect whistleblowers”.
The recommendation advises member States to adopt “a comprehensive
and coherent approach to facilitating public interest reporting
and disclosures” (paragraph 7) and broadly, although not completely,
reflects the position expressed by the Assembly in 2010.
21. The 2015 report identified a number of shortcomings in Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)7. In particular, the recommendation excludes from its
scope intelligence activities in the national security sector by
allowing the application of "special schemes or rules, including
modified rights and obligations" to information "relating to national
security, defence, intelligence, public order or international relations
of the State" (paragraph 5). In its
Resolution
2060 (2015) the Assembly called on member States to “enact whistle-blower
protection laws also covering employees of national security or
intelligence services and of private firms working in this field”.
It
Recommendation
2073 (2015) also encouraged States to take steps to draft a binding
legal instrument (framework convention), which would be negotiated
under the auspices of the Council of Europe. This convention should
be designed to provide potential whistleblowers with equivalent
legal protection regardless of where they live or where they make
a disclosure.
2.2. A
Convention on the protection of whistleblowers?
22. In its 2015 report, the Assembly
proposed the drawing up of a Council of Europe convention on the subject.
In its reply to Assembly
Recommendation
2073 (2015) the Committee of
Ministers mentioned the “existing international legal framework
that protects whistle-blowers from any form of retaliation” (paragraph 3).
“Without
ruling out the possible preparation of a convention in the longer
term”, the Committee of Ministers considered that it was “more appropriate
[...] for the Council of Europe to continue to support the promotion
and implementation of Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7” (paragraph 5)
so as “to guide member States when reviewing relevant legislation
and institutional set-ups aimed at protecting those who alert the
public and/or competent authorities to potential threats or harm
to the public interest” (paragraph 4).
23. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that it would be useful to
agree on a binding legal instrument to protect all individuals who
denounce wrongdoing that may violate the rights of other individuals
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”).
A new convention on whistleblowers would prevent the scope of legislation
being restricted to specific sectors of activity and ensure that
the various situations are covered on a broad and exhaustive basis.
For instance, the Committee of Ministers defines whistleblowers through
their employment relationships. This excludes the protection of
any other individuals not in employment relationships, but who become
aware of a threat or harm to the public interest and would be just
as liable to potential retaliation. Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7
could clearly serve as a starting point that ultimately led to the
drafting of a convention. That convention should also draw on the
recent proposal for a European directive on this subject by taking
account of the adoption of the new European data protection regulation
and the need to regulate gagging (SLAPP) lawsuits, which are still
an issue today. It would be a basis for the creation of independent
whistleblower authorities in every country that ratifies it.
24. On the eve of the Council of Europe’s 70th anniversary, a
convention on the protection of whistleblowers would show the determination
to enshrine the greater protection of whistleblowers in the legislation
of the States Parties to the ECHR. Protection needs to be strengthened,
particularly in the fields of public safety, corruption and finance.
The negotiations need not start from scratch as the new European
directive provides a sound basis, common to all Council of Europe
member States that also belong to the European Union.
25. A convention on the protection of whistleblowers would make
it possible to stabilise and harmonise the law in this area, which
is our main objective. Other legal means that form part of the Council
of Europe’s arsenal could also be employed to achieve this objective.
For example, the adoption of an additional protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights would help the European Court of Human
Rights to further develop its case law on the subject and, as a
result, impose binding common rules in all States Parties to the
Convention. Another possibility would be the adoption of an additional
protocol to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 174),
the aim being to expand and redraft more precisely Article 9 of
that instrument dealing with the protection of whistleblowers. The
advantage of such a protocol would be that its implementation would
be monitored by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
I personally prefer a special convention on the protection of whistleblowers.
An additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
would risk jeopardising the Court’s existing case law, especially
that based on Article 10 (see below), as long as not all States
Parties to the Convention had ratified the protocol. Moreover, the
solution of an additional protocol to the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption would risk unduly limiting the protection of whistleblowers
to the sector of fighting corruption, although the existence of
a ready-made (and effective!) monitoring mechanism such as GRECO
is not without its attractions.
2.3. Recent
case law of the European Court of Human Rights
26. The ECHR and the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) remain a key source for
the protection of whistleblowers, through the application of Article
10 of the Convention, which protects freedom of expression and the
right to information. The Assembly 2015 report summarised the case
law of the Court, which consistently seeks "to balance freedom of
expression and information, especially when denouncing misconduct,
including unlawful actions and human rights violations, and the
duty to maintain national security-related information secret [...]
in the interests of territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others”.
As
far as pre-2015 case law is concerned, I refer to the last report.
27. In the recent case of
Catalan v.
Romania the
applicant, a civil servant who worked for the National Council for
the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS), had provided the national
daily newspaper, Libertatea, with documents from the archives of
the Securitate, the Communist-era secret police. The documents concerned
T., the patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church then in office,
and involved allegations of homosexuality and membership of the
Legion, an anti-Semitic fascist movement active between the two
world wars. The applicant was dismissed for misconduct by the CNSAS
disciplinary board. The Court concluded unanimously that the applicant's
dismissal was not a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR.
28. While the Court held that Mr Catalan's dismissal from the
civil service constituted interference with the exercise of his
right to respect for freedom of expression, it also considered that,
in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the
interference was “prescribed by law” (paragraph 49) and pursued
two legitimate aims: preventing the disclosure of confidential information
and protecting the rights of others (paragraph 55), i.e. those of
individuals included in the archives managed by the CNSAS. It considered
that the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” because
the civil service required of its staff a duty of loyalty and discretion
and that certain manifestations of the right to freedom of expression
that might be legitimate in other contexts were not legitimate in
the workplace (paragraph 58).
29. Moreover, the fact that Mr Catalan had been able to join the
civil service again as a teacher after his dismissal led the Court
to conclude that his dismissal had not been a disproportionate sanction.
The severity of the sanction was one of the six criteria set out
by the Court in the cases of
Guja v.
Moldova and
later
Heinisch v. Germany, Bucur and Toma v. Romania and
Matùz v. Hungary for
the purpose of determining whether the interference with the applicant's
right to freedom of expression, in particular the right to impart information,
was “necessary in a democratic society”.
30. In February 2008 the Court delivered a judgment in the aforementioned
Guja case concerning the initial dismissal
of the applicant following whistleblowing activities. In the judgment
the Court recognised Mr Guja as a whistleblower. Following the 2008
judgment, the domestic courts ordered his reinstatement in his previous post.
Ten days later, however, he received a dismissal order based on
a provision of domestic law, the reason given being the appointment
of a new prosecutor general. In
Guja
v. Republic of Moldova (No. 2) the
Court again held that Article 10.2 of the ECHR had been violated,
taking the view that the interference with his right to freedom
of expression was not necessary in a democratic society.
31. The “Guja” test and the related case law are reflected in
the Tshwane Principles. The benefit of ensuring that the Guja test
is incorporated in member States' legislation is all the greater
since all domestic courts should take account of the Court's case
law, even when it arises from judgments concerning other member
States, so as to avoid judgments finding against their governments
(
res interpretata).
32. The Grand Chamber judgment in
Medžlis
Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina concerned
the civil conviction for defamation of four non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) based on a letter they had sent to the highest authorities
of their district to complain about a person’s candidature for the
post of director of the Brčko district multi-ethnic radio station.
The letter was in response to information received by the NGOs from
station employees. The Grand Chamber held, by eleven votes to six, that
there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention relating
to freedom of expression, basing its decision on Article 10, paragraph
2, which refers to the protection of the reputation of others. The
nature of the statements was indeed such that they seriously called
into question the ability of the person concerned to fill the vacant
post. The Grand Chamber affirmed that the applicants could not be
regarded as whistleblowers and that it was not necessary in that
particular case to determine their status. However, according to
the six judges who voted to find a violation of Article 10 the NGOs
acted as quasi-whistleblowers. In the opinion of these judges, reporting
alleged misconduct to the authorities in question in a private letter
required “the application of a more subjective and lenient approach
than in completely different factual situations” (paragraph 82).
33. In the
Berlusconi v. Italy case
the Court emphasised
the importance of the protection of whistleblowers, citing GRECO’s
conclusions on the fight against corruption published on 1 July
2013 (paragraph 52).
34. A pending case worth following is that of
Robert Norman v. the United Kingdom. This case
involves the sale of information to a journalist by a prison officer.
The applicant was arrested and charged with misconduct in public
office. The UK court ruled that he was not a real whistleblower.
The ruling mentioned the fact that not all of the information sold
by the applicant was in the public interest and that some details
were aimed solely at attacking the prison governor; that the applicant
was motivated by financial interests; and that, as a union representative,
he could have sought to have matters addressed through official
channels.
3. The
proposal for a European directive
35. On 16 April 2019, the European
Parliament adopted a proposal for a directive on the protection
of persons reporting on breaches of Union law. This text was a response
to two resolutions of the European Parliament
condemning
the lack at EU level of a minimum level of protection for whistleblowers.
36. The proposal for a EU directive draws, in particular, on the
case law of the Court relating to Article 10 of the ECHR and Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers on the protection of whistleblowers
(para. 32). The latter broadly reflects the positions expressed
by the Assembly in its
Resolution 1729
(2010) and its
Recommendation
1916 (2010).
37. This draft directive represents real progress for all EU member
States, which are legally required to transpose it into their domestic
law. In formal terms, it only applies to persons who “blow the whistle”
on breaches of EU law, but there is no reason for member States
to exclude breaches of their national law from the scope of their
transposition laws. Once the necessary structures have been created,
it would be an aberration that national law should not benefit from
the same protections as European law. Moreover, States that are
not (or not yet) members of the EU have every reason to bring their
own protection of whistleblowers up to the level in force in the
EU. These are two key points that I have also included in the draft
resolution. Before beginning a critical appraisal of the draft directive,
I wish to stress the importance of the involvement of the European
Parliament’s rapporteur on this question, Ms Virginie Rozière, and
the role she has played in the process of negotiating this key text.
I would like to thank her for presenting the main achievements of
this document to our committee at its meeting on 29 May 2019.
3.1. Material
and personal scope
38. The draft directive obliges
EU member States to adopt common minimum standards for the protection of
persons reporting “unlawful activities or abuse of EU law” which
may result in serious harm for the public interest in the areas
listed in Article 2 of the draft directive. Article 2 (a) mentions,
inter alia, public procurement, financial services, product and
transport safety, protection of the environment, public health and
public security. Breaches of human rights and infringements in other
areas referred to in Tshwane Principle 37 are not expressly mentioned,
but, according to the recitals of the draft directive, the enumeration
in Article 2 can be extended in future (see recital 108), and member
States are free to include other areas in the transposition legislation.
Furthermore, in protecting disclosures regarding abuses of law the
draft directive does not confine itself to protecting disclosures
concerning illegal activities in the strict sense (Article 1).
39. The draft directive does not cover the disclosure of information
relating to national security, like
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 (paragraph 5). In 2015 the Assembly
considered this
exception too broad, especially in the absence of a definition of
“national security”. It emphasised the need to avoid intelligence agencies
covering up serious human rights violations by improperly classifying
all related information as matters of “national security”. As the
EU lacks jurisdiction in this area, it is therefore up to the member
States themselves to work to develop specific legislation on a matter
that cannot be dealt with in the general context of whistleblowers.
In order to guide these efforts, I propose in the draft resolution
that people working in the area of national security should be able
to rely on legislation providing better guidance regarding criminal prosecutions
for breaches of state secrecy in conjunction with a public interest
defence. The courts, which have to decide whether the public interest
justifies “blowing the whistle”, should themselves have access to
all relevant information in order to reach a determination, in accordance
with the “Tshwane Principles” on national security and the right
to information, already supported by the Assembly in its above-mentioned
Resolution 1954 (2013).
40. In terms of personal scope, the provisions of the draft directive
go beyond those recommended by the Committee of Ministers
and apply to all types of employment
relationships irrespective of their nature, and whether or not the
individual is paid, including employment relationships that have
ended or not yet begun. The proposal also protects legal entities
for which whistleblowers work, such as trade unions or NGOs, as
well as shareholders, suppliers, consultants and self-employed persons.
The future directive will thus offer protection to all whistleblowers
working in the private or public sector who acquired information
on breaches in a work-related context in the broad sense (Article
4).
41. In the context of a future Convention on the protection of
whistleblowers it will therefore be essential to introduce a broader
definition of a whistleblower than in the Committee of Ministers’
Recommendation, so as to include situations outside employment relationships
in the strict sense and cover the entire work-related context. Furthermore,
as we heard during the “48-hour whistleblower challenge” in Strasbourg,
it is necessary to protect individuals or legal entities that pass
on in good faith information received from persons who want to remain
anonymous. In this case, too, the whistleblower, such as a researcher,
journalist or NGO official, could be personally affected by measures
of retaliation.
However, whistleblowers in the true
sense, namely people who report information they have personally
obtained in the context of their employment, should be distinguished
from witnesses and “reporting auxiliaries”, such as a journalists
or NGO officials, who examine and, if appropriate, pass on information
received from whistleblowers. Witnesses and “reporting auxiliaries” also
deserve increased protection, which is also in the interests of
the whistleblower who initiated their report provided that they
act responsibly. The protection of these individuals is very important,
especially when they are put under pressure to reveal the whistleblower’s
identity. However, they are not themselves whistleblowers in the
strict sense.
3.2. Choice
between internal and external reporting procedures
42. Article 6 of the draft directive
provides for three reporting channels: internal (Articles 7 to 9),
external (to the competent authorities - Articles 10 to 14) and
public (via the media - Article 15). The compromise solution adopted
in the context of the “trilogue” no longer mentions the obligation
to report information internally before making an external or public
report. The whistleblower can choose from the outset between an
internal report and contacting the competent authorities (for example
the prosecution service or the supervisory or regulatory authorities).
Three months after an external report, he or she can make a public
disclosure if the external report has produced no result (Article
15, paragraph 1). In justified cases (imminent threat to the public
interest with a risk of irreversible damage, or if there is an obvious
risk of retaliation or collusion with the perpetrator of the violation
in the case of an external report), an immediate public disclosure
is also protected.
43. This solution, obtained after a hard fight by the European
Parliament against the resistance of several “major countries” within
the Council, corresponds to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. The
Guja judgment
pertinently points out that
“in a democratic system the acts or omissions of government must be
subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial
authorities but also of the media and public opinion. The interest
which the public may have in particular information can sometimes
be so strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of confidence”.
3.3. The
internal reporting channel: required attributes
44. Whistleblowers are generally
encouraged to give priority to the internal reporting channel if
available and if the whistleblower can reasonably expect it to function
properly. According to the European Parliament resolution on the
proposal for a EU directive, this principle “should help foster
a culture of good communication and corporate social responsibility
in organisations, whereby reporting persons are considered as significantly contributing
to self-correction and excellence” (recital 47). In this context
it should be emphasised that national laws should also “institutionalise”
as far as possible the protection of what is in everyday life the
most natural and most frequently used channel of communication employed
by people who discover problems in connection with their work, namely
communication through the chain of command.
45. Article 8 of the draft directive requires member States to
“ensure that legal entities in the private and in the public sector
establish internal channels and procedures for reporting and following
up on reports”, which is in keeping with the recommendations of
the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. These criteria take account
of the size of the entities and also, in the case of private entities,
the risks which their activities pose to the public interest. Small
and micro-companies (less than 50 employees) are exempted from establishing such
internal reporting procedures, unless they operate in the area of
financial services.
Article
11 adds an obligation for member States to set up appropriate external
reporting channels, which must be independent and responsive.
46. In the light of the results of our “48-hour whistleblower
challenge”, I would like to add that those to whom the employer
delegates the task of receiving reports should enjoy legal privilege
(professional confidentiality, in the same way as lawyers) so that
whistleblowers can have full confidence and the person delegated
cannot be forced by their employer to disclose their identity. A
second point I would add concerns the quality of the internal channel:
those who receive and/or investigate reports should be sufficiently
qualified and independent and report directly to top management,
which will increase the legitimacy of this channel and prevent senior management
from plausibly denying having had any knowledge of the information
reported.
3.4. Ensuring
effective follow-up to reports
47. Genuine whistleblowers are
motivated by the desire to change something. Articles 9, 11 and
13 of the draft directive, which seek to ensure that internal and
external reports are followed up, should therefore be welcomed.
As far as external reporting procedures are concerned, the draft
directive is in line with the position of the Assembly and Tshwane
Principle 39 in that it requires States to establish “independent
and autonomous external reporting channels” (Article 12, paragraph
1) which are both secure and ensure confidentiality (recital 74).
The Assembly’s criticism
of the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation
is thus taken into account by the draft directive.
48. The draft directive also adopts the Assembly’s position
regarding
the independent body’s investigatory powers concerning the subject-matter
of the external reporting. In Article 11 the draft text calls for
the competent authorities to be given such powers. It even gives
whistleblowers the right to demand a personal meeting with those
responsible in connection with the follow-up given to their reports.
In the transposition laws it would be helpful to state that the
investigations in question should be “thorough, prompt, impartial
and effective”, in line with the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights on “procedural violations” of Articles 2 and 3 of
the ECHR.
49. The draft directive also provides for “a reasonable timeframe,
not exceeding three months following the report, to provide feedback
to the reporting person about the follow-up to the report” in the
case of internal reporting (Article 9(1)f) and “a reasonable timeframe
not exceeding three months or six months in duly justified cases”
in the case of external reporting (Article 11(2)d). The imposition
of these timeframes is generally positive, but when reporting takes
place within a corrupt organisation this waiting period, from the whistleblower’s
point of view, can be misused in order to intimidate the informer
or remove the evidence.
Hence the importance
of enabling the whistleblower to refer a matter directly to an external
authority and, in justified cases, to contact the media.
50. The draft directive leaves it to the member States to determine
the authorities competent to receive and follow up on external reports.
That may cause problems if the “competent authorities” set up do
not possess the necessary expertise and are too few in number and
susceptible to political influences. In Malta, for example, the
“competent authority” to receive external reports is the Prime Minister’s
office.
It is therefore important
for national transposition laws to clarify that all whistleblowers
are protected if they send their report to any authority that they
have reasonable grounds for believing is competent to deal with
the information reported.
3.5. Confidentiality
and anonymity: how should personal data be dealt with?
51. Article 12 of the draft directive
provides that for external reporting channels to be considered independent
and autonomous they must meet a number of criteria, including the
ability to store information on a long-term basis so as to enable
substantive investigations. Article 18 accordingly provides for
record-keeping of reports received. The storage of such data may,
however, conflict with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection
of personal data, which recently came into force. It requires the
consent of the persons concerned to the processing of their personal
data and also enables them to secure their deletion. Article 17
of the draft reiterates that any processing of data pursuant to
the directive must be in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
52. The difficulty will arise when it becomes necessary to balance
the imperatives of protecting individuals' personal data and the
needs of reporting and investigatory mechanisms. If, for instance,
an investigation into a report of wrongdoing proves unsuccessful
due to lack of evidence, the company would be required to delete the
data concerning the individual against whom the accusations had
been levelled. Nevertheless, a succession of reports, even when
unsubstantiated, could still be indicative of wrongdoing. Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 remains vague about the adaptation of reporting procedures
to its provisions. It is therefore desirable for member States to
agree on the best means of ensuring that mechanisms for reporting
and for protecting whistleblowers comply with the Regulation on
the protection of personal data and, conversely, that the Regulation
is not used to dissuade whistleblowers.
53. As far as data protection is concerned, the Tshwane Principles,
which were endorsed by the Assembly, provide that “the names and
other personal data of victims, their relatives and witnesses may
be withheld from disclosure to the general public to the extent
necessary to prevent further harm to them, if the persons concerned
or, in the case of deceased persons, their family members, expressly
and voluntarily request withholding, or withholding is otherwise
manifestly consistent with the person's own wishes or the particular needs
of vulnerable groups. Concerning victims of sexual violence, their
express consent to disclosure of their names and other personal
data should be required. Child victims (under age 18) should not
be identified to the general public.” These common-sense rules may
be useful guidelines for the member States in the transposition
of the future directive.
54. In keeping with paragraph 18 of the Committee of Ministers’
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7, the draft directive aims to protect
the confidential nature of the whistleblower’s identity (Article
16) and provides for penalties in the event of failure to fulfil
this obligation (Article 23 (d)). The draft directive goes further
than simply protecting the confidentiality of the identity of the
whistleblower (who should in principle be known to the internal or
external body charged with receiving reports). Article 5, paragraph
3 of the draft directive also provides for the protection of an
anonymous whistleblower (which is important if his or her identity
is discovered), while leaving it to the member States’ discretion
whether or not to impose an obligation to follow up on anonymous reports
(Articles 5, paragraph 2 and 9 (e)).
3.6. Protection
of reporting persons and the persons affected by reports: good faith,
penalties, forbidden types of retaliation, burden of proof, effective
remedy
55. The conditions for the protection
of reporting persons provided for in the draft directive (Article
5) are consistent with the Assembly's guiding principles, which
recommend that “all bona fide warnings against various types of
unlawful acts” should be taken into account.
Article 5(1)a requires
whistleblowers to have “reasonable grounds to believe” that the
information reported was true and fell within the material scope
of the directive at the time of reporting.
3.6.1. Penalties
in cases of false reporting
56. In contrast, under Article
23, paragraph 2 of the draft directive member States may provide
for "effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties” applicable
to persons making false reports. These penalties include compensation
for “persons who have suffered damage from malicious or abusive
reports or disclosures”. This provision, which is consistent with
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7,
is the
“counterbalance”, for the benefit of victims of false reports, of
the strong protection afforded by the draft directive to whistleblowers
who act in good faith. The provision may, however, appear superfluous,
since the protection of whistleblowers is already confined to “bona
fide” reports and member States’ national law already includes measures
punishing defamation, for instance.
57. It is of prime importance that the whistleblower is de facto
presumed to have acted in good faith as long as he or she has reasonable
grounds for believing that the information concerned is truthful
and that reporting or revealing it is necessary in the public interest.
In my opinion, Articles 5, paragraph 1, 15 paragraph 1 and 21, paragraph
2 meet this condition, provided that the national transposition
laws clarify the definition of “reasonable belief” in accordance
with the usual legal definition, whereby it is sufficient that other
people with equivalent education, knowledge and experience
could be of the same opinion
or that the whistleblower had reasonable
grounds for believing the truth of what he or she reported. The
juxtaposition of other subjective criteria relating to the whistleblower’s
motivation (for example, not being motivated by a grievance or by
the prospect of a personal advantage, or having acted “responsibly”)
is dangerous as it is unpredictable with regard to its application
by the courts.
3.6.2. Criminal
and civil immunity also for the acquisition of the information
58. Article 21 of the draft directive
in principle extends the whistleblower’s criminal or civil immunity
to the acquisition of the information reported, provided that the
acquisition does not in itself constitute a separate offence. The
recitals (94) clarify that this immunity must cover cases in which
whistleblowers legally have access to the documents whose content
they report or of which they transmit a copy, or cases involving
a whistleblower removing documents from his or her employer’s place
of business. However, the immunity must also apply when the whistleblower
acts in breach of a confidentiality clause or accesses information
or documents outside his or her normal professional duties. Whistleblowers
only lose their immunity when they commit a physical break-in or
engage in hacking.
59. The implementation of this principle risks being rendered
more complicated by widespread digitisation and the growing criminalisation
of all those who access digital information without permission.
Efforts should therefore be made to limit this criminalisation to
computer hacking that is perpetrated for personal gain and has nothing
to do with reporting information in the public interest. I have
included this in the draft resolution.
3.6.3. Protection
against any form of retaliation, burden of proof, penalties
60. Article 19 of the draft directive
sets out an extensive, non-exclusive list of various forms of direct
or indirect retaliation which are prohibited. Here it is entirely
consistent with the recommendations made by the Committee of Ministers
(Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 paragraph 21), the Assembly (
Resolution 1729 (2010) paragraph 6.2.2) and the Tchwane Principles (Principle
41).
61. As far as the burden of proof is concerned, the draft directive
provides that whistleblowers only need to prove that they have made
a protected report and subsequently suffered prejudice. It is then
up to employers to prove that their action with adverse effects
for the whistleblower is based on duly justified grounds (Article 21,
paragraph 5). The draft directive goes further than the Committee
of Ministers' recommendation (paragraph 25) and is in line with
the Assembly’s position
in this regard.
62. However, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding that
a “duly justified ground” can excuse the intention to retaliate,
it is important for transposition laws to clarify this wording.
The recitals of the draft directive point the way forward (recital
95): the person who has taken the detrimental action must prove
that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the whistleblower’s report.
63. The draft directive imposes the introduction of criminal,
civil or administrative penalties, in addition to possible damages,
against people who retaliate against whistleblowers. This echoes
the “downside risk” that the Assembly has long been advocating.
64. The draft directive will ensure that whistleblowers will not
“lose out through winning” as they are guaranteed to be reinstated
and to receive damages to compensate them for the prejudice suffered.
65. An important element of the protection from all forms of retaliation
is protection from “gagging procedures” aimed at intimidating whistleblowers
and wearing them down. Recital 93 of the draft directive states
that the right to report under the directive removes all restrictions
and threats, including those based on contractual non-disclosure
clauses, trade secrets, data protection laws, copyright or breach
of contract proceedings – provided that the whistleblower has “reasonable
grounds” to believe that the report was necessary in order to put
an end to the abuses in question.
3.6.4. In
particular: temporary measures to avoid irreparable damage
66. The draft directive also provides
for interim relief measures, to avoid a fait
accompli causing harm to the whistleblower following
lengthy proceedings on the merits even if he or she wins the case
(Article 21, paragraph 6). This is a particularly important point
and is also mentioned in the draft resolution, because the possibility
of interim measures removes the advantage that an employer acting
in bad faith would have in bringing long adversarial proceedings
that could be very costly for the whistleblower and discourage many
whistleblowers (see recital 98 of the draft directive). Transposition
laws should therefore clarify that the alleged retaliation must be
blocked until the end of the proceedings on the merits of the case
whenever the presumed whistleblower succeeds in providing prima facie proof of his or her
status.
3.7. Legal
and psychological support measures
67. In Article 20, paragraph 1,
the draft directive requires member States to give (potential) whistleblowers access
to support measures, including free and independent advice. The
competent authorities (responsible for dealing with external reporting)
are obliged to provide effective assistance and to certify that
whistleblowers who contact them are legally protected. Governments
are also obliged to provide legal aid in criminal cases and cross-border
civil cases. Lastly, the draft directive encourages States to provide
whistleblowers with financial and psychological support.
68. Such support measures are extremely important. They were also
mentioned by many participants in the “48-hour whistleblower challenge”
that I organised with regional civil society in Strasbourg on 14-15
March 2019. The participants ─ whistleblowers, lawyers, researchers
from the University of Strasbourg and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration,
NGO representatives, trade unionists and local and regional councillors
─ emphasised that whistleblowers feel isolated and face tremendous
pressures ─ professional, financial, psychological and domestic.
We discussed practical ways of providing such support, some of which
are mentioned in the draft directive.
69. It is all the more regrettable that the final proposal for
a EU directive no longer mentions the whistleblower’s right to be
represented by a trade union or the protection of non-governmental
organisations that work with whistleblowers. I think that proper
protection should also be given to “reporting surrogates” (see paragraph
41 above). These individuals, especially investigative journalists
and NGO activists, if they do their work responsibly, play an important
role as “filters” of information reported by whistleblowers and
also protect whistleblowers, whose anonymity they can safeguard.
I have therefore included this point in the draft resolution.
70. The role of civil society is crucial when it comes to helping
and supporting whistleblowers, as well as becoming involved in drafting
legislation. It is a fact that the States which have done the most
to involve civil society players are those with the best laws in
this area. Individuals can also feel more secure with representatives
of bodies such as NGOs when intending to blow the whistle. These
players have a vital role in helping whistleblowers to act, especially
when it comes to sorting the data relevant to the public interest objective
pursued and thus avoiding the disclosure of irrelevant information,
such as a person’s sexual orientation or the identity of undercover
agents. The independent authorities that should be set up would
have the task of encouraging the participation of these non-institutional
players and would draw on their work and expertise.
3.8. Establishment
of an administrative authority responsible for assisting whistleblowers
71. The draft directive provides
for the establishment of independent external reporting channels
tasked with receiving external reports and conducting the necessary
investigations (Articles 11 and 12).
72. In each member State, an independent whistleblower authority
would be set up, possibly on the basis of the aforementioned future
convention. It would be one of the keys to the effective protection
of whistleblowers and would make it possible to:
- help whistleblowers, especially
by investigating allegations of retaliation and failure to follow
up on reports and, when necessary, by reinstating the whistleblower
in all his or her rights, including full redress for all adverse
treatment suffered;
- ensure that a report made has every chance of achieving
results, whatever the interests at stake, by condemning any attempts
at a cover-up. This role is particularly crucial where powerful
economic or political actors intervene and create disproportionate
pressure regarding the disclosure and/or on the whistleblower;
- provide a link with the judicial authorities as a reliable
source of material evidence in connection with judicial proceedings.
An independent authority will therefore be able (in the same way
as authorities acting as defenders of citizens’ rights) to intervene
in legal proceedings so as to give its analysis of a case and provide
elements of assessment regarding the reporting and the action taken
by the whistleblower.
73. These independent authorities would be instrumental in establishing
a genuine European network that would make it possible to share
good practices and exchange experience regarding challenges faced
and difficulties encountered in their work. They would accordingly
constitute an independent European observatory, which would act
on a daily basis to ensure that whistleblowers and the alarms they
sound are accorded their rightful place in our democracies. In its
own field, this network of independent authorities would be a prime interlocutor
for the Council of Europe.
74. These independent authorities will also be able to foster
the emergence in civil society of an ecosystem that encourages support
for whistleblowers, by drawing in particular on networks of voluntary
organisations and the commitment of community volunteers. This ecosystem
is essential in order to overcome the isolation faced by all whistleblowers
and back them in their efforts, as well as to bring about changes
in national legislation. In the context of whistleblowing and the
protection of whistleblowers, the drafting of legislation together
with civil society is a particularly appropriate approach.
3.9. Transparency
and follow-up
75. The draft directive (Article
27) obliges member States to report on the impact of reports made
by whistleblowers. In my opinion, national laws should clarify that
information should also be collected and published on, in particular,
the number of proceedings brought, the time taken to reach decisions,
outcomes (cases won or lost by whistleblowers) and measures taken
to punish retaliation. This information is necessary in order to
assess the good functioning of the laws in question, thus facilitating
a comparison between the member States in order to improve the sharing
of good practices and to correct bad ones.
3.10. Whistleblowers’
right of asylum
76. A point not mentioned in the
draft directive (as the EU lacks jurisdiction in this area) should
nonetheless be taken into account in future national legislation,
namely conferring on whistleblowers the right of asylum if they
risk being persecuted in their countries for exercising their freedom
of expression (Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
Essentially, that should not pose a problem under the law as it stands,
but proper procedure requires an asylum application to be made in
the territory of the intended host country. In my opinion, exceptions
should be possible in special cases, such as that of Edward Snowden,
who was no longer able to travel after his passport was cancelled
by the American authorities. I confess that I was very moved by
the exchange of views with Mr Snowden, by videoconference, during
the “48-hour whistleblower challenge”. He blew the whistle on an
illegal and secret practice that concerns all of us, namely the
mass surveillance of our communications by the NSA and others. He
took this action while risking his career and even his personal
freedom but without losing his optimism, his love of his country
and his strong commitment to the protection of future whistleblowers.
I therefore fully endorse the “case study” by Pieter Omtzigt in
his 2015 report and the appeal made by the Assembly in its
Resolution 2060 (2015) to the American authorities to allow Edward Snowden
to return to his country without fear of criminal prosecution under
such conditions that would not allow him to raise a public interest
defence.
4. Case
study: France
4.1. The
law of 9 December 2016 on transparency, anti-corruption measures
and the modernisation of economic life
77. The law of 9 December 2016
on transparency, anti-corruption measures and the modernisation
of economic life (Sapin II Law),
established a confirmed definition
of “whistleblower” in France. This is one of the most advanced laws
in Europe and is on a par with the UK legislation. The Sapin II
Law also lays down a three-stage reporting procedure which whistleblowers
must follow and establishes a common protection system, thereby
ending sector-based protection of whistleblowers in France.
78. Section 6 of the law defines a whistleblower as “any individual
who reveals or reports, acting selflessly and in good faith, a crime
or an offence, a serious and clear violation of an international
commitment which has been ratified or approved by France or of a
unilateral act of an international organisation adopted on the basis of
such commitment, or a serious breach of a law or regulation, or
a serious threat or serious harm to the public interest, of which
the individual has personally become aware”.
79. The personal and material scope of the law is very broad.
It covers “all individuals” and, in addition to unlawful acts, includes
any “serious threats or harm to the public interest”. This aspect
of the French legislation is interesting in the light of cases such
as the LuxLeaks scandal.
80. However, in excluding from the protected reporting arrangements
“facts, information or documents, in whatever form or on whatever
medium, classified on national security grounds or covered by medical
secrecy or legal privilege”, the scope of protection afforded by
section 6 is narrower than that advocated by the Assembly,
which
recommends that protection be extended to members of intelligence
services, who, like other public officials or private-sector employees,
may also become aware of serious wrongdoing in the context of their
employment relations. The confidential nature of the relevant information
should not automatically preclude protected disclosures, as administrative
authorities could otherwise escape from any type of public scrutiny
by classifying information in an unwarranted manner. That is why
it is necessary to have specific legislation for people who work
in the area of national security. Such legislation would provide
better guidance regarding criminal prosecutions for breaches of
state secrecy in conjunction with a public interest defence.
81. Section 7 sets out the circumstances in which a person who
reveals confidential information protected by law is not criminally
liable. That is the case when disclosure is “necessary and proportionate
to the protection of the interests involved, takes place in accordance
with the reporting procedures provided for by law and the person
meets the criteria defining whistleblowers” provided for in Article
6 of the law. The law unfortunately fails to specify the protection
of whistleblowers from civil liability, as recommended in Tshwane
Principle 41.
82. Section 8 places in sequential order the authorities to which
whistleblowers must refer when making reports. In line with the
principles adopted by the Assembly, the Sapin II Law provides that
any reports must first be made through internal channels “to a direct
or indirect superior or a person appointed for that purpose by their
employer”. If these internal channels prove ineffective, i.e. “in
the event of inaction by the person to whom the report is made”,
the whistleblower may alert the judicial or administrative authorities
or professional associations (external reporting). Public disclosure
is allowed only after a three-month time lapse if there are no internal
or external channels or if they are ineffective, or if there is
a serious and imminent danger or a risk of irreversible damage.
While this ranking of reporting channels complies with the Assembly's recommendations,
it may be problematic for whistleblowers who, given vague criteria
such as "inaction by the person to whom the report is made", cannot
be sure of being protected in the case of direct disclosures through external
channels or to the public until they come before the courts. As
far as the ranking of reporting channels is concerned, the Sapin
II Law will have to be amended in connection with the transposition
of the future directive.
83. In accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly and
the Committee of Ministers, Article 9 of the Sapin II Law ensures
the confidentiality of whistleblowers' identities at all stages
in the process and lays down penalties of two years' imprisonment
and a fine of 30 000 euros for any disclosure of information relating to
the identities of whistleblowers or the persons accused or of the
information received by any persons to whom the reports are made.
Whistleblowers may claim anonymity solely in accordance with certain
conditions set out in Article 2 of the deliberation of the National
Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms (CNIL).
That
article also provides that the relevant body “must not encourage
persons wishing to use the mechanism (for managing reports) to do
so anonymously”. Accordingly, the confidentiality clause is all
the more important in connection with the implementation of the
European personal data protection regulation. In accordance with
the Assembly's guiding principles, Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and
16 set out the retaliatory measures prohibited in respect of whistleblowers,
including employees, civil servants, trainees and members of the
armed forces. It is worth noting that the Sapin II Law includes
members of the armed forces in the protection arrangements for whistleblowers,
as advocated by the Tshwane Principles, but fails to add any other professions
related to the security sector. The prohibition of retaliatory measures
against reporting persons whose employment relationship has ended
but who could still suffer retaliation from their former employers,
for instance in terms of retirement pension, is not mentioned, contrary
to the draft directive.
4.2. Recent
law transposing the European Directive on the Protection of Trade
Secrets
84. The recent law on the protection
of trade secrets
transposes the
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection
of undisclosed know-how and business information against their unlawful acquisition,
use and disclosure. The text includes a broad definition of the
information to be protected from competitors and provides for compensation
for the civil tort suffered by the victim company in the event of
the unlawful possession or disclosure of a trade secret. If used
inappropriately, provisions of this kind could jeopardise the status
of whistleblower, as defined in the Sapin II Law.
85. However, this law very fortunately provides for exceptions
to the protection of trade secrets. In particular, protection of
a trade secret is not enforceable where “the acquisition, use or
disclosure of the secret was carried out in order to exercise the
right to freedom of expression and communication, including respect
for press freedom, and to freedom of information, or to reveal illegal
activity, misconduct or wrongdoing, in good faith and for the purpose
of protecting the general interest, including when exercising the
right to report as set out in Article 6 of the [Sapin II] law, or
for the protection of a legitimate interest recognised by Union
or national law, in particular to prevent or halt any threat to
or endangerment of public order, public safety, public health or
the environment” (Article L-151-7 of the Code of Commerce created
by the above-mentioned transposition law).
4.3. The
anti-SLAPP law
86. In France, Article L. 152-8
of the Commercial Code
introduces
a civil fine for dilatory or vexatious proceedings brought against
journalists or whistleblowers in order to intimidate them or wear
them out financially in lengthy and repetitive litigation.
Proceedings of this kind, known
as gagging lawsuits or Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation
(SLAPP), can discourage potential whistleblowers. For example, since 2009
more than 20 defamation actions have been brought by Bolloré or
Socfin in France and other countries concerning press articles,
audiovisual reports, reports by NGOs and even a book about the group's
activities, in particular in Africa.
The inclusion,
albeit after considerable debate, of this “anti-SLAPP” rule in French legislation
is very good news.
5. Conclusions
87. Once formally adopted, the
proposal for a European directive for the protection of whistleblowers
will be binding on all EU countries. The Assembly’s 2015 recommendation
to propose a minimum level of protection for whistleblowers in all
Council of Europe member States is all the more important if new
legal divides are to be avoided and in the interests of the development
of a democratic culture based on transparency in countries that
are members of the European Union and those that are not, or not
yet. Beginning such work on the protection of whistleblowers would,
in the Council of Europe’s 70th anniversary year, demonstrate the determination
to enshrine greater protection of whistleblowers in the legislation
of all the States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.
In my opinion, effective protection of whistleblowers is a clear indicator
of improved functioning of our democracies, and the Council of Europe
therefore has real legitimacy and a key role to play here.
88. Finally, based on the experience of the “48-hour whistleblower
challenge”, I propose that some thought be given to how parliaments
can genuinely work together with civil society in developing legislation
on the protection of whistleblowers. At first sight, unlike areas
such as bioethics, where the discussion partners and stakeholders
are structured and clearly identified, this does not apply regarding
whistleblowers. However, there are a number of specialised NGOs,
trade unions and employers’ organisations and, in particular, whistleblowers
themselves who are prepared to share their experience and work together
to develop a really positive legal and corporate framework.
89. In order to take stock of the current situation and assess
how much remains to be done, I have availed myself of the network
of the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation
(ECPRD). Mr Omtzigt, the previous rapporteur, did the same in 2010,
which makes it possible to analyse developments in this area.
90. My “survey” produced 27 replies, which was an excellent result
for this exercise and shows the strong interest sparked by the protection
of whistleblowers in many European countries (see the summary table
in Appendix 1). We need to harness this momentum so as to have good
laws passed in as many countries as possible. A comparison between
the two “surveys”, however limited and incomplete they may be, enables
us to discern certain trends. Firstly, in 2010 six countries (Belgium,
France, Norway, the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom)
stated they had passed specific legislation applicable to whistleblowers.
The number of positive replies to the recent questionnaire doubled.
In 2010, France and Norway replied that there were laws protecting
whistleblowers in their respective countries, but in reality France
only passed such a unified law in 2016: the “Sapin II Law” (see
paragraph 77 and following above). Norway now says it only has certain provisions
in the area of labour law, so it is not counted among the 13 positive
replies. I would add that the Netherlands, which did not reply to
the new questionnaire, has improved its legislation since 2010,
thanks to the commitment shown by Mr Omtzigt in particular.
91. In sum, the first lesson to be drawn from this survey is the
trend towards codifying the protection of whistleblowers by passing
specific laws. This trend is likely to accelerate after the entry
into force of the European directive on this subject. Five countries
that replied “no” to my questionnaire expressly stated that their
governments were waiting for the directive in order to be certain
that their legislation complied with the new European rules.
92. Among the Council of Europe member States that do not, or
do not yet, belong to the EU, I noted with interest that some have
a modern single law that protects whistleblowers. In the Republic
of Moldova and Romania, well-known cases dealt with by the European
Court of Human Rights led to improvements, when the Court’s judgments
were implemented by those countries (see the above-mentioned cases
of Guja v. Moldova (2008)
and Bucur and Toma v. Romania (2013)).
On the other hand, in spite of the Heinisch
v. Germany judgment (2011) the situation of whistleblowers
in Germany is still very precarious. Nonetheless, it may on balance
be worthwhile bringing “strategic litigation” before the European
Court of Human Rights. For whistleblowers who are victims of non-existing
or ineffective protections, a Strasbourg judgment often comes too
late, but in order to further the protection of whistleblowers in
general “strategic litigation” is an avenue to be explored by civil
society, which should support whistleblowers who are prepared to
embark on such litigation – including by providing lawyers with
expertise in this area.
93. A third lesson drawn from this survey concerns the substance
of relevant legislation, including some recent laws that still leave
much to be desired. Some countries (Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey) provide virtually no protection
for whistleblowers or only permit internal reporting to superiors.
The Slovak Republic provides several reporting channels, whether
an entity specially appointed by the company, the employer or a
new authority for the protection of whistleblowers, but the possibility
of reporting such information publicly is not recognised. Some replies
to the questionnaire reveal that the very concept of a whistleblower
is unknown in these countries’ legal systems. These replies (for
example, from Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) mention
the protection of witnesses, especially those who co-operate with
the judicial authorities and enjoy protected witness status, or
the protection of journalists’ sources. All that is very well and
good but it does not relate to the notion of a whistleblower in
the modern sense. Other countries protect whistleblowers very well
in certain very limited areas, for example Norway where working
conditions are concerned, Poland in the financial sector, especially
in the context of money-laundering or the funding of terrorism,
and Denmark in the case of marine navigation. A surprising number
of countries protect whistleblowers in the area of competition law.
However, in other sectors there is no protection. Finally, a large
number of countries impose subjective conditions (concerning the forum internum), including the whistleblower’s
altruistic motivation or “good faith” (for example, Albania, France,
Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic and the United
Kingdom), while others lay down the condition that whistleblowers
must act “responsibly” (Norway) or take account of a “duty of loyalty”
towards the employer (Switzerland). These are dangerous conditions
for whistleblowers as they are unpredictable, so these dangers must
be countered by adopting a de facto presumption in favour of the
whistleblower.
94. The replies received from many countries abound with details
of good practices and innovative ideas that should be taken into
account elsewhere. Some countries (Estonia, Finland and Latvia)
do not impose any particular condition for the whistleblower to
be able to contact the media. Finnish legislation in particular
even expressly refers to the constitutional provisions protecting
freedom of expression and of information. The result in practice
is not a permanent backdrop of scandals but simply more transparency
and less corruption. Hungary expressly states in its reply that
the whistleblower’s motivation is not important, while in several
countries (Republic of Moldova, Romania) good faith is expressly
presumed – as well as the bad faith of the employer if adverse measures
are taken against a whistleblower. Some countries also provide for
a presumption of causality (with the report being presumed to have
resulted in an adverse measure taken against a whistleblower), which
are also points taken up in the proposal for a European directive.
95. All these elements, as well as the Venice Commission’s work
on the rule of law, have enabled me to identity criteria that make
it possible to analyse the laws and practices that protect or, by
contrast, disadvantage whistleblowers. Member states will be able
to use these criteria to assess their legislation, as will civil
society players and the independent authorities to be set up (see
Appendix 2).
96. In the meantime, it can be noted that there is much work to
be done if we want to “improve the protection of whistleblowers
all over Europe” as the – very ambitious – title of my report says.
“All over Europe” also means that every European country can benefit
from the experience of others, whether or not it is a member of
the European Union. The “cross-fertilisation” of ideas works in
two directions, as shown by the genesis of the draft directive.