1. Introduction
1. On 2 October 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted
Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia.
In this resolution, the Assembly strongly condemned the outbreak
of war between two of its member states and considered that, during
the war and its immediate aftermath, both countries had violated
human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as the
Statute of the Council of Europe and specific accession commitments.
2. While recognising that the war did not start on 7 August 2008,
the Assembly considered that the shelling of Tskhinvali, without
warning, by Georgia marked a new level of escalation and constituted
a disproportionate use of armed force, albeit within its own territory,
which violated international humanitarian law and Georgia’s commitment
to resolve the conflict peacefully. At the same time, the Russian
response, including large scale military operations in Georgia,
outside its own territory and the original conflict zone, failed
to respect the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian
law, and constituted a violation of the principles of the Council
of Europe, as well as statutory obligations and specific accession
commitments of Russia as a member state of this Organisation. The
Assembly was especially concerned about the failure of Russia to
stop the looting, destruction of property and acts of ethnic cleansing,
and its failure to protect the ethnic Georgian civilian population,
in the areas under its de facto control, despite its duties under
the Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
The Assembly considered the occupation of a significant part of
the territory of Georgia by Russia and the subsequent recognition
of the independence of the break-away regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia by Russia to be a direct violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the inviolability of
its frontiers, which it strongly condemned.
3. The Assembly remained especially concerned about the immediate
implications of the war, especially the human suffering it caused
and the human rights abuses that were committed during and after
the war, including the large scale wanton destruction of property
and looting, as well as the credible reports that ethnic cleansing
was taking place in the areas under effective control of Russia
and the de facto South Ossetian authorities. In
Resolution 1633 (2008), in order to address these concerns, the Assembly formulated
a series of precise and concrete demands to Russia and Georgia.
In addition to the full and unconditional implementation of the
ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular the obligation
for Russia to withdraw its troops to their positions
ex ante the war, the Assembly called
upon the Russian and Georgian authorities,
inter
alia, to:
- co-operate
fully in the establishment of an independent international investigation
into the precise circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war;
- co-operate fully with all international monitoring missions
– especially those from the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) – and allow these monitors unrestricted
access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- bring an immediate halt to, and investigate all reports
of, human rights abuses and acts of ethnic cleansing in the two
break-away territories and the so-called “buffer zone”;
- investigate any alleged violations of humanitarian law
and the laws on the conduct of war that occurred during the war
and bring the perpetrators to justice;
- ensure the right of return of all internally displaced
persons (IDPs) as a result of this conflict and implement the six
principles outlined by the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council
of Europe;
- work towards the creation of a new peacekeeping format
and internationalise the peacekeeping force.
The
Assembly demanded that the de facto authorities in South Ossetia
co-operate fully with any international monitoring missions and
that they stamp out lawlessness, protect the security of all persons
in the areas under their control and ensure the effective implementation
of the six principles outlined by the Human Rights Commissioner
of the Council of Europe. Russia was called upon to withdraw its
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
to respect fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia
and the inviolability of its frontiers.
4. At the same time, the Assembly considered that the establishment
of a dialogue was the best way forward to overcome the consequences
of the war and to ensure the long-term stability of the region.
However, a meaningful dialogue should be backed up by political
will and concrete action. The Assembly therefore considered compliance
with its demands in
Resolution
1633 (2008) to be minimum requirements for a meaningful dialogue.
5. Following the adoption of Assembly
Resolution 1633 (2008), the Bureau of the Assembly, at its meeting on 3 October
2008, decided to place on the agenda of the Standing Committee meeting
in Madrid, on 28 November 2008, an item on “the follow-up given
to
Resolution 1633 (2008)” and to include in the preliminary draft agenda of the
January 2009 part-session of the Assembly a report on the implementation
of
Resolution 1633 (2008). The Monitoring Committee was seized on this matter
for report and the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for opinion. The Bureau also asked
the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population to prepare a
report on the “humanitarian consequences of the war between Georgia
and Russia”, which could also be debated during the January 2009
part-session. In addition, the Bureau decided to ask the Presidential
Committee to visit Tbilisi and Moscow to discuss with the authorities, at
the highest level, the implementation of Assembly
Resolution 1633 (2008) and to report back to the Standing Committee on the
follow-up given to this resolution.
6. The Presidential Committee visited Georgia on 30 and 31 October
2008. The visit of the Presidential Committee to Russia was foreseen
to take place on 13 and 14 November 2008. However, these dates coincided
with the EU-Russia Summit in Nice. Many of the high-level meetings
requested therefore could not take place, resulting in a programme
that would not meet the requirements set by the Bureau for this
visit. It was therefore decided to postpone the visit to Moscow
to 18 and 19 January 2009. The findings by the Presidential Committee
on these visits, in which both co-rapporteurs participated, are
reflected in this report.
2. Implementation
of the ceasefire agreement
2.1. Withdrawal of troops
7. The 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement contains six
points:
- non-use of force;
- definitive cessation of hostilities;
- access for humanitarian aid;
- withdrawal of Georgian military forces to their usual
bases;
- withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they
held before the hostilities broke out. While waiting for an international
body, the Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional
security measures;
- opening of international discussions on the modalities
of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
8. Following a delay in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement
by Russia, Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic,
in his capacity as President of the European Council, joined by
Mr José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Mr
Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, and Mr Bernard Kouchner, French Minister for Foreign and
European Affairs, travelled to Moscow on 8 September 2008 to press
the Russian authorities to unconditionally implement the ceasefire
agreement, as well as to discuss the initial phase of its implementation.
9. In the agreement reached at this meeting, the Russian authorities
reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the six-point ceasefire
agreement and agreed that Russia:
- would
withdraw its troops from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South-Ossetia
within ten days after the deployment of an EU monitoring mission
on 1 October 2008;
- would allow UN observers to remain in Abkhazia and allow
OSCE monitors access to all of their previous areas of deployment,
including in South Ossetia;
It was also agreed
to start the talks under point 6 of the ceasefire agreement on 15
October 2008 in Geneva.
10. The exact status of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement of 8 September
has led to some controversy. While the international community and
the Georgian authorities insist that the 8 September agreement outlines the
first phase of the implementation of the 12 August ceasefire agreement
and in no manner supersedes it, the Russian position seems to be
that this agreement replaces certain aspects of the ceasefire agreement, most
notably with regard to the withdrawal of Russian troops. This was
also clear during the Assembly’s debate on 2 October 2008 on the
consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, when the Russian
delegation sought to replace references to the ceasefire agreement
with references to the “Sarkozy-Medvedev” agreement of 8 September
2008.
11. According to international monitors, Georgian troops have
in general withdrawn to their usual bases, with the exception of
those that used to be based in areas that are currently under the
control of Russia. The Russian authorities, however, dispute that
Georgian troop withdrawals are in line with the ceasefire agreement. In
December 2008, in response to increased tensions along the administrative
border with South Ossetia, the Georgian police started the deployment
of Cobra armoured vehicles in the area adjacent to the administrative border.
In the view of the Russian authorities, this deployment is in violation
of the 12 August ceasefire agreement. The Head of the EU Monitoring
Mission stated that, although deployment of these armoured vehicles
“is not in violation of the relevant provisions of the six-point
plan of 12 August and the Implementation Agreement of 8 September”,
the EU Monitoring Mission had advised against their deployment as
it would not reduce the tensions in the region.
12. On 9 October, Russia completed its withdrawal of troops from
the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after the deployment
of the EU observers in these areas on 1 October 2008. However, Russian forces
maintained a checkpoint in Perevi, near the administrative border
with South Ossetia, but within the undisputed territory of Georgia.
The maintenance of military troops in Perevi is in violation of
not only the 12 August ceasefire agreement, but also of the Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement of 8 September 2008. In a statement on 16 November 2008,
the EU insisted that Perevi is well outside the administrative borders
of the break-away region of South Ossetia and therefore should be
vacated, without delay, by Russian troops and South Ossetian militia.
13. According to the 12 August ceasefire agreement, Russia should
withdraw its troops to the positions held before the start of the
conflict. This implies that the presence of Russian troops in these
two regions should be limited to the positions and strengths as
defined in the 1992 Sochi agreement with respect to the conflict
zone in South Ossetia and the 1994 Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) treaty with respect to Abkhazia; this would limit the number
of Russian troops in South Ossetia to 500 and in Abkhazia to less
than 3 000. However, the Russian authorities assert that, with the
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by
Russia, the presence of Russian troops in these two regions is now
governed by bilateral agreements with the de facto authorities of
these regions. On 17 September, Russia signed far-reaching “friendship
and co-operation” treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These
treaties foresee the establishment of military bases and the stationing
of up to 3 800 Russian troops in each of these two regions. Therefore
they maintain that, with the withdrawal from the zones adjacent
to these regions, Russia has fulfilled its obligations under the
ceasefire agreement. On 20 October, President Medvedev transmitted
both treaties to the State Duma for ratification. Both treaties
were unanimously ratified by the State Duma on 29 October 2008 and
by the Council of the Federation on 11 November 2008. Russia has
currently stationed several thousands of troops in each of the break-away
regions.
14. The deployment of Russian troops foreseen in these “friendship
and co-operation” treaties, and indeed the continued presence of
Russian troops over and above the strengths and positions as outlined
in the 1992 and 1994 agreements, is in violation of the ceasefire
agreement of 12 August, as well as the demands made by the Assembly
in Resolution 1633 (2008). On 1 September 2008, the European Council
concluded that: “The military forces which have not yet withdrawn
to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities must do so without
delay”. In the conclusions of its meeting on 15 and 16 October 2008,
the European Council noted “with satisfaction that Russian troops
have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia
as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements
of 12 August and 8 September”. These two conclusions were reconfirmed
during the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations
Council on 10 and 11 November 2008, which concluded that: “All points
regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and the
implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, as
set out in the European Council conclusions of 1 September and 15
and 16 October, remain valid and relevant, including those concerning
access to certain areas”. In an interview on 13 November, President
Medvedev acknowledged that “no text, and that includes our agreement
with President Sarkozy, governs our military contingent” in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, stressing that it was up to Russia itself to decide
upon its military deployment in these two break-away regions.
15. This issue is of particular importance with respect to the
Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and the ethnic Georgian areas
of Upper Abkhazia. While administratively part of the former Autonomous
Oblast of South Ossetia, whose administrative borders are now recognised
by Russia as the “state borders” of South Ossetia, the Akhalgori
district, which is mainly populated by ethnic Georgians, has always
been under the control of the central authorities in Tbilisi and
was not part of the conflict zone. Indeed, Russian troops only occupied
this district on 15 August, three days after the signing of the
ceasefire agreement on 12 August. Similarly, the ethic Georgian
areas in upper Abkhazia had been under the control of the central
authorities in Tbilisi until the Georgian troops were driven out
by Abkhaz separatist forces, purportedly with the help of Russian
troops, on 8 August 2008.
2.2. Security situation:
non-use of force and cessation of hostilities
16. Following the deployment of EU monitors and the withdrawal
of Russian troops from the zones adjacent to the break-away regions
of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgian police forces, including
the Ministry of the Interior special police forces, moved back into
these zones to ensure security in those areas. With the return of
the Georgian police, the security vacuum that existed in these zones
dissolved and IDPs returned in large numbers to these areas. The
security situation in the areas is generally calm.
17. While initially limited to a few isolated incidents, the situation
along the administrative borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has
been escalating during the last months, with an increasing number
of violent incidents and provocations being reported. OSCE and EU
monitors regularly report cases where Georgian villages and Georgian
police posts along the administrative border with South Ossetia
have come under fire from small arms and grenade launchers from
the Ossetian side. The OSCE and EU monitors have not been able to
confirm allegations that Ossetian villages have come under fire
from the Georgian side, due to the refusal by Russia and the de
facto authorities in South Ossetia to allow access of EU and OSCE
monitors to the region. In their meeting with the Presidential Committee
in Georgia, the international monitors indicated that the number
of reported incidents and provocations along the administrative
border with South Ossetia had started to approach the levels seen
in the months before the outbreak of the military hostilities in
August, raising fears of possible new clashes in these volatile
regions.
18. On 22 and 24 October, two Abkhaz officials from the de facto
authorities were killed in the Gali region, while, on 24 October,
a local Georgian governor was killed in Muzhava on the administrative
border with Abkhazia. On 15 November, a Georgian policeman was killed
near the administrative border with Abkhazia. EU monitors reportedly
came under fire from the Abkhaz side when investigating this incident.
Reportedly, Georgian policemen regularly come under fire from the
South Ossetian side of the administrative border, which has resulted
in a number of casualties recently. On 10 November, a bomb explosion
killed a police officer in Dvani, near the administrative border
of South Ossetia, while another one was killed and three injured
when a second bomb was detonated when they were investigating the
scene of the first explosion. The EU Monitoring Mission called this
attack an unacceptable breach of the ceasefire agreement by its
perpetrators.
19. In addition to the attacks, there are continuing reports of
bands of South Ossetian marauders crossing the administrative border
in order to loot and terrorise Georgian villages and villagers close
to the administrative border. We regret that Russia, despite its
overwhelming troop presence, has so far failed to stop these incursions
into undisputed Georgian territory.
20. Regrettably, the Russian authorities and South Ossetian de
facto authorities have increased their rhetoric against the international
observer missions in what seems to be an attempt to cast doubt on
their impartiality. On 20 October, the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali
accused the EU monitors of being biased against South Ossetia and,
on 23 October, the Russian Foreign Minister criticised the EU monitors
of being biased and not doing enough to ensure the security in the
zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was dismissed
by the Head of the EU Monitoring Mission.
21. In their meetings with the Presidential Committee, the Russian
authorities also expressed their concern that the increased tensions
along the administrative borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia
could lead to renewed hostilities between Russia and Georgia. The
Russian authorities claim that the increase in tensions is mainly
the result of Georgian provocation. They allege that Georgia has
established armed civilian units with the aim of destabilising the
security situation in the areas adjacent to the administrative border.
These allegations have not been confirmed by independent international
monitors.
22. We are seriously concerned that this increase in tensions
and provocations could undermine the overall security and stability
in the region and could lead to renewed clashes or even military
hostilities. This underlines the urgent need for access of international
monitors to the two break-away regions and for the establishment of
a new international peacekeeping force as demanded by the Assembly.
2.3. International discussions
on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
23. The opening of international discussions on the modalities
of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the sixth
point of the 12 August ceasefire agreement. During the Sarkozy-Medvedev
meeting on 8 September 2008, it was agreed to start the talks under
this point on 15 October 2008, in Geneva.
24. The first round of talks in Geneva, under the co-sponsorship
of the UN, EU and OSCE and with the participation of the United
States, did not lead to any results and was suspended on the same
day, after the Russian and Georgian delegations failed to meet face
to face.
25. The main stumbling block during the 15 October talks was the
participation of representatives from the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
de facto authorities. The Russian authorities insisted that the
Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives should be given a status
equal to that of Georgia and Russia. This was refused by Georgia
and the international community, which considered that this would
imply recognising the statehood of these two regions. As a result,
Russia refused to participate in the plenary opening session of
the talks. The Georgian side agreed that representatives of the
de facto authorities could participate in the informal working groups,
but insisted that representatives of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
communities that favour integration with Georgia should also participate
in these working groups. This was refused by the de facto authorities.
As a result, it was decided to postpone the talks to 19 November,
so as to give the negotiators time to work on the “procedural difficulties”.
26. The second round of talks, held on 19 November 2008 in Geneva,
was considered constructive by all participants and hailed by its
co-sponsors as an important step forward. In order to avoid a new
stalemate, the talks took place in informal working groups where
all participants, including representatives of the de facto authorities,
participated as individuals. During the talks, it was agreed by
all participants to suspend the discussions on the most polemical
issues to a future round and to focus on the security situation,
as well as on the return of IDPs and freedom of movement across
the administrative borders. It was agreed that a new round of talks
would take place on 17 and 18 December in Geneva, during which, inter alia, a broader discussion
on peacekeeping missions would also be included in the agenda. The
third round of talks, held on 17 and 18 December, took place in
the same format as the talks in November and with the same constructive
attitude of the participants. During this round of talks, the participants
agreed on most of the details regarding concrete mechanisms to address
security-related incidents and disputes. It was agreed to discuss
the outstanding issues in relation to these mechanisms during the
next round of talks, which is foreseen to take place on 17 and 18
February 2009.
27. We welcome the constructive attitude displayed by all participants
during the second and third rounds of talks, which could play a
crucial role in increasing the stability in the regions. However,
we note that the talks remain fragile and that, to date, no plenary
sessions have taken place. We hope that the same constructive spirit
as witnessed in Geneva on 19 November and 17 and 18 December will
also prevail in order to find a solution for the format of these
plenary sessions. This would allow all the different representatives
of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz people to participate, while respecting
Georgia’s legitimate concern that no status equal to that of Georgia
and Russia can be given to the representatives of the de facto authorities,
as this would amount to an implicit recognition of the two break-away
regions in violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Access of international
monitoring missions to the South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions
28. In Resolution 1633 (2008), the Assembly demanded
that Russia, Georgia and the de facto authorities in South Ossetia
co-operate with all international monitoring missions, specifically
those of the UN, OSCE and the EU, and explicitly insisted that those
observer missions should be given full and unconditional access
to the areas under the control of Russia and the de facto authorities.
In addition, in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement of 8 September 2008,
Russia agreed to allow UN observers to remain in Abkhazia and to
allow OSCE monitors access to all of their previous areas of deployment,
including in South Ossetia.
29. On 9 October, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1839
which extended the UNOMIG
mandate
until 15 February 2009, allowing for the continued presence of UN
monitors in Abkhazia until that date, in line with the Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement. However, beyond that date, the future of the UNOMIG presence
is uncertain: Russia and the Abkhaz de facto authorities demand
changes to its mandate and the dropping of the reference to Georgia
from its name. This could put into question the continued presence
of UN observers in that region after 15 February. Some officials
from the Abkhaz de facto authorities are reported to have privately
informed western diplomats that they would prefer a continued UN
presence, in some format or another. We call upon Russia not to
veto the extension of the UNOMIG’s mandate in Abkhazia on grounds related
to the status of the break-away region.
30. Georgia has given its full co-operation to the international
monitoring missions and has allowed these missions, as well as other
international humanitarian bodies, full and unconditional access
to the areas under its control.
31. To our great concern, and in violation of the Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement and Assembly demands, OSCE observers have not been granted
access to South Ossetia by Russia and the South Ossetian de facto authorities.
In addition, EU observers have not been granted access to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, as requested by the EU and the international
community, including the Assembly in
Resolution 1633 (2008). This has,
inter alia,
hindered the investigation of reports of violence along the administrative
borders and the improvement of the security situation in zones along
the administrative borders of these two regions, as well as the
return of IDPs to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
32. The refusal to give access to international monitors to South
Ossetia, which negatively affects the security situation, further
endangers the overall stability in these volatile regions and could
potentially lead to renewed confrontations. We find this unacceptable,
especially taking into account the fact that the unconditional access
of international monitors to the two break-away regions does not,
as such, affect the question of their status.
33. On 22 December 2008, Russia blocked the extension of the mandate
of the OSCE Mission in Georgia, as a result of its objection to
any linkage between the OSCE activities in South Ossetia and the
rest of Georgia. The proposal by the Finnish Chairman-in-Office
of the OSCE to establish two mutually independent field offices,
directed by a special representative of the Chairman-in-Office in
Vienna, was, regrettably, not acceptable to the Russian authorities.
Taking into account the increased tensions along the administrative borders,
we deeply regret the de facto vetoing by one OSCE member state,
Russia, of the renewal of the mandate of the OSCE Mission in Georgia.
The negotiations over the mandate of the OSCE Mission in Georgia are
ongoing under the current Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE and we
urge all parties, including Russia, to accept a formula for the
extension of the mandate of the OSCE Mission in Georgia, including
its military monitoring operation, that would not prejudice the
status of the two break-away regions;
34. These developments reinforce our above-mentioned concerns
with regard to the extension of the UNOMIG’s mandate in Abkhazia.
4. Independent international
investigation into the precise circumstances surrounding the outbreak
of the war, as well as investigations into alleged violations of
human rights and international law during the war and its aftermath
35. An independent international investigation into the
precise circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war, as well
as the exact sequence of events in August 2008, is one of the key
demands of the Assembly expressed in
Resolution 1633 (2008). Recent media reports, from different sides, giving
support to the claims made by the Russian or the Georgian authorities,
only serve to show the extent of the controversy and the conflicting
accounts regarding the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of
the war. This underscores the need for an independent international
investigation, as demanded by the Assembly.
36. We welcome the fact that, from the outset, the Georgian authorities
publicly stated their full support for the establishment of such
an independent international inquiry, as well as their readiness
to give it their full co-operation. This support was reiterated
to the Presidential Committee during its visit to Tbilisi on 30
and 31 October 2008. We also welcome the fact that, in a meeting
with the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, on 15 November,
President Medvedev stated that Russia would equally welcome the establishment
of such an independent international investigation and that Russia
was ready to co-operate fully with it.
37. The EU established, on 2 December 2008, an independent international
fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia to investigate the
origins and the course of the conflict, including with regard to
international law,
humanitarian law and
human rights and the accusations made in that context.
Ms Heidi Tagliavini has been appointed
head of the fact-finding mission for the period from 2 December
2008 to 31 July 2009. Ms Tagliavini was former Deputy State Secretary
of Switzerland and, from 2002 to 2006, the Head of UNOMIG in Georgia.
The geographical scope and time span of the investigation will be
sufficiently broad to determine all the possible causes of the conflict.
The results of the investigation will be presented to the parties
to the conflict and to the EU Council, the OSCE and the United Nations
(UN) in the form of a report. Taking into account the important
human rights implications of the war between Georgia and Russia
and the fact that both are members of the Council of Europe, we
consider it important that the report of the fact-finding mission
should also be presented to the Council of Europe and its Assembly.
We therefore call upon the member states of the Council of Europe
which are also EU members to ensure that the report of the EU mission
is also presented to the Council of Europe in order for its findings
to be debated before the Assembly.
38. In order to ensure the independence of the investigations,
Ms Tagliavini has complete freedom to decide on the composition
of the mission, as well as its procedures and working methods. The
fact-finding mission shall comprise recognised experts, in particular
lawyers, historians, military staff and human rights experts. The implementation
of the EU Council’s decision on the fact-finding mission shall be
reviewed by the Council before 31 July 2009 and the work of the
mission may be prolonged, if necessary.
39. We welcome the establishment of the independent international
fact-finding mission and reiterate the demand of the Assembly that
both Georgia and Russia fully and unconditionally co-operate with
its investigations. In addition, we call upon all Council of Europe
member states and states that have observer status with the Organisation,
to make available to this fact-finding mission any information,
including satellite data, which may be of relevance to the investigation.
We equally welcome the support of Russia and Georgia for establishment
of the mission and their declared willingness to co-operate with
it. We would, however, like to stress that only their full, effective,
and unconditional co-operation with the investigation will mean
that they have met the Assembly’s demands in this respect. In the
light of this important development, we will not touch further upon
the possible causes of, and circumstances leading to, this war.
We recommend that the Assembly comes back to this issue when the
fact-finding mission has published its report and findings.
40. In parallel with the discussions on an international inquiry,
the Parliament of Georgia started its own inquiry into the circumstances
of the war, the exact sequence of events in August and the decisions
taken by the Georgian executive authorities. For this purpose, on
7 October 2008, the parliament established a special ad hoc commission
which is chaired by a member of the parliamentary opposition, Mr
Paata Davitaia. The inquiry commission was to report back to the
parliament, but had the power to refer issues to the General Prosecutor
for investigation, if it found that possible criminal actions may
have taken place.
41. In order to ensure the complete transparency of its work,
the commission met in public, unless issues affecting national security
were discussed, and its meetings were broadcast live on television.
In addition, the full transcript of its proceedings was published,
in both Georgian and English, on the website of the Georgian Parliament.
Moreover, the public was exhorted to provide information, as well
as raise any questions they wished to see answered by the commission.
42. The commission started its work on 10 October and heard testimonies
from key decision makers during the war, including from President
Saakashvili, the Minister of Integration, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the Secretary of the National Security Council, the Head
of the Security Services, the Chief of Staff of the Georgian armed
forces and the Speaker of the Parliament. The ruling party publicly
stated that any of its officials that failed to fully co-operate
with the inquiry commission would face dire political consequences.
Although the commission did not have the constitutional power to
summon the president to testify, President Saakashvili stressed
that “not a single official is immune” from being questioned by
the inquiry commission and that he would be ready “to come and answer
all questions” put to him by the commission. He subsequently testified
to the commission on 28 November 2008.
43. From our meetings with the chairman of the commission, we
were convinced of the clear political will of the commission to
fully investigate the circumstances of the war and to address the
many questions that have been raised in this context. We believe
that this is an example of how parliamentary democracies should function,
by making the events that led to the outbreak of the war, as well
as its conduct and the different responsibilities in relation to
it, subject to a wide public debate. However, in this context, we
regret that the questioning of the former Georgian Ambassador to
Moscow, who has been publicly critical of the authorities’ conduct
of the crisis since his dismissal in June 2008 for unrelated reasons,
resulted in a brawl between him and some members of the ruling party.
44. The commission finalised its work and published its report
on 18 December 2008. Although critical of the authorities’ actions
during the war, it largely confirms the official Georgian version
of the events that led to the outbreak of the hostilities. Taking
into account the ongoing work of the EU fact-finding mission, we
call upon the Parliament of Georgia to review its conclusions in
the light of the forthcoming report of this mission once it has
been published.
45. We are not aware of the establishment of any similar commission,
with a comparable mandate, composition and powers, by the Parliament
of Russia. In his meeting with the ad hoc committee of the Assembly
to study the situation on the ground in Russia and Georgia, which
visited Moscow from 21 to 23 September 2008, the Chairman of the
Council of the Federation indicated that the Council was considering setting
up an ad hoc committee to study the conduct and origins of the war,
as well as the actions of the Russian authorities in relation to
this. We therefore would urge the Council of the Federation to establish
an inquiry committee with the same scope and mandate as that established
by the Georgian Parliament.
46. Since the adoption of
Resolution
1633 (2008), a number of reports have been published by,
inter alia, such respected non-governmental
organisations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which have
documentary evidence and witness testimonies that give credence
to the claims that both Russia and Georgia committed violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law – possibly including
war crimes – in the course and aftermath of the war. Such violations
include the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of armed force,
the forceful displacement of civilians, looting, pillage, wanton
seizure and destruction of property and acts of ethnic cleansing.
We are seriously concerned about reports that the looting and pillaging, as
well as harassment of civilians, hostage-taking and acts of ethnic
cleansing, are still continuing in areas under Russian control.
In addition, the UNOSAT satellite images reveal the massive damage
to Georgian villages that predominantly occurred after cessation
of hostilities.
47. In
Resolution 1633
(2008), the Assembly demanded that Russia and Georgia “stamp
out lawlessness”, investigate all allegations of human rights violations
committed during the war and its aftermath and hold the perpetrators
to account before domestic courts.
48. The inquiry commission of the Georgian Parliament had the
mandate to investigate allegations of violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed by Georgia in the course
of the war. As already mentioned, it had the power to refer to the
General Prosecutor for investigation any allegations of criminal
behaviour in this respect. Although the Commission has finalised
its investigations, we are not aware of any cases having been referred
to the General Prosecutor’s Office.
49. On 9 August 2008, the General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia,
for its part, launched an investigation into deliberate violations
of international humanitarian law during the war and its aftermath.
The Prosecutor’s Office has made clear that this investigation is
aimed at all violations, regardless of who, on either side, has
committed them. The Georgian Government has stated that it will
fully co-operate with these investigations.
50. The Investigative Committee of the General Prosecutor’s Office
of Russia launched an investigation into genocide committed by Georgian
troops against Russian citizens (ethnic Ossetians) in South Ossetia.
In addition, it opened an investigation into crimes committed by
Georgia against the Russian military. It would seem that there is
no intention to investigate possible violations of human rights
and humanitarian law committed by Russian forces and forces under
the control of the de facto South Ossetian authorities. Indeed, the
special Investigation Committee reportedly closed its investigations
on the ground in South Ossetia in mid-September, at a time when
credible reports indicated that looting and pillaging, as well as
acts of ethnic cleansing were taking place on a daily basis in the
areas under Russian control, including in the so-called “buffer
zone”. On 23 December 2008, the Head of the Investigation Commission
of the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office announced that the commission
had finalised its investigations into the deaths of 162 South Ossetian
civilians – a considerably lower number of civilian deaths of than
originally announced by the Russian authorities – and of 48 members
of the Russian military troops during the war and that it had collected
sufficient evidence to bring charges of genocide against Georgia
for its treatment of South Ossetians. In addition, he alleged that
the commission had found irrefutable evidence that nationals of
a number of other countries had provided assistance to Georgian
military forces during the war.
51. To our knowledge, neither the investigation of the General
Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, nor that of the General Prosecutor’s
Office of Russia, have to date resulted in any persons being charged.
52. Amnesty International has reported that the Public Chamber
of Russia, a consultative body of NGOs, established, on 12 August
2008, a Public Commission on “War Crimes in South Ossetia and Civilian
Victims Aid”.
53. The Russian authorities have been actively encouraging and
assisting ethnic Ossetians to file applications with the European
Court of Human Rights against alleged human rights violations committed
by Georgia in the course of the war. On 10 October 2008, the European
Court of Human Rights announced that it had received over 2 700
individual applications from South Ossetians against Georgia. By
January 2009, the number of applications filed had increased to
over 3 300. The unprecedented number of applications is having a
considerable impact on the already heavy workload of the Court,
especially in the absence of the reform of the Court foreseen in
Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
On 16 January 2009, the European Court of Human Rights announced
that it would urgently examine seven applications of South Ossetians
against Georgia, which it considers to be representative of the
over 3 300 similar applications that have been filed with the Court.
These cases have now been communicated to the Georgian Government under
Rule 54, paragraph 2.b of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
54. Georgia has filed an inter-state application against Russia
with the European Court of Human Rights and, on 12 August 2008,
upon the request of the Georgian authorities, the European Court
of Human Rights indicated interim measures to Russia and Georgia
under Rule 39 of the Court.
55. Georgia has also filed a request for the indication of provisional
measures with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague
in order to preserve its rights under the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “to protect
its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces,
acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries”.
On 15 October 2008, the ICJ held that the case fell under its jurisdiction
and ordered provisional measures to be taken by both Georgia and
Russia.
56. Under the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
has jurisdiction over possible war crimes and crimes against humanity.
As Georgia has ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction
over such crimes committed on the territory of Georgia in the course
of the conflict, irrespective of whether they were committed by
Georgian or Russian citizens, notwithstanding the fact that Russia
has not yet ratified the Statute. In addition, as Russia has signed
the Rome Statute, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, it is bound to refrain from any action that would defeat
the Statute’s object and purpose. The Prosecutor of the ICC has
reportedly started his preliminary analysis of the information received.
This is the first formal step in deciding whether to seek authorisation
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open a formal investigation.
5. Humanitarian consequences
of the war
57. The humanitarian consequences of the war between
Georgia and Russia are the subject of a separate report by the Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Population. We will therefore not deal
extensively with these issues in the context of this report.
58. Following the re-establishment of a security environment in
the zones adjacent to the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, many IDPs have returned to these areas. On 17 October 2008,
the UNHCR reported that, from the originally recorded 133 000 IDPs
in Georgia, more than 100 000 had returned to their homes, and that
20 000 of these had returned to the former “buffer zone”. However,
many homes in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia have been looted
and destroyed by South Ossetian militias in the aftermath of the
conflict. The UN estimates that around 11 500 IDPs cannot return
to their original residences in the zones adjacent to South Ossetia.
The Georgian Ombudsman estimates that, at present, a total of 23
000 IDPs cannot return to their pre-war places of residence. Moreover,
occasional incursions by South Ossetian marauders make many IDPs
fearful to return permanently to the areas close to the administrative
border.
59. The return of IDPs to ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia is considerably more difficult, if not outright impossible.
Amidst continuing reports of acts of ethnic cleansing, most IDPs
fear for their safety if they return, especially in the absence
of independent international monitors from the EU and OSCE. In addition,
most ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia have been looted
and razed.
60. The return of ethnic Georgian IDPs to the break-away region
of South Ossetia is further complicated by the insistence of the
de facto authorities that IDPs returning to it accept the South
Ossetian “nationality” and rescind the Georgian one. Ethnic Georgians
in the Gali District of Abkhazia are reportedly also being put under pressure
to accept Abkhazian passports. The Abkhaz de facto Foreign Minister,
Mr Sergey Shamba, has informed OSCE/ODIHR officials that Georgian
IDPs would be welcome to return to the Gali district and the upper
Kodori Gorge. However, he said that the return of IDPs (including
the IDPs from the 1994 conflict) to other areas of Abkhazia would
be “impossible” under the current circumstances.
61. A further complication is the result of restrictions imposed
on the freedom of movement for civilians. Civilian movement across
the administrative border has until now been possible on a limited,
ad hoc, basis. However, with the entry into force of the “friendship
and co-operation” agreements between Russia and the break-away regions,
which include an open border agreement between the parties, the
administrative borders of these regions will be manned by Russian
border guards, ending any possibilities for the free movement of civilians
across the administrative borders. In this context, the de facto
leaderships in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have indicated that they
plan to implement a visa regime for Georgians in the very near future.
62. The situation in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia,
which is a predominantly ethnic Georgian area that was not directly
affected by the war in August and which, prior to the war, was never
under the control of the de facto authorities, is a matter of special
concern. Indeed, Russian troops occupied this district on 15 August,
some three days after the signing of the ceasefire agreement on
12 August.
63. Recent reports by Human Rights Watch and the Russian human
rights NGOs, Memorial and Demos Centre, have documented extensive
evidence that systematic looting, pillaging, hostage taking and
attacks on ethnic Georgians by South Ossetian militias continue
to take place in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and that
the Russian forces have done nothing to stop them. We strongly condemn
the ethnic cleansing in the Akhalgori district by South Ossetian
militia, as well as Russia’s unwillingness to stop this from happening
or to bring its perpetrators to justice. We would like to reiterate
that, under international law, Russia bears full responsibility
for violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed in
the areas under its de facto control, including those committed
at the behest of the de facto authorities in Tshkinvali.
64. As a result of the continuing attacks on ethnic Georgians,
many of them have fled the Akhalgori district due to safety concerns.
In addition, many more have left due to fears that the administrative
border with Georgia will be closed or because they will be obliged
to accept the South Ossetian nationality if they stay. According
to the UNHCR, Georgia registered more than 1 700 IDPs from the Akhalgori
area in October alone.
65. Humanitarian aid has been reaching the two break-away regions,
mainly via Russia. However, significant obstacles remain for the
access of humanitarian organisations and aid as a result of the
insistence by Georgia, on the one hand, that access to the two break-away
regions takes place via Georgia, and by Russia and the de facto
authorities, on the other hand, that access takes place via Russia.
66. The UN and other international (humanitarian) organisations
have been given unrestricted access by the Georgian authorities
to the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Regrettably,
the de facto authorities have allowed only limited access for these
organisations, with the exception of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), to the territories under their control.
67. In his report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe, the Commissioner for Human Rights expressed his concern
about the possible negative impact of the law on the occupied territories
that was adopted by the Georgian Parliament on 28 October 2008.
According to this law, access for foreigners and stateless persons
to the occupied territories is subject to authorisation by the Georgian
authorities, while entry into these areas without such an authorisation
would be a criminal offence under Georgian law. Moreover, this law
restricts economic activity with the two regions and declares null
and void any certificate issued by the de facto authorities, including
civil certificates and property deeds. In his report, the Commissioner
expressed concern that certain provisions in the law on the occupied
territories may be at variance with principles of international
human rights law, including the European Convention on Human Rights.
For this reason, the Monitoring Committee, at its meeting on 17
December, decided to submit this law to the European Commission for
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) for opinion. We call on
the Georgian authorities to implement any recommendations contained
in the future opinion of the Venice Commission.
68. Problems in the supply of gas from Georgia to the region of
South Ossetia, as well as the supply of drinking water from the
break-away region of South Ossetia to the villages in the zones
adjacent to the administrative borders have led to mutual recriminations
between Russia and Georgia. The Georgian authorities have accused
Russia and the South Ossetian de facto authorities of blocking the
water supply to the areas adjacent to the administrative border,
while Russia has accused the Georgian authorities of halting the
gas supply to South Ossetia. The Georgian authorities expressed
their readiness to resume the gas supply to Tskhinvalli, but asserted
that the gas pipeline to Tskhinvali had been damaged during the
war in the area close to the administrative border, and that it
could not be repaired without adequate security guarantees from Russia.
OSCE-mediated contacts between the two sides revealed continuing
damage to the pipeline on 31 December 2008. On 21 January 2009,
the Georgian gas company announced that the pipeline had been fully
repaired and that it was ready to resume the supply of gas as soon
as it received authorisation from the Georgian government. Furthermore,
on 28 December 2008, Georgia and Russia reached an agreement on
the joint management of the Enguri Hydro power central, which is
situated on the administrative border with Abkhazia. We welcome
this agreement, which will ensure an uninterrupted electricity supply
to Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. We hope that the same constructive
approach will prevail in other disputes over energy and water supplies.
6. Recognition of
independence of the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
by Russia
69. In Resolution 1633 (2008), the Assembly condemned
the recognition of the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia by Russia as a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial
integrity and the inviolability of its recognised international
borders. The Assembly therefore called upon Russia to withdraw its recognition
and urged all member states, as well as states holding observer
status with the Organisation, not to recognise the independence
of these two regions. The Assembly regretted that the recognition
by Russia was prompted by a unanimous demand of both houses of the
Russian Parliament.
70. The Russian authorities, as well as the Federal Parliament,
have publicly stated that they do not intend to withdraw their recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The “friendship
and co-operation” treaties signed by Russia with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia on 17 September 2008, which were unanimously ratified by
the State Duma and Council of the Federation on 29 October and 11 November
2008 respectively, further confirmed this position. Under the treaties,
Russia has pledged to help the two break-away regions to protect
their borders and will be responsible for controling them, and their
signatories have granted each other the right to set up military
bases on their respective territories. The treaties also formalised economic
co-operation between Russia and the two break-away regions, and
allowed dual citizenship for Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian
residents.
71. The recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and the subsequent signing and ratification of the “friendship
and co-operation” treaties not only violate the ceasefire agreement,
international law, the Statute and principles of the Council of
Europe and Russia’s accession commitments, but also impede the normalisation
of the current situation and further affect the stability in the
region. In this context, we also regret that Russia seems to be
making the implicit recognition of the independence of the two break-away regions
by the international community, including by our Assembly, a point
in its co-operation with international organisations, as borne out
by its insistence that the representatives of the de facto authorities
of the two break-away regions should be given state status in the
Geneva talks.
72. On 23 December 2008, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and its counterpart in the de facto authorities in Abkhazia signed
a memorandum of understanding on co-operation in which they agreed, inter alia, to strive for the formation
of mutually advantageous relations in the field of international
co-operation and in which Russia pledges to facilitate the entry
of “the Republic of Abkhazia” into international organisations of which
Russia is a member.
7. Creation of a new
peacekeeping format and internationalisation of the peacekeeping
force
73. In Resolution 1633 (2008), the Assembly called upon
Russia and Georgia to work towards the creation of a new peacekeeping
format and to internationalise the peacekeeping force.
74. Georgia formally withdrew from the 1992 Sochi and 1994 Moscow
agreements that established the pre-war peacekeeping formats on
27 August 2008, and has indicated that it would welcome a peacekeeping
force that would include European peacekeepers. The Georgian authorities
have not ruled out their acceptance of a possible Russian participation
in such a peacekeeping force. The Russian authorities have announced
that the former peace agreements have now been replaced by the bilateral
friendship and co-operation treaties between Russia and the break-away
regions and have stated that they see no role for any “additional” international
peacekeeping format.
75. We would like to stress that Russia, as a party to the conflict,
cannot be the sole provider of peacekeeping troops and the sole
guarantor of peace and security in the two break-away regions. As
we have mentioned before, the absence of an international peacekeeping
force, especially in combination with the presence of a large number
of Russian troops, undermines the stability in the region, as well
as the possibilities for the normalisation of the situation resulting
from the war. In that respect, we welcome the fact that the issue of
peace keeping was on the agenda for the December round of talks
in Geneva, although no concrete results have, as yet, been achieved.
We call for a continued constructive approach by all participants
in future talks.
8. Overview of implementation
of the demands of the Assembly as expressed in Resolution 1633 (2008)
8.1. Georgia
76. On the basis of the recent developments described
in this report, we consider that Georgia has implemented the following
demands of the Assembly outlined in
Resolution 1633 (2008). Notably, it has:
- implemented
fully and unconditionally the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008
(paragraph 22.1 of the Resolution);
- given its fullest co-operation to international monitors
and allowed full access to the territories under its control (paragraphs
22.2 and 23.3);
- taken measures to ensure the safety of citizens – including
the removal of mines and unexploded ordnances – in the territories
under its control, and allowed for the voluntary return of IDPs
to those territories (paragraphs 23.1, 23.2 and 23.4);
- worked towards a new peacekeeping format and worked to
internationalise the peacekeeping force (paragraph 22.4);
- made use of available means of peaceful conflict resolution
(paragraph 22.10);
- participated unconditionally in the Geneva negotiations
foreseen in point 6 of the ceasefire agreement (paragraph 22.5).
We consider to be justified the condition laid down by the Georgian
authorities that the participation of the de facto authorities of
the two break-away regions should not be taken to signify any implicit
recognition of them and that this condition does not contradict
the Assembly’s corresponding demand.
77. The Georgian authorities have stressed that they would welcome
the establishment of, and would co-operate unconditionally with,
an independent international inquiry into the war and the circumstances surrounding
it (paragraph 22.3). They can therefore be said to have taken all
the necessary steps to comply with this demand by the Assembly,
even though a final judgment can only be made when the inquiry has
been completed and Georgia’s co-operation in it has been fully assessed.
78. The Georgian authorities have taken concrete measures to effectively
implement the six principles formulated by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, in compliance with paragraph 23.7
of
Resolution 1633 (2008). We note that the implementation of several of these
principles, including the exchange of prisoners of war, the unconditional
return of IDPs and the provision of adequate accommodation for them, are
still ongoing. We therefore urge the Georgian authorities to continue
to implement the Commissioner’s six principles, as well as the related
demands made in sub-paragraphs 23.4 and 23.5 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
79. Overall, Georgia is seeking to ensure effective respect for
all human rights under the ECHR and humanitarian norms under the
1949 Geneva conventions and their additional protocols, in the territories
under its control, in compliance with paragraph 22.7 of the resolution.
However, we share the concerns expressed by the Commissioner for
Human Rights that certain provisions in the new law on the occupied
territories may be at variance with principles of international
human rights law, including the European Convention on Human Rights.
We therefore call upon the Georgian authorities to implement any
recommendation contained in the forthcoming opinion of the Venice
Commission, which was requested by the Monitoring Committee. This
would also ensure full compliance with paragraph 22.7 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
80. The Georgian authorities have allowed unhindered access by
the press to the part of the conflict zone under its control, in
line with paragraph 22.9. However, we are concerned that the provisions
in the law on the occupied territories that make it obligatory for
foreign nationals to obtain prior authorisation from the Georgian authorities
to visit the Georgian territories under Russian control could hinder
the free access of the press to those parts of the conflict zone,
in contradiction with paragraph 22.9.
81. The Georgian General Prosecutor’s Office has opened an investigation
into violations of humanitarian and human rights law that took place
during the war and its immediate aftermath. This investigation explicitly also
includes possible violations committed by Georgia. In addition,
the parliamentary inquiry commission had the mandate to investigate
the war and look into possible human rights and humanitarian law
violations committed by all sides during the war, including the
right to refer cases to the General Prosecutor for investigation.
We therefore welcome the efforts of the Georgian authorities to
comply with paragraph 22.8. The investigations of the General Prosecutor
are still ongoing and we are not aware that they have as yet resulted in
any persons being charged. In the light of the overwhelming and
credible evidence mentioned in this report that human rights and
humanitarian law were violated by both sides during the war, including
by Georgia, full compliance with this demand of the Assembly can
only be assessed on the basis of the outcome of these investigations
and the impartial manner in which the allegations of violations
are addressed. We therefore call upon the Georgian authorities to
inform the Monitoring Committee of the Assembly, on a regular basis,
about the progress of the investigations conducted by the General
Prosecutor’s Office. We consider that compliance with this Assembly
demand is still pending.
82. Regrettably, Georgia has not yet signed the UN Convention
on Cluster Munitions In addition, the relations and rhetoric between
Russia and Georgia are still tense and influenced by the war. We
cannot therefore consider that Georgia has complied with paragraphs
22.6 and 22.11 of
Resolution
1633 (2008).
8.2. De facto authorities
in South Ossetia
83. On the basis of the recent developments described
in this report, we consider that, with regard to the demands addressed
to the de facto authorities in South Ossetia, the latter have generally
complied with the demand to exchange prisoners of war (paragraph
23.5), although we are concerned about reports that hostage taking
still occurs, in contravention of paragraph 23.5.
84. Regrettably, the South Ossetian de facto authorities have
failed to co-operate with international monitoring missions, as
demanded in paragraph 23.3, and are placing unreasonable restrictions
on the access of humanitarian organisations to South Ossetia, in
contravention of the demand of the Assembly in paragraph 23.1.2.
In addition, the South Ossetian de facto authorities have failed
to stamp out lawlessness and to guarantee security in the areas
under their de facto control, as demanded in paragraph 23.1. and
paragraph 23.1.1. They have also failed to guarantee the right of
return of all IDPs from the areas under their control. We therefore
consider that they have not complied with the demands formulated
in paragraph 23.3, paragraph 23.4 and paragraph 23.7 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
8.3. Russia
85. On the basis of the recent developments described
in this report, we consider that Russia has implemented the following
demands of the Assembly outlined in
Resolution 1633 (2008):
- removal of mines
and unexploded ordnances and raising awareness among the affected
population about the danger posed by such devices. We understand
that this difficult task is ongoing (paragraph 23.2 of the resolution);
- release and exchange of prisoners of war (paragraph 23.5),
on the understanding that this is also an ongoing process;
- on the basis of the constructive proceedings during the
latest round of the Geneva talks, we would consider that Russia
has complied with paragraph 22.5 of Resolution 1633 (2008) regarding participation
in the Geneva talks. While we support the principle that different
representatives of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian people, both those
of the de facto authorities and those favouring integration with
Georgia, should participate in these talks, we consider that Russia’s
insistence that representatives of the de facto authorities should
be given state status equal to that of Georgia and Russia in these
talks, infringes on Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
and could raise questions regarding Russia’s continued compliance
with this point.
86. The Russian authorities have indicated that they would welcome
the establishment of, and would co-operate unconditionally with,
an independent international inquiry into the war and its circumstances (paragraph
22.3). They can therefore be said to have taken all the necessary
steps to comply with this demand of the Assembly, even though a
final judgment can only be made when the inquiry has been completed
and Russia’s co-operation with it has been fully assessed.
87. The Russian General Prosecutor initiated investigations into
human rights and humanitarian law violations committed by Georgian
troops during the course of the war against Russian citizens and
against Russian servicemen. These investigations were closed on
18 December 2008. However, despite several credible reports that
provide evidence that human rights and humanitarian law were also
violated by Russia and the South Ossetian forces allied to it during
the war and its aftermath, no investigation has been started by the
Russian General Prosecutor into such alleged violations. We therefore
consider that Russia has not complied with paragraph 22.8 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
88. While press accredited in Moscow has had access to the break-away
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, continued restrictions on
journalists’ freedom of movement, including the refusal of access
to the two regions from undisputed Georgian territory, are in contradiction
with paragraph 22.9 of Resolution 1633 (2008).
89. The Russian authorities have asserted that the former peace
agreements with respect to South Ossetia and Abkhazia have now been
replaced by the bilateral “friendship and co-operation” treaties
between Russia and these break-away regions and that they see no
role for any “additional” international peacekeeping format, as
demanded in paragraph 22.4. However, we take note of the fact that
the issue of peacekeeping was included in the agenda of the December
round of talks in Geneva. We hope that these talks will lead to
concrete and constructive results which would imply that Russia
is complying with this demand by the Assembly.
90. While we welcome the prompt withdrawal from the areas adjacent
to the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia
has so far failed to withdraw its military forces to the positions ex ante the war, in violation of
the ceasefire agreement of 12 August, as well as the Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement of 8 September 2008 and the demand of the Assembly. In
addition, the continuing provocation and attacks on Georgian villages
and police forces, originating from the South Ossetian side of the
administrative border are, as mentioned by the Head of the EU Monitoring
Mission, a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement. We would like
to stress that Russia is directly responsible for any violations
of this agreement at the behest of the South Ossetian de facto authorities.
We therefore regret to note that Russia has not implemented all
points of the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, as demanded
by the Assembly in paragraph 22.1 of Resolution 1633 (2008).
91. We are extremely concerned by Russia’s failure to stop the
ongoing looting, pillaging and ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia
and to bring its perpetrators to justice. Russia has therefore not
complied with the Assembly’s demands to ensure effective respect
for all human rights under the ECHR in the territories under its
control (paragraph 22.7) and take urgent measures to ensure the
safety of all persons within the region of South Ossetia (paragraph
23.1), as well as to stamp out lawlessness in accordance with Article
43 of the Hague Convention (paragraph 23.1.1).
92. Russia’s continuing refusal to give access to OSCE and EU
monitors to South Ossetia, as well as access to EU monitors to Abkhazia,
are in contradiction with the demands formulated by the Assembly
in paragraph 22.2 and paragraph 23.3 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
93. As mentioned in the recent report of the OSCE/ODIHR
dealing
with the human rights situation in the former conflict areas, prepared
at the request of the Finnish Chairman-in-Office of the OCSE, Russia
and the South Ossetian de facto authorities are placing unreasonable
restrictions on the access of humanitarian organisations to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, the right of return of IDPs from
those areas is refused outright or severely restricted. We have
therefore to consider that Russia is not complying with paragraph 23.1.2,
paragraph 23.4 and paragraph 23.7 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
94. Russia has been actively encouraging and assisting ethnic
South Ossetians to file applications against Georgia with the European
Court of Human Rights. However, as stated by the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities, the restrictions on the right of return
of IDPs from the areas under control of the de facto South Ossetian
leadership is in contradiction to the provisional measures ordered
by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. We therefore
do not consider that Russia has complied with paragraph 22.10 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
95. Regrettably, Russia has not yet signed the UN Convention on
Cluster Munitions. In addition, the relations and rhetoric between
Russia and Georgia are still tense and influenced by the war. We
cannot therefore consider that Russia has complied with paragraph
22.6 and paragraph 22.11 of
Resolution
1633 (2008).
96. The Russian authorities, as well as the Federal Parliament,
have publicly stated that they do not intend to withdraw their recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, contrary to Assembly demands
as formulated in paragraph 22.2 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
9. Conclusions
98. We fully support the establishment by the EU, on 2 December
2008, of an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate
the circumstances surrounding the outbreak and the course of the
conflict in Georgia, including with regard to international law,
humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusations made in that
context. We urge the member states of the Council of Europe that
are also members of the EU to ensure that the report of this mission
is also presented to the Council of Europe and recommend to the Assembly
to include a debate on its findings at a future part-session.
99. We welcome the support of Russia and Georgia for the establishment
of this independent fact-finding mission and their declared willingness
to fully co-operate with it. We call upon Russia and Georgia to
co-operate effectively, fully and unconditionally with the mission.
100. We welcome the constructive approach and political will of
the Georgian authorities to comply with the demands of the Assembly
expressed in Resolution 1633 (2008). As a result, Georgia has complied
with many, but not all, demands of the Assembly expressed in this
resolution. We call upon the Georgian authorities to ensure that
all remaining outstanding demands are promptly and fully complied
with.
101. We welcome, in particular, the establishment of an inquiry
commission by the Georgian Parliament as evidence that it is willing
to reflect on the actions and mistakes of the Georgian authorities
at the outbreak and during the course of the war. We call upon the
parliament to review the conclusions of this commission in the light
of the forthcoming report of the EU fact-finding mission.
102. We are concerned that some provisions of the Georgian law
on the occupied territories may be at variance with principles of
international human rights law, including the European Convention
on Human Rights. We therefore call upon the Georgian authorities
to promptly implement any recommendation contained in the forthcoming
opinion of the Venice Commission, which was requested by the Monitoring
Committee.
103. We regret that Russia has not yet complied with a significant
number of key demands made by the Assembly, including the many demands
that are not related to, and therefore have no effect on, the question of
the status of the two break-away regions.
104. We condemn the ongoing violations of human rights and international
law, such as looting, pillaging and ethnic cleansing that are taking
place in South Ossetia and which Russia has failed to stop. We reiterate
that Russia is fully responsible for any human rights violations
in the territories under its effective military control. We therefore
call upon Russia to bring these practices to an immediate halt,
to prosecute all perpetrators and to implement fully all Assembly
demands aimed at protecting the human rights of all individuals
in the two break-away regions.
105. We are seriously concerned that the escalation of tensions
and provocation along the administrative borders is undermining
the stability in the region and could lead to renewed clashes or
an outbreak of hostilities. The access of international monitors
to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the establishment of a new internationalised
peacekeeping format and force are therefore crucial to establishing
security and guaranteeing the stability in the region.
106. We welcome the fact that, during the visit of the Presidential
Committee to Moscow, the Russian authorities expressed a willingness
to engage in an open and constructive dialogue with the Assembly.
In this context, we would like to stress that the issue of the status
of the two break-away regions should not be used as an argument
by Russia not to address other Assembly concerns raised in
Resolution 1633 (2008), as well as in this explanatory memorandum, most notably
those related to the short- and long-term stability along the administrative
borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the respect of human rights
for all Georgian citizens and the humanitarian consequences of the
war between Georgia and Russia.
107. We welcome the readiness expressed by both Russian and Georgian
parliamentarians to engage in a dialogue with each other under the
aegis of the Assembly. We therefore call upon the Assembly to set
up a special ad hoc committee, in which both Georgian and Russian
parliamentarians will participate, to discuss their differences
and develop concrete proposals to address the consequences of the
war, in line with paragraph 31 of
Resolution 1633 (2008).
108. We consider it unacceptable that persons residing in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia should not be effectively covered by the human
rights protection mechanisms granted to them as citizens of a Council
of Europe member state under the European Convention on Human Rights,
as well as other relevant Council of Europe conventions, as a result
of the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. Such
a black hole of human rights protection should not be allowed to
exist within the Council of Europe area. The relevant bodies of
the Council of Europe should develop a comprehensive action plan
to ensure that the rights guaranteed under the Convention are effectively
secured for persons residing in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This
could include the establishment of a field presence in the two break-away
regions, as demanded by the Assembly in
Resolution 1633 (2008). In the absence of other credible investigations, this
field presence should also investigate and document human rights
violations committed during and in the aftermath of the war.
____________
Reporting committee: Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee).
Reference to committee: Resolution 1115 (1997).
Draft resolution unanimously
adopted by the committee on 26 January 2009.
Members of the committee: Mr
Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson),
Mr György Frunda (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (2nd Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Leonid Slutsky (3rd Vice-Chairperson),
Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Pedro Agramunt, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mrs Meritxell
Batet Lamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Luc van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,
Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Telmo Correia, Mrs
Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis,
Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi,
Ms Mirjana Ferić-Vac, Mr
Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Marcel Glesener, Mr Charles
Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross,
Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajiyeva, Mr
Michael Hancock, Mr Davit
Harutyunyan, Mrs Olha Herasym’yuk,
Mr Andres Herkel, Mr Raffi
Hovannisian, Mr Kastriot Islami,
Mr Miloš Jevtić, Mrs Evguenia Jivkova, Mr Hakki Keskin, Mrs Katerina
Konečná, Mr Andros Kyprianou, Mr Jaakko Laakso,
Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger,
Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr René
van der Linden, Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Dick
Marty, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mr
João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mr Ivan Popescu,
Ms Maria Postoico, Mr Christos Pourgourides,
Mr John Prescott, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Armen Rustamyan,
Mr Indrek Saar, Mr Oliver
Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi,
Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Christoph Strässer, Mrs Chiora Taktakishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose,
Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Mr
José Vera Jardim, Mr Piotr Wach,
Mr Robert Walter, Mr David
Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend,
Mrs Karin S. Woldseth, Mrs Gisela Wurm, Mr Boris Zala.
NB: The names of the members who took part in the meeting
are printed in bold.
Secretariat of the committee:
Mrs Chatzivassiliou, Mr Klein, Ms Trévisan, Mr Karpenko.