1. Introduction
1. Belarus is the only European country which is not
a member of the Council of Europe. It is often referred to as an
exception, in the sense that it did not follow the same path towards
democracy as the other European countries which emerged from the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
2. In the last few years, the Council of Europe has also treated
Belarus as an exception: while it has assisted 47 European countries
in their endeavours towards democracy, through political dialogue
and a great deal of patience, and has constantly made the choice
to engage with them politically even when they do not entirely live
up to their commitments and obligations, it has not done the same
for Belarus.
3. The Assembly made the choice of isolating Belarus. Some might
say that the Belarusian authorities isolated themselves by stamping
on human rights and democratic standards. This is true, but rhetorical
at the same time. The reality is that the Assembly decided that
enough was enough and tried to see if, by isolating the Belarusian
leadership, it would be possible to change the situation. We were
proved wrong. It is not possible to isolate the Belarusian authorities
without isolating the Belarusian people. Moreover, the developments
of the latest months show that a careful combination of dialogue,
constructive criticism and pressure can, on the contrary, achieve
results.
4. In this report, I intend to call for a revision of the approach
held by the Council of Europe towards Belarus over the last few
years: if it continues with its current practice, unlike the other
European organisations, the Council of Europe will miss the opportunity
to have an influence on the situation in Belarus.
5. It is possible to remain consistent with one’s own values
and principles while maintaining a dialogue both with the Belarusian
opposition and the authorities. This is, for me, the only way forward
to promote the development of democracy in Belarus.
2. Relations
between the Council of Europe and Belarus
2.1. Relations with
PACE
6. Over time, PACE has oscillated between dialogue and
isolation, as indicated by the following table:
Year
|
State of PACE-Belarus
relations
|
1992
|
The Belarusian parliament
is granted Special Guest status with the Assembly, in a similar
way as all the other countries from Eastern Europe or the Caucasus
which aspire to join the Council of Europe.
|
1993
|
Belarus presents a membership
application to the Council of Europe.
|
1996
|
In Belarus, a referendum
leads to a constitutional reform which strengthens the powers of
the President. The 13th Supreme Soviet, the first and last parliament
elected in a free and fair vote, is dissolved and a new parliament
is formed.
|
1997
|
The Bureau of the Assembly
suspends Special Guest status for the Belarusian parliament, with
two arguments: a) the way in which the new legislature came into
being deprives it of democratic legitimacy; b) the constitutional
amendments introduced by referendum are illegal, do not respect
minimum democratic standards and violate the principles of separation
of powers and the rule of law.
|
1998
|
The Bureau suspends the
membership application of Belarus to the Council of Europe.
|
1998-2004
|
Relations between the
Assembly and the Belarusian authorities continue, even outside a
formal co-operation format: in 2000 the Assembly ensures its presence
to observe the parliamentary elections, and the following year it
sends a delegation to observe the presidential elections, in both
cases under the framework of the Parliamentary Troika on Belarus .
|
January 2004
|
Considering that the
reasons that had led to the suspension of Special Guest status are
still valid, the Bureau of the Assembly confirms the suspension
of Special Guest status, further to a request from the Belarusian
side to reconsider this decision.
|
April 2004
|
In its Resolution 1371 (2004), the Assembly decides that the informal presence of
members of the Belarusian parliament during Assembly sessions or
other Assembly events will be inappropriate until a proper investigation
is carried out on the issue of disappeared persons . During the debate, two separate groups
of parliamentarians move amendments to have this provision deleted,
with different arguments , but
they are defeated.
|
2004-2006
|
There are no contacts
between the Assembly and the Belarusian authorities, despite an
ongoing debate within the Political Affairs Committee on the usefulness
of this.
|
2006
|
Vladimir Konoplev, then
Speaker of the Belarusian Parliament, is invited, together with
the opposition presidential candidate Alexander Milinkevich, to
address the Assembly in the context of the debate on the Situation
in Belarus on the eve of the presidential election.
|
2007
|
On separate occasions,
former PACE President Mr van der Linden and myself in my capacity
as rapporteur conduct visits to Belarus.
|
2008
|
On two occasions representatives
of the Belarusian parliament are invited, together with representatives of
the opposition, to address the Political Affairs Committee in the
context of discussions on the situation in Belarus
|
2009
|
An ad hoc sub-committee
of the Political Affairs Committee led by Mr Lindblad, Chair of
the committee, Mrs Hurskainen, Chair of the sub-committee on Belarus,
and myself in my capacity as rapporteur conduct a visit to Minsk.
|
7. A key year for PACE-Belarus relations is 2004, when
PACE starts a practice of isolation. The use of the term ‘practice’
rather than ‘policy’ is deliberate: as a matter of fact, the isolation
of the authorities has never been a clearly formulated PACE policy
but only the consequence of an interpretation of the
Resolution 1371 (2004) on disappeared persons.
8. In effect, in the same meeting when it decided not to restore
Special Guest status, the Bureau expressed the wish to observe the
2004 legislative elections in Belarus, to send a pre-electoral mission
shortly before these elections, authorised the sub-committee on
Belarus to visit Belarus after the April 2004 Assembly part-session
and even confirmed its willingness to continue dialogue with all
political forces in the country. None of this took place, as after
the April debate in the Assembly a climate of mutual distrust prevailed.
9. This started to change in 2007, with the visit to Belarus
of the then President van der Linden’s visit to Belarus, and my
own visit some months later, which were followed by invitations
to representatives of the Belarusian parliament to participate in
exchanges of views on the situation in Belarus in the context of
the Political Affairs Committee and its sub-committee on Belarus.
In February 2009, an ad hoc sub-committee of the Political Affairs
Committee led by Mr Lindblad, Chair of the Committee, accompanied
by Mrs Hurskainen, Chair of the sub-committee on Belarus, and by
myself, in my capacity as rapporteur, also conducted a visit to Minsk.
2.2. The visit by the
Spanish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers
10. On 30 March 2009, Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos
conducted an official visit to Minsk in his capacity as Chair of
the Committee of Ministers. During his visit, which had the aim
of evaluating Belarus’ level of commitment to the principles of
the Council of Europe and stimulating internal reforms that would
strengthen its relations with the Organisation, he met representatives
of civil society as well as high-ranking officials, including the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Lukashenko himself.
2.3. Council of Europe
conventions
11. Even if Belarus’ membership application to the Council
of Europe remains suspended, it is party to a number of Council
of Europe instruments, which are open for signature and ratification
to non-member states. Belarus is a party to the European Cultural
Convention and an associated member of the Venice Commission and
can, therefore, participate in relevant Council of Europe activities
at a technical level. It has also ratified the European Convention
on Information on Foreign Law and its additional protocol (in 1997),
the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher
Education in the European Region (in 2002), the Council of Europe
Anti-Doping Convention (in 2006), the Civil Law Convention on Corruption
(in 2006) and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (in November
2007).
12. The Belarusian authorities have expressed the wish to join
additional Council of Europe instruments, and this matter has been
examined, in general terms, by the Rapporteurs Group on democratic
stability (GR-DEM) of the Ministers’ Deputies. Belarus, however,
needs to revise some areas of its legislation in order to make it compatible
with Council of Europe instruments. The Council of Europe could
play its traditional role of assisting in this process, in order
to make accession possible.
2.4. The Congress of
Local and Regional Authorities
13. In December 2008, the Standing Committee of the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe decided
to grant observer status to the Council for Co-operation of Local
Self-Government Bodies of the Council of the Republic of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Belarus. This status allows the representatives
of the Council for Co-operation of Local Self-Government Bodies
to participate in the events organised by the Congress.
14. In March 2009, at the first session of the Congress attended
by the Belarusian observer delegation, its President ad interim,
Ian Micallef, expressed appreciation for this participation and
announced that a round table would be organised on the conformity
of the Belarus’ legislation with the European Charter of Local Self-Government;
the Congress will also provide an expert assessment of the draft
law on local self-government in Belarus.
2.5. The Infopoint on
the Council of Europe in Minsk
15. Finally, I look forward to the opening of an Infopoint
on the Council of Europe in Minsk, an initiative on which I insisted
considerably during my visit in 2007. Indeed, as correctly mentioned
by the Assembly in its Recommendation 1734 (2006) on Belarus, on
the eve of the presidential election of 19 March 2006, the opening
of an information structure on the Council of Europe in Belarus
could be a foot in the door for our Organisation to reach out to
the Belarusian public and contribute to the dissemination of European
values.
16. The availability of the authorities to open such an Infopoint
in the premises of the State University in Minsk is a sign of their
willingness to accept the exposure of Belarusian society to the
Council of Europe discourse. I am pleased that this opportunity
has not been missed and that, thanks to the efforts of the Slovak Chairmanship
of the Committee of Ministers, an agreement to this end was concluded
in May 2008. The ad hoc sub-committee of the Political Affairs Committee
who visited Minsk in February 2009 could visit the premises made
available by the State University, in the faculty of journalism.
17. I am pleased that, on 3 March 2009, the Belarusian government
gave its final consent to the opening of the Infopoint and that
now the Council of Europe and the University willl finalise the
technical details. At the moment, the Council of Europe is selecting
the staff for the Infopoint. The opening ceremony of the Infopoint is
planned for June 2009.
3. The state of democracy,
rule of law and human rights in Belarus
18. Since my first visit to Belarus as rapporteur, in
2007, there have been some major, objective and tangible improvements
in the situation in the country.
- these
improvements relate to areas falling under the core mandate of the
Council of Europe;
- they respond to demands made by our Assembly, as well
as by the European Union;
- and they are accompanied by consistent statements by the
authorities testifying to their commitment to undertake a progressive,
step-by-step and two-way process to come closer to Europe.
3.1. Release of political
prisoners
19. Between January and August 2008, nine figures
of the Belarusian opposition
serving prison sentences based on spurious charges and politically
motivated trials were freed.
20. Amongst them was Alexander Kozulin, leader of the Belarusian
Social Democratic Party and candidate in the 2006 presidential election.
He had been sentenced to five and a half years imprisonment on charges
of hooliganism and incitement to mass disorder during a demonstration
of protest against the conduct and the results of the 2006 presidential
vote.
21. The importance of this liberation should not be underestimated:
Mr Kozulin is a highly charismatic opposition figure, considered
by many as someone who has a potential to antagonise President Lukashenko, and
the latter is said to have personal grievances against him. Mr Kozulin
refused several times to ask for the presidential pardon and, finally,
was pardoned despite never having requested it.
22. These nine liberations have led a number of organisations
and countries, including the United States of America, which are
known for their criticism against the Belarusian authorities, to
state that there are no more political prisoners in Belarus.
23. I consider the improvement of the situation in this area as
a key progress which must be taken into account and responded to
by the Assembly. Even more so, if one considers that, despite having
undertaken a commitment to solve the issue of political prisoners
upon accession, a few Council of Europe member states regrettably
still have not succeeded.
24. Nevertheless, the allegations made by opposition representatives,
that a number of people who are currently in detention or subjected
to limitations of their personal liberty are political prisoners,
should be looked into with the most attentive consideration.
In
my opinion, in the framework of a dialogue with the Belarusian authorities
and in a similar manner to what was done for some member states
of the Organisation, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
should instruct a panel of independent experts with the task of investigating
these cases and ascertaining whether they are political prisoners,
according to the precise criteria already established by the Council
of Europe.
3.2. Political freedoms
25. The situation as regards the enjoyment of political
freedoms, in general, by Belarusian citizens is not very encouraging.
26. There have been important steps forward on the part of the
authorities, such as:
- in December
2008, the registration of the movement For
Freedom!, led by the former single opposition candidate
for the 2006 presidential elections, after repeated attempts and
legal quarrels that lasted more than a year; and
- a somewhat less repressive attitude towards the holding
and conduct of some demonstrations, such as the demonstration following
the parliamentary vote of September 2008.
27. However, obstacles to the activities of opposition parties,
movements and NGOs still remain and the general climate is such
that the expression of political views deviating from the official
line is stigmatised, repressed and sanctioned, not only through
measures taken by the judiciary and law enforcement officials but also
by loss of employment and expulsion from universities.
28. Even if there are no more political prisoners, harassment
and intimidation of opposition activists, in particular youth, continue
to take place through various means, such as unwarranted searches
of private houses, unlawful requisition of equipment, police brutality
during demonstrations and forced conscription into the draft despite
previous unfit declarations for military service. In addition, a
number of political activists are under house arrest and the criminal
records of those political prisoners who were released have not
been cleared, with the result that they face limitations in the
exercise of some rights, including the right to run for elections.
29. The main impediment to the exercise of freedom of association
remains the application of the provisions on the registration of
political parties and organisations. The conditions that must be
met in order to obtain registration by the Ministry of Justice are
exceedingly restrictive, with the result that, in the absence of registration,
the organisation in question is considered as unlawful and its members
risk criminal prosecution. The main factor precluding registration
is the obligation to find premises to use as a legal address, not
only because of the high cost of rent but above all because the
overwhelming majority of buildings are state-owned and, in any case,
residential buildings are not considered suitable for these purposes.
Only a few days before writing, the human rights non-governmental
organisation NashaViasna was refused registration,
after years of repeated attempts.
30. As regards freedom of assembly, even if in the course of 2008
a number of demonstrations could be held without particular hindrance
or without being followed by large-scale arrests, some of them were
heavily repressed, especially those organised by entrepreneurs,
journalists and youth organisations.
3.3. Elections
31. The parliamentary elections held in September 2008
were yet another source of disappointment, as they failed to meet
European standards of freedom and fairness. Although PACE decided
not to ensure its presence, as it had not received an official invitation,
I was able to form my own first-hand opinion having observed the
elections in my capacity as an Italian parliamentarian, attached
to the OSCE/ODIHR mission.
32. For me it is quite unthinkable that, out of 110 constituencies,
not one single opposition candidate was able to get elected.
33. There were indeed some improvements, such as:
- The fact that opposition representatives
could sit in electoral commissions,
- the registration of a higher number of opposition representatives
as candidates, compared to previous years, and
- a reduction of the proportion of voters using the system
of early voting from 31.5% in 2006 to 26.2% and the sealing of early
voting ballot boxes overnight.
34. On the other hand, these improvements are less significant
when one considers that:
- the
number of opposition representatives sitting in the electoral commissions
at various levels was very low and that they had only an advisory
role, with no realistic possibility of influencing decision-making;
- the most delicate stage of the procedure is the counting
of the votes, which was not transparent and during which international
observers were not allowed to approach.
35. Regrettably, the overall assessment of these elections is
that ‘the election environment in Belarus still did not allow genuine
political competition and equal treatment of election competitors
by the authorities. Serious concerns remain pertaining to fundamental
rights of freedoms of assembly and expression, and access to plurality
of views, constituting meaningful information necessary for voters
to make an informed choice. The legislative framework continues
to present obstacles to the conduct of elections in line with OSCE commitments.
Previous concerns regarding the Electoral Code (EC), as expressed
in past OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe Commission for Democracy
through Law (The Venice Commission) reports and legal opinions,
remain to be addressed’.
36. It is, however, to be welcomed that, following the final OSCE/ODIHR
assessment, the Belarusian authorities agreed to work with the OSCE/ODIHR
on the reform of the country's electoral legislation and practice,
in order to improve the environment for holding elections in line
with Belarus' OSCE commitments. The first Round Table to this end
was held in January 2009.
37. I expect that, in the context of a renewed dialogue and especially
in the case of restoration of Special Guest status for the Belarusian
parliament, PACE will be invited to observe future elections.
3.4. Media
38. There cannot be democracy without freedom of the
media. Unfortunately, in Belarus there are a number of elements
which make it particularly hard for ordinary citizens to have access
to pluralist information:
- the
printing and distribution of independent publications dealing with
political issues are hindered by practical and legal obstacles;
- by contrast, the distribution of official or pro-governmental
publications amongst the public at large is greatly encouraged;
- similarly, enormous resources are poured into the publication
of print press or the production of TV programmes, very plainly
supporting the Belarusian leadership, or depicting European democracies
and institutions in a bad light;
- cases of harassment against independent journalists are
not a rare occurence, with the result that many of them prefer to
opt for self-censorship.
39. It would be naïve to think that these ‘endemic’ problems can
be solved rapidly or easily. It is, however, a first important step
in the right direction that, in November 2008, the Belarusian authorities
decided to allow the printing in Belarus and the distribution through
the state network of three independent newspapers, Narodnaya Volya,Nashe Nivaand Uzgorak.
40. In addition, also in November 2008, the Belarusian Ministry
of Information, together with the OSCE Representative on Freedom
of the Media and the OSCE Office in Minsk, organised a round table
on the Belarusian legislation on Internet media.
41. Despite these improvements, much more should be done to improve
freedom of the media in Belarus and break the state’s monopoly of
information. Some of these measures are:
- the inclusion of the other independent publications into
the state distribution network;
- the removal of obstacles to the accreditation of foreign
journalists and the registration of foreign media, first of all
the satellite channel BELSAT, whose registration was refused on
3 March 2009 on the grounds of inadequate documentation;
- ensuring that the new media law is not implemented in
such a way as to limit freedom of the media, in particular as regards
the obligation of re-registration;
- ensuring the full respect of freedom of expression, and
refraining from using the Law on Counteraction against Extremism
as a way to restrict the activities of independent media outlets,
as it happened to the cultural magazine Arche,
the publication of which was temporarily suspended in February 2009.
3.5. Capital punishment
42. Although recourse to capital punishment has been
restricted to a few, particularly serious crimes, until not long
ago death sentences were still handed down and carried out, 4 or
5 on average each year, with the latest execution having taken place
in February 2008. For the sake of clarity, I should say that, as
far as I know, the death penalty has never been inflicted upon political
prisoners but only on people convicted for particularly serious
and gruesome crimes.
43. During my 2007 visit to Minsk, as well as during the recent
visit carried out by the ad hoc sub-committee of the Political Affairs
Committee, we discussed the question of capital punishment with
a number of officials, including the highest judicial authorities,
as well as other specialists and NGOs. The authorities pointed out
that the Belarusian public opinion is not ready to accept the abolition
of the death penalty, as indicated by a referendum held in 1996
in which the electorate voted in favour of maintaining this form
of punishment. On the other hand, the introduction of the death
penalty in the Constitution is envisaged as a temporary measure, which
is liable to be abolished when conditions are appropriate, and no
legal constraints would prevent the President or Parliament from
introducing a moratorium.
44. In April 2008, I made a public appeal to the Belarusian parliament
asking its Chairmen to take the lead in favour of the introduction
of a moratorium on capital executions as an intermediate step towards
complete abolition. This appeal was published in the newspaper
Narodnaya Gazeta.
Although
welcoming the fact that, since my open letter, no capital execution
has been carried out and that no more death sentences have been handed
down, I regret that despite some discussions by Belarusian legislators,
there has been no legislative follow-up to my proposal. I hope,
however, that in the context of the development of further dialogue
with the authorities, the current parliament will take the idea
on board. The introduction of a moratorium is, in my opinion, an
objective within reach which would bring Belarus closer to Council
of Europe values and standards. It would also give a clear signal
that, even if at the moment there is a
de
facto moratorium, the authorities are prepared to introduce
a formal change in the legislation.
4. The opposition
45. Despite its participation in the 2008 parliamentary
elections, the democratic opposition in Belarus is only extraparliamentary.
46. It is composed of a great number of political parties and
groups, from the far left to the far right. The majority of these
parties, however, is united under an umbrella structure, called
the Unified Democratic Forces of Belarus (UDF) which, in 2006, managed
to put forward a single candidate to run in the presidential elections, Mr
Alexander Milinkevich.
47. However, despite its commitment to preserve unity, the UDF
does not have a single leader or charismatic figure and its members
are divided on a plethora of political issues, with the exception
of their common opposition to the current leadership.
They often disagree on strategic issues,
for instance whether to take part in the elections or to boycott
them; or whether or not to engage with the authorities – and at
what level.
48. In recent years, the UDF has approved several programmatic
documents, including the project of a shadow constitution for Belarus
and an economic platform. After the 2008 elections, it agreed on
a number of measures called ‘the priorities of the UDF in legislation
changes for democratisation on the situation in the country during
the next 6 months’, which deal with electoral law, freedom of speech
and freedom of the media, political freedoms and freedom of action
for non-governmental organisations.
49. Outside the UDF, there are a number of other political parties
and groups, such as the For Freedom! movement
and the Christian Democratic Party, who count on well-known and
reputable political leaders and certainly reflect the views and
represent the interests of part of the Belarusian population.
50. Personally, I have admiration for the representatives of the
Belarusian opposition, who conduct their political struggle with
great courage and commitment, in very difficult conditions. I believe
that the success of the democratisation process in Belarus depends
to a large extent on the strengthening of the democratic opposition,
its unity, its communality of vision, strategy and actions; in a
nutshell, its potential to be considered a credible political force,
first of all by the Belarusians.
51. I think that the main preoccupation for the Belarusian opposition,
at this stage, should be how to gain widespread support among the
Belarusian public, because at the moment their outreach capacity
is limited. This can partly be explained with the authorities’ control
over the media and their manipulation of electoral results, as the
opposition argues. In my view, however, this is also due to strategic
mistakes made by the opposition itself and to limits stemming from
its stage of development.
52. Increased efforts are needed on the part of the democratic
opposition to:
- overcome internal
divisions;
- modernise the functioning of its political parties and
consider modernising party structures and leadership in such a way
as to enhance credibility and visibility;
- have a clear message; clear, concrete and attainable objectives
and a visible leadership;
- keep in touch with the needs, aspirations and grievances
of society and give them political expression: most probably, some
opposition’s programmatic documents are too lofty and theoretical
for average Belarusians who, even if they had access to them, would
not understand in what way these documents would improve their life;
- endorse the potential for change coming from the business
sector;
- devise a strategy of engagement with the Establishment.
53. As regards this last point, the opposition made attempts to
engage with the authorities before the elections, but was not met
by any positive reaction. However, after the elections, a number
of Consultative Councils were set up under the aegis of the Presidential
administration and other state bodies, to deal with various issues,
ranging from human rights to media or social affairs. Representatives
of civil society, NGOs, experts and also opposition leaders were
invited to sit in these councils, in a personal capacity. I am hopeful that
this opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue will not be
missed, and that the outcome of the discussions taking place within
the Consultative Councils will be taken into account by the authorities.
5. The new European
Union strategy of dialogue
54. Encouraged by the positive steps undertaken by the
Belarusian authorities in a number of areas, the European Union
has recently decided to restore the contacts with them which had
been restricted since November 2004
.
It has therefore embarked on a gradual normalisation of relations
with the authorities, while continuing to support democratic opposition
forces, NGOs and civil society.
55. The first demonstration of the willingness of the European
Union to engage in a step-by-step and two-way process with the Belarusian
leadership was the suspension of the visa-ban against a number of
high-ranking Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenko,
for a period of six renewable months
,
which has now been extended for an additional nine months, until
December 2009.
56. It is telling of the unity of the European Union institutions
on the new strategy towards Belarus that also the European Parliament,
which has always been an outspoken critic of the situation in the
country and its leadership, has supported the Council of the European
Union’s decision by a large majority.
57. Similarly, in response to the positive steps taken by Belarus
and in line with the new strategy of the Organisation, the European
Commission has entered into an intensified dialogue with Belarus
in fields such as energy, environment, customs, transport and food
safety and has confirmed its readiness to further expand the scope
of these technical co-operation activities. It is also studying
ways to adapt instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy
and the newly devised Eastern Partnership to the specific case of
Belarus. The office of the European Commission’s Delegation in Minsk,
opened in March 2008, will be instrumental to this end.
58. The willingness of the European Union to normalise relations
with Belarus, which can be a key strategic and economic partner
for Europe, was epitomised by the visit of Javier Solana to Minsk
and his meeting with President Lukashenko on 19 February 2009.
59. Belarus is also one of the six countries that will participate
in the Eastern Partnership, a new instrument designed to strengthen
political and economic co-operation between the European Union and
its Eastern and Caucasian neighbours, with a view to enhancing their
stability and supporting democratic and market-oriented reforms.
The level of Belarus’ participation will depend on the overall development
of its relations with the European Union. In this context, Belarus
attended the Eastern Partnership summit in Prague, on 7 May 2009. The
European Union also intends to establish a Human Rights Dialogue
with Belarus.
60. The leading role that the European Union is now going to undertake,
also in the promotion of democratic and human rights standards in
Belarus, offers new opportunities for engagement also to the Council
of Europe: the expertise of our Organisation could be valuable in
the context of the Eastern Partnership, especially within the multilateral
track.
61. Now the ball is in Belarus’ court: the European Union needs
to see further tangible progress, in order to pursue confidently
the line that it has undertaken with the suspension of the visa-ban.
In particular, progress should be irreversible, and enshrined in
legislative or systemic changes.
62. According to the European Parliament, in order to significantly
improve relations with the European Union, Belarus should:
- remain a country without political
prisoners,
- guarantee freedom of expression for the media,
- continue to co-operate with the OSCE on reform of the
electoral law,
- improve conditions for the work of non-governmental organisations,
and
- guarantee freedom of assembly and political association.
63. With this change of policy, the European Union joins the OSCE,
which has always maintained a strategy of engagement with the Belarusian
authorities. Belarus has been a member of the OSCE since 1992. Relations between
the OSCE and Belarus have at times been tense, due to the outspoken
criticism of the situation in the country by the organisation, but
dialogue has never stopped. The OSCE has an office in Minsk which
has proved of key importance to provide firsthand information on
the situation in the country; in addition, Belarusian parliamentarians
sit in the OSCE PA. At the moment, bilateral co-operation between
the OSCE and Belarus has intensified, in particular in the field
of electoral reform, and the OSCE representatives are satisfied
with the degree of responsiveness shown by the authorities.
64. I am convinced that, by restoring relations with the Belarussian
authorities, the European Union has made a wise decision and I hope
that the Assembly will also follow a similar course of action.
6. Why is dialogue
with the authorities necessary?
65. Belarus is the only European country which has not
undertaken a transition towards democratic institutions, political
pluralism and a free market economy. In 1990, upon becoming independent,
it briefly set off on this path, but reverted to a state-controlled
economy and to a system of power based around the figure of the
President after the election of Alexander Lukashenko in 1994, who
became President through free elections.
66. This pattern can be seen in society: in Belarus, the public’s
political awareness and the degree of development of society cannot
be compared to those of any other European country, even those previously part
of the Soviet Union. The political apathy of the population at large
– which contributes to explaining the support for the system of
power, as well as the weakness of and lack of widespread support
for the opposition, are objective features of Belarus, illustrated
by surveys and research conducted by independent observers and research
centres.
67. The specificity of the Belarusian case should not be used
as an excuse for acquiescing to non-democratic policies and human
rights violations. It should, however, be kept in mind when devising
a strategy to promote the development of democracy and human rights
in this country.
68. In recent years, the Council of Europe has focused its activities
towards Belarus on supporting democratic opposition forces, NGOs
and civil society. However, this strategy has had only limited results,
as these groups, being completely outside the current system of
power and having only limited support amongst the population, have
no substantial impact on the situation.
69. The Council of Europe should continue to give its support
to democratic forces and encourage their further development and
modernisation. PACE political groups should play a more prominent
role in this field, something that they were encouraged to do but
that – with the important exceptions of some political groups – failed
to do or failed to do systematically. In addition, however indispensable,
it is not sufficient to involve Belarusian opposition forces only
in discussions concerning their country: they need to grow politically;
to develop sound structures and programmes, finely tuned to the
characteristics of their potential electorate and they need to be
aware and participate in the main political debates taking place
in Europe.
70. However, it is rather optimistic, let alone unrealistic, to
think that the democratisation process in Belarus might be led exclusively
by the Belarusian opposition.
71. Given the country’s specificities, it is necessary to have
a dialogue with the Establishment in order to have access to the
Belarusian public and strengthen the awareness of democratic values,
in particular amongst the young generation. Furthermore, the Belarusian
Establishment is not single-minded: many people belonging to thepolitical élite are
or could be receptive to the Council of Europe message and, precisely
because they are part of the system of power, could have an impact
on the situation in the country.
72. During my visits to Minsk, I was assured by the Belarusian
authorities of their willingness to engage with our Organisation
and its Assembly in a progressive dialogue. I was told that the
authorities fully realise that, in this process, Belarus will have
to take conclusive steps towards meeting Council of Europe standards,
in the core areas of our Organisation. There is a readiness to do
so, provided that the Council of Europe also takes progressive steps
towards engaging with the Belarusian authorities. Similarly, there
is a readiness to take on board criticism, provided that it is expressed
in the context of dialogue.
73. This position has been repeatedly confirmed by the parliamentarians
and the diplomatic representatives of Belarus who have taken the
floor in the course of discussions on Belarus in the PACE Political
Affairs Committee.
74. In addition, the recent resignation from his post by the Minister
of the Interior, Mr Vladimir Naumov, should be seen as part of the
reshufflings which have led to the removal from positions of power
of all the main figures who were close to President Lukashenko at
the beginning of this decade and who were considered by European
organisations as directly involved in orchestrating and implementing
his most repressive policies.
7. Conclusions
75. Special Guest status was set up by the Assembly in
1989 to forge closer links with the parliaments of Central and Eastern
Europe in order to help these countries meet the conditions for
membership of the Council of Europe. According to the Assembly’s
rules of procedure, Special Guest status can be granted by the Bureau to
national parliaments of non member states, provided that the state
concerned meets four requirements:
- it is European;
- has signed the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 21 November 1990;
- has accepted the other instruments adopted by the OSCE
Conferences;
- has signed and ratified the two United Nations Covenants
of 16 December 1996 on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.
76. Special Guest status was suspended for the Belarusian parliament
more than twelve years ago. It is now time for the Assembly to make
an honest assessment of the situation in Belarus and the effectiveness
of its policy:
- the practice
of isolation of the authorities and support of the democratic opposition
has not served the purpose of advancing the state of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law in Belarus;
- in recent months, as never before, the Belarusian authorities
at the highest level have given tangible signs of their willingness
to come closer to Europe and have responded positively to a series
of demands made by European institutions, including the Assembly;
- the greatest progress is that, since August 2008, there
are no internationally-recognised political prisoners in Belarus,
and there is a political commitment from the authorities not to
step back on this issue;
- there has also been progress in the media field, with
the possibility for three major independent publications to be published
in Belarus and distributed through the national distribution network;
- improvements can also be seen in the areas of freedom
of association and freedom of assembly, as well as the willingness
of the authorities to engage with civil society.
77. At the same time, the Assembly should compare its attitude
towards Belarus with its attitude towards other countries:
- amongst the member states of
the Council of Europe, there are countries which still have political prisoners,
where the exercise of freedom of association and freedom of assembly
are hindered, where elections fall short of European standards;
and
- the Assembly patiently engages with these countries and
tries to raise their standards of democracy, human rights and the
rule of law, through dialogue and the monitoring procedure.
78. Finally, the Assembly should keep in mind that the two other
European Organisations with which it shares a communality of values
– the European Union and the OSCE – have abandoned, or have never
had, a policy of isolation. A joint position of these organisations
is bound to have a greater impact on the Belarusian authorities.
8. Main recommendations
8.1. Relations with
the Belarusian authorities
79. In the light of these considerations and for the
sake of consistency in the Assembly policies, I have no hesitation
in proposing that the Assembly re-establishes a structured and formal
dialogue with the Belarusian authorities.
80. It seems to me that the restoration of Special Guest status
for the Belarusian parliament is the best way to re-establish this
dialogue. It would enable parliamentarians from Belarus to attend
Assembly sessions and committee meetings, with the right to participate
in the discussion but with no right to vote.
81. In addition, the restoration of Special Guest status would
open up further possibilities for the Council of Europe as an organisation
to expand its activities in Belarus, including in the core areas
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
82. Although this decision lies with the Bureau, which can decide
with a 2/3 majority, I feel that the Assembly should put its political
weight behind this step. It is, indeed, a courageous decision but
also a necessary one if the Assembly wants to be relevant and have
an impact on the situation in Belarus.
83. The Belarusian leadership, for its part, should realise that
the restoration of Special Guest status is a starting point rather
than a point of arrival: it is the beginning of a closer dialogue
which can be sustained only through continuous progress and improvement
in the field of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and through
preparedness to accept constructive criticism in a co-operative
and open spirit.
84. This is why, after the restoration of Special Guest status,
the Assembly should continue to follow the situation in Belarus,
to measure whether there is the right progress and the right attitude
to proceed on the path of a structured dialogue.
85. Therefore, in one year’s time at the latest, taking into account
the opinion of the Political Affairs Committee, the Bureau should
be invited to evaluate whether the Belarusian authorities have undertaken substantive
and irreversible progress towards Council of Europe standards, indicating
their resolve to embrace its values, and consider further action.
In this assessment, the Bureau should pay special attention to developments
occurring in the following areas:
- political
prisoners
- electoral law and practice,
- freedom of association and assembly,
- freedom of the media, and
- capital punishment.
86. In this context, the activities of the sub-committee on Belarus
should be geared to supporting the rapporteur on the situation in
Belarus in assessing the evolution of the situation in the country,
through the organisation of field visits and exchanges of views
with the participation of guests from Belarus.
8.2. Support of democratic
opposition, NGOs and civil society
87. The Council of Europe and the Assembly should not
only continue, but also intensify, their contacts with the Belarusian
democratic opposition and increase their support to the strengthening
of civil society and non-governmental organisations in Belarus.
88. In particular, in order to associate these groups more closely
to the work of the Assembly and ensure that a variety of views is
taken into consideration, a delegation of the Belarusian extraparliamentary
opposition should be invited at every Assembly session as well as
every time that the issue of Belarus appears on the agenda of the
Assembly’s committees.
89. This invitation would have a great political significance,
as it would be the very first time that individuals who do not hold
a parliamentary mandate are so closely and systematically associated
with the activities of the Assembly. At the same time, this involvement
will hopefully mitigate the concerns expressed by some opposition
groups to be left aside in the renewed dialogue between European
organisations and the Belarusian leadership, by emphasising that
democratic forces are to remain central interlocutors for the Assembly.
8.3. Co-operation with
other European organisations
90. The Council of Europe and the Assembly should enhance
their co-operation with the appropriate bodies and institutions
of the European Union and the OSCE in order to improve the standards
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Belarus. The Assembly
should continue its co-operation with the European Parliament and
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in particular through the Parliamentary
Troika on Belarus. The organisation of joint activities and the
issuance of joint recommendations and statements should be strongly
encouraged.
***
Reporting Committee: Political
Affairs Committee.
Reference to Committee: Decision
of the Bureau of the Assembly on 17.12.98, Order 562 (2000), Doc.
8544, Ref. 2444, 04.11.99, Res. 1306 (2002)
Draft resolution and draft recommendation unanimously
adopted by the Committee on 26 May 2009
Members of the Committee: Mr Göran Lindblad (Chairperson),
Mr David Wilshire (Vice-Chairperson) (alternate: Mr Nigel Evans), Mr Björn Von Sydow (Vice-Chairperson),
Mrs Kristina Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mrs Fátima Aburto Baselga
(alternate: Mr Pedro Agramunt),
Mr Françis Agius (alternate: Mr Joseph DebonoGrech), Mr Alexander Babakov, Mr
Viorel Badea, Mr Denis Badré,
Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr Andris Bērzinš, Mrs Gudfinna Bjarnadottir,
Mr Pedrag Boškovic, Mr Luc Van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,
Mr Lorenzo Cesa, Mr Titus Corlătean,
Ms Anna Čurdová, Mr Rick
Daems, Mr Dumitru Diacov, Ms Josette Durrieu, Mr Frank Fahey, Mr
Joan Albert Farré Santuré, Mr Piero Fassino (alternate: Mr Andrea Rigoni), Mr Per-Kristian Foss, Mr György Frunda, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto,
Mr Marco Gatti, Mr Charles Goerens, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutiunyan,
Mr Joachim Hörster, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński,
Mr Bakir Izetbegović, Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, Mr Miloš Jevtić,
Mrs Birgen Keleş, Mr Victor
Kolesnikov, Mr Konstantion Kosachev, Mr Jean-Pierre Kucheida, Ms Darja Lavtižar-Bebler,
Mr René van der Linden, Mr Dariusz Lipiński,
Mr Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Gennaro Malgieri, Mr
Dick Marty, Mr Frano Matušić, Mr Dragoljub Mićunović, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Ms Nadezhda Mikhailova, Mr
Aydin Mirzazada, Mr Joāo Bosco MotaAmaral, Mr Gebhard Negele, Mrs
Miroslava Nemcova, Mr Zsolt Németh,
Mr Fritz Neugebauer, Mr Hryhoriy Omelchenko,
Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mr Aristotelis Pavlidis, Mr Ivan Popescu, Mr Christos Pourgourides,
Mr John Prescott (alternate: Mr John Austin),
Mr Gabino Puche, Mr Ilir
Rusmali, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Ingo Schmitt,
Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Leonid Slutsky, Mr Rainder Steenblock, Mr Zoltán Szabó, Mr Mehmet Tekelioğlu, Mr Han Ten Broeke,
Lord Tomlinson (alternate: Mr Denis MacShane),
Mr Petré Tsiskarishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mr Ilyas Umakhanov, Mr
José Vera Jardim, Mr Luigi Vitali,
Mr Wolfgang Wodarg, Ms Gisela Wurm (alternate: Mr Albrecht Konečný), Mr Boris Zala, Mr Emanuelis
Zingeris.
Ex-officio: MM. Mátyás
Eörsi, Tiny Kox
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting
are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee:
Mrs Nachilo, Mr Chevtchenko, Mrs Sirtori-Milner, Ms Alleon