1. Introduction
1. Migration flows to European countries, including
from eastern to western Europe, have assumed significant proportions
in the contemporary world. However, countries’ policies to manage
the many challenges and opportunities that emerge with these movements
have been lagging behind developments.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly and notably its Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Population has been engaged in dealing with the subject
of Europeans living abroad and their links to countries of origin
for the last fifteen years. In this context, your rapporteur recalls
the Assembly’s Recommendations
1410 (1999) and
1650
(2004) on the links between Europeans living abroad and their
countries of origin, as well as
Resolution 1462 (2005) and
Recommendation
1718 (2005) on co-development policy as a positive measure to regulate
migratory flows,
Recommendation
1500 (2001) on the participation of immigrant and foreign residents
in political life in Council of Europe member states, and the recent
Resolution 1618 (2008) and
Recommendation
1840 (2008) on the state of democracy in Europe: measures to improve
the democratic participation of migrants. It is regretful that the
numerous Assembly recommendations for the revision of emigration
policies, establishment of institutional links with expatriate communities
and promotion of greater involvement of expatriates in policy making
have largely gone unheeded.
3. Relations between European diasporas and their homelands in
Council of Europe member states range from strong and institutionalised
to loose and informal, without much effect of efforts to harmonise institutionalised
relations at the pan-European level. There is nevertheless a growing
understanding in Europe that labour mobility, if well managed, can
be advantageous for destination countries and bring significant benefits
to the countries of origin. How best to manage mobility, multiple
identities and diversity in a way that can maximise diaspora engagement
both in countries of origin and host countries, is a challenge that governments
need to tackle today.
4. Efficient utilisation of the potential of diasporas is particularly
essential for economies in transition. Many member states from central
and eastern Europe have relatively large, well-organised, highly
educated and broadly successful diasporas. Armenia, Lithuania and
Serbia may be mentioned as the most obvious, but also Poland, Ukraine,
other Baltic countries and former Yugoslavian republics have significant
diasporas in Europe and elsewhere.
While at political level, diaspora
communities in countries such as Bulgaria and the Baltic States
have provided strong political support at the highest leadership
level after the collapse of communist regimes, the potential that
diaspora communities offer in terms of development has – apart from
a few exceptions – been grossly underused. The financial flows initiated
by the diasporas have been almost exclusively used for subsistence,
consumption and philanthropic purposes rather than productive investments, export
expansion, new technologies and development in a broad sense.
5. Nevertheless, especially in the context of the current global
economic crisis, European governments are beginning to increasingly
recognise the potential development and other benefits of engaging
their diasporas in a more institutionalised manner. Faced with today’s
harsh economic realities, a growing number of countries are seeking
or are beginning to seek ways to capitalise better on their links
with national diasporas and to multiply the impact of remittances,
promote the transfer of skills and technologies and help reinforce
the political engagement of diaspora communities in their home countries.
What is so far missing, however, is reflecting these tendencies
at policy-development and implementation levels.
6. Host countries are also becoming increasingly aware of the
role that diaspora communities play in helping new migrants integrate
into their host society, while encouraging them to maintain contacts
with their countries of origin. It is being realised that, if properly
supported, guided and encouraged, diasporas can be an important
element in enhancing migrants’ participation and increasing their
contribution to their host society. Diasporas can likewise be instrumental
in assisting migrants with returns.
7. Your rapporteur is also convinced that well-integrated migrants
and diasporans (members of a diaspora) are better equipped to invest
in home country development. Conversely, the involvement of diasporas
in the development of their home country may facilitate integration
in the host country, provided those activities are developed in
partnership with other actors in the host society.
8. It is for these reasons that your rapporteur considers it
important to raise once again the issue of European diasporas in
the Assembly. Her objective is to look at how European diasporas
in Europe interact with their homeland and host country, and analyse
the benefits that both countries can derive from this dual role.
She also proposes some relevant policy recommendations to governments
in both home and host countries and looks at the role that the Council
of Europe could play in promoting harmonisation of policies, transnational
collaboration and rights-based action.
9. Your rapporteur wishes to underline that, whereas previous
related Assembly reports have talked about “European expatriates”
or “Europeans abroad”, she is in favour of using the term “European
diasporas”, keeping in mind the general evolution of the concept
in recent years as well as its distinction from temporary migrants.
2. Diasporas:
an evolving concept
10. There is no agreed definition of diaspora;
the
concept is complex and evolving in time. It was originally used
notably in relation to communities which had been forced to move
and had lost homelands, such as Jews following the destruction of
the Second Temple in 586 BC, African slaves, Armenians after the
First World War
or various communities from central and eastern
Europe during and after the Second World War.
11. With globalisation and expansion of labour mobility and increasing
migration in the past few decades, the concept has acquired new
dimensions: in 1986 Gabriel Sheffer identified modern diasporas
as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting
in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material
links with their countries of origin – their homelands”.
Today it
is commonly agreed that modern diasporas, regardless of their degree
of integration in the host society, are complex and heterogeneous communities
that are bound by a common attachment to their countries of origin,
their values and development. Owing to their hybrid identities,
diasporas have become important stakeholders with capacity to influence socio-economic
development in both their host and home countries.
12. What distinguishes modern diasporas from temporary labour
migrants is their status of being more permanently settled
as
well as their sharing of a self-awareness or diasporic consciousness:
they identify with each other as members of a dispersed identity
group with continuing common ties to the homeland
.
13. All the same, labour migrants are key components in the organisational
and developmental dimensions of diaspora groups and their support
organisations today. They often gather together in compact communities in
their host countries, prompted by the need to create mutual aid
systems to overcome day-to-day social and economic difficulties.
In this connection, diaspora communties are acquiring a particularly
important role acting as migrants’ collective organisations.
14. Membership in a diaspora group is not static and can fluctuate
as the interest of individuals in their homeland grows or dwindles.
It may also vary with the degree to which potential diasporans are
effectively integrated in the life of their host countries. Likewise,
second and third generations of diasporas grow up speaking different
languages, and their world view is inevitably influenced by the
experience of living in different societies and cultures. In some
cases they focus more on their lives in host countries and may hardly
have any interest in the reasons that caused their ancestors to
resettle or in the current situation of their country of origin.
15. Diaspora communities from one city, region or country living
together in the same host country often come together in formal
organisations. These organisations take a variety of forms: they
may be professional associations, for example bringing together
migrant doctors, lawyers and teachers (for example the Hungarian Medical
Association in America), or they may be organisations based on common
interests such as sport, religion, gender, social issues, charitable
work, and development. These can also be investment groups, affiliates
of political parties, humanitarian relief organisations, schools
and clubs for the preservation of culture, virtual networks, and
federations or associations. Home Town Associations (HTAs) are a
specific type of organisation bringing together people from the
same town or city and focusing their activities on the development
of their hometown. The interests and capacities of these diaspora
organisations vary enormously. Some are powerful and capable networks;
some have a significant impact in one particular town or village; some
operate sporadically on a very limited scale and some seem to exist
in name only.
16. The globalisation of the world economy has greatly expanded
the means by which diasporans – as individuals and associations
– can become and remain actively involved in the economic, cultural,
social and political life of both their home and host countries.
3. The positive role
of diasporas
3.1. Diasporas’ engagement
in their country of origin
17. Changing migration patterns and trends, as well as
increasing globalisation, communications and technological advances
are laying the foundation for new methods of engagement by and with
diasporas. Besides the more traditional assistance to their home
countries and regions though remittances or foreign direct investment,
new fields of diasporic activity are developing. These range from
new professional networks for the exchange of knowledge and skills,
local development initiatives through micro-enterprises and other community
infrastructural support, lobbying and advocacy in policy design
and implementation, to the public display of people’s homeland attachment.
Diasporas often serve as a main force for modernisation in countries of
origin and can even influence the strategy of development of whole
regions. In this expanded context, it is important that governments
view diasporas not merely as financial investors but as strategic
development partners.
18. The most direct and immediate impact to the development of
home countries nevertheless comes out of diaspora engagement at
family and community levels, notably through remittances. In several
countries, diasporas contribute significant proportions to their
homeland’s GDP. Cash remittances are the most obvious, although
remittances in kind are also important. For example, in 2008, Ukraine
received 19 billion euros of remittances from abroad, which forms
18% of the country’s GDP.
Globally, remittances
outpace official development assistance, for example by USD 167
billion in 2006 according to the World Bank estimates. They are
expected to exceed USD 300 billion in 2009.
19. However, while remittances directly augment the income of
recipient households, they do not reduce the need for foreign development
aid and direct investments. The current climate of economic downturn
and the growing loss of jobs have led many diaspora and migrant
donors to reduce the remittances they send to their families, and
have increased labour migrants’ return to their home countries.
According to World Bank estimates, remittances are bound to decrease
by up to 6% worldwide in 2009. This poses a serious threat to the
states and communities dependent on such transfers.
20. Governments and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) have only recently begun to think systematically about
the actual and potential contributions of diasporas to the development
and reduction of poverty in the countries of origin.
Several
Council of Europe member states or observers, among them the United
Kingdom, United States, France, Sweden and Denmark, are now working
closely with their diaspora organisations to mobilise and maximise
remittances for the benefit of development projects back home.
21. Nevertheless, remittances constitute only one vehicle for
diasporas’ influence on the development of their home countries.
For many countries, diasporas are a major source of foreign direct
investment (FDI), market development, technology transfer, tourism,
political contributions, and more intangible flows of knowledge,
progressive attitudes, and cultural influence.
22. Significant investment in the country of origin by diaspora
investors can be a push factor for market reforms and/or for strengthening
institutions in a country of origin. Diasporans play an increasing
role in developing business opportunities and community services
in a large number of member states. A number of web-based diaspora
networks now facilitate commercial investments and community service
by their members for the benefit of home countries. It is through
this type of creative global exchange of information and ideas that
new and exciting initiatives are developed.
23. Diaspora homeland investments are crucial to less economically
developed member states with relatively weak institutions, increased
political risks, high levels of corruption and low incomes. While
such factors would likely discourage the non-diaspora foreign investors,
diasporans in general are more likely to invest in economies that
others would consider high-risk, simply because they have knowledge
and relationship opportunities that other investors lack. They can
also combine this knowledge with the skills, knowledge, and networks
they have cultivated abroad, yielding important synergistic advantages.
24. The social and political activities of diasporas may have
even greater prospects for the development of their home societies.
Although these are more difficult to assess than economic contributions,
they affect attitudes towards human rights, women’s economic rights
and the advancement of political participation, the value of education
for girls, the prevention of the use of violence to resolve political
disputes, etc. In central and eastern Europe, diasporas have played
a significant role in the promotion of human rights and democracy
in the last two decades. As democracy affords a more conducive environment
for diaspora’s political engagement, and more opportunities for
policy influence in the homeland, these social and political activities are
likely to grow.
25. Diasporas may play an influential role in the electoral processes
in their homelands. For example, diaspora support to homeland political
campaigns may influence electoral outcomes. In some countries, this leads
political candidates to campaign in diasporas’ countries of residence
even when those diasporans cannot vote or tend not to vote.
26. Diasporas are increasingly involved in lobbying and advocacy.
Some host countries are becoming aware of the potential benefits
of having diasporas as partners in areas such as the design and
implementation of development policies
vis
à vis the home country. Other lobbying and advocacy initiatives
by diasporas have influenced, for example, specific trade agreements
between host and home countries such as between southern European
and northern African countries.
27. Diaspora lobby groups increasingly engage in direct communication
with third-party states and international organisations, in effect
bypassing their homeland and host state governments. Diasporas are
thus becoming perceived as transnational political entities, operating
“on behalf of their entire people”, and capable of acting independently
from any individual state, be it their homeland or host states.
28. Diasporas have the potential to make powerful contributions
to peace and reconciliation. They can contribute to post-conflict
recovery and development through financial and economic contributions,
political and technocratic leadership as well as institutional capacity-building
by expatriate professionals that return temporarily to their homeland.
Similarly, they can contribute to peace and reconciliation processes,
and can support civil society networks and educational projects
promoting their causes.
Diaspora
involvement in political changes may help to avert violent conflict
by promoting and funding non-violent forms of opposition. Such influence
may come from grass-roots organisations, and also from individual
leaders within diaspora communities such as religious, ethnic or
business leaders, journalists, scholars, artists and performers
able to reach large segments of the population.
29. But the reverse is also true. Diasporas have contributed to
conflicts in nearly all regions of the world, including Kosovo,
Turkey, and Northern Ireland.
Sheltered
from the daily consequences of violence, they are often more uncompromising
than their counterparts who remain in countries of origin. Their
support may be direct, providing financial, manpower, arms and transport,
to groups involved in violent conflict in their countries of origin,
or indirect, via remittances that are used locally to fuel conflicts
and undermine development and peace building efforts. Members of
diaspora communities may also contribute to ongoing conflicts by
providing skills for insurgent groups, such as computer programming,
demolition, fundraising, or financial management.
30. Some diaspora organisations and individuals seek no personal
return on investment, but rather pursue charitable enterprises.
Such enterprises range from very small-scale, one-off efforts of
community groups to more organised and durable efforts; from the
donations of single individuals to powerful networks of like-minded
donors.
3.2. European diasporas’
engagement in host countries
31. Diasporas’ relationships with their host countries
are shaped by a wide set of variables. These may be demographic,
influenced by the total size of a particular diaspora group in the
host country, their geographic concentration or the socio-economic
status of the diaspora group. They may relate to the proximity and
ethnic, political or other linkages of the host country to homeland.
Or they may relate to the political relationship between the host
state and the diaspora group, i.e. be influenced by the extent diaspora
groups are participating in society, by the degree of how much refugee
and migration policies disadvantage members of the diaspora population,
to what extent their political activities towards homelands are
supported and by many other factors.
32. The depth of integration in the host country is often of direct
relevance to the extent and nature of diasporas’ contributions to
their home country. A migrant who feels settled and accepted in
the host community can expend less effort on his or her own well-being
and devote more time, energy and resources for the home community.
In
this respect, citizenship rights in host countries play an important
role: for instance, Ukrainian diaspora groups in Canada, who can
enjoy citizenship rights not enjoyed by their fellow migrants in
France, Germany or the United Kingdom,
tend to be much more
active and more vocal in relations with their homelands.
33. One of the key positive roles played by diasporas in their
host countries is helping new migrants to integrate in their new
environments while also helping them maintain contacts with their
countries of origin. Migrant workers frequently encounter various
infringements of their rights both when moving away from their own
country and on arrival in their host country. As a rule, the deterioration
of migrants’ living conditions in European countries stems from
legal uncertainty and growing inequality of access to social welfare.
They also have to cope with psychological factors, which relate
to language barriers, loss of usual social networks and other type
of social and legal problems. Ukrainian migrants, for example, often
need social and psychological support to adapt to the new living
environment in the host country. Their educational needs – ranging
from learning the language to establishing Ukrainian schools – are
not always sufficiently satisfied. Nor is their need for objective
information about the current political and economic situation in
Ukraine adequately met. In addition, such vitally important social
and legal issues as working and housing conditions, public health
issues, and the payment of retirement benefits abroad have not been
resolved. Additionally, legal protection and the regularisation
of the status are important unresolved issues for irregular migrants.
34. However, if properly supported, guided and encouraged, diasporas
may serve as an important tool for helping their compatriots adjust
and adapt to their host societies. Voluntary organisations such
as the “Ukraine-World” Association, the Ukrainian Worldwide Co-ordinating
Council and Ukrainian Mutual Aid in case of Ukraine play an important
role in this process. For instance, Ukrainian Mutual Aid directs
its efforts at working mainly with the latest wave of Ukrainian
diasporas, predominantly migrant workers. By coordinating the activities
of voluntary organisations in Ukraine and within the Ukrainian diasporas,
co-operation with home and foreign governments, business community
and non-profit organizations, these associations uphold the economic,
political, legal, ethnic and cultural interests of Ukraine and Ukrainians
abroad. Partly state-funded or working entirely on a voluntary basis,
such organisations now act as a unifying force, providing the foundation
on which strong ethnic communities develop.
35. Nonetheless, no matter to what extent diasporas can play the
positive role, the real difference regarding the respect of migrant
workers’ rights, their integration or return is made at the levels
of government policy development and implementation. Both sending
and receiving countries should develop mutually beneficial and coherent
policies in which diasporas can play a constructive role.
4. Government responses
at national level
36. European governments today are faced with the challenge
of how best to manage the complexities of mobility, multiple identities
and diversity in a way that can maximise diaspora engagement both
in home and host societies.
37. Most Council of Europe member states are simultaneously countries
of origin and destination. Therefore their national migration policies
need to encompass a holistic view on managing inflows and outflows
of migrants. For this particular reason, your rapporteur deems it
necessary to suggest government responses that contain both aspects
and emphasise their inter-linkages.
38. Government policies and practices in Council of Europe member
states reflect the diverse views and methods of engagement, ranging
from symbolic to very concrete. The context in which member states
are reaching out to their diasporas is unique, given the socio-historical
background of origin and destination countries. Whereas the majority
of “older” member states have long-standing institutionalised relations
with their expatriates; many “newer” member states from central
and eastern Europe are only beginning to recognise the potential
development and other benefits of engaging their diasporas in a
more institutionalised manner.
39. Your rapporteur finds it regrettable that after years of calls
by the Assembly, relations between member states and their diasporas
abroad are far from being harmonised at European level. There is
nevertheless a clear trend for the countries of origin to court
their nationals and descendants of nationals who are living abroad.
In a number of recent member states, such as Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, diaspora communities have provided political
leadership at the highest level after the collapse of the communist
regimes. Several other states have established ministerial-level
ties for fostering relations with their diasporas.
40. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the development
potential of diaspora communities has in general been much underexploited,
and the remittances generated by diasporas are predominantly used
for the purposes of consumption, education and health. Other types
of financial flows, such as direct business investments, investment
in capital markets and charitable contributions are particularly
dependent on the existence of a conducive economic environment in
the country of origin. In many parts of Europe, corruption and political
manipulation still inhibit potentially lucrative and sustainable
contributions to development aid, much as they do to any type of
foreign investment. Active business support and productive investment programmes
are suitable governmental responses to these problems. Albania can
be cited as one such positive example. The country has recently
elaborated a National Action Plan on Remittances with a view to encourage
formal channels of remittances and directing remittances towards
productive use and investment in Albania.
41. In order to fully benefit from diaspora contributions and
devise better policies, all member state governments should first
and foremost be aware of the size of their communities abroad and
have collected information about their profiles. It is not an easy
task, given the large number of labour migrants from central and
east European countries residing abroad illegally. Profile-mapping
is also rather complex. For instance, whereas first generation diasporans
may be keen to contribute to their home country’s development through financial
investment and/or remittances, later generation diasporas may prefer
to contribute through a transfer of knowledge and skills. Better
knowledge of varying profiles may enable more successful targeting
of activities and policies.
42. Most importantly, however, governments need to consider the
shifting migration policy perspectives which have emerged during
the globalisation process since the 1990s. Whereas earlier generations
of migrants in Europe left their homelands to take up permanent
residence in a particular country, the revolutionised communications
and transportation, flourishing cross-border mobility and trans-nationalism
(which has redefined individual and family identities) have rendered
the traditional classification of countries of origin, transit and
destination obsolete.
43. Unlike the traditional flows of relatively unqualified manpower,
migration today includes the movement of highly qualified professionals,
entrepreneurs, academics and young persons seeking employment experience
abroad. Therefore, home countries have every interest in retaining
links with these people and encouraging their return. At the same
time, economic disparities and demographic imbalances between developed
and developing countries are increasing, and smuggling and trafficking
networks are developing to service a fast-growing irregular migration
industry.
In this
context, states are increasingly challenged by the tensions between
preventing brain drain and controlling the activities of diaspora
communities on one hand, and not limiting their potential economic
contributions on the other.
44. These evolutions require understanding of migration as an
unavoidable feature of the contemporary world, which means that
European states need coherent policies that take into account the
potential of human mobility while attempting to strike a balance
amongst many conflicting and competing interests, such as migration
facilitation and migration control, diversity and cohesion, state
sovereignty and human security.
45. Migrant communities on the whole, and diasporas in particular,
are highly interested partners, provided their opportunities are
credible, the environment is conducive to their involvement and
benefits are recognised by both home and host countries. In order
to improve policies towards diasporas, it is essential that European governments
recognise:
- the important role
that the double or multiple belonging of diasporas can play in bridging
cultures and contributing to European cultural and religious diversity;
- the changing migration patterns as well as the increased
potential of diasporas as strategic development partners;
- the heterogeneity of expectations and skill levels of
diaspora communities and representatives, and the necessity to refrain
from applying one-fit-all responses.
46. Particularly in the current situation of global economic downturn,
governments should attach greater attention to the importance of
creating policies that benefit migrants who choose to support various development
initiatives in their countries of origin. These policies need to
build on the skills and talents of diaspora communities and their
members for the purpose of achieving better integration in the countries
of residence and development in the countries of origin.
47. It is also essential for governments to publicise positive
images of diasporas contributing to their home country’s development
in order to reduce often-prevailing negative perceptions of immigration
in host countries. The French Government’s co-development policy,
which labels immigrants as development actors bridging home and
host countries or as ambassadors facilitating the development of
bilateral relations,
is one such positive example.
48. Your rapporteur distinguishes four broad areas of diaspora
engagement policies, upon which governments could build their strategies.
These include:
- instituting
a comprehensive and multi-sector approach to managing migration
and development at a national level;
- generating policy incentives for diasporas at political,
economic and trade, educational and cultural levels;
- fostering dialogue and partnership with diaspora communities;
- building national capacities to facilitate engagement.
4.1. Coherent migration
management
49. Diaspora policies should be viewed within a holistic
concept of migration management and development, which should also
integrate health, education, public sector reform, private sector
development, national security concerns and the reinforcement of
legal and administrative frameworks.
50. Migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which implies a policy
coherence approach involving all sectors of social and political
life. In practice and as a matter of policy development, international
migration must be seen in its entirety – that is, as a phenomenon
that involves political and economic institutions of the countries
of origin, destination and transit as well as migrants themselves.
It should encompass all economic, political or even environmental
components of migration, whether legal or illegal. Any measure taken
by a country towards a migrant or group of migrants must be approached
within this overall context and considering its impact on other
countries. Circular migration should be endorsed in order to prevent
the negative consequences of irregular migration and brain drain.
Migrants need to be provided ways and means that enable them to
move fairly easy between their countries of origin and destination
in an orderly manner.
51. In order to maximise diasporas’ development impact, it is
important that home countries integrate diaspora initiatives in
the planning of development and national poverty reduction strategies,
both at the national and local levels. Development policies should
be coherent in relation to home and host countries.
4.2. Policy incentives
52. Governments can play a catalytic role in creating
an environment conducive to diasporas involvement through offering
various policy incentives. These may include civil and political,
economic, social, educational, tax benefits or various other forms
of incentives.
4.2.1. Civil and political
incentives
53. Diasporas are constituencies that are marginalised
from the homeland. In order to help diasporans and diasporas remain
engaged, policies such as the extension of citizens’ political rights,
organisation of diaspora summits and diplomatic visits to diaspora
organisations in their host countries should be encouraged. More than
other resources, these policies extend moral support/encouragement
to the diaspora by legitimising them as homeland contributors and
influencers.
54. A number of approaches to encourage maintaining identity with
a home country have been tested, one of which is dual (or multiple)
citizenship. Approximately 80 countries worldwide allow dual citizenship;
however, the policies and practices on dual citizenship vary, and
there are arguments both in favour and against them.
European countries
like Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom allow multiple citizenship from
among the Council of Europe member states. Several other member states,
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia, make exceptions for
children born abroad. Most, nevertheless, request these second generation
emigrants to make a declaration of desire to retain citizenship
or to apply for definitive citizenship once they come of age. Countries
such as Latvia and Poland allow their citizens to become citizens
of a foreign state, but the authorities will only recognise their
Latvian or Polish citizenship respectively. Spain makes exceptions
for countries with which it has dual citizenship treaties.
55. Diasporas often face with the problems of limited rights of
entry and residence, and may require visas to return to their country
of origin. They may also be ineligible to invest, hold the rights
of inheritance and property. These factors present a challenge to
their integration and democratic participation in their host societies.
Some
countries already started implementing such policies. In Ukraine,
for example, the members of diasporas and their families are eligible
to receive an official certificate granting them the status of “Ukrainian
abroad”, which allows them to enter and exit the country of origin
without a visa.
56. It would therefore be desirable to offer diasporas the opportunity
to maintain close ties with their country of origin, as well as
exercise wider economic, electoral and other political rights in
the host countries by arranging maximum harmonisation of diasporas
rights with those of native citizens’. This would enable governments
both to take full advantage of the fruits of the experience of diasporas
(including their financial assets, their organisational skills and
their patriotism) and to turn the latter into a genuine lever of
influence over the development of their countries of origin. Clearly,
one cannot expect help from the diasporas if they are not given
real opportunities to influence the situation in their countries
of origin.
57. That being said, it is equally important that any policy of
extending political rights to nationals living abroad on a large-scale
basis should abide by the principles of international law and be
governed by bilateral agreements between the states concerned. Your
rapporteur recalls that the Parliamentary Assembly has consistently
protested against the practice of giving out passports and conferring
citizenship to residents of foreign states in pursuit of expansionist
policies.
She
also recalls the recommendations on national minorities in inter-state
relations issued by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
in June 2008, which provide that states should refrain from taking
unilateral steps, including extending benefits to foreigners on
the basis of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious or historical
ties that have the intention or effect of undermining the principles
of territorial integrity.
58. Your rapporteur also recalls the Assembly’s position as regards
encouraging host countries to promote integration of migrants by
reducing residency requirements for acquisition of nationality for
five years or less, while ensuring that other requirements, such
as naturalisation tests, language tests, income and housing requirements,
fees and oaths do not become unduly onerous in terms of their number
and conditions.
The Assembly has also requested
ensuring that countries do not impose unreasonable impediments to
obtaining nationality on second- or later-generation migrants.
59. Another measure that relates to identity and which may indirectly
attract diaspora involvement in both their country of origin and
host country includes the right to vote.
60. Although there is a tendency worldwide for political rights
to be given to emigrants, many states – including Council of Europe
members – remain hostile to the enfranchisement of their expatriates.
An example is that of Ireland, whose millions of expatriates still
have no right to vote. This should be seen in the context of the
mass emigration from Ireland and the huge diaspora community which
potentially vastly outnumbers the domestic population of Ireland.
Other countries do not open polling stations in certain countries
where an insufficient number of voters are registered. Opponents
raise significant ethical and constitutional issues, such as whether
individuals should be able to influence policies to which they are
not subject to, or whether they should have representation without
taxation.
61. As regards diasporas’ voting rights in their host countries,
the Assembly is in favour of granting migrants the right to vote
and the right to stand in local and regional elections after a residence
period of five years or less.
62. Only four countries in Europe – Croatia, France, Italy and
Portugal – allow their citizens abroad not only to participate actively
in some electoral processes, but also enable them to elect their
own representatives to the national legislature. This practice is
clearly aimed at reinforcing external voters’ link with the national political
community, enabling promotion of their own legislative agenda and
direct intervention from an overseas viewpoint in the debates and
processes of political decision-making on topics of national interest. Each
case has its own particular features, of course. In 2007, the Croatian
diaspora occupied 6 seats (3.9%), the French diaspora 12 seats (3.6%),
the Italian diaspora 12 seats (1.9%), and the Portuguese diaspora
4 seats (1.7%) in their home country legislature
.
63. Besides the political participation through voting and standing
for election, democratic participation in home and host societies
also includes the exercise of rights such as freedom of expression,
thought, conscience and religion. It can cover freedom of association,
including membership of political parties or trade unions and participation
in demonstrations. Furthermore, it can include participation in
civil society, whether in migrant-dedicated associations or other
associations with wider remits such as sports, arts, charity, philosophy or
religion. Your rapporteur maintains that granting political rights
to migrants is a universal demand, which is also consistent with
the principles of democracy and citizen equality.
64. It should nevertheless be underscored that, alongside rights,
diasporas and migrants in general also have responsibilities vis-à-vis
their host countries: they must accept the laws, customs and values
of their host societies. They also have responsibilities to the
wider community they live in terms of participating on its development.
They may campaign for peaceful change using democratic means, but
if they cannot respect the law and the constitution of the hosting
country they should leave the country.
4.2.2. Fostering return
65. In a number of Council of Europe member states, brain
drain constitutes a growing problem, enforced by the economic crisis.
On the other hand, the economic downfall also encourages return
to home country. Policies should be put in place to manage these
flows, with a view to transforming brain drain into “brain gain”. Institutional
conditions, including legislation, that facilitate the voluntary
return of migrants and diasporas to their country of origin and
their reintegration ought to be elaborated. For migrants returning
home, essential steps should be taken to ensure that their financial,
tax and retirement rights are guaranteed.
66. Even in economically hard times, European states have the
important responsibility in offering their citizens sustained economic
growth, a favourable business climate and decent working conditions.
In creating such conditions and becoming more attractive, countries
will not only ensure that migration becomes a choice rather than
a necessity, but will also encourage return and circular migration,
maximise the impact of remittances and encourage diaspora populations
to invest in their homeland.
4.2.3. Promoting investment
and entrepreneurship
67. Entrepreneurship is a sphere in which diasporas want
to be involved. Not all migrants are predisposed to entrepreneurship,
and the very nature of economic activities developed by diasporas
relies on their status in the receiving country (regular or irregular,
long-term resident, second generation migrant, etc.), the reasons behind
the initiative (investment, preparing return, helping the family)
and existing opportunities in the home country. Yet if diaspora
members happen to have acquired means, knowledge and networks that
they wish to use in their home country, home and host governments
can provide them with useful help.
68. Home countries willing to promote diaspora entrepreneurship
can provide them with customs/import incentives, give them access
to special economic zones and to foreign fiscal institutions, and
more generally inform them on investment opportunities, for example,
through the use of internet. Additionally, since diasporas often
obtain most firsthand information about their home countries from
their families, quality information on investment opportunities
can be provided through local media.
69. Access to land and property is a sensitive issue, especially
in post-conflict cases where diasporas demand to recuperate property.
In other cases, reforms of land ownership legislation may be an
important step to encourage diasporas to invest in agriculture and
property reconstruction.
70. All in all, in order to boost investment and create a conducive
business environment, home governments need to guarantee the rule
of law, and in particular fair access to courts and fair trial,
which are particularly important for diasporas who are frequently
targeted for their money, and whose investments might be misappropriated.
4.2.4. Fostering remittance
flows
71. In today’s context of global economic crisis in particular,
member state governments should design policies that make the transfer
of financial remittances more cost-effective.
72. In particular, countries that are traditionally countries
of origin should encourage remittance flows through pro-active legislative
and regulatory policies. They should, for example, endow their migrants
with specific rights, protection and recognition, so as to maximise
the income stream from their remittances and involve them in the
broader development process.
73. Countries of origin and destination should also co-operate
with a view to supporting remittance flows and their impact. They
should consider measures such as:
- lowering transaction costs and signing agreements on avoiding
double taxation, and treating international migrants as investors;
- creating a proper legal and regulatory framework allowing
effective use of remittances in various investment areas;
- simplifying and securing the procedures for transfer operations
through adapted and transparent banking arrangements;
- encouraging banks to make transfers of savings and welfare
benefits in a spirit of genuine competition and at reasonable cost;
- encouraging collective remittances to support community
development and the generation of employment opportunities;
- offering financial incentives (such as special loans and
interest rates) under economic and social development programmes;
- sponsor research on the patterns and uses of remittances.
4.2.5. Promoting education
and culture
74. Another desirable diaspora integration policy includes
direct assistance through public cultural and information centres
for members of the diaspora and migrants, designed to satisfy their
educational, cultural and information needs and preserve their distinct
ethnic identities. Teaching or maintaining language, culture and
identity must be encouraged through the establishment of school
or language support networks. However, a great deal still depends
on the co-operation of host countries, some of which still consider
that retaining one’s original language hinders integration and therefore
oppose such measures.
75. Diaspora communities who are among the leading internet consumers,
also need sites where they can find all the necessary information.
At relatively low cost, states could use web technologies to help
reinforce social, affective and cultural cohesion and encourage
migrants to consider returning to their country of origin.
4.3. Dialogue and partnership
with diasporans and diaspora organisations
76. Partnership with diasporans and diaspora communities
is vital: they represent a bridge between countries of origin and
destination, and give ownership to the process.
77. One particularly important step in diaspora networking is
through creating government structures and initiatives with the
purpose of helping diasporas retain strong, effective links with
their countries of origin. Many European countries have created
special ministerial-level departments responsible for expatriate
matters, special offices in embassies, president’s offices or specialised
agencies. Some European countries, such as Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Serbia have set up specific ministries of diasporas in order
to promote relations with their citizens abroad. For example, in
Serbia, the Ministry of Diaspora is tasked with translating new
diaspora legislation into concrete practice-oriented programmes;
it is currently developing a diaspora strategy and national action
plan, which is expected to be finalised in December 2009. In Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees is gathering
necessary data on diaspora contributions and engaging public and
private sector stakeholders in an inter-institutional process to
devise a coherent strategy and legislative framework for maximising
the impact of such contributions.
78. An important issue from both home and host country perspectives
is to identify the profiles of existing diaspora organisations and
there should be an attempt to work with all of them. Diaspora organisations
are diverse in objectives, size, capacity and experience, and different
categories of diaspora organisations need differentiated partnerships.
79. Governments should be encouraged to devise programmes to promote
co-operation between cities in countries of origin and voluntary
organisations operating in twin towns in host countries. Also government programmes
should offer support to build and strengthen diaspora networks that
have strong development potential, such as those devoted to co-operation
in business or information technology. Events such as trade and
investment fairs or diaspora business conferences, and networking
tools such as websites may be difficult for smaller and poorer diaspora
groups to organise independently.
80. However, national governments are not the only important partners
for diaspora groups. Local and regional governments, non-profit
institutions and foundations, universities, research laboratories
and hospitals in communities of origin are also actual or potential
partners in diaspora activities.
Furthermore, the private sector
can contribute to creating new opportunities for business, joint
ventures, trade and increased flows of investment.
4.4. National capacity-building
81. National policies need to be accompanied by national
capacity-building, which should concentrate on the importance of
enhancing knowledge, research and human capacities. This requires
as a first priority improving data and statistics on issues related
to inter-linkages between migration and development (transnational
communities, return and circular migration, remittances); enhancing
knowledge of the impact of migration policies on development and
vice versa; promoting policy dialogue and closer co-operation between migration
and development stakeholders at bilateral, regional, inter-regional
and global levels; and devising and investing in new pilot projects
and programmes to test out in very practical ways how migration
can best contribute to development.
82. It is equally important to develop administrative, financial
and technical capacities. The governments of many countries of destination
have minimal official structures – or none at all – for relating
to diaspora populations in the context of development. Creating
an office in the national development assistance agency to relate
to diasporas is a step towards a more systematic way of engaging
diasporas. The governments of origin countries may have the necessary
structures, but often do not have the fiscal capacity to staff them adequately
or provide them with operational funds. Donor governments and donor
agencies could assist the governments of countries of origin, both
technically and financially, to strengthen their diaspora institutions.
83. Finally, both origin and destination governments that want
to work with diasporas on development have a stake in developing
the capacity of diaspora organisations to participate in both planning
and implementing development activities, and to ensure that diaspora
issues are taken into account and have a focal point within their
own ministries.
5. International and
inter-governmental responses: the ways forward
84. The international community, including organisations
such as the International Organization for Migration, the International
Labour Organization or the Council of Europe, have an important
and multiple task in assisting governments in developing coherent
migration and development policies, both at national and international
levels.
85. Firstly, there is a need to clarify different concepts, classifications
and definitions concerning diasporas with a view to harmonising
the concept at international level, taking into account its evolving
and dynamic nature. It is also important that the status, rights
and obligations of diasporas in Europe, both in their countries of
origin and host societies, be defined.
86. Secondly, any international co-operation on migration management
should be multi-dimensional and channel migration into regular and
humane avenues, including by increasing legal opportunities for
labour migrants. Your rapporteur considers it of paramount importance
that any co-operation on migration management should be based on
a human rights approach, promoting human dignity and equal treatment.
The integration of migrants in Europe and respective migration policies
have to be based on the principles of enjoyment of human rights
and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law while at the same time
making it possible for migration to be managed, different nationalities
to peacefully co-exist in society and individual characteristics
to be respected. Any co-operation on migration management should
in general be based on democratic values and, in particular, respect
for diversity.
87. Thirdly, the international community has a key role to play
in promoting standard-setting. Full advantage should be taken of
the existing international legal instruments, consolidating the
legal status of migrants. It is important that as many European
countries as possible ratify the relevant conventions, and those
that have done so should incorporate these instruments into their
national legislation and put them into practice.
88. Regrettably, attempts at an international level to strengthen
the rights of migrants and diasporas have not been a complete success,
and the road to acceptance of a general framework for rights of
both regular and irregular migrants at a European level remains
long
. The International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families has been ratified by a relatively
few number of states. Only three Council of Europe member states
have fully acceeded this treaty (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Turkey). The Council of Europe’s own Convention on the Legal
Status of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 93) has only been ratified by
11 countries so far. Other Conventions of the Council of Europe
having a bearing on migrants have similarly not found great favour
from member states of the Council of Europe. The European Convention
on Nationality (ETS No. 166) has received 16 ratifications and the
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at
Local Level (ETS No.144) has received only 8 ratifications. Your rapporteur
encourages member states to ratify these instruments as a matter
of priority.
89. Fourthly, with its wealth of experience in matters relating
to migration and development, the Council of Europe could contribute
to the current policy discussions through an elaboration of policy
guidelines to encourage greater engagement of European diasporas
in development projects in countries of origin. It should further
harmonise legislation and practice to protect human rights of working
migrants and diaspora members, and encourage, where appropriate,
diaspora members in their work for the improvement of democracy
and human rights both in their countries of origin and in host countries.
Most importantly, it should assist member states to put in place
policies and implement specific programmes to encourage permanent
or temporary return of qualified expatriates to their country of
origin, therefore promoting “brain gain”.
90. Finally, international partnerships amongst destination countries,
and between countries of origin, transit and host countries are
a first step towards the recognition of migrants’ positive contribution
to development. It recognises responsibility sharing between countries
involved in, or affected by, particular migratory movements. The
international community should therefore facilitate collaboration
between diaspora organisations, including professional organisations,
and other European development non-governmental organisations through
incentives such as partnership funds, which could make it possible
for the mainstream development agencies and the diaspora to engage
with each other.
91. Your rapporteur reiterates the idea already expressed by the
Assembly in its
Recommendation
1650 (2004) that the Council of Europe could serve as a vector for
the establishment, under its auspices, of a council of Europeans
abroad, a body representing European diasporas at the pan-European
level, which could organise at regular intervals a forum of Europeans
abroad.