1. Introduction
1. On 26 January 2015, Mr Robert Walter (United Kingdom,
European Conservatives Group) with the support of more than 30 members
belonging to at least five national delegations challenged the still
unratified credentials of the Russian delegation on the basis of
Articles 8.1 and 8.2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary
Assembly on the grounds that the role and participation of the Russian
Federation in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as its continued
illegal annexation of Crimea were in violation of the Statute of
the Council of Europe as well as its accession commitments to the
Organisation, which, in general brought into question the commitment
of the Russian delegation to the principles and membership obligations
of the Council of Europe. In line with Article 8.3 of the Rules
of Procedure, the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee) was seized for report and the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs for opinion.
2. At is meeting on 26 January 2015, the Monitoring Committee
appointed me rapporteur for the present report.
3. On 10 April 2014, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1990 (2014) on the reconsideration on substantive grounds of the
previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation. In this
resolution, the Assembly considered that the illegal annexation
of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and the involvement and actions of
the Russian Federation in the lead up to this annexation, constituted
a grave violation of international law and were in clear contradiction
to the Statute of the Council of Europe and Russia’s accession commitments.
The Assembly
strongly condemned the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial
integrity by the Russian Federation, which required a strong signal
of disapproval from the Assembly. At the same time, the Assembly highlighted
the need for continuing dialogue with the Russian Federation, including
on Russia’s obligations and adherence to the values and principles
of the Council of Europe.
The Assembly decided therefore
not to annul the credentials of the Russian delegation but to suspend,
until the end of the 2014 session, the voting rights of the Russian
delegation as well as its right to be represented in the Bureau,
Presidential Committee and Standing Committee of the Assembly and
its right to participate in election observation missions.
4. Already concerned about the developments in eastern Ukraine,
that were to escalate soon afterwards, the Assembly expressed its
concern about the intentions of the Russian Federation in the light
of the steady and noticeable build-up of military forces along the
Russian–Ukrainian border. Also in that context, the Assembly explicitly
reserved the right to annul the credentials of the Russian delegation
if the Russian Federation did not de-escalate the situation or reverse
the annexation of Crimea.
5. In addition to its condemnation of the annexation of Crimea
and concerns about developments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the
Assembly also expressed its deep apprehension about the failure
of the Russian Federation to implement Resolutions
1633 (2008),
1647 (2009) and
1683
(2009) on the war between Russia and Georgia, as well as the
state of the freedom of the media and freedom in expression in Russia,
especially in the context of the ongoing crackdown on the independent
media, including online media and journalists.
6. In the sections below, I will outline the main developments
with regard to Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, I will include
a short section on developments concerning other obligations and
commitments of the Russian Federation that are relevant in this
context. An assessment of the willingness of the Russian Federation,
and especially the State Duma and Council of the Federation, to
address the concerns and demands of the Assembly, and to engage
in an open and constructive dialogue about these concerns, should be
an important factor when assessing the current challenge of the
credentials of the Russian delegation. I have outlined the developments
in that respect in a separate section.
2. Developments
with regard to Crimea
7. In
Resolution
1990 (2014), the Assembly reserved the right to annul the credentials
of the Russian delegation if the Russian Federation did not de-escalate
the situation and reverse the annexation of Crimea.
8. Since the adoption of
Resolution
1990 (2014), the full integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation has
continued unabated. The irreversibility of the annexation of Crimea
by the Russian Federation was underlined in the annual address of
President Putin to the Russian Federal Assembly, in which he called
the annexation of Crimea a “historical unification” stating that
Crimea was “the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted
but solid Russian nation and a centralised Russian State”. Underlining
this position, he continued that “Crimea, the ancient Korsun or
Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilisational and even
sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem
for the followers of Islam and Judaism” adding that “And this is
how we will always consider it”.
9. The ongoing annexation by the Russian Federation of Crimea
continues to be a violation of international law, including the
United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Act of the OSCE as well as
the Statute of the Council of Europe and Russia’s accession commitments
to this Organisation.
10. International organisations as well as civil society organisations
have expressed their concern about the deterioration of the human
rights situation in Crimea.
11. In his report following his mission to Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea,
the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Mr Nils
Muižnieks, expressed his concern about the reports of deaths and disappearances
under suspicious circumstances of civil activists who were critical
of the developments in Crimea.
Mr Muižnieks exhorted the
de facto authorities in Crimea to
fully investigate these deaths and disappearances, as well as allegations
about abuses by the police and (para) military forces that were
active in the region. Moreover, he expressed concern with regard
to the freedom of the media in Crimea. A number of media outlets
that did not support the annexation of Crimea were closed down or
their journalists and editorial staff put under pressure. The Crimean
Tatar television channel ATR was warned by the authorities that
the content of its broadcasts and the views expressed in its programmes
could be interpreted as extremist activity.
12. The situation of minorities in Crimea, especially of the Crimean
Tatar community, is a point of concern.
13. The Crimean Tatar population in general opposes the annexation
of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the Tartar Mejlis
called
for a boycott of the illegal referendum on Crimea’s secession from
Ukraine as well as the local elections that were organised on 14
September 2014.
14. Crimean Tatar organisations and religious institutions, as
well as businesses and private homes of members of the Tatar community
have been raided by Russian forces, on the pretext of searching
for extremist propaganda. These searches were denounced by the Council
of Europe Human Rights Commissioner as “disproportional and excessive”.
In addition, the leader of the Crimean Tatars,
Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev, and his successor as Chairman of the Mejlis,
Mr Refat Chubarov, were declared
persona
non grata by the Russian authorities and banned from
entering the territory of Crimea. Reportedly, the books written
by Mr Dzhemilev, a well-known Soviet dissident, are considered extremist
literature and banned. On 16 September 2014, the offices of the
Tatar Mejlis were raided by the Russian authorities and computers
and documents confiscated, which had a chilling effect on the Tatar
community in Crimea.
15. For their part, the Russian authorities have asserted that
the average income, especially of pensioners and persons working
in the public sector, has increased exponentially in Crimea. In
addition they assert that they have taken several measures to improve
the social and economic status of the Crimean Tatar community, including
protection of their language as well as by a “land amnesty” to address
their housing problems.
16. The ethnic Ukrainian minority has expressed its concern about
the diminishing availability of Ukrainian language education and
the general sense of insecurity. This in turn has led a number of
ethnic Ukrainian families to leave Crimea for other areas of Ukraine.
In January 2015, the UNHCR reported that there were close to 20
000 registered IDPs from Crimea in Ukraine, mostly of Tatar and
ethnic Ukrainian origin. Given that not everyone registers as IDP
when relocating to mainland Ukraine the real number is certainly
higher.
17. The movement of citizens over the administrative border is
relatively unrestricted. However, checkpoints at both sides of the
boundary line and vehicle controls reportedly make the crossing
cumbersome and time consuming, especially for cargo transport. The
law on “legal guarantees of people’s rights and freedoms on the temporarily
occupied territories of Ukraine” that was adopted by the Verkhovna
Rada following the annexation of Crimea by Russia, does not place
any restrictions on the movement of Ukrainian citizens over the administrative
boundary line. It does however require that foreigners obtain a
special permit to do so. This, together with legal and political
considerations, has limited the access of international organisations
to Crimea. To my best knowledge, no restrictions are placed by the
Russian authorities on movement across the boundary line by Ukrainian
citizens. Most foreigners now need a Russian visa to enter Crimea,
which is an obstacle for the access of international organisations
to the region. Until recently, public transport continued to cross
the boundary line. However, in December 2014, the Ukrainian authorities
suspended bus and train services, citing the security environment.
18. The Ukrainian authorities have continued to supply water
and electricity to Crimea. However, they stopped supplying electricity
in December 2014, due to power cuts in Ukraine, which depends on
coal from the Donbas region – now no longer available – for its
electricity production. Russia, in response, announced that it would
resume coal and electricity supplies to Ukraine without advance
payment by the latter.
3. Developments in
eastern Ukraine
19. The escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine,
and the role of the Russian Federation in it, has eclipsed and overshadowed
the annexation by Russia of Crimea and the subsequent developments
in that region. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this report
to outline in detail the events in eastern Ukraine since the April 2014
part-session of the Assembly. In this section I will limit myself
to the main developments in Ukraine that are relevant for this report.
20. Following the referendum in Crimea, several demonstrations
and protest rallies were organised in eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv,
Odessa, Mariupol, Donetsk and Luhansk) calling for the organisation
of similar referenda in eastern Ukraine with the aim of these oblasts
seceding from Ukraine and possibly joining the Russian Federation.
Large demonstrations in favour of Ukraine unity were also organised.
21. These pro-Russian protests turned increasingly more violent
with local city councils being stormed. There were often clashes
between competing demonstrations. Many observers and journalists
noted that the pro-Russian protests were well orchestrated and apparently
centrally organised, lacking the spontaneity of a mass movement.
Others highlighted the participation
of considerable numbers of Russian citizens in these protests. The
Ukrainian authorities pointed in this respect to the fact that in
Kharkiv the protesters stormed the local theatre, mistaking it for
the city council.
On 18 March 2014, Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk announced that his government would initiate the decentralisation
of central government including through the adoption of a new Constitution.
By 28 March 2014, the Minister of the interior announced that the
number of pro-Russian demonstrations in eastern Ukraine was diminishing
considerably.
22. The armed insurgency formally started on 7 April 2014, when
around 1 000 protesters stormed the SBU offices in Donetsk and Luhansk
taking control of the armouries in these offices. The, now armed,
protesters announced that a referendum on independence, and subsequent
integration into the Russian Federation should be organised by 11
May at the latest. In response to these developments, acting-President
Turchynov announced the start of an anti-terrorist operation (ATO)
in eastern Ukraine with the aim of re-establishing full control
of the central government in these regions.
23. The situation escalated dramatically on 12 April 2014, when
masked and armed men under the command of the former Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Girkin
stormed the
police station, the local SBU office and other municipality buildings,
first in Sloviansk and then in Kramatorsk in an attempt to re-enact
the same scenario he had helped implement in Crimea in February
2014. Following this, armed groups started seizing buildings in
inter alia Druzhkivka, Horlivka,
Mariupol and Yenakiieve, as well as in the city of Donetsk proper.
Many members of Mr Girkin’s groups were “volunteers” from Russia
and Crimea aided by a relatively small number of volunteers from
eastern Ukraine
.
24. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior the occupations
of local government buildings were aided if not orchestrated by
Russian Special Forces operating on Ukrainian territory. This is
strongly denied by the Russian authorities who claim that no Russian
troops were operating on Ukrainian territory. After a number of
Russian soldiers were captured by Ukrainian military, Russia admitted
that Russian military were fighting in Ukraine on a voluntary basis
while on leave from their regiment. On the other hand, Mr Girkin
has been quite open about his role in the escalation of the conflict
in eastern Ukraine. In an interview he stated “I am the one who
pulled the trigger of war. If our squad had not crossed the border,
it all would have ended like in Kharkiv or Odessa. There would have
been a few dozen killed, burned, and arrested. And that would have
ended everything,” continuing: “Our squad set the flywheel of war
in motion. We reshuffled all the cards on the table.”
25. The ATO operation launched against these seizures of local
government buildings ran into problems when initially a number of
soldiers deserted from their battalions or defected to the pro-Russian
separatists.
26. On 17 April 2014, representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the
United States and the European Union met in Geneva in order to find
a negotiated solution to the escalating insurgency in eastern Ukraine.
During this meeting the participants adopted the “Geneva Statement
on Ukraine”, in which they agreed
inter
alia to:
- dissolve
all illegal military formations in Ukraine
- end the occupation of local government buildings and require
the protesters to disarm
- adopt an amnesty for all anti-government protesters
- amend the constitution of Ukraine in an inclusive, transparent
and accountable manner
It was agreed that the dissolution
of illegal armed formations and the end to the occupation of government buildings
would be overseen by monitors from the OSCE.
27. Despite the Geneva agreement, the occupation of government
buildings continued unabated and none of the illegally armed insurgent
groups disarmed. On the contrary, the conflict showed that the insurgents
were increasingly armed with advanced weaponry, such as artillery,
tanks and surface to air missiles, which were supplied by the Russian
Federation. The influx of this type of weaponry into the conflict,
which was matched by the Ukrainian armed forces, exponentially increased
the lethality of the conflict and collateral damage among civilians.
28. The Russian authorities have denied that they supplied weaponry
to the armed insurgents and have asserted that their arms came from
arms caches left behind or captured from the Ukrainian army. However,
a number of European governments and military experts have pointed
out that the insurgents have access to Russian-made weaponry, including
tanks and missile systems that were never bought by, or supplied
to, the Ukrainian armed forces.
29. With the conflict escalating and fighting increasing exponentially
on a daily basis, President Putin asked, on 7 May 2014, for the
insurgents to delay the referenda on the status of the Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts that were foreseen for 11 May 2014. However, this
was rejected by the insurgents. The lateness of the request by President
Putin and the speed by which it was rejected by the insurgents,
raised some questions about the sincerity of this proposal, especially
with the Ukrainian Government.
30. The so-called referenda on the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk
Oblasts took place on 11 May 2014. They were not observed by credible
independent international organisations, but journalists reported
that the conduct of the referenda was questionable in the extreme:
there were no voters’ lists and persons were allowed to vote as
many times as they wanted.
According to the insurgents’ leadership,
the turnout in Donetsk Oblast was 75% and in Luhansk 81%, with around
90% of the voters supporting independence for the self-proclaimed Luhansk
and Donetsk People’s Republics. These referenda are illegal under
Ukrainian law and their conduct and declared results are not recognised
by the international community, which denounced them as an unnecessary
escalation of the tensions.
31. The Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) gained momentum, with the
Ukrainian military becoming increasingly better organised and recapturing
towns that were previously under separatist control. Important political
and economic interests became more vocal in their support for Ukrainian
unity. On 15 May 2014, Rinat Akhmetov, an influential businessman
from the Donbas region, expressed his support for Ukrainian unity
and ordered his workers in Mariupol to patrol the city jointly with
the local police. As a result of this, the occupation of government
buildings in Mariupol had ended by 16 May 2014.
32. The Anti-Terrorist Operations gained a new impetus after President
Poroshenko was elected with a large majority on 25 May 2014. On
20 June 2014, President Poroshenko announced a comprehensive 15
point peace plan.
As
part of this plan, President Poroshenko announced a week-long unilateral
ceasefire, which was later extended by three days. Regrettably,
the insurgents rejected the ceasefire and continued their armed attacks
on Ukrainian military forces. After a rocket attack that left 19
Ukrainian soldiers dead, President Poroshenko ended the unilateral
ceasefire.
33. On 17 July 2014, in a lamentable and tragic development, Malaysian
Airlines Flight MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was
shot down by an anti-aircraft missile, killing all 283 passengers
and 15 crew on board. At the request of the Ukrainian authorities,
the Dutch
Safety Board was appointed as the lead agency investigating the
crash. In its preliminary report,
published on 9 September 2014, the
Dutch Safety Board concluded that flight MH17 had disintegrated
in mid-air as a result of a large number of impacts (forward fuselage
and cockpit) of high velocity objects from outside the aircraft.
The Dutch Safety Board is continuing its investigation into the
source of these objects, but many experts have noted that these
impacts, and their pattern, are consistent with the explosion of
a surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile. A number of European countries,
as well as the USA, Ukraine and NATO have alleged, based on intelligence
available to them as well as in the public domain, that flight MH17
was shot down by a missile fired from a mobile BUK M1 missile launcher,
supplied by the Russian Federation, from the nearby town of Snizhne,
which is in rebel-held territory. A number of military experts and
a journalist have noted that BUK missile systems are complex weaponry, which
can only be operated by skilled technicians. They therefore concluded
that the BUK missile system was not only supplied by the Russian
Federation, but in all likelihood also operated by Russian military
personnel, reportedly coming from the 53rd Anti-aircraft Missile
Brigade based in Kursk.
The Russian authorities strongly
denied any role in the downing of flight MH17, either of their military
or of the insurgents. During a press conference organised by the
Ministry of Defence on 21 June 2014, the Russian authorities alleged
that flight MH17 had been downed by a SU25 ground attack plane from
the Ukrainian armed forces. However, several military experts pointed
out that this type of plane neither has the technical capabilities,
nor the adequate weaponry, to down a Boeing 777 flying at 33 000
feet (approximately 10 060 meters). It is important to note that
the Dutch Government has indicated that it intends to prosecute
the downing of flight MH17 as a war crime.
34. Following the end of ceasefire that was declared by President
Poroshenko, the Ukrainian military launched a counter offensive
to recapture the land and cities that were under the control of
the insurgents. This counter-offensive was largely successful. By
the end of August 2014, Ukrainian military troops had recaptured large
parts of the rebel held territory, with troops in the outskirts
of Luhansk and Donetsk, raising the spectre of the Ukrainian authorities
regaining full control over their territory. However, an increasing
influx of Russian military personnel and advanced heavy weaponry
in aid of the insurgents was noted.
35. On 25 August 2014, the insurgents unexpectedly started a counter-offensive
with the covert aid of Russian military troops in eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, Russian artillery was firing on Ukrainian military positions
from within Russia itself. Within several days the insurgents managed
to regain a considerable part of lost territory as well as to open
a new front towards the city of Mariupol.
36. On 31 July 2014, new peace negotiations started in Minsk under
the auspices of the OSCE. On 5 September, the Minsk protocols were
signed by representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as well
as the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.
This protocol established, inter alia,
an immediate ceasefire in eastern Ukraine. The modalities of these
protocols were outlined in a memorandum that was signed by these
participants in Minsk on 19 September 2014. The text of the Minsk
protocol and memorandum is appended to this report in Appendix 1.
37. The ceasefire that was agreed upon in Minsk continues to be
in place at the moment of writing of this report. However, international
monitors deployed by the OSCE report that the ceasefire continues
to be violated by both sides on a regular, almost systematic, basis.
Since the beginning of January 2015, violations of the ceasefire
seem to have exponentially increased. Regrettably, in what would
appear to be in clear contradiction of the protocols and memorandum
it signed in Minsk, the Russian Federation reportedly has continued
to supply weaponry to the insurgents and deployed military personnel
inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine. The OSCE monitoring mission
warned of the risk of escalation of the conflict and, on 12 November 2014,
NATO Secretary General Mr Jens Stoltenberg called upon Russia to
pull back its forces.
38. The Russian authorities continue to deny the presence of any
Russian military in Ukraine. However this seems to be belied by
the fact that a considerable number of Russian citizens, who identified
themselves as Russian military personnel, were captured deep inside
Ukrainian territory by the Ukrainian military.
On 28 August
2014, NATO released satellite images conclusively showing the presence
of Russian military personnel within the sovereign territory of
Ukraine.
These conclusions were further
confirmed by an independent analysis commissioned by Amnesty International
of commercially available satellite images, backed up by reports
by their researchers, which clearly establish the presence of Russian
military troops inside Ukraine.
39. It should be emphasised that the presence of Russian military
troops in Ukraine without the authorisation of the Ukrainian authorities
or UN Security Council – can be interpreted as an act of aggression
under the UN Charter and a violation of international law as well
as of the Statute of the Council of Europe and Russia’s accession
commitments to this Organisation. In addition it also violates Russian
legislation as, on 25 June 2014, the Russian parliament revoked
its much criticised authorisation to President Putin to deploy Russian troops
inside Ukraine if he so wished
. The assembly should require that
Russia should immediately withdraw all of its military troops from
Ukrainian soil and end the supply of arms to the insurgents.
40. Article 208 of Russia’s Criminal Code prohibits the creation
of unlawful armed groups and Article 359 the recruitment, training,
financing and using mercenaries. However, none of the voluntary
fighters that Russia has admitted participate in the conflict, have
been charged under these articles, ostensibly because it is impossible to
prove that anyone was paid for their participation in military operations
inside Ukraine. Surprisingly in this context, Russia’s Investigative
Committee filed charges under Article 359 against Roman Zheleznov,
a Russian citizen who had joined the Azov voluntary battalion that
fights alongside the Ukrainian military. The Russian parliament
should, without further delay, adopt amendments to the Criminal
Code with a view to criminalising any participation in a private
capacity of Russian citizens in armed conflicts overseas, whether they
are remunerated or not.
41. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has resulted in enormous suffering
and loss of life. According to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), by 9 January 2015,
more than 4 800 persons were killed because of the conflict.
In addition, UNHCR reported that
by 9 January 2015 more than 630 000 persons were internally displaced,
in addition to the approximately 245 000 persons who fled to Russia.
The humanitarian consequences of
the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea are comprehensively
outlined in the excellent report by my colleague Mr Jim Sheridan,
on the “Humanitarian situation in Ukraine”
that
will be discussed by the Assembly during this January part-session,
and whose conclusions and recommendations I wholeheartedly support.
42. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Ukraine,
Ms Mailis Reps and Ms Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin, expressed on
a number of occasions their deep concern for the credible reports
of grave human rights violations, including possible war crimes,
in areas under the control of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics
of Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as in areas under the control of
some of the voluntary brigades fighting alongside the Ukrainian
military forces.
Similar concerns were expressed by
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks,
following his visit to Ukraine from 30 November to 5 December 2014.
43. A specific case is that of former Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko
who fought in one of the volunteer battalions in eastern Ukraine.
On 18 June 2014, she was captured by armed insurgents fighting for
the self-proclaimed “People’s Republic of Luhansk”. On 24 June 2014,
she was illegally transferred to the Russian Federation
and charged by the Russian Investigative
Bureau for complicity in the killing of two Russian journalists
who died during a mortar attack outside Luhansk in Ukraine. It should
be noted that this transfer and her being charged by the Russian
authorities is a direct violation of the Minsk protocol. Moreover,
the crimes of which she is accused took place inside Ukraine and
outside the jurisdiction of the Russian courts, which raises questions
as to the legality of her continuous detention. On 26 October 2014,
Ms Nadiya Savchenko was elected to the Ukrainian Parliament on behalf
of the Batkivshchyna Party. On 25 December 2014, she was appointed
a member of the Ukrainian delegation to our Assembly. It is unacceptable
that a member of our Assembly is illegally held captive by another
Council of Europe member State. I therefore call upon the Russian authorities
to immediately release her and allow her return to Ukraine.
44. The re-establishment of full control by the Ukrainian authorities,
under international supervision, of its entire border with the Russian
Federation is a key precondition for a political resolution of the
conflict, as highlighted in the Minsk protocol. The fulfilment of
this requirement depends largely, if not solely, on Russian co-operation
and political will.
45. On the initiative of President Poroshenko, a summit was to
be held on 15 January 2015, in Astana (Kazakhstan) between President
Poroshenko, President Putin, President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel
– the so-called Normandy format – to discuss solutions to end the
conflict in eastern Ukraine. However, on 10 January 2015, Chancellor
Merkel told President Putin she would not participate in the summit
if no clear progress was visible with regard to the implementation
of the Minsk agreements, including full control by the Ukrainian
authorities over Ukraine’s external borders. A similar statement
was also made by President Hollande. On 12 January 2015, amid an
increase in the number of violations of the ceasefire agreement,
and in the absence of any real prospect for progress, the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the Normandy format countries decided to cancel
the summit of 15 January. On 16 January President Poroshenko and
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan announced that they now planned
to convene the summit by the end of January, if developments warranted
it.
46. On 22 January 2015, the Ukrainian authorities announced that
they had had to withdraw their military from its positions at Donetsk
airport, which were on its side of the line of contact agreed in
the Minsk negotiations, due to heavy shelling by separatist forces.
47. On 23 January 2015, the pro-Russian rebel leader Alexander
Zakharchenko announced that his forces would no longer abide by,
or were interested in, a ceasefire agreement with the Ukrainian
authorities and that his forces would start an offensive to occupy
the rest of the Donetsk region. This is a clear violation of the
Minsk protocols and represents a serious escalation of the conflict
in Eastern Ukraine
4. Developments on
other commitments and obligations of the Russian Federation
48. As already argued in
Resolution 1990 (2014) and in the previous sections of this report, Russia’s
actions in Crimea, as well as its role and participation in the
conflict in eastern Ukraine, are in direct violation of the Statute
of the Council of Europe as well as the country’s accession commitments,
in particular, paragraphs 10.7, 10.8 and 10.11 of Assembly
Opinion 193 (1996).
In
addition, the events in Ukraine have exacerbated a number of negative
tendencies – often related to the increasing importance of the ideology
of “Eurasianism” – in the Russian Federation with regard to other
obligations and commitments that are of relevance to this report.
These tendencies have led to an increasingly marginalised political
opposition, increased control over the media and the stifling of
independent voices in civil society.
49. As stated in Assembly
Resolution
1990 (2014), control of information has been at the heart of the
conflict in Ukraine, notably with the adoption of a series of measures
that have further eroded freedom of information and reinforced government
control of the Internet.
These encroachments
on media pluralism, Internet freedom and the right to freedom of
expression are serving the propaganda war, and allow for a biased coverage
of the situation by the Russian State-controlled media. By adding
media-support NGOs to the “foreign agents” list, the authorities
have further aggravated the decrease in freedom of information in
Russia.
50. While there is arguably wide public support in Russia for
its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine – also as a result of
the monolithic media coverage of these events – these views are
not shared by all and a number of civil society organisations have
questioned Russia’s role and participation in the conflict. In that
context, the concerns expressed
about
the situation of NGOs and human rights defenders over the past year,
with legislative changes
mutually reinforce a chilling effect
on the exercise of freedom of expression along with freedom of association.
The new legislation on NGOs does not comply with international standards
in respect of democracy and human rights.
However, despite the widespread criticism
about the NGO legislation, a number of organisations were nevertheless
included by the Russian authorities in the register of “foreign agents”
and inspections continue. The Minister of Justice registered as
“foreign agents” several NGOs including the NGO “Soldiers’ Mothers”
of St Petersburg” after this NGO had raised the issue of the death
of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine against the Ukrainian forces
and had demanded that these deaths be investigated.
51. A number of measures have been taken to increase the Russian
authorities’ ability to control public discourse and freedom to
demonstrate. Laws were passed to criminalise non-authorised street
protests, setting high penalties
including
enormous fines, forced labour and prison sentences (up to five years). Opposition
leaders, such as Alexei Navalny, were put under house arrest or
sent to prison. Such measures are clear attempts to deter participation
in demonstrations and open political debate. In the case
Nemtsov v. Russia, the European
Court of Human Rights
acknowledged
the arbitrary interference with the right to freedom of assembly
in violation of Article 11 of the ECHR.
52. The ad hoc Sub-Committee
on “Russia’s neighbourhood policy towards other Council of Europe member
States” of the Monitoring Committee has discussed a number of recommendations
with the Russian Federation, the implementation of which could be
considered a clear signal that the Russian Federations is willing
to honour its accession commitments with regard to its relations
with its neighbouring countries. These recommendations are reflected
in the next paragraphs.
53. In
Resolution 1990
(2014), the Assembly expressed its concern about “by the continuous
failure of the Russian Federation to implement
Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia,
Resolution 1647 (2009) on the implementation of
Resolution 1633 and
Resolution
1683 (2009) on the war between Georgia and Russia: one year after,
by the occupation of the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia by Russian troops and by the refusal of the Russian Federation
to allow European Union monitors and to reverse ethnic cleansing”.
Regrettable no progress
on this issue has been made since April 2014 and I continue to urge
the authorities to comply with the resolutions of the Assembly in
this respect. An important issue, the resolution of which would
constitute an important step forwards, is the free movement of civilians
over the administrative boundary lines (ABL) between South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, which are controlled by the Russian
Federation. The continuing borderisation of the ABL increasingly impedes
civilians at both sides of the border from visiting their properties
and tending the graves of family members, as well as for residents
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to have access to health and other
social services including for emergencies. If only for humanitarian
reasons, any obstacles to the free movement of civilians across
the AOB should be removed by the Russian Federation and the de facto
authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In November 2014, Russia
signed an agreement for “alliance and co-operation” with the self-proclaimed
“Republic of Abkhazia. This treaty is a sign of the gradual annexation
of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Russian
Federation and deepens the barriers between the population residing
in these break away regions and those residing in the rest of Georgia.
54. With regard to the Republic of Moldova, when becoming a member
of the Council of Europe, Russia committed itself to withdrawal
of the 14th Army and its equipment from the territory of Moldova
within a time-limit of three years from the date of signature of
the agreement
that was signed 19
years ago. It is therefore high time that the Russian authorities
completed the withdrawal of the remaining Russian military forces
and their equipment from the territory of the Republic of Moldova
without further delay. Russia and the
de
facto authorities of Transnistria should implement, without
delay the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case
of
Catan and others v. the Russian Federation
and the Republic of Moldova related to the right to education
in Latin-script schools, and comply with the decision of the Committee
of Ministers.
In
addition, the Russian authorities should lift the embargo on export
of Moldovan products to the Russian Federation. This embargo is
widely perceived as an attempt to put pressure on the Moldovan authorities
with regard to the Association Agreement it signed with the European
Union in June 2014 and as a means to influence the parliamentary
elections of 30 November 2014. It is worth noting that this embargo
does not apply to the products of the Autonomous Territorial Unit
of Gagauzia-Yeri
, which, on
2 February 2014, held an unconstitutional referendum whereby 98%
the voters expressed their will to join Russia’s Customs Union.
55. With regard to Armenia, the Russian authorities, and especially
former President, and current Prime Minister, Medvedev, overall
have played a constructive role towards finding a solution for the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.
That notwithstanding, it was noted that the Russian Federation continues
to supply arms, including offensive weaponry, to both Armenia and
Azerbaijan and has used the supply of arms as a mechanism for putting
pressure on both countries to align themselves with Russia’s foreign
policy goals, as was recently the case in relation to Armenia’s
joining the Eurasian Union. I call upon the Russian Federation to
cease the supply of offensive weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
5. Dialogue
56. In
Resolution
1990 (2014), the Assembly stated that it believed that “dialogue
should remain the preferred way to find a political compromise”
and for that reason decided not to suspend the credentials of the Russian
delegation, as that would make “dialogue impossible” and impede
the Assembly from “keeping the Russian delegation accountable on
the basis of the Council of Europe’s values and principles” The
sanctions applied by the Assembly in April 2014 were therefore seen
by the Assembly as a minimal response designed to keep the avenues
of dialogue and communication open.
57. Regrettably, on 18 April 2014 the Russian Duma adopted a declaration
on “the anti-Russian resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe”. The text of this statement is appended to
this report in Appendix 2. In this declaration, the Duma considered
that the adoption of
Resolution
1990 (2014) was a display of “double standards” and “discrimination”
against the Russian delegation. The criticism expressed of the actions
of the Russian Federation in the debate on the Russian credentials
as well as in the debate on the Maidan events in Ukraine, were considered
by the State Duma “Russophobic rhetoric and direct insults to the Russian
Federation” by members who “have no moral right to judge Russia
and to adopt sanctions against it”. The State Duma therefore resolved
that it would only be able to participate in the work of the Assembly
when the rights of the Russian delegation were fully restored and
given the possibility to participate in the decision-making processes.
In addition it declared that “any proposal to resume dialogue against
the background of the sanctions and discrimination against Russia
is not acceptable”.
58. I cannot but regret and reject this declaration of the Russian
Duma, which effectively closed the avenues for dialogue that the
Assembly had explicitly left open by not deciding to suspend the
credentials of the Russian delegation. This declaration notwithstanding,
the Parliamentary Assembly continued to deploy a number of initiatives
that aimed to continue the dialogue, inter alia by the Presidential
Committee and by the Monitoring Committee.
59. Individual Assembly political group leaders maintained contacts
with the Russian State Duma and in particular with its President,
Mr Sergey Naryshkin. At the same time the President of the Assembly,
Ms Anne Brasseur, had a number of telephone conversations with Mr
Naryshkin, urging the State Duma to enter into a dialogue and to
participate in the work of the Assembly, unless the Russian delegation
wished to further isolate itself from the Assembly. Following a
visit of individual political group leaders to Moscow it was agreed
to set up a meeting between Mr Naryshkin and the Presidential Committee
in Paris in September 2014. As a result of that meeting the Russian
authorities agreed to drop their objections to a planned visit of
the co-rapporteurs for Russia of the Monitoring Committee, agreed
to the participation of the Russian members in the Monitoring Committee
and its ad hoc Sub-Committee
on “Russia’s Neighbourhood Policy” and allowed Ms Olga Kazakova,
to present the opinion of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination
on the report on “Counteraction to manifestations of neo-Nazism”
during the September 2014 part-session of the Assembly. Further
meetings between Mr Naryshkin and the Presidential Committee subsequently
took place to discuss the relations between the Assembly and the
Russian delegation.
60. The Monitoring Committee has been playing an active role in
establishing a dialogue with the Russian delegation. In
Resolution 1990 (2014) on “Reconsideration on substantive grounds of the previously
ratified credentials of the Russian delegation”, the Monitoring
Committee was invited to consider setting up an
ad hoc sub-committee to follow the
developments related to the conflict. When introducing this proposal
to both the committee and the Assembly, I, as the rapporteur and
Chair of the Monitoring Committee, made it clear that the intended
purpose of this ad hoc sub-committee was to bring together the committee’s
co-rapporteurs for Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Republic of Moldova, with representatives of the Russian delegation,
in order to discuss Russia’s neighbourhood policy with regard to
these countries, as well as the conflicts involving these countries
in which the Russian Federation is either a direct party and/or
acts as mediator/peace-keeper. This proposal was based on my conviction
that a new challenge to the credentials of the Russian delegation
was to be expected on the grounds that Russia’s actions towards
Ukraine and its neighbourhood policy to other former Soviet republics
would continue to violate its obligations and accession commitments
to this Organisation.
61. Therefore, following my proposal, the committee decided on
26 June 2014, to establish an ad hoc Sub-Committee on Russia’s Neighbourhood
Policy with regard to other Council of Europe member States, consisting
of the Chairpersons of the political groups of the Assembly and
the rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, as well as
the Chair of the Monitoring Committee and two members of the Russian
delegation to the Assembly.
62. The ad hoc sub-committee
met on 22 September 2014 in Vienna, on 2 December 2014 in Berlin
and on 20 January 2015 in Paris. I would like to express my gratitude
to the German Bundestag and Austrian Parliament for hosting these
meetings in their parliament and assisting it in this important
work. In a positive development, both Mr Slutsky and Mr Pushkov
participated in all the meetings of the sub-committee and actively
contributed to the discussions on a far from easy subject matter.
At its third and last meeting in Paris on 20 January 2015, the sub-committee
discussed a number of recommendations on Russia’s policy towards its
neighbours that were included in the previous section.
63. In the context of the challenge of the credentials of the
Russian delegation, it is important to stress the need to maintain
dialogue with the Russian authorities and the Russian delegation.
Russia is undoubtedly part of the problem with regard to the developments
in Ukraine, and therefore, any resolution of the conflict in eastern
Ukraine will depend on its participation. The Council of Europe
and its Assembly should play an active role in the solution of the
conflict in Ukraine, and for that it would need to maintain a constructive
dialogue with the Russian delegation. However, it is equally important
to stress that in order to maintain a dialogue between two actors,
the participation – in good faith – of both actors is necessary.
It is therefore important that the Russian Parliament and its delegation
express their unequivocal willingness to enter into a dialogue,
without preconditions, with the Assembly on Russia’s compliance
with the obligations and honouring of commitments to the Council
of Europe, including with regard to its policy towards its neighbouring
States. It should be stressed that the acceptance of such a dialogue
is a basic tenet of membership of the Parliamentary Assembly incumbent
on all delegations.
64. It should be noted that the Russian authorities considered
the current relations between the Russian parliament and the Assembly
as primarily an issue between those two entities, which does not
affect Russia’s co-operation with and participation in other bodies
and institutions of the Council of Europe. Russia has continued
to play an active role in the work of the Committee of Ministers
and has developed a constructive and fruitful relationship with
the Council of Europe Office in Moscow on the implementation of
the co-operation programmes of the Council of Europe.
6. Sanctions by the
Assembly
65. In line with the Rule 10 of the Assembly’s Rules
of Procedure, a report submitted to the Assembly on the challenge
of the credentials of a delegation under Rules 7, 8 or 9 shall propose
one of the following three options: a) to ratify or confirm the
credentials; b) not to ratify or confirm the credentials; c) to
ratify or confirm the credentials together with depriving or suspending
the exercise of some of the rights of participation or representation
of members of the delegation concerned in the activity of the Assembly
and its bodies.
66. On 11 April 2014, the Bureau of the Assembly invited the Committee
on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs to “elaborate
a list of rights of participation or representation that may be
deprived or suspended in the context of a challenge or reconsideration
of credentials …”. On 30 September 2014, the committee approved
an opinion for the Bureau
on this subject, prepared by
Ms Nataša Vučković (Serbia, SOC). This opinion was approved by the
Bureau of the Assembly at its meeting on 30 September 2014.
67. In her opinion Ms Vučković stressed that it would be impossible
to give an exhaustive list of the rights of participation
or
representation
that could be suspended
or deprived, as this would in practice only be limited by the inventiveness
and creativity of the members.
However, her explanatory memorandum
also stated that any sanctions applied should be based on the principles
of consistency and legal certainty of sanctions as well as the principle
of proportionality to the seriousness of the infringement in question.
68. The principles of legal certainty and proportionality are
therefore important criteria when discussing and deciding on possible
sanctions against the Russian parliamentary delegation. Legal certainty
in this context implies that similar violations should lead to similar
sanctions if repeated, and that similar actions by other delegations
should lead to sanctions of similar gravity. Proportionality implies
that when deciding on applying sanctions, these sanctions – or the
absence thereof – cannot be so severe, or so light, that it would
make it impossible on future occasions for the Assembly to apply
sanctions for more serious, or less severe violations of a given
country’s membership obligations and accession commitments.
7. Conclusions
69. From the above, it is clear that with regard to Crimea,
as well as the developments in eastern Ukraine, Russia is violating
international law, the Statute of the Council of Europe and its
accession commitments to this Organisation. This cannot be left
unaddressed by the Assembly.
70. However, while Russia is undoubtedly part – and in many respects
even the cause – of the developments in eastern Ukraine and Crimea,
it is clear that no resolution will be found to the conflict in
eastern Ukraine without the full participation and commitment of
the Russian Federation. The Assembly therefore needs to maintain
a constructive dialogue with the Russian delegation on this issue
as well as the honouring of its obligations and commitments to the
Council of Europe. That is now more necessary than ever. While this dialogue
was originally rejected by the State Duma, there have since been
clear signals that the Duma is willing to engage in such a constructive
dialogue with the Assembly.
71. I therefore propose that, in order to foster such a dialogue,
the Assembly ratify the credentials of the Russian delegation. As
I stated in
Resolution
1990 (2014), only if the Russian delegation participates in the work
of the Assembly, will the Assembly be able to keep the Russian delegation
accountable on the basis of the Council of Europe’s principles and
values, At the same time, the Assembly cannot but maintain a number of
sanctions to express its condemnation of Russia’s continuing grave
violations of the Council of Europe Statute and its accession commitments,
but without impeding the necessary dialogue. I therefore propose
that the Assembly suspend the following rights of the Russian delegation
for the duration of the 2015 session: the right to be appointed
rapporteur; the right to be member of an ad hoc committee on observation
of elections as well as the right to represent the Assembly in Council
of Europe bodies, external institutions and organisations, both
instructionally and on a an occasional basis.
72. It is evident that the Assembly expects its clear emphasis
on dialogue to be reciprocal and to lead to concrete results. It
cannot accept that its offer for dialogue be refused or that Russia
continue to ignore its basic obligations and membership commitments
to the Council of Europe. Therefore, in addition to the sanctions outlined
above, the Assembly should consider the possibility of suspending
the voting rights and right to be represented in the Bureau of the
Assembly, the Presidential Committee and the Standing Committee
of the Russian delegation to the Assembly at the opening of its
June 2015 part-session, if Russia has not made marked and measurable
progress towards improving the human rights situation in Crimea,
withdrawn its military forces from Ukraine and stopped supplying
arms to the rebels; made marked and measurable progress with regard
to fulfilling its membership obligations towards neighbouring countries
as outlined in paragraphs 53 to 55 or fails to give its full co-operation
to the initiatives of the Assembly to support the implementation
of the Minsk protocols.