“Our freedom is built
on what others do not know of our existences”, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn
1. Introduction
and procedure
1. Since June 2013, disclosures by journalists to whom
Mr Edward Snowden, a former employee of the CIA and of a private
contractor working for the United States National Security Agency
(NSA), had entrusted a large amount of top secret data concerning
mass surveillance carried out by the NSA and others have triggered
a massive public debate on privacy in the Internet age. The extent
of mass surveillance programmes conducted all around the world by
the NSA and other countries’ intelligence agencies is stunning.
The disclosures have confirmed the need for the Council of Europe
to encourage its member and observer States to reassess their own
surveillance programmes, assess loopholes which enable such programmes
to target their own citizens by foreign services, and consider possible
redress, including through legislative means, international agreements
and the promotion of mass encryption. This is a matter not only
of the protection of our fundamental rights, but also a matter of
national security, which is under threat from rogue States, terrorists, cyberterrorists
and ordinary criminals who can do enormous damage by making use
of weaknesses in encryption and other Internet security measures
deliberately created by intelligence agencies in order to facilitate
mass surveillance.
2. The manner in which Mr Snowden has made these disclosures
possible has also reignited the discussion on the protection of
whistle-blowers. Both discussions have given rise to motions in
the Parliamentary Assembly.
3. On 6 November 2013, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights appointed me as rapporteur for two interrelated subjects,
namely: “Massive Eavesdropping”
and “Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights on protection of whistle-blowers”.
After a first round of discussions
on 6 November 2013, the committee decided, at its meeting on 27
January 2014, on the basis of my introductory memorandum,
to change the title of
the future report from “Massive eavesdropping” to “Mass surveillance” and
to organise a hearing with the participation of Mr Snowden during
the Assembly’s spring part-session, on 8 April 2014.
4. Unfortunately, it was not possible to receive the necessary
assurances which would have allowed Mr Snowden to come safely to
Strasbourg and to freely travel to a country of his choosing after
the hearing. The committee therefore had to content itself with
hearing Mr Snowden via a live video link from his temporary place
of asylum in Moscow, whilst his German lawyer, Mr Wolfgang Kaleck,
followed the discussions by a standing telephone line enabling him
to provide advice to his client, if needed.
5. I should like to thank Mr Snowden for his readiness to address
the committee and to answer questions “live”, despite possible legal
risks. His courage and dedication to the cause of Internet freedom
and privacy, despite the obvious danger for his personal safety
and freedom, commands the highest respect.
6. I should also like to thank the two other experts who participated
in the hearing on 8 April 2014, namely Mr Hansjörg Geiger, former
head of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), and Mr Douwe Korff, Professor
of International Law, London Metropolitan University.
7. I had already agreed that this would not be a report about
Mr Snowden, but about the practices he has helped to disclose. But
we cannot close our eyes to the fact that it was Mr Snowden whose
courageous action triggered the public debate on the protection
of privacy. His case also provides a particularly interesting example
of the kind of balancing of interests which underlies the rules
on the protection of whistle-blowers, which I have been mandated
to look into in a second, separate report.
2. Nature
and extent of mass surveillance
8. The Snowden disclosures have revealed a stunning
array of mass surveillance programmes by the NSA, but also by the
intelligence services of other countries. These secret programmes
directly threaten the protection of human rights and international
co-operation.
2.1. No communication
methods spared: the NSA’s mass surveillance programmes
9. All types of communications are intercepted through
a multitude of tools and programmes that the NSA, as well as other
intelligence agencies around the world, has developed. Targeted
surveillance has always been used for legitimate law-enforcement
measures and for protecting States from threats against their national security.
But the disclosures on the NSA have raised serious concerns about
the indiscriminate collection and analysis of data from citizens
who are not suspected of having links to terrorism or other forms
of crime. The following is now known about the various methods intelligence
agencies use to intercept, store, and analyse data.
2.1.1. Accessing Internet
company data: “front-door” and “back-door” access
10. NSA files revealed that the agency accessed Internet
companies’ customer data with or without their consent, and Special
Source Operations (SSO), the division inside the agency dealing
with collection programmes through private companies, was described
in leaked documents as the “crown jewels” of the NSA. With its PRISM
programme, said to be the biggest single contributor to the NSA’s
intelligence collection effort, the NSA has “front-door” access
to data from nine Internet firms, including Google, Microsoft and
Yahoo. The NSA has access to the customer data held by the companies
through a (secret) court-approved process and could collect email,
chat logs, stored data, voice traffic file transfers, or social
networking data from them. The companies in question first denied
having had any knowledge of this programme and later insisted that
any co-operation with the intelligence agencies was compelled by
law.
Subsequent disclosures also showed
that the NSA and its British counterpart, the General Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), had “back-door access” too: the agencies were
able to intercept data from those companies, without their knowledge,
via a secret programme codenamed “MUSCULAR”, in addition to the
data they gathered with the companies’ knowledge.
2.1.2. Tapping fibre-optic
cables
11. The United Kingdom was said to tap into fibre-optic
cables carrying global communications and share the data with the
NSA. Because much of the world’s communication traffic passes through
the United States or the United Kingdom, both States’ agencies have
a “home-field advantage” to intercept traffic flowing into and across
their countries. While the Internet as a “virtual” electronic communications
system is transnational, even global, by its very nature, its infrastructure
(all sorts of switches, routers, servers and cables) is physical
and located in real places. At present, many of these places are
in the United States and in the United Kingdom.
In this way, the GCHQ
has been able to access at least 200 fibre-optic cables, giving
it the ability to monitor up to 600 million communications every
day. Information on Internet and phone use was allegedly stored
up to 30 days in order for it to be sifted and analysed.
2.1.3. Collecting and
analysing metadata: “less” data is more
12. “Metadata” is information about the time and location
of a phone call or email, as opposed to the actual content of those
conversations or messages. The first Snowden document published
by
The Guardian was a secret
court order showing that the NSA was collecting the telephone records
of millions of US customers of Verizon, one of the largest American
telecom providers. Those who defend unfettered metadata collection
do not consider this activity as
surveillance at all. Others strongly disagree, even with the very
use of the term “metadata” (which simply means data describing other
data), preferring the term of “summaries” or “abstracts”. In fact,
the Court of Justice of the European Union observed that communications
metadata “taken as a whole may allow very precise conclusions to
be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data
has been retained”.
The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has taken the same position
– namely that the distinction between metadata and data is not persuasive
– in its June 2014 report on data privacy, thus concluding that
“any capture of communications data is potentially an interference
with privacy and, further, that the collection and communications
data amounts to an interference with privacy whether or not those
data are subsequently consulted or used”.
I
find this convincing, even more so in light of former NSA and CIA
chief General Michael Hayden’s unrepenting admission that “we kill
people on the basis of metadata”.
13. Because metadata allows agencies to get a much more concise
representation of the huge amount of communication that it intercepts
and still includes personal information that can be used to build
an even more detailed “profile” of a person than through listening
to the actual content, the NSA has extensively relied on metadata
collection. In March 2013, the NSA was said to have collected up
to 97 billion pieces of intelligence or metadata from computer networks
worldwide. More than 14 billion were from Iran, 13.5 billion from
Pakistan, and 12.7 billion from Jordan, and European States were
not spared. According to NSA presentation slides about “Boundless
Informant”, a tool used by the NSA to analyse the metadata it holds,
and to know what information is currently available about a specific
country, the agency may have been collecting metadata also from
European allies. The slide showed the amount of metadata associated
with a country, with over 70.3 million items from France, 471 million
from Germany, 45.9 from Italy and 60.5 from Spain, among others. The
Norwegian and German Governments claimed that numbers labelled for
the metadata collection for their countries on the presentation
slides referred to metadata that they themselves had collected in
Afghanistan and shared with the NSA. But the journalist Glenn Greenwald
has contested this explanation, referring to the NSA’s own FAQ slide
for “Boundless Informant”, which explains that the “tool allows
users to select a country on a map and view the metadata volume
and select details about the collection
against the
country”, not
from the country.
2.1.4. Eavesdropping on
phones, collecting text messages, bugging faxes
14. In January 2014, it was revealed that the NSA stores
data on hundreds of millions of mobile phones worldwide. In particular,
it stocked about 5 billion sets of localisation data per day, which
the NSA can access even when a smart phone’s GPS function is turned
off by simply following the movement of a phone from one “cell tower”
(local emitter) to another.
The NSA collects such location
and travel habit data for “target development”, for example to find
unknown associates of “targets” it already knows.
15. More details on the numerous other programmes used by the
NSA and its British counterpart to intercept phone text messages,
phone calls and fax messages are now available. GCHQ documents revealed,
and the NSA later confirmed, that a system codenamed “DISHFIRE”
can be used to process and store SMS message data, collecting “pretty
much everything it can” rather than merely storing the communications
of existing surveillance targets. An NSA presentation from 2011
showed that the programme collected an average of 194 million text
messages a day in April of that year, adding that the content was
shared with the GCHQ. The NSA has used its vast text message database
to extract information on people’s travel plans, contact lists,
financial transactions and more, including of individuals under
no suspicion of illegal activities.
16. The NSA also developed the “MYSTIC” voice interception programme
to gather mobile calls placed in countries with a combined population
of more than 250 million people. It was later disclosed that the
United States was able to conduct one such operation, codenamed
SOMALGET, in the Bahamas and record every single phone call in the
entire country without its government’s knowledge or consent, processing
around 100 million call events per day concerning the Bahamas and
a second, unnamed country. The NSA collected this huge amount of
data that was accessed by the US Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), which can request legal wiretaps of foreign phone networks
as part of international law-enforcement co-operation. With 80 offices worldwide,
the DEA is the most widely deployed US agency around the world.
But foreign States do not realise that its mandate includes collecting
intelligence beyond fighting drug trafficking. Edward Snowden testified
in his hearing before the committee on the method of “parallel construction,”
whereby (secret) intelligence information is (unlawfully) used for
law-enforcement purposes, whilst it remains concealed from the courts dealing
with the cases in question. This deprives the accused party of the
right to challenge the legality of the initial surveillance.
Mr Snowden noted that the initial
intelligence information in such cases is often gathered without
a judicial warrant, as would be required in a traditional law-enforcement
setting. This unlawful use of secret evidence, whose existence or
source has been concealed from both the defendant and the court,
is a serious threat to both the right to a fair trial and the right
to face one’s accusers. Moreover, many countries, including the
Bahamas, use private contractors to install and maintain intercept
equipment on their telecommunications infrastructures in order to
facilitate taps. A senior technologist at the American Civil Liberties
Union noted that these systems always introduce vulnerabilities
into communications networks.
17. The NSA can not only intercept phone calls from entire countries,
but can also go back in time and listen to phone calls recorded
during previous months, allowing for “retrospective retrieval”,
that is figure out what targets said during calls that occurred
even before the targets were identified as such.
In contrast to its previous remarks
that the NSA only intercepted metadata on calls, “RETRO” was found
to be the NSA’s programme with which analysts can even rewind and
retrieve phone conversations as long as a month after they take
place.
Analysts are said to listen to only
a fraction (about 1%) of the calls, but the absolute numbers remain
high. Although Presidential Policy Directive 28 issued by President
Obama instructed the NSA and other agencies that bulk acquisition
may be used only to gather intelligence related to one of six specific threats,
including nuclear proliferation and terrorism, it noted that limits
on mass collection do not apply to intelligence that is “temporarily
acquired to facilitate targeted collection”. The White House had
tasked an independent group to review US surveillance policies,
but President Obama refused the group’s recommendation that agencies
should, as a rule, purge incidentally collected calls and emails
involving US citizens upon their detection. US officials interviewed
for the
Washington Post instead
acknowledged that large numbers of conversations involving Americans
would be gathered from countries where “RETRO” operated, and that
the NSA did not attempt to filter out their calls, since the communications
were incidentally acquired as a result of collection directed against
appropriate foreign intelligence targets.
18. With the “PREFER” programme, the NSA could extract each day
on average more than 5 million missed-call alerts to use in contact-chaining
analysis (that is working out someone’s social network from who
they contact, and when), details of 1.6 million border crossings
a day, more than 110 000 names from electronic business cards (including
the ability to extract and save images), over 800 000 financial
transactions (by text-to-text payments or linking credit cards to
phone users), and extract geolocalisation data from more than 76 000
text messages a day. Documents suggest that communications from
US phone numbers were removed from the database, but that those
of other countries were retained.
2.1.5. Collecting millions
of faces from web images
19. In addition to written and oral communications, the
NSA has collected millions of faces from web images every day to
develop the large untapped potential of using facial images, fingerprints,
and other identifiers to track suspected terrorists and other intelligence
targets.
One of its broadest efforts to obtain
facial images is through its programme called “WELLSPRING”, which
strips out images from emails and other communications, and those
that might contain passport images. In conjunction with programmes
that it has developed itself, the NSA also relies in part on commercially
available facial recognition technology; both government and private
sector have been investing billions of dollars into face recognition
research and development. According to the
New
York Times, it is unclear how many images the agency
has acquired and the NSA said it had no access to US States’ drivers
license or passport photos, but it declined to confirm whether the
agency had access to the State Department database of photos of
foreign visa applicants or whether the agency collected facial images
of Americans from Facebook, other social media, or by other means.
The US Congress has largely ignored the issue, with Senator El Franken
stating that American “privacy laws provide no express protections
for facial recognition data”.
2.2. Working with Five
Eyes and more: collaboration between the NSA and intelligence agencies around
the world
20. The Snowden disclosures revealed details of the “Five
Eyes” collaboration, as well as the extensive partnerships that
the NSA has with other States, including members of the Council
of Europe.
2.2.1. Five Eyes: United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada
21. The “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing alliance is
based on the 1946 UKUSA Signals Intelligence Agreement, which was
later extended to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. For instance,
the Five Eyes share “ECHELON”, a global intelligence-gathering network
operated on behalf of the Five Eyes Alliance with a focus on intercepting
private and commercial (rather than military) communications. The
system is alleged to be able to intercept any “telephone, fax, Internet,
or email message sent by any individual”.
22. Mr Snowden’s files have also unveiled the United Kingdom’s
individual and collective surveillance efforts. In addition to sharing
data collected with the help of “TEMPORA”, a programme established
in 2011 to intercept large amounts of phone and Internet traffic
by tapping into fibre-optic cables, with its American counterpart,
the GCHQ also had some level of access to the NSA’s “PRISM” programme
since June 2010 and during the Olympics, and has requested further
unsupervised access to data collected by the NSA. As of April 2013,
the GCHQ had successfully lobbied for increased access to the data
trove “supervised” by the NSA.
23. According to The Guardian,
the programme “OPTIC NERVE” could collect still images of Yahoo
webcam chats in bulk and save them to agency databases, regardless
of whether individual users were an intelligence target or not.
Substantial quantities of sexually explicit communications were
included and in one six-month period of 2008 alone, the agency collected
webcam pictures from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts globally.
The programme saves one image every five minutes from the users’
feeds, partly to comply with human rights legislation and also to
avoid overloading GCHQ’s servers. The
Guardian explained that the agency did make efforts to
limit analysts’ ability to see webcam images, restricting bulk searches
to metadata only. Yahoo has denied prior knowledge of the programme.
24. The Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), GCHQ’s
previously secret unit, engaged in cyber-offensive missions against
people who had nothing to do with terrorism or national security
threats. For example, JTRIG used DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service)
tactics to shut down Internet chat rooms used by members of the
“hacktivist” group known as Anonymous, also affecting others using
the same servers or network (a form of “collateral damage”).
25. Meanwhile, in Canada, Communications Security Establishment
Canada (CSEC) used information from the free Internet access at
a major Canadian airport to track wireless devices of thousands
of ordinary airline passengers for days after they had already left
the terminal. Canada legally prohibits the targeting of Canadians or
anyone in Canada without a judicial warrant, and the agency is supposed
to be collecting foreign intelligence by intercepting overseas phone
and Internet traffic. The CSEC’s written statement retorted however
that it was “legally authorized to collect and analyse metadata”
that apparently identified the travellers’ wireless devices, but
not the content of calls made or emails sent from them. CBC reported
that this programme was a trial run of a powerful new software programme
the Canadian agency was developing with the NSA’s help, and that
the technology tested in 2012 has since become fully operational.
2.2.2. More eyes in Europe
too
26. More information on US-European collaboration and
European States’ own individual efforts for mass surveillance programmes
have come into the public domain. In France,
Le
Monde revealed that the
Direction générale
de sécurité extérieure relied on free and total access
to the networks and flow of data transiting through the French telecommunications
company Orange, including information on foreigners as well as French
citizens.
Unlike the US Prism programme, however,
France has not formalised co-operation between the DGSE and France
Telecom-Orange, relying instead on informal connections made by
engineers who have “shuttled” between the two institutions for the
last 30 years at least.
27. The Netherlands has reportedly intercepted vast amounts of
Somali telephone traffic and shared it with the NSA.
The Dutch authorities argued that
they were not collecting information as per US requests, but to support
the Dutch navy’s own mission in the Gulf of Aden in order to combat
piracy. The
NRC Handelsblad suggested
that the United States could have used the information for drone
attacks against terrorism suspects.
28. Denmark also collaborated closely with the United States on
surveillance in the late 1990s. Secret documents revealed that Denmark
was under “significant pressure” from the United States to change
its laws and allow tapping of communication in order to stay within
“the good company”, also known as the “Echelon Network” or the “9-eyes”
working closely with the NSA. During the 1998-2000 period described
in the secret documents, the Danish national defence intelligence
service allegedly received “technical assistance” to decrypt codes
on tapped communication and surveillance techniques to tap the Internet
and “identify illegal downloads on the Internet”.
The Director of the Danish Defence
Intelligence Service has neither confirmed nor denied the partnership
with the NSA.
29. The Snowden disclosures also revealed extensive collaboration
between Germany and the United States. In June 2014,
Der Spiegel revealed that the NSA
was more active in Germany than anywhere else in Europe and described
the increasingly intimate relationship that the American agency
had developed over the past thirteen years with the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (
BND), the German foreign intelligence
agency that reports directly to the Chancellor’s Office.
Many sites of collaboration and
surveillance were identified. The NSA’s European headquarters in
Stuttgart focuses closely on Africa and some intelligence documents
state that the intelligence insights allowed for the “capture or
killing of over 40 terrorists and has helped achieve GWOT (Global
War on Terror) and regional policy successes in Africa” by passing
on information to the US military’s European Command or individual
African governments. An agreement between Germany and the United
States in 2004 established the now-named European Cryptologic Centre
(ECC), currently the most important listening station in Europe.
The office collects, processes, analyses, and distributes information
and is presumed to be used for military purposes, but a presentation
from 2012 suggests that European data streams are also monitored
on a broad scale. The ECC targets Africa, as well as Europe, because
““most terrorists stop thru Europe” according to NSA slides.
The
European Technical Centre in Wiesbaden is also said to serve as
a “primary communications hub” of the NSA, with huge amounts of
data intercepted and forwarded to NSA agents and fighters, and to
foreign partners in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Last but not
least, the Special Collection Service in the US Consulate General
in Frankfurt was at the centre of a German investigation for tapping
Chancellor Merkel’s phone. Agents operating in this listening post,
in addition to the one in the US Embassy in Berlin, are said to
be protected by diplomatic accreditation, even though their job
is not covered by the international agreements guaranteeing diplomatic
immunity. As regards the co-operation between the BND and the NSA
in Bad Aibling, based on a Memorandum of Understanding dating back
to 2002, the Bundestag committee of inquiry on the NSA affair
has
already held a number of public hearings with witnesses describing
these activities, which were terminated in 2012.
2.2.3. Collusion for circumvention
30. These partnerships between US and allied services
allow governments to easily engage in what could be termed “collusion
for circumvention”. For example, Britain’s GCHQ intelligence agency
is allowed to spy on anyone but British nationals, the NSA anyone
but Americans, and Germany’s BND anyone but Germans. Information-sharing
partnerships allow each agency to circumvent its respective national
restrictions protecting their own countries’ citizens, since they
are able to access the data collected by others.
31. This “collusion for circumvention” has important ramifications
on the domestic level if it is strategically used to circumvent
domestic legislation and limits on the government’s ability to tap
its own citizens’ communications. The former President of the Federal
Constitutional Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, a former Constitutional
Court judge, Mr Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, and another eminent expert,
Professor Matthias Bäcker, stated that the BND is potentially violating
the German Constitution by working with data received from the NSA.
Furthermore, they argued that basic constitutional rights such as
the privacy of correspondence, post and telecommunications apply
to Germans abroad and to foreigners in Germany and that secret agreements between
intelligence services cannot provide a legal basis for any interference
with these rights. That would mean that this type of co-operation
on surveillance between the BND and the NSA would be unconstitutional.
32. In view of Mr Snowden’s allegations in this respect at our
hearing in June 2014, I addressed the following questions to the
German, British and US authorities:
1. Is
it true that the relevant US services (in particular the NSA) have
obtained information on US citizens collected by their counterparts
in Germany [in the United Kingdom] that they were not legally entitled
to collect themselves?
2. Is it true that in turn, the relevant US services provided
their German [British] counterparts information on German [British]
citizens that the German services were not legally entitled to collect themselves?
33. The German answer is short and crisp: “German intelligence
services respect the law. Personal data are transmitted to foreign
intelligence services according to relevant statutory provisions.
These provisions are not circumvented in any way.”
34. The British answer includes a helpful presentation of applicable
legislation and review mechanisms
and stresses that “the gathering
of information using State surveillance should be carried out in
a proportionate and non-arbitrary manner, with legitimate purposes,
in accordance with the rule of law and subject to effective oversight.”
Regarding my question, the letter says: “You have asked whether
the strong working relationship between the GCHQ in the UK and NSA
in the United States has been used to circumvent domestic legal regulations
on the collection of information. The answer is emphatically no.”
35. The US authorities have not replied to my letter and the reminder
sent on 18 December 2014.
36. The strict wording of the German reply covers only the transmission
of personal data to foreign intelligence services. Personal data
of German residents are well-protected in law and there are no grounds
to doubt that this protection is applied, as indicated in the letter.
The public hearings in the Bundestag Committee of Inquiry concerning
the so-called “set of issues relating to Bad Aibling” even provide
some anecdotal evidence that the co-operation between the BND and
the NSA using US and German facilities in this town, which was based
on a Memorandum of Understanding of April 2002, was terminated in
2012 by the US side because it became frustrated with the German
partners’ insistence on (tediously) filtering out all data concerning
Germans because of legal requirements based on Article 10 of the
German Constitution (Grundgesetz).
But the reply does not, at least not explicitly, refer to data concerning
Germans received from foreign
co-operation partners; and the Article 10-based protections for
German data do not apply to foreigners, for example US citizens,
whose data could thus indeed have been transmitted to their home
country’s intelligence services. In my understanding of the reports
on the public hearings, the legal objections raised by the German
partners which so “frustrated” their NSA colleagues concerned only
German data.
37. The British reply regarding the circumvention issue is so
strongly worded that I dare not put it into question. But it seems
to me that since the (very) urgent adoption of the Data Retention
and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) in July 2014
and
the rejection of the USA Freedom Act in September 2014, the real question
is whether the relevant domestic legal regulations (in the United
Kingdom and the United States) governing the retention and use of
personal data are sufficiently narrowly drafted and assorted with
sufficiently effective oversight in order to protect the privacy
of British and US individuals. As I understand the new law, read
in conjunction with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA)
adopted in 2000 and the interpretation given by the NSA to existing
rules in the United States
allow for the wide-ranging collection, usage
and transmission of personal data, in particular metadata, so that
there seems to be little need for circumvention any more. This is
confirmed by the ruling of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT)
dated 5 December 2014,
which saw no problem in sharing intelligence
with the NSA, or accessing information obtained through the NSA’s
PRISM programme, relying on secret government policies in reaching
this decision.
2.3. No one and nothing
spared from surveillance
38. Despite strong partnerships and collaboration, if
not collusion, between the NSA and intelligence agencies of certain
allied countries, the Snowden files have shown that no States, individuals,
or organisations – regardless of their ties with the United States
– were exempt from surveillance.
2.3.1. US approval of
surveillance over all but four countries in the entire world
39. In June 2014, the
Washington
Post revealed that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) allowed the NSA to intercept information “concerning”
all but four countries in the entire world (namely the other four
States of the Five Eyes coalition, except their sovereign territories,
such as the British Virgin Islands) as well as international organisations
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
The NSA is not necessarily targeting
all targets identified in the certification at all times, but was
granted the authority to do so.
2.3.2. Refusal to enter
into “no-spy agreements” with any country
40. In spite of the exclusive relationship between the
Five Eyes, an apparent disconnect surfaced between the understanding
by the United States and the other four States as to whether their
partnership included a “no-spy agreement” among themselves. Classified
documents stated that the “NSA does not target its 2nd party partners,
nor requests that 2nd parties do anything that is inherently illegal
for NSA to do,” underscoring the privileged relations the United
States maintains with the Five Eyes.
Yet, the United States has repeatedly emphasised
that it had no “no-spy agreement” with any country, not even the
Five Eyes partners, and in fact, the text of the UK/USA agreement
does not explicitly mention such an arrangement. The administration
has instead clarified its position that while there are “no such
formal agreements … [w]ith a very small number of governments, however,
there are bilateral arrangements or understandings (which include,
in appropriate cases, intentions, strictures, and limitations with
respect to collection). These bilateral relationships are based on
decades of familiarity, transparency, and past performance between
the relevant policy and intelligence communities”.
41. This said, a draft memorandum leaked by Mr Snowden, entitled
“Collection, Processing and Dissemination of Allied Communications”,
shows that even these long-standing trusting relationships have limits.
The leaked memorandum has different classification levels, paragraph
by paragraph. A paragraph, cleared to be shared with the Five Eyes
partners (“second party” countries) refers to the common understanding
that both governments will not target each other’s citizens. But
the next paragraph – classified as not to be shared with foreign
partners (“noforn”) – states that governments “reserved the right”
to conduct intelligence operations against each other’s citizens
“when it is in the best interests of each nation”. The draft memorandum
continues that “under certain circumstances, it may be advisable
and allowable to target second party persons and second party communications
systems unilaterally, when it is in the best interests of the US and
necessary for US national security”.
2.3.3. A “European Bazaar”:
the watchers being watched
42. European countries, even those closely involved in
the NSA’s efforts, were not spared from US surveillance. Through
the RAMPART-A programme, the NSA relies on foreign partners who
provide access to communication cables and host US equipment to
transport, process, and analyse the intercepted data. Once the partner
country taps an international cable at an access point located in
its territory, it sends the data to a processing centre, with the
equipment provided by the NSA, before forwarding it to an NSA site
located in the United States. As a result, States collaborate to
collect and process the content of phone calls, faxes, emails, Internet
chats, data from virtual private networks, and online video calls.
At least 13 RAMPART-A sites were said to exist, with nine active
in 2013. Thirty-three third party countries were revealed, and included
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden and Turkey among others.
These partnerships operate on the
condition that the host country does not use the NSA’s spy technology
to collect any data on US citizens. In exchange, the NSA also agrees
not to collect data of the host countries’ citizens, subject to
certain exceptions not described in the disclosed documents. Nevertheless,
the bilateral agreements between the US and third party States not
to spy on one another are meaningless and easily circumvented, resulting
in what Mr Snowden called a “European bazaar”. As Mr Snowden explained,
the US can simply access communications of country A as it transits
through country B, which would technically not violate its agreement
with country A not to access A’s communications. In fact, the NSA
boasted in its own internal presentation that “we can, and often
do, target the signals of most third party foreign partners” despite
being supported by and working with those partner States.
43. Recent revelations about the NSA’s repeated and continuous
surveillance of Germany shows the extent of secretive monitoring
the NSA carries out of its own allied States, whose activities and
data seem at best tenuously related to US efforts to protect its
own people from terrorist or other national security threats. Chancellor
Angela Merkel, along with 121 other heads of States and government,
was on the “Target Knowledge Base”, the central agency database
of individual targets that employees could use to analyse “complete
profiles” of targeted people. In March 2013, the NSA also obtained
a top-secret court order against Germany as part of US government
efforts to monitor communications related to the country, while
the GCHQ targeted three Germany companies in a clandestine operation
that involved infiltrating the companies’ computer servers and eavesdropping
on the communications of their staff. Following the scandal of the
NSA tapping the phone of Chancellor Merkel, a student named Sebastian
Hahn has been identified as the second German citizen known to be
under surveillance by the American agency. Hahn, based in Bavaria,
was targeted by the US because he lawfully operated a server as
part of Tor, a network for users trying to preserve the privacy
of their activities on the Internet. Two of Germany's major public
broadcasting channels, NDR and WDR, reported simultaneously that
the NSA was spying specifically on individuals who use encryption
and anonymisation procedures to hide data flows. Merely searching
the web for software that encrypts data and provides further security
to one’s data caused the NSA to mark and track the IP address of
the individuals conducting the search, regardless of where they
were around the world. As of 10 July 2014, German Federal law-enforcement
agencies are investigating two persons suspected of spying for the
United States, one in the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and
another in the Defence Ministry in Berlin. The former was allegedly arrested
when trying to sell some of the information he had been collecting
for the US for two years to Russian intelligence.
In a country where surveillance
is a particularly sensitive issue due to memories of abusive surveillance
by the Gestapo (Nazi secret police) and the Stasi (East German State
security police), such revelations contributed to considerably cooling
relations with the United States.
2.3.4. Americans under
surveillance, too
44. The US Government has repeatedly emphasised that
it distinguished its treatment of Americans and foreigners for its
surveillance programmes. For example, to obtain a court order to
wiretap an American, the government must convince a judge that there
is “probable cause” to believe the target is engaged in a crime on
behalf of a foreign power; non-Americans need only be “suspected”
of being foreign agents. But even Americans were not spared from
their own government’s surveillance. A few days after the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board approved of programmes operating
under the authority of Section 702 that mainly targets foreigners,
the
Washington
Post reported that nine out of ten communications intercepted
under these programmes were not direct targets of the NSA’s surveillance
measures and that ordinary Internet users, whether American or non-American,
far outnumbered legally targeted foreigners.
For four months, the newspaper
investigated an estimated 22 000 surveillance reports collected
by the NSA between 2009 and 2012, Obama’s first term during which
the NSA’s domestic collection of data exponentially increased. The
files leaked by Mr Snowden comprised a large number of emails, messages,
photos, and documents that had valuable contents on a secret overseas
nuclear project, identities of aggressive hackers into US computer networks,
and military calamities affecting an unfriendly power. But the data
also included “startlingly intimate, even voyeuristic” communications
between more than 10 000 account holders who were not targeted but whose
information was recorded nonetheless. In this sample, roughly nine
in ten communications were not the direct targets of the NSA’s surveillance,
and based on numbers of a “transparency report” dated 26 June 2014 by
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 89 238 people
were targets of last year’s collection under FISA (the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, a US federal law authorising surveillance of “foreign intelligence
information” between “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers”)
section 702. On the basis of the ratio found in Mr Snowden’s sample,
the Office’s figure would amount to nearly 900 000 accounts, targeted
or not, which were subjected to surveillance. Furthermore, nearly
half of the surveillance files contained names, email addresses
or other details that the NSA marked as belonging to US citizens
or residents.
45. The NSA defended its practice by insisting that it only aims
for valid foreign intelligence targets and the only possible conclusion
from the Washington Post’s
coverage was that such a target talks to an average of nine people.
The NSA insists that incidental collection of information on untargeted
individuals is inevitable and in other contexts, the US Government
also strives to limit and discard irrelevant data (for example,
for criminal wiretaps, the FBI is supposed to stop listening to
a call if a suspect’s wife or child is using the phone). Yet, it
is worth noting that while some incidental collection happened because
the individuals communicated directly with a target, others had
a more tenuous link. For example, the NSA collected words and identities
of every person who, regardless of subject, was posting or just
reading in a chat room which the target had entered. Presumptions
that senders of emails written in a foreign language or anyone on
a chatroom “buddy list” of a foreign national is also a foreigner,
or the fact that someone connects to a computer address that seems
to be from overseas (though very simple tools called proxies can
be used to redirect a user’s data traffic around the world) were
all grounds to meet the requirement that analysts have a “reasonable
belief” that the targets have information of value about a foreign
government, a terrorist organisation or the spread of non-conventional weapons
under PRISM and Upstream rules.
46. This disclosure came only a few days after the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s conclusion that the NSA’s policy
of intercepting communications, which the agency said was based
on Section 702, included efforts to “minimize” so-called “by-catch”
data that the Board had found to be largely effective.
Mr Snowden’s sample shows that a
high number of unintended targets’ communications are still caught
in the Agency’s net. Moreover, this disclosure was significant because
General Keith Alexander had repeatedly denied that Mr Snowden could
have passed the actual content of the intercepted communications
to a journalist – which he in fact did – because he did not have
access to such data. Mr Snowden claims that his position as contractor
for Booz Allen in the NSA’s Hawaii operations centre gave him “unusually
broad, unescorted access to raw SIGINT [signals intelligence] under
a special ‘Dual Authorities’ role”.
47. Additionally, the Snowden files revealed that US intelligence
agencies monitored prominent American Muslim activists, lawyers,
and politicians under laws intended to target terrorists and foreign
spies.
According to documents disclosed,
the NSA and FBI covertly monitored emails of prominent American
Muslims, whose names were in a list of 7 485 email addresses monitored
between 2002 and 2008, alongside foreigners long accused of terrorist
activities. One of them was Mr Faisal Gill, a lawyer and former
intelligence policy adviser in the Department of Homeland Security
who had authorisation to access sensitive compartmented information,
a classification level reserved for the country’s most closely guarded
secrets. He served in the US Army and worked in the George W. Bush
Administration from late 2001 until 2005. Yet the NSA began monitoring
his account in 2006, after he left his government job and co-founded
a law firm with Asim Ghafoor, a Muslim rights advocate who represented
foreign governments and Middle Eastern organisations in US courts,
and who was also targeted by US intelligence according to the report.
He was once again monitored by the NSA from March 2005 until at
least March 2008, while he was suing the government over its prior,
illegal surveillance of his personal communications.
48. In order to conduct surveillance over an American citizen,
agencies have to show probable cause to believe that the American
targets are agents of a foreign power or an international terrorist
organisation, and that they “are or may be” engaged in or abetting
espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. US officials insist that internal
checks in the current procedure prevent any abuses. The Justice
Department’s Office of Intelligence has various “gatekeepers” that
frequently (in at least half the cases) reject applications or send
them back for further review. Finally, before the Foreign Intelligence
Security Court (FISC), the agent wishing to carry out surveillance
of a US citizen must establish probable cause that the target is
an agent of a foreign power and is engaged in, or about to engage
in, one of the “three crimes” included in the FISA statute, namely
an actual or potential attack or other grave hostile act, sabotage
or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities.
Nearly all of the cases that reach the FISC get permission to proceed
with surveillance, but the intelligence officials claim that only
the strongest applications reach the court in the first place.
49. Yet, according to The Intercept,
there is no adversarial process before the FISC and it is not known
what the exact standard is to establish “probable cause”. A former
law-enforcement official said in an interview that judges often
simply relied on the claims of the agents seeking the authorisation,
and that he had obtained many warrants signed by a judge – in his
pyjamas, in his living room – at 2am.
50. These disclosures are a disturbing reminder of past surveillance
practices against civil rights activists like Martin Luther King
– even more troubling given the more effective surveillance tools
now in the hands of the government. One of the leaked NSA documents
described a potential target of FISA surveillance as a “raghead”
and some
law-enforcement officials involved in counterterrorism efforts have
expressed bigoted and conspiratorial views about Americans of Muslim
descent.
The Intercept mentioned
John Guandolo, a former counterterrorism agent who candidly described
a Muslim lawyer as “major player in the Muslim Brotherhood in the
US” or a “jihadi” who was “directly linked to Al Qaeda guys,” simply
because he represented Middle Eastern Foundations or governments.
Guandolo’s anti-Islamic views were even incorporated in basic training
materials within the Bureau. This shows that people can become victims
of intrusive surveillance on the basis of stereotypes and questionable
evidence.
51. A joint response from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Justice Department stated that “it is entirely
false that US intelligence agencies conduct electronic surveillance
of political, religious or activist figures solely because they
disagree with public policies or criticise the government, or for
exercising constitutional rights”.
This response does
not exclude that religion and criticism is used as an important
factor in initiating surveillance and is in any case difficult to
assess due to the lack of transparency regarding the standards used
by government to initiate surveillance.
52. Meanwhile, a new whistle-blower came forward, John Napier
Tye, the former section chief for Internet freedom in the State
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from January
2011 to April 2014, where he had clearance to receive top-secret
and “sensitive compartmented” information. On 18 July 2014, Mr Tye
revealed through the
Washington Post that
while discussions on mass surveillance have focused on collections
that happened under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the latter is
only a small part of the picture and “does not include the universe
of collection and storage communications by US persons authorised
under Executive Order 12333” that has much more problematic implications
for Americans than Section 215.
Executive Order 12333, issued by
President Reagan in 1981, has no protections even for US citizens
if the collection occurs outside US borders. Agents must get a court
order to individually target someone under Order 12333, but if the
contents of a US person’s communications (both content and metadata)
are “incidentally” collected while lawfully targeting another (foreign)
individual, then Section 2.3.
c of
Order 12333 explicitly authorises the retention of such data, without
any conditions or limits. Mr Tye stated that President Obama’s own
Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies had
Executive Order 12333 in mind when it advised in Recommendation
12 of its public report that the government immediately purge “incidentally” collected
US communications, which the White House has refused to do.
2.4. Actual and/or potential
politically-motivated abuses of mass surveillance
53. Recent disclosures have shown that mass surveillance
has been used to undermine opposition politicians, human rights
activists or journalists. As indicated in my introductory memorandum,
the NSA monitored the use of pornographic websites by six Muslim
men considered to be Islamist hate mongers in order to undermine
their credibility and reputation.
Mr Snowden
confirmed at the hearing before our committee that the NSA has even
used surveillance against human rights organisations. It is hard
to imagine how spying on the likes of Amnesty International or Human
Rights Watch can be justified by “national security interests”.
To the contrary, these organisations’ activities, which are highly
valued for their contribution to the promotion of our common values,
are seriously undermined when victims and witnesses of acts of human
rights violations no longer dare to communicate freely with those
who try to help them because they must fear surveillance.
2.4.1. Targeted spying
for political and economic purposes
54. The Snowden files have confirmed that States spy
on one another or engage in surveillance that at best tenuously
relates to anti-terrorism efforts.
Le
Monde reported that with its Upstream programme, the
NSA was able to intercept communications of a variety of targets,
including two Filipino leaders, Jejomar Binay and Manual Roxas,
who are not known for any anti-American stance, a resort in Honduras
that hosts international conferences, the International Centre for
Theory of Physics in Italy, AT&T, the Saudi Telecom Company,
the Austrian Internet company Chello, the Pakistani online security
company Tranchulas and the Libyan International Telecom Company.
55. Other examples of the NSA’s targeted surveillance include
those described in an internal NSA presentation from 2010. The slides
showed that the GCHQ’s “Royal Concierge” operation involved monitoring at
least 350 upmarket hotels around the world for more than three years
“to target, search and analyse reservations to detect diplomats
and government officials”. The agency listened in on telephone calls
and tapped hotel computers, in addition to sending intelligence
officers to observe the targets in person at the hotels.
The Guardian also
revealed that the NSA used a programme called Dropmire to bug security-enhanced
fax machines and access documents that passed through encrypted
fax machines based in other countries’ foreign embassies.
56. The British intelligence agency collaborated with its American
counterpart to extract information from “leaky” smartphone apps,
such as the game Angry Birds. They were able to obtain the age,
gender, location, phone model, screen size and, in some instances,
sensitive information like sexual orientation through their mass
surveillance tools.
57. The
New York Times revealed
that the NSA monitored an American law firm representing a foreign government
in trade disputes against the United States
as well as other countries’ preparations
for the Copenhagen Climate Summit, including those by the host country,
Denmark.
The NSA also engaged in targeted
surveillance of the United Nations, the European Union, and other
international organisations in a variety of ways, including bugging
embassy phones and faxes, copying hard disks, and tapping into the
internal computer cable network used by collaborators.
To cite a few examples out of the
many that were revealed, the NSA used operation Blackfoot to gather
data from French diplomats’ offices at the New York United Nations headquarters.
Operation Perdido targeted the European
Union’s offices in New York and Washington, while Powell was a codename
for the NSA’s scheme to eavesdrop on the Greek UN offices in New
York. The NSA’s internal document indicated that its spying had
a key influence on “American negotiating tactics at the UN” in connection
with the Iraq War. Thanks to the intercepted conversations, the
NSA was allegedly able to inform the US State Department and the
American Ambassador to the UN with a high degree of certainty that
the required majority had been secured before the vote was held
on the corresponding UN resolution.
While the inclusion of traditional
ideological adversaries and sensitive Middle Eastern countries could
be “expected” and more easily explained in light of US anti-terrorism
efforts, the inclusion of traditional allies discredits the contention
that the purpose of surveillance is the protection of national security.
2.4.2. Blatant propaganda
attacks
58. The United States and the United Kingdom have been
shown to resort to propaganda attacks to support their own agenda.
The US Agency for International Development conducted a secret programme
called ZunZuneo to gather private data from Cuban Internet users,
which it hoped to use in order to manipulate users and foment dissent
against the Cuban Government.
59. Additional disclosures showed similar British offensive efforts
unrelated to terrorism or national security threats. Leaked slides
showed that the British agency published false material via the
Internet in order to destroy the reputation of targeted individuals
and companies, while also trying to manipulate online discourse and
activism in order to generate outcomes that it considered desirable.
It engaged in false flag operations (i.e. posting material online
and falsely attributing it to someone else) and posted fake blog
entries, pretending to be a victim of the individual whose reputation
they wanted to destroy.
The Intercept also
revealed that the GCHQ has developed numerous covert tools to manipulate
and distort online political discourse and disseminate State propaganda.
Tools included programmes to manipulate the results of online polls,
artificially inflate pageview counts on websites, “amplif[y]” sanctioned
messages on YouTube, censor video content judged to be “extremist”,
monitor the use of the UK auction site eBay, and even connect two
target phones together in a call.
60. It is obvious that such manipulation techniques represent
a serious threat to the rule of law in that they allow for the fabrication
of evidence in criminal cases, for example against journalists or
human rights activists accused of aiding and abetting terrorists.
At the same time, the existence
of such manipulations makes it harder, if not impossible, to use
genuine digital evidence in court against real criminals.
2.4.3. Lack of internal
accountability in intelligence agencies
61. In an interview with
The
Guardian in July 2014, Mr Snowden testified that privacy
violations by NSA agents who had access to intercepted private communications
were “routine enough”:
“You've
got young enlisted guys, 18-22 years old. They've suddenly been
thrust into a position of extraordinary responsibility where they
now have access to all of your private records. During the course of
their daily work they stumble upon something that is completely
unrelated to their work in any sort of necessary sense -– for example,
an intimate nude photo of someone in a sexually compromising situation,
but they're extremely attractive. So what do they do? They turn
around in their chair and show their co-worker – and their co-worker
says 'hey, that's great, send it to Bill down the way.' And then
Bill sends to George, George sends it to Tom, and sooner or later
this person's whole life has been seen by all of these other people.”
62. A similar accusation came up in 2008, when NSA employees were
said to be sharing within the agency sexually explicit phone calls
they had intercepted,
but such abuses have gone largely
undetected and unreported because of weak internal controls. There
have been reports of NSA officers using the agency’s surveillance
techniques to snoop on love interests, “a practice common enough
that it has its own spycraft label: LOVEINT”.
2.5. Installing “back
doors”, breaking encryption and sending malwares: how the NSA and
its partners undermine Internet privacy and security
63. Almost all online communications are encrypted in
some way to protect our private lives, communications and bank accounts
from cyberattacks, thieves, or nosy neighbours. The NSA openly admits that
it is its vital job to counteract its adversaries’ use of encryption.
But in this quest, the agency has resorted to methods that experts
warn have the counterproductive consequence of undermining online
security and leaving users vulnerable to intrusions into their private
lives and data. The methods used include insuring NSA control over
international encryption standards, the use of “brute force” by
applying supercomputers for code breaking and collaboration with
technology firms and Internet service providers to install “back
doors”, that is secret vulnerabilities, to subvert commercial encryption
software.
64. The NSA paid companies to deliberately set weaker encryption
standards as the default choice for their safety software clients.
Using “supply-chain interdiction”, the agency could intercept US-made
products, such as routers and servers manufactured by American companies
such as Cisco, and implant them with beacons before they are repackaged
and shipped to unaware consumers around the world.
65. According to an intelligence budget document leaked by Mr
Snowden, the NSA. spends more than US$250 million a year on its
“Sigint Enabling Project” designed to undermine security standards
and implementation.
66. The NSA has also aggressively accelerated hacking initiatives
that it had repeatedly criticised when the US was the victim of
such attacks. Using “malwares”, the agency can gain total control
of an infected computer, which then enables agents to take over
a targeted computer’s microphone and record conversations taking place
near the device, covertly take over a computer’s webcam and snap
photographs, or record logs of Internet browsing histories and collect
login details and passwords used to access websites and email accounts.
The NSA has also computerised processes for large-scale dispatches
of such “malwares” and shared many of its files on the use of “implants”
with its Five Eyes alliance members. For example, the TURBINE system,
which carries out automated implants of malwares to targets, has
been operated with the knowledge and support of other governments,
some of which have even participated in malware attacks. The GCHQ
has played a particularly important role in helping to develop the
malware tactics: it operated the Menwith Hill satellite eavesdropping
base (the NSA’s European hub in North Yorkshire) and applied some tactics
itself, like when it reportedly hacked computers of network engineers
at Belgacom, the Belgian telecommunications providers whose customers
include several EU institutions.
A new disclosure by
The Intercept on 4 December 2014,
based on the Snowden files, shows that in an operation codenamed “AURORAGOLD”,
it is shown that the NSA has hacked the networks of mobile phone
operators world-wide.
Another spyware programme apparently
jointly developed by the NSA and the GCHQ was named “REGIN” when
it was discovered by Internet security firms; the latter have reportedly
succeeded in developing countermeasures.
67. The flagship programme for the surveillance of the Internet
on a global scale would appear to be the joint NSA/GCHQ “TREASUREMAP”
disclosed in September 2014
on the basis of documents leaked
by Mr Snowden. It is described as a vast NSA campaign to map the
global Internet, seeking to identify and locate every single device
(computer, tablet, smartphone) that is connected to the Internet
somewhere in the world – “anywhere, all the time”, according to
leaked NSA documents. Maps extracted from TREASUREMAP show that
the agencies broke into private satellite companies such as German-based
Stellar. These security breaches potentially have enormous consequences,
including the capability to cut entire countries off the Internet.
68. Installing back doors, deploying malwares and deliberately
weakening encryption systems creates new vulnerabilities in the
targeted systems that other non-benevolent third parties can discover
and exploit. The targeted computers and users’ information are left
defenceless not only to the governments’ surveillance, but also
other hackers, thieves and dangers from which the encryption system
is supposed to defend users. I am therefore somewhat surprised that
the head of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre
has asked for encryption to be allowed
only subject to back doors being installed for their benefit.
69. Moreover, such programmes were not only used against those
who pose a threat to national security or to individuals regarded
as “extremist” by the NSA. Targets have included systems administrators
working at foreign phone and Internet service providers, none of
whom were related to terrorist or other criminal activities. They
were targeted because by hacking an administrator’s computer, the
NSA could gain covert access to communications that are processed
by the administrator’s company. Finally, the NSA has repeatedly reaffirmed
its position that Mr Snowden was not able to access the raw data
resulting from the agency’s surveillance activities. Yet, the agency
has proven itself incapable of safeguarding the extremely sensitive
data it gathered.
What
if Edward Snowden were a terrorist? What if such data fell into
the hands of a totalitarian regime? The deliberate weakening of
encryption and other Internet safety standards by the NSA and its
allies for purposes of facilitating mass surveillance presents a
grave danger for national security. These weaknesses can be detected
and exploited by rogue States, terrorists, cyberterrorists and ordinary
criminals, and even individual researchers, who independently discovered
such weaknesses and published their exploits as a warning. They
can take advantage of the schemes implemented by those entrusted
with ensuring our security in order to wreak enormous damage on
our societies.
2.6. Legislative, judicial,
and political responses in the United States and United Kingdom following
the Snowden disclosures
70. Following the Snowden disclosures, the US Government
has reviewed and implemented some changes in its surveillance practices.
In January 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
criticised telephone
records programmes conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act (“United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”)
and the functioning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
It concluded that collecting phone records in bulk had provided
only “minimal” benefits in stopping terrorism,
was
illegal, and should be shut down. The Board found “no instance in
which the programme directly contributed to the discovery of a previously
unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack”.
In its first report, the Board
also recommended that the government limit analysts’ access to the
call records of people to no further than two links removed from
a suspect (currently three), create a panel of outside lawyers to
serve as public advocates in major cases involving secret surveillance
programmes, and delete data faster. President Obama, in his Presidential
Policy Directive of 17 January 2014
ultimately decided to cease government
bulk collection of phone data and required individual warrants from
the FISC for the NSA to access the data henceforth collected by
the phone companies.
He also forbade eavesdropping on
leaders of allied countries unless there is a compelling national
security purpose. But the administration did not address the issue
whether the United States would spy on other top officials from
those countries. Finally, scrutiny of phone calls was limited to
lines two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist
suspect. But President Obama did not accept some of the further-reaching
recommendations of his advisory board on surveillance practices
(for example requiring court approval for so-called national security
letters, a kind of subpoena allowing the FBI to obtain information
about persons from their banks, cell phone providers and other companies).
71. In contrast, in July 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberty Oversight
Board’s second report upheld the NSA’s Internet tapping programmes
pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. Section 702 covers the PRISM programme, under which the NSA
collects foreign intelligence from Google, Facebook, Microsoft,
Apple and nearly every other major US technology firm. According
to the Board, the Section 702 programme has enabled the government
to “acquire a greater range of foreign intelligence than it otherwise would
have been able to obtain – and to do so quickly and effectively”
for purposes such as tracking nuclear proliferation and monitoring
terrorist networks to understand how they operate.
The Board’s report concluded that
in some aspects, the programmes “push to the line of constitutional
reasonableness” because of the “unknown and potentially large scope
of the incidental collection of US persons’ communications”, and
offered some policy proposals to take the programmes more “comfortably
into the sphere of reasonableness”.
72. In July 2014, the US Senate Intelligence Committee passed
new cybersecurity legislation called the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA) that critics of the NSA say would further broaden
the Agency’s access to the data of Americans.
If passed by the Senate, the Act
would grant permission to government agencies to retain and share
data for “a cybersecurity purpose” and allow private firms to share
information regarding cyberattacks “in real time”, in addition to
shielding them from lawsuits by individuals for sharing data with
each other and with the US Government.
73. A legislative effort to (somewhat) rein in the NSA – the USA
Freedom Act introduced in 2013 to end the NSA collection of US phone
data – was defeated in the US Senate in November 2014. The bill
had received support from the President, senior congress members
from both parties, and more reluctantly from most civil liberty
groups and the NSA. It was stopped in the Senate after critics depicted
the bill as a “gift to terrorists”; it also failed to rally support
from civil libertarians (including NSA whistle-blowers Thomas Drake
and Bill Binney), who feared that the wording of the bill was so
vague that it could even inadvertently expand the NSA’s powers, given
the NSA’s history of expansive interpretation of legal provisions
intended to restrict its powers.
The
last hope for civil libertarians is the fact that Section 215 of
the Patriot Act, on which much of the metadata collection is based,
will be timed out in June 2015. This will give rise to new debates.
74. In the United Kingdom, in July 2014, the government passed
controversial emergency laws through all its House of Commons stages
within a single day in order to continue to force Internet and communications companies
to store their customers’ usage and location data for up to a year
and hand it over to law- enforcement services when requested. The
government claimed this legislation was necessary to protect national
security in light of events in Iraq and Syria. The rush also came
in reaction to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) in April 2014
holding that the EU Data Retention
Directive, which required communications providers to store the
traffic and location records (though not content) of their customers
for up to two years, was disproportionate in relation to individuals’
right to privacy. The new bill also introduced new oversight tools,
including the establishment of a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board, and the government was required to publish annual “transparency
reports”. In response, United Nations Human Rights Commissioner,
Navi Pillay, criticised the decision to fast-track the emergency
surveillance bill and echoed civil liberties groups’ concerns that
the rushed procedure failed to address key privacy concerns raised
by the CJEU when it struck down the EU Directive.
75. The legal challenge against the GCHQ’s surveillance activities
that Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union,
Privacy International and Liberty, among others, brought before
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) descended into “pure farce”,
according to Amnesty International.
During the proceedings, the government
insisted that it would neither confirm nor deny any of their surveillance
activities
which illustrates the difficulty
of challenging secret government surveillance programmes in court.
In its ruling dated 5 December 2014,
the IPT rejected the complaints
against,
inter alia, the TEMPORA
programme revealed by Mr Snowden, finding this programme (if it
were to exist...) in compliance with the law. The plaintiffs have announced
that they will take this case to the European Court of Human Rights.
76. By contrast, constitutional courts in Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, and Slovenia, like the CJEU,
have all rejected blanket data retention as unconstitutional.
77. In Germany, the Bundestag set up a Committee of inquiry on
the NSA affair on 20 March 2014.
The Committee’s work is still going
on, which is why I should like to limit myself to the following
comments, based on publicly available information:
i. Firstly, I should like to commend
the Bundestag for setting
up such a committee of inquiry at all. I am not aware of any other
parliament of a member State of the Council of Europe which has
taken a similar step.
ii. Secondly, I am a little worried that, as in previous instances,
the parliamentarians accept all too readily the executive’s tactics
of refusing to provide information to the committee on the ground
that it must be kept secret on national security grounds. In his
report on “State secrecy as an obstacle to judicial and parliamentary
scrutiny of serious human rights violations”, our colleague Dick
Marty has already made a similar remark with respect to the Committee
of inquiry on the BND’s role in the CIA renditions programme. A
judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court following a complaint lodged by opposition
members clarified the scope of the parliamentary right to information
in a spirit of openness, stressing that the protection of the State’s
security interest is not a monopoly of the executive, but that it is
a responsibility shared by parliament. This judgment came too late
for the BND/CIA committee, but the NSA committee could rely on it
to assert its information rights in a more robust way.
iii. Thirdly, I regret that the committee has not been able
to agree on inviting Mr Snowden to Berlin. He is obviously an important
witness, and it is doubtful that he can speak freely in Moscow.
3. Implications of
mass surveillance for human rights
78. Mr Snowden’s disclosures inevitably raise the question
of the human rights implications of the large-scale collection of
private data. Former BND chief Hansjörg Geiger aptly summed up the
situation before our committee: “To put it bluntly, if we have unfettered
massive data surveillance by intelligence services then this is
simply incompatible with safeguarding human rights”.
Similarly,
the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has stated
that “suspicionless mass retention of communications data is fundamentally
contrary to the rule of law, incompatible with core data-protection
principles and ineffective”.
3.1. Right to privacy
3.1.1. Council of Europe
standards
79. Mass surveillance is a prima facie interference with
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5,
“the Convention”), by which all member States of the Council of
Europe are bound. The European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”)
has ruled on a series of data protection and surveillance cases, including
applications concerning the interception of communications,
various forms of surveillance
and protection against
storage of personal data by public authorities.
80. Article 8.1 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence”) affirms the right
to privacy, which is also enshrined in other human rights conventions,
such as Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
Communications
intercepted and stored under mass surveillance programmes without the
consent of the targeted individual clearly fall within the scope
of “correspondence” and “private life” in Article 8.
Even if the interference
affects information that is available in the public domain, the
Court found in
Segerstedt-Wiberg and
Others v. Sweden and
Rotaru v. Romania, and reaffirmed
in
Shimovolos v. Russia that “public information
can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically
collected and stored in files held by the authorities”.
According
to the Court, “private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhausting
definition” and can include activities of a professional or business
nature.
Because the protection of
personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s right to
privacy, the Court has consistently found that “the systematic collection
and storing of data by security services on particular individuals
constituted an interference with these persons’ private lives, even
if that data was collected in a public place or concerned exclusively
the person's professional or public activities”.
81. Article 8.2 provides for narrow exceptions for which the Court
has developed a set of principles that governments must comply with
when engaging in conduct affecting people’s privacy as protected
in Article 8.1. There are two conditions which must be met as detailed
below.
82. The first is that the interference must be in accordance with
the law. The law must be accessible and the person concerned able
to foresee its consequences for him/her, in other words the law
must be formulated with sufficient clarity and precision to give
citizens adequate notice of the conditions and circumstances under
which the authorities are empowered to interfere with the right
to privacy. The law must provide for minimum safeguards for the
exercise of discretion by public authorities, that is it should
have sufficiently detailed and clear rules on the nature of the
offences that could give rise to an interception order. Effective
supervision and review should be provided by competent authorities
to prevent abuse. The Court stressed that “it would be contrary
to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive
to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power”, especially since
risks of arbitrariness are evident when it comes to a form of power
that the executive exercises in secret.
83. In
Khan v. the United Kingdom and
PG. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom,
the European Court
of Human Rights found that covert listening devices planted by the
police in a private home violated Article 8. At the time of the
events, such measures were only governed by Home Office Guidelines,
which were neither legally binding nor directly publicly accessible.
Similarly, in
Copland v. the United Kingdom,
the use of covert listening devices and the collection and storage
of information on the applicant’s use of phone, email, and Internet,
was found not to be “in accordance with the law” because no domestic
law existed at the relevant time to regulate such monitoring.
84. In
Kruslin v. France,
the Court found a violation of Article 8 in a telephone tapping
ordered by an investigating judge in a murder case, because French
law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner
of exercise of the authorities’ discretion in this area.
In
Amann v. Switzerland, the Court
also found an Article 8 violation when the public prosecutor’s office
intercepted a telephone call the applicant received from the former
Soviet embassy (for an order of a depilatory appliance advertised
by the applicant), since Swiss law was unclear as to the authorities’
discretionary power in the creation and storage of intelligence
files of the type drawn up about the applicant.
The Court found
similar violations for lack of clarity in the legal provisions allowing
the systematic recording of conversations in a visiting room for
purposes other than prison security in
Wisse
v. France and
the use of recording devices against murder suspects in
Vetter v. France.
In
A. v. France, the Court found a
violation of Article 8 because the recording of a private individual
in the context of a preliminary police investigation was not carried
out pursuant to a judicial procedure and had not been ordered by
an investigation judge.
85. The second condition for an interference to fall under the
exception under Article 8.2 is that the interference with the right
to privacy shall be “necessary in a democratic society” in the interest
of one of the stated goals in the second clause (national security,
public safety, economic well-being, etc.). In
Segerstedt-Wiberg
and Others v. Sweden,
the applicants
complained about the storage of information about them in Swedish
Security Police files and the latter’s refusal to reveal the extent
of the information stored. The Court found in 2006 that for one
of the applicants, it was legitimate for the government to keep
information relating to bomb threats against the applicant and certain
other personalities, since it was justified by the police’s goal
of preventing disorder or crime. In contrast, it found no legitimate
aims for the other applicants who had been affiliated with certain
left-wing and communist political parties. One had allegedly advocated
violent resistance against police during demonstrations in 1969,
while others were party members of KPLM(r), which advocates the
dominion of one social class over another by disregarding the law.
Because of the historical nature of the relevant information, however,
the Court found that its storage could not have pursued any relevant
national security interest.
86. Klass and others v. Germany,
despite being from 1978, accurately shows the different benefits
and dangers at stake with surveillance tools of the kind revealed
through the NSA files. The Court recognised that:
“Democratic societies nowadays
find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated forms of espionage and
by terrorism, with the result that the State must be able, in order
effectively to counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance
of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction. The Court has
therefore to accept that the existence of some legislation granting
powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications
is, under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security and/or for the prevention
of disorder or crime”.
87. But it also emphasised that technical advances have made espionage
as well as surveillance much more sophisticated, and the Court emphasised
that the threat of terrorism
“does
not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion
to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance.
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or
even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms
that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle
against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate”.
88. The guidelines and requirements laid down in
Shimovolos v. Russia provide guidance
on legislative safeguards that all States must have to protect privacy
under Article 8. According to the Court,
“where a power vested in the executive is exercised in
secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore
essential to have clear, detailed rules on the application of secret
measures of surveillance, especially as the technology available
for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The law must be
sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication
of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are
empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection
of data. In addition, because of the lack of public scrutiny and
the risk of abuse intrinsic to any system of secret surveillance,
the following minimum safeguards should be set out in statute law
to avoid abuses: the nature, scope and duration of the possible
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities
competent to permit, carry out and supervise them, and the kind
of remedy provided by the national law”.
89. This case is especially illustrative of the forms of mass
surveillance discussed in this report: the applicant, a human rights
activist, was placed in a secret surveillance security database
– and his movements subsequently tracked, which led to his arrest
– based on a ministerial order that had not been published and was
not accessible to the public. The public could thus not know why
individuals were registered in the database, what type of information
was included, for what duration, how it was stored and used or who
had control over the information. In another case,
Association “21 December 1989” and others v.
Romania,
the president
of an association that defended the interests of participants and
victims of the 1989 events (a crackdown on anti-government demonstrations
in Romania) had been subjected to surveillance measures, mainly
phone tapping, by the secret services. The intelligence services
had gathered information on the applicant in 1990, which they stored
for 16 years. The Court found a violation of Article 8.
90. The Court’s assessment of the quality of the law and safeguards
against abuses of surveillance programmes depends on the circumstances
of each case, including “the nature, scope, and duration of the possible
measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities
competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and
the kind of remedy provided by the national law”.
In
Klass and others v. Germany, the
Court found no violation of Article 8, because it found the surveillance
measures in question necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security and for the prevention of disorder or crime
and that there were sufficient safeguards ensuring the review of
such measures before, during, and after the monitoring. It concluded
that the review bodies foreseen in the law were independent from the
authorities carrying out the surveillance and vested with sufficient
powers to exercise effective and continuous control over the monitoring
process.
91. Additionally, the Court has also accepted, in
Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania,
that an
individual, under certain conditions, can claim to be the victim
of a violation residing in the mere possibility of secret measures
on the basis of legislation allowing for this, without having to
establish that such measures were in fact applied to him or. Otherwise,
Article 8 would be “reduced to a nullity”. This would also contravene
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights that guarantees
that “everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity”.
92. The pending case of
Big Brother
Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom and other cases
brought after the Snowden disclosures
will show the
Court’s position on the GCHQ’s mass surveillance programmes.
The applicants
in
Big Brother Watch allege
that they are likely to have been the subject of generic surveillance by
the United Kingdom security services, which may have been in receipt
of foreign intercept material relating to their electronic communications.
They contend that these interferences are not “in accordance with
the law” as required under Article 8, because there is no basis
in domestic law for the receipt of information from foreign intelligence
agencies and there was no legislative control and safeguards in
relation to the circumstances in which the UK intelligence services
can request foreign intelligence agencies to intercept communications
and share access to the data obtained, and the extent to which the
United Kingdom can use, analyse, disseminate, store, and destroy
data solicited and/or received from foreign intelligence agencies.
In another case pending since 2006,
Roman
Zakharov v. Russia, a
Russian book editor complains about the lack of legal guarantees against
the surveillance of his mobile phone communications. On the basis
of an unpublished executive order, his mobile phone operator had
installed equipment allowing the Federal Security Service (FSB)
to intercept any phone communication without prior judicial authorisation.
93. In the meantime, the Court of Justice of the European Union
addressed the issue of data privacy and found in
Google Spain v. Gonzalez that an Internet
search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it
carries out of personal data that appear on web pages published
by third parties. The CJEU essentially upheld a right for citizens
to request erasure of such personal data listings.
94. The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (
ETS
No. 108) grants additional protection for any data processing
carried out by the private and the public sector, including data
processing by judicial and other enforcement authorities. The convention defines
“personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable individual”, which includes communications intercepted
by government surveillance programmes. As of April 2014, this convention
was ratified by all EU member States; it was amended in 1999 to
enable the European Union to become a Party. It is the only legally
binding international instrument in the data protection field. The
convention allows the processing even of “sensitive” data, such
as information pertaining to a person’s race, politics, health,
religion, sexual life or criminal record, in the presence of certain
legal safeguards. The convention provides for the free flow of personal
data between States Parties to the convention, but it also imposes
restrictions on flows to States where legal regulation does not
provide equivalent protection. The convention is currently undergoing a
modernisation exercise. I strongly agree with the recommendation
of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights that “the
review of Convention No. 108 should not lead to any lowering of
European or global data-protection standards. On the contrary, it
should lead to a clarification and better enforcement of the rules, especially
… in relation to surveillance for national security and intelligence
purposes”.
3.1.2. Discussions at
United Nations level
95. The Snowden files have also given rise to discussions
at United Nations level. In December 2013, the UN General Assembly
adopted Resolution 68/167, which affirmed that people’s rights protected
offline should also be protected online and called on all States
to respect and protect the right to privacy in digital communications.
On 30 June 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights presented a report
on the serious human rights implications
that mass surveillance programmes have in the context of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified
by 167 States and includes in its Article 17 similar guarantees
for the right to privacy as the European Convention on Human Rights.
The report raised several important points that States will have
to address in order to maintain legislation and policies up to date
with the evolving nature of digital communications. First, it called
for surveillance measures to be “lawful” (that is that the interference
be authorised by States on the basis of law, which must itself comply
with the Covenant), not “arbitrary”, and be “reasonable” (proportional
to the end sought and necessary in the circumstances of the case
at hand). The report asserts that mandatory third-party data retention
(for example when States require communications companies to store
data about their clients’ communications) was neither necessary
nor proportionate, and that the collection of data for a legitimate
aim and its subsequent use for another also violated proportionality.
It stressed that secret rules and secret interpretations – even
secret judicial interpretations of law – [to which certain States
have referred in order to justify their surveillance programmes]
do not possess the necessary qualities of “law” as they are not sufficiently
precise and accessible to enable potentially affected persons to
regulate their conduct with foresight of the consequences that a
given action may entail. To address legal loopholes that allow for
“co-operation for collusion”, the report found that State obligations
to protect privacy arise as soon as the surveillance involves the
exercise of the State’s “power or effective control in relation
to digital communications infrastructure”.
96. The United Nations report finally noted that the different
treatment of foreign and non-foreign targets contravenes the principle
of non-discrimination in the ICCPR – a key issue in my view also.
It stressed the need to have an effective oversight process over
surveillance programmes, a combination of administrative, judicial, and
parliamentary oversight mechanisms that are truly impartial, independent
and transparent. Finally, the report suggested that States make
effective remedies available to those whose privacy was violated
and that the business sector, to the extent that it has been entrusted
with a role of “law-enforcement and quasi-judicial responsibilities
[as] Internet intermediaries under the guise of ‘self-regulation’
or ‘co-operation’”,
should explicitly commit to respecting
and protecting human rights.
3.2. Freedom of speech,
right to information and freedom of association
97. Regardless of whether individuals are aware of being
targets of mass surveillance, the indiscriminate interception and
collection of data has important ramifications with regard to the
freedoms of speech, information and association. The knowledge that
States engage in mass surveillance has a chilling effect on the
exercise of these freedoms. According to a November 2013 report
by PEN International
on the effects of NSA surveillance,
the vast majority of writers are not only worried about government
surveillance, but are also engaging in self-censorship as a result.
85% of the 520 American writers who responded to the survey said
they were worried about government surveillance.
28% have curtailed or avoided social
media activities, 24% have deliberately avoided certain topics in
phone or email conversations, and 16% have avoided writing or speaking
about a particular topic. When authors, journalists or civil society
activists are reluctant to write, speak, or pursue research about
certain subjects (for example the Middle East, criticisms of the
government post-9/11, the Occupy movement, military affairs, etc.)
or to communicate with sources or friends abroad for fear that they
will endanger their counterparts by so doing, this does not only
affect their freedom of speech, but also everyone else’s freedom
of information.
98. As mentioned above, the NSA has targeted individuals who had
merely searched for certain words indicating their desire to protect
their data, visited certain websites, or passively read an online
forum where other suspected individuals were chatting. Awareness
that governments are likely to target individuals who gather on
certain websites affects people’s freedom to navigate through the
online world or communicate with people they think might raise the
authorities’ suspicions for one reason or another.
99. In October 2014, President Putin announced tougher surveillance
of the Internet in Russia, to guard against hacker attacks and propaganda
for violence and extremism.
As the latter term is known to be interpreted
widely by Russian law enforcement, this announcement is ominous,
even though the President vowed to uphold the democratic principles
of freedom of expression and information.
3.3. Democracy
100. Indiscriminate mass surveillance also presents substantial
dangers for democracy if intelligence agencies bypass democratic
political and legal channels to implement programmes that intercept
a large amount of private communications. Files disclosed by Mr
Snowden show that States have made false claims of ignorance about
their intelligence agencies’ co-operation with the NSA in conducting
various forms of mass surveillance nationally and internationally.
In the United Kingdom, ministers have claimed to have been in complete
ignorance of TEMPORA, the largest GCHQ spying programme, while President
Obama claimed he was kept unaware of the NSA’s surveillance of Chancellor
Merkel’s personal cell phone. Top-ranking German politicians have
expressed outrage following the disclosure of mass surveillance
of the German population.
Subsequently, disclosures of extensive co-operation
by German intelligence services in such surveillance have emerged.
101. Such supposed or actual ignorance suggests that some parts
of government, let alone the public that is directly affected by
the surveillance programmes, was not properly consulted. In fact,
a leaked NSA document revealed that: “Upon being asked whether political
shifts within those nations affect the NSA’s relationships, the
SIGINT [‘signals intelligence’] official explain[ed] why such changes
generally have no effect: because only a handful of military officials
in those countries are aware of the spying activities. Few, if any,
elected leaders have any knowledge of the surveillance.”
While it is of course not advisable
or even possible to place all intelligence activities under full
public scrutiny, constitutional political processes ensuring the
services’ accountability before democratically elected leaders must
not be bypassed. Parliamentary oversight bodies must have sufficient
access to information and resources in order to fulfil their mandate
in a meaningful way. In my view, an idea I heard in Brussels earlier
this month makes eminent sense: in order to give parliamentary oversight
bodies teeth, they should be given a say in the budgetary appropriations
for the services they oversee. In my own experience, budgetary responsibility
is indeed a very effective form of political accountability.
102. As noted in my introductory memorandum,
the runaway surveillance machine
is the outcome of a loss of control by the political leadership
over the activities of intelligence agencies that most politicians
can no longer understand. James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
famously replied “No sir, not wittingly” to the question of Senator
Ron Wyden, member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, at an open
congressional hearing on 12 March 2013, whether the NSA was collecting
the data of hundreds of millions or hundreds of millions of Americans
not suspected of any crime.
I still do not want
to believe that he lied. But he was at the very least not properly
briefed by his own collaborators, who themselves may have lost control
over the activities of the private businesses to whom much of the
surveillance work has been outsourced (such as Mr Snowden’s employer).
Privatisation of surveillance carries a high risk of self-propelled
growth fuelled by the providers’ self-interest. Ever-increasing
“needs” for surveillance spending can be justified so easily: if
a terrorist attack was averted by surveillance, more surveillance
is needed to avert more attacks;
if
an attack is not be averted, the cause must have been insufficient
surveillance… The parallel to the privatisation of prisons in the United
States is worrying: since privatisation began in the early 1980s,
the US prison population has at least tripled, despite a decrease
in the crime rate during the same period.
The “rise of the prison industrial complex”
may find itself matched or even surpassed
by the rise of the “surveillance-industrial complex”.
3.4. Extraterritorial
application of human rights and equal treatment of domestic and
foreign residents
103. We have seen that national law provides more or less
solid legal protections for the privacy rights of residents – fairly
solid in Germany, somewhat less so in the United States
or
the United Kingdom, whose populations lack the distrust of their
respective intelligence agencies that Germans owe to the ravages
of the Gestapo and Stasi. But these protections (and even the improvements
under discussion in the United States and elsewhere) simply do not
apply to foreigners, who are treated as fair game: only “US persons”
(citizens and residents) benefit from the First Amendment (free
speech and freedom of association), the Fourth Amendment (protection
against “unreasonable searches”) and from most of the (limited)
protections under the national security legislation.
The December 2014 report
of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights aptly sums
up how this state of affairs runs counter to the general trend in
international human rights law to broaden the scope of the extraterritorial
application of the States’ human rights obligations (including those
under the ICCPR, which the United States has ratified) and why it
constitutes a violation of the principle of equal treatment.
For the
purposes of this report, the unique position of the United States
(and the United Kingdom) with regard to the physical infrastructure
of the Internet and the fact that private companies based in the
United States collect and store huge amounts of data of persons
residing anywhere in the world makes the exclusion of “non-US (and
UK) persons” from any legal protection against mass surveillance
simply intolerable – it may well lead to the destruction of the
Internet as we know it, as we will see below.
4. Implications of
mass surveillance on international co-operation and the future of
the Internet
104. First, revelations that the NSA spied on even its
closest allies have affected State-to-State relations. In Brazil,
President Rousseff has strongly condemned NSA surveillance, stating,
at an address before the United Nations General Assembly in September
2013, that: “We face … a situation of grave violation of human rights and
of civil liberties; of invasion and capture of confidential information
concerning corporate activities, and especially of disrespect to
national sovereignty of my country.”
Ms Rousseff
even called off a visit to the United States after revelations that
the NSA had intercepted emails and messages from her, as well as
those of the State oil company Petrobras.
Brazil has since attempted to route
Internet traffic around the United States in order to avoid surveillance.
On 2 July 2014, India summoned a senior US diplomat over reports
that the United States had authorised the NSA to spy on the ruling
party, the BJP, in 2010 when it was in the opposition.
105. US-German relations have also substantially soured over the
surveillance affair. The German Government terminated its contract
with US-based Verizon Communications Inc. on communication services to
government agencies from 2015.
A public outcry followed revelations
that the NSA was spying on Chancellor Merkel and other high-profile
Germans.
Der Spiegel accused
the NSA of “turning the Internet into a weapons system”, while the
New York Times reported that Ms
Merkel likened NSA wiretapping of her phone to Stasi eavesdropping.
German Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, who
had strongly criticised the United States since the PRISM scandal,
called US surveillance methods “reminiscent of methods used by enemies
during the Cold War”. Months of negotiations on a no-spy agreement
between Germany and the United States ended unsuccessfully, as the
two sides could not agree on its scope.
Although Ms Merkel advised against
inviting Mr Snowden to testify before the above-mentioned Committee
of Inquiry set up by the German Parliament, to avoid further damage
to the relationship between the United States and Germany, relations
were strained again following reports of two alleged double agents
spying on Germany on behalf of the United States. These disclosures
were made when the Bundestag Committee of Inquiry heard the testimony
of two former NSA collaborators, Thomas Drake and William Binney,
on the NSA’s mass surveillance programmes and the German BND’s alleged
co-operative role. After cautiously asking for explanations from Washington,
especially since President Obama had earlier ordered a complete
review of spying on allies and other partners following the disclosure
of the wiretap against Ms Merkel, Germany not only summoned US ambassador
John B. Emerson to the Foreign Ministry on 4 July 2014, just before
the American Embassy’s national holiday party for hundreds of guests,
but also invited the CIA Station
Chief to leave Berlin, stopping short of formally expelling him
from the country.
Certain Bundestag offices were even
said to have seriously considered reverting to the use of typewriters
for particularly sensitive communications in order to foil further NSA
surveillance.
106. Yet, some have called governments’ initial responses to the
revelation of the NSA’s mass surveillance programmes as “surprisingly
muted”, because leaders have been generally aware that foreign intelligence agencies
– as well as their own – routinely engage in such surveillance activities.
A representative example was the
United Kingdom. Following the destruction of computers and files
that journalists of
The Guardian had received
from Edward Snowden, Prime Minister Cameron even made a public announcement
that “[i]f they [newspapers] don’t demonstrate some social responsibility
it will be very difficult for government to stand back and not to
act”, essentially warning British newspapers against reporting on
the content of the Snowden files. In August 2013, David Miranda,
the partner of Mr Greenwald who had been given access to the Snowden
files, was even detained under anti-terrorism laws at Heathrow airport
for nine hours on his way to Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian citizen
reportedly had his mobile phone, laptop, DVDs and other items seized.
As Jonathan Marcus stated on BBC news,
“European governments friendly to the United States are
somewhat upset and the Obama Administration is somewhat embarrassed.
I say ‘somewhat’ because, as much of the commentary in the wake
of these disclosures has indicated, there is a kind of shadow game
going on here. It is a bit like that moment in the classic film
‘Casablanca’ when the police chief expresses his shock that gambling
is going on in an establishment he well knows is a casino, only
moments before being handed his own winnings by a clerk”.
107. Or as US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once put it, “stuff
happens”. But the confirmation that close allies spy on one another
puts political and economic co-operation in other areas at stake.
The public’s trust in their own country’s government and companies
has also eroded, because actors in both the public and private sectors
were shown to have colluded with the NSA. Europe’s Internet users
have increasingly complained about the dominance of American tech
companies, particularly when it comes to handling data, although
they still heavily rely on those companies.
Google still maintains an 85% market
share for search in the five largest European economies, including
the United Kingdom, France and Germany, in contrast to the 65% Google
has in the American market. Facebook has also more than doubled
its number of European users to over 150 million in the last five
years, and according to comScore statistics, American tech companies operate
seven of the ten most visited websites.
108. In response to growing discontent with US surveillance, one
political response has been to push for more “technological sovereignty”
and “data nationalisation”. The Snowden disclosures have therefore
had serious implications on the development of the Internet and
hastened trends to “balkanise” the Internet to the detriment of
the development of a wide, vast and easily accessible online network.
The Internet as we knew it, or believed we knew it, is a global
platform for exchange of information, open and free debate, and
commerce. But Brazil and the European Union, for example, have announced
plans to lay a US$185 million undersea fibre-optic cable between
them to thwart US surveillance. German politicians have also called
for the development of a “German Internet” for German customers’
data to circumvent foreign servers and the information to stay on networks
that would be fully under Germany’s control.
Russia passed a law obliging Internet
companies to store the data of Russian users on servers in Russia.
After
a six-month inquiry following the Snowden disclosures, the European
Parliament adopted a report on the NSA surveillance programme in
February 2014,
which argues that the European Union
should suspend bank data and “Safe Harbour” agreements on data privacy
(voluntary data protection standards for non-EU companies transferring
EU citizens’ personal data to the US) with the United States. MEPs
added that the European Parliament should only give its consent
to the EU-US free trade deal (TTIP) that is being negotiated if
the US fully respects EU citizens’ fundamental rights. The European
Parliament is seeking tough new data protection rules that would
place US companies in the difficult situation of having to check
with EU authorities before complying with mandatory requests made by
US authorities. The European Parliament’s LIBE Committee also advocated
the creation of a “European data cloud” that would require all data
from European consumers to be stored or processed within Europe,
or even within the individual country of the consumer concerned.
Some nations, such as Australia, France, South Korea, and India,
have already implemented a patchwork of data-localisation requirements,
according to two legal scholars.
109. In my view, the European Parliament’s proposals to make use
of all the instruments at the European Union’s disposal in its relations
with the United States in order to build up pressure in favour of
protecting the privacy of European citizens deserves every support.
Both in negotiating new agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and in implementing existing ones
such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) or the Passenger
Name Records (PNR) agreement and the Safe Harbour decision,
EU negotiators should make it clear
that Europe does not accept to be spied on by its transatlantic
partner. Equal protection in law and practice of European and US
persons’ privacy rights should be part and parcel of a partnership
based on mutual respect and trust.
110. By contrast, suggestions to “nationalise” Internet traffic
are fraught with danger: the architecture of the Internet is not
designed for “national routing”, and big changes to routing patterns
might diminish overall network functionality.
Furthermore, experts consider
that the sophistication of defence measures, rather than the location
of data, is what truly matters for communications security.
Most importantly, such re-nationalisation
measures may well be counterproductive from the point of view of
the principles upheld by the Council of Europe. National routing
typically does not protect fundamental rights, but rather the opposite.
It is abused for instance in China or Iran where governments seek
to restrict the availability of information to their citizens: “The
localisation of Internet traffic will intensify opportunities for
national surveillance, censorship, and the kind of political persecution
of online dissidents that the West has fought for years.”
Some
member States of the Council of Europe may also be tempted.
5. Possible solutions
to minimise negative consequences of mass surveillance, and the
role of the Council of Europe
111. The Snowden files have shown the need to establish
a more precise legal framework for surveillance activities, within
and outside of national borders. The Council of Europe has an important
role to play in this respect, as it is not, contrary to the European
Union, precluded from dealing with the national security aspects of
human rights protection.
5.1. Reviewing national
legislation with a view to adapting the protection of privacy to
the challenges posed by technological advances enabling mass surveillance
112. Since July 2014, several new cases that directly
involve mass surveillance programmes disclosed through the Snowden
files are pending before the European Court of Human Rights. The
Court’s existing case law has already established that the States
must establish a transparent process to ensure that only the requisite
amount of surveillance takes place, for a clearly defined set of
objectives that require and justify affecting the right to privacy.
Rather than awaiting findings of violations by the Court, the member
States of the Council of Europe should proactively review their
legislation to ensure that it is (still) adapted to the challenges posed
by the technological advances enabling mass surveillance on the
scale revealed by Mr Snowden.
113. National law should allow the collection and analysis of personal
data (including so-called metadata) only with the consent of the
person concerned or following a court order granted on the basis
of reasonable suspicion of the target being involved in criminal
activity. Unlawful data collection and treatment should be penalised
in the same way as the violation of the traditional mail secret.
The creation of “back doors” or any other techniques to weaken or
circumvent security measures or exploit their existing weaknesses
should be strictly prohibited. Given the particularly strong role
played by private businesses in the collection and treatment of
personal data, all private institutions and businesses collecting
or holding such data should be held to stringent security standards.
114. In order to enforce such a legal framework, member States
should also ensure that their intelligence services shall be subjected
to adequate judicial and parliamentary control mechanisms. Control
bodies shall be given sufficient access to information and expertise.
They should also have the power to review international co-operation
without regard to the so-called originator control principle (according
to which the service with whom the information in question has originated
has the right to determine with whom this information is shared).
This shall be valid on a mutual basis, on the common understanding
that in all States under the rule of law, intelligence services
are subject to judicial or parliamentary controls.
5.2. An international
“Intelligence Codex” laying down mutually accepted ground rules
115. The political problems caused by “spying on friends”
and the possible collusion between intelligence services for the
circumvention of national restrictions show the need for States
to come up with a generally accepted “codex” for intelligence services
that would put an end to unfettered mass surveillance and confine surveillance
practices to what is strictly needed for legitimate security purposes.
Such a codex would lay down precisely what is allowed and what is
prohibited between allies and partners; it would clarify what intelligence agencies
can do, how they can co-operate, and how allies should refrain from
spying on each other. As explained at the committee’s hearing on
4 April 2014 by Mr Hansjörg Geiger, former head of the German BND and
State Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, such a codex would be
a signal that governments are willing to provide some degree of
transparency in the conduct of their surveillance programmes and
guarantee citizens’ rights to privacy to the extent possible.
116. Mr Geiger suggested four simple rules. First, any form of
mutual political, economic espionage must be prohibited without
exception. Eavesdropping or wiretapping on allies erodes trust among
“friendly” nations with a price tag that outweighs any benefits.
Second, any intelligence activity on the territory of another member State
may only be carried out with that State’s approval and only taken
within a statutory framework (for example for the specific goal
of preventing terrorism or other very serious criminal acts). Third,
in no event may mass data be tracked, analysed or stored, if it
is data from non-suspected individuals from a friendly State. Only information
pertaining to legitimately targeted individuals may be collected
on an exceptional basis for specific individual purposes. Any data
on individual citizens or economic data that is stored but is not
needed for this clearly defined purpose must be deleted or destroyed
without delay. And fourth, telecommunications and Internet companies
cannot be forced by intelligence services to grant them unfettered
access to their massive databases of personal data; this should
only be possible on the basis of a court order. This limit would
not jeopardise the security of contracting States, because in the
case of a specific, realistic threat, such a court order can be
obtained.
117. Even a voluntary intelligence codex would have a strong effect
because those States that do not abide by it could be accused of
wrongful actions by their allies, thus eroding their credibility
as co-operation partners. But a multilateral binding agreement would
be more effective to close loopholes States can currently exploit
in order to circumvent legal limits placed on their intelligence
programmes. As seen in previous sections, “collusion for circumvention”
still allows intelligence agencies to push the boundaries of their
data collection powers at home by relying on data collected by their
allies or third parties. An intelligence codex would provide an
opportunity to close loopholes and protect citizens not only from
surveillance by their own government, but also from those of other
contracting States.
118. Such a feat would of course be challenging and raise many
key questions before the negotiation process is even initiated,
such as determining who would be part of such a codex, how its enforcement
would be monitored, and the precise terms of the agreement that
would allow intelligence agencies to function properly for their
legitimate missions while protecting civil liberties and human rights.
But the challenge is worth taking up, given the stakes, and provides
an opportunity for the Council of Europe to play an important role
in line with its mandate to uphold the rule of law, human rights
and democracy.
5.3. Pervasive encryption
to strengthen privacy
119. Until States agree on and actually implement limits
on their intelligence agencies’ mass surveillance programmes, pervasive
encryption to strengthen privacy remains the most effective fallback
for people to defend their data. As explained by Mr Snowden during
the April 2014 committee hearing, some encryption methods are not
susceptible to any realistic brute-force attacks, because “properly
implemented modern encryption algorithms backed by truly random
keys, of significant length, can require the application of more energy
to cryptanalyse, or basically to derive the solution to and decrypt,
than exists in the known universe”. Advocates of mass encryption
as an answer to mass surveillance thus insist that they can win
an “arms race” with the NSA and others, because of the technology-based
“asymmetry” between the modest resources required from “code-makers”
compared to the huge cost for “codebreakers” of neutralising even
a relatively cheap code.
120. Taking this suggestion a step further, some technical experts
propose “decentralising” (rather than “Balkanising”) the Internet,
for example encouraging each user to set up his or her own well-protected
server. This would exclude any form of mass surveillance. Legitimate
targets, such as terrorists, organised criminals and the like (and
their providers) would have to be court-ordered to relinquish their
encryption keys. This type of “clientele” is in any event what traditional,
targeted forms of surveillance used to be reserved for, which were authorised
by specific court orders based on concrete grounds for suspicion.
5.4. Improving the protection
of whistle-blowers
121. Mr Snowden’s revelations have been essential for
the public – and politicians – to become aware of intelligence agencies’
mass surveillance programmes and have sparked the much needed discussion
about the extent to which the public’s civil rights and privacy
should be sacrificed in the name of national security.
122. But even after appropriate legal limits and oversight mechanisms
have been established on the national level and on the international
plane in the form of a multilateral “intelligence codex”, whistle-blowing
will be needed as the most effective tool for enforcing the limits
placed on surveillance. The activities of secret services are by
nature difficult to scrutinise by any of the usual judicial or parliamentary
control mechanisms. Access of any monitoring bodies to relevant
information and capacity issues in view of the huge volume of activity
to be monitored will always remain a problem for effective supervision.
The “sword of Damocles” of the disclosure of any abuses by well-protected
inside whistle-blowers may well constitute the most powerful deterrent
against serious violations of the legal limits that should in our
view be placed under surveillance. This assessment is particularly
authoritative as it is shared by a senior former intelligence practitioner,
Mr Geiger, whose experience as former head of the German BND carries
special weight.
123. Consequently, we need to reassess whistle-blower protection
measures in parallel with our recommendations concerning mass surveillance.
These issues will be addressed shortly in the separate report under
preparation on “Improving the protection of whistle-blowers”.
6. Conclusions
124. The “Snowden files” have shown the extent of the
threat mass surveillance represents for our privacy and other human
rights whose effective exercise depends on privacy – such as freedom
of expression and information, even freedom of religion, the right
to a fair trial and the right to equal treatment. In sum, nobody and
nothing is safe from snooping by our own countries’ and even foreign
intelligence services – unless we succeed in generalising the use
of secure technologies.
The technological
progress enabling the world’s leading intelligence services to collect
and store stunning amounts of data “anywhere, anytime” is in the process
of being matched by equivalent technological leaps in the development
of the filtering and analysing tools needed to use these data. Before
the ever-growing “surveillance-industrial complex” spins completely
out of control, we must act, in order to subject surveillance to
the rule of law. This will require a thorough review of the relevant
national legislation in most, if not all member and observer States.
In addition, ground rules must be laid down on the international
plane. In order to be credible, the national and international legal
framework must be enforced by credible control mechanisms – including
the protection of whistle-blowers who disclose any violations. Also,
parliamentary oversight bodies should be given the necessary teeth
by giving them,
inter alia,
a say in the approval of the services’ budgetary appropriations.
Whilst waiting for such a legal framework to be actually in place
and functioning, pervasive end-to-end encryption and decentralisation
seems to be the only available defence against abuses that already
now affect the integrity of the Internet.
125. Ultimately, we should bear in mind the political and human
rights price tag of mass surveillance: the threat to the very existence
of the Internet as we know it and of which we currently enjoy the
socio-economic benefits; the erosion of trust between friends and
partners on the international scene; and the privacy and civil liberties
of our citizens. The Council of Europe should seize this opportunity
to draw attention to the need for international standards to safeguard
basic human rights, while ensuring that intelligence agencies continue defending
our security using effective and proportional means. A good first
step could be for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
to launch an inquiry under Article 52 of the European Convention
on Human Rights requesting all member States to explain the manner
in which their internal law ensures the effective implementation
of the right to respect for private and family life protected by
Article 8.
126. We have seen that mass surveillance is not even effective
as a tool in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, in
comparison with traditional targeted surveillance.
We
have also seen that some aspects of mass surveillance, such as the
deliberate weakening of encryption and other Internet safety standards
for the purposes of facilitating data collection, present a grave
danger for national security.
Such weaknesses can be detected
and exploited by rogue States, terrorists, cyberterrorists and ordinary
criminals to inflict enormous damage on our societies. It follows
that there is no contradiction between the protection of privacy and
of national security, on the contrary: data protection and Internet
security are necessary for our safety!
127. The draft resolution and draft recommendation reflect the
essence of these findings and conclusions.