1. Introduction
1. The initiative for this report stemmed from Mogens
Jensen (Denmark, SOC), who had tabled, with other members of the
Parliamentary Assembly, a motion for a resolution on “Media responsibility
and media ethics in a changing media environment” on 30 January
2013 (
Doc. 13122). Having been appointed Danish Minister for Trade and
Development Co-operation on 3 February 2014, Mr Jensen left the
Assembly. The Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media
subsequently appointed me rapporteur on this subject. Having started
with the BBC in 1993, I worked as a journalist and film director
in Kyiv until 2007, when I was elected to parliament. This professional
experience and the impact of media on democratic transition in my
own country as well as in neighbouring countries explain my commitment
to media freedom, responsibility and ethics.
2. Two decades ago, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism. That epoch was marked by
the fall of the Iron Curtain which had divided Europe into East
and West as well as by a gradual transition towards democracy in
countries in central and eastern Europe. At that time, the traditional role
of media in communist regimes also changed. While media had been
considered a tool to guide the masses through propaganda, they became
a means for every citizen to receive information and discuss views, both
of which are necessary in a democratic society. During that transition
period, it was therefore important to recall ethical standards of
journalism corresponding to such values as democracy and human rights.
3. The technological progress in electronic media has changed
the media landscape dramatically over the last decade, especially
through technological convergence on the Internet. Traditional print
media have lost subscribers and advertising revenue, making them
often targets for takeovers by financially strong investors with
political ambitions rather than commercial interests. The journalistic
profession has also changed in parallel to these changes in the
media environment. While journalists had a perspective of long-term employment
in the past, ever growing numbers of freelance positions have reduced
the number of permanent media staff, thus leading to increased competition
among journalists. In addition, journalists in many countries have
very low income and poor social rights, making them more vulnerable
to political and other pressures on their work.
4. It is therefore timely and necessary to remind parliaments
and governments in Europe of the need to give media the freedom
to organise their own professional ethics while reminding them of
their professional obligations in a democratic society based on
the rule of law.
2. Preparatory
work
5. On 22 May 2013, the Committee on Culture, Science,
Education and Media held a hearing on this subject in the House
of Commons in London with Ms Agnès Callamard, Executive Director,
ARTICLE 19, London, Mr Lutz Tillmanns, Secretary General, German
Press Council, Berlin, Ms Judit Bayer, Representative of the Southeast
European Network for Professionalization of the Media, Budapest,
and Dr Rachael Craufurd Smith, School of Law, University of Edinburgh.
Ms Rachael Craufurd Smith subsequently presented an introduction
to media self-regulation at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on
Media and Information Society in Istanbul on 12 and 13 May 2014.
Based on this preparatory committee work and in accordance with
my thematic instructions, Ms Rachael Craufurd Smith was commissioned
to prepare a background report, which she presented to the committee
in Strasbourg on 27 January 2015. This explanatory memorandum is
based on her background report, for which I am very grateful.
3. Media legislation
and media ethics
6. As the European Court of Human Rights has consistently
held, freedom of expression is applicable not only to information
or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock
or disturb the State or any sector of the population, subject only
to the conditions and restrictions foreseen in the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”). This is the yardstick
for media freedom and all media legislation.
7. Under Article 10 of the Convention, any restriction to media
freedom must be established by law and be proportionate to a legitimate
aim as necessary in a democratic society. Therefore, States can
only restrict media freedom by law as opposed to any arbitrary or
unspecified “soft” standards attempting to restrict Article 10.
The emphasis on law is due to the fact that legal standards can
be applied as well as reviewed by courts, as they are publicly accessible
as published laws and require sufficient precision.
8. Media ethics is hence a non-legislative approach, which is
typically equalled with media self-regulation. The latter implies
that media outlets and those working for the media voluntarily comply
with certain professional standards. While such ethical standards
cannot logically be enforced by courts of law, compliance with professional
ethics or diligence can be taken into account by courts when applying
legal norms to journalistic behaviour. A typical example is the
legal defence against defamation charges: statements or allegations
in the media which are made in the public interest, even if they
prove to be inaccurate, should not be punishable provided that they
were made without knowledge of their inaccuracy, without intention
to cause harm, and their truthfulness was checked with proper diligence.
9. Standards of media ethics could be very wide and diverse,
depending on the particular sector of the media and their staff
as well as their willingness to prescribe professional editorial
lines. A rather exhaustive list of such ethical standards was developed
in Assembly
Resolution
1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism. As we will see below, there
are no common national ethical standards, except for very basic
ones such as the professional obligation for accuracy and respect
for the truth, impartiality and editorial independence, fair comment,
respect for others and correction of errors.
4. The role of self-regulation
in the media sector
10. Self-regulation is an important and long-standing
component of media regulation in Europe. Regulation of the printed
press, film, video-game and advertising sectors has characteristically
involved significant self-regulatory elements. Self-regulation involves
the setting and enforcement of rules by those whose behaviour is
to be governed, without formal State oversight. A key motivation
for self-regulation in the media field is to protect freedom of
expression and to support the media in performing their democratic
functions – reporting on matters of public interest, providing comment
and opinion, offering a forum for debate, and acting as a “watchdog”
over powerful political and other social interests.
11. The democratic role of the press is specifically recognised
in a number of national constitutions, such as Article 5 of the
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swedish Freedom
of the Press Act, while the European Court of Human Rights (“the
Court”) has held not only that freedom of expression under Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights “constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society” but that it is “incumbent
on the press to impart information and ideas on political issues
and on other subjects of public interest”.
12. Self-regulation not only reduces the capacity of the State
to influence the media for its own ends, it can also be a flexible
form of regulation that can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances.
Self-regulation draws on industry expertise, which can enhance its
effectiveness and offer speedy and straightforward methods for resolving
disputes. Because self-regulatory systems tend to be funded wholly
or mainly by the regulated industry concerned, they may also reduce
the cost of regulation for the general public.
13. Though State regulation of the media can raise censorship
concerns, the Court has held that State restrictions on freedom
of expression can be justified when intervention is prescribed by
law, pursues a legitimate public interest, notably the protection
of the rights of others, and is necessary in a democratic society. In
practice, the media in all European States are subject to a significant
component of State regulation. Not only are the media expected to
comply with the general law in civil and criminal matters, particular
media sectors, notably the broadcast media, have been subject to
extensive State regulation, notably on the basis of their perceived
capacity to influence the public. State regulation may sometimes
be required to support media freedom, for example by tackling concentrations
in media ownership.
14. More controversial is the use of State regulation to support
self-regulation in the media field. Pure self-regulatory regimes
are voluntary in nature and adherence is primarily encouraged through
the reputational and other advantages on offer. These incentives
may not be sufficient to ensure that members comply with the set standards
and certain operators may calculate that it is in their best interests
to remain outside the system altogether. Effectiveness and adherence
are thus major problems for self-regulatory systems and may offer
the public only patchy protection. To the extent that the State
itself wishes to advance the interests pursued by the self-regulatory
body, or sees particular advantages in so doing, such as a reduction
in the number of cases coming before the courts, it may seek to
“reinforce” or “underpin” the regime through statutory or other interventions,
resulting in what is often termed a “co-regulatory” approach.
15. In the media sector, co-regulation takes a number of different
forms. In some cases the State has established the terms on which
the self-regulatory system can operate (Denmark, United Kingdom);
in others it has mandated adherence to the self-regulatory regime
(Denmark) or provided “backstop” powers of enforcement or sanction
(Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom). Carefully framed, such
intervention may serve to enhance the independence of the regulatory
regime from external pressures, including from the industry itself,
but it may also open the door to State influence, fundamentally
changing the nature of the self-regulatory institution from a body
stemming from, and pursuing interests established by, the industry,
to a body acting on behalf of the State. As noted above, the State
may have its own distinct motivations for the success of the self-regulatory
regime and these motivations may influence the nature of its intervention.
16. It can be argued that there should be no further regulation
of the media beyond that established by the general law, in that
even industry self-regulation can open the door to censorship and
external direction. Such concerns have influenced the development
of media regulation in countries such as France, where there is considerable
opposition to the development of self-regulatory mechanisms for
the press.
Throughout much of Europe, however,
distinct self- and co-regulatory regimes frequently sit alongside,
and subtly interact with, the general law.
17. There are a number of reasons why industry supports the development
of self-regulatory regimes in the media sector.
Firstly,
such regimes are often introduced in order to pre-empt State regulation.
Secondly, they seek to build trust with citizens and consumers by
establishing basic standards to which participating organisations
or individuals commit. These may overlap with the general law, for
instance a commitment not to harm children or invade privacy, but
characteristically go much further in requiring standards of honesty, transparency,
diligence and respect that, if breached, would not give rise to
any legal repercussion. Such regimes serve to underline the professional
nature of journalism and promote fulfilment by the media of its democratic
role. Thirdly, certain regimes establish a relatively cheap and
speedy procedure for public complaints regarding published content
or journalistic practices that contravene the regime’s specified standards,
thereby enhancing media accountability. Fourthly, industry is aware
that compliance with professional standards can sometime offer a
degree of protection in legal proceedings on the basis that the individual
or body concerned has acted responsibly or may lead to certain privileges
being awarded, such as access to information. Last, but by no means
least, such regimes may have a broad remit to support freedom of
the press and expression through educational or training initiatives
and active engagement in policy and political debates relating to
these freedoms.
18. Certain of the objectives noted above are essentially self-serving,
designed to protect the industry from various external threats or
provide certain advantages, while others seek genuinely to enhance
the public interest. The particular emphasis adopted will have an
important impact on the ability of the regulatory body to influence
overall media standards. The rather limited focus on complaint resolution
on the part of the previous Press Complaints Commission in the United
Kingdom, for example, arguably deterred the regulator from exploring
the cultural and organisational factors that undermined ethical
behaviour in certain sections of the press. The public interest
in free, independent and responsible journalism is most likely to
be realised where those framing self-regulatory systems explicitly
recognise the centrality of these goals both in their published codes
and constitutional framework.
5. Media self-regulation
in practice
19. Self-regulation in the media sector usually has one
or both of the following components:
- a code of conduct;
- a body, typically a council and/or an ombudsperson, charged
with the promotion or enforcement of the code, although, as indicated
above, the duties of the body may be considerably more extensive.
20. In certain media sectors, notably the film and games sectors,
self-regulation has tended to take a rather different form, involving
the creation by industry of rating systems that can then be used
to inform the public as to the nature of the content on offer. An
example is the Pan European Game Information or “PEGI” system, developed
for the Interactive Software Federation of Europe, and used to rate
computer games in 30 European countries. Self-regulation is here
designed to provide public information rather than maintain editorial standards.
Ratings are typically employed to facilitate the protection of children
from exposure to unsuitable content and to flag up violent or sexually
explicit content in contexts where audiovisual goods or services, considered
to be particularly influential, are sold on an on-demand basis.
5.1. Codes of conduct:
a typology
21. Codes of conduct have been developed by a wide range
of media organisations both across and within specific industries.
22. Certain representative organisations, notably unions, have
established codes of conduct for their individual members that may,
as in the case of the National Union of Journalists in the United
Kingdom, extend across traditional print and broadcast media to
online services.
23. Codes of conduct may also be adopted by specific public or
private media organisations to be followed by their staff, contributors
or users. The BBC, for example, has developed detailed editorial
guidelines for its producers.
As public service broadcasters must
have higher standards of quality and ethics, the values adopted
by the European Broadcasting Union in 2012 and its Public Service
Values, Editorial Principles and Guidelines are a reference point
for its members.
Social media sites such as YouTube
establish guidelines for users regarding content that they post
on their sites. Persistent violation of these guidelines may lead
to the termination of the user’s account.
24. Codes of conduct have also been adopted for specific media
sectors, such as the print, broadcast and video on demand sectors.
25. Many codes operate at the national level but private codes
operated by specific multinational companies or codes developed
by representative organisations such as the International Federation
of Journalists (IFJ)
can also be international in their
scope.
5.2. Codes of conduct
in an evolving media environment: current challenges
5.2.1. Complexity, opacity
and potential gaps
26. The number and variety of codes in operation can
create a complex and confusing regulatory environment. This can
make it difficult for the public to ascertain whether a given service
is subject to self-regulation, who is responsible for the service,
and the applicable standards. The piecemeal development of distinct
self- or co-regulatory regimes for specific media sectors over time
has in certain countries, such as the United Kingdom, resulted in
gaps and inconsistencies in the protection offered the public. It
has also led to demarcation disputes between regulatory bodies,
as industry members seek to locate within the most beneficial regime
and avoid any duplication in membership fees.
27. In my own country, Ukraine, two competing journalists unions
had each developed their own codes of ethics. In practice, those
codes played an insignificant role in raising journalistic ethics,
but both unions agreed in 2013 on one single code of conduct and
thus strengthened their professional ethics.
5.2.2. Convergence and
regulatory scope
28. The impact of media convergence on domestic self-regulatory
systems thus underlines the importance of creating a coherent and
transparent regulatory framework. Though text and video content
may raise rather different questions regarding production procedures
and presentation, the underlying regulatory principles relating
to responsible journalism remain the same. The specificities of
particular media can be addressed, if necessary, through additional
guidance. Moreover, comparison of how different sectors are regulated
can lead to standards being enhanced across the board. In the United
Kingdom, for example, the regulatory regimes for the broadcast media
include detailed procedural requirements to be undertaken prior
to action that could infringe privacy. If these procedures had been
applied in the print context some of the unlawful behaviour that precipitated
the Leveson Inquiry may well have been pre-empted.
29. Certain regulatory regimes have moved more quickly than others
to address convergence and accommodate online-only content providers,
bloggers and social media services, as well as news agencies. The
Finnish regime, for example, now extends to Finnish news agencies,
the print and broadcast media and their web services as well as
online-only services; the Swedish Press Council is similarly open
to online-only players, while the German Press Council handles complaints
relating to “journalistic and editorial content from the Internet”.
The professional rules developed by the Danish Press Council require
all domestic print and broadcast services to accede to the regime
but certain Internet media, including blogs and social media, subject
to editorial control, can also apply for registration and have taken
advantage of this opportunity. These developments raise questions
as to the fees that online players should be expected to pay and
their representation in the management structures of self-regulatory
bodies. Dialogue among the various regulatory bodies operating in
Europe and exchange of experience may thus prove useful to those
that have still to progress some way down this road.
30. It may remain desirable, however, to have a number of self-regulatory
regimes operating in a given country in order to reflect the diversity
of media operators that now exist and their different aspirations.
Lara Fielden, for example, has suggested the adoption of a range
of regulatory regimes that vary in intensity but which are equally
open to providers of text, audio and video-based services.
She
proposes four tiers of regulation. The first, most demanding “public
service tier” would set standards generally expected of public service
broadcasters, including impartiality. The second, an “ethical private
content tier” would be somewhat more exacting than the current press
regime in the United Kingdom but less so than those applicable to broadcasting.
The third, a “baseline private content tier” would maintain the
minimum standards set out in the European Union Audiovisual Media
Services Directive (codified in Directive 2010/13/EU), while the
fourth tier would involve no regulation beyond the general law.
Operators adhering to one or other of the three initial tiers would
be able to employ standard or “kite” marks to inform the public
as to the type of service they offered. The various schemes would
be open to bloggers and amateur publishers who could opt-in to one
of the tiers in order to benefit from the quality mark and reputational
advantages.
31. Clarity is also now required as to the extent to which media
organisations can be held responsible for user-generated content
hosted on the various fora or chat sites that many now provide.
These sites enable newspapers to test content prior to printing
and offer an important venue for democratic dialogue and debate. A
number of regulatory bodies, such as the new Independent Press Standards
Organisation (IPSO) in the United Kingdom, review complaints only
in relation to readers’ letters or content where it has been edited
or subject to moderation. Requiring providers to pre-moderate all
such content, however, would impose an impossible administrative
burden on media organisations and would impede public engagement.
32. The recent ruling of the Court in
Delfi
v. Estonia,
now
being considered by the Grand Chamber, suggests that flagging systems
and selective filtering may not be sufficient to protect news providers
from liability in actions for defamation regarding user-generated
content in the courts. The case underlines the importance of developing
an appropriate conception of “responsible journalism” in relation
to all services now offered by the media, taking into account its
changing role, which now extends well beyond the simple delivery of
internally produced and edited information. It is worth noting in
this respect the guidance on “material generated by the public on
a media website” published by the Finnish Council for the Mass Media
in 2011
and the provision on editorial materials
in the Danish Press Council ethical rules.
5.3. Enhancing the quality
of codes of conduct through a comparative approach
33. Across Europe, opinions diverge as to whether the
framing of media codes should be left to the industry itself, potentially
leading to self-serving provisions or omissions, or whether citizen,
consumer, or even judicial representation as in Denmark, should
be incorporated. Article 9 of the IFJ Declaration of Principles
on the Conduct of Journalists states that “within the general law
of each country the journalist shall recognize in professional matters
the jurisdiction of colleagues only, to the exclusion of every kind
of interference by governments or others”.
In Finland, the Management Group,
which incorporates representatives from publishers, broadcasters
and the journalists’ union draws up and revises the rules. Similar
concerns regarding the risks of external intervention can be seen
in the German system, which relies on industry members to draft the
press code. In a number of post-communist countries, there have
also been fears that vested interests may compromise the independence
of self-regulatory bodies through the participation of non-journalists.
Other countries, such as Denmark, incorporate input from journalists,
management and the public alongside independent legal professionals,
a system designed to ensure that the wider public interest in press
standards is reflected.
34. In relation to industry representation, it is important that
the interests of both management and journalists are taken into
account. It is arguable that the failure of the former Press Complaints
Commission (PCC) in the United Kingdom to incorporate representation
by journalists below the grade of editor in the formulation and enforcement
of standards undermined its credibility and effectiveness. Regardless
of the make-up of the body drafting or revising the code, provision
should be made for public consultation and adequate time for input allowed
prior to its adoption.
35. Codes of media ethics are influenced by a range of social
and cultural factors. Expectations of privacy in France, for example,
are rather different from those in the United Kingdom. Divergences
between codes in different countries are thus to be expected and,
indeed, welcomed. There remains, however, scope for further dialogue
among the various self-regulatory regimes operating in Europe with
a view to identifying and sharing best practice both in relation
to substantive standards and procedural requirements. This may also
lead to the identification of genuine omissions or different and
important emphases. The Danish Press Council ethical rules, for
example, seek to protect journalists from being required to carry
out tasks contrary to their conscience or convictions;
while the German Press Code clearly
identifies contexts in which there may be a conflict of interest
and expressly calls for the separation of advertising and editorial
content.
36. Certain issues are problematic in all countries, in particular
the circumstance in which journalistic activities, otherwise considered
to infringe code provisions, should be held legitimate in the public
interest. Co-ordinated discussion at a regional and indeed international
level on such matters could help to clarify and increase awareness
of the concerns at stake.
37. Given the increasingly international nature of the mass media,
consideration could also be given to identifying a core of fundamental
standards and principles that should be reflected in all codes.
A number of criteria that enhance in a general way the quality of
media codes of conduct have been identified. In particular, codes
should be written in clear language and be regularly revised in
the light of technological and social developments. They should
also be readily accessible to the public. Given the evolving nature
of the field, it is preferable to concentrate in the code on key
principles and values, with detailed supporting guidance provided to
indicate how the principles and values should be applied in practice
and how potential internal conflicts can be addressed.
38. In substantive terms, Article 19 has argued that, at a minimum,
all codes of conduct/ethics should include a commitment to the following
principles:
- respect for the
public’s right to know;
- accuracy in news gathering and reporting;
- fairness in methods to obtain news, photographs and documents;
- non-discrimination in relation to race, ethnicity, religion,
gender and sexual orientation;
- sensitivity in reporting on vulnerable groups such as
children and victims of crime;
- presumption of innocence in reporting on criminal procedures;
- duty to protect sources of information obtained in confidence;
- duty to rectify published information found to be inaccurate
or harmful.
39. Reference may also be made to the codes and declarations developed
by organisations such as the IFJ. There is, however, a risk that
these minimum requirements could be interpreted as establishing
a sufficient benchmark, deterring adoption of additional standards.
40. Enhanced dialogue among the various national press councils
could potentially be taken forward through the Alliance of Independent
Press Councils in Europe in co-ordination with interested citizens, consumer,
industry and press freedom organisations. The nature of the deliberations
and conclusions reached should be made as transparent and accessible
to the public as possible.
6. Implementation
and enforcement
6.1. Implementation
of media standards: the need for a multi-level approach
41. Even where a code meets the various requirements
identified above and reflects the public interest in press responsibility
and freedom, it will be of little moment if it does not influence
media practice on the ground. Indeed, there is then a danger that
the self-regulatory system will obscure the need for further action.
A major challenge for any self-regulatory regime is to attract sufficient
members to ensure credibility and to ensure that industry pays more
than mere lip-service to the standards identified.
42. The ability and willingness of media owners, editors and journalists
to act responsibly in line with ethical standards cannot be attributed
to any one factor, but is rather dependent on a complex interaction
of factors that influence the overall media ecology. In particular,
adherence to professional standards depends on:
i. the individual journalist – level of training, perception
of the profession and own role as a journalist;
ii. the institution in which the journalist works – security
of tenure, pay, workload, internal mechanisms for raising and discussing
ethical questions;
iii. the professional and legal environment – effectiveness
of professional organisations in representing the interests of journalists
and addressing consumer and public concerns, recognition of the
important democratic role played by journalism in constitutional
texts, statutes and the operation of the common law;
iv. the social and cultural environment – understanding by
the public of the role of journalism in society (media literacy)
and the factors that shape it, as well as a willingness to engage
critically with the media, particularly where intrusive stories
or unethical reports are published.
43. To be effective, a self-regulatory body may need to address
all these dimensions. The importance of a working environment that
protects and respects professional standards was underlined by the
failings at the British newspaper
News
of the World, which ultimately led to the Leveson Inquiry.
The phone-hacking scandal
exposed the importance of an environment in which ethical issues
can be discussed and where staff are not afraid to speak up. Ultimately,
the commercial benefits of unethical behaviour turned out to be
a false economy, though this was not understood at the time.
44. How can such problems be pre-empted in future? A clear statement
by the firm of its commitment to ethical standards, published on
its website, can set an important precedent. In particular, company
editorial guidelines were considered among the most influential
media accountability instruments by those journalists surveyed across
Europe and the Arab world in the course of research carried out
by the MediaAcT project.
Professional
codes of ethics and journalism education were considered similarly
influential. It has also been argued that independent trade union
representation would have given staff at the
News
of the World more confidence in dealings with management,
and
one criteria for membership of a self-regulatory body could be its
willingness to recognise collective representation, particularly
in ethical matters. Research also suggests that the more journalists
are organised in unions, the higher they rate the impact of traditional
media accountability instruments.
45. Alternatively, a specific individual could be designated to
discuss with journalists ethical issues that might arise in the
course of their work, though this could be seen as detracting from
the role of the editor. Indeed, in a number of European countries
such as Finland, certain press organisations are required to designate
a “responsible editor” who is explicitly expected to take responsibility
for the content published. Similar concerns have been expressed
in relation to the appointment of ombudspersons or readers’ editors
within individual firms, which can be found in countries such as
Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The readers’ editor at
The Guardian newspaper in the United
Kingdom considers not only readers’ comments and complaints but is
also tasked with considering, more strategically, how the paper’s
work and performance can be improved.
46. Maciá-Barber has argued that ombudspersons should perform
more than a merely advisory role and be empowered to ensure that
editors meet their ethical obligations.
In
times of economic stringency, any additional obligations that take
journalists away from their journalistic role is problematic, but
the provision of a speedy, first-line response to complaints can
pre-empt more costly and time-consuming disputes further down the
line. It may be possible to rotate posts to provide coverage or
for an ombudsperson to work for a number of separate outlets, thus
spreading the cost.
47. The Leveson Inquiry also discussed the provision of a “whistleblowing”
line, which journalists could use to raise ethical concerns with
a press regulatory body, on a confidential basis. Whether or not
concrete initiatives of this type are pursued, it is apparent that
an important role that ombudspersons and media councils can play
is the provision of support for journalists in developing and maintaining
a respectful and ethical working environment.
6.2. The role of press
councils and ombudspersons in enforcing professional standards
48. Looking beyond the individual firms, media standards
set out in formal codes are most commonly promoted and “enforced”
by specific Media Councils and/or Ombudspersons. As with the committees designated
to create and formulate industry ethical codes, the composition
of the management bodies of domestic media councils varies widely,
from all-industry as in Germany to a combination of industry and independent
representatives, sometimes with a legal chair, as is the case in
Denmark.
49. The sanctions at the disposal of these organisations are characteristically
limited and primarily take the form of a requirement that the media
organisation concerned publishes a correction or apology. The degree
to which complaints are facilitated varies from country to country,
with different time limits for lodging the complaint and standing
requirements. In Ireland and Denmark, for example, only those personally
affected by the publication in question can bring a complaint, while
in Germany any member of the public can do so. The position adopted
by IPSO in the United Kingdom is more nuanced: in relation to complaints
of inaccuracy on a general point of fact, anyone can complain, but
where the inaccuracy relates to a specific organisation or person,
IPSO will consider their position before determining whether to
accept a complaint from a third party. In other matters, only those
affected can bring a complaint, although IPSO will consider complaints
from representative bodies where the alleged breach of the Code
is considered significant and there is a public interest in proceeding.
50. Although media organisations themselves emphasise the significant
deterrent effect of being required to publish a correction or negative
ruling, only just over 30% of the journalists interviewed for MediaAcT considered
press councils to have a “high” or “very high” impact on media accountability.
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the deterrent and
educational effect of negative decisions has been undermined by
an emphasis on mediation, enabling media companies to escape without
a formal finding of fault. As the Media Standards Trust has noted,
mediation is fundamentally different from regulation, which characteristically involves
the setting of precedents to inform future action and determinations
that establish what constitutes adequate redress for certain types
of breach.
Many Press Councils in Europe do, however,
promote mediation prior to adjudication, though the Danish Press
Council excludes mediation. Once again, it is necessary when framing
the regulatory regime to consider what the ultimate priority is.
In the Danish context, this appears to be the public interest in
the maintenance of press standards.
51. In addition to requiring publication of a correction or apology,
it is theoretically possible that a recurrent offender might have
its membership revoked. Under the Swedish system, publications against
which a complaint is upheld are required to pay a limited administrative
fine. The general absence of significant financial sanctions serves
to distinguish press self-regulatory regimes from judicial enforcement
of the civil and criminal law in the courts, where significant damages
or fines may be levied. Meaningful financial sanctions could lead to
pressure for greater formalisation and legal representation, potentially
undermining the constructive approach on which self-regulation is
built and deterring membership.
52. That it is not in principle impossible, however, for self-regulatory
systems to incorporate much more significant sanctions is illustrated
by the new British press regulator, IPSO, which is empowered to
fine members up to £1 million or 1% of annual turnover. The scale
of the potential fine distinguishes IPSO from other media self-regulatory
bodies but it is unlikely that its deterrent effect will be tested
in the near future. This is because the Chairperson of IPSO, Sir
Alan Moses, has himself stated that “the instruction booklet for
the use of so novel a weapon is rather too complicated for we ordinary
mortals at IPSO to understand”.
Nor is there any mention of the
power to fine on the IPSO webpage dealing with complaints. It is
not clear, however, why criteria could not have been established
for at least a lower level of fine in particular cases though the
approach adopted undoubtedly reflects a widespread view that fines
are not an appropriate sanction in the press (as opposed to say
advertising) regulatory context.
53. A strong presumption against prior censorship means that Ombudspersons
and Press Councils generally respond to complaints in relation to
published material or press practices that have already taken place.
Although falling short of empowering the Press Council to block
publication of certain content, the Danish press code does require
publishers to examine carefully content that could be prejudicial
to individuals and, if possible, to submit it to that individual
prior to publication. As a result of their advisory functions, media regulators
may be willing to give advice to members (as opposed to the public)
in relation to a particular proposed story or investigation and,
through the publication of past decisions and specific guidance
on code provisions, can help to pre-empt unethical practices.
6.3. State intervention
and the role of co-regulation
54. The potential for weak implementation and an inability
to ensure that all major players participate have led certain States
to complement or strengthen the self-regulatory system through statutory
provision. In some cases they have introduced specific statutory
remedies. A number of countries, such as Finland and Denmark, have
established a statutory right of reply, while Article 28 of the
European Union Audiovisual Media Services Directive calls on States
to ensure that a right of reply is made available to legal persons
whose legitimate interests are damaged by an incorrect assertion
of facts in a broadcast television programme (Directive 2010/13/EU).
55. In other instances, the State has sought to shore up and enhance
the effectiveness of self-regulatory structures through a co-regulatory
approach. Denmark has been one of the most interventionist in requiring that
all domestic print media and broadcasting services participate in
the regulatory regime operated by the Danish Press Council. Failure
to comply with a Press Council decision can lead to a limited fine
and, potentially, to up to four months in prison. In Ireland a rather
different approach has been adopted in the Irish Defamation Act
2009, which requires that courts take into account membership of
the Press Council and compliance with its Code of Practice when
determining whether it was “fair and reasonable” for a media organisation
to publish a particular defamatory statement (section 26). In order
for the Press Council to be recognised in this way, it is required
to maintain a code of conduct covering specific matters, in particular,
accuracy, intimidation and harassment, privacy, integrity and dignity.
A further form of support is the provision of funding to assist
the operation of press or media councils, exemplified by the contribution
of the German State of around 30% of the costs of the German Press
Council.
56. As with the Irish position, the United Kingdom has stopped
short of requiring that media companies join a self-regulatory scheme,
so that adherence remains voluntary. The Crime and Courts Act 2013,
however, establishes a number of incentives and disadvantages designed
to encourage press publishers to join an independent media regulator
approved under the terms of the 2013 Royal Charter on Self-Regulation
of the Press. Such organisations are offered a degree of protection
from the imposition of exemplary damages and costs in civil proceedings,
while organisations that are not members are potentially exposed
to liability in costs, whether or not they win the action (sections
34-42). One consequence of this is that it has been necessary to define
who should be a member of such a recognised body (see section 41
and Schedule 15 of the Act, which excludes, inter
alia, “micro-businesses”). A specific feature of the
2013 Royal Charter is the requirement that recognised regulatory
bodies make provision for an arbitration system for civil disputes
involving their members (criterion 22). The linking of the self-regulatory
body with the resolution of civil disputes in this way blurs the
line between self-regulation relating to agreed standards and the
resolution of legal disputes. Opposition to the new system has led
most British newspapers, with the notable exception of The Guardian and The Financial Times, to become members
of IPSO, which does not intend to seek recognition under the 2013
Royal Charter.
57. In certain countries, there has been a simple preference for
State rather than self-regulation, even in the press sector. In
Portugal, for example, an independent administrative body, the Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC),
was set up by statute with the remit to oversee the operation of
both the print and audiovisual media in 2005 (Law 53/2005 of 8 November).
Four of the five members of the regulatory body of the ERC are appointed
by the Portuguese Parliament, and these members then appoint the
fifth. Reliance on political appointments in this way can bring
into question the independence of the regulatory body.
6.4. Appeal and review
58. There is considerable variation across Europe as
to whether appeal or review is possible in relation to a decision
by a media regulator. Where the regulatory system incorporates both
an ombudsperson and press council, as in Ireland and Sweden, an
appeal in relation to a ruling by the ombudsperson to the press
council is usually available. A number of countries provide for
appeals on certain matters. In Germany, an internal appeal mechanism
is provided, allowing appeal to a differently composed board; in
Finland, an appeal from a decision of the Press Council is allowed
only where a ruling has been based on incorrect information; while
in the United Kingdom, IPSO allows complainants to refer procedural
as opposed to substantive matters relating to the handling of their
dispute to a designated Complaints Reviewer.
59. Judicial review of the regulator’s decision is not possible
in countries such as Finland although it is in others, such as Denmark
and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom’s experience suggests,
however, that this is likely to be of only limited value to complainants,
given the potential costs and the deference afforded by courts to
the judgement of professional bodies. In an application for judicial
review of a PCC decision by the television presenter Anna Ford in
2001, for example, the judge held that the court should show deference
to the PCC’s decisions and only interfere “where it would be clearly
desirable to do so”.
For this reason, incorporation of a procedure
for appeal, along German lines, could reassure complainants in countries
such as the United Kingdom that their concerns will be taken seriously,
though there will inevitably be cost and administrative implications
for systems that have been designed to provide the public with quick
and relatively informal means of redress. This is thus an area where
further comparative work into the value of such procedures in practice
could prove useful.
6.5. Enforcement in
an international context
60. The media are increasingly distributed on an international
basis, rendering it increasingly likely that an individual will
wish to complain about a publication that is based in another country.
Certain regulatory bodies, such as the Irish Press Council, allow
companies established abroad that have a presence in Ireland to
become members, though organisations that are not members and “adhere
to standards equivalent” to those of the Council can still take
advantage of the terms of the 2009 Defamation Act.
61. From the perspective of the media organisation itself, membership
of media self-regulatory bodies in all the territories it covers
could entail substantial costs and is unlikely to be an attractive
option. One option would be to draw on the experience of the cross
border complaints system operated by the European Advertising Standards
Alliance (EASA), under which individuals who wish to complain about
an advertisement published by an organisation subject to a self-regulatory
body in another country can complain to their own national regulator
who will assist by referring the matter on to the relevant regulator.
62. An alternative, much more ambitious, approach would be to
support the development of effective self-regulatory systems operating
at the regional or even international level, incorporating their
own codes of fundamental ethical standards and dispute resolution
procedures. As indicated above, a number of European and international
organisations, such as the European and International Federation
of Journalists, have developed codes that cross domestic borders.
Further consideration should be given to how this increasingly important
matter can be resolved in the public interest.
7. War propaganda
and hate speech: international legal limits for the media
63. Self-regulatory action by the media can only take
place within the legal limits of media freedom. While it is not
possible to refer to all general laws regulating media content,
hate speech has become of particular concern. As there is no clear
definition of hate speech, ethical considerations may be applied
in the grey area around it, although hate speech as such is to be
punished by law in accordance with international legal standards.
In this context, it is therefore important to recall also such limits.
64. Article 20 of the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is the foremost universal standard
against war propaganda and hate speech. It stipulates: “(1) Any
propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. (2) Any advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”
The second part of Article 20 has been analysed and interpreted
internationally (see, for example, Article 19.b,
2010) and was further developed by Article 4 of the United Nations
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination which inter alia stipulates:
“State Parties … (a) shall declare an offence punishable by law
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized
and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination,
and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities
as an offence punishable by law.”
65. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted
in 1997 its Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on hate speech. Hate speech
is also addressed by the Council of Europe through its European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which adopted the General
Policy Recommendations No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism
and racial discrimination and No. 8 on combating racism while fighting
terrorism.
66. As regards the prohibition of war propaganda under Article
20.1 of the ICCPR, reference can be made to the General Comment
No. 11 adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee on 29
July 1983: “The prohibition under paragraph 1 extends to all forms
of propaganda threatening or resulting in an act of aggression or
breach of the peace contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.
… The provisions of article 20, paragraph 1, do not prohibit advocacy
of the sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to
self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.”
8. Conclusions
67. National legislation should secure media freedom
and establish its boundaries; thus no “external” interference by
public authorities shall be admissible unless clearly provided therein.
Corporate policies of individual media outlets are the expression
of free choices by the media themselves. Such corporate policies may
establish procedures or editorial rules on media content which,
to some extent, limit the freedom of individual journalists or other
employees or contractors. Between these two levels, there is a space
for the “codes of ethics”, established in particular at national
level.
68. As the Parliamentary Assembly stated in its
Resolution 1636 (2008) on indicators for media in a democracy, “Media should
set up their own self-regulatory bodies, such as complaints commissions
or ombudspersons, and decisions of such bodies should be implemented”
(paragraph 8.25). In practice, there is a rich and varied history
of self-regulation in the media sector across Europe, with self-regulatory
systems operating at both national and regional levels, within individual
firms, and within and across media sectors. Many of the domestic
systems, which vary significantly depending on the political, economic
and cultural environment, attract a high level of both public and
industry support. Self-regulatory systems are, however, prone to
certain failures, notably limited coverage and weak enforcement,
and there is a real opportunity to draw on experience at the European
level to strengthen and enhance the existing regimes.
69. Key challenges facing self-regulatory systems in Europe today
are the need to respond to media convergence and an increasingly
international media environment. The gradual accretion of new self-regulatory
systems over time, alongside State and co-regulatory initiatives,
has created an unduly complex regulatory landscape in certain countries,
one that it is difficult for individuals to navigate and where there
may be significant gaps in the protection offered to the public.
Consideration should thus be given to rationalising existing frameworks
and moving beyond a medium specific focus. A number of regulators,
such as the Press Council in Denmark, have already gone a considerable
way in adapting to this new environment and have opened up membership
to online publishers that are subject to editorial control. The
challenge of international distribution has received rather less
attention to date and further work needs to be done to develop viable systems
of co-ordination or supra-national regulation within Europe, drawing
on the experience in other sectors such as advertising.
70. Self-regulatory codes require continuous review and revision
and further efforts should be made by those overseeing such codes
to ensure that they are kept up to date. Comparison of the various
regulatory regimes in Europe can reveal gaps or suggest improvements
in relation to both substantive and procedural requirements. It
is suggested that enhanced dialogue among the various national press
councils be taken forward, possibly through the Alliance of Independent
Press Councils in Europe, in co-ordination with interested citizens,
consumers, industry, and press freedom organisations. Such dialogue
would seek to identify and lead to the publication of best practice
among the members and to address common concerns, such as the degree
of oversight publishers should apply to user-generated content hosted
on their sites.
71. Particularly at the procedural level, there is considerable
diversity in approach across Europe and although care needs to be
taken in transplanting specific provisions outwith the home environment,
there is scope to consider from a comparative perspective matters
such as the role of own initiative investigations; time limits for
bringing proceedings, particularly in relation to online content;
the respective merits of mediation and adjudication; the desirability
of appeal procedures; the effectiveness and implications of financial
sanctions; and the extent to which decisions of the regulatory body
are published, accessible and searchable.
72. The phone-hacking scandal in the United Kingdom has underlined
the importance of a workplace environment in which ethical issues
can be openly addressed and where staff are treated with respect.
The role of media self-regulatory bodies should ideally extend beyond
the resolution of public complaints to supporting, through monitoring
and training, the development of such a climate. The explicit articulation
and publication by firms of their own ethical standards is to be
encouraged and firms should be expected, as a term of membership,
to support collective representation on the part of their staff.
To the extent that self-regulatory bodies open their doors to professional
and amateur publishers that do not work within established media organisations,
as in the Danish context, they can themselves offer a valuable point
of contact and forum for ethical debate.
73. Systemic failures in certain self-regulatory systems have
encouraged a number of States to seek to enhance the effectiveness
of those systems through statutory intervention. Experience in Denmark
and Ireland suggests that it is possible for carefully crafted State
measures to be introduced that do not undermine the independence
of the media (these countries are ranked 7th and 16th respectively
in the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index for 2014).
In contrast, State initiatives in the United Kingdom have been fiercely
opposed by the press and rendered largely ineffective. By requiring
a recognised self-regulatory body to provide an arbitration service
for civil claims, a very direct and controversial link was being
made between the self-regulatory regime and the protection of legal
rights. The United Kingdom experience suggests that States considering
intervention to support self-regulation in the media sector should
take care to ensure that their measures work with, rather than potentially
distort, the regulatory regime in question.