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A. Draft
resolution
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B. Draft
recommendation
(open)
Report | Doc. 13851 | 06 July 2015
Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society
Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media
Summary
Our democratic societies are threatened by fanaticism and religious extremism, but also by xenophobia and rejection of anything different. Faced with this threat, States and religions should work together to foster dialogue and mutual respect.
Religions have a fundamental duty to promote the shared values and principles which underpin “living together”. Within the framework of a “secularity of recognition”, States should ensure that their neutrality remains inclusive and diversity-friendly, seek “reasonable accommodations” on controversial religious practices. The aim should be to guarantee equality that is effective in the right to freedom of religion and avoid any restrictions on this right which are not necessary in a democratic society.
Education is the key to combating ignorance, breaking down stereotypes, building trust and mutual respect and promoting sincere support for the shared values of living together. School should be a meeting point and a place for constructive dialogue between individuals of different beliefs, and help them open up to other visions of the world. In this context, States and religious communities should collaborate so that the teaching of religion becomes an opportunity for reciprocal listening and for developing critical thinking.
The Council of Europe should set up a stable platform for dialogue with senior representatives of religions and non-denominational organisations in order to foster active commitment by all the stakeholders in activities to promote living together.
A. Draft
resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly notes that religion has
gained renewed importance in European societies. Many beliefs and
churches are developing in Europe alongside the religions which
have influenced the history of our continent. The Assembly notes
with great regret and anxiety that this continues to give rise to
tensions, lack of understanding and suspicion, and even to xenophobic
attitudes, extremism, hate speech and the most despicable violence.
This vicious circle must be broken.
2. Churches and religious organisations are an integral part
of civil society and must, with secular organisations, take part
in the life of society. National authorities should take more account
of religious communities’ potential to work for dialogue, mutual
recognition and solidarity. For their part, those communities have
a fundamental duty, which they must fully assume, to promote the
shared values and principles which underpin “living together” in
our democratic societies.
3. Those values and principles consist mainly of profound respect
for human dignity and the fundamental rights protected by our democratic
constitutions and by the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5),
as well as respect for democratic principles and the rule of law,
including the principle of non-discrimination between the different
groups which make up our plural societies. These values and principles are
non-negotiable and they must prevail over any social or religious
norms that counter them.
4. Religious affiliation is, for many European citizens, a key
element of their identities. That affiliation is also expressed
through worship and compliance with religious practices. Freedom
to live according to those practices is one element of the right
to freedom of religion safeguarded by Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. That right coexists with the fundamental
rights of others and with the right of everyone to live in a space
of socialisation which facilitates living together. That may justify
the introduction of restrictions on certain religious practices,
but any restriction not necessary in a democratic society should
be avoided.
5. Furthermore, the Assembly considers that the principle of
secularity does not require the elimination of religion from social
space; quite the contrary, this principle, properly interpreted
and implemented, protects the possibility for the different beliefs,
religious and non-religious, to coexist peacefully while all parties
respect shared principles and values.
6. Legislatures and governments must take account of the fact
that political decisions taken in the name of the “neutrality of
the State” may, in practice, give rise to disguised discrimination
against minority religions, which is incompatible with the right
to freedom of religion and the principle of secularity. Worse, such
decisions may give rise to a feeling amongst the members of the
communities concerned that they are not considered full members
of the national community.
7. Certain religious practices remain controversial within national
communities. Albeit in different ways, the wearing of full-face
veils, circumcision and ritual slaughter are divisive issues. Other
religious practices may also provoke tensions, for example in the
workplace. In this context, while it is aware that standards cannot
be imposed, the Assembly invites States to seek “reasonable accommodations”
with a view to guaranteeing equality that is effective, and not
merely formal, in the right to freedom of religion. States should
ensure that their neutrality remains inclusive and diversity-friendly.
8. Where the wearing of full-face veils is concerned, the Assembly
refers to its Resolution
1743 (2013) on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe and invites
States to refrain from dictating general prohibitions and to prefer
targeted policies designed to make Muslim women aware of their rights,
help them to take part in public life and offer them the possibility
of achieving social and economic independence.
9. As far as circumcision is concerned, the Assembly refers to
its Resolution 1952 (2013) on children’s right to physical integrity and, out of
a concern to protect children’s rights which the Jewish and Muslim
communities surely share, recommends that member States provide
for ritual circumcision of children not to be allowed unless practised
by a person with the requisite training and skill, in appropriate
medical and health conditions. Furthermore, the parents must be
duly informed of any potential medical risk or possible contraindications
and take these into account when deciding what is best for their
child, bearing in mind that the child’s interest must be considered
the first priority.
10. Where ritual slaughter is concerned, the Assembly is not convinced
that legislation prohibiting this practice is really necessary,
or that it would be the most effective way of ensuring the protection
of animals; legislation which imposes strict requirements, like
that of France and Germany, achieves a balanced reconciliation of
the legitimate concern to protect animals from unjustified suffering
and respect for the right to freedom of religion.
11. The Assembly is convinced that education is the key to combating
ignorance, breaking down stereotypes, building trust and mutual
respect and promoting sincere support for the shared values of living together.
In this respect, the Assembly is aware that many factors are influential
in the formation of the individual personality. Families and media,
as well as cultural and religious communities themselves, should support
the development of open-minded individuals, capable of critical
thinking and of constructive dialogue with others. It is crucial
to fight against intolerance on the web. School should also be a
meeting point and a place for constructive dialogue between individuals
of different – religious or secular – beliefs.
12. Referring to its Recommendation
1962 (2011) on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue,
the Assembly reminds States of their obligation to ensure that all
the religious communities which accept shared fundamental values
are able to benefit from an appropriate legal status guaranteeing
the exercise of freedom of religion. In the Assembly’s view, member
States and religious communities should work together to promote coming
together, dialogue and mutual respect: there is no better way of
effectively combating all fanaticism and extremism, religious or
anti-religious.
13. In this context, the Assembly recommends that member States:
13.1. ensure that religious communities
and their members are able to exercise the right to freedom of religion
without impediment and without discrimination, in accordance with
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and make sure, inter alia, that religious communities
and their members are able, in compliance with the law, to:
13.1.1. practise their faith publicly
and freely in places of worship designed for that purpose by themselves
or in other places accessible to the general public, in accordance
with their own rites and customs;
13.1.2. manage welfare institutions (hospitals, workshops for
persons with disabilities, homes for elderly people, nursery schools,
etc.), and schools and places of education;
13.1.3. make their opinion publicly known without being subjected
to censorship;
13.2. promote the social integration of religious minorities
and act at an early stage against those social, economic and political
inequalities which affect those minorities;
13.3. put into practice a “secularity of recognition” and treat
religious organisations as partners in the development of inclusive
and mutually supportive societies, while respecting the principle
of the independence of politics from religion and the rule of law;
in this context:
13.3.1. develop projects
in collaboration with religious communities to promote shared values and
“living together”, and involve those communities in the combating
of all extremism and fanaticism;
13.3.2. give encouragement to projects jointly developed by several
communities, inter alia with non-religious
associations, with a view to strengthening the social fabric through,
for example, the promotion of inter-community solidarity, attention
being paid to the most vulnerable people and the fight against discrimination;
13.3.3. ensure that public service media firmly oppose any form
of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or beliefs and
contribute not only to fighting stereotypes, but also to upholding
the vision of a pluralist, intercultural and inclusive democratic
society;
13.4. promote in the school and extracurricular framework opportunities
for people of different beliefs to meet and talk so that they can
learn to express their religious identity without fear, but also
without provoking others or prevaricating, and both open up to other
visions of the world and learn to respect them even if they do not
share them; in this context, co-operate with religious communities
so that the teaching of religion becomes an opportunity for reciprocal
listening and for developing critical thinking.
B. Draft
recommendation
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly, referring to its Resolution
… (2015) on freedom of religion and living together in a democratic
society, and drawing attention to its Recommendation 1962 (2011) on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue
and Recommendation 1975
(2011) “Living together in 21st-century Europe: follow-up to
the report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe”,
reiterates its support for an integrated approach to issues relating
to “living together” and refers to the numerous proposals that those
texts contain, not all of which have been followed by practical
measures.
2. Convinced of the urgent need to step up the Council of Europe’s
action so that it can better support member States’ efforts to combat
the danger that fanaticism and religious extremism, but also xenophobia
and rejection of anything different, represent to our democratic
societies, the Assembly confirms its readiness to help to draw up
a comprehensive Council of Europe strategy on this subject.
3. The Assembly further considers that, in this context, the
Council of Europe should step up and make more substantial its co-operation
with the main religious communities and the main European organisations representing
the secular humanist and philosophical world. It consequently recommends
that the Committee of Ministers:
3.1. set
up a stable an officially recognised platform for dialogue between
the Council of Europe and senior representatives of religions and
non-denominational organisations in order to consolidate the existing
relations with those partners and foster active commitment by all
the stakeholders in activities to promote the Organisation’s fundamental
values, which underpin “living together”;
3.2. include this initiative amongst the Council of Europe’s
action priorities and develop it speedily in consultation with the
parties concerned, closely involving the Parliamentary Assembly
in it; invite, if appropriate, the European Union and the United
Nations Alliance of Civilizations, and possibly other partners,
to contribute to it;
3.3. link to this platform for dialogue the holding of thematic
meetings on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue, which
should be made more operational;
3.4. develop synergies between the platform and the thematic
meetings on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue with
other Council of Europe projects and initiatives in the field of
education, culture and youth, such as the “No Hate Speech Movement
– Young People for Human Rights Online”, “Education for Democratic
Citizenship and Human Rights” and “Intercultural cities”.
C. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Huseynov, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction: scope and aim of the report
1. The tragic terrorist attacks which took place on
7, 8 and 9 January 2015 in Paris, the
two deadly attacks of 14 and 15 February 2015 in Copenhagen, but also profanations
of Jewish and Catholic cemeteries in France and other violent actions
targeting religious communities, reveal in a dramatic way the need
to revert to the theme of “living together” in democratic societies.
the
two deadly attacks of 14 and 15 February 2015 in Copenhagen, but also profanations
of Jewish and Catholic cemeteries in France and other violent actions
targeting religious communities, reveal in a dramatic way the need
to revert to the theme of “living together” in democratic societies.2. Apart from being saddened and dumbfounded by these acts of
barbarism, we must ask ourselves not only if they could have been
avoided, but also what we are going to do to prevent other such
events. Asking this question does not entail seeking to attach blame,
or even holding ourselves guilty. The aim is simply to understand
the situation better, so as to take effective action.
3. Understanding does not equate with justifying. There can be
no possible justification for these acts; in particular there is
no justification linked to the (real or professed) religious faith
of the perpetrators. Killing, like profaning places of worship or
cemeteries, is in no way an act of faith, and it quite simply offends
against all religions and human reason to claim otherwise.
4. Understanding entails being capable of drawing distinctions:
the young Muslims living in certain disadvantaged sink estates,
who are disheartened and are seeking their place in the society,
must not be confused with jihadist terrorists or anti-Semitic fanatics.
5. This brings me to the heart of the theme of this report: freedom
of religion and living together in a democratic society. If a society
were perfectly homogeneous from a cultural standpoint, including
in religious matters, the question of freedom of religion would
not be problematic. It is increasingly a subject of debate precisely
because our European societies are plural and our cultural and religious
identities are becoming more and more diverse.
6. Our Assembly’s axiom is that such diversity and miscegenation
of cultures are not only unavoidable but are also a treasure. We
have asserted this repeatedly and in no uncertain terms.
7. We must stop being afraid of difference, renounce the idea
that everything would be better if others were like us, and change
our political discourse about the “identity” of the national community,
understood as being monolithic and thus a negation of the plural
nature of individual and collective identities. In short, we must
stop wanting the “assimilation” of others, and promote recognition
of diversity and the integration of all in an inclusive, plural
society. That can be done only if we manage to build a consensus
around the shared values – including interculturality – on which living together is based.
– on which living together is based.8. This report could not cover this complex issue in all its
many facets, including those which are a matter for democratic institutions
and processes, but is intended to contribute to the wider-ranging
consideration of these issues by the Parliamentary Assembly.
2. Religions and the right to freedom of religion
9. Religions are historical, social and cultural realities.
They are far from being in decline and it is important to give them
due consideration. In this section, I will take a look at a number
of (sociological and legal) elements regarding religions and the
way in which religion is protected by the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”).
2.1. Understanding religion and how strongly it is rooted in society
10. As Professor Jean-Paul Willaime has
stressed, religions provide resources in terms of identity and ethics,
and they provide meaning in the three ways in which this is understood,
for they provide:
has
stressed, religions provide resources in terms of identity and ethics,
and they provide meaning in the three ways in which this is understood,
for they provide:
- a sense of significance (the meaning of life and death, of happiness and unhappiness);
- a sense of direction (guiding behaviour);
- sensations (individual and collective ways of feeling individual and collective emotions).
11. Religious groupings, like all realities based on activism
and belief, may give rise to intolerance, even fanaticism and violence.
In these deviant forms, religions can pose a threat to democracy
and human rights. That is unacceptable, but religious phenomena
cannot be considered only in such forms or be demonised on such
grounds.
12. There are many more examples that prove that religions help
us to live together. In all of our countries, we have examples of
religious organisations encouraging people to rally together and
take concrete action to help the weakest members of society, the
deprived and those living in extreme precariousness (refugees, foreigners,
Roma, abandoned children, the homeless, people with disabilities
and the elderly…). Religious authorities are often in the forefront
in reminding people of their duty of solidarity with their fellow
citizens and in promoting fraternity among peoples. Similarly, religious
leaders often advocate changing the current economic model and demand
a more prudent management of ecological resources and in protecting
the environment.
13. Moreover, not only our committee’s report on “The religious
dimension of intercultural dialogue” but also the accounts given
by various experts we have heard remind us of the religious response
to extremism and of their commitment to cultural and religious diversity
on the ground.
remind us of the religious response
to extremism and of their commitment to cultural and religious diversity
on the ground.14. Mr Kbibech stressed that believers and humanists from all
cultures and religions have a duty to bring communities and peoples
together. Grand Rabbi Guigui pointed out that each religion must
have its identity if it is to take root in a given country, and
that the only way to prevent jihadism is to give each person an
identity. Ms Marguerite A. Peeters, referring to Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, insisted
on the urgency that “in political speeches, in education and culture,
we should highlight the things that all human beings have in common:
conscience, reason and heart”; she also highlighted that, in these
times of fragmentation, the heritage of non-Western cultures may
help to free our cultures of their individualism and to promote
a more complete human development.
insisted
on the urgency that “in political speeches, in education and culture,
we should highlight the things that all human beings have in common:
conscience, reason and heart”; she also highlighted that, in these
times of fragmentation, the heritage of non-Western cultures may
help to free our cultures of their individualism and to promote
a more complete human development.15. I would like to mention in this respect what His Holiness
Pope Francis said in his address to the Council of Europe of 25
November 2015: “The royal road to peace … is to see others not as
enemies to be opposed but as brothers and sisters to be embraced.”
16. Finally, it is essential to stress – as Professor Willaime
does – that it is wrong to want to prevent religions from giving
their opinion on subjects which are controversial (issues concerning
sexuality, gender, filiation, surrogate motherhood, medically-assisted
procreation and the risk of eugenics, the end of life and euthanasia, and
scientific research without ethical limits …). Even when the stance
they take is inconvenient, it is obvious that citizens who have
religious beliefs have the right, just like everyone else and with
the same limitations, to “freedom of expression”. When acknowledging
religions, States must also accept the possibility of disagreement,
with all due respect for constitutional order. I will come back
to this later.
2.2. The right to freedom of religion: meaning, scope and extent of protection
17. Of course, the right to freedom of religion is fundamental
to the relation between States and religious groups. Freedom of
thought, conscience and religion is protected under Article 9 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
18. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (ETS No. 9)
protects a particular aspect of freedom of religion, namely the
right of parents to ensure the education of their children in conformity
with their own religious convictions. It states that:
“… In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”
19. Our report on “The religious dimension of intercultural dialogue” includes
a detailed analysis of the place of religion in European States
and of the rules governing religious worship in Europe, and a presentation of
the case law on Article 9 of the Convention. In October 2013, the
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights published an updated
overview of the Court’s case law on freedom of religion. On this
basis, the paragraphs below highlight some key principles which
should guide our work.
includes
a detailed analysis of the place of religion in European States
and of the rules governing religious worship in Europe, and a presentation of
the case law on Article 9 of the Convention. In October 2013, the
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights published an updated
overview of the Court’s case law on freedom of religion. On this
basis, the paragraphs below highlight some key principles which
should guide our work.20. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, enshrined in
Article 9 of the Convention, is one of the foundations of a “democratic
society” within the meaning of the Convention. The term “religion”
must be considered in a non-restrictive sense: religious beliefs
cannot be restricted to the “main” religions. The freedom enshrined
in Article 9 is guaranteed equally to all religious groups and their
members.
21. In its religious dimension, this freedom is one of the most
vital elements that go into making up the identity of believers
and their conception of life. Freedom of religion entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not
to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion.
22. Article 9 has to be interpreted in the light of Article 11
of the Convention, which safeguards associations against unjustified
State interference. Seen from this perspective, the believer’s right
to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the community
will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State
intervention. Participation in the life of the
community is a particular manifestation of one’s religion, which
is in itself protected by Article 9 of the Convention.
Participation in the life of the
community is a particular manifestation of one’s religion, which
is in itself protected by Article 9 of the Convention. 23. Freedom of religion has both an internal and an external aspect.
On an “internal” level, this freedom is absolute. On an “external”
level, religious freedom also means freedom to “manifest one’s religion”
alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and
in the circle of those whose faith one shares.
24. Article 9 lists the various ways in which a religion or belief
can be manifested, namely worship, teaching, practice and observance.
On this level, the freedom in question is only relative, since public
order may be affected or even threatened. Freedom of religion does
not protect each and every act or form of behaviour motivated or
inspired by a religion or a belief. Article 9 of the Convention
protects a person’s private sphere of conscience, but not necessarily
any public conduct inspired by that conscience. Accordingly, it
does not allow general laws to be broken. However,
any interference by a State in the exercise of the right to freedom
of religion must be “necessary in a democratic society”. This means
that it must meet a “pressing social need”.
However,
any interference by a State in the exercise of the right to freedom
of religion must be “necessary in a democratic society”. This means
that it must meet a “pressing social need”. 25. In exercising its regulatory power in this sphere and in its
relations with the various religions, denominations and beliefs,
the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial; what is at
stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning
of democracy.
26. In the delicate matter of the establishment of relations between
religious communities and the State, the latter in principle enjoys
a wide margin of appreciation. The
Court determines the scope of that margin having regard to the need
to secure true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept
of a democratic society. The
Court has also held that where questions concerning the relationship
between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the
national decision-making body must be given special importance.
The
Court determines the scope of that margin having regard to the need
to secure true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept
of a democratic society. The
Court has also held that where questions concerning the relationship
between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the
national decision-making body must be given special importance. 27. Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.
12 (ETS No. 177) prohibit the State from treating differently, without
an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly
similar situations. The State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation
in assessing whether and to what extent the existing differences
justify different treatment, but the difference of treatment must
pursue a legitimate aim and satisfy the requirement of reasonable
proportionality.
28. Conversely, it follows from the case law on Article 14 that,
in some circumstances, the failure to treat differently persons
whose situations are significantly different may constitute a violation
of this provision. The Court accordingly takes
into account the distinctive features of various religions (in terms
of dogma, rituals, organisation, etc.) when those features may be
of key significance in settling the dispute before it.
The Court accordingly takes
into account the distinctive features of various religions (in terms
of dogma, rituals, organisation, etc.) when those features may be
of key significance in settling the dispute before it.29. In a democratic society in which several religions (or several
branches of the same religion) and belief systems co-exist within
the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on
freedom of religion in order to reconcile the interests of the various
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.
3. Freedom of religion and religious practices
30. Although, on the whole, the legal systems of European
States recognise various (religious and non-religious) beliefs and
offer adequate protection, as Ms Kitanović (Conference of European
Churches, CEC) told us, minority religious groups complain that
it is not really possible for them to practise their religion without discrimination.
31. Therefore it is useful to point out that, in addition to the
right to be constituted as a legal entity – which States should,
without discrimination, guarantee to every Church and religious
community – national legislation should – as the CEC asks – guarantee other very concrete
rights concerning the possibility to practise their religion freely,
including the right for a religious community to:
– guarantee other very concrete
rights concerning the possibility to practise their religion freely,
including the right for a religious community to:
- practise its faith publicly and freely, within its own self-designated houses of worship, or other places accessible to the general public, according to its own rites and customs;
- operate diaconal institutions (such as hospitals, working facilities for persons with disabilities, homes for the elderly, nursery schools, etc.) and schools (places of instruction);
- make its views known in public without being subject to censorship.
32. The accounts given by representatives of the Jewish and Muslim
faiths that we have heard also concerned de
jure or de facto restrictions
on the possibility for believers to comply with certain “religious practices”
that are considered essential to the expression of their identity
and religious beliefs. As such practices are considered constitutive
elements of religious beliefs, possible restrictions on them raise
the question of whether they may not be violations of the right
to freedom of religion.
33. Religious practices which I will consider in the present report
are those that go beyond the “private sphere” and have, at least
to some extent, a “public dimension”. This is of course the case
when the rights of persons other than the believers are at stake
and, more generally, when the religious practice is implemented in
a “public space”.
34. Circumcision is one of those practices, but there are many
others which raise questions. For example, beyond the specific problems
raised by the full-face veil, religious attire or symbols which
are worn ostensibly are frequently banned from schools and public
(or even private) services to preserve the neutrality in relation to
different beliefs and convictions. Other relevant prescriptions
are those on food; in this respect ritual slaughter is of high importance
for Jewish and Muslim communities. Religious practices which require
believers not to work on certain days may also create tensions between
employees and employers.
3.1. Circumcision
35. The practice of circumcision has been subject to
much discussion in various countries. After the adoption of Assembly Resolution 1952 (2013) on children’s right to physical integrity, some readers misinterpreted
the Assembly position, considering that it had called for a ban
on the circumcision of young boys. It is important to clarify that
this is not what the Assembly did. Instead, the Assembly called, inter alia, on Council of Europe
member States to “clearly define the medical, sanitary and other
conditions to be ensured for practices which are today widely carried
out in certain religious communities, such as the non-medically justified
circumcision of young boys” (paragraph 7.5.2).
After the adoption of Assembly Resolution 1952 (2013) on children’s right to physical integrity, some readers misinterpreted
the Assembly position, considering that it had called for a ban
on the circumcision of young boys. It is important to clarify that
this is not what the Assembly did. Instead, the Assembly called, inter alia, on Council of Europe
member States to “clearly define the medical, sanitary and other
conditions to be ensured for practices which are today widely carried
out in certain religious communities, such as the non-medically justified
circumcision of young boys” (paragraph 7.5.2).36. However, this resolution – and namely its paragraph 2 – might
raise the sensitive question of whether circumcision can be qualified
as a “violation of the physical integrity of children” or,
in other terms, if circumcision per se raises an issue of compatibility
with the right of children to their physical integrity. I believe it
would be inaccurate to conclude in this sense. As a matter of fact,
circumcision impacts on the physical integrity of children and entails
a “permanent alteration” of the child’s body (though a minor one);
however, this is not a “violation per se” of the child’s physical
integrity.
or,
in other terms, if circumcision per se raises an issue of compatibility
with the right of children to their physical integrity. I believe it
would be inaccurate to conclude in this sense. As a matter of fact,
circumcision impacts on the physical integrity of children and entails
a “permanent alteration” of the child’s body (though a minor one);
however, this is not a “violation per se” of the child’s physical
integrity.37. In this respect, it could have been misleading that Resolution 1952 (2013) mentioned circumcision in the same list which also included,
among others, female genital mutilation and early childhood medical interventions
in the case of intersex children. These are of course very different
kinds of “physical alterations” and, to my understanding, the Assembly
never intended to equate them and the circumcision of young boys.
38. There is no need to discuss here the potential sanitary benefits
of circumcision against its potential inconveniences. In European
societies, in many cases the main – if not unique – reason for circumcision
will be the religious belief of the parents. I believe it is perfectly
understandable and acceptable that parents wish to share their faith
with their children; and there is nothing wrong in their desire
that their children form part of their religious community.
39. Of course, there must be agreement on the need to protect
the child: the child’s interest shall be considered predominant.
For this reason, it is quite right that member States “regulate”
circumcision as a medical act. In this respect:
- first, circumcision shall not be allowed unless it is practised by a person with the required training and skills, and under adequate sanitary and medical conditions. This shall remain a non-negotiable borderline;
- second, I believe that parents should take “informed decisions”; this means that, whatever the importance attached to the act from a religious standpoint, parents must be duly informed of any potential medical risk or contraindications and also take them into account when deciding what is best for their child.
40. To conclude on this question, I am sure that neither responsible
religious authorities nor the communities themselves would ask parents
to harm their child. Therefore, I also believe religious authorities
themselves might wish to seek how best to reconcile religious tradition
and children’s rights, should there be specific medical reasons
which clearly opposed practising circumcision.
3.2. The full-face veil: the S.A.S. v. France judgment
41. In its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of S.A.S. v. France, the European
Court of Human Rights held that a ban on wearing clothing designed
to conceal one’s face – in the instant case the full-face veil –
in public areas in France did not breach the European Convention
on Human Rights.
the European
Court of Human Rights held that a ban on wearing clothing designed
to conceal one’s face – in the instant case the full-face veil –
in public areas in France did not breach the European Convention
on Human Rights.42. The Court found that the legal ban on concealing one’s face
constituted a “continuing interference” in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family
life) and 9 (right to respect for freedom of thought, conscience
and religion) of the Convention. However, the ban complained of
could be regarded as “proportionate”.
43. The Court dismissed the arguments of the French Government
relating to “public safety” and, as to the “protection of the rights
and freedoms of others”, the arguments relating to respect for gender
equality and for human dignity. However, for the Court, wearing
a veil that concealed one’s face in a public space could undermine
another value of an “open democratic society”: the “living together”.
44. In this connection, it indicated that the face played a significant
role in social interaction and that the possibility of open interpersonal
relationships was, by virtue of an established consensus, an indispensable element
of community life. It was able to understand the view that practices
or attitudes which might fundamentally call into question this possibility
should not be allowed to develop. The Court therefore considered
that the full-face veil represented a “barrier” that could be construed
as breaching the “right of others to live in a space of socialisation
which made living together easier”.
45. Then, the Court noted that the question whether or not it
should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places
constituted a choice of society and that there was no common ground
between the member States of the Council of Europe on this question. In these circumstances,
the respondent State has a wide margin of appreciation, and the
Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review
of Convention compliance, since such review leads it to assess a
balance struck by means of a democratic process within the society
in question. The ban complained of could therefore be regarded as
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the
conditions of “living together”.
In these circumstances,
the respondent State has a wide margin of appreciation, and the
Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review
of Convention compliance, since such review leads it to assess a
balance struck by means of a democratic process within the society
in question. The ban complained of could therefore be regarded as
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the
conditions of “living together”.46. In the framework of this report, I do not wish to adopt a
position in respect of this judgment and its possible implications.
I will confine myself to the following remark: the assertion of
the “right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes
living together easier”, although it provided a justification, in
the case under consideration, for a restriction of freedom of religion,
could also be a starting point for developing a new concept of the
State’s role in the promotion of “living together”.
47. I will add that the Court recognised the significant negative
impact of the blanket ban on the situation of women who chose to
wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs and
that many national and international human rights bodies regarded
a blanket ban as disproportionate.
48. It also underlined that a State which entered into a legislative
process of this kind took the risk of contributing to the consolidation
of stereotypes which affected certain groups of people and of encouraging
the expression of intolerance, when it had a duty, on the contrary,
to promote tolerance. The Court reiterated that remarks which constituted
a general, vehement attack on a religious or ethnic group were incompatible
with the Convention’s underlying values of tolerance, social peace
and non-discrimination and did not fall within the right to freedom
of expression that the Convention protected.
3.3. Ritual slaughter
49. In various European countries, the ritual slaughter
required by Jews and Muslims for religious reasons comes into conflict
with the principle that an animal to be slaughtered, after being
restrained, must first be stunned (i.e. plunged into a state of
unconsciousness in which it is kept until death intervenes), in
order to spare it any suffering.
50. In Switzerland, following a referendum on ritual slaughter,
the Constitution was amended in 1893 to introduce Article 25.b, which prohibits the bleeding
of animals before they are slaughtered without stunning them first.
This provision, which applies to all types of slaughter and to all
types of livestock, has forbidden ritual slaughter since 1894. Slaughter
of animals without stunning is also banned in Iceland, Norway and
Sweden.
51. Several States allow slaughter without pre-stunning, but under
specific conditions, such as “immediate” post-cut stunning. In Germany
no-stunning permissions can be granted to slaughterhouses, but only
if they demonstrate they have local religious customers. In June
2011, the lower house of the Dutch Parliament voted in favour of
banning “no-stunning” slaughter. The Jewish community strongly condemned
this decision. In June 2012, the Dutch Senate rejected the bill
and proposed, as a compromise, that a veterinarian had to be present during
slaughter and the animal should die within 40 seconds.
52. In France, the derogation is subject to a number of conditions:
ritual slaughter must take place in an authorised slaughterhouse;
the operators must have a certificate of competence in protecting
animals (CCPA) and must be authorised by an approved religious body
(the Chief Rabbinate of France where Kosher slaughter is concerned);
the animals must be immobilised by appropriate means of restraint
before their blood is let.
53. At European level, ritual slaughter is authorised by the Council
of Europe 1979 Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter
(ETS No. 102) and by the European Union Regulation 1099/2009 on
the protection of animals at the time of killing (which applies
from 1 January 2013, replacing Directive 93/119). This regulation
allows the existing slaughter methods with no stunning for religious
reasons to continue; however, national authorities can impose stricter
rules, including refusing to exempt religious slaughter from pre-stunning regulations.
54. In this context and given the wide range of possible solutions,
it is not easy to take a strong position one way or the other. Personally,
I believe that the laws in countries such as France or Germany strike
a balance between the legitimate desire to ensure that animals are
not subjected to unjustified suffering and respect for the right
to freedom of religion, which also entails the right to manifest
one’s religion by observing certain rites.
55. Apart from the fact that the right to freedom of religion
is a fundamental right, I believe that such solutions are the best
way of responding to the concern to protect animals. Some States
justify their choice – which no doubt meets the perceived need of
their citizens – by explaining that it is always possible for the
members of the religions concerned to import the meat that they
require; however, I find this argument rather strange: for those
who seek to protect animals, it should be preferable to ensure that
strict safeguards are offered (i.e. that they are established in
their legal system) rather than shifting the problem on to other
countries where ritual slaughter may be carried out without any
specific constraints with regard to the protection of animals when
they are slaughtered.
4. The place of religions in a democratic society
56. It would take too long – and would not be very useful
with regard to the aims of the report – to make a detailed analysis
of the attitude taken in the different States to other religious
practices which create tensions. For example, a whole report could
be devoted to the question of distinctive types of clothing – in
particular but not only the Islamic headscarf. One need only think
of the numerous judgments handed down by the European Court of Human
Rights (some of which have already been mentioned) or, to mention
only the case of France, of the amount of ink that flowed with regard
to the “Baby Loup case”, or
of the debates on issues such as the following: should a Muslim
mother be allowed to wear her headscarf while accompanying children
on a school outing?
or
of the debates on issues such as the following: should a Muslim
mother be allowed to wear her headscarf while accompanying children
on a school outing?57. As Mr Kbibech explained to us, the debates on “full-face veils”,
“national identity” or the “Islamisation of France,” which stigmatise
the Muslim community, may cause strong feelings of uneasiness among
young Muslims: the constant doubts as to the compatibility of their
“culture” and their “religious beliefs” with life in France pose
a challenge to their identity. As a result, even those who were
not asserting their difference in terms of their culture or in the
way they worship find themselves compelled to assert the identity
that is being imposed on them. This is a danger that we have to
consider when discussing how to counter radicalisation.
58. Tensions may differ in intensity – and they may be reduced
– also depending on the approach taken by the national authorities
concerning the principle of secularity and its implementation. Moreover,
the possible solution to several conflicts depends on the willingness
– or not – to seek reasonable accommodation. I will address these
questions in the following sections.
4.1. Towards a secularity of recognition
59. Our commitment to the principle of secularity is
unquestionable. It is a pillar of our plural democratic societies
and we must ensure that it is respected. Nevertheless, it has to
be recognised that there is no one single way of understanding and
applying secularity. As a result, these diverse understandings of
secularity have an impact on the ways in which the place and role
of religions are seen in our democracies. In this section I therefore
reiterate almost in extenso Professor
Willaime’s analysis of this issue during his exchange of views with
our committee, which I fully endorse.
60. The English language makes a clear distinction between secularity and secularism, between the secular State and the secularist State. While a State’s and its public
authorities’ secularity is a vital component of a liberal society,
secularism is an ideological position seeking to promote a secularist
order in the name of individualist values proper to it. Secularity
does not mean a secularist State, but a secular one, or, in democratic societies,
a State that is neutral and impartial towards its nationals’ religions
and beliefs; in other words a State which, as a State, professes
no particular religion or atheistic philosophy of life.
While a State’s and its public
authorities’ secularity is a vital component of a liberal society,
secularism is an ideological position seeking to promote a secularist
order in the name of individualist values proper to it. Secularity
does not mean a secularist State, but a secular one, or, in democratic societies,
a State that is neutral and impartial towards its nationals’ religions
and beliefs; in other words a State which, as a State, professes
no particular religion or atheistic philosophy of life.61. That secular State, whose secularity should extend to its
institutions and public services (and their staff), need not have
a secular society. The members of that society may opt for a very
wide range of religions and philosophies, and States may take account
in different ways of this component of civil society, making its contributions
an integral part of public life.
62. That secularity, with the State in principle adopting a neutral
position to people’s concepts of life, rests on the following three
elements:
- freedom of conscience, thought and religion, which includes the freedom to have, or not to have, a religion, freedom to change religion and freedom to practise or not to practise the chosen religion (limited solely by the need to comply with the law and to respect democracy and human rights);
- equality of rights and duties for all citizens, irrespective of their religious or philosophical identification, i.e. non-discrimination by the State and public authorities against people because of their religious or philosophical affiliations;
- the mutual independence of State and religions, meaning that not only is the State free vis-à-vis religions, but also religions are free vis-à-vis the State (subject to compliance with the law and human rights in a democracy).
63. Secularity which builds on these three principles is a common
good for all, believers and unbelievers alike. The State’s secular
neutrality also betokens equitable treatment for the different faiths.
However, the neutrality of both the State and the public authorities
is not relativistic: it is rooted in the bedrock of common values
of human rights, the rule of law, public safety and public morality.
64. Charles Taylor holds a very similar position. Speaking about
“secularism” – a term that he equates with “laïcité”
–, Taylor states that “State neutrality is to avoid favouring or
disfavouring not just religious positions, but any basic position,
religious or nonreligious”. According to Taylor, “secularism” has
to do with “the correct response of the democratic State to diversity”
and implies three requirements or goals:
Taylor also adds a fourth goal: “to try as much as possible to maintain relations of harmony and comity between supporters of different religions and Weltanschauungen” (“worldviews”). I believe this approach should pave the way for constructive policies towards “living together”.
- “no one must be forced in the domain of religion or basic belief”;
- “there must be equality between people of different faiths or basic beliefs”;
- “all spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing process of determining what the society is about (its political identity) and how it is going to realise these goals”.
65. The tragic events of 2015 in Paris and Copenhagen and those
instances of terrorism claimed to be in the name of Islam show us
that religions can be manipulated. Hence the importance of secularity
as a defence against clerical and absolutist manoeuvring that may
occur when religions want to impose their standards on their members
by force, or even to extend those standards to society as a whole.
Religions may lead to inward-looking communities, if they aim to
“confine” their members within their network, cutting them off as
far as possible from the society around them, or even conveying
to them a view of world society – or of a specific society, such
as Western society – as a diabolical reality to be shunned and combated.
66. However, in democratic countries, rather than adopting a merely
defensive concept of secularity intended to protect society from
religions, a proactive and inclusive concept of secularity should
be embraced, which can positively take into account the contributions
made by the religious components of society. Indeed, in Europe various
forms of secularity prevail which recognise religions, namely forms
of secularity which combine mutual independence for State and religions
and an explicit taking into account of religions’ place and role
in society.
67. “Secularity of recognition” particularly means the social
recognition of religious communities. Religions are socially recognised
when they are regarded as specific social and cultural realities.
There are five dimensions in which States give religions social
recognition:
- a specifically legal dimension, with special legal frameworks being offered to them for their religious activities (including, in France, religious associations and religious congregations);
- a specifically social dimension, taking account of the contributions they make in the fields of social solidarity and education;
- an ethical dimension, consulting them on issues involving concepts of the human being;
- a more political dimension when States provide for partnership and co-operation relationships with religious groupings to work towards shared objectives;
- a more symbolic dimension when States get religions involved, or more often the majority religion, to mark national unity on certain occasions (deaths, disasters, …).
68. A secularity of recognition necessarily fosters constructive
partnerships between the public authorities and religious communities
as well as the willingness, in the context of such partnerships,
to seek reasoned and reasonable solutions to the tensions that such
opposing demands can create; solutions which would therefore help
us to live together in harmony.
4.2. The concept of reasonable accommodation: the possibility of applying it in the domain of freedom of religion
69. When discussing member States’ duties in relation
to the effective guarantee of the right to freedom of religion,
“reasonable accommodation” constitutes an interesting concept. This
concept first emerged in the United States and Canada in equality
law as a means of handling religious diversity. It was then applied
to other grounds of discrimination, primarily to disability.
This
concept first emerged in the United States and Canada in equality
law as a means of handling religious diversity. It was then applied
to other grounds of discrimination, primarily to disability. 70. This concept holds that measures need to be taken in order
to ensure effective equality and full enjoyment of rights. It is
applied not to groups or categories of individuals, but on a case-by-case
basis to individuals who are specifically and personally affected
by regulations or measures which prevent the full enjoyment of their
rights. Therefore, the objective is not to exclude the general application
of the law, but to remove the barriers faced by persons in a situation
of discrimination.
71. The duty of reasonable accommodation is generally accepted
by Council of Europe member States when it applies to disability,
as a corollary of the prohibition of indirect discrimination, but
very few recognise this duty in other areas. It should, however,
be noted that the accommodation principle is applied in many member
States of the Council of Europe in practice, regarding flexible
working hours and leave for religious holidays in the field of employment
or regarding dietary requirements.
72. In the case of Glor v. Switzerland, the Court, without
expressly mentioning this duty as such, stated that Article 14 of
the Convention “does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which
are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different
factual circumstances and which, being based on the public interest,
strike a fair balance between the protection of the interests of
the community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded
by the Convention”. The Court then noted that “special forms of
civilian service tailored to the needs of people in the applicant’s
situation are perfectly envisageable” and found a violation of Article
14 because of the Swiss authorities’ failure “to strike a fair balance
between the protection of the interests of the community and respect
for the Convention rights and freedoms of the applicant”.
the Court, without
expressly mentioning this duty as such, stated that Article 14 of
the Convention “does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which
are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different
factual circumstances and which, being based on the public interest,
strike a fair balance between the protection of the interests of
the community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded
by the Convention”. The Court then noted that “special forms of
civilian service tailored to the needs of people in the applicant’s
situation are perfectly envisageable” and found a violation of Article
14 because of the Swiss authorities’ failure “to strike a fair balance
between the protection of the interests of the community and respect
for the Convention rights and freedoms of the applicant”.73. As regards dietary requirements, the Court recently found
a violation of Article 9 because the prison authorities had refused
to provide the applicant with a vegetarian diet as required by his
Buddhist convictions, referring in particular to “a positive duty
on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the
applicant’s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Convention”.
74. In the case Eweida and Others v.
the United Kingdom, the applicants maintained
that the right to freedom of religion also entails a duty of reasonable
accommodation. Again, the Court did not formally recognise the concept,
but established general principles which, at least implicitly, result
in a duty of reasonable accommodation for employers with regard
to the religious beliefs of their employees.
the applicants maintained
that the right to freedom of religion also entails a duty of reasonable
accommodation. Again, the Court did not formally recognise the concept,
but established general principles which, at least implicitly, result
in a duty of reasonable accommodation for employers with regard
to the religious beliefs of their employees.75. In particular, in the case of Ms Eweida, a British Airways
employee who had been prevented by her employer from remaining in
her post while visibly wearing a cross, the Court ruled that the
British court had accorded too much weight to the employer’s corporate
image at the expense of the applicant’s wish to manifest her religion
and, therefore, that the criterion of proportionality had not been
met in the case under consideration.
76. Conversely, in the case of the second applicant, Ms Chaplin,
a geriatric nurse in a State hospital who had also been requested
to remove her cross while on duty, the Court considered that the
reason for asking her to remove the cross, namely the protection
of health and safety on a hospital ward, was inherently more important
than a corporate image and found that there had been no violation
of Article 9 of the Convention.
77. In the cases of Ms Ladele and of Mr McFarlane, who had been
dismissed for refusing to carry out certain duties which they considered
would condone homosexuality, the
Court dismissed the applicants’ claim that they be afforded reasonable
accommodation, considering that the right to freedom of religion
could not justify impairment of other fundamental rights such as
the right not to be discriminated against.
the
Court dismissed the applicants’ claim that they be afforded reasonable
accommodation, considering that the right to freedom of religion
could not justify impairment of other fundamental rights such as
the right not to be discriminated against.78. Based on this case law, it seems that the concept of reasonable
accommodation can be used as a sort of corollary of the principle
of non-discrimination; it helps courts to analyse a concrete situation
and to verify whether, with a view to the effective implementation
of this principle, it is necessary to adopt specific solutions in
respect of the subjects concerned, taking account of the various
interests at stake. One might see this as a sort of “justice for
specific cases” but with the potential to be extended to similar
cases. I would welcome such a development, namely a wise use of
the principle of reasonable accommodation by the judiciary to correct indirect
discrimination which could originate from regulations imposing disproportionate
burdens on members of religious communities.
79. Heiner Bielefeldt, United
Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, speaks
about “diversity-friendly equality” and argues that the purpose
of the principle of reasonable accommodation is “to overcome the
indirectly discriminatory implications of those societal or legal
norms that stem from the dominant religious traditions of a country
and to create more suitable conditions for members of minorities,
who should be able to live in accordance with their convictions”.
Within this framework, the “reasonableness” criterion implies the
seriousness of the claims and is there to avoid their “inflation”,
and “accommodations” contribute to achieving “equality” in different
societal contexts.
United
Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, speaks
about “diversity-friendly equality” and argues that the purpose
of the principle of reasonable accommodation is “to overcome the
indirectly discriminatory implications of those societal or legal
norms that stem from the dominant religious traditions of a country
and to create more suitable conditions for members of minorities,
who should be able to live in accordance with their convictions”.
Within this framework, the “reasonableness” criterion implies the
seriousness of the claims and is there to avoid their “inflation”,
and “accommodations” contribute to achieving “equality” in different
societal contexts.80. On this basis, I would like to suggest, in addition to the
legal one, a more political approach: instead of giving the court
the monopoly of seeking fair solutions, I believe that it is for
political decision-makers to take constructive initiatives in this
field and to provide guidance on how to facilitate living together
by means of reciprocal efforts of accommodation. This does not concern
exclusively believers: the principle of reasonable accommodation,
for example in the workplace, can be of value for non-religious
employees and shall be applicable to them.
81. I would also stress the need for reciprocity: it is not a
case of religious communities asking on the one hand and the State
responding on the other. The accounts we have heard also show that
religious communities are prepared to fit into the legal framework
of the host country; and are also prepared to meet with other communities:
extremists and fanatics are the exception rather than the rule.
5. Conclusions
82. Living together in harmony is based on shared principles
and values. Where the Council of Europe is concerned, these principles
and values can be summarised as:
- a profound belief in human dignity which takes the form of respect for fundamental rights as recognised and protected by our democratic constitutions and by the European Convention on Human Rights;
- observation of democratic principles and the rule of law, which takes the form of acknowledgment of diversity and respect for the principle of non-discrimination between the different groups that make up our plural societies.
83. These principles and values, which are the product of our
History, are non-negotiable and it is our common responsibility
– whatever religious or non-religious worldviews we may embrace
– not only to respect, but also to preserve and promote them. In
this connection, there is no question of accepting “relativism”. Unconditioned
and resilient commitment towards effective guarantee of the fundamental
rights of every person, steady respect of democratic principles
and firm adherence to the rule of law are the benchmarks which apply to
all members of the State community. Nevertheless, that does not
mean that there is only one way of implementing our common principles
and values in different contexts. This “contextualisation” is not
intended to undermine them but to make them dynamic and vibrant.
84. Deep down inside, we are each free to choose how we see the
world and to choose our faith; in our relational life, this freedom
goes hand in hand with the freedom of others. The right to freedom
of religion of some cannot be imposed on others. Nevertheless, that
does not mean that public areas should be seen as areas in which
there should be no religion: that would be tantamount to imposing
a new State religion on everyone. It is more a question of “making
room” for encounters between various visions of the world. That
is how I understand a secularity of recognition. Our role should
be to build societies where all our fellow citizens, whatever their
religion or cultural identity, live together with mutual respect
and understanding.
85. In all our countries, albeit to differing degrees, encounters
with “others”, with those who are different, generate a social malaise;
and mixing, notably as a result of immigration, is regarded by some
people as synonymous with a decline in living conditions and is
linked to all the problems: growing crime (trafficking, prostitution,
violence, theft, vandalism) and insecurity in urban areas; unemployment;
welfare system deficits and so on.
86. More generally, some people consider cultural and religious
diversity as a threat of loss of what people term national identity,
which seems to be understood most often as an immutable identity
that is held sacred. As a result, many of our fellow citizens de facto come to desire the isolation
and exclusion of members of communities characterised by such cultural
and religious diversity, and even their elimination from social space.
87. Grand Rabbi Guigui told us that “the beauty and wealth of
our society lie in its diversity” and that not only must we not
be afraid of differences but we have a “right to difference”. This
means to me not only the right to be different and be accepted,
but also the right to benefit from the difference of others that
can enrich us.
88. The wide range of cultural and religious references creates
tensions. That is not a reason for wishing to have societies where
there is no diversity and for ghettoising everything that is different.
Such tension can be resolved by dialogue and real determination
to build society together. We must therefore foster encounters and partnerships.
89. As His Holiness Pope Francis told us: “This calls for mutual
engagement in a far-ranging reflection aimed at creating a sort
of new ‘agora’, in which all civic and religious groups can enter
into free exchange, while respecting the separation of sectors and
the diversity of positions, an exchange inspired purely by the desire of
truth and the advancement of the common good.”
90. We need to really get to know each other in order to join
our strengths and build together social justice through responsive
and inclusive policies. The prerequisite for this is mutual understanding
and respect. Many factors are influential in the formation of the
individual personality. Each family and each cultural and religious community
has the responsibility and the duty to support the development of
open-minded individuals, capable of critical thinking and of constructive
dialogue with others; without their commitment we can hardly build
up a pluralist but cohesive, democratic society.
91. Moreover, media in general and Internet in particular have
a great influence in today’s global information society. In the
virtual agora, young people meet and develop peer-to-peer relationships
which are crucial in the process of structuring their personalities
and identities; but these encounters can also channel messages which
deconstruct solidarity and instil fear and even hate of others.
It is therefore crucial to fight against intolerance on the web
and use the Internet to promote mutual recognition and respect.
This issue falls outside the scope of the present report, but I
would like to pay tribute to the Council of Europe project “No Hate
Speech Movement – Campaign of Young People for Human rights Online”.
92. The role of education and the presence of religion in schools
are sensitive issues. At the risk of provoking a debate, I believe
that we are not doing enough to teach about religion or to encourage
encounters between religions in schools.
93. What would happen if, instead of removing all religious symbols
from schools, we tried to explain them to one another? What would
happen if instead of interpreting the presence of such symbols as
a violation of our personal identity, we learned to interpret them
as what people have to tell us about who they are? It is not the
symbol in itself that is dangerous but the attitude we take when
we wear it or reject it. We need to work on those attitudes and
this can be done by fostering encounters and dialogue. A secularity
of recognition perhaps requires more effort from States in this
respect.
94. As political decision-makers, we are duty-bound to ensure
that:
- the principles of democracy are upheld not just formally, but also in the deepest sense, thereby giving everyone a say in the process that determines our societies’ choices;
- in this context, democratic principles are not used to justify a tendency towards “majoritarianism”, which too often tends to ignore the needs and expectations of those in the “minority” or, worse, gives them the impression that they do not belong, that they do not have the same right to exist as those in the “majority”.
95. To conclude, I believe that the Council of Europe should play
a more active role in the promotion of the “living together”. We
have already put forward concrete proposals to the Committee of
Ministers, inter alia in our Recommendation 1962 (2011) on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue
and our Recommendation
1975 (2011) “Living together in 21st-century Europe: follow-up to
the report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe”.
Some of these proposals can be found again in the draft resolution and
draft recommendation contained in the present report.