1. Introduction
1. On 4 July 2014, I signed and
tabled, with 19 other members of the Parliamentary Assembly, a motion for
a resolution noting that “Europe has engaged more and more in co-operation
with … transit countries, aiming to reduce the number of arrivals
in Europe. As a result, some transit countries have increasingly
fenced their borders, preventing migrants from entering Europe.
This development does not always go hand in hand with an improved
access to protection and basic rights for migrants and refugees.”
The motion then called on the Assembly to “share its experience
on migration and asylum with those countries by examining the migration and
asylum challenges they are facing and offering assistance in dealing
with these challenges”. On 23 March 2015, the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons decided that the current report should also
address the issues raised in the motion on “The implementation of
the Hirsi judgment: have push backs come to an end?”.
2. On a superficial level, the concept of 'country of transit'
indicates only that a migrant has passed through a particular country
in the course of his/her journey from country of origin to eventual
country of destination. It ignores the reasons for leaving the country
of origin, the length of time spent by or behaviour of the migrant
in the 'country of transit' and the reasons for leaving it. Unless
elaborated further and located in a broader conceptual framework,
it is weak and unreliable as a basis for policy. To be effective,
migration policy must be seen in a global perspective: all of the
countries from, through and to which a migrant may travel must co-operate
and co-ordinate their actions, with the support and assistance of
the international community; and policies must focus on the situation
of individuals who decide to migrate (further). Merely to designate
a country as being 'of transit' and expect it unilaterally to block
all irregular entry and exit whilst at the same time respecting
international norms of respect for migrants' rights is an approach
that is doomed to failure, as painful experience has shown.
2. Definitions and scope of
the report
2.1. Description of the different
phenomena potentially covered by the term “transit migration’
3. Transit migration, starting
on an individual level, can be examined from four angles:
- First, the intentions of the
migrant. Did he/she, at the time of leaving the country of origin a, intend to pass through country b before arriving at a predetermined
country c; did the intention
to continue to country c only
arise after a period of time spent in country b;
was an original intention to proceed to country c accompanied by concrete plans
and directed efforts, or was it more vaguely aspirational, the principal
aim being to leave country a?
- Second, the length of time spent in country b. The United Nations Population
Division suggests that a stay of 3 to 12 months can be categorised
as “temporary immigration” and one of more than 12 months as “immigration”.
Anything more than a practical minimum stay of a few days but less
than 3 months could thus be considered “transit migration”. That
said, these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary; a more useful definition
would also take into account, for example, the migrant’s actions
during their stay in country b.
- This leads to the third consideration, which is to ask
to what extent a migrant interacts socially and economically with
or even integrates in country b.
From this perspective, even a relatively longer time spent in country b could be viewed as transit migration
if the migrant spends it in hiding or in activities directed solely
at preparing for onwards movement; equally, a shorter time during
which clear efforts are made towards integration, following which
some change in circumstances forces a further move, could be seen
as “temporary immigration”.
- Fourth, one might also examine the “push” and “pull” factors
that influence a migrant’s passage through country b: it may be the only legal escape
route from country a; the
migrant may be obliged to work or otherwise raise funds in country b in order to pay for passage to
country c; onward migration
to country c may be motivated
by the presence of family members there; the legal (especially the
availability of protection), security or socio-economic situation
may influence an intention to stay in country b;
border controls at the intended country of destination, lack of
documentation; lack of financial resources, in particular to pay
smugglers.
4. For the purposes of this report, the above analysis implies
that a superficial examination of a migrant’s movements over time,
without considering also his evolving circumstances and subjective
state of mind, is not enough to permit his classification as a transit
migrant or not. This in turn has consequences for categorisation of
movement as “transit migration” and of a particular country as being
(primarily) a “country of transit”. From a practical perspective,
a destination country may see another as being a “transit country”
because migrants have passed through it, whereas in fact these form
only a part, perhaps the minority, of migrants entering that country.
5. Furthermore, the expression “country of transit” can have
a strong resonance in political discourse. On the one hand, it may
be used in a pejorative sense in destination countries, implying
that the country in question is failing properly to control its
borders and is thus problematic, without properly recognising the
geopolitical reasons for the migrants' presence there. On the other,
a country may describe itself as a “country of transit” as a signal
that it does not welcome immigration and even as cover for policies
and practices that make migrants' continued stay unviable and their
onwards movement inevitable; if they are unable to leave, the country
may attribute their presence to the prospective destination country's
restrictive border controls and be reluctant to discharge fully
its responsibilities towards them. Neither approach is helpful in
finding constructive, sustainable solutions respectful of migrants'
fundamental rights.
6. One can also usefully distinguish between different types
of “transit countries’: those that are “stage posts” along the way,
and those that are the final “stepping stone” into the European
Union. Consistent with the original motion, which emphasises the
aspect of “externalisation” of the European Union’s border control to
neighbouring States through which migrants pass on their way to
Europe, the present report focuses on examples of the second category.
Nevertheless, it is significant that the European Union’s efforts
to control migration now look further afield, especially also to
countries of origin.
If
human rights are to have a central position in this co-operation, I
believe this “triangular” approach to be fundamental to any long-term
solution.
7. It should also be recalled that transit migration is not synonymous
with irregular migration. Most legs of a migrant’s journey are regular;
it is often only the final step into Europe that is irregular. Ever-stricter
EU border controls also mean that what may initially have been intended
as “transit” migration in practice becomes extended, even semi-permanent
immigration.
During this time, the migrants' clandestine
status and resulting lack of protection leaves him in a situation
of socio-economic exclusion, lacking legal protections and vulnerable
to discrimination, exploitation, he will be forced into the hands
of migrant smugglers, exposing him to further risks of violence
and abuse, as well as often extremely perilous means of transport.
2.2. Implications for the scope
of the report
8. All this is not to say that
the concepts of “transit migration” and “country of transit” have
no validity or usefulness, but rather that the more nuanced approach
outlined above allows for a better understanding of the circumstances
of individual migrants, the nature of specific migration flows and
the situation in particular countries. I will therefore take this
approach in examining two 'countries of transit' in particular,
namely Turkey (a member State of the Council of Europe) and Morocco
(a 'partner for democracy' of the Parliamentary Assembly);
and,
more briefly, Libya as the most extreme illustration of the consequences
of complete failure of migration management.
9. Both Turkey and Morocco, although often labelled as countries
of emigration and transit, have been confronted with large numbers
of migrants and refugees entering their countries in order to reach
the European Union. The Syrian crisis and severe hardship and persecution
in other neighbouring countries especially have increased these
numbers. The European Union intensified its co-operation with these
countries with the aim of controlling this immigration to its member
States. Partly due to this co-operation, Turkey and Morocco have increasingly
become countries of destination themselves. Especially In the case
of Turkey, a large part of the refugees initially do not intend
to travel onward, and its economic development also attracts increasing
levels of migrant labour. It would be reductive to conceive either
as only a country of transit, and delusional to pretend that more-or-less
permanent immigration is not a significant reality for both. Nevertheless,
persistent human rights concerns towards migrants and refugees in
these countries need to be addressed and tackled. Libya, on the
other hand, has unfortunately experienced change in entirely the
opposite direction: from a country of (mainly labour) immigration
to one also experiencing very high levels of effectively uncontrolled
transit migration.
3. Routes and countries of
transit for migrants to Europe
10. The European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) defines the main
migratory routes into the European Union in 2014 as follows:
i. Central Mediterranean route – a
total of 170 664 illegal border crossings;
ii. Eastern Mediterranean route – 50 834;
iii. Western Balkans route – 43 357;
iv. The “circular route” from Albania to Greece (almost entirely
irregular labour migration) – 8 841;
v. Western Mediterranean route (by land to Ceuta and Melilla
and by sea to mainland Spain) – 7 842;
vi. Eastern borders route – 1 275 (Frontex notes that abuse
of legal channels is more common than illegal border crossing);
vii. The Black Sea route – 433;
viii. Western African route (to the Canary Islands) – 276.
11. Bearing in mind the broad definition of “transit country”
in paragraph 6 above, one can conclude that a large number of Council
of Europe and neighbouring States experience transit migration;
the most notable would seem to be:
- Morocco, Libya, Serbia, Kosovo* ,
Albania, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey and Ukraine,
as “stepping stones” (from an EU perspective);
- Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland,
as countries of entry to and transit within the European Union;
- One could also mention EU countries such as France, through
which migrants travel en route to the United Kingdom, and Austria,
in a similar situation with respect to Germany.
It
is worth observing that there are countries of transit both inside
and outside the European Union, a point that is often overlooked
in the EU-centric policy debate: for family, cultural and economic
reasons, the intended destination is often not 'the European Union'
as a monolithic whole but a particular member State. Two factors in
particular distinguish the two situations: the relevant legal framework
in most EU countries is strongly harmonised under the Common European
Asylum System; and there is little if any control of the European Union's
internal borders, at least so far as the Schengen countries are
concerned, whereas control of the European Union's external borders
is extremely strict. As noted above, the present report will focus
on the situation in “stepping stone” countries of transit, in particular
Turkey, Morocco and Libya. Besides the large numbers of migrants
and refugees they deal with, the first two countries are interesting
because of their far-reaching co-operation with the European Union
on migration. Assessing the impact of this co-operation enables
me to make recommendations to the European Union. Libya is one of
the main countries of departure to the European Union and struggles
with a vacuum of State authority, which requires a different approach
by the European Union. In both cases, however, the human rights
of migrants and refugees should be the central concern.
4. Challenges faced by countries
of transit
4.1. Domestic challenges
12. It has been said that “by containing
rather than resolving migration pressures, Morocco has been transformed
from a place of transit
en route to
Europe to a “reluctant host” of a grounded [irregular] migrant population”.
The political attitudes and
public perceptions that reflect such reluctance go hand-in-hand.
It is therefore important that opinion-shapers, especially amongst
politicians and the media, act responsibly by presenting an accurate,
fair and balanced view of migration and migrant communities and
above all by not indulging in scaremongering, stigmatisation or
hate speech. Such attitudes should be reflected in a positive, realistic
legal and policy framework that ensures legal status, protection
and access to basic rights such as health care, employment, education
and training and family reunification, and thereby provides stability,
dignity and a basis for integration. In this respect, I would like
to compare the situations in Turkey and Morocco.
13. The Turkish Government's attitude to migration and international
protection has evolved significantly in recent years, this being
typified by two developments: the introduction in 2014 of a new
“Law on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP) and the
response to the arrival of huge numbers of Syrian refugees. Although
not yet fully implemented, including in important areas like capacity-building
and regulation of issues such as access to education and the labour
market, the LFIP effectively satisfies international protection standards
and for the first time establishes a modern, comprehensive legal
framework, accompanied by a new, dedicated administrative body,
the Directorate-General for Migration Management. Developed in close
co-operation with international organisations such as the UNHCR
and the IOM and national civil society organisations, the new law
reflects Turkey's acknowledgement that migration policy is not an
unwelcome imposition by a purely self-interested European Union
seeking only to externalise its border control, but a matter of
national self-interest; furthermore, it expresses recognition that
effective, sustainable migration policies must involve respect and
protection of migrants' basic human rights. As a result, Turkey
and the European Union are now acting as partners in a win-win situation,
regardless of outstanding issues in other areas such as EU visa
liberalisation, readmission agreements or the wider accession negotiations.
What is more, Turkey hosts almost 2 million refugees; without the
LFIP’s protection and the huge expenditure by public authorities,
many of these would undoubtedly have sought to enter the European
Union.
14. As for Morocco, the King’s September 2013 announcement, following
a report by the
Conseil national des
droits de l’Homme (CNDH),
shows
acceptance at the highest levels of the need for a comprehensive, coherent
and “humanist” migration and asylum policy. Incorporation of international
norms on migrants’ rights into an expected raft of new legislation,
along with measures such as regularisation of refugees and irregular migrants,
have the potential to produce significant improvements in the situation
of migrants and popular and official attitudes towards them, and
to make Morocco an example of good practice for other countries
in the region. Many steps still need to be taken, however, in order
to effectively implement a migration and integration policy which
ensures the right to protection, freedom of movement and access
to basic needs, the labour market and education. On the other hand,
my meetings with Moroccan officials revealed a continuing tendency to
blame Europe’s strict border controls for the presence of (especially
irregular) migrants in Morocco. Whilst from a practical perspective
it is true that these controls prevent certain migrants from leaving
Morocco, this attitude overlooks the push factors that lead them
to leave their countries of origin and seems to imply that migrants
in Morocco whose stay there was intended to be transitory should
be granted entry into Europe. Whilst European countries do have
certain moral and legal duties towards migrants, such an approach
ignores concrete realities, distracts attention from the plight
of individual migrants and complicates the search for political
agreement on co-operative solutions. If Morocco can come to appreciate
that immigration is now a fact of its national life, reflecting
its geographical, economic and political situation, even greater
progress could be made to the benefit of all concerned.
15. It is also worth recalling the size of the migrant populations
in these two countries. Turkey (2012 population: 74 million
)
currently hosts almost 2 million refugees and asylum seekers, of
whom around 1.7 million are Syrian;
in 2011, it hosted
over 240 000 foreign nationals with residence permits, with almost 17
000 work permits issued that year, and reported over 42 000 irregular
migrants (illegal entrants and overstayers).
Morocco
(2012 population: 32.5 million) hosts some 4 000 refugees and asylum
seekers, of whom almost 1 300 are Syrian,
along
with almost 78 000 foreign residence-permit holders;
in
2014, the government estimated that there were up to 30 000 irregular
migrants, of whom over 27 000 applied for regularisation under the
exceptional procedure, with almost 18 000 being accepted.
16. At the other end of the spectrum, the situation of Libya (2012
population: 6.2 million) illustrates the consequences of a lack
of effective institutional and legal frameworks. “Before the crisis,
the most quoted figure was that of 600 000 regular
plus between 750 000 and 1.2 million
irregular foreign workers living in Libya … As of 28 March 2011,
IOM estimated the total number of foreign nationals living in Libya
before the crisis at 2.5 million … According to IOM estimates, during
the 2011 crisis, 768 372 migrants fled violence in Libya ... Despite Libya
being, first and foremost, a country of immigration, the deterioration
of immigrants’ conditions in the country has also made it an important
country for transit migration and particularly for the many migrants
trying to reach Malta and the Italian Isle of Lampedusa.”
The
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) notes that even
“members of well-established communities living permanently in Libya,
such as Palestinians and Iraqis, are increasingly considering leaving
the country given the dire security situation and ongoing abuses”.
17. Recent events have underlined the need for Europe and the
European Union to maintain and where necessary enhance their political
and material support to countries of transit. In 2014, the Central Mediterranean
Route was by far the most frequented passage for irregular migration
to Europe (see paragraph 10 above). By mid-2015, despite record
numbers of arrivals as compared to the same period in 2014, it has been
massively overtaken by the Eastern Mediterranean Route: as at 14
August, there had been 158 356 arrivals in Greece from Turkey, as
compared to approximately 104 000 to Italy and 94 to Malta.
Around
two thirds of the arrivals in Greece are Syrians.
Most do not intend to stay in
Greece, which, as refugees and migrants continue their journeys
north, has placed strain also on countries such as “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, Serbia, Hungary and Austria.
I
therefore strongly support the Assembly’s initiatives to encourage
other European countries to furnish far greater assistance and support
to Turkey and other third countries in their efforts to provide
protection and assistance to Syrian refugees.
4.2. Regional challenges: co-operation
on migration management with neighbouring countries, including countries
of origin
18. Implementation of policies
intended to “externalise” EU border control has consequences for
relations between transit countries and countries of origin. Turkey,
for instance, has long had a liberal visa regime with a wide range
of countries, but this is now being put in question by the European
Union’s requirement that Turkey harmonise its visa policy with that
of the European Union as a precondition for EU visa liberalisation. This
may in turn have consequences for Turkey’s relations with those
countries whose citizens had enjoyed visa-free travel to Turkey.
As for Morocco, it has been suggested that its “relationship with
the European Union has helped weaken potential co-operation with
sending countries”.
19. For countries of transit, effective migration policies require
co-operation not only with countries of destination, in particular
the European Union, but also regional co-operation with both other
countries of transit – in the case of Morocco, around 90% of irregular
migrants, including Syrian refugees, enter from Algeria, sub-Saharans
having crossed the Sahara via Niger
–
and countries of origin (in the case of Morocco, notably those in
sub-Saharan Africa).
20. In this connection, the Euro-African dialogue on migration
and development (“Rabat Process”), which brings together the European
Union, its member States and a swathe of States across north, west
and central Africa, is of interest. Established in 2006, the Rabat
Process has involved a number of ministerial conferences, thematic
meetings and meetings of high-level officials. Whilst it may so
far have produced few concrete results, its importance lies above
all in its being an established, recognised forum and a foundation
for future regional co-operation, something that did not previously
exist.
Morocco’s willingness to engage also in
bilateral co-operation is shown, for example, in the recent announcement
by the Secretary General of the official
Conseil de
la communauté marocaine à l’étranger that Morocco was
ready to extend to African States the benefits of its experience
in migration policies.
Morocco
is also developing its trade and diplomatic links with its southern neighbours:
for example, during my visit, King Mohammed VI was concluding a
“tour” of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast and Gabon; whilst
the focus was on trade and development agreements, it must be recalled
that progress in these fields would address many of the most significant
push factors generating migration to (and through) Morocco.
21. The Parliamentary Assembly has been active in promoting inter-parliamentary
dialogue, notably through the Sub-Committee on co-operation with
non-European countries of origin, of the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons. In March 2015, this sub-committee held a
conference on “North-South Migration Dialogue” in Lagos, Portugal,
with participation of parliamentarians from,
inter
alia, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. In October
2014, it held a seminar on “The new migration policy of Morocco
and European experience: new challenges in the integration policies
and practices”, intended to “discuss how parliamentarians, experts,
NGO activists, from Africa and Europe can work together to transform
the various and complex challenges posed by migration, regular or
irregular, into positive economic and social opportunities that
would ultimately benefit both the country of residence and the country
of origin”.
4.3. Compliance with international
protection standards, including the 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees
22. The European Union’s agreements
with transit countries on border control or readmission require
high levels of human rights protection in the latter. After all,
if migrants are confronted with human rights violations in these
transit countries or are prevented from access to protection as
a result of these agreements, the European Union is responsible
as well. In practice, however, even where international instruments
such as the 1951 Refugee Convention have been ratified, they are
not always implemented. For example, until the expected new legislation
is adopted and implemented, Morocco will still have “yet to adopt
national refugee legislation and establish asylum procedures consistent
with international standards”, and only since the establishment
of an ad hoc commission in September 2013 have refugees whose status
was determined by the UNHCR been recognised and protected by the
authorities.
Elsewhere
the situation is worse: for example, Algeria has no asylum law or
refugee status determination authority
and Libya has
not ratified the 1951 Convention.
23. Turkey has a “geographical limitation” to its application
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, such that only refugees originating
from “Europe” (in practice, other member States of the Council of
Europe) are recognised as Convention refugees. The Law on Foreigners
and International Protection in principle provides analogous protection
to refugees from other countries, with separate statuses for Syrians
and all other non-European nationalities.
In
practice, however, due to the enormous number of Syrian refugees
on Turkish territory, which exerts great pressure on the Turkish
system, asylum seekers of other nationalities are left in a situation
of precarity and uncertainty that may influence their decision either
to remain in Turkey or to attempt to enter the European Union.
24. Similar concerns also relate to non-ratification or ineffective
implementation of other international instruments.
25. In such cases, conclusion of readmission agreements between
the European Union and these countries would create the possibility
of migrants with protection needs being sent from the European Union
to countries that do not provide adequate legal guarantees that
those needs will effectively be met. Readmission agreements can
also lead to measures being taken by transit countries in order
to prevent refugees from entering their country from another member
State, which in the end may result in refugees being prevented from
fleeing their country of persecution. Readmission agreements also
result in measures being taken by transit countries to prevent migrants
from entering the European Union. Strengthened border controls by
EU member States and transit countries can thus lead to migrants
becoming stranded there, without access to an effective asylum procedure.
5. Co-operation between European
countries and countries of transit
5.1. Instruments of co-operation
on border control, readmission and visas
26. The European Union’s relations
with many of its neighbouring States now include agreements on enhancing
those States’ own border controls as a means of reducing subsequent
pressure on the European Union’s external borders. This is apparent
in the prominent references to migration management and border control
in the European Commission’s progress reports on implementation
of the European Neighbourhood Policy in relevant States, including,
for example, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.
27. In the case of Morocco, relations with the European Union
are since June 2013 governed by a “Mobility Partnership”, amongst
the objectives of which are “to combat illegal immigration, networks
involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and to
promote an effective return and readmission policy while respecting
fundamental rights, the relevant legislation and ensuring the dignity
of the people concerned”.
These
should be seen in the context of wider EU negotiations with Morocco,
including those towards a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area”
launched in March 2013.
28. This and the various other Mobility Partnerships form part
of the European Union’s “Global Approach on Migration and Mobility”
(GAMM), which consists of four pillars: organising and facilitating
legal migration and mobility; preventing and reducing irregular
migration and trafficking in human beings; promoting international protection
and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy; and maximising
the development impact of migration and mobility.
29. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights
of migrants has criticised the GAMM for “lack[ing] transparency
and clarity in the substantive contents of its multiple and complex
elements. Additionally, many agreements reached in the framework
of the Approach have weak standing within international law and
generally lack monitoring and accountability measures, which allow
for power imbalances between countries and for the politics of the
day to determine implementation. Nonetheless, the European Union
has continued to use the Approach to promote greater 'security'.
There are few signs that mobility partnerships have resulted in
additional human rights or development benefits, as projects have
unclear specifications and outcomes. The overall focus on security
and the lack of policy coherence within the Approach as a whole
creates a risk that any benefits arising from human rights and development
projects will be overshadowed by the secondary effects of more security-focused
policies”.
The
attention given to improvement of human rights seems to be on a
more ad hoc basis, whilst co-operation on border controls is more
structural and receives significantly more funding.
30. The European Commission’s recent “European Agenda on Migration’
proposes “immediate action to intervene
upstream in regions of origin and transit”. This includes increasing
support to countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees; setting
up a centre in Niger (which is on the main migratory route from
West to North Africa) to provide information, local protection and
resettlement opportunities for those in need; and making migration
part of existing Common Defence and Security Policy missions in
countries such as Niger and Mali. Other measures proposed in the
Agenda would also concern countries of transit, including the proposed
actions against criminal migrant-smuggling networks and trafficking,
and resettlement of refugees from outside the European Union. Whilst
maintaining an emphasis on securing the European Union’s external borders,
the Agenda also recognises the need for a better EU policy on legal
migration and to promote development in countries of origin.
31. Readmission agreements, extending also to third-country nationals,
are an important goal in the European Union’s relations with transit
countries. The European Commission, in its 2011 evaluation of readmission
agreements, recommended reconsidering the policy of including third
countries in the (negotiations on) readmission agreements with transit
countries, partly because of human rights concerns.
Nevertheless,
in June 2014, Commissioner Malmström, welcomed ratification by the
Turkish Parliament of the EU–Turkey readmission agreement, stating
that it “reflects our shared interest for a more effective migration and
border management”. The press release accompanying the statement
explained the importance of the agreement to the EU–Turkey visa
liberalisation dialogue.
Visa liberalisation is seen as politically
important also by Turkey, especially as its economic development
leads to increasing numbers of Turkish citizens travelling (as opposed
to migrating) to Europe. Readmission and visa facilitation agreements
are also linked in ongoing negotiations under the “Mobility Partnership”
between the European Union and Morocco,
although the
Moroccan authorities appear averse to concluding any readmission
agreements extending to third-country nationals and in any case
do not seem to attach the same importance to visa liberalisation.
5.2. Financial and technical
assistance to “countries of transit’
32. The European Union’s co-operation
and assistance activities with third countries are complex and multiple.
It is beyond the scope of the present report, and in any case unnecessary
to its conclusions, to conduct an exhaustive review of these activities,
so what follows are selected examples.
33. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is currently responsible
for an 18-month, €1 million project with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia
that aims to promote the participation of the three countries in
its work and that of Frontex. It does this by familiarising the
competent authorities with the mandate, tools and instruments of
the agencies, including co-operation models developed with EU member
States. Frontex promotes the concept of “integrated border management”
and the comprehensive approaches to the management of mixed migratory
flows and in particular on the inter-agency co-operation aspects
with Tunisia and Morocco, while EASO promotes the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS) and shares EU member States’ best practices,
including on reception facilities.
34. Frontex also plays other roles in the process. For example,
it has signed a “working arrangement” (or memorandum of understanding)
with the competent authorities of Turkey by which they agree to
co-operate in a number of areas. These include, amongst other things,
exchange of experience and best practice in the field of border
control; border management-related activities; joint projects to
enhance collective capacity to fight against illegal/irregular migration;
promoting improvement of the technical and organisational co-operation between
competent border-management authorities; and developing co-operation
in the field of Frontex co-ordinated joint return activities, including
the active facilitation and participation of the competent Turkish authorities,
which may be financed by Frontex on a case-by-case basis.
35. Such activities take place in the context of very large financial
commitments by the European Union. For instance, the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (which amongst other things finances
the aforementioned EASO project with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia)
over the years 2007-2013 involved average annual commitments of
€204 million in the case of Morocco, €110 million in the case of Tunisia,
€52 million in the case of Algeria and almost €12 million in the
case of Libya.
Such levels of support have
continued: in the case of Morocco, for example, the “Single Support
Framework” for Morocco covering the period 2014-2017 includes an
indicative allocation of up to €890 million.
36. The European Union is, of course, not the only international
organisation whose co-operation with transit countries can improve
the situation of migrants there. In Morocco, for example, in addition
to its role in refugee status determination (see above) and protection
and humanitarian assistance activities, the UNHCR also engages in
capacity-building, technical assistance and expertise activities
with the Moroccan authorities and contributes to the social integration
of refugees.
It
is also involved in capacity-building activities in Turkey connected
to implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.
The IOM is similarly active
in both countries.
5.3. Consequences for transit
countries
37. The European Union’s aim of
“externalising” border control, set in the political context of
the importance to transit countries of trade relations with and
financial transfers from the European Union, is highly influential on
their migration policies. Morocco has even been described as “merely
a servant of policies that are imposed from external actors. Through
the measures implemented in Europe that either slightly or severely
limit the freedom of movement of people, Morocco is almost regarded
as the
gendarme of Europe’s
borders in the southern Mediterranean”. Thus, “[t]hrough a combination
of political pressure and financial assistance, the EU has effectively
outsourced much of its border management to Morocco”.
Another example might be Ukraine: following
the European Union’s 2004 eastern enlargement, Human Rights Watch
argued that “given the strategic, political and economic importance
… of its relationship with the European Union, the government in Kyiv
ha[d] a clear interest in cooperating with the European Union on
the management of migration and asylum flows on the European Union’s
terms”.
38. The situation is not, however, always straightforward, and
transit countries, as independent sovereign States, ultimately retain
freedom of action. For example, in 2012, Moroccan Foreign Minister
Saâdeddine El Othmani stated that Morocco would not be the “
gendarme of the European Union”.
According
to Hein de Haas, “Morocco’s increasingly independent policy course
became evident in the major immigration policy reform that was announced
in 2013”.
It
has been argued that “previous Moroccan migration policy has been interpreted
as a reactive response to European Union pressure to control migration
to Europe. It is difficult to interpret the regularisation in the
same way. Given the majority [of migrants interviewed] declared
an interest in reaching Europe, regular status may facilitate that.
The regularisation is not therefore in the obvious interests of
European States wishing to reduce immigration from Morocco”. According
to this argument, the policy instead reflects recent changes in
Morocco’s geopolitical orientation, including strengthening relations
with sub-Saharan African countries, and as being much more proactive
than in previous years.
39. Nevertheless, given the European Union's formal institutional
commitment to human rights protection, including in its external
relations, co-operation between the European Union and countries
of transit has great potential to ensure enhanced protection of
migrants’ rights. In Morocco, for example, I was told by the European
Union delegation of its willingness and the availability of resources
to support implementation of the expected new legislation on migration,
asylum and the fight against human trafficking; the European Union recognises
the importance of the human rights aspects and hopes to see the
new legislation become an example of best practice for the region.
I can only welcome and encourage this attitude.
40. If co-operation focuses mainly on border controls, however,
it creates the risk that it actually provokes further human rights
breaches, since refugees cannot flee the transit country, even when
unable to find protection and safety there. In order to avoid this
effect, a certain standard of human rights for migrants and refugees
should be a precondition for starting or intensifying the co-operation
on border controls. The European Convention on Human Rights and
the Refugee Convention should be the framework of reference in this
regard.
5.4. Consequences for migrants
41. In the negotiations between
the European Union and transit countries, the negotiating parties
look after their own interests, but the migrant’s interests are
not properly considered or taken care of. Concerns have been expressed
in relation to the human rights consequences of the various agreements
and co-operation activities between the European Union and its member
States on the one hand and non-EU transit countries on the other.
For example, in 2014, the International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), having “repeatedly
expressed their concerns about the ‘mobility partnership’ signed
by the EU and Tunisia”, argued that “implementation of such agreement
is particularly worrying in the current Tunisian transitional context
where key institutions and legislative instruments needed to guarantee
the respect of the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers
are still lacking. The wording of the joint declaration … makes
it clear that these rights are not a priority in the ‘partnership’.”
42. Similarly, in its analysis of the EU–Morocco mobility partnership,
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) expressed its
“fears that actions to combat irregular migration immigration will
be prioritised and implemented at the expense of other themes included
in the Partnership and, more worryingly, at the expense of the rights
of migrants and refugees”.
(The EMHRN also expressed disapproval
of the “donor/ beneficiary logic governing the Partnership and the
European Union’s use of a ‘bargaining chip’, by which European economic
aid and visa facilitation are conditioned on Morocco’s ability to
effectively control migration flows”.)
43. Stricter control of the European Union’s external borders
forces migrants to spend longer in the transit country. “As border
controls have tightened and as hostility towards migrants has risen
in both transit and destination countries, irregular migrants stuck
indefinitely in Saharan migration hubs have experienced difficult living
and working conditions.”
This can be
compounded by administrative complications, notably the lack of documentation.
For example, “the
carte de sejour,
which is a residency permit required from all foreigners living in
Morocco, serves as the basis of regularisation for employment, residency
and access to services such as healthcare; without it, a migrant
is marginalised in virtually every aspect of their daily lives.
This results in acute invisibility and vulnerability for the majority
of sub-Saharan migrants”, with no possibility of recourse to police protection
against theft or physical violence, no access to official channels
of complaint concerning abuse, exploitation or discrimination in
relation to accommodation or employment, and restrictions on freedom
of movement.
It
is to be hoped that the new policy and legislation will change all
this.
44. As Moroccan migration policy has evolved, in particular since
2013, so has the use of violence by public officials against irregular
migrants become less recurrent, especially when compared with the
situation 10 years ago;
this was confirmed to me by the UNHCR.
There remains room for improvement, however, as shown by the events
of February-March 2015, when some 1 200 migrants, including 14 identified
as asylum seekers by the UNHCR, were arrested in the vicinity of
Melilla and subsequently transferred to and arbitrarily detained
in southern cities, purportedly in order to protect women and children
against traffickers. (The NGOs I met felt that the real reason was
to maintain the 'buffer zone' around Melilla.) By 6 March, all detainees appeared
to have been released with no reported
refoulements or
deportations.
Nevertheless,
these arrests and detentions were in clear violation of the migrants’
fundamental rights to liberty and security and of access to justice,
and there have been detailed accounts of threats and use of violence
by officials.
A key element in
the implementation of the new migration policy, therefore, will
be training and awareness raising to ensure a complete end to the
use by public officials of excessive force against migrants and
the possibility for NGOs to monitor the acts and behaviour of public
officials towards migrants.
45. One can see in the case of Libya how the absence of a functioning
legal framework or effective institutions with which external actors
could co-operate makes migration management impossible and exposes migrants
to great danger. UNSMIL has reported that “Against the backdrop
of political crisis, armed hostilities, the absence of national
asylum legislation and the breakdown of law and order, migrants,
asylum seekers and refugees in Libya are at risk of abuses including
detention in horrific conditions; torture; abduction for ransom; exploitation;
and killings. Smugglers and traffickers, who are thriving in the
context of lawlessness, are responsible for many such abuses. Women
migrants are especially vulnerable to sexual violence and sexual exploitation…
The deteriorating security situation, coupled with limited access
to neighbouring countries by land, has compelled unprecedented numbers
of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to undertake dangerous
and frequently deadly journeys across the Mediterranean Sea in unseaworthy
boats”.
Despite these
enormous problems, efforts are being made to address the situation,
with the UNHCR and the IOM having recently set up a forum to improve
Libya’s response to boats in distress off its coast, intended to
boost capacity in search and rescue, collection of bodies at sea
and humanitarian care for rescued persons on disembarkation.
I welcome the European
Union’s financial support to this initiative. On the other hand,
I am very worried that actions intended to combat smuggling by destroying
boats in the Libyan waters, can lead to refugees not being able
to leave Libya, despite their desperate circumstances. It would
be more appropriate to support refugees in finding a place of safety
in Europe by legal means.
6. Push-backs following the
Hirsi judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
6.1. The Hirsi judgment
46. In the case of
Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy,
the applicants, migrants
attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Italy, were
intercepted in international waters by vessels of the Italian navy
and taken to Tripoli. The European Court of Human Rights found that
since the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive
control of the Italian authorities, they fell within Italy’s jurisdiction
under the European Convention on Human Rights. Italy’s return of
the migrants to Libya without any assessment of individual protection
needs thus amounted to collective expulsion in violation of Article
4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (ETS No. 46); given reception
conditions in Libya and the insufficiency of guarantees protecting
the migrants against the risk of arbitrary
refoulement to
their countries of origin, return also amounted to a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention; and the lack of an effective remedy
against these violations in turn violated Article 13.
6.2. Developments since Hirsi
47. By the time the Grand Chamber
delivered its judgment in Hirsi,
the Italian authorities had already ceased the practice of direct
return to Libya of migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean. This
was apparent in the Mare Nostrum operation,
which involved search and rescue by Italian naval ships and aeroplanes
in coastal waters and international waters up to the coastal waters
of Libya, with rescued migrants being brought back to Italian territory.
48. That said, on 8 October 2012, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the rights of migrants expressed concern about ongoing bilateral
co-operation based on a 2012
processo
verbale between Italy and Libya, stating that “there
appears to be a strong focus on strengthening the capacities of
the Libyan authorities to intercept migrants hoping to reach Europe,
on both their territory and in their territorial waters, and return
them to Libya. In this context, I warn EU member States against
a progressive ‘externalisation’ of border control. In particular,
considering the ongoing difficulties of the Libyan authorities and
the reports of human rights abuses against migrants on Libyan territory,
this migration co-operation with Libya should not lead to any migrant
being returned to Libyan shores against their will, either by Italian
coast guards or
Guardia di Finanza,
or by Libyan coast guards with the technical or logistical support
of their Italian counterparts”. The Special Rapporteur, recalling
the Court’s judgment in
M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece, was also critical of the Italian authorities’ practice
of preventing irregular migrants from disembarking from vessels
arriving from Greece, thus forcing them to return to Greece with
no formal processing during which migrants could have the opportunity
to raise protection issues including claims for asylum. “Italy should
formally prohibit the practice of informal automatic ‘push-backs’
to Greece.”
49. Despite the
Hirsi judgment,
reports suggest that the practice of push-backs continues in other
Council of Europe member States. For example:
- concerning Bulgaria: in 2014 Human Rights Watch reported
having “heard detailed accounts of 44 pushback incidents from 41
people. The pushback incidents involved at least 519 people in which Bulgarian
border police apprehended people on Bulgarian soil and summarily
returned them to Turkey without proper procedures and with no opportunity
to lodge asylum claims, often using excessive force. Many of those
interviewed about being summarily returned said that Bulgarian guards
beat or otherwise mistreated them. These incidents had occurred
following the Bulgarian authorities’ implementation of a “containment
plan” in response to an increase in the number of asylum applicants,
many fleeing the conflict in Syria; Human Rights Watch noted that
the operation was “supplemented by a contingent of guest guards
from other EU member States through the European Union’s external
border control agency, Frontex”. During
my visit to Turkey, however, I heard conflicting accounts of whether
or not such push-backs occurred.
- concerning Greece: in 2014, Amnesty International reported
that “the sheer volume of credible allegations of push-backs that
Amnesty International was able to record in a few short weeks of
research in Greece and Turkey over the last months strongly suggests
that they are routine across both the land and sea borders”, adding
that “the persistent denial of the scale of this dangerous and rights-violating practice
by the Greek authorities is allowing it to continue”. These allegations
were echoed during my visit to Turkey. There have again been suggestions
of a possible Frontex dimension to this situation.
- concerning “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”:
in 2015, Amnesty International reported that “rather than make a
formal application for their return to Greece, Border Police appear
to be routinely pushing refugees and migrants back over the border,
without any safeguards. They rarely provide any opportunity for
refugees to apply for asylum … Refugees and migrants who succeed
in crossing Macedonia undetected may be pushed back to Greece even
when they reach the border with Serbia”.
- concerning Serbia: in 2015, Amnesty International reported
that “[s]tatements from refugees and migrants contain a level of
detail and consistency which suggests that push-backs by Serbian
Border Police are routine, and that border officials consistently
fail to examine the individual situation of each person arriving
on their territory or offer the opportunity to register their intent
to claim asylum. In some cases, push-backs are accompanied by ill-treatment”.
- concerning Spain (Melilla): the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, earlier this year reported receiving
“consistent information on push-backs, in some cases accompanied by
excessive use of force, carried out by the Spanish border police
(Guardia Civil)”. The
Commissioner has also expressed concern at an amendment to the Spanish
Aliens Act “aimed at legalising push-backs of migrants arriving
in Ceuta and Melilla”, which “falls short of providing clear guarantees
against refoulement and collective
expulsions”.
50. The references to the possibility of push-backs taking place
in the context of Frontex operations is a source of concern. The
Assembly has already observed that there were “many human rights
implications attached to [Frontex’s] work and that it was ill-equipped
to tackle them. This was particularly the case when intercepting
irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees at borders or at
sea, and also during return operations involving irregular migrants
and rejected asylum seekers”.
Whilst the Assembly’s report had also referred
to an EU Fundamental Rights Agency finding that “the risk of informal
push backs of third country nationals to Turkey decreased with the
deployment of Frontex operations in Greece”,
the more recent reports concerning
Bulgaria and Greece may imply a need for further scrutiny. Furthermore,
the actions that Frontex undertakes in non-EU third countries require
extra attention to their human rights impact, especially the risk that
refugees do not reach the EU territory without being granted effective
protection in that third country.
51. Finally, I would note that I was unable to proceed with a
planned fact-finding visit to Melilla and Madrid (Spain), as it
proved impossible, over the course of several months, to obtain
the agreement of the Spanish delegation to the proposed dates. As
a result, I have been unable to conduct a more detailed assessment
of the issues of push-backs in and around Melilla, of co-operation
with the Moroccan authorities, and of the above-mentioned Spanish
legislation, which merited more extensive exploration in this report.
I would call on the Spanish delegation, as any other, to ensure
that it co-operates effectively in the organisation of working visits by
Assembly members, in order to ensure the transparency necessary
to making progress on human rights in our member States.