1. Introduction
1. The basis for the Parliamentary
Assembly’s monitoring procedure is
Resolution 1115 (1997) on the setting up of an Assembly committee on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by member states of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee) (as modified by
Resolution 1431 (2005),
Resolution
1515 (2006),
Resolution
1698 (2009),
Resolution
1710 (2010),
Resolution
1936 (2013) and
Resolution
2018 (2014)). This resolution defines the mandate of the Monitoring
Committee and entrusts it with the task of ensuring “the fulfilment
of the obligations assumed by member States under the terms of the
Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, ‘the Convention’) and all other Council of
Europe conventions to which they are parties” as well as ensuring
the “honouring of commitments entered into by the authorities of
member States upon their accession to the Council of Europe”.
2. In accordance with
Resolution
1115 (1997), as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to
report to the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress
of the monitoring procedures. In line with established practice,
the committee entrusted me, as its Chairperson, with the task of
being the rapporteur on the committee’s activities.
3. The progress in the monitoring procedure for the countries
that are subject to a monitoring procedure of the Assembly or engaged
in a post-monitoring dialogue will be discussed in the next section
of this report. Following customary practice I have limited myself
to the findings in the relevant texts adopted by the Assembly as
well as the reports, statements and other public documents prepared
by the co-rapporteurs for the respective countries. In addition,
where appropriate, I have made reference to the reports of the ad
hoc committees for the observation of the elections in the countries
in question.
4. In
Resolution 2018
(2014) on the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure,
the Assembly resolved to introduce a periodic review for the now
34
countries
that are not subject to a monitoring procedure
sensu stricto, or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue, with regard to the honouring of their membership obligations
to the Council of Europe. It was agreed that each year a number
of countries would be subjected to such a periodic review and their
reports included in the progress report of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure
for that year. In line with
Resolution
2018 (2014), the working methods for the implementation of these
periodic reviews were adopted by the Monitoring Committee at its
meeting on 17 March 2015. I will outline these working methods,
in summary, at the end of part one of this report
5. During the period covered by this report, the committee adopted
periodic reviews in respect of Andorra, Belgium, Croatia and Cyprus.
These periodic reviews are contained in part two of this progress
report.
2. Overview of the committee’s
activities
2.1. General remarks
6. At the start of the period
covered in this report, ten countries
remained
under the monitoring procedure
sensu
stricto and an additional four countries
were
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue. However, on 27 January 2015,
the Assembly adopted
Resolution
2030 (2015) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Montenegro,
in which it resolved to close the monitoring procedure and to move
to a post-monitoring dialogue with that country. In addition, on
23 April 2015, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2052 (2015) on the post-monitoring dialogue with Monaco in which
it resolved to end the post-monitoring dialogue with Monaco in view
of the progress made with regard to the honouring of its obligations
to the Council of Europe. As a result, there are currently nine
countries under the monitoring procedure and four countries engaged
in a post-monitoring dialogue.
7. It should be noted that, following the reform of the monitoring
procedure in 2013, a time limit was established by which a post-monitoring
procedure for a given country will be closed by the Assembly if
the country fails to honour its remaining commitments within a maximum
of two reports – each adopted within the statutory period of three
years – after the opening of the post-monitoring dialogue. In such
a case, the country will automatically return to the full monitoring
procedure.
In addition,
in view of the importance of the post-monitoring dialogue, the Assembly
resolved to ask the Monitoring Committee to appoint two co-rapporteurs
– instead of a single rapporteur – for each country under a post-monitoring
dialogue. This brings the procedure into line with that used for
the monitoring procedure in
sensu stricto.
In line with the agreed transitional provisions, the second rapporteur
for countries engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue was appointed
during the second 2015 part-session of the Assembly, or when the
term of the sitting rapporteur expired, or when a report on the
post-monitoring dialogue for that country was debated in the Assembly,
whichever of these events occurred first. Following the expiry of
the transitional provisions in June 2015, two rapporteurs had been appointed
for all the counties engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue.
8. During the reporting period, two full reports and draft resolutions,
on Albania and Montenegro, were produced and debated by the Assembly.
In addition, two reports on the functioning of democratic institutions, with
regard to Georgia and Azerbaijan, were debated in the Assembly,
as well as a report on the post-monitoring dialogue with Monaco.
9. The illegal annexation of Crimea and military intervention
in eastern Ukraine by the Russian Federation has continued to be
an important item in the work of the committee. On 26 January 2015,
the Monitoring Committee was seized, in line with the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly, for report on the “Challenge, on substantive grounds,
of the still unratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian
Federation”.
The report was debated by the Assembly
on 28 January 2015 and
Resolution
2034 (2015) was adopted. Subsequently, in line with this resolution,
the committee presented a report on the “Consideration of the annulment
of the previously ratified credentials of the delegation of the
Russian Federation (follow-up to paragraph 16 of
Resolution 2034 (2015))”,
which was debated in the Assembly
on 24 June 2015 and resulted in the adoption of
Resolution 2063 (2015).
10. During the reporting period, the respective co-rapporteurs
carried out fact-finding visits to Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova (two visits), Monaco
(two visits), Montenegro (two visits), the Russian Federation, Serbia,
Turkey and Ukraine (three visits). In addition, the respective co-rapporteurs
participated in the pre-electoral and election observation missions
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey and Ukraine.
11. The co-rapporteurs produced information notes on Georgia,
the Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Turkey and Ukraine, which were
declassified by the committee, as well as declarations and statements
with regard to developments in Armenia (two statements), Azerbaijan
(three statements), Bulgaria, Georgia (three statements), the Republic
of Moldova, the Russian Federation (two statements), “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (two statements), Turkey (three
statements) and Ukraine (three statements).
12. In addition to the committee meetings, the Ad hoc Sub-Committee
on Russia’s neighbourhood policy with regard to other Council of
Europe member States met twice, in Berlin and Paris. Following the
presentation of its findings, the ad hoc sub-committee was disbanded
in January 2015. Given the importance of the ongoing conflicts over
South Ossetia and Abkhazia; Nagorno Karabakh and seven provinces,
Transnistria and northern Cyprus, and based on the experience of,
and on recommendation of, the ad hoc Sub-Committee on Russia’s neighbourhood
policy with regard to other Council of Europe member States, the
Monitoring Committee decided, in April 2015, to establish an Ad
hoc Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe member States.
This ad hoc sub-committee held its first meeting in Paris on 27 May
2015 and will meet for the second time on 21 September 2015 in Vienna,
at the invitation of the Austrian Parliament.
13. With regard to the request to open a monitoring procedure
in respect of France, on 3 September 2015 the committee adopted
an opinion presented by the two co-rapporteurs in which it recommends
not to open a monitoring procedure in respect of this country.
14. On 14 November 2014, the committee held an exchange of views
with Mr Laurent Nouvion, Speaker of the National Council of Monaco,
and Mr Jacques Rit, Chairperson of the Special Committee on modification
of the law on the organisation and functioning of the National Council,
on the ongoing developments with regard to the implementation of
Monaco’s remaining accession commitments. On 28 May 2015, the committee
held an exchange of views with Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, Special
Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and
in the Trilateral Contact Group on the implementation of the “Package
of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” with
regard to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Also on 28 May 2015,
the committee held an exchange of views with Sir Nicolas Bratza,
Chair of the International Advisory Panel on Ukraine, on the report
of the Advisory Panel on the review of the Maidan investigations.
15. In response to the political crisis that ensued after the
parliamentary elections in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,
the Monitoring Committee decided to send a committee delegation
to the country composed of the rapporteur in respect of that country,
the Chair of the committee and the Chair of the Socialist Group
in the Assembly. The visit took place from 28 to 29 April 2015.
16. In the framework of the periodic review of the honouring of
the membership obligations to the Council of Europe by the 34
countries
that are not subject to a monitoring procedure
strictu sensu, or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue with the Assembly, four reports were prepared in respect
of Andorra, Belgium, Croatia and Cyprus. They are presented in Parts
2, 3, 4 and 5 of this progress report.
2.2. Overview of monitoring in
the reporting period with regard to countries under a monitoring procedure
sensu stricto.
2.2.1. Albania
17. On 2 October 2014, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2019
(2014) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania.
The co-rapporteurs visited Albania on 29 and 30 June 2015.
18. In
Resolution 2019
(2014), the Assembly welcomed the progress made by Albania
in honouring its obligations and commitments to the Council of Europe,
but regretted the delays and negative effects of the continuing
tense and polarised political climate in the country. In this respect,
it welcomed the changes to the electoral code and parliamentary
reforms agreed on between the ruling majority and opposition, but emphasised
that democratic elections and co-operation between the majority
and opposition cannot be ensured by legislation alone, but also
need a culture of co-operation and respect for democratic values
by all concerned. Following their visit to Tirana in June 2015,
the co-rapporteurs welcomed the December 2014 agreement that was
brokered by the European Parliament and that led to the return of
the opposition to parliament. All political forces should now continue
their mutual co-operation to implement these agreements, which are
of key importance for the political stability of the country.
19. A non-partisan and impartial civil serve is crucial for the
functioning of democratic institutions. The politicisation, at all
levels, of the civil service in Albania remains of concern. In that
respect, the Law on Civil Service should now be implemented, without
delay, both according to its letter as well as its spirit.
20. A far-reaching territorial-administrative reform has been
implemented by the authorities, leading to a substantial reduction
in local government units, which was a long-standing recommendation
of, inter alia, the Assembly.
These reforms culminated in the local elections that were conducted
on 12 June 2015. According to international observers, these elections
respected fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression, but serious
shortcomings were still encountered. These shortcomings need now
to be promptly addressed by all political stakeholders. The territorial
administrative reform and local elections have laid a sound basis
for the decentralisation and strengthening of self-government in
Albania. However, it is now essential that local authorities are
given clear and concrete powers and functions of self-government,
as well as the necessary means to implement them properly.
21. The persistent and widespread corruption at many levels of
Albanian society continues to undermine the country’s political
and socio-economic development and remains a major point of concern.
While welcoming the priority given by the government to fighting
corruption, it is important that the many policy papers and strategies
are now effectively and coherently implemented by the authorities.
Concrete results in terms of effective prosecutions and convictions
are still largely lacking and increased efforts must be made to
clearly demonstrate that there is no impunity for corruption at
any level within the government, the police, the judiciary or the
prosecution service.
22. The independence and impartiality of the judiciary continues
to be of concern and the justice system continues to suffer from
political pressure and interference. In that respect, it is to be
welcomed that the reform of the justice system is a stated priority
for the Albanian authorities. The reform of the justice system,
including of the prosecution service, should be made on a consensual
and inclusive basis and in full respect of the fundamental principle
of the independence of the judiciary. To this extent, all political
forces should participate fully in the work of the ad hoc parliamentary
committee on judicial reform set up by the Albanian Parliament.
2.2.2. Armenia
23. The co-rapporteurs visited
Armenia from 9 to 12 June 2015. The ongoing constitutional reform,
which currently dominates the political agenda in Armenia, was a
key item on the agenda for this visit.
24. In June 2013, President Sargsyan established a Specialised
Commission on Constitutional Reform with the aim of “improving of
constitutional mechanisms to ensure fundamental human rights and
freedoms, guaranteeing full balance of power and raising the efficiency
of public administration”. While a number of public consultations
were organised with the assistance of the international community,
the political opposition forces, for a large part, decided not to
participate in the consultations on the concept for constitutional
reform. Nevertheless, the Specialised Commission presented its concept
paper for constitutional reform in June 2014. The Venice Commission
adopted its, generally positive, opinion on this concept at its
October 2014 plenary session.
25. A crucial feature of the concept paper is the proposal to
move from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government.
This is opposed by a considerable part of the political opposition
in the country, which allege that the main objective of this change
of system is to perpetuate the power of the current President. For their
part, the authorities argue that, until recently, most of these
opposition parties had been proponents of a change to a parliamentary
system, while at the same time President Sargsyan has publicly declared
that he will not stand for the post of Prime Minister.
26. It is essential for the democratic consolidation of the country
that the constitutional reform process is inclusive and aimed at
the strengthening of political pluralism and accountability of the
government towards the National Assembly. In view of the diverging
views on the political system for the country, as well as the need to
strengthen trust in the political structures of the country, it
is to be welcomed that the constitutional amendments will be adopted
on the basis of a national referendum. A fully democratic referendum
process, based on a comprehensive public debate on the constitutional
changes, is crucial for the democratic legitimacy of the new Constitution,
The authorities should ensure that such public consultations and
public debate is organised before the referendum takes place.
27. While the introduction of a parliamentary system of government
and a fully proportional electoral system are dominating the public
debate on constitutional reform, the constitutional amendments also
aim to strengthen human rights protection mechanisms and the independence
of the judiciary. This, as well as the fact that the constitutional
reform process is conducted in close consultation with the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe, should be commended.
28. In June 2015, an increase in energy costs led to protests
in Yerevan. These protests were broken up by the police, allegedly
with excessive use of force, including against journalists. While
all persons detained were later released, the allegations of excessive
use of force should be investigated by the authorities. In this respect,
the co-operation between protesters and police which led to a de-escalation
of tensions during subsequent protest rallies against energy price
increases should be welcomed.
2.2.3. Azerbaijan
29. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country from 2 to 3 March 2015. On 23 June 2015, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2062
(2015) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan.
30. The institutional structure of Azerbaijan grants very strong
powers to the President, who has no constitutional limit to his
terms of office, and results in a parliament with limited competences.
Opposition forces are not represented in the parliament and the
authorities are therefore encouraged to develop a political environment
that favours political pluralism and strengthens parliamentary oversight
of the executive. In that context, it is regrettable that some of
the most important recommendations of the Venice Commission with regard
to the electoral code have not yet been implemented.
31. Despite a number of welcome reforms of the justice system,
the judiciary in Azerbaijan lacks independence and continues to
be subjected to undue influence by the executive. Administration
of justice, including dubiously motivated criminal prosecutions
and disproportionate sentences, is a serious point of concern. The
criminal prosecution of NGO leaders, journalists, their lawyers
and others who express critical opinions of the government, as reported
by, inter alia, the Council
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, is alarming. The resumption
of the Joint Working Group on Human Rights Issues, with the participation
of Council of Europe experts, should be welcomed in this respect.
32. The systematic repression of human rights defenders and those
critical of the government, as well as reprisals against independent
media and journalists in Azerbaijan, should be condemned and brought
to an immediate halt.
33. A number of reforms of State programmes, including the establishment
of the network of public service centres, called ASAN centres, have
resulted in a decrease in levels of corruption, which is to be welcomed. The
authority’s efforts to increase transparency and fight corruption,
terrorist financing and money laundering, should be supported. At
the same time, it is important to ensure a proper balance between
the fight against terrorism and organised crime on the one hand
and the fundamental rights of freedom of association and expression,
as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, on the
other.
2.2.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
34. No visits of the co-rapporteurs
to the country took place in the reporting period, but the co-rapporteurs participated, ex officio, in the work of the ad
hoc Committee of the Assembly to observe the general elections in
Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12 October 2014.
35. As a result of the Dayton Constitution, elections in Bosnia
and Herzegovina are excessively complex, with elections for the
State Presidency and the State House of Representatives taking place
at the same time as, in Republika Serbska, the elections for the
President and Parliament for that entity, as well as in the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the cantons and Federation House of
Representatives.
36. The legal framework for elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina
continues to place unacceptable ethnicity-based restrictions on
the right to vote and stand as a candidate. The general measures
to remedy this situation demanded by the European Court of Human
Rights in its decision on the Sejdić
and Finci case have regrettably not been implemented
by the Bosnian authorities. As a result, the 2014 General elections
were not conducted in line with European standards.
37. The ad hoc committee that observed these elections
noted that, aside from the already
mentioned ethnicity-based restrictions on passive and active voting
rights, the legal framework is generally conducive to democratic
elections. The elections were competitive but overshadowed by the
interethnic divide.
38. Regrettably, the ad hoc committee noted an ever-growing public
mistrust in the functioning of democratic institutions, which is
undermining the stability and compromises the future of the country.
This is of serious concern and should be addressed as a priority
by all political forces in the country.
2.2.5. Georgia
39. On 1 October 2014, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2015
(2014) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Georgia.
Subsequently, the co-rapporteurs visited the country from 3 to 5
December 2014.
40. Regrettably, despite some improvement, the political environment
in Georgia remains polarised. Following the controversial dismissal
of the Minister of Defence, and Free Democrats leader, Irakli Alasania, by
Prime Minister Garibashvil, the Free Democrats left the governing
coalition. This event followed a period of mounting tensions within
the governing coalition between Georgian Dream and its junior coalition
partners. The former independent group in the Georgian Parliament
joined the government coalition, assuring its continued governing
majority.
41. The strengthening of democratic institutions and establishment
of a genuinely independent judiciary are the stated priorities of
the Georgian authorities, which is to be warmly welcomed. A special
State Commission for Constitutional Reform was established in 2013,
in which both majority and opposition participate, but reportedly
it has not yet achieved any concrete results. A pivotal component
of these reforms is the planned electoral reform that recently gained
new impetus. It should be noted that the current variations in the
size of the single-mandate electoral districts violate the principle
of the equality of the vote. It is therefore essential that the
electoral reform is concluded well in time before the 2016 parliamentary
elections take place, if they are going to be held in line with
European standards for democratic elections.
42. A number of comprehensive reforms of the justice system have
been implemented with a view to increasing the efficiency of the
administration of justice and the independence of the judiciary.
Notwithstanding these reforms, the independence of the judiciary,
and especially of the prosecution service, remains a point of concern.
Further reforms are necessary. Despite a marked reduction of its
use, the excessive use of pretrial detention remains a point of
concern in Georgia. It should be emphasised that pretrial detention
should only be used as a measure of last resort, when there is a
clear risk of absconding, interference in the course of justice or
a serious risk that the person will commit a serious offence or
pose a threat to public order.
43. On 9 December 2014, the OSCE/ODIHR published its monitoring
report on the trial of 14 former high- level government officials
with regard to its compliance with international standards. While
this report explicitly did not wish to comment on the merits of
the indictments or convictions against these persons, the monitoring report
noted a number of systemic deficiencies in the court proceedings
that resulted in the respect for a fair trial not having been fully
guaranteed in these cases.
44. The issue of the systematic illegal surveillance of citizens
by the Georgian security and law-enforcement agencies remained topical
and of concern. On 28 November 2014, after protracted political
debates, the parliament finally adopted a law regulating the access
of security and law-enforcement agencies to the telecommunications
networks and telecommunication providers’ databases. This law is
criticised by civil society and opposition parties, as well as by
the junior governing partner “the Republican Party”, for failing
to provide adequate guarantees to prevent unlawful access by the
law-enforcement and security agencies to the telecommunication networks.
45. The increased use of intolerant public discourse and discriminatory
acts against minorities, especially sexual and religious minorities,
is of concern. In this respect, the adoption on 2 May 2014 of the
Law on all forms of discrimination, which significantly enhances
the legal framework for the protection of individuals from discriminatory
acts, is to be strongly welcomed.
46. The Russian Federation signed agreements on “alliance and
integration” with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
These agreements amount to a creeping annexation of these regions
by the Russian Federation. This act of the Russian Federation was
strongly condemned by the Assembly and its Monitoring Committee.
47. Following recommendations by, inter
alia, the Assembly, the authorities adopted the strategy
for the repatriation of the deported Meskhetian population. It is
important that this strategy be accompanied by a realistic action
plan to ensure its implementation. The Charter for European Regional
or Minority Languages (ETS No. 148) has not yet been signed and
ratified by Georgia, despite this being an accession agreement of the
country.
2.2.6. Republic of Moldova
48. The co-rapporteurs visited
the Republic of Moldova from 23 to 26 September 2014 and from 13
to 16 May 2015. In addition, they participated, ex officio, in the work of the ad
hoc committee to observe the parliamentary elections on 30 November
2014.
49. The ad hoc committee of the Assembly that observed the parliamentary
elections considered that the elections were generally well organised
with voters expressing their will freely and being able to choose
from among a wide range of alternatives. However, a number of shortcomings
remain, including in the legal framework, which sets a very high
threshold for parties and blocs to enter the parliament. Lack of
transparency of party and campaign financing and media ownership,
as well as the uneven distribution of polling stations abroad, are
issues of concern in this respect. The participation of foreign
experts and interests as well as allegations of parties being funded
from abroad characterised these elections, which took place in a challenging
geopolitical context for the country. Four days before the elections
took place, the Central Election Commission deregistered the Parti
Patria – which is reportedly close to Russia and allegedly financed
by it – for campaign financing violations. Some questions can be
raised with regard to the timing of this decision.
50. Following the elections, a minority government was formed
between the pro-European Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova and
the Democratic Party of Moldova with the support of the Party of
Communist of the Republic of Moldova. On 12 June 2015, Prime Minister
Gaburici resigned over allegations that he had forged his high school
diploma. Following the local elections that took place on 14 and
28 June 2015, the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova and the Democratic
Party of Moldova entered into negotiations with the Liberal Party
of Moldova to form a new governing coalition. On 23 July 2015, these
three pro-European parties reached an agreement on the formation
of a new government.
51. At the end of 2014, three commercial banks were placed under
direct administration of the central bank after they were declared
insolvent over a number of bad loans. In the ensuing investigations,
the central bank discovered that more than one billion euros (around
12% of the gross national product (GNP)) had mysteriously disappeared
from these banks to offshore bank accounts whose owners could not
be traced. Despite ongoing investigations, no-one has yet been charged
or held responsible for the disappearance of this enormous sum of
money. This banking scandal has undermined the people’s trust in
the functioning of the democratic institutions of the country and
tarnished the country’s international reputation.
52. The banking scandal also underscored the ongoing importance
of the strengthening of the fight against corruption, including
high level corruption, in the Republic of Moldova. The National
Anti-Corruption Center, one of the main mechanisms to fight corruption
in the Republic of Moldova, lacks independence and its work is hampered
by low penalties as well as lack of co-ordination and independent
decision-making from the anti-corruption unit of the Prosecutor
General’s Office. As a result, impunity for corruption, as reflected
by the low number of convictions for corruption in the Republic
of Moldova, continues to be a point of concern.
53. The reform of the Prosecution Office is an important priority
for the country. A new law on the Prosecution Office, which takes
into account most of the recommendations of the Venice Commission,
was adopted in first reading on 29 May 2015. The provisions that
govern the appointment of the Prosecutor General may necessitate
amending the Constitution. The new appointment procedure proposed
in the draft law will be an important mechanism to de-politicise
the prosecution service. The adoption in final reading of this law
is foreseen to take place this summer with the law coming into effect
– minus the provisions governing the appointment of the Prosecutor
General that need a change of the Constitution – on 1 January 2016.
54. Constitutional reform should also be adopted without further
delay with regard to the election of the President, which is scheduled
to take place in spring 2016. The current provisions governing the
election of the President have previously resulted in vicious cycles
of failed elections, throwing the country into a political crisis.
55. The present geopolitical situation has a considerable impact
on domestic politics in the Republic of Moldova, as already noted
with regard to the elections. Since September 2013, as a result
of the Republic of Moldova’s negotiations with the European Union
for an Association Agreement, the Russian Federation imposed an
import ban on wine that was subsequently extended to most agricultural
products. After the November 2014 elections in the Republic of Moldova,
two meat and two wine companies were exempted from this import ban
and, in a welcome development, the Russian Federal Consumer Rights
Protection and Human Health Control Service announced that the import
ban on fruits to Russia could soon be lifted.
56. The Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova has been
considerably affected by the economic crisis in Russia, which has
diminished the flow of subsidies from Moscow to these regions. Also,
the covert war in eastern Ukraine is impacting on the possible settlement
of the Transnistrian conflict. On 21 May 2015, the Ukrainian Verkhovna
Rada renounced five military agreements with the Russian Federation,
including one that allowed Russian military cargo and personal transit
to Transnistria via Ukrainian territory. In this context, the renewed
impetus by the Moldovan authorities and parliament for dialogue
with the transition de facto authorities
is to be strongly welcomed. The ad hoc Sub-Committee of the Monitoring
Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe member States will
dedicate its first meeting in Vienna, on 21 September 2015, to developments
with regard to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
2.2.7. Russian Federation
57. The Russian delegation took
the regrettable decision to boycott the work of the Assembly, including
the monitoring procedure, following the decision of the Assembly
to apply sanctions against the Russian delegation over its role
in the illegal annexation of Crimean and the starting of a covert
war by the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine. This decision
by the Russian delegation was a clear rejection of the Assembly’s
offer of dialogue and has raised questions with regard to the Russian
delegation’s commitment to co-operate and to maintain a constructive
dialogue with the Assembly, including on the honouring of its commitments
and obligations to the Council of Europe. In this respect, it should
be noted that, according to Rule 8.2.b of
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, “lack of co-operation in
the Assembly’s monitoring procedure” is in itself a ground to challenge
the credentials of a delegation.
58. Limited co-operation between the Assembly and the Russian
delegation took place during the second half of 2014. As a result,
the Russian delegation participated in the work of the ad hoc Sub-
Committee of the Monitoring Committee on “Russia’s Neighbourhood
Policy with regard to other Council of Europe Member States” as
well as in some meetings of the Monitoring Committee itself. In
addition, the co-rapporteurs were able to make a fact-finding visit
to Moscow on 16 and 17 December 2014.
59. The illegal annexation of Crimea and continuing integration
in the Russian Federation, as well as the covert hybrid war waged
by the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine are gross violations
of international law, of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki
Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) as well as of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No.
1) and Russia’s accession commitments to the Council of Europe.
60. In this context, Russia’s actions towards all its immediate
neighbours have been a source of great concern to the Assembly.
The Assembly has continued to remind the Russian Federation of its
accession commitment to the Council of Europe “to denounce as wrong
the concept of two different categories of foreign countries, whereby
some are treated as a zone of special influence called ‘the near
abroad’ and refrain from promoting the geographical doctrine of
zones of special interests”.
61. As a result of
Resolution
2034 (2015) and
Resolution
2063 (2015) adopted by the Assembly in reaction to the illegal annexation
of Crimea and Russia’s involvement, including with military troops
and supply of volunteers and advanced weaponry, in the conflict
in eastern Ukraine, the following rights of the Russian Delegation
were suspended for the duration of 2015: voting rights; the right
to be represented in the Bureau of the Assembly, the Presidential
Committee and the Standing Committee; the right to be appointed
rapporteur; the right to be member of an ad hoc committee on observation
of elections; the right to represent the Assembly in Council of
Europe bodies as well as external institutions and organisations,
both institutionally and on an occasional basis. However, taking
into account that these sanctions were in place, and as a signal
of its continuing commitment to dialogue with the Russian delegation,
the Assembly decided not to annul the credentials of the Russian
delegation.
62. The political climate in Russia is guided by security and
stability considerations as a result of the annexation of the Crimea
and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which have resulted in an overall
deterioration of the respect for human rights. A restrictive and
repressive legal framework has hindered the work of the opposition,
civil society and independent media.
63. The cumulative effect of the “Law on foreign agents”, the
“Law on non-commercial organisations” and the “Law on treason” has
had a chilling effect on the work of civil society, forcing many
NGOs to close or face persecution and harassment at the hands of
the authorities. Over 80 NGOs have been registered as “foreign agents”,
which exposes them to stigmatisation. A number of these challenged
this decision in court, while at least 15 NGOs disbanded to avoid
further persecution. A new law regulating the procedure of exclusion
of non-commercial organisations from the foreign agent list was
adopted in February 2015, but has not addressed concerns regarding
the exclusion procedure that were voiced by international organisations,
including the Council of Europe.
64. On 23 May 2015, the Law on “undesirable foreign organisations”
entered into force. This law criminalised the work of foreign non-profit
organisations that are considered to “threaten Russia’s constitutional
order, security or defence capacity”. This law, which was strongly
criticised by the international community, including the Council
of Europe and its Assembly, also penalises with heavy fines any
organisation or individual that is found “collaborating” with organisations
that are deemed “undesirable”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Prosecutor General are responsible for the establishment and
maintenance of the list of “undesirable foreign organisations” On
7 July 2015, the Council of the Federation unanimously adopted a
“patriotic stop list” containing 12 organisations, among them the
Open Society Foundation and Freedom House, requesting that they
be added to the list of undesirable foreign organisations. The adoption
of this law is a clear sign of the authorities’ desire to stifle
any form of public criticism and independent opinion.
65. The media environment continues to raise serious concerns.
The authorities have tightened, through a restrictive legal environment,
direct and indirect State control over the media. On 2 May 2015,
President Putin signed into force an amendment to the law on extremism
that increases tenfold (up to 1 million rubbles) the maximum fine
that can be levied on media organisations for publishing material
that is deemed to incite or justify extremism and terrorism. It
should be noted that extremism in not clearly defined in the law
and allows for arbitrary and overbroad interpretation by the authorities.
66. On 28 February 2015, the well-known opposition figure, and
former Prime Minister, Boris Nemtsov, was killed close to the Kremlin
by unknown assailants. The assassination of Mr Nemtsov, a strong
critic of President Putin’s policies, as well as the manner in which
the investigation into this murder has been conducted, have raised
a series of questions and has had a chilling effect among political
forces and social movements opposed to the policies of the current
Russian authorities.
67. On 14 July 2015, the Russian Constitutional Court, in a controversial
ruling, decided that judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
were not binding on Russia if they violated its Constitution. This regrettable
decision was widely condemned as it raises the spectre of selective
implementation of Court judgments by the Russian Federation. It
should be underscored that, according to the Convention, the implementation
of Court judgments is a legal obligation binding on any State Party
to the European Convention on Human Rights.
2.2.8. Serbia
68. The co-rapporteur visited Serbia
from 27 to 28 October 2014. This visit followed the parliamentary elections
on 16 March 2014 and addressed the implementation of
Resolution
1858 (2012) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Serbia,
with a special attention paid to the situation of media and minorities. No
information documents or statements were adopted during this period.
2.2.9. Ukraine
69. The co-rapporteurs visited
Ukraine from 24 to 27 November 2014, from 25 to 27 March 2015 and
from 18 to 22 May 2015. In addition, the co-rapporteurs participated, ex officio, in the work of the ad
hoc committee of the Assembly that observed the parliamentary elections
on 26 October 2014.
70. The monitoring of Ukraine’s honouring of obligations and commitments
to the Council of Europe was dominated by developments in relation
to the ongoing military conflict in eastern Ukraine, which have
had a profound impact on the reform agenda.
71. The ad hoc committee that observed the elections concluded
that “the early parliamentary elections marked an important step
in consolidating democratic elections in line with international
commitments, and were characterised by many positive aspects, including
an impartial and efficient Central Election Commission (CEC), competitive
contests that offered voters real choice, and general respect for
fundamental freedoms”.
72. Following the gradual breakdown of the ceasefire agreement
agreed in Minsk in September 2014, a “Package of measures to implement
the Minsk agreement” was negotiated by the German Chancellor and French
President and signed on 12 February 2015. As a result, the provisions
of this package of measures, the implementation of the reform agenda
in Ukraine and the resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine
are strongly intertwined. While the new ceasefire agreement has
resulted in a cessation of large-scale military hostilities, it
is violated almost daily by all sides in the conflict. In addition,
heavy weapons continue to be present in the security zone that was
established by the agreements signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015.
73. There have been credible reports of human rights abuses and
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by
all sides in the conflict, including persistent reports of abductions,
summary killings, arbitrary detention and torture of civilians,
which are of serious concern. Any allegations of the involvement
of armed forces under the control of the Ukrainian authorities in
such abuses should be fully investigated by the authorities.
74. Constitutional reform is the basis of a successful implementation
of the main reforms needed for the country’s democratic consolidation.
In the package of measures signed in Minsk, the authorities agreed
to adopt, as a priority, the constitutional amendments that would
allow for decentralisation of powers to the local and regional authorities.
Constitutional amendments for the decentralisation chapter were
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, in first reading, on 16 July 2015.
Reportedly, all the recommendations made by the Venice Commission
were included in the amendments. They are scheduled to be adopted
by the Verkhovna Rada in second and final reading in September 2015.
In line with the Minsk agreements, the transitional provisions allow
for the status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
to be regulated by a special law.
75. A number of laws have been adopted to address the systemic
shortcomings in Ukraine’s judicial system, especially with regard
to the independence of the judiciary. However, these laws need commensurate constitutional
amendments to be implemented. In a welcome development, the Constitutional
Commission sent its proposals for the constitutional amendments
in the judicial chapter to the Venice Commission for opinion on
21 July 2015. This raises the hope that also the judicial chapter
of the constitutional amendments can be adopted in final reading
before the end of this year, which is to be welcomed.
76. In April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law to postpone
the implementation of the law on the General Prosecutor. The adoption
and enactment of a new law on the prosecution service has been a
long-standing recommendation and point of attention for the Assembly.
The postponement of its implementation is a setback for the legal
reform process.
77. The package of measures adopted in Minsk on 12 February 2015
foresee the organisation of local elections under Ukrainian legislation
in all of Ukraine’s territory, including in the areas of Luhansk
and Donetsk that are not under the control of the central government.
In line with the current Constitution, these elections are scheduled
to take place on 25 October 2015. A new local election code is currently
under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada. It is important that
that law be aligned with the new constitutional framework for self-government.
Regrettably, it is not clear whether elections can take place in
the areas not under the control of the central government.
78. On 16 September 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a lustration
law. According to the law, anybody that, inter
alia, helped the Yanukovich regime to usurp power, took
action or inaction that undermined the national security of Ukraine,
served in leading positions during the Soviet Union, or ordered
or abetted police action against the Euromaidan protesters, are
excluded from serving in government positions or the civil service.
Elected positions are excluded from the scope of this law. Concerned
about the human rights implications of this law, the Monitoring
Committee asked the Venice Commission for an opinion. Following
an initially critical assessment, a number of amendments were adopted
that addressed most of the Venice Commission’s reservations and
recommendations. Only the concerns regarding the temporal scope
of the law and the decentralised nature of its implementation were
not addressed.
79. On 9 June 2015, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
received an official notification
by Ukraine that it would derogate
from certain rights of the European Convention on Human Rights under
Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 allows contracting States
to derogate from certain obligations under the Convention in situations
of “emergency, war or in other circumstances threatening the life
of a nation”. The Ukrainian authorities notified that the derogation,
which is limited to the so-called anti-terrorist operation zone, concerns
certain provisions of Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
It is important to note that, even with this derogation, Ukraine
remains fully covered by the European Convention on Human Rights
and the jurisdiction of the Court.
2.3. Countries engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue
2.3.1. Bulgaria
80. The rapporteur visited Bulgaria
from 2 to 5 June 2015. Pre-term parliamentary elections took place
on 5 October 2014.
81. Following the dismal showing of the Bulgarian Socialist Party
during the May 2014 European Parliament elections, the minority
government Prime Minister, Mr Oresharki, resigned on 23 July 2014,
triggering the second early elections in a row in Bulgaria. These
elections took place on 5 October 2014. The International Election
Observation Mission, of which the ad hoc committee of the Assembly
to observe these elections was part, concluded that the elections
“were well administered and fundamental freedoms were respected,
but allegations from all sides of vote buying and selling and other
regularities, as well as a campaign that lacked substance continued
to negatively affect public confidence in the integrity of the process”.
In addition, while the legal framework for elections is in principle
adequate, a number of recommendations from previous ad hoc committees
that observed the elections in Bulgaria were not addressed, in particular
with regard to the lack of transparency of campaign and party financing
and the excessive variance in size of election districts, which violates
the principle of equality of the vote.
82. The political climate improved after the elections and a strategy
for the continued reform of the judicial system was adopted in broad
consensus between ruling majority and opposition. However, it is
now necessary to translate this strategy into concrete reforms that
will be implemented by the authorities.
83. Corruption remains a concern in Bulgaria. It is important
that all political forces display the commensurate political will
to efficiently implement the anti-corruption strategy that has been
developed.
84. Prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners by the police
and prison staff are of serious concern. On 26 March 2015, the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) took the rare step of making a public
statement to express its deep concern with regard to the ill treatment
of prisoners, dismal physical prison conditions, and prison overcrowding
and violence. Ill treatment of prisoners by police and prison staff
is widespread and frequent. Prisons are generally overcrowded and
their physical conditions so appalling that incarnation amounts
to inhuman and degrading treatment. Corruption in the prison system
to obtain better conditions is endemic. These are longstanding problems
that have been underscored by the CPT on many previous occasions,
but regrettably none of their recommendations have been implemented
by the authorities to date.
2.3.2. Montenegro
85. The co-rapporteurs visited
Montenegro on 17 and 18 November 2014. On 27 January 2015, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2030
(2015) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Montenegro. The
Assembly considered that Montenegro had made considerable progress
on the five key issues identified by the Assembly, namely: the independence
of the judiciary; the situation of the media; the fight against corruption
and organised crime; the rights of minorities and the fight against
discrimination; and the situation of refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs). It therefore decided to close the monitoring procedure
in respect of Montenegro and opened a post-monitoring dialogue with
the country.
86. Corruption remains wide spread in Montenegro, as does discrimination
against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. The
implementation of the laws on the courts, on the rights and duties
of judges, on the Judicial Council, on the Constitutional Court
and on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which, apart from the Law
on the Constitutional Court, were subsequently adopted in 2015,
is essential to ensure an efficient and genuinely independent judicial
system and judiciary. The Assembly will continue to monitor developments with
regard to Montenegro’s honouring of its accession commitments with
regard to the above-mentioned five key areas within the framework
of the post-monitoring dialogue with Montenegro. The Assembly has
resolved to consider the possibility of re-opening the monitoring
procedure in respect of Montenegro in 2017 if further progress in
these areas is found to be lacking.
2.3.3. “The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”
87. A political crisis ensued in
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” following the parliamentary
and presidential elections on 13 and 27 April 2014. In response
to the deepening crisis, the Monitoring Committee decided to send
a delegation, composed of the rapporteur, the Chair of the Committee,
as well as the Chair of the Socialist Group in the Assembly, to
the country on 28 and 29 April 2015.
88. The political crisis has highlighted systemic shortcomings
in the functioning of democratic institutions in the country and
raised questions with regard to the implementation in practice of
the Ohrid agreements. While calling on the opposition to end their
boycott of the parliament, the Monitoring Committee expressed its
concern and bewilderment about the apparent extent of surveillance
at all levels carried out in the country in recent years. They urged
the authorities to transparently and impartially investigate any
allegations of violations and wrongdoing by, inter
alia, State officials that surfaced in the wiretap scandal.
On 15 July 2015, the main political parties reached an agreement,
brokered by European Union Commissioner Hahn, to overcome the political crisis
in the country, which is to be strongly welcomed. It is now important
that new elections take place and that all political forces work
together to address the underlying systemic causes of the crises,
including the lack of trust in the electoral system, the independence
of the judiciary and the functioning of the judicial system, as well
as the freedom of the media and the depoliticisation of the civil
service.
89. On 10 May 2015, 8 policemen and 14 members of an armed gang,
reportedly coming from neighbouring Kosovo*
, were killed when a gun fight broke
out in the town of Kumanovo between the police and this armed group.
The timing of this clash, in the midst of a deep political crisis,
and its alleged ethnic connotations, raised fears of renewed outbreaks
of ethnic violence in the country. The exact circumstances of these
clashes need to be fully and transparently investigated to avoid
any ethnic tensions arising.
2.3.4. Turkey
90. The rapporteur visited Turkey
from 30 April to 4 May 2015. In addition, the rapporteur participated, ex officio, in the work of the ad
hoc Committee of the Assembly that observed the parliamentary elections
on 7 June 2015.
91. The parliamentary elections on 7 June 2015 were seen as a
crucial test for a possible change of the political system from
a parliamentary to a presidential model, a stated objective of President
Erdoğan and the ruling APK party. The ad hoc committee that observed
the elections concluded that the elections were characterised by
active citizen participation and a high voter turnout, but the excessively
high threshold of 10% had limited political pluralism in the elections.
Media coverage of the campaign, the undue involvement of the President
of the Republic in the pre-electoral campaign and the functioning
of the electoral supervisory bodies were issues of concern during
the elections, with media outlets and journalists critical of the
ruling party reportedly being subject to pressure and intimidation.
As was the case for the presidential election, the legal framework
was generally conducive to democratic elections – if implemented
fully and effectively –, but contains undue limitations on the fundamental
freedoms of association, assembly and expression, as well as electoral
rights. In addition, the legal framework for the media places undue
restrictions on the right of freedom of expression. In these elections,
the AK Party lost its parliamentary majority, putting on hold its
project of introducing a presidential political system in Turkey.
In addition, for the first time, the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic
Party (HDP) participated as a party
in
these elections and passed the 10% threshold. These two events have
the potential to considerably change Turkey’s political environment.
92. Recent developments in Turkey have been strongly influenced
by the ongoing conflict in Syria, with more than two million refugees
entering Turkey. The authorities should be lauded for their resolve
to provide a safe haven for such a large influx of refugees. The
active involvement of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds in the fight against “IS”
has had a direct impact on the domestic political environment.
93. In this context, the peace process to resolve the Kurdish
question has been put on a back-burner and has shown a diverging
approach between the government and the President of Turkey, which
could hamper the process. With the establishment of the HDP as an
important parliamentary force, it is hoped that the dialogue between
the Turkish Government and Kurdish representatives will be resumed
as soon as possible.
94. The authorities continued allegations of the existence of
“parallel State structures”, and plots to overthrow the government
are starting to influence the functioning of, and trust in, the
democratic State institutions.
95. The Ergenekon and Balyoz trials have fallen apart and many
convicted individuals acquitted on appeal. The attention of the
AK Party authorities has now focused on its erstwhile ally, the
Gülen movement, which it has classified as a terrorist organisation.
The purging of alleged sympathisers of the Gülen movement from State
structures, including from the judiciary, prosecution and police
force, is undermining their independence and efficient functioning,
which is of serious concern.
96. The reversal of a number of previous reforms that were implemented
to strengthen the independence of the judiciary is of concern. The
Venice Commission has also expressed concern about interference
with the independence of the judiciary in Turkey in its June 2015
declaration. The possible review of the provisions that allow individual
appeals to the Constitutional Court is a case in point. The introduction
of the individual appeal in 2010 was widely hailed by Turkey’s partners.
The government claimed that the Constitutional Court was overburdened
by individual complaints. This was, however, denied by the Constitutional
Court itself which opposes this review of the right to individual
appeal.
97. As mentioned in the context of the parliamentary elections,
the continuing threats to freedom of expression and freedom of Assembly
are of concern in Turkey.
98. The media environment suffers from overly restrictive laws
and questionable criminal investigations and prosecutions of journalists,
restrictions on Internet access and interference of the authorities
in the work of the media.
In March 2015, the Turkish Parliament
adopted Act No. 5651 on the Internet, which grants overbroad powers
to the Telecommunications Directorate to block websites without
sufficiently adequate legal oversight. In addition, the recent frequent
use of the legal provisions that criminalise “insulting the President”
and the “denigration of Turkishness” are of concern.
99. With regard to the freedom of assembly, the adoption of the
Internal Security Act on 27 March 2015 raises a number of questions.
This act, which has been referred to the Constitutional Court, would
allow police to search homes and vehicles based only on “suspicions”
and would allow questioning of suspects for 24 hours (48 hours for
collective crimes) without supervision of a judge.
100. Relations with religious minorities have reportedly improved.
Confiscated churches and properties have often been returned to
their communities, but a proper legal status for these churches
as well as for religious and for ethnic communities is still lacking.
101. Regrettably, the recognition of the right to conscientious
objection and the establishment of an alternative service have still
not been accomplished by the authorities.
102. Despite the economic crisis and diminished prospects for joining
the European Union, the Turkish authorities have continued their
work towards further European integration, which underscores the
clear European objective of the country. This is also clear from
its recent and commendable decision to become a major contributor
in the Council of Europe, as a result of which its seats in the
Assembly will be increased from 12 to 18.
2.4. Requests to open a monitoring
procedure
2.4.1. France
103. On 26 June 2013, 21 members
of the Assembly tabled a motion for a resolution requesting the
opening of a monitoring procedure in respect of France, claiming
serious set-backs in the field of human rights and the rule of law
in relation to police action against protesters against the Taubira
Law, as well as in relation to the compulsory teaching of gender
theory as from the age of six.
104. The Monitoring Committee appointed me and Mr Ghiletchi as
co-rapporteurs for the preparation of a written opinion on this
subject. We carried out a fact-finding visit to Paris on 10 and
11 September 2014. Based on our proposals, the Monitoring Committee
adopted an opinion on 3 September 2015, which contained a draft decision
recommending not to open a monitoring procedure in respect of France.
3. Periodic review of the honouring
of the membership obligations to the Council of Europe by countries
that are not subject to a monitoring procedure sensu stricto, or
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly
105. In Resolution 2018 (2014) on
the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure, it was agreed
to subject, on a country-by-country basis, all the countries that
are not under the monitoring procedure sensu stricto or
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue, to a periodic review of the
honouring of their membership obligations to the Council of Europe.
On 17 March 2015, the Monitoring Committee agreed on the working methods
and reporting schedule for the preparation of these periodic reviews.
In the following paragraphs, I will summarise the main aspects of
the working methods and reporting schedule as agreed by the committee.
106. In line with the clear opposition in the Monitoring Committee
to the idea of grouping countries on a geographical basis, countries
are grouped on an alphabetical basis. It is foreseen to present
between six and eight periodic reviews (prepared in two cycles of
groups of 3 to 4 countries) in each annual progress report. The
exact number could be adapted by the committee based on its workload
and resource constraints. Under such a reporting cycle, the interval
between reports for each country not under the monitoring procedure sensu stricto or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue would be approximately four years, which is similar to
the three-year interval for countries under the monitoring procedure.
107. For each country concerned, a concise preliminary report will
be drafted by the Chair of the committee, containing an outline
of any major political developments, as well as an assessment of
the findings of the different convention-based and institutional
monitoring bodies of the Council of Europe, with respect to the functioning
of democratic institutions, the rule of law and respect for human
rights during the reporting period. These preliminary reports will
be discussed by the committee and sent to the national delegation
of the country in question with a request for comments by the authorities
on its findings. On the basis of these comments, a draft report
will be produced that will be the subject of an exchange of views
in the committee with a representative of the majority and opposition
of the country in question. These final reports, as approved by
the committee, will be included in the progress report of the Monitoring
Committee for the year in which these country reports are adopted.
Main recommendations in these reports will be included in the draft
resolution that is part of the progress report.
108. When, in these reports, a country is found to be globally
honouring its membership obligations to the Council of Europe, no
further action should be necessary until the next reporting cycle.
However, in the event that the committee considers that certain
developments are of serious concern, it can decide to table a motion for
a resolution, in line with paragraph 7 of its terms of reference,
on the functioning of the democratic institutions in that country.
Similarly, if a country is found to be structurally failing to honour
its obligations as a member State of the Council of Europe, the
committee can propose the opening of a monitoring procedure on the
basis of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the terms of reference of the committee.
109. A number of special situations have been taken into account
by the committee when it agreed on the reporting schedule. It is
clear that it would be inappropriate for a Chair to present a report
on his own country. In such situations, the report on that country
should be taken into consideration immediately after a new Chair has
been appointed according to the normal two-year rotation of committee
chairs. Similarly, as with countries under the monitoring procedure,
a periodic review report should not be discussed in the plenary
when the country in question holds the presidency of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Lastly, in the event of a
motion being tabled with a request to open a monitoring procedure
in respect of a member State, the consideration of a report on this
country in the framework of the periodic review will be postponed
until the procedure regarding the request to open a monitoring procedure
has been finalised.
110. On this basis, four periodic review reports have been prepared
and included in the present progress report: in respect of Andorra,
Belgium, Croatia and Cyprus. These periodic reviews are presented
in the second part of this progress report.
4. Miscellaneous
111. Currently, the report on the
progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure is debated each
year during the Assembly’s October part-session. In line with statutory
requirements, the report and draft resolution are therefore adopted
by the committee during its September meeting. The progress report
therefore contains information provided by the rapporteurs between
September of the previous year and the June part-session of the
year in which the progress report is presented. Especially with
the inclusion of the periodic review reports, it would be more appropriate
for the progress report to cover a full calendar year, which would
bring it fully in line with the Assembly’s session calendar. In
addition, it would more closely align with the reporting cycles
of other monitoring mechanisms. It is therefore proposed that from
the next progress report on the Assembly’s monitoring procedure
onwards, the report be presented at the January part-session. That
would allow the committee to adopt the report at its December meeting.
In the years that the committee chairpersonship changes, the report
would still be presented by the outgoing Chair.