1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. The motion for a resolution
on “Administrative detention” was referred to the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights for report on 1 October
2012. At its meeting on 11 December 2012, the committee appointed
Mr Roman Jakić (Slovenia, ALDE) rapporteur. Following Mr Jakić’s
departure, the committee, on 25 April 2013, appointed Mr Agustin
Conde as rapporteur. At its meetings on 4 and 30 September 2013,
the committee considered an introductory memorandum presented by
Mr Conde. On 12 December 2013, the committee examined a revised
introductory memorandum and agreed to hold, at a future meeting,
a hearing with experts on general issues regarding administrative
detention. On 18 March 2015, the committee took note that Mr Conde
had stepped down as rapporteur owing to his increased responsibilities
in the Spanish Parliament and on 20 April 2015 appointed me as new
rapporteur. At its meeting on 28 September 2015, the Bureau invited
the committee to take into account in the preparation of the current
report the motion for a resolution by Mr Wold and others on “When
human rights provide protection to individuals who represent a threat
to national security”,
as recommended by the committee
at its meeting on 23 June 2015. On 28 September 2015, the committee
considered another revised introductory memorandum.
The reference was last extended
until 31 December 2016.
At its meeting
on 7 March 2016, the committee held a hearing with the following
three experts: Michael Fordham QC (barrister at Blackstone Chambers),
Professor Stefan Trechsel (University of Bern, Switzerland, former
President of the European Commission of Human Rights, former judge at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and
Professor Jon Petter Rui (University of Bergen, Norway).
1.2. Questions at issue
2. There is no single international
definition of administrative detention. However, according to one
of the generally accepted definitions, administrative detention
or internment refers to deprivation of liberty which has been ordered
de facto and/or
de jure by the executive and comes
under the sole responsibility of the administrative or ministerial
authority, even if an
a posteriori judicial
review is available against such a decision. In this case, the jurisdiction
of the courts is confined to examining the legality of the decision
and/or the appropriateness of its implementation.
3. This means that the definition of administrative detention
does not cover the provisional detention of a person suspected of
having committed a criminal offence (pretrial detention or detention
on remand).
Nor does it include the internment
of prisoners of war in an international armed conflict.
4. Both international and domestic law, including in the member
States of the Council of Europe, use a variety of terms to describe
this type of custody. Depending on the circumstances of each case
and the perspective adopted by the commentator, the different terms
used range from “detention without charges and without trial”, “extra-judicial
detention”, “administrative detention”, “arrest”, “administrative
internment”, “house arrest”, “ministerial detention” or “preventive
detention”.
Administrative
detention is used by States for very different purposes, including
custody of persons who are considered to pose a security threat,
for controlling immigration and cross-border movements, and in dealing
with persons suffering from mental disorders, rehabilitation of
minors, protection of minors,
protection
of public health
and
application of disciplinary sanctions.
Thus,
the term administrative detention applies to a whole range of situations
falling outside the normal procedure for the arrest of persons suspected
of having committed a crime by the police for purposes of prosecution.
5. Despite the many possible forms of administrative detention,
States’ international obligations in this field remain the same:
judicial proceedings must be the rule and administrative proceedings
the exception – an exception which must also, eventually, give rise
to judicial review. According to the European Court of Human Rights
(“the Court”), the right to liberty and security is “a fundamental
human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary
interferences by the State with his right to liberty”.
In order
to prevent administrative detention from degenerating into arbitrary
detention, it will be necessary to apply relevant human rights standards
and to safeguard the rule of law.
6. Recourse to administrative detention raises questions in terms
of procedural guarantees and the right to a fair trial. In some
cases, this practice can be abused to bypass the strict rules of
evidence and the guarantees applicable in criminal matters. Persons
placed in administrative detention may be deprived of the right
to information on the reasons for their detention, the right of
speedy access to a lawyer, the right to challenge the lawfulness
of their detention and the right to periodical reconsideration of
such lawfulness, the right to be brought before a judge, and lastly,
the right to adversarial proceedings. This may also flout the presumption
of innocence, because some individuals are placed in detention on
the sole ground that they are likely to pose a threat to the security
of the State, even though they have not yet committed any offence,
or there is no evidence to this effect.
7. Administrative detention can also imply risks of torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment. Not only have human rights bodies
frequently emphasised the link between this practice and an increased
risk of torture,
but also the
conditions and duration (and the uncertainty regarding the duration)
of such detention are liable per se to constitute inhuman or degrading
treatment as prohibited under the applicable international standards.
8. Lastly, where administrative detention is used to detain political
opponents on the basis of administrative legislation, which is sufficiently
vague to enable a whole range of political protest to be sanctioned,
it also infringes freedom of expression, association and peaceful
assembly, as well as the legality principle (“no penalty without
a law”), which constitutes an essential component of the rule of
law.
9. In view of the wide range of practices of administrative detention,
I will not be able to cover them all in the framework of this report.
I suggest focusing on three forms of administrative detention, which
have spread most widely in recent years and have also prompted the
most serious concerns in terms of preserving human rights standards
and the rule of law. The practices in question are:
9.1. administrative detention based
on the need to manage migration flows;
9.2. administrative detention as a means of punishing political
opponents and quelling protests;
9.3. administrative detention for reasons of security, including
national security.
10. As regards administrative detention for reasons of security,
this group of cases comprises both administrative detention based
on military law and the state of emergency (this would apply particularly
to Israel) and administrative detention based on anti-terrorism
legislation.
It is true that the initiators of the original
motion three years ago placed considerable emphasis on the use of
administrative detention by Israel, which was also presented in
some detail in an earlier version of the introductory memorandum
prepared under the instructions of my predecessor. But in my view,
it has become apparent in the meantime that there are enough challenges
related to administrative detention in the Council of Europe’s own
member States, without entering into the detail of the situation
in Israel. Furthermore, the situation in Israel is rather specific,
due to the conflict situation which has evolved over a very long
time. It is therefore unlikely that we could draw any lessons for
the benefit of our member States from a more in-depth analysis of
the situation in Israel, for which we would also have to take into
account the practices and tactics used by the opposing party in
this conflict, some of which have been described in the excellent
information memorandum on the state of play concerning the abolition
of the death penalty.
11. Regarding, again, administrative detention for reasons of
security, we have been asked by the Parliamentary Assembly to take
into account a second motion submitted by Mr Wold and others on
“When human rights provide protection to individuals who represent
a threat to national security”. With this in mind, I have explored
not only what States cannot do without violating their human rights
obligations, but also what they can do in order to ensure the safety
of their citizens from new threats of terrorism. A citizen’s right
to protection from terrorism is also a human right.
12. By way of example, the authorities in Norway have found it
difficult to deal with a fundamentalist cleric called Mullah Krekar.
Since he fled to Norway in 1991, he has faced multiple criminal
charges for incitement to violence and for issuing death threats
against Norwegian politicians and fellow Kurds. In February 2003,
a deportation order was served but attempts to deport him have been
constantly frustrated by the Mullah who, whilst refusing to abide
by the norms of Norwegian society, is nonetheless keen to remain
in that country. The seeming impossibility to deport him and what
is seen locally as a perverse interpretation of human rights is widely
resented in Norway. On a recent visit to Norway talking to a wide
range of citizens from across the political spectrum, your rapporteur
did not find a single person ready to support the continued presence
of Mullah Krekar in Norway.
13. Any country should first and foremost be able to protect its
own citizens, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5, “the Convention) should not be interpreted in such a way as to
make this impossible. With the help of the experts we heard at the
committee meeting on 7 March 2016, I have therefore pointed out
some measures which could take the place of administrative detention
when it is not legally possible.
2. International law applicable
to administrative detention in general
2.1. International human rights
and humanitarian law
14. The right to liberty and security
and the right to
habeas corpus in
order to challenge the lawfulness of any deprivation of liberty,
of whatever kind and on whatever grounds, are enshrined in a wide
variety of international human rights instruments.
15. As a result, according to the case law of the United Nations
treaty bodies, administrative detention is often but not always
incompatible with the rule of law and with the States’ obligations
deriving from international human rights law, with some very limited
exceptions. In particular, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
considers that this practice is generally contrary to Article 9
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
that security reasons cannot justify infringing the right to liberty
and security.
16. The UN Committee against Torture and the UN Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
consider
that some forms of administrative detention (especially incommunicado
detention and detention of indeterminate duration) constitute ill-treatment
within the meaning of Article 16 of the Convention against Torture.
The UN Committee against torture takes a particularly restrictive
view.
17. Exceptions to the principle of the general prohibition of
administrative detention are generally confined to cases of duly
proclaimed states of emergency and are strictly regulated by a number
of principles, such as:
- the
legality principle and the rule of law;
- the legitimacy principle (in particular, proportionality);
- the non-discrimination principle.
18. International humanitarian law, which is applicable to armed
conflicts and other situations of violence, does not proscribe administrative
detention. But its use is confined to exceptional circumstances,
where the security of the power being held by the persons protected
under the Geneva Convention (IV) on the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Times of War makes it “absolutely necessary”.
This also applies to cases of “imperative reasons
of security”.
19. International humanitarian law also establishes a number of
principles to the effect that administrative detention cannot take
the place of criminal prosecution, can only be imposed on a case-by-case
basis, individually and without discrimination, must cease as soon
as the causes justifying it no longer exist, and must comply with
the legality principle and be accompanied by procedural safeguards.
2.2. The European Convention
on Human Rights
2.2.1. Case law of the European
Court of Human Rights
21. The Court has repeatedly held that Article 5.1(
a-f) is the exclusive and exhaustive
list of exceptions under which a person may be lawfully detained,
and that these exceptions should be interpreted narrowly so as to
ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty.
In considering cases relating
to detention measures taken “preventively” against individuals suspected
of participating in ordinary-law offences, including terrorist activities,
the Court affirmed that “it has long been established that the list
of grounds of permissible detention in Article 5.1 does not include
internment or preventive detention where there is no intention to
bring criminal charges within a reasonable time”.
22. The Court has also repeatedly stated that for detention to
be “lawful” within the exceptions listed in Article 5.1(
a-f), it must look to the procedure
and safeguards of the national system in order to determine whether
the relevant authorities followed a “procedure prescribed by law”,
as required by Article 5.1.
The Court has found that national
law has not met the sufficient “quality of law” standard to constitute
a lawful detention in cases in which there are no applicable time
limits to the detention
or when an applicant is held in
detention “without a specific legal basis or clear rules governing
his situation”.
When a national legal system fails
to protect an individual from arbitrary detention, the detention
cannot be considered “lawful” under the Convention.
23. With respect to expulsion, the Court determined that “a Contracting
State would be in violation of Article 5 if it removed an applicant
to a State where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach
of that Article”.
It nevertheless set a high threshold for
determining the existence of a “flagrant” breach of Article 5, noting
that only extreme circumstances, such as arbitrary detention for
several years or without intention of bringing an individual to
trial, could constitute a flagrant breach of Article 5.
24. The Court has stated that various forms of judicial review
will satisfy the Article 5.4 guarantee to a review of the lawfulness
of the measure under which one is detained and it is not the Court’s
place to determine the most appropriate system of judicial review.
Nevertheless, the Court has also
professed that even in cases that concern matters of national security
the authorities may not use this as an excuse to free themselves
from effective control by domestic courts.
2.2.2. Relevant work of the Parliamentary
Assembly and of the Committee of Ministers
25. The Parliamentary Assembly
has not yet dealt with the issue of administrative detention in
general, but has consistently condemned abusive practices concerning
the detention of refugees and migrants.
The Assembly recently reiterated its
position that detention shall only be used as a last resort, in
particular for asylum seekers, when it should be as short as possible,
and that alternatives to detention should be used wherever possible.
With
regard to immigration detention of children, the Assembly has taken
a particularly critical stand.
26. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has affirmed
the fundamental rights of all persons deprived of their liberty
several times
and
has developed a number of general rules in this field,
including the
legality principle, the prohibition of arbitrariness, the right
to
habeas corpus, the proportionality
requirement, the right of access to a lawyer and authorisation of
contact with the outside. In view of the general nature of these
principles, they also apply in the area of administrative detention.
3. Administrative detention
of migrants and asylum seekers in Council of Europe member States
3.1. The legal framework
27. Administrative detention of
immigrants in an irregular situation and asylum seekers is permitted
in limited circumstances. Detention is possible in order to facilitate
either the removal of an irregular migrant from the national territory,
or the implementation of the procedure to determine whether a foreign
national shall be allowed to stay. This is the “prompt procedural
purpose”, the need for which Michael Fordham stressed at the hearing
on 7 March 2016. If removal turns out to be unfeasible within a
reasonable period of time, the “prompt procedural purpose” disappears
and the detention must be ended. The Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights also recalled that “detention is arbitrary when
it is not closely connected to the grounds on which it has been
ordered”.
28. In addition, immigration detention must fulfil legal standards
of certainty, that is to say it must be in accordance with criteria
and process prescribed by law,
including
a maximum duration. The need for a prescribed maximum duration was
embraced by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012 in
Mathloom v Greece. Legislation of Council
of Europe member States provides for administrative detention lasting
up to one or two years. The so-called “Return Directive” recommends,
for European Union countries, a maximum of eighteen months’ detention
for the purposes of deportation.
The actual period in detention
may be even longer, notably where judicial review is ineffective,
where there are obstacles, particularly financial ones, to implementing
the relevant decisions,
or when deportation
orders are more difficult to implement for certain nationalities.
In the United Kingdom,
a maximum duration has not yet been fixed, but this may soon change.
29. Immigration detention must also fulfil a “strict necessity”
standard, that is to say it must be necessary in order to carry
out entry or removal controls effectively, as confirmed by the European
Court of Human Rights.
This
applies to the need for any detention at all (or whether a less
intrusive alternative exists), and to the duration, which must not
exceed the reasonable period required to achieve the aim pursued.
Ordering detention requires addressing the specific circumstances
of the individual and can therefore not be automatic.
30. Finally, every detainee must be promptly brought before a
court of law. The judge must decide whether, for what purpose and
for how long detention may be ordered. Mr Fordham recalled that
Spain and Denmark require referral to a judge within three days,
Finland and Switzerland within four and France within five days. He
stressed that this is not voluntary “best practice” but an essential
legal safeguard.
31. In view of the above, the practice of some States to systematically
detain migrants in an irregular situation on arrival in the national
territory or when they are subject to a deportation order, without
considering less coercive measures, and even if they belong to a
vulnerable group of persons,
would appear to be in violation
of the Convention.
Also, in a judgment concerning Belgium,
the Court found that administrative detention of infant asylum seekers
together with their mother constituted a violation of Article 3
of the Convention (inhuman and degrading treatment).
Indefinite
detention of stateless persons who have no status in the host country
and cannot be deported would also appear to be inadmissible.
3.2. Practice in the member States
32. The principles and minimum
standards of international law in matters of detention apply to
persons detained for the purposes of immigration control in the
same way as to individuals held on other grounds. In practice, however,
migrants held in administrative detention find themselves in a particularly
difficult situation if they do not speak the language of the host
country and can therefore find it difficult to challenge the lawfulness
of their detention. The Committee of Ministers has therefore set
out the procedural safeguards to which persons in detention are
entitled, including the right to be informed as quickly as possible,
in a language they understand, of the legal and factual grounds
for their detention and the remedies available to them, as well as
the possibility of immediately contacting a lawyer, a doctor and
another person of their choice to inform them of their situation.
33. In principle, migrants held in administrative detention must
be placed in centres specially designed for them covering their
specific needs.
In practice, the conditions of
detention for migrants sometimes amount to inhuman or degrading
treatment,
either
because of unacceptable living conditions (overcrowding, lack of basic
amenities, insufficient staffing, lack of appropriate medical, psychological,
social and legal assistance)
or owing to general conditions
likely to cause major distress to the asylum seekers.
34. The Assembly deplored in 2010 that the living conditions and
safeguards provided for migrants in administrative detention – who
are not criminals, as must be recalled – are often worse than those
provided for persons sentenced to prison (for example, dirty, unhealthy
surroundings, lack of beds, clothing and food, insufficient health
care); it noted that the detention system often does not allow for
any normal activities (for example, education, access to the outside
and open-air exercise). The Assembly also deplored persistent allegations
of ill-treatment, violence and abuse by staff.
The European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CPT), for its part, has noted from its visits to member
States that immigrants in an irregular situation are sometimes held
in police stations under conditions which are barely acceptable
for twenty-four hours, never mind for weeks at a time.
It is not likely
that the situation has improved in the current conditions of mass
migration to Europe.
35. In particular, establishments suitable for vulnerable persons
(including families with children, pregnant women and unaccompanied
minors) have limited accommodation capacities. Regarding unaccompanied minors,
international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
are advocating alternatives to detention. The United Nations Working
Group on arbitrary detention has said that it finds it difficult
to conceive of a situation in which the detention of an unaccompanied
minor would be compatible with the second sentence of Article 37.
b of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which provides that imprisonment of a child must only
be ordered as a last resort.
Regarding persons
with disabilities or serious chronic mental or physical problems
must be given access to appropriate health care.
4. Administrative detention
as a means of repressing political opponents in some Council of
Europe member States
4.1. The legal framework
36. Administrative detention is
provided for by national law for certain administrative offences,
below the threshold of criminal law. It is used by some States as
a means of restricting freedom of expression and of assembly. In
your rapporteur’s view it is unacceptable for administrative detention
to be used in this way and indeed its abuse makes it harder to justify
its use in deserving cases of combating terrorist threats.
37. The various pieces of legislation providing for this type
of detention are generally broad in scope. For instance, the following
may fall within the ambit of an administrative offence and be subject
to detention on this ground: refusal to obey a police officer, participation
in riots, hooliganism and other forms of non-compliance with the
regulations in matters of public assembly.
38. Here again, administrative detention is broadly characterised
by an erosion of the applicable procedural safeguards. Judicial
procedures relating to administrative offences do not always fulfil
all the requirements of a fair trial.
Until last year, the Georgian
Code of Administrative Offences provided for detention of up to 90 days,
which was reduced to 15 days in an overhaul of the Code adopted
in November 2014. This reform has also strengthened the procedural
rights of detainees. Previously, the police was not even required
to rapidly inform defendants of their rights or to provide grounds
of detention. In many cases, detainees had access neither to their
families nor to a lawyer and were tried peremptorily.
Where detainees
did have access to lawyers, the latter had only a few minutes to
prepare their files, and it was unusual for the defence to be allowed
to produce evidence.
It remains to be
seen to what extent the recent reform succeeds in changing such
practices.
39. States have some discretion in deciding on the length of such
detention before a person is brought before a court. On 14 May 2013,
for instance, Azerbaijan adopted new legislative provisions extending
the maximum length of administrative detention – without any court
decision – for a wide range of offences. For example, organising
an unauthorised demonstration now gives rise to 60 days detention,
and the refusal to obey a police officer can be punished by up to
30 days’ detention (in both cases, the limit was previously 15 days).
4.2. Practice in the member States
40. Cases in which administrative
detention is used in order to imprison political opponents, demonstrators and
activists during periods of political tension, particularly in pre-
or post-electoral contexts, are far from isolated. Such practices
have been observed in recent years in Armenia,
Azerbaijan,
Georgia,
the Republic
of Moldova,
the
Russian Federation,
Turkey
and
Ukraine.
41. Administrative detention often follows in the wake of mass
arrests carried out during political demonstrations.
It
is sometimes even implemented preventively, before any hypothetical
administrative offence could have been committed, for example when
potential participants in a planned protest are arrested in their
homes or on their way to the site of the public gathering.
42. Administrative detention has been used to arrest any person
considered to have been directly or indirectly involved in such
demonstrations: not only organisers and participants
– even where the demonstrations
were duly authorised – but also mere observers
of
such demonstrations, including journalists covering them.
Recent
examples include the detention, in Belarus, of 16 people participating
in a protest on the occasion of the anniversary of the Chernobyl
disaster.
43. The aim of resorting to administrative detention in such cases
is clearly political: to restrict freedom of expression and assembly
by imprisoning activists and opponents while depriving them of the
means of defence, which they would enjoy under regular criminal
proceedings. This practice has been condemned by the European Court
of Human Rights on many occasions. The Court has assessed such cases
both directly as deprivation of liberty per se (violation of the
right to liberty and security as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention),
and on the grounds of its indirect effects (violation of the right
to a fair trial, Article 6 ECHR, or of the principle secured under
Article 7 that there can be no punishment without law, violation
of the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed by Article
11).
44. Another type of abuse of administrative detention under this
heading was noted by the Assembly’s rapporteur on the issue of political
prisoners in Azerbaijan, Christoph Strässer:
certain political opponents were
first of all placed in administrative detention,
where
they were pressured into confessing to more serious criminal offences.
At the end of the maximum period of administrative detention, they
were once again detained and placed in pretrial detention pending
the criminal proceedings for the offences admitted under pressure, during
the period of administrative detention.:
5. Administrative detention
based on reasons of security
5.1. Introduction
45. The second motion by Mr Wold
and others (“When human rights provide protection to individuals
who represent a threat to national security”),
which
the committee has been invited to take into consideration in the
preparation of this report clearly raises some important issues.
46. To avoid any misunderstandings, I should like to begin this
chapter by endorsing the Assembly’s well-settled position
that democratic societies must not
“throw out the baby with the bathwater” by overreacting to the threat
of terrorism in such a way that basic rights and freedoms are sacrificed
for the sake of an (often illusory) increase of security. As our
committee’s former chairperson and rapporteur on several relevant
issues stated at a hearing before the committee on 18 March 2015,
such over-reactions play into the hands of the terrorists, whose
aim it is, precisely, to destroy our free societies. Extrajudicial
killings, abductions, secret detentions, torture and other human
rights violations committed in the so-called war on terror are just
so many recruitment arguments for terrorist groups, as can be observed
most directly in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.
47. At the same time, democracy must be willing and able to defend
itself against its enemies. In Germany, this concept (wehrhafte Demokratie) is a lesson
learnt from the failure of the Weimar Republic espoused by the drafters
of the 1949 Basic Law and consistently upheld by the Federal Constitutional
Court. In my view, the defence of democracy and the rule of law
against its enemies remains a necessity in the face of Al Qaida
and Daesh. But this must be done without giving up democracy and
the rule of law ourselves.
48. As explained before, I do not cover in this report detention
– albeit also for security purposes – in an armed conflict situation,
such as the conflict opposing Israel and certain Palestinian authorities.
The same applies to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia,
Syria and any other countries and regions outside the territorial
remit of the Council of Europe. The closest we have come in Europe
to armed conflict is the situation in the North Caucasus region
of the Russian Federation and that in the east of Ukraine. The human
rights issues pertaining to these two regions are the subject of
separate pending rapporteur mandates, by Michael McNamara (North
Caucasus) and Marieluise Beck (eastern Ukraine, including Crimea).
I trust the two colleagues will cover all relevant human rights
issues, including possible abuses of administrative detention. The
North Caucasus report adopted by the committee on 18 April 2016
does indeed include numerous references to cases of arbitrary detention
in the fight against terrorism.
5.2. The rule: preventive detention
is unlawful under Article 5 of the Convention
49. At the committee hearing in
March 2016, all experts were in agreement that the interpretation
given to Article 5 of the Convention by the European Court of Human
Rights would generally exclude the use of administrative detention
for purposes of the prevention of terrorism. At first glance, this
interpretation is a little surprising, because Article 5.1.
c explicitly refers to the possible
detention of a person “on reasonable suspicion of having committed
an offence
or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”
[emphasis added]. The Court, in several Grand Chamber judgments,
has given this phrase a restrictive interpretation. Stefan Trechsel,
one of the committee’s experts, notes that “[t]he Court has held
that any person detained under paragraph 5.1.
c must
eventually be brought to trial. This makes sense only if there also
exists a suspicion that the person concerned has actually committed
an offence. In view of the first alternative, the second one becomes
thereby redundant”.
But Mr Trechsel
also explained during the hearing, convincingly in my view, why
this interpretation is the correct one: starting from the consensus
that the over-arching purpose of Article 5 is to prevent arbitrary
detention, he noted that for all exceptions from the right to liberty
in Article 5.1(
a-f), there
are:
“proved
and tested methods for ascertaining whether the conditions justifying
arrest and detention of a specific individual are given or not.
… There is an exception in lit. (c), where the substantial justification involves
suspicion. Suspicion is, by definition not, or not yet, proven.
Still, detention on remand remains provisional and, even more important,
under the control of a judicial authority. However there is, to
my best knowledge, no reliable method to prove that a person is
dangerous. Suspicion is retrospective and must eventually be proven
to be justified. If this does not succeed, the suspect must be released. Dangerousness
is, as it were, a suspicion pro futuro. The only evidence which
can prove that it was justified arises when the danger materializes.
This is exactly what the detention is intended to prevent. ”
The
slippery slope we would engage in if we were to follow the contrary
interpretation would end at a “European Guantanamo”, with the indefinite
detention of putatively “dangerous” individuals. This would not
be compatible with the right to liberty enshrined in the Convention.
5.3. Possible exception: lawful
short-term preventive detention in case of imminent danger
50. Our Norwegian expert, Professor
Jon Petter Rui, considers that the prohibition on preventive detention is
not absolute. First, he pointed out that Article 5 can be derogated
from under Article 15 of the Convention “in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. The threshold
of Article 15 is a high one, but a sustained campaign of severe
terrorist attacks may indeed justify such a derogation, as was the
case during the height of the IRA’s bombing campaign and, more recently,
in France after the attacks in Paris.
51. Mr Rui, basing himself on a Strasbourg Court Grand Chamber
judgment and the separate opinions of two judges, considers that
in extreme cases, short-term preventive detention is also possible
in the absence of a derogation. In
Ostendorf
v Germany (note 30 above), the Court did indeed find
that preventive detention without charge of a suspected football
hooligan for four hours did not violate Article 5. Mr Rui also pointed
out that police laws in several German
Länder allow
for detention of people for up to two weeks if there is a clear and
present danger for public security.
52. Personally, I do not think it wise to put into question the
well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
Detention for a few hours, as tolerated by the Court in Ostendorf, or even for two weeks,
as foreseen by law in some German Länder,
do not really provide a sustainable solution to problems such as
that posed by Mullah Krekar in Norway. Europe should definitely
not adopt a Guantanamo-style solution.
5.4. Failure of preventive detention
in the United Kingdom
53. As far as the United Kingdom
is concerned, the experience with indefinitely detaining suspected terrorists
without trial in Northern Ireland under the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (PTA) was ultimately unsuccessful.
Unsurprisingly, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that this
practice was a breach of Article 5.3 of the Convention.
The government responded by
derogating from Article 5.3 under Article 15 of the Convention.
The subsequent internment of almost 2 000 mostly Catholic men led
to greater civil disturbances and was qualified by a former IRA
commander as “among the best recruiting tools the IRA ever had”.
The PTA (and the derogation
from Article 5.3) was left to expire and was replaced by the Terrorism
Act 2000, which severely restricted the possibility to detain terrorism
suspects without charge. The time limit for such “pre-charge detention”
was subsequently extended again, from 7 to 14 days by the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 and from 14 to 28 days by the Terrorism Act 2006. Plans
for a further extension to 42 days were scrapped after considerable
doubts were voiced about its compatibility with the United Kingdom’s
human rights obligations, also by this committee.
“Pre-charge
detention” for terrorism suspects is a problematic instrument, also
in terms of effectiveness for purposes of detention. Even 42 days
come to an end, and then charges must be brought or the person released.
5.5. Other solutions
5.5.1. Closed material procedure
in the United Kingdom
54. In many cases, the underlying
problem is another one, namely that evidence for a crime may well
exist, but that it is of the kind that cannot be disclosed in open
court without disclosing the competent authorities’ working methods
or its sources (in particular, the identity of informers). In order
to prevent such long-term damage, the British authorities have,
in a number of cases, preferred not to press charges and let suspects
go free knowing they had committed serious terrorist offences.
A solution to
this dilemma has been attempted with the introduction of the closed
material procedure (CMP) by the Justice and Security Act 2013.
The Act foresees some safeguards
to avoid descent into unacceptable “secret trials” against suspected
terrorists, but it relies mostly on the long-standing, well-established
culture of independence and critical distance from the executive
authorities prevailing among British judges. I would not wish to
speculate whether such a system could function satisfactorily in
countries whose judiciary does not have such a “track record” or
has different traditions. However, if this basic approach were adopted
then it would go a long way, in my view, towards making this practice
acceptable – as Professor Trechsel also hinted during the hearing
in March.
5.5.2. Banishment: from Guzzardi
to Mullah Krekar
55. The problem remains – in particular
in view of the motion by Mr Wold and others of which I have been invited
to take account in this context – of what to do when a person gives
rise to a threat to national security without having committed a
criminal offence – yet, or after having served out a prison term. Mr Wold
has kindly provided me with some information on an individual case
in Norway, which had triggered his initiative. As mentioned above
(paragraphs 11-13), a radical Mullah from Iraq, who preaches hatred
against the infidels in his mosque in Oslo and even issued a death
threat against the Norwegian Prime Minister, cannot be expelled from
Norway, basically because Iraq refuses to promise that he will not
be subjected to the death penalty there and no other country will
accept him. Such cases obviously do not only exist in Norway. The
hearing in March was designed to identify possible solutions, including
ones outside the scope of administrative detention. More precisely,
I am looking at restrictive measures that remain below the threshold
of detention, which involves the complete withdrawal of liberty
of movement. An example for such measures could indeed be the Norwegian measure
to ban Mullah Krekar from Oslo and re-settle him in Kyrksæterøra,
a remote town in the centre of Norway, where he will presumably
pose less of a threat to national security.
56. An important precedent for such a measure is the European
Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the case of
Guzzardi v. Italy.
Mr Guzzardi was
a suspected mafioso, who, along with other mafia suspects, was “banished”
to the small island of Asinara, off Sardinia, for more than a year,
after the time limit for pretrial detention had expired and before
he was finally tried and convicted for conspiracy and abduction.
The Court took great care to establish the existence of a “deprivation”
of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, to
be distinguished from a mere “restriction” of liberty, which is
permitted more widely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention
(ETS No. 46). In view of the circumstances of the individual case (namely
the small size of the island, and in particular of the section accessible
to the banished suspected mafiosi, under police guard; lack of access
other than by a police boat, strict limits on visiting rights and communications),
the Court found that this banishment amounted to “deprivation” of
liberty, which was not covered by one of the exceptions listed in
Article 5. Mr Guzzardi was subsequently ordered to stay in a remote town
in central Italy, on the mainland. The complaint he then launched
against the new measure was summarily rejected as inadmissible by
the European Commission of Human Rights – which our expert, Mr Trechsel,
had chaired – because the application concerned a mere restriction
of Mr Guzzardi’s liberty of movement.
57. In light of the explanations provided by our Norwegian expert,
Mr Rui, I would contend that the banishment of Mullah Krekar to
Kyrksæterøra is indeed comparable with that of Mr Guzzardi – but
not the one to the island of Asinara, but the second one to the
remote town on the Italian mainland. I would agree with Mr Rui that
such banishment would be compatible with the Convention – provided
it has a proper basis in national law, which must be sufficiently
precise, accessible and non-discriminatory. A law allowing for the banishment
of potentially dangerous persons must not be limited to foreigners,
which seems to create a problem at present in Norway.
5.5.3. Control orders, TPIMs and
ASBOs
58. Similar measures were possible,
in the United Kingdom, in the form of “Control Orders” based on
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, replaced in 2011 by “Terrorism
Prevention and Investigation Measures” (TPIMs).
In brief, the Minister of the Interior
is empowered to impose certain restrictions upon persons suspected
of constituting a threat to national security, including a ban on
visiting certain places, meeting with certain people, using the
Internet and other measures, for up to two years. Short of completely
depriving a person of liberty by placing him or her under arrest,
such measures, which can also be enforced by electronic tagging,
can free police resources required for placing a person under round-the-clock
surveillance.
59. Whilst such measures can be imposed administratively, in a
procedure under the responsibility of the Home Office, another instrument,
the ASBO (anti-social behaviour order),
has the advantage, from a rule of law
perspective, that it must be imposed by a court. It has been used
for preventive purposes such as keeping a violent person away from
his or her partner, or a recidivist drunk driver from his or her
favourite pub. It may be worth considering whether hate propaganda
of the kind described by Mr Wold could not also qualify as “anti-social
behaviour”. It should be noted that the violation of an ASBO qualifies
as a criminal offence giving rise to criminal sanctions – including
a term of imprisonment.
5.5.4. The last resort: expansion
of substantive criminal law
60. Finally, as Mr Trechsel indicated
at the hearing in March, the detention (on remand, and after conviction) of
suspected terrorists can also be facilitated by cautiously expanding
the limits of substantive criminal law. One direction to follow
would be to specifically criminalise actions to prepare or otherwise
facilitate terrorist acts, beyond the traditional scope of “aiding
and abetting” a particular crime. Another would be to create new
criminal offences that are easier to prove than participation in
a particular attack, such as membership in a terrorist group. In
extreme cases, hate propaganda as such can be made a criminal offence,
especially if it involves incitement to violence. In my view, the
Norwegian case may well fall in this category. In this context,
it is worth considering the Council of Europe Convention for the
Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196) and its 2015 amending Protocol
(CETS No. 217),
which
calls on States Parties to criminalise a number of ancillary acts related
to terrorism, such as certain preparatory acts, recruitment and
propaganda.
61. In agreement with all our experts, I would recommend caution
for the expansion of criminal law, whose clarity, predictability
and proportionality must not be damaged by the legislature “shooting
from the hip” in a quick reaction to the latest terrorist attack.
6. Conclusion
62. As we have seen, administrative
detention is still a widespread practice in the Council of Europe’s member
States. The legality of such detention is subject to a number of
safeguards, whose violation gives rise to infringements of international
and European human rights law.
63. We should not underestimate the challenges facing member States,
particularly as regards controlling migration flows and ensuring
national security in the face of the threat of terrorism. But these
challenges do not justify infringing the rule of law and failing
to respect human rights. These constitute the very foundations of
our democratic societies. Other solutions than those undermining
the protection of the right to liberty and security by resorting
to preventive detention exist, as shown above. The draft resolution
contained in this report sums up these findings.