1. Introduction
1. Since 2004, the Parliamentary
Assembly has been engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with Turkey to
monitor the implementation of a 12-point roadmap (see paragraph
23 of
Resolution 1380
(2004) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Turkey).
The Monitoring Committee has since then been following developments
in the country. The Assembly adopted
Resolution 1925 (2013) on the post-monitoring dialogue with Turkey. A fact-finding
visit was carried out by former Assembly rapporteur Ms Josette Durrieu
in May 2015.
The Assembly observed the 2014 presidential
election and the June and November 2015 parliamentary and early
parliamentary elections. It has also been engaged in a continuous
dialogue with the Turkish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly
– which was enlarged to 36 members in 2016, after Turkey became
a major contributor to the Council of Europe.
2. Upon our suggestion, the Monitoring Committee organised a
hearing on recent developments in south-east Turkey and the peace
process on 9 March 2016. In a declaration adopted on the same day,
the committee expressed its serious concern about recent developments
in Turkey with respect to restrictions on media freedom and access
to pluralistic information, challenges to the decisions of the Constitutional
Court and the erosion of the rule of law, as well as the human rights
situation of people living in south-east Turkey, who have been subject
to military operations and curfews for several months.
3. The Monitoring Committee also decided to propose a debate
on the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey during the
June 2016 part-session, which was agreed by the Bureau of the Assembly
on 22 April 2016. As co-rapporteurs, we decided to pay a fact-finding
visit to the country from 9 to 13 May 2016 in order to discuss with
the Turkish authorities the main issues highlighted by the committee,
namely freedom of media and expression, the rule of law and the
situation in south-east Turkey. We would like to thank the Turkish authorities,
in particular the Chairperson of the Turkish delegation to the Assembly,
Mr Talip Küçükcan, for facilitating the meetings and ensuring the
excellent preparation of the visit. In the parliament, we had discussions
with the Assembly delegation and the leaders or members of the four
political groups, and Mr Yeneroğlu, President of the Committee on
Human Rights Inquiry. We met the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Çavuşoğlu
and the Minister for Family and Social Affairs, Ms Ramazanoğlu,
the Undersecretary of the Minister for European Affairs Ambassador
Soysal, the Deputy Undersecretaries of the Interior and Justice Ministries,
the Vice-President of the Constitutional Court, Mr Üstün, the Vice-President
of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, and the Head of the
European Union Delegation, Ambassador Haber. We had meetings with
journalists from a variety of media outlets, as well as non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). We travelled to Diyarbakır on 10 May to discuss
the situation with the authorities, but also with representatives of
civil society, displaced persons and lawyers.
4. In this report, we intend to highlight the current problematic
issues raised in the Monitoring Committee, but also to draw lines
of action where more action could be undertaken by the authorities
in co-operation with the Council of Europe, so as to address these
shortcomings. We understand that the current situation is at a critical
point. We therefore deem it necessary to provide information about
the context and political background, and the recent political developments
that may have a significant impact on the functioning of democratic institutions.
We will then look at the situation in south-east Turkey, address
the issues of freedom of expression and of the media, and the issue
of the rule of law.
2. Context
and political background
2.1. Political
landscape after the 2014 presidential election and the 2015 (early)
parliamentary elections
5. Since the adoption of
Resolution 1925 (2013), there have been a number of significant political changes:
- the anti-corruption operation
on 17 and 25 December 2013, in which four ministers and the son
of the then Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan were suspected of
being involved, marked the beginning of new political processes,
with the adoption of a series of laws pertaining to the tightening
of internal security, restrictive conditions on the use of the Internet
and changes in the structure of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
Alleged members of the “parallel State structure”, including within
the police and the judiciary, have since then been continuously
tracked;
- the country had the first direct election of the President
of the Republic, which was won by Mr Erdoğan with 51.79% of the
votes. Parliamentary and early parliamentary elections were held
respectively on 7 June and 1 November 2015.
While the Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured a majority
in parliament in November 2015 (with 49.50% of the votes and 317
seats), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – a political party
with a pro-Kurdish stance – entered parliament for the first time
in Turkish history, despite the 10% electoral threshold; a threshold
that the Assembly has repeatedly asked be substantially lowered.
6. As the AKP failed to form a coalition to set up a government
after the June 2015 elections, early parliamentary elections were
organised on 1 November 2015. According to the Assembly’s observers,
while the elections were generally free and well administrated,
the election campaign was “characterised by unfairness, given the
serious restrictions on freedom of the media, the criminalisation
of dissenting voices, the lack of effective and timely remedies
provided by the Supreme Board of Elections (SEB) (in particular
with respect to unfair media coverage) and judicial review of SEB
decisions, and the context of fear prevailing in the country following
the resumption of terrorist attacks, and the renewed fight against
terrorism”.
The November 2015
elections enabled the AKP to recover a majority in the parliament
and to appoint its Chairperson, Mr Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister.
While the CHP gained 25.32% of the votes (134 seats), the HDP again managed
to overcome the 10% threshold, gaining 10.76% (59 seats).
7. Following the disappointing results of the Nationalist Party
MHP at the November elections (11.9% of the votes and 40 seats),
leading members of the party challenged the leadership of Mr Bahceli
and
requested the organisation of an extraordinary party congress. As
this proposal was dismissed by the party leadership, the matter
was brought to court. One court decided to appoint trustees to organise
a party congress on 15 May, while another court decided the contrary.
While awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, dissidents
resolved to gather on 15 May 2016 and collect signatures for the
organisation of the party congress, but the leading figures (and
potential candidates to the post of leader) were prevented by the
police from attending this party meeting. A few days earlier, Mr Bahceli
had vowed to support the government (in particular in its fight
against terrorism), raising speculation about his possible participation
in a governmental coalition – a crucial issue ahead of the adoption
of constitutional amendments on the lifting of immunities, the non-partisan President
of the Republic or a new Constitution.
8. Our visit took place a few days after Prime Minister Davutoğlu
announced, after meeting President Erdoğan, that he would, “by necessity”,
step down from his position of Chairperson of the party and not
re-stand for this position, thus opening the way for the organisation
of an extraordinary congress of the AKP on 22 May 2016, which appointed
the new chairperson of the party – and Prime Minister – Mr Binali
Yıldırım, then Minister of Transport, Maritime and Communication.
The decision to side-line Mr Davutoğlu was perceived as yet another
move by the now directly-elected President of the Republic to play
an active role in politics: since his election, the President has
extensively used the competences granted to him by the Constitution,
such as presiding the Council of Ministers, which was done only
on rare occasions by his predecessors. He was also actively involved
in the 2015 election campaigns, and is involved in daily politics
and party business, in breach of the spirit of the Constitution
and its Article 103, which requires the President to perform his
function without bias.
This has led many to fear that the
office of the President was being hijacked and the ground was being laid
for a
de facto presidentialisation
of the regime, paving the way for the drafting of a tailor-made
Constitution based on a presidential system, thus formalising a
practice established by President Erdoğan.
9. During our visit, we discussed recent political developments
after the early parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015. The
main issue was the motion tabled by 316 AKP members to introduce
a constitutional amendment that would, temporarily, suspend Article
83, first sentence, of the Constitution, which states that “A deputy
who is alleged to have committed an offence before or after election
shall not be detained, interrogated, arrested or tried unless the
General Assembly decides otherwise”. Even though this measure applies
to 138 deputies from different political parties,
it
turns out that half of the 567 requests concerned HDP members, including
for proceedings initiated on the basis of terrorist-related charges.
Discussing the scope and extent of immunities is a legitimate debate
in a democracy, one that has been debated in several Council of
Europe countries, including Turkey, for a number of years, as well
as by the Parliamentary Assembly.
While immunity should never be an obstacle
to rendering justice,
it
should provide adequate protection for parliamentarians, in particular
those belonging to the minority, from undue procedures. In the current
context, the overly wide notion of terrorism combined with concerns
about the independence of the judiciary leads us to wonder whether the
stripping of immunity may not affect disproportionally one political
group in parliament, and produce negative consequences on political
processes expected to address and solve the Kurdish issues. The
HDP co-leader, Mr Demirtaş, warned that, with the adoption of the
bill, there would be “a serious risk” of violence increasing in
the country as a result and that many people would feel that the
democratic political channels have been shut completely.
10. The constitutional amendment was unanimously voted in the
Constitutional Committee after a heated session. On 20 May 2016,
the Turkish Parliament adopted – by 376 votes in favour – a constitutional amendment
to strip 138 MPs of their immunity from prosecution.
11. Prosecuting members of parliament for statements touching
on terrorist-related subjects needs to be assessed in the light
of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In a previous
case, the immunity of four parliamentarians (Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle,
Selim Sadak and Orhan Doğan), members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic
Labor Party (DEP) – a predecessor of the HDP – were lifted in 1994
on charges of helping the PKK. They were eventually sentenced to
jail, where they spent nine years until the European Court of Human
Rights found Turkey guilty, which led to retrials.
Lifting the immunity of individual
parliamentarians – who potentially face trials and pretrial detention
on terrorism charges – was seen by some as a surrogate to the ban
of the pro-Kurdish party. This option had been clearly ruled out
by the authorities, especially after the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights of 12 January 2016,
which
found that Turkey had violated the right to freedom of assembly
and association by ordering the dissolution of the Party for a Democratic
Society (DTP) in 2009 as the party had not distanced itself sufficiently
from some members' “indirect support of terrorism”.
12. Another issue discussed with parliamentarians was the revision
of the Constitution. After the November 2015 elections, the AKP
again launched work on a new Constitution and undertook to revise
the military-inspired 1980 Constitution, as recommended by the Parliamentary
Assembly in its
Resolution
1380 (2004). A cross-party conciliation committee (2012-2014) failed
to draft a new Constitution, yet approved 60 articles for a future
Constitution. In March 2016, after consultation, the representatives
of the three opposition parties refused to further co-operate with
the AKP on this issue, as the presidential system proposed by the
AKP was non-negotiable. During our visit and discussions with the
Assembly delegation and parliamentary groups, we were informed about
a new initiative to introduce three to six amendments to the Constitution,
which would allow the President of the Republic to be partisan –
and keep ties with his political party, which is ruled out by the
current Constitution. Should these amendments be adopted, the drafting
of a new Constitution could be introduced at a later stage. We reiterated
our hope that the Turkish authorities would take advantage of the expertise
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
to ensure that future constitutional developments are in line with
Council of Europe standards, in particular the separation of powers, and
the checks and balances which are essential in a democracy to prevent
abuse of power and breach of the rule of law and of fundamental
rights.
2.2. Security
and migration issues in the regional and international context
13. Turkey has been confronted
with numerous terrorist attacks on its territory since mid-2015,
prompting the authorities to intensify the fight against terrorism
and security operations in the south-east:
- deadly attacks were perpetrated by Daesh in Suruc in July
2015 (35 killed), Ankara on 10 October (103 killed and 400 injured)
and Istanbul on 12 January 2016 (10 killed in the touristic Sultanahmet
district), and 19 March 2016 on the commercial street of Istiklal
(4 killed and 36 wounded), which prompted the Turkish security forces
to escalate military operations against IS targets inside Syrian
territory. More recently, on 1 May 2016, a Daesh militant exploded
his car near the police headquarters in the southern city of Gaziantep,
killing three policemen and wounding 21 people, including civilians;
- in Ankara, the “Kurdistan Freedom Hawks” (TAK) – a group
affiliated to the “Kurdistan Workers' Party” – claimed responsibility
for two attacks that killed dozens of people on 17 February 2016
(29 civilians and military personnel killed) and 13 March 2016 (35
people killed), as well as a bomb attack near Bursa’s Grand Mosque
(14 persons wounded) aimed at “avenging the Turkish Government’s
current security operations in the south-eastern provinces”, according
to the TAK claims.
14. In addition, over recent weeks, the city of Kilis, which borders
Syria, has been targeted by rockets fired by Daesh forces from the
Syrian territory, leaving 21 people dead (as at 9 May 2016) and
more than 70 wounded.
15. As co-rapporteurs, we firmly condemn all terrorist attacks
perpetrated against Turkish citizens, which can on no account be
tolerated. The Turkish State has the right and the duty to protect
its population from these deadly attacks, which aim to undermine
democracy and the rule of law. Fighting terrorism in a global world requires
international co-operation, and we welcome the recent ratification
by Turkey of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of
Terrorism (
CETS
No. 198). At the same time, the fight against terrorism must
be conducted in line with international standards.
16. The resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey cannot be separated
from the situation of Kurds in neighbouring countries, in particular
in northern Syria (where Syrian Kurds established self-administrated cantons)
and in northern Iraq (where the PKK has based its headquarters).
The current regional geopolitical context creates additional constraints
on Turkey’s regional policy. Recently, Iran strengthened its regional
role after the signature of the 14 July 2014 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear programme. Russia became increasingly
involved in the Syrian conflict and provided direct support to Syrian
leader Bashar-el-Assad. The Russian-Turkish relationship also deteriorated
after the shooting down of a military plane which was violating
Turkish airspace in November 2015. The participation of Syrian Kurds
in the Geneva talks with a view to resolving the Syrian conflict
remains a disputed issue among anti-Daesch coalition partners. Turkey has
intensified its air strikes on northern Iraq, northern Syria and
southern Turkey to reportedly combat the “Kurdistan Workers' Party”
and related Kurdish organisations in the region, as well as Daesh.
17. The ongoing conflict in Syria continues to fuel the massive
flow of refugees reaching Turkey. The Assembly stresses the outstanding
efforts made by the country since 2011 to host nearly 3 million
refugees (of which 262 000 in refugee camps),
which are in need of accommodation,
education and access to social and medical care. The Assembly values
the outstanding financial efforts of the country to address this
issue, with over €7 billion spent on refugee-related issues, despite
some remaining problems, in particular the lack of access to any
education for 400 000 Syrian child refugees.
18. In 2015-2016, European Union member States were confronted
with unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants arriving in
western Europe, notably via the eastern Mediterranean route, transiting through
Turkey. On 18 March 2016, the EU-Turkey Agreement was signed to
manage the migration crisis. As part of this agreement, and after
the completion of 67 out of 72 benchmarks of its 2013 Visa Liberalisation Roadmap,
the European Commission proposed, on 4 May 2016, to the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union to lift the visa
requirements for Turkish citizens, on the understanding that the
Turkish authorities would fulfil, as a matter of urgency and as
they committed to do so on 18 March 2016, the five remaining benchmarks,
notably on the implementation of the GRECO recommendations to fight
terrorism, and the need to revise the anti-terror legislation –
an issue that was raised by the Parliamentary Assembly in 2013 in
the framework of its post-monitoring dialogue. The reinvigorated
accession negotiations with the European Union prompted Turkey to
ratify several Council of Europe conventions, including Protocol
No. 15 amending the European Convention on Human Rights (CETS No.
213), the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings (CETS No. 197), the Additional Protocol to the Convention
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 167) and the Council
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism.
19. Notwithstanding this adverse geopolitical context, recent
domestic developments in Turkey pertaining to freedom of the media
and of expression, erosion of the rule of law and anti-terrorism
security operations in south-eastern Turkey raise serious questions
about the functioning of its democratic institutions. These findings
are corroborated by recent reports adopted by several Council of
Europe monitoring mechanisms, such as the Venice Commission, GRECO
and the Commissioner for Human Rights, which highlighted concurring
concerns that Turkey should address without further delay.
3. Situation
in south-east Turkey
20. Following the collapse of the
peace talks in July 2015, violence escalated in south-east Turkey,
leading to clashes between Turkish security and army forces, and
the PKK. In order to conduct security operations and “eradicate
the PKK”, the authorities have imposed, since August 2015, curfews
in various districts which, as noted by Assembly’s election observers,
were predominantly voting for the HDP. In retaliation, ditches and trenches
were built in these areas under curfew and barricades were erected
by youngsters first, and then possibly PKK militants. This situation
depicts a change in the strategy of the PKK, which is relocating
its guerrilla type of action from rural to urban areas, that it
to say in highly populated areas, thus causing human loss when clashes
occur. The Ministry of the Interior provided us with the latest
figures, according to which, since 20 July 2015, 458 security officers
have been killed and 3 321 wounded, while – in official terminology
– “1 682 terrorists were counteracted and 450 captured alive”. Almost
4 500 weapons and 50 tons of explosives have been seized.
Today,
Şırnak-Central and Nusaybin remain under curfew. In Sur and Yüksekova
security operations have ended but the curfews, full-time search
and control are maintained. In Cizre, Silopi and İdil, operations
have ended, but the curfews remain in place from 21:30 to 04:30.
In Silvan, Varto, Derik, Dargeçit and Bağlar security operations
have ended and the curfews have been lifted.
21. According to the figures gathered by the Human Rights Foundation
of Turkey, there were 65 officially confirmed, open-ended and round-the-clock
[all day] curfews in at least 22 districts of seven cities in south-east Turkey
between 16
August 2015 and 20 April 2016. Some 1.6 million people have been
affected by these curfews, which resulted in 355 000 displaced persons.
Considering
the number and the length of the curfews, the Monitoring Committee
expressed serious concern about the compatibility of the legal framework
governing curfews in Turkey with Council of Europe standards and
requested the expertise of the Venice Commission, which is expected
to be adopted in June 2016. The Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr
Niels Muižnieks, also questioned the very weak basis (namely an
administrative decision based on a law that does not even mention the
word “curfew”) on which to impose such drastic restrictions of basic
human rights, for a huge population and for months on end.
For Amnesty
International, these daily 24-hour curfews lasting for over 90 days
(at the time of our committee hearing) amounted to a form of collective
punishment, forbidden by international law. In places visited by
Amnesty International and which had previously been under curfew,
it was clear that many of the people who died (the elderly, babies
and women) could not have been involved in any fighting.
22. The Constitutional Court of Turkey rejected the request to
annul the decision to impose curfews. The European Court of Human
Rights, in its decisions of 13 January 2016, refused to indicate
interim measures for lack of elements, decided to pursue its examination
of applications to issue interim measures but relied on the government
to take any necessary steps to ensure that physically vulnerable
individuals could have access to treatment if they so requested.
23. We decided to travel to Diyarbakır on 10 May 2016 to get a
better picture of the current developments in south-east Turkey.
We thank the authorities, in particular the Ministry of the Interior,
for making this visit possible. The historical neighbourhood of
Diyarbakır, called Sur, is currently under curfew. The city is also subject
to regular, if not daily, attacks. On the day of our visit, a car
transferring PKK militants was bombed, leaving 3 PKK militants dead,
and 45 wounded, including 12 police officers. Likewise, we were
shocked to learn that, on 12 May 2016, a truck loaded with 15 tons
of explosives accidentally exploded in a rural area of the province
of Diyarbakır, killing 16 civilians and wounding 23. The PKK claimed
responsibility, saying that the explosion had been “accidental”
after shooting erupted between the truck driver and the villagers.
The explosives were meant to be transferred to another location.
The HDP co-leader Mr Demirtaş demanded that the PKK apologise and
condemned this explosion.
24. We were not in a position to visit the site of Sur (which
is still either under curfew or under investigation) but we understood
from various sources that, in Sur, like in other places, severe
damage caused by heavy artillery and bombardments in densely-populated
areas had been observed. In Sur, there were 23 000 inhabitants in
the neighbourhoods which have been under curfew. Only a thousand
had decided to stay during the security operations. We also noted
the extent and consequences of these security operations on civilians affected
by the curfews (1.6 million people) or who had to leave the areas
under curfew (355 000 people). Those who remained were subject to
restrictions in access to water, electricity, education and health
care, including emergency medical care, which proved fatal for many
residents. According to data of the Ministry of the Interior, 30%
of the 280 500 displaced residents
had returned
home.
25. In Diyarbakır, we spoke with the Governor, Mr Aksoy, and the
Chief Prosecutor, Mr Solmaz. They briefed us on the current situation,
the help provided by the State (food and accommodation, temporary
jobs in State agencies and social aid, including compensation for
lost income, etc.), and the investigations being carried out. We
were also informed about the 10-point Anti-Terror Action Plan presented
by the Prime Minister, Mr Davutoğlu, on 5 February 2016.
We had discussions with the Governor
about the measures undertaken to assist the victims of the security
operations. We were informed that the State provided rent allowances
and financial aid,
free accommodation
in guest houses, various assistance
and
that financial aid (3.7 million Liras) had been granted to 1 564
tradesman who had been affected by the terrorist attacks. The Turkish Employment
Agency had provided jobs for 3 000 persons from displaced families
affected by the security operations.
26. The adoption by the Council of Ministers of an emergency decree
on expropriation on 21 March 2016 raised many concerns among displaced
persons. It concerned notably Sur (Diyarbakır), enabling the expropriation
of 6 292 plots of land (out of 7 714 plots – that is to say 82%).
The remaining 18% belonged either to the Housing Development Administration
of Turkey (TOKİ
) or were already owned by the State
Treasury. Overall, at the end of this process, every plot of land
in Suriçi
would be turned into public
property.
We
were informed by the Governor that this decree had been adopted
to accelerate the reconstruction process and allow the return of
the displaced families, and that the expropriated owners would receive
one third of the value of their property on a bank account, and
that the ownership title would be transferred to the State Treasury.
This expropriation process was however challenged by a platform
of local NGOs, which lodged a complaint in court. In the meantime,
they feared that reconstruction work had already begun.
27. We were given rather contrasted evaluations by Ms Kışanak,
Co-Mayor of the HDP-run Metropol of Diyarbakır, and the NGOs working
with displaced persons in the region. The Metropolitan Municipality
of Diyarbakir provided assistance to 4 758 families (30 000 persons).
The municipality had undertaken to register digitally all displaced
families. The municipal authorities estimated that 70% of the building
in the eastern part of the old city (namely the six neighbourhoods
under curfews) had been fully or partly destroyed by the security operations.
According to their figures, 45 000 people from Sur were displaced.
Two thirds of the displaced were renting apartments, while one third
was living with friends or relatives.
They also
stressed that 95% of the population in the Sur district was poor.
28. In addition, serious allegations of human rights violations
have emerged and have to be duly investigated. The investigation
related to the killing of the President of the Bar Association and
prominent human rights defender, Mr Tahir Elçi, in the street in
Sur on 28 November 2015 is still to be completed.
29. The violence of the clashes, the extent and violence of the
terrorist attacks and the retaliation measures by the security forces
further exacerbated the relationships between communities. The proportionality
of these measures raised question in a number of areas, such as
the limitation of human rights, freedom of movement, property rights
and the massive demolition of homes, etc. The displaced population,
who fled the clashes and lost everything they had overnight, are
still prevented from approaching the area. The emergency expropriation decree
that was adopted on 21 March 2016 for the Sur area, was also challenged
by the residents. In Sur, we met some displaced persons who were
in need of information, help and support, and felt insecure about
the future. Impunity was another source of concern; as was effective
investigations into alleged abuses by security forces. These reports
were in particular very serious in relation to Cizre, as reflected
in the statement made by United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein.
Further to Zaid’s statement, the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – who refuted that it had denied access
to the United Nations representatives – invited the United Nations
investigation commission to carry out research and investigations.
30. The lack of information about legal procedures, future urban
construction projects and the right of displaced persons to return
to live in their neighbourhoods raise many questions and lack of
transparent information fuels fears and insecurity among those concerned.
The Assembly expects Turkey to take due care of the needs of the
local population and ensure fair compensation for the losses suffered
by civilians in case of expropriation procedures, which should be
conducted in line with Council of Europe standards and taking account
of property rights and their safeguards as guaranteed by the European
Convention on Human Rights.
31. Access to information through the increased presence of the
media and accurate and unbiased media coverage, transparency of
the procedures, prosecution of those who committed crimes or abuses
of human rights, but also the presence of observers to assess the
human rights situation in the affected districts and release credible
reports, would contribute towards restoring confidence. However,
to resume the peace process, the PKK has to stop its terrorist attacks
and lay down its arms. All those involved should resort to political
means to stop the escalation of violence.
32. The Assembly is also worried about the lack of political dialogue
in the region, the arrests and destitution of democratically elected
mayors in south-east Turkey on the following charges: “aiding and
abetting a terrorist organisation”, “disrupting the unity and territorial
integrity of the State”, “membership of a terrorist organisation and
making terrorist propaganda”, “acting as a human shield” and “providing
logistical support to a terrorist organisation”.
The announced preparation of legislation
which would empower the Governor
to appoint “trustees” and replace mayors suspected of committing
terrorism-related crimes, also raised questions. The Assembly recalls
that, as part of the post-monitoring dialogue, decentralisation
needs to remain on the agenda – in compliance with the European
Charter for Local Self-Government, which Turkey ratified in 1992
– as a possible response to Kurdish needs in the region, and in
full respect of the territorial integrity of the country. It also
reiterates its call on Turkey to ratify, in line with the post-monitoring
dialogue requirement, the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
which could also contribute restoring confidence among communities.
4. Restriction
to freedom of expression and freedom of the media
33. In several of its resolutions,
the Assembly stressed that freedom of the media and of expression
remain problematic in Turkey.
These issues,
despite positive steps highlighted in Assembly
Resolution 1925 (2013), remain unaddressed, or have even worsened. The deterioration
of the situation of media in Turkey was also reflected in the 2016
Freedom House report, where Turkey backslided to the 156th position
(out of 199 countries and regions) (-6 places compared to 2015)
and was considered as “not free”.
In the 2016 World Press Freedom
Index released by Reporters Without Borders, Turkey ranks 151th
(out of 180 countries) (-2 places compared to 2015).
34. According to media organisations, 28 journalists (15 of them
were convicted) and 10 media distributors were in prison in April
2016. Eighteen of these journalists and distributors are from the
Kurdish media. They are charged with being affiliated to an [illegal]
organisation according to the Anti-Terror Law and the Turkish Penal
Code.
The main opposition party (CHP),
for its part, stated that in 2015 “774 journalists were fired, 484 legal
actions were taken by the judicial authorities, 200 press members
and seven media companies were subjected to an investigation, 156
journalists had been detained, and court cases had been opened against 238
journalists”.
The Press for Freedom
organisation reported that, in the first quarter of 2016 alone,
among others, 894 journalists were dismissed from their jobs, 200
attacks were reported against journalists, including 21 against
media institutions, and 12 journalists faced charges of “insulting
the President”.
The authorities however
denied that any journalists were in prison because of their journalistic
activity, and the Platform for Civil Solidarity (an association
close to the government) provided us with a list of 28 detained
journalists, and their grounds for detention.
35. During our visit, we expressed our concern about freedom of
the media and of expression. In Istanbul and Ankara, we met several
journalists from various media. Echoing the concerns voiced by the
Commissioner for Human Rights, too many measures currently taken
by the authorities, including investigations, prosecutions and the
interpretation of the Penal Code by domestic courts, have had a
chilling effect. Attacks on journalists and media outlets, seizure
of media (which undermines property rights), pressure on journalists
and punishment of journalists doing their job leads to self-censorship.
Recent changes in media ownership, with media outlets being bought
by companies who run businesses with the State, were motivated by,
and have resulted in, political influence on the media.
Our findings thus confirmed
the concerns expressed previously by the Parliamentary Assembly,
in Ms Durrieu’s previous
information note,
and also substantiated by the high
number of alerts (61) related to Turkey registered by the “Council
of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety
for journalists”.
Recent negative developments also
concerned the deportation or entry denial of foreign journalists.
4.1. Restrictive
measures to limit media freedom
36. The Assembly already previously
deplored the blocking of Internet websites. Unfortunately, no progress was
noted in that area; on the contrary, the number of blocked websites
has increased significantly in the past months (there are currently
110 000). The Commissioner for Human Rights recalled that the country
holds the world record for Twitter takedown requests.
The Assembly
questioned the compatibility of the 2014 Internet law (Law 5651)
with Council of Europe standards, as this Law broadened the capacity
of the Telecommunication Communications Presidency (TİB) to block
access to websites. We have also been informed that, in April 2015,
an article (8.
a) was introduced
in Law 5651, allowing judges (on rare occasions) and the Prime Minister
to require the TIB to block websites, and then submit the request
to a judge who – if our information is correct – is usually inclined
to grant such authorisation. Seventy separate blocking decisions have
been issued since July 2015, without being published. The Assembly
therefore requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on this
new article, to be adopted in June 2016.
37. Another problematic issue relates to the withdrawal of TV
channels from digital service providers. A few weeks before the
November 2015 elections, several television stations – most of them
critical of the government – were removed from four digital service
providers, following correspondence from the Ankara Prosecutor’s
Office in connection with ongoing investigations into charges of
supporting terrorism.
At the request of the Ankara Prosecutor,
the independent Turkish broadcaster IMC TV was pulled off the air
by Turksat (one of Turkey's largest broadcasters) on 26 February
2016
for allegedly “spreading terrorist propaganda”
for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This further compromises
the possibilities for the public to have access through television
and radio to impartial and accurate information and to “allow diverse
political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that
call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided
that they do not harm democracy itself”, as noted by Mr Muižnieks.
38. Further restrictions to media freedom include bans imposed
on the media on subjects which, we believe, are of public interest,
such as the information disclosed by Can Dundar and Erdem Gül on
the major terrorist attacks in Turkey in recent months, or the situation
in south-east Turkey. In addition, some events deemed to be critical
to the authorities seem to be ignored by those media under governmental
influence, and hardly mentioned by the remaining media, which apply
self-censorship for fear of financial pressure, being closed down
or handed over to trustees.
39. Finally, economic pressure is yet another tool used to curb
media freedom. In a recent move, a prosecutor launched an investigation
against Aydin Dogan, founder of the Dogan Group, whose interests
range from real estate to energy and media (it owns the
Hurryiet Daily and the CNN-Turkey
channel), on charges of running a fuel-smuggling ring – which he
denies.
In 2009, the Dogan Group had already
been given a 3.8 billion lira ($1.3 billion) tax fine.
40. In recent months, in the name of the fight against the so-called
“parallel State structure”, there were several seizures of holdings,
including media companies, belonging to groups or persons allegedly
supporting the Gülen Movement. On 30 October 2015, on the eve of
Election Day, a board of trustees was appointed to take over the
Koza İpek Holding (owner of critical media outlets including the
television channels Kanaltürk and Bugün and the newspapers
Bugün and
Millet).
The authorities explained that this judicial decision followed tax investigations
into the group and “strong suspicions of setting up firms and umbrella
organisations, and carrying out illegal financial transactions to
fund a terrorist organisation”.
This seizure
sparked criticism from the Assembly’s ad hoc committee to observe
the elections, which regretted that unclear provisions in the Anti-Terrorism
Law and Press Law were excessively applied during the election period,
and that a number of journalists and media outlets were prosecuted
for “support of terrorism”.
41. In March 2016, the private media group Feza Journalism, owner
of
Zaman, Turkey’s largest
newspaper which is Fethullah Gülen’s media outlet, was seized. Parliamentary
Assembly President Pedro Agramunt expressed his serious concern
at a court decision entrusting to State-appointed trustees the control
of the media group to which the newspapers
Zaman and
Today’s Zaman, well known for their
independent opinions, belong. He urged the Turkish authorities to
take all available measures to reverse the effects of these undue restrictions
and refrain from further undermining freedom of expression and silencing
critical voices,
a
plea which has remained unaddressed.
42. The taking over of these media organisation resulted in a
drastic change in editorial policy, in a sharp decrease in the number
of readers,
and
finally in the closure of the Koza Ipek media outlets in March 2016 “due
to constant losses and the depletion of capital”, according to an
official statement.
It is thus undeniable that, despite
the intention expressed by the Turkish authorities,
the takeover
of these newspapers by trustees obstructed the regular functioning
of the companies, including the broadcasting corporation in question.
This was also confirmed by the Commissioner for Human Rights after
his visit to Turkey in April 2016, where he stated that “the takeover
of newspapers and TV stations by trustees was also a very dangerous
precedent … by law, these trustees are supposed to safeguard assets,
but they changed editorial policy, causing the loss of readership
and ruining the market value of the companies. This is an extremely
worrying precedent which has already done irreparable harm to media
freedom and pluralism in Turkey, even before a final court judgment”.
4.2. The
case of Can Dundar and Erdem Gül
43. In Istanbul, we met Mr Can
Dündar. Mr Dündar and Mr Erdem Gül were arrested after publishing material
showing that Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) had
been delivering arms to Syria. They spent 92 days in pretrial detention,
until the Constitutional Court found their detention to be unlawful
– a decision challenged by President Erdoğan and his ministers.
They were sentenced to, respectively, five years and 10 months and
five years in prison for “leaking State secrets”, a sentence which
raises again the question of journalists’ rights to inform the public
on matters of general interest. They remain free, pending their
appeal trial and the recovery of the right to leave the country.
They were acquitted of the “attempted coup” charges and espionage
and “knowingly aiding the armed terror group FETÖ/PDY [Fethullahist
Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure]”. On the day of
the verdict, Mr Dündar escaped an armed attack in front of the courthouse
by an individual who accused him of being “a traitor”, which is
another worrying sign – and a possible consequence of the stigmatisation
of investigative journalists. At institutional level, we are very puzzled
by the President of the Republic openly challenging a decision of
the Constitutional Court (and even its existence), in breach of
the principle of separation of powers which, for the Venice Commission,
was a clear violation of Council of Europe principles.
However,
we note – with satisfaction – that so far all decisions of the Constitutional
Court following individual applications have been implemented.
44. This case and the harsh sentences handed down again raise
the right of journalists to inform the public on matters of general
interest. In a recent decision (
Görmüş
and Others v. Turkey ), the European
Court of Human Rights emphasised the importance of freedom of expression
with regard to matters of public interest. The Court held that the
interference with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression,
especially their right to impart information, had not been proportionate
to the legitimate aim sought, had not met a pressing social need,
and had not therefore been necessary in a democratic society; the
interference had consisted in the seizure, retrieval and storage
by the authorities of all of the magazine’s computer data, even
data that was unrelated to the article, with a view to identifying
the public-sector whistle-blowers. Lastly, the Court considered that
this measure was such as to deter potential sources from assisting
the press in informing the public on matters of general interest,
including when they concerned the armed forces.
4.3. Provisions
of the Penal Code, and assessment by the Venice Commission
45. We would find it relevant to
upgrade the legal framework, as suggested by the Venice Commission
in its recently adopted opinion on “The conformity with European
human rights standards of Articles 216
(criminalisation
of public incitement to hatred or hostility and degrading sections
of the public
), 299
(criminal liability for insults
against the President of the Republic), 301 (criminalisation of
the degradation of the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish
Republic or the organs and institutions of the State) and 314 (criminalisation
of the establishment, command or membership of an armed organisation)
of the Turkish Penal Code as well as their application in practice”.
Further co-operation
with the Council of Europe on the issue of freedom of expression
would substantially contribute to alleviating the problems.
46. We enquired about the prosecutions initiated under Article
299 of the Penal Code (insult to the President and public officials)
brought against journalists and academics, but also ordinary citizens.
The Ministry of Justice provided us with extensive material on this
question. While defamation does indeed exist in the criminal law
of other member States, the magnitude of the problem in Turkey (almost
2 000 cases filed in two years) is by no means comparable to the
situation in other countries, and might go well beyond the restrictions necessary
in a democratic society that can be tolerated under Article 10 (freedom
of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. We agree
with the Commissioner for Human Rights that the application of Article 299
has become “abusive”,
and we follow the reasoning of the Venice
Commission that the best option for the time being is to invite
the Turkish authorities to repeal this article – given that “in
case of unjustified attacks on the President, civil proceedings
or only in the most serious cases, criminal proceedings based on
the general provisions of the Penal Code concerning insult (art.
125 of the Penal Code) should be preferred to criminal proceedings
based on Article 299”.
47. We have taken due note of the arguments put forward by the
Turkish authorities, which consider that Article 299 is necessary
to protect the Head of State and that any insult against the President
should be considered as a crime against the State.
We do not agree,
however, with such a view, even though, as underlined by the Venice
Commission, the Head of State should indeed remain protected from
extreme forms of defamation, which is possible by using the civil
and criminal law procedures that are meant to protect any citizen
taking into account specifically established principles of freedom
of expression with regard to public figures and political matters.
48. We find it useful to quote here the Venice Commission: it
appears that “investigations, prosecutions, arrests and detentions
on remand based on allegations of insult against the President of
the Republic, are not only limited to expressions merely containing
profanity. The investigations and prosecutions of journalists in particular,
for having insulted the President in press articles related to the
December 2013 corruption probe, to the Syrian refugee crisis, and
against an opposition party leader, who protested against government
policies in the context of the fight against terrorist propaganda,
which are all related to debates on important matters of public
interest”. The Venice Commission stressed that “the use of offensive,
shocking and disturbing words especially within the context of a
debate on matters of public interest, are guaranteed by the freedom
of expression. There must be room for a robust public debate in
a democratic society and that the value placed by the Court’s case
law on political speech, including criticism of public figures,
is particularly high, while a clear distinction should be made between
criticism and insult amounting to wanton denigration or gratuitous
personal attack”, for which a proportionate sanction would not,
in principle, constitute a violation of the right to freedom of
expression”. However, the prison sentences pronounced by courts
[even against minors] are “very likely to create a chilling effect
on society as a whole and cannot be considered proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued, i.e. protecting the honour and dignity
of the President”.
49. We encourage the Turkish authorities to take into account
the European consensus highlighted by the Venice Commission (and
the Parliamentary Assembly as well
),
which indicates that States should either decriminalise defamation
of the Head of State or limit this offence to the most serious forms
of verbal attacks against them, at the same time restricting the
range of sanctions to those not involving imprisonment. We would also
like to echo Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland’s
call to the 47 Council of Europe member States to ensure that their
national legislation on defamation “does not lead to self-censorship
of the media and does not weaken public debate”.
50. Considering Article 216 (“Provoking the Public to Hatred,
Hostility, Degrading)”, the Venice Commission recalled that there
is little scope under Article 10.2 of the Convention for restrictions
on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest.
The Venice Commission does not disregard the problems and difficulties that
occur in the context of the fight against terrorism. However, in
a democratic society, “the actions and omissions of the government
must be subject to close scrutiny not only by the legislative and
judicial authorities, but also by public opinion. Thus, even in
relation to expressions containing very harsh criticism against
government policies and which are hostile in tone, or offend, shock
or disturb, resorting to criminal proceedings (including on the
basis of Article 216) should only be possible if those expressions
amount to incitement to violence. Those are the essential factors
to be taken into consideration when examining the ‘necessity’ of
an interference with the right to freedom of expression in a democratic
society”.
Therefore Article 216 should not be applied
to punish non-violent but harsh criticism of government policies,
but “rather to prevent racist statements in particular against national
minorities that create an explicit and imminent danger to public
security. Article 216(3) should not be applied to punish blasphemy,
but limited to cases of religious insult that intentionally and
severely disturbs public order and calls for public violence”.
51. Concerning Article 301 (“Criminalisation of the degradation
of the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish Republic or the
organs and institutions of the State”), the Venice Commission, like
the Parliamentary Assembly previously,
acknowledged
that some progress has been made in Turkey in recent years in particular
with respect to the application of Articles 301 and 314 (in conjunction
with Article 220) of the Criminal Code. However, in the absence
of a well-developed case law, the Venice Commission considered that
Article 301 is not specific enough to meet the requirements of predictability.
It recommended that this provision be redrafted and further amended
in order to make all the concepts used in it sufficiently clear
and specific to satisfy the principle of foreseeability and legality.
The article should also be interpreted by the domestic courts in
line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. However,
the Venice Commission expressed its doubts “as to whether the protection
of State organs against discredit could be considered as pursuing
the legitimate aim of protecting the public order, in the absence
of incitement to violence by the perpetrator”. The Venice Commission
also recalled that the tools of criminal law “should be used with
restraint by the State in the area of political speech and questions
of general interest, and that in the absence of incitement to violence,
the imposition of an imprisonment sentence fails to meet the requirement
of necessity in a democratic society”.
52. With respect to Article 314 (“Membership of an armed organisation”),
the established criterion in the case law of the Court of Cassation
that acts attributed to a defendant should show “in their continuity,
diversity and intensity” his/her “organic relationship” to an armed
organisation or whether his/her acts may be considered as committed
knowingly and wilfully within the “hierarchical structure” of the
organisation, should have a strict application. In paragraphs 6
and 7 of Article 220 (“Establishing organisations for the purpose
of committing crimes”) (in conjunction with Article 314), the sentence
“although he is not a member of that organisation, shall also be
sentenced for the offence of being a member of that organisation”
should be repealed. If this sentence in paragraph 6 and 7 is maintained,
the application of Article 220 in conjunction with Article 314 should
be limited to cases which do not involve the exercise of the rights
to freedom of expression and assembly.
53. The Venice Commission concludes that “all four articles have
to be applied in a radically different manner to bring their application
fully into line with Article 10 [of the Convention] and Article
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)”.
The Commission underlines that prosecution of individuals and convictions,
in particular by lower courts, which have a chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, must cease. This is not sufficient if individuals
are in some cases finally acquitted by the Court of Cassation after having
been the subject of a criminal prosecution for several years. Moreover,
the Venice Commission underlines the importance of States’ positive
obligation to create a favourable environment where different and alternative
ideas can flourish. We share the Venice Commission’s views that
“the different kinds of measures taken by the authorities, including
investigations, prosecutions and drastic custodial measures such
as detentions constitute interference with the right to freedom
of expression”.
We therefore urge the authorities to put
an end to these practices which do not comply with Council of Europe
obligations.
4.4. Other
problematic issues pertaining to freedom of expression: scope of
the Anti-Terror Law
54. In addition to problematic
provisions of the Penal Code, the Anti-terror Law also raises questions
with regard to freedom of expression, due to an overly wide notion
of terrorism. We understand that the current context is very sensitive,
but we believe that the narrowing of the scope of this law would
contribute to preventing criminalisation of statements covered by
Article 10 of the Convention (as understood by the European Court
of Human Rights), without undermining the raison
d’être of anti-terrorism legislation, which is about
the positive obligation to protect the right to life for each citizen.
55. While counter-terrorist measures are needed at a time when
Turkey is under severe and daily terrorist threats and attacks,
we are concerned that the notion of terrorism may be used beyond
what is necessary and proportional in a democratic society. While
there is no international definition of terrorism, member States
must remember that “State security and fundamental rights are not
competitive values; they are each other’s precondition”, as stated
by the Venice Commission:
member
States have a positive duty to take measures to protect people within
their jurisdiction which, however, must be taken within the framework
set out by international human rights law.
In
the framework of the post-monitoring dialogue, the Assembly had
invited Turkey to align its legislation, in particular the Penal
Code, with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on
freedom of expression and association.
In
the light of recent developments, this question must now be addressed
as a matter of urgency. Steps were taken in the past, in the framework
of different legislative packages, to distinguish what is to be
considered as support to terrorism or incitement to terrorist activity
and what falls under the scope of Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (freedom of expression). In practice however, we
observe that there is an extensive interpretation of anti-terrorism
legislation, which does not help to address the Kurdish issue, for
example.
56. The prosecution of academics who signed a peace declaration
calling for an end to the military campaign in south-east Turkey
and accusing the government of breaching international law (“We
shall not be part of this crime!”) is another example that raises
serious questions about the scope of the anti-terror law. Of the
initial 1 128 signatories of the declaration, 495 academics are
under investigation. On 14 January 2016, the police reportedly briefly
detained 27 of them. The Council of Europe Secretary General issued,
on 15 January 2016, a statement expressing his concern about these
arrests”.
Four petitioners (Esra Mungan, Muzaffer
Kaya, Kıvanç Ersoy and Meral Camcı) were arrested and detained on
16 March 2016 on charges of “terrorist propaganda” (Article 7/2
of the Anti-Terrorism Law). The prosecutor in the first hearing
decided to drop the charges of terrorism, and considered launching
an investigation under Article 301 of the Penal Code (insulting the
State) – subject to the authorisation of the Minister of Justice.
In the meantime, the four academics were released on 22 April 2016.
Disciplinary and criminal proceedings had been launched against
other petitioners for a statement calling for an end to violence,
which, for the Commissioner for Human Rights, fell within the boundaries
of free speech, whether one agreed with their message or not.
57. We are also concerned that human rights defenders advocating
peaceful solutions are targeted by smear campaigns. In Diyabakir,
we enquired about the investigation into the killing of the Head
of the Diyarbakir Bar Association and prominent human rights defender,
Tahir Elçi, who was shot on 28 November 2015. We were assured by
the Chief Prosecutor that the investigation was ongoing, although
his lawyers had complained about not having access to his file and
the evidence, which had been ignored by the investigators. The circumstances
remain unclear, with police forces and PKK militants involved in
the fighting (including shooting) in the vicinity of the place where
Mr Elçi was staying, a few moments after he made a call for a peaceful resolution
of the Kurdish issue.
58. We are also concerned about information received concerning
the arrest of two Turkish lawyers, Ms Ayşe Acinikli and Mr Ramazan
Demir on charges of “membership of an illegal organisation” (i.e.
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)), reportedly for events that
took place between 2011 and 2014. They have been questioned about
interviews they gave in the media, complaints they lodged before
the European Court of Human Rights and visits to their clients.
The reasons behind the alleged offences that led to the searches and
arrests were not disclosed. To date, the case file on the arrests
remains confidential pursuant to Article 153.2 of the Turkish Criminal
Code Procedure (No. 5271). They have been held in pretrial detention
since 22 March 2016.
59. The Assembly also notes that, in the framework of the fulfilment
of the 72 benchmarks for visa liberalisation, the European Commission
required Turkey to “revise – in line with the ECHR and with the European
Court of Human Rights case law, the EU
acquis and
EU member States’ practices – the legal framework as regards organised
crime and terrorism, as well as its interpretation by the courts
and by the security forces and the law enforcement agencies, so
as to ensure the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair
trial and freedom of expression, of assembly and association in
practice”.
This issue gave rise to a lot of
controversy in the EU-Turkey negotiations, as President Erdoğan
and the then EU Minister Volkan Bozkir ruled out any changes to
the Anti-Terror Law.
5. Functioning
of the judiciary
60. In its
Resolution 1925 (2013), the Assembly highlighted the many steps taken by the
AKP government in the last few years to reform the justice system
and bring it into line with Council of Europe standards. However,
in the two last years, and especially after the disclosure of the
alleged corruption cases in December 2013, which highlighted the
alleged role of four ministers and the son of the then Prime Minister
Mr Erdoğan, the Monitoring Committee has observed worrying developments
with respect to the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.
This bolstered the perception that the justice system is State controlled,
as shown by the adoption of amendments to the Turkish Criminal Code
and Code of Criminal Procedure and, in particular, the restructuring
of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors:
- the amendment to Article 116
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression “reasonable doubt” was
changed to “strong doubt based on concrete evidence” on 21 February
2014, at the time of the corruption investigations, then changed
back to “reasonable doubt” on 2 December 2014 before the police
operation on 14 December 2014;
- the amendment to Article 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
on the defence counsel’s access to preliminary procedural files,
adopted by the parliament on 2 December 2014 in its Omnibus Act;
- the creation, on 18 June 2014, of the system of “criminal
peace judgeships”, conferring on them sole authority for taking
decisions on “questions associated with investigations and appeals
against decisions”, especially decisions on custody, arrests, property
seizures and search warrants – since these decisions could not be
appealed before a higher court.
61. During our visit, we addressed the issue of the functioning
and the independence of the judicial system. We were informed about
assessments and declarations by the Bureau of the Consultative Council
of European Judges (a Council of Europe consultative body), the
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Venice Commission and GRECO.
They share concerns about the independence of the judiciary due
to the latest changes in the Turkish Criminal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure, the restructuring of the Supreme Council of Judges and
Prosecutors and the creation of “criminal peace judgeships” in 2014,
in the aftermath of the disclosure of the alleged corruption cases
in December 2013. We discussed these issues with the Turkish authorities,
as well as the Association of Judges and Prosecutors (Yarsav, a
member of the International and European Association of Judges)
and another association, the Platform for Unity in the Judiciary,
which had differing views on this matter.
5.1. Need
to strengthen the independence of the judiciary
62. There is mounting concern about
the lack of independence of the judiciary, which was echoed by the Bureau
of the Consultative Council of European Judges on 12 June 2015 following
the suspension and arrest of Judge Özçelik and Judge Başer
and the declaration of the Venice
Commission adopted at its meeting on 19 and 20 June 2015,
in which it called on the Turkish
authorities to review the measures taken against the judges and
prosecutors concerned; further revise the Law on the High Council
of Judges and Prosecutors to reduce the influence of the executive
within it; outlaw any interference by the High Council with pending
cases; and provide judges with legal and constitutional guarantees
against transfers against their will, except in cases of reorganisation
of the courts. During our meetings, we noted that the expected reform
of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Council of State, which
would lead to the decrease, by half, of the number of its members, fuelled
further concern about the selection of the judges who would remain
in these bodies, and the independence of these institutions in the
future.
63. In its March 2016 report, GRECO examined corruption prevention
in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. It
provided a useful analysis of the structure and functioning, but
also the complex internal procedures, related to transfer, promotion
and disciplinary measures against judges and prosecutors, that are
likely to cast a shadow on the independence of the judiciary. In
particular, the role of the Minister of Justice (even if limited,
according to the statutes of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors)
and, more generally, of the executive, remains a source of concern,
and raises suspicion of the executive’s interference in the judiciary.
The report highlights that the appointment of the elected members
of the HCJP in 2014, the use of disciplinary proceedings, including
the dismissal of a number of members of the judiciary, and the potential
influence of the executive on this body, has further triggered the
debate concerning the role and the independence of the HCJP, which
seriously undermines the trust of the public in its judicial institutions.
The recommendations issued by GRECO tackle the lack of independence
of the judiciary and call on Turkey to implement the recommendations,
in particular to strengthen the security of tenure of judges and
to ensure that evaluations of the performances of judges and prosecutors,
as well as disciplinary procedures against them, are free from undue
influence.
64. We were also informed by various authorities that the State
continued to “purge” the system of alleged members of the Gülen
Movement, a former ally of the government, which was later labelled
a terrorist organisation by Turkey. This affects in particular the
police and the judiciary and has led to a number of prosecutions,
transfer of personnel, and disciplinary procedures against these
alleged members, which leaves us with a number of questions.
65. The Commissioner for Human Rights pointed out that the fight
against this presumed terrorist organisation within the judiciary
may have weakened its independence.
“In this respect,
we had worrisome information from Yarsav that 680 judges are currently
being investigated for their alleged links to the ‘parallel State
structure’, based on the decisions they took as judges and prosecutors”
(see for example the suspension and arrest of Judge Özçelik and
Judge Başer, supra). “Fifty-three judges were standing trial due
to their activity and 300 judges and prosecutors were being investigated
on the basis of comments posted on social media.” Yarsav also pointed
out that 6 000 judges and prosecutors had been transferred these
past two years, while the Platform for Unity in the Judiciary (a
government-sponsored platform created in 2014 before the elections of
the elected members of the HSYK, which won the majority of the seats)
recalled that 1 500 judges and prosecutors are usually moved on
a yearly basis.
5.2. Challenges
of the Constitutional Court decisions
66. The Assembly has praised on
various occasion the role played by Turkey’s Constitutional Court
to uphold fundamental rights; in particular thanks to the mechanisms
of individual appeals to the Constitutional Court, which were introduced
in Turkey by an amendment to the Constitution in 2010. The decisions
resulting from this process have on several occasions been discussed,
if not challenged by the President of the Republic. Recently, the
Constitutional Court was fiercely criticised by Mr Erdoğan after
the court decided, on 25 February 2016, to release
Cumhuriyet Editor-in-Chief, Can
Dündar, and Ankara Office Chief, Erdem Gül (see supra) from pretrial
detention. The Constitutional Court ruled that, in the light of
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Mr Dundar and
Mr Gül’s rights had been violated, and that the earlier ruling on
their arrest lacked sufficient justification. President Erdoğan
vowed he would continue to stand against the top court’s verdict
in line with his presidential duty to protect the Constitution.
The Venice Commission expressed
its “serious concern over statements made by the President of Turkey
who has declared that he will not respect a recent judgment of the
Constitutional Court of Turkey and has moreover threatened to abolish this
Court. As a member State of the Council of Europe, Turkey is bound
by the Council’s fundamental principles, that of democracy, the
protection of human rights and the rule of law. These threats against
the Constitutional Court of Turkey are in clear violation of the
Council of Europe’s fundamental principles”.
During our
discussion at the Constitutional Court, we were however pleased
to learn that all of the decisions issued following individual applications
had been implemented.
5.3. The
issue of the “criminal peace judgeship”
67. We had the opportunity to meet
the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of Ankara and four “criminal judges
of peace” to discuss this newly-created institution, which raises
some questions.
68. As noted by the previous rapporteur,
the
“criminal judges of peace” (“super judges”) with extended powers
were created in June 2014, in the wake of the “fight against the
parallel State”. During our meeting with four criminal judges of
peace, it was explained that these judges review prosecutorial acts
and administrative acts. They deal notably with cases of defamation
and publication on, and blocking of websites. They can decide on
the launch of investigations (based on “reasonable suspicion”) and
pretrial detention (based on “strong suspicion”) for crimes that
can be punished by at least two years of imprisonment. They combine
the function of investigative judges and “judges of the liberties”,
deciding on arrests, seizures, wiretaps and searches, pretrial detention
and release from pretrial detention. These judges are appointed
by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
69. The decisions of “criminal judges of peace” can be appealed
to another criminal peace judgeship, the ruling being thus issued
by another criminal judge of peace, which raises question about
fair process. As an example, Mr Dundar explained that they appealed
their pretrial detention, in vain, to ten different criminal judges
of peace, before being released after the decision of the Constitutional
Court (which referred to the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights). We understood that these courts act as “closed circuit”
courts. We fear that this institution might be considered as “special
jurisdiction”, which would be problematic, after Turkey abolished
the special courts in 2010, which were dealing with the so-called
“coup cases” and subsequent mass trials (Ergenekon, Bayloz, etc.),
which later proved to have been fabricated.
70. “Criminal judges of peace” consider that their monitoring
of the prosecutorial and administrative acts provide the necessary
procedural safeguards, taking into account the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights. The Constitutional Court confirmed, in 2014,
the constitutionality of Law 5235 and its appeal procedure.
However,
upon his return from Turkey, the Commissioner for Human Rights pointed
out that a number of problematic measures had been taken by “criminal
judges of peace”. While they were supposed “to improve the protection
of human rights in criminal proceedings”, there were “strong indications
that these judicial formations may be having exactly the opposite
effect, and seemed to have caused many violations in their own right”.
An opinion of
the Venice Commission on this judicial institution would be welcome.
71. In conclusion, the Assembly urges Turkey to further co-operate
with the Council of Europe, and notably take account of the recommendations
by GRECO when implementing the Judicial Reform Strategy, which aims to
establish a more reliable justice system, to execute judicial services
in an independent and impartial way and to conclude trials within
a reasonable time. In this respect, we welcome, as a first step,
the adoption of the “Action Plan on Enhancing Transparency and Strengthening
the Fight Against Corruption (2016-2019)” on 30 April 2016 aimed
at addressing these issues. We were not able, however, at this stage,
to examine it in detail.
6. Concluding
remarks
72. This report has identified
a number of challenges Turkey is currently facing due to the unstable geopolitical
context, terrorist attacks that we strongly condemn, and the refugee
crisis. We recall that Turkey is a founder member of the Council
of Europe, and remains a strategic partner for Europe. Therefore
the Turkish legislation and legal practices in force are expected
to comply with Council of Europe standards in the fields of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
73. The terrorism and security operations have led to enormous
suffering by civilians. There is an urgent need to deescalate the
violence by political dialogue. The cycle of violence is likely
to nurture resentment and hate. The Assembly is deeply concerned
that the tensions and clashes among the communities could spread to
other parts of Turkey. It urges the PKK to stop its terrorist attacks
and lay down its arms. The Assembly also urges all those involved
to resort to political means to stop the escalation of violence.
The Turkish Parliament, which could provide a political forum for
peace resolution, should consider putting in place mechanisms to resume
the peace process, including a joint, cross-party parliamentary
commission, or a “truth and reconciliation” commission that would
allow for a fresh impetus and the healing of past traumas. Political solutions
need to be discussed in parliament by all the political forces involved.
A due system of parliamentary inviolability – which excludes statements
inciting hatred, violence or the destruction of democratic rights
and freedoms – is thus necessary to ensure that issues of public
interest can be debated by elected representatives without fear
of executive or judicial interference.
74. A number of recently adopted amendments to the legislation
or the Penal Code remain problematic. The Turkish authorities explained
that they drew inspiration from legislation developed in other Council
of Europe member States to draft the latest legislation pertaining
to internal security and restrictions of freedoms when fighting
terrorism, etc. We should however stress that such legislation –
which always requires finding an adequate balance between public
order and citizens’ individual freedoms – needs to be assessed in
an overall political and legal context, and include mechanisms to
avoid or redress any possible abuses. All of the concerns outlined
in our report are inherently serious in terms of democracy, the
rule of law and respect for human rights. Taken separately, they
would already warrant close scrutiny by the Assembly. In the present context,
with a weak system of checks and balances, the accumulation of all
these recent developments pertaining to freedom of the media and
of expression, erosion of the rule of law and the alleged human
rights violations in relation to the anti-terrorism security operations
in south-eastern Turkey, constitute a threat to the functioning
of democratic institutions and the country’s commitments to and
its obligations towards the Council of Europe.
75. Restrictions on the freedom of media and of expression have
increased well beyond the scope of Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, and seriously undermine access to and provision
of balanced and accurate information based on investigative and
independent journalism.
76. The role of the Minister of Justice and, more generally, the
possible interference of the executive in the judicial system, remains
a source of concern and raises suspicion about the role and the
independence of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which
plays a key role in ensuring the independence of the judiciary, and
in building citizens’ confidence in their judicial institutions,
which are all too often perceived as an instrument to curb dissenting
voices. This seriously undermines the trust of the public in its
judicial institutions.
77. The Assembly notes that EU integration remains a strategic
goal for Turkey. It therefore reiterates its belief that the opening
of additional chapters, in particular Chapter 23 (judiciary and
fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (justice, freedom and security),
would help consolidate the reform process and reinforce several actions
undertaken by the Council of Europe for Turkey to align its legislation
and practice with Council of Europe standards.
78. We thus encourage the Turkish authorities to further co-operate
with the Council of Europe and the European Union to redress the
shortcomings in its legislation, address systemic problems, and
prevent numerous cases from reaching the European Court of Human
Rights in the years to come. We consider that the ongoing co-operation
between the Council of Europe and the Turkish authorities on Strengthening
the Individual Application System of the Constitutional Court, Strengthening
the Capacity of the Turkish Judiciary on Freedom of Expression (in
co-operation with the Turkish Justice Academy), and on Strengthening
Judicial Ethics (in partnership with the High Council of Judges
and Prosecutors) will be extremely valuable.
79. As co-rapporteurs, we expect to travel back to Turkey by the
end 2016. The present report did not address all the requirements
included in the post-monitoring dialogue with Turkey, notably the
revision of the Constitution. We will thus continue to follow the
situation in the framework of the post-monitoring dialogue with Turkey
and assess on that occasion the progress made on the issues raised
in the present report. We would also like to encourage Turkey to
address without further delay the issues raised in this report,
while stressing that the Council of Europe, and in particular the
Venice Commission, remain at the disposal of the Turkish authorities.
We firmly believe that Turkey needs to overcome the current challenges
and reconnect to its reform agenda
80. It appears that the latest developments pertaining to freedom
of the media and of expression, erosion of the rule of law and the
alleged human rights violations in relation to the anti-terrorism
security operations in south-east Turkey constitute a threat to
the functioning of democratic institutions and the country’s commitments
and obligations towards the Council of Europe. The Assembly should
thus continue to follow closely the issues raised in this report,
in particular the situation in south-east Turkey with respect to
human rights, on the basis of information provided by its Monitoring
Committee. The Assembly should also urge the Turkish authorities
to fulfil the remaining requirements pertaining to the post-monitoring
dialogue with the Parliamentary Assembly.