1. Introduction
1. Without existing disaster and
emergency funding by individual countries, international organisations, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and many private donors, the present migration
emergency would represent even more of a global cataclysm. Despite
shortfalls, political disagreement, reluctance to engage in full
burden-sharing and structural and administrative problems, most
actors are mobilising substantial resources for humanitarian action
aimed at alleviating the crisis. Overall humanitarian aid rises
yearly, reaching a total from all sources of US$28 billion in 2015.
2. The original inspiration for the present report, as expressed
in the motion for a resolution tabled by the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons in June 2015, was the committee’s
ongoing dialogue with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), which on several occasions had raised the
issues – revealed by the scale of the crisis – of the organisation’s
long-standing system of resource mobilisation, which by the latter’s
own admission should be reviewed to better withstand the increasing
pressure on emergency humanitarian aid mechanisms.
3. I was appointed as rapporteur on 9 September 2015. Since then,
further regular exchanges with the UNHCR took place during the preparation
of this report, and on 11 October 2016 I proposed that the committee invite
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to attend the debate on this
report: the Assembly subsequently decided to invite the High Commissioner
to the full-day debate on migration to be held on 28 June 2017 during the
Assembly’s part-session. The Conference on “A comprehensive political
and humanitarian response to the Migration Crisis” organised by
the committee at the invitation of the French Assemblée nationale
in December 2015 and subsequent hearings (in particular in relation
to the preparation of the report on the EU–Turkey Agreement of 18
March 2016) added relevant elements on the financial implications
of the crisis. The committee also held an exchange of views with
the Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank on 11 October
2016.
4. Through these exchanges and discussions, I concluded that
it would be useful, while focusing on the United Nations system
and its implications for the UNHCR, to take the opportunity both
to compare the UNHCR and the European Union in this area and to
describe very briefly the other main sources of emergency humanitarian
funding, the decision-making processes involved in their implementation,
their sustainability and their comparative advantages in providing
rapid and co-ordinated reactions to humanitarian emergencies. The Assembly
has not so far examined the important issue of emergency humanitarian
funding, and looking at the figures also serves to put into perspective
a number of perceptions of countries’ attitudes towards the migration crisis
and political stances.
2. Scope of emergency funding
2.1. What
is “emergency refugee situations” funding?
5. According to the UNHCR, a refugee
emergency is “any situation in which the life and well-being of refugees
will be threatened unless immediate and appropriate action is taken,
and which demands an extraordinary response and exceptional measures”.
Most humanitarian aid organisations make a distinction between emergency
aid and more regular forms of financial and development assistance.
However, previously well-defined notions such as “emergency aid”,
“humanitarian aid and “development aid” now overlap in “protracted
emergencies”, as asylum seekers and refugees spend longer periods
in precarious conditions originally designed to provide immediate
and provisional shelter. Allocations for development aid, in the
past seen as a means of building sustainable capacities within developing
countries in order to avoid the inevitability of forced migration,
are therefore increasingly used to respond to urgent humanitarian
crises. The theme of development aid could usefully be taken up
for a future report building on some of the findings of the present study.
6. There is at present very little distinction either between
“humanitarian aid” and aid devoted specifically to refugee situations,
as the mass migration which Europe faces is the consequence of all
the present catastrophes, whether they are due to conflict, political
tension and persecution of minorities, climate change or natural
disasters. And despite both disagreement as to levels of contribution
to assistance and the problem of “forgotten emergencies”, the appropriation
of humanitarian assistance to emergency assistance to refugees is
seldom criticised.
To illustrate this, the 12%
increase in global humanitarian assistance between 2014 and 2015
was driven almost entirely by the need to address the severe “mega-emergencies”,
especially those resulting from the ongoing conflict and displacement
in the Middle East. In 2015, almost one third of total funding was
allocated to the Syria crisis. The “top five” emergencies combined
– Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for over
half of all international humanitarian assistance. For the purposes
of this report, no particular differentiation will be made between
overall humanitarian aid and the financial response to the refugee
crisis, unless otherwise specified.
7. As far as European countries themselves are concerned, humanitarian
assistance is also principally devoted to the refugee and migrant
crisis, and responsibility is usually separated from that of regular
social assistance programmes. Third-country contributions to the
refugee crisis are examined below. The case of Turkey is interesting,
as expenditure related to the hosting of Syrian refugees within
its own territory is reported as “humanitarian assistance” in the
same way as third-country donations, and some other refugee-hosting costs
are counted as part of its “official development assistance” (ODA).
2.2. Frameworks
for emergency responses
8. Within the United Nations system,
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages
the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), established in 2005
to respond quickly to new and deteriorating emergencies and sustain
life-saving assistance in ongoing but neglected crises. Recognising CERF’s
critical role in humanitarian funding, the General Assembly in December
2016 called for an increase in total CERF funding from $450 million
to $1 billion per year. Country-based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) are established
by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) when a new emergency
occurs or when an existing humanitarian situation deteriorates.
They allow donors to pool contributions into single, non-earmarked country-specific
funds to support humanitarian efforts, locally managed by international
and national NGOs, United Nations Agencies and Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement organisations. In 2016, CBPFs were the largest source of
direct funding for national NGOs. Eighteen CBPFs received a total
of $706 million in donor contributions in 2016.
9. In the European Union, emergency funding is split between
the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the Internal
Security Fund (ISF) and the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI).
For instance in Greece, €191.92 million had been contracted as of
January 2016 for emergency support, under the ESI (health care, shelters,
food, protection and psychological support), and €174.7 million
awarded under the AMIF and
ISF budgets for the same types of emergency support, plus other
services related to security and asylum-processing capacity.
3. Who
pays the bill for humanitarian refugee crises?
3.1. Host
countries foot the biggest bills for humanitarian aid
10. Global humanitarian assistance
amounted to a total of US$28 billion in 2015,
representing
a third consecutive annual rise (compared to 20.1 billion in 2013
and 25.8 billion in 2014). The rises in total funding in 2014 and
2015 came principally from governments and private donors, who increased
contributions by around 11% and 13% respectively from the previous
year. In 2015, 20 government donors contributed 97% of all international
government contributions. The largest increases came from governments
in the Middle East and North of Sahara region, a rise of almost
500% since 2011, mainly driven by contributions from Gulf States
in response to crises in the Middle East.
11. However large the amounts appear when seen as a total, in
the 20 countries where aid is most required, international aid actually
only accounts for 4.8% on average of spending for humanitarian assistance.
National governments have the primary responsibility to prepare
for and respond to crises in their own territories, and often invest
significant amounts in both preparedness and response. On average,
the governments of these countries assume 61% of humanitarian aid
costs alone, and the rest is advanced through short and long-term debt,
foreign investment and other secondary sources of revenue. Yet the
most crisis-affected countries still rely more on international
flows than other developing countries. Domestic resources in the
countries less impacted constitute an average of 78% of total expenditure.
12. In Lebanon, for instance, net domestic spending rose by 65%
in real terms between 2010 and 2015 – the period in which the number
of refugees in the country rose from 464 853 to 1 535 662. The rise
accounts for all internal expenditure so cannot be exclusively attributed
to the increase in refugees, but there is a strong connection. Impact
and needs assessments by the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation in Jordan indicated an estimated US$1.1 billion domestic
funding gap in the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018,
a shortfall of around 8.6% of total government expenditure in 2016.
3.2. Third-country
donors
13. Closer examination of the contributions
of third countries to humanitarian relief reveals a rather different picture
than the dominant political standpoints suggest. Whereas it is to
be expected that Germany would rank among the biggest donors, it
may seem surprising that the United States devotes by far the largest
amounts. The United States, Turkey and the United Kingdom all donated
more humanitarian assistance to the countries most in need than
the European Union in 2015 (for instance, the United Kingdom donated
US$32 million to Greece alone, and the United States gave US$29 million
to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund).
Turkey spent the greater part of an overall US$3.2 billion for 2015
on hosting the 2.75 million (mostly Syrian) refugees in the country,
which it reports to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) as humanitarian aid rather than domestic expenditure.
14. The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016 summarises
the ranking of countries, totals and main sources of aid. European
countries other than those mentioned above (in particular Sweden,
the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland France, Denmark, Italy, Belgium
and Spain) donate significant amounts in proportion to their national
resources. When taken as a proportion of gross national income (GNI),
Germany’s contribution represents 0.04% of GNI, whereas for the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom aid funding represents 0.10% (Sweden
0.19%, Luxembourg 0.16% and Denmark 0.15%).
3.3. International
organisations
3.3.1. The
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
15. Since its establishment in
1951, the UNHCR, the leading refugee agency in the world, has been overwhelmingly
funded by direct voluntary contributions from States (86% in 2015),
but also from NGOs (6%), the private sector (including corporations,
trusts, foundations) and individual citizens (6%). Only a small
annual subsidy of 2% comes from the regular budget of the United
Nations. Each year, the UNHCR issues a Global Appeal asking governments
and other donors to contribute to its budget. In large and complex
refugee situations, the UNHCR leads and co-ordinates the humanitarian
response among agencies and NGOs. With new crises, as in the case
of Syria or Ukraine, the UNHCR launches an emergency appeal, hoping
that donors will provide it with additional resources and thus enable
it to compete with other humanitarian agencies, including UN sister
organisations, for a limited amount of humanitarian funding.
16. In 2015, the total amount requested through UN appeals stood
at US$19.8 billion, but actual contributions left a shortfall of
45% (US$8.9 billion). The UNHCR’s financial requirements for 2017
amount to $7.310 billion. The three largest emergencies, Iraq, Lebanon
and Turkey, will alone take up 23% of the budget for programmed
activities. The crisis situation and funding pressure mean that
some humanitarian situations are persistently neglected: the list
of persistently underfunded or “neglected emergencies” frequently
features the same countries year on year.
17. The UNHCR prepares a Biennial Programme Budget, broken down
into annual budgets based on globally assessed needs. The original
programme budget is presented to the UNHCR’s main governing body, the
Executive Committee, prior to the start of the biennium. Needs are
re-assessed during the biennium and a revised budget is presented
to the Executive Committee for approval in October of each year.
The budget may be adjusted for unforeseen needs that arise in the
course of the year by means of supplementary budgets. The final
budget from the previous year is presented to the Executive Committee’s
Standing Committee at its June/July meeting each year.
18. The UNHCR uses cash-based interventions (cash and vouchers)
to provide protection, assistance and services to the most vulnerable,
including access to food, water, health care and shelter, that allow
them to build and support livelihoods and to facilitate voluntary
repatriation. Cash-based interventions seek to protect refugees
by reducing the risks they face and by maintaining their capacity
to spend; they can be used in a variety of settings, and are a more
dignified form of assistance, giving refugees the ability to immediately prioritise
and choose what they need. The UNHCR’s position is that in this
way the displaced are less likely to resort to harmful coping strategies
(survival sex, child labour, family separation, forced marriage,
etc.). They also directly benefit the local economy and can contribute
to peaceful coexistence with host communities.
3.3.2. The
European Union
19. The European Union’s migration
funding is contained mainly under Heading 3 “Security and Citizenship” (less
than 1% of the EU budget), within the Home Affairs budget of 9.26
billion euros earmarked at the beginning of the 2014-2020 Multiannual
Financial Framework, divided between the Asylum, Migration and Integration
Fund (AMIF, 3.1 billion), the Internal Security Fund (ISF-Borders
and ISF-Police, 3.8 billion) and the European Border and Coastguard
Agency, EASO and Europol (2.36 billion), and outside of Europe in
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (€132 million between
2014 and 2016). Other secondary financing is assumed through development
aid, trust funds and some headings such as Cohesion Policy and Agriculture.
20. Budgets are decided in a seven-year multi-annual funding framework
(MFF), with regular adjustments. In 2015, no less than eight “amending
budgets” were adopted to respond to the growing migration crisis,
and the European Agenda on Migration was developed with the aim
of improving management of irregular migration, border management
and the implementation of the Common European Asylum System, and introducing
the concept of hotspots.
21. The European Union Resettlement Programme was built into the
AMIF programme in 2015, by a series of agreements between July and
September 2015 (relocation of 22 504 persons in need of international protection,
temporary emergency relocation of people from Italy and Greece in
need of international protection, availability of 54 000 places
not yet allocated for legally admitting Syrians from Turkey to the
European Union). On 13 July 2016, a permanent EU Resettlement Framework
was proposed to establish a common set of standard procedures for
the selection of resettlement candidates and a common protection
status for persons resettled to the European Union, aimed to streamline
and better focus European resettlement efforts in the future.
22. According to the legislation, the decision to activate emergency
support within the European Union can be taken by the Council following
a proposal made by the Commission. The first activation took place
on 16 March 2016 for the current influx of refugees and migrants
into the European Union, proposing to distribute a total of €700
million to Greece in different tranches between 2016 and 2018. The
emergency support project funded with this money addresses the basic
and urgent needs of refugees and migrants (food, health, water and
sanitation, shelter and protection). This support will be complementary
to what is already being provided by the Greek authorities.
23. Flexibility mechanisms enable the European Union to mobilise
funds to react to unforeseen events such as crisis and emergency
situations. In the current context of reduced expenditure, these
mechanisms also ensure that budgetary resources can respond to evolving
priorities, so that every euro is used where it is most needed.
Most of the flexibility mechanisms are therefore kept outside the
MFF and the funding can be mobilised above the expenditure ceilings.
3.4. Other
organisations
24. This report cannot hope to
present a complete picture of humanitarian emergency assistance
funding, but some of the other principal contributors are referred
to in this chapter. Private initiatives are not examined in this
report, although they are an important element of funding for the
United Nations, for NGOs and directly for recipient countries.
3.4.1. The
Council of Europe Development Bank
25. Although the loans granted
by the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) are small when compared
to the scale of UN or EU funding, they constitute a flexible and
efficient means for small-scale social projects for migrants to
become a reality. The CEB is the oldest European multilateral development
bank, established in 1956 to bring solutions to the specific problems
of refugees’ resettlement after the Second World War.
Therefore,
although the scope of the Bank’s lending activities has broadened
with its membership and resources to all types of social projects
and emergency situations in Europe, assistance to migrants and refugees
and to the countries which host them is fully in line with its original
vocation.
26. Established in October 2015, the Migrant and Refugee Fund
(MRF) has since then provided emergency assistance to “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia, Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic, to ensure that refugees and migrants passing through these
countries have safe shelter and basic care by adapting and upgrading
existing facilities to make them appropriate for winter conditions.
The grant of €1.5 million to Slovenia financed the purchase of 100
heated modular units, providing more appropriate shelter than tents
in cold weather, and the procurement of 10 vehicles to facilitate
the transportation of migrants and refugees between various reception
centres, according to the needs and availability of shelter. At
the time, the number of refugees asking for international protection
in Slovenia was negligible.
27. The CEB has also provided funding for actions such as training
in cultural mediation and intercultural competencies for public
service providers. In “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,
a significant part of the €2.2 million Migrant and Refugee Fund
grant is funding the installation of a fully industrial kitchen
and several field kitchens in the reception centres, based on UNHCR
recommendations. This will facilitate food preparation and ensure
that refugees have access to warm meals. The Bank’s loans are often
combined with other funding programmes, in particular those of the
European Commission.
3.4.2. The
World Bank
28. In all, 86% of the refugees
under the UNHCR’s mandate in 2015 were in low- and middle-income countries
close to situations of conflict, many of which struggle to come
up with sustainable means to manage the additional costs of hosting
them (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey). The World Bank’s
Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), announced at the
World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, is designed to help them to acquire
key development financing while at the same time bridging the gap
with organisations providing direct humanitarian assistance on the
ground. The facility was launched by a US$50 million contribution
from the United States at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees on 20
September 2016. The GCFF is added to the Concessional Financing
Facility for the Middle East and North Africa (CFF) – also launched
in 2016 – to support Jordan and Lebanon, the two middle-income countries
whose demographics have been most altered by hosting large numbers
of refugees.
3.4.3. The
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
29. The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) predominantly works in situations of conflict.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) co-ordinates and provides international assistance following
disasters caused by natural hazards in mainly non-conflict situations.
Finally, the National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, made
up of volunteers and staff in 190 countries, provides services to
vulnerable people in their own countries and contribute to international
fundraising efforts. In 2015, the ICRC requested US$1.7 billion
through its appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance, an increase
of 15% on 2014’s request. Donors responded to ICRC appeals in 2015
with contributions of US$1.4 billion, leaving a shortfall of US$259
million (16% of requested funding). Funding requirements were dominated
by continuing humanitarian needs in the Syria crisis (10.3% of appeal
requirements).
3.4.4. Médecins
sans Frontières
30. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)
is a non-profit, self-governed organisation, guided by medical ethical principles
and sworn to impartiality. In 2015, 92% of the MSF’s overall funding
of 1.44 billion euros came from private voluntary donations. Donations
rise each year, as the organisation’s reputation and track record
is confirmed and the tax deductions on donations provide incentive
to donors.
4. Challenges
to effective emergency humanitarian assistance for refugees
31. The main challenges to international
emergency humanitarian assistance are political and structural, with
particular problems with respect to rapid implementation and accountability.
4.1. Problems
of politics and policies
32. The main problem with national
funding of humanitarian assistance lies in its advantage – the greatest proximity
to the situations they seek to remedy. While external assistance
organisms may have difficulties in reading the complexity of a country’s
needs and those of the “persons of concern” within the territory, governments
and regional authorities as well as national NGOs have first-hand
knowledge and experience of the challenges. It has already been
shown that all countries foot the biggest bill for internal humanitarian
aid. On the other hand, domestic management of refugee and migrant
crises reawakens historic identity and perceived security issues,
inspiring protectionist nationalistic tendencies. The refusal of
some EU member States (Hungary, for instance) to accept the European
Union’s “relocation quota” proposals is based on arguments of national
sovereignty, but is symptomatic of the country’s political reluctance
to receive more migrants.
33. With respect to the European Union itself, there is a danger
that priorities appear to be shifting from humanitarian assistance
and placing human rights and values at the forefront to a declared
policy of security aimed at controlling borders (i.e. leaving many
of those most in need on the other side of the frontier) and to dealing
with refugee “problems” outside of European Union countries. The
3 billion euro EU–Turkey Agreement
was the
first move in this direction, now confirmed by the Valetta Declaration
in February 2017, which states that capacity-building for Libya
should enable the country to host refugees and conduct asylum and
return procedures. This “outsourcing” of part of Europe’s emergency
humanitarian action behind EU borders may jeopardise the protection
of the human rights of the people concerned under international conventions.
34. An article published in the online news site
EurActiv in April
2016 pointed to the large proportion of European aid funds now being
spent on the management of migratory flows, sometimes at the direct
expense of development projects. It referred to a report by the
Court of Auditors which found that “security and border protection
were the predominant element in European migration spending”. Concerns
were raised that European development aid is becoming increasingly
influenced by the European Union’s security interests, and that
strengthening security at the borders in order to contain migration
was not helping the refugees themselves, or populations suffering
from poverty in developing countries or dealing with extreme inequality. This
trend was also apparent when the development ministers of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee’s 29 countries agreed to expand
their definition of development assistance to include more spending
linked to peace and security operations.
4.2. Structural
problems
35. Large organisations inevitably
have complex administrative systems and procedures. The UNHCR and European
Union mechanisms are very different but present to some extent the
same symptoms of delay between decision making and action, and between
sums allocated and those actually spent on the ground.
36. The assessment of the UNHCR’s action to be taken is made very
courageously on needs assessment of “the comprehensive persons of
concern” worldwide, without any certainty as to the availability
of funding available. As has already been noted, unexpected emergency
situations then add to the strain put on the existing budget and
increase pressure to raise more funds, and shortfalls are increasing
each year (US$8.9 billion in 2015). Providing a consistent level
of support to the millions of people of concern to the UNHCR and
to the partners with which it works results in further operational
and financial strain in the absence of further financial support.
With the gap between needs and funding increasing, the UNHCR must
adopt more innovative and more long-term approaches to how it plans
and responds to the needs of people of concern, but also in how
and from where it raises funds to do so.
37. The European Union’s seven-year programmes span such a long
time period that constant adjustment is required, entailing delays
in decision making and delivery. As an example, on 7 March 2016
the European Council called for an acceleration of the implementation
of relocation in order to alleviate the humanitarian situation in
Greece, and on 15 December endorsed the Joint Action Plan on the
implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016,
including the relocation target
for Greece of 2 000 monthly transfers. As of January 2017, only
13 968 of the agreed 22 504 resettlements had been carried out.
4.3. Accountability
and implementation
38. The UNHCR publishes financial
data on the Global Focus platform and the Financial Tracking System (FTS),
in addition to regular reporting to the governance and oversight
mechanisms. However, the standard of the data is not yet fully harmonised
with other agencies. The United Nations is now endeavouring to solve problems
of transparency and accountability as a follow-up to the Grand Bargain
commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit (see below). The
aim is to publish transparent and harmonised data and allow traceability
of donors’ funding by 2018 (from donors through the UNHCR to international
and local partners). The FTS is managed by the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and collects reports on
humanitarian funding flows submitted by government donors, UN-administered
funds, UN agencies, NGOs and other humanitarian actors and partners,
including the private sector. The FTS provides visibility on financial contributions
to humanitarian activities, an updated picture of funding flows
between donors (government and private sector) and recipient organisations,
and monitors funding progress against humanitarian response plan and
appeal requirements.
39. In March 2016, a European Court of Auditors’ report on European
Union humanitarian funding up to 2014
was highly critical of the European
Union’s programmes, pointing to a lack of reliable indicators for irregular
immigration statistics in the European Union which made the evaluation
of these programmes difficult. It also stated that funds were too
diluted, with small amounts of aid money going to a large number
of small projects. In other cases, only some parts of the programmes
had been implemented due to capacity and management challenges on
the ground. Examples of partially effective projects given in the
report were the Seahorse Mediterranean capacity-building programme
for North African governments to enhance border surveillance so
as to better tackle irregular immigration and illicit trafficking.
One year after the start of the project, only Libya had joined the
network and project implementation was severely compromised there
by the prevailing climate of insecurity and instability. Overall,
according to the report, five projects were implemented with a delay
of less than 12 months, and five projects incurred a delay of more
than 12 months.
40. The end beneficiaries of aid often have little choice or influence
in the services they receive, and feedback mechanisms so far have
had little impact on changing programme delivery. The UNHCR is now committed
to providing more accessible information to ensure that an effective
process for participation and feedback is in place and that design
and management decisions are responsive to the views of affected communities
and people, and donors will henceforth have to agree that programmes
can be adapted following community feedback.
5. Conclusions
and recommendations
41. The “Grand Bargain” struck
during the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 between the United Nations’
15 biggest donors and 15 biggest aid providers aimed to reduce the
humanitarian funding gap, and provides a good roadmap for improvement
in global responses to emergency humanitarian funding. Its ten main
commitments include increasing predictable and flexible funding
and improving delivery of humanitarian aid, with the aim of saving
$1 billion in efficiency over the next five years, to be spent on
direct humanitarian action. The agreement was a follow-up to the
UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel report published in January
2016.
42. The commitments are:
- greater
transparency;
- more support and funding tools for local and national
responders (with the aim of transferring at least 25% of programme
expenditure to national and local responders and reducing administrative
barriers to partnerships);
- increased use and co-ordination of cash-based programming;
- reducing duplication and management costs;
- data streamlining, with joint and impartial needs assessments
by specialists;
- a “participation revolution” to include people receiving
aid in making decisions which affect their lives;
- increased collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning
and funding;
- reduced earmarking of donor contributions (in order to
respond more flexibly to emergencies);
- harmonised and simplified reporting requirements by the
end of 2018;
- enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development
actors.
43. Coupled with the need to keep the basic needs and fundamental
rights of migrants arriving in Europe at the forefront of humanitarian
financing policies, and to encourage member States to increase burden-sharing and
solidarity, these commitments, if implemented, should help to address
the migration crisis and contribute to sustainable solutions to
cope with migration flows in the future.