1. Introduction
1. The right to freedom of expression
and information and freedom and diversity of the media are fundamental
elements of true democracy: no system can claim to be “democratic”
if it does not effectively ensure media pluralism and independence.
2. At European Union level, the European Regulators Group for
Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA)
has stated unequivocally that: “An independent
media is the cornerstone of our European democracies, enabling citizens
to form their own opinions and not be steered in one way or another
by any stakeholder, including the State.”
In September 2015, the OSCE Representative
on Freedom of the Media – the world’s only intergovernmental media
watchdog – published a fact-sheet on media freedom in the “OSCE
region”, in which it stated that “[f]ree media is essential to free
and open society, no nation can develop democratically without free
expression and the publication and distribution of ideas and opinions”.
Overseas, the American Department
of Defence recently stated in a revision of its Law of War Manual:
“Journalists play a vital role in free societies and the rule of
law and in providing information about armed conflict.”
3. These statements are a very clear acknowledgment of the need
to recognise and protect the role of independent journalists in
all places and all circumstances; but the reality is far from being
consistent with this expectation. As the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU) stressed, “Our commitment to independence needs to be underpinned
by safeguards in law, and our commitment to the safety of journalists
needs to be underpinned in all our actions”.
Regrettably, this is not just a
hollow remark. Media freedom is no longer an exclusive challenge
for young or growing democracies. On the contrary, the development
of new media and particularly the growing influence of social network
platforms have put to the test the long-established traditions of
respect for freedom of expression in well-established democracies
too.
4. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović,
has admitted that “media freedom throughout the OSCE region is under
threat”.
In 2014, she intervened
more than 250 times on free media matters across the OSCE member
States and, in a publication of 2015 on “Safety of journalists:
an imperative for free media”,
stated that between 1997 and 2015,
a total of 137 journalists were killed in the line of duty in OSCE
participating States. She also expressed serious concerns about
the culture of impunity and non-prosecution of perpetrators of violence
against journalists.
5. Since 2002, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), a leading organisation
on media freedom in the world, has been publishing the annual World
Press Freedom Index; the 2016 edition denounces “a deep and disturbing
decline in media freedom”
. In December 2016, RSF released its
annual worldwide round-up of journalists who are detained, held
hostage or missing, showing that “the numbers are rising dramatically”.
A negative trend is confirmed by
the increasing number of reports on violence against journalists
and violations of press freedom published by the Mapping Media Freedom
(MMF) initiative.
The
data available from the Council of Europe Platform to promote the
protection of journalism and safety of journalists
are just as worrying and our report
on “Attacks against journalists and media freedom in Europe”
depicted an alarming situation in
many European countries.
6. Talk about independence of the media makes little sense when
journalists can only do their work at the risk of their lives or
freedom and the media outlets which employ them run the risk of
simply being put out of business. There are, however, subtle ways
of eroding the freedom of the media and journalists, such as forcing self-censorship
or, indeed, taking control over certain media outlets and subjugate
them to the interests of their oppressors. We must recognise the
threat which these methods pose to the independence and also the genuine
pluralism of the media and hence to our democratic systems.
7. As it emerged from a recent public consultation by the European
Commission on media pluralism and democracy, the methods for political
influence on media and journalists’ behaviour are not new. However, traditional
methods of influence have been adapted to developments in politics,
economics and journalism over the years, and advancements in technology
have brought about new prevailing ways of access to communication
channels. On the basis of the excellent expert report submitted
by Ms Margo Smit,
which
I very broadly endorse, I intend highlighting some of the methods –
whether old, transformed or completely new – that seek to influence
journalists and media politically, and their consequences.
2. What are independent media?
8. The “independence” of media
outlets must be examined in financial, operational and editorial
contexts. It cannot be separated from pluralism; they are two pillars
of true media freedom and democracy, which reinforce each other.
The present report does not discuss media pluralism, but it is clear
that the latter uphold independence as it weakens the effectiveness
of pressures intended to silence criticisms; at the same time independence
is a necessary condition to impede pluralism becoming merely formal.
Independence of the media and independence of journalists do not
necessarily coincide: in theory, a media outlet can enjoy the required
guarantees to develop freely its own editorial line while (some
of) the journalists working for it could be subjected to targeted
pressures or specific threats. However, in practice, external interference
over a media outlet can hardly be without effect on the work of
its journalists and pressures or threats which impact journalists’
behaviour can hardly be without effect on the operation of media
outlets employing them.
9. The mission statement of the European Broadcasting Union on
the core values of public service media provides a framework for
the definition of independent media: “We make our choices only in
the interest of our audiences. We strive to be completely impartial
and independent from political, commercial and other influences
and ideologies. Free to challenge the powerful, test prevailing
assumptions, and contribute to an informed citizenship. We want
to be autonomous in all aspects within our remit such as programming,
editorial decision-making, staffing.”
10. This statement can be combined with aspects that the Parliamentary
Assembly underlined in its
Recommendation
1878 (2009) on funding of public service broadcasting: “Public service
broadcasters must be an important public source of unbiased information
and diverse political opinions; they must function under high editorial
standards of objectivity, fairness and independence from party political
or economic interference; they should be subject to higher public
scrutiny and accountability for their programming than commercial broadcasters.”
11. Transparency is an essential condition of the independence
of the media at all levels, from financial ownership to sponsorship
relationships, from operational outlines to editorial policies and
guidelines (published, upheld and be sanctioned in case of non-compliance).
Transparency must be supported by legally protected independent
regulatory authorities, for instance following as a benchmark the
recommendations by the European Regulators Group for Audio Visual
Media
and considering that, as the EBU
states: “To fulfil our commitment to the public, we require robust
legislation, adequate and sustainable funding. We require professional
governance to safeguard editorial independence and to ensure that
we can perform to the highest professional standards.”
3. Vulnerability
to influence on account of lack of transparency about media ownership
and funding mechanisms
12. A recent report of the Committee
on Culture, Science, Education and Media
deals
extensively end eloquently with the issue of transparency of media
ownership. I would further underline the importance of banning non-transparent
legal ownership constructions and hidden ownership, and the conclusion
of the report: “Member States should … ensure that the public have
access to specific information about the ownership, management and
editorial structures of media as well as their financing. Relevant
information shall be submitted by the media outlets concerned to
an independent national media authority.”
13. The availability of and access to data on “beneficial and
ultimate” media ownership structures help to track the abuse of
media power by various powerful interests. As the same report of
our committee states: “Judicial and legislative bodies should be
encouraged to expressly recognise the links between freedom of expression,
media plurality and a functioning democracy, on the one hand, and
media ownership transparency, on the other.”
14. Full transparency of media outlets requires not only ownership
information but also disclosure of “key control points”, namely
“transparency of influence”. Therefore the identification, inter alia, of their management boards
and their key executive officers is also crucial. The transparency
of regulatory bodies must also be ensured; their appointment, mandate,
function and powers must be designated so as to ensure independence from
any influence, especially from the governments.
15. Another issue to be taken into account is the transparency
of media ownership structures and the business engagement of media
owners in fields other than the media. It is relatively complicated
for the ordinary citizens to track the extent and impact of such
a phenomenon, which as far as we know is not widespread within the
Council of Europe geographical area.
16. At organisational level, the recent “Media Ownership Monitor”
reports of Reporters Without Borders
reveal the scope, utmost gravity
and ultimate consequences of political influence – on top of that,
political dependence – when media owners risk the independence of
production and dissemination of media content in the interest of
more profit.
17. Media outlets seek profit to stay in business. The need to
make money – be it for an owner or other stakeholder – does not
necessarily translate into a lack of independence: an array of newspapers,
magazines, websites and TV/radio stations with commercial obligations
are dedicated to impartial and balanced journalism. However, full
transparency of ownership structures and financial ties, for public
and commercial media organisations alike, enhances their accountability
and public trust in their operation.
18. The fundament of a democratic society is citizens who are
capable of underpinning the democracy and promoting its development
through free, multiple viewpoints and critical thinking about societal
issues. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 5), but also the UNESCO Universal Declaration on cultural diversity
of 2001, requires that States guarantee media pluralism for the
sake of an active and well-informed society.
19. Transparency of media ownership structures, in this context,
strengthens media pluralism by ensuring the availability of information
from diverse sources, and help to monitor and promote it, as it
enables to assess the level of – and possibly prevents – media concentrations
that may exercise hidden influence due to their dissemination channels.
However, the present situation is not satisfactory, as we noted
in our report on “Increasing transparency of media ownership”.
20. I believe it is also important to make here a warning about
the influence that political and economic powers could have through
advertising policies. The risk of losing resources from advertising
because what you could publish would affect the interests of the
(public or private) advertiser may have a tremendous chilling effect,
in particular when resources are crucial for the viability of the
media outlet concerned. This is why it is so important that, when
the advertiser is a public authority, its advertising policy is
anchored to criteria which are neutral with regard to the editorial
policies of the beneficiaries.
4. Public
service media
21. In times of fast changing media
consumer habits and the internationalisation and ubiquity of information availability,
there is discussion about the necessity of having (national) public
service media (PSM). In my view, the need is now greater than ever
before. In this respect, in its
Declaration
on public service media governance,
the Committee of Ministers
“alerts to the risks to pluralism and diversity in the media and,
in consequence, to democratic debate and commitment, if the current
model, which includes public service, commercial and community media,
is not preserved”.
22. The European Broadcasting Union states that PSM should be
“a trusted source of objective and impartial information; a reliable
provider of high quality and cultural content; a guardian of pluralistic
and minority views; a reference point in times of national crisis”.
It
is hard to give a better explanation of why our democratic systems
need independent PSM that are strong enough to remain competitive
in a cut-throat information and entertainment market; they are a
vital bulwark both against inaccurate information (indiscriminate,
irrelevant, misleading) and against disinformation aimed at manipulating
public opinion.
23. Indeed, the Committee of Ministers states that: “As an important
public source of unbiased information and diverse political opinions,
public service media must remain independent from political or economic interference
and achieve high editorial standards of impartiality, objectivity
and fairness.”
In
the same vein, in
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2012)1, the Committee of Ministers states: “The first priority
for public service media must be to ensure that their culture, policies,
processes and programming reflect and ensure editorial and operational
independence.”
24. In order to fulfil their role of providers of independent
and unbiased information to the public, PSM need stable and adequate
funding.
However,
with growing discontent amongst the general public – claiming it
does not feel represented by public broadcasters – and politicians
eager to cater to this discontent
increasingly requiring proof of
PSM’s public value, it becomes more and more popular to regard PSM
as elitist and expensive, and thus an easy target for budget cuts.
In addition, continuous changes in these funding mechanisms make
PSM vulnerable to (attempts at) political arm wrestling.
25. To date, the marketing of advertising time remains the main
sources of funding for free-to-air commercial broadcasting services
and contractual fees are the main source of revenue for commercial
services such as pay-TV, which are predominantly free of advertising.
PSM are mainly financed either directly from public budgets or from
statutory licence fees. However, in some countries (including Austria,
Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Italy) they are also partly funded
by advertising; this is even the main source of revenue of the Polish
PSM. In the United Kingdom, two parallel systems exist: the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is exclusively funded by licence
fees, while Channel 4, ITV and Five (which do not get a share of
the licence fee proceeds) have mainly advertising revenues.
26. The license fee structure is still the funding scheme considered
to provide the most independence to PSM. For example, the media
licence fee established in 2007 in Denmark (which is a device-dependent household
fee, with a high degree of technological neutrality) produced good
results in terms of stability of the system in securing continuity
of funding.
But the trend within the EBU area
is away from licence fees towards other funding schemes such as
direct grants or receiving a (not always objectively defined) slice
of the general tax pie. This change adds an extra level of uncertainty
about budgeting, for when license fees are replaced with general
taxation, governments can cut the budgets of public broadcasters
even more easily than when an affixed licence fee has to be allocated
to PSM.
28. The latter trend also emerges from another report on licence
fees, in which the EBU states that: “The higher the licence fee
in any given country, the larger the market share PSM achieve on
their domestic markets. This clearly speaks in favour of not reducing
licence fees but more for guaranteeing sustainable and stable levels
of funding for PSM.”
29. A recent comparative analysis of risks of political influence
on PSM in 19 European Union countries
highlights several threats, among
them the influence on funding schemes is one of the most prominent.
The study, also referring to Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1, asks
that it be ensured that financing meets PSM’s needs through participation
of PSM “in the decision-making about the level of financing. In
other words, the state shouldn’t be able to decide the level of
licence fee without consultations and taking into account the financial
needs of the PSM”.
30. Staunchly independent national regulatory bodies could play
an additional buffer role here
– perhaps even
through removing the responsibility for setting licence fees from
the political bodies and initiating an independent calculation of
the costs of PSM – and independence of the regulatory body from
political powers should be guaranteed. Also, with younger generations
being less inclined to buy a radio or a television and thus a likely
decline of licence fee revenues if based on the current description
of taxable devices, when and what devices to charge a license fee
for should be redefined while also discussing inclusion of new connected devices.
31. When considering other funding methodologies for PSM, the
above-mentioned comparative analysis states: “On the other side
of the spectrum are usually direct state grants to the PSM, which
are often seen as tools through which the State can try to influence
the PSM … PSM can … be harmed by this type of funding since it can
affect the perception of their independence in the eyes of the public.
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that PSM’s political independence
is correlated with the trust in PSM, so the more the State is able
to influence the PSM, the less trust in its content citizens have.”
32. The study finds that “six out of 19 studied countries do not
have media law prescribing transparent and objective procedures
on determining the amount of money to be granted to PSM (Austria,
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia). Furthermore,
five out of 13 countries that do have appropriate legal provisions
are evaluated as at risk due to the ways in which governments are
able to decide the amount of money to be granted to the PSM (Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain). In our sample, half of examined
countries (n=9) have PSM that receives substantial direct State
grants, which is considered to represent a risk to its independence,
i.e. grants could be used as a point of pressure from the State”.
33. Opening up PSM funding to a broader array of sources, including
advertising, sponsoring and product placement (as several countries
to a certain extent already do), might free PSM from stifling government dependency.
But, again, the key words here must be full transparency and accountability
on financial, operational and editorial policies concerning the
sources of income. Indeed, a primary role in the determination of
the product would be played by the advertisers if they were the
main financial source, and they are often tied to the political
elites and political forces (in power or opposition), thus a source
of political influence. Certain current interesting developments
towards taxing and levying should be watched closely in case they
prove to be favourable to independent media
.
34. In an increasingly financially strained media landscape, many
(hyper) local media find a source of income in the dissemination
(printing, streaming or broadcasting) of (local) authorities’ announcements
and regulations. However, when local politics – in their own opinion
unnecessarily or unfavourably – are held accountable by these same
media, it is a small step to cut off this income source. This is
both a very crude and a highly sophisticated method of gaining political
influence, as local media have little resistance and thus may resort
to self-censorship in order to keep the income.
Research into the occurrence of
this phenomenon is scarce and highly anecdotal, due to the fact
that neither (local) government bodies nor media organisations are very
likely to report incidents. But it is clear that, when the government
or business interests related to the government is the main advertiser,
political intervention through the funding mechanism is more destructive.
35. In positive terms, I would like to refer here to the experience
of the “free radio stations”, for example in Austria, Germany, Switzerland
and the Netherlands.
Besides
the public and the commercial private radio broadcasters, free radios
can be considered (together with the “open channels”) as a third
column in the media landscape. They are independent, self-determined,
grassroots associations; they are often non-profit and do not have
commercial advertising as a source of revenue. They see themselves
as communication channels in the local and regional areas and aim
at supporting local and regional development. Political pirate movements are
among their predecessors. They are alternative media, which critically
deal with societal issues, and they form part of what has been defined
the “counter-public sphere”. They contribute to public debate challenging the
message of mainstream traditional media and are therefore a factor
of stronger freedom of expression. In Austria they can benefit from
public funding, though there is no interference by public authorities
in their editorial policies.
36. To prevent (local) government bodies from throwing their weight
around, one could argue against the publication of government announcements
in independent media. That would mean excluding a welcome source
of income for small, often (hyper)local media, for which replacement
is not easy. In countries where this phenomenon is observed, funding
schemes should move away from this form of direct funding to, for
instance, a grant system with “Chinese walls” between donors (which
then can be a government body) and recipients.
Grant
systems like this, when desired or deemed necessary, could be extended
to private media as well if those media applying provide news and
independent information that is not (or not sufficiently) provided
by other means.
37. We should question the ways and terms needed for protecting
and promoting public interest and ensuring that PSM remain answerable
to the public, rather than cutting their budget; however, despite
their financial problems, PSMs are somewhat protected from market
forces and still have higher financial security than private media.
In this respect, solution-oriented action concerning their financing
should also pay special attention to the public requirements which
PSMs have to respect and assess to what extend they truly meet those
requirements that are often neglected by the private media.
5. Appointment
policies and staffing
38. The practice of “political
appointments”, which is one of the oldest methods of gaining or
keeping political influence, seems to have gained new strength and
appeal in recent times: “the appointments of the PSM boards in the
countries of Central Eastern Europe are one of the most common techniques
of retaining control over public media.”
However, this – rather coarse – method
of political influence on independent media is most certainly not
constrained to central and eastern Europe.
39. Although it does not cover the entire Council of Europe area,
the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM)
can shed light on these methods
of political influence on independent media. In the MPM, a separate
section is devoted to political independence of the media, examining
the legal framework in which PSM operate, plus the extent to which
this legislation is implemented and is safeguarding PSM’s independence.
(Attempts to use) political appointment strategies are considered
an important threat to the independence of media organisations
, not just PSM, though
these are often the first to feel a government’s strong arm. While
the results of the gathering of date by the MPM for 2015 were published
in 2016,
new poignant examples of
this method of political influence have since been observed in –
for instance but not exclusively – Croatia
and Turkey
.
40. This trend is often only cautiously opposed by European institutions,
for there is a lot of hesitancy to criticise these events because
appointing policies are considered a principle of member States’
subsidiarity. But this hesitancy can be perceived as indifference
and turning a blind eye, thus strengthening a (seemingly growing)
boldness of authorities to intervene. On top of this growing boldness
is an apparent increase in public discontent with (public) media
(whether or not fed by political actors
) that reinforces
authorities’ justification of the politicisation of media appointments.
41. Therefore, it is important to at least discuss – but better
still formulate – transnational guidelines and principles for the
appointment process of board and management positions and employees
in (independent) media organisations. In 2012, the Committee of
Ministers stated that it is “legitimate for the State to be involved in
the appointment of the highest supervisory or decision-making authority
within the public service media”.
42. It also stressed that the appointment processes should be
designed so as to guarantee independence of the PSM from the State.
Concrete steps as to how to do this were not outlined, however.
In light of recent developments referred to in the above-mentioned
fact-finding missions to several Council of Europe member States,
initiating and guiding the designing of transparent and depoliticised
appointment procedures is urgent and overdue. The data of the MPMs,
the work of the Council of Europe, plus the outcome of several fact-finding missions
by the IPI and ECPMF could provide groundwork for drawing up these
guidelines applicable to the different member States’ media ecosystem.
43. Besides influencing the staffing of media organisations, political
influence can stretch to affecting or attempting to affect editorial
autonomy, particularly when media are dependent on a ruling party
either financially or for a broadcasting license.
Political influence
on general working conditions of journalists is evenly undesirable,
whether it is on wage levels or accreditation as a working journalist
or other issues. Two separate reports by our committee address the
issues of editorial integrity and the status of journalists; no
more therefore needs to be said on the matter here.
6. Use
of laws and regulations
44. It is unfortunately not infrequent
that laws and regulations which are legitimate and/or necessary
in themselves are used to unduly restrict or impede coverage of
certain issues by independent media or limit their general functioning.
The matter of misuse or even abuse of legislation for dissuasive
effect is a cross-cutting issue that was also dealt with in two
other recent reports.
These
questions will not therefore be analysed in depth in this report,
but their impact on media independence cannot be overlooked and
a few examples of governments’ interference with the free flow of
information should be mentioned briefly here.
45. In the recent past this has happened, for instance, under
the guise of the fight against terrorism or the need to suppress
public protest against unpopular (i.e. austerity) measures. With,
for example, France extending state of emergency regulations
that
might impede journalists working in certain areas, or Hungary
using regulations to watch media
workers or prohibit journalists from covering demonstrations or the
refugee crisis, according to independent media freedom watchdogs
governments exceedingly extend their influence over the possibilities
of free coverage. Interference with free media activity could go
even further, as in recent cases in Turkey where media organisations
were banned or online publications closed. In Germany, the government
is proposing a law that would allow the Bundesnachrichtendienst
to spy on journalists from countries not members of the European
Union.
46. The potential abusive use of defamation laws to (threaten
to) sue media and force them into silence or compliance,
or to discourage sources from coming
forward, is a serious problem. With the internet going across borders
and with that the accessibility of journalistic content, there is
fear of “a race to the bottom” with “libel tourism” moving to countries
with the largest possibilities to sue media organisations. Though
designing defamation laws belongs to States’ area of subsidiarity,
cross-border general observations could be made and published on
the boundaries of defamation and libel issues, preferably by trusted
international organisations. Decriminalisation of defamation has
become one of the major tasks of the Representative on Freedom of Media
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
In recent years, there has been extended activity, particularly
in the countries in south-eastern Europe, providing them with advice
and expertise on implementing reforms in media legislation, in order
to decriminalise defamation and thus increase the sense of security
for journalists and independent journalism in general.
47. Introducing (additional) limitations to access to data and
documents, under the guise of privacy of people and/or companies
close to political ranks or of State security, is a relatively new
method employed to exert influence over independent media, but it
is very disturbing. Access to data and documents must be considered a
fundamental component of freedom of information, unless there are
justifiable restrictions. But those should be confined to what is
admissible under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. If allowed, by (re)defining what constitutes a document,
State security, company confidentiality or privacy, political spheres
can gain new ground against the right of the public (and of journalists)
to access or use information. Speaking out against these incidents
is of great importance.
48. No true democracy can do without enabling citizens’ (and thus
journalists’) access to documents through a working freedom of information
law. Without going into this too extensively,
in
several countries proposed amendments to freedom of information
laws and regulations (sometimes outdated and in urgent need of overhaul)
may very well impede a smooth handling of freedom of information
requests.
However, also in this aspect there
are best practices that can be an inspiration or benchmark and could
be promoted, such as recent initiatives by the city of Madrid.
49. There is Europe-wide concern about the treatment of whistle-blowers,
recently culminating in protests against the sentencing of the whistle-blower
that initiated the so-called LuxLeaks reporting on tax evasion by the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists ICIJ.
Though in this case the reporters
were not charged, the sentencing of a high profile whistle-blower
can have a chilling effect that goes beyond borders.
50. The expansion of new media and methods used to disclose political
affairs, primarily of a corrupt and criminal nature, have challenged
the readiness of political elites to create legal frameworks providing
for the protection of whistle-blowers. I would like to highlight
that, in early 2015, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
was hit by a major wiretapping scandal, which revealed serious abuse
of power by Prime Minister Gruevski and members of his cabinet.
Even though there were attempts to adopt legislation in parliament
to protect whistle-blowers, they failed.
51. In response to the ever-growing dangers for news and information
providers, Reporters Without Borders is calling for the creation
of the position of “Special Representative for the safety of journalists
“, directly attached to the office of the United Nations Secretary-General,
arguing that: “The many UN resolutions on protecting journalists
and combating impunity for crimes against them have yet to produce
satisfactory results.”
7. Psychological
violence and intimidation
52. During the exchange of views
with our committee on 23 March 2017,
Professor
Marilyn Clark presented the key outcomes of the survey on “Journalists
under pressure – Unwarranted interference, fear and self-censorship
in Europe”.
The
answers journalists gave to this survey bring to light a widespread
situation of distress which originates not only from the most evident
threats we are used to looking at and condemning – though apparently
with no real results – but also from forms of unwarranted interference
which, though less visible, are sadly effective in provoking self-censorship.
If, in the period 2014-2016, 46% of journalists in the sample had
been threatened with force and 31 % had suffered physical assault,
they are 69% who have experienced psychological violence and 53%
cyberbullying. In particular, psychological violence included, among
others, interference by public authorities in the forms of intimidation
(56%), humiliation (48%) and slandering or smear campaigns (43%).
53. These methods are combined with – and increase the impact
of – other menaces such as: targeted surveillance (24% of journalists
replied they do not feel protected from this threat) and judicial
intimidation (which affected 23% of journalists in the sample) in
the form of arrests, investigations, or (possible) prosecution under
a variety of laws, starting from defamation legislation, public
order and national security or anti-terrorist legislation. It is
very sad, but necessary, to stress that here we are not speaking
only about Turkey or Russia or Belarus, as 63% of the journalists
in the sample from EU and non-EU western countries experienced psychological
violence. We cannot just look elsewhere and pretend that nothing
is wrong in our own countries.
54. The cumulative impact of physical and psychological violence
is shocking both in terms of psychological repercussions
and
of chilling effects.
All
in all, the personal life of 40% of the journalists in the sample
and the work of 37% was affected. It is no consolation that 36%
of journalists declared their determination to resist pressure;
though their resilience calls for greater esteem, what they expect
is not our praise but that we protect them more effectively.
8. Questioning
image and reputation
55. A new and still little explored
phenomenon, which could produce disruptive effects on independent journalism
and public discourse, is the use of social media by politicians
to paint independent media as biased, shady, unreliable and politically
motivated against (ruling) parties or politicians. This is accompanied
by a tendency to use social media as a tool that replaces the dialogue
between politicians and the public through traditional independent
media.
56. An interesting case of this phenomenon could be observed in
the United States presidential election: Mr Trump ran the campaign
mainly through Twitter and live meetings, while banning several
traditional media outlets for “inaccurately” reporting on the campaign
and
(whether or not knowingly) distorting press reports on the campaign.
These traditional media reported on the campaign, but without the
usual access to the candidate, the possibility of seeing the candidate
and thus of balancing the reporting.
57. Examples like this, of politicians avoiding independent media
and increasingly resorting to supplying their own media coverage,
as well as an undisputed smearing of the general press by candidates,
can and will become more frequent as the more communication with
the wider public goes directly through channels such as Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube, the less politicians see the need to be accountable
through critical media.
This phenomenon entails not only
a risk of impoverishment of the quality of public debate, but also
a threat for independent journalism and its role to support critical
thinking and the formation of public opinion. Of course, political
parties are at liberty to choose their means of communication and
picking a medium sympathetic to a candidate is not new. But the
extent to which the current move towards selective means of communication
is possible should be noted. It is difficult to counterbalance this
development other than by continuous education on the value of impartial
information, and thus increasing media literacy amongst the general
public.
:
58. Amongst the public there is a growing distrust, scepticism
and criticism about journalism and journalists. (Parts of) the public
feel under- or misrepresented, question the truthfulness of the
media and their coverage, and extrapolate this into a discussion
on the sheer need for these media’s existence or barring them from covering
certain events. To give just a few examples: in many countries,
discussion is ongoing on the need for or level of public funding
of independent media such as public broadcasters.
Germany over the last year has seen (sometimes
violent) demonstrations against the “Lügenpresse” (lying press).
59. In the worst cases, one can observe political powers fuelling
public distrust of the media. A recent joint fact-finding mission
to Croatia
chronicled
several examples of media or regulators being targeted by smear campaigns
and street protests, concluding that: “Within the context of the
media, journalists and civil society groups describe an atmosphere
in which certain politicians, including prominent members of the
HDZ-Most coalition, have deliberately fostered mistrust in critical
media, regulatory bodies and human rights defenders so as to undercut
the credibility of these institutions. Frequently, this is manifested
in verbal attacks on ‘leftist media’ that display insufficient ‘patriotism’,
with journalists smeared as ‘traitors’, ‘anti-Croats’ or equated
with members of groups such as the Četniks (a Serbian paramilitary
force accused of atrocities against Croats and other groups during
World War II).”
9. Conclusions
9.1. Funding
schemes which safeguard PSM independence
60. Tightening financial screws
on the media to tame them is probably as old as mass media itself.
But with the disappearance of the classical media business model,
due to the omnipresence of low-cost communication technology and
a declining willingness amongst the public to pay for news and information,
it is acquiring extra impact. In this environment, public funding
becomes even more important, but media relying on it become more vulnerable
as well.
61. In this connection, we should encourage national authorities
to review PSM funding systems in their country with the following
key objectives:
- PSM should be entitled to a
level of funding which is predictable and sufficiently stable (as
to allow reasonable future planning) and which enable them to properly
fulfil their mission;
- the system shall be designed so as to avoid funding mechanisms
being used to exercise editorial influence or threaten the PSM’s
institutional autonomy;
- the system should be buoyant, in order to resist the adverse
impact of negative economic cycles;
- there shall be full transparency concerning funding, grants
and sponsoring for PSM and information on PSM funding shall be easily
accessible to the public.
62. Of course, the difficult questions here are how to set the
right mix of sources of funding, how to determine the adequate level
of funding and who should decide. It seems difficult to give a unique
recipe, given the great differences between countries in terms of
market structures, PSM legislative frameworks and economic models;
it is also difficult to suddenly radically change social habits.
However, I believe that we could at least agree on some basic principles.
63. Concerning the level of funding, I consider that it should
be assessed regularly, in consultation with the PSM concerned, and
it should be kept coherent with the agreed role and remit of PSM.
To avoid political interferences, the adequate level of funding
should be determined by an independent body that would assess whether
the PSM programme decisions are coherent with the mission of public
service and whether the financial needs as calculated by PSM are
consistent with the principles of efficiency and economy;
the
room for manoeuvre of policy makers (parliaments and governments)
to change the proposals for funding submitted by this independent
body should then be tight and in particular the possibility to reduce
the funding for reasons linked with programme or media policy should
be excluded. I would add that, in determining the funding level, account
should be taken of the new media environment, with the increasing
significance of online media.
64. Member States should also consider the possibility of establishing
specific rules which do not allow PSM to keep revenues exceeding
real needs; income in excess could be recovered and put in reserve
funds which could then be used in different ways: as part of the
funding for the following year; to accompany investments which are
required to keep pace with technical developments; to support media
literacy programmes; to reinforce pluralism through grants to non-commercial
private media outlets, such as the free radio stations, and so on.
65. Concerning buoyancy, I believe that the resilience of funding
schemes could be enhanced by combining different sources of funding;
preference could be given to licence fees (which should be paid
by all households irrespective of the device) and/or earmarked taxes
to be adjusted (possibly automatically) to the inflation rate, but
I would suggest refraining from subjecting PSM to excessive constraints
concerning advertising compared to those on private media.
9.2. Appointment
procedures which safeguard PSM independence
66. Another difficult issue is
that of political appointments as a means of gaining influence over
media outlets. Of course, we can recall in this respect what is
stated in paragraph 27 of the “Guiding principles for public service
media governance” in the appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1,
namely that “the appointments cannot be used to exert political
or other influence over the operation of the public service media” and
that there should be “clear criteria for the appointments that are
limited, and directly related, to the role and remit of the public
service media”. But this remains too generic. Two other more operational
requirements are listed in the same paragraph: the appointment should
be made “for a specified term that can only be shortened in limited
and legally defined circumstances – which should not include differences
over editorial positions or decisions”; and “representation of men
and women in decision-making bodies should be balanced”. However, alone,
these principles do not really solve the problem.
67. We should explore further what are the options for appointment
mechanisms which could safeguard the genuine independence, including
in editorial terms, of public service media, while preserving national authorities’
oversight role. From my side, I would suggest stressing the role
of the parliaments and the need to preserve the role and the voice
of the opposition in the appointment of the top managers of the
PSM. We should also recommend that the Committee of Ministers resume
work on this important issue with the aim of developing in operational
terms the principles enshrined in its Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1.
9.3. Tackling
the issue of violence against journalists
68. Violence against journalists
and pressures against media freedom have amplified in recent years. Murders
and physical assaults, including sexual violence especially against
female journalists and bloggers; threats to the lives of journalists
and members of their families; unlawful detention and arrests on
unfounded or baseless charges; destruction of private and professional
property, including vandalism and arson; arbitrary raids on editorial
offices and journalists' homes… To these threats we should now add
more sophisticated tactics of psychological violence through intimidation
and harassment, targeted surveillance and cyberbullying, deployed
to silence critical voices and free speech.
69. Building on concrete proposals by experts we heard, I believe
we should urge all our member States to implement effectively Recommendation
CM/Rec(2016)4 on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists
and other media actors in the four key areas of prevention, protection,
prosecution of threats to journalists and media freedom and promotion
of information, education and awareness raising.
70. The experts also suggested performing an independent review
of relevant laws and practices, including those on national security,
terrorism and defamation and having further regular reviews carried
out by human rights commissions or ombudspersons. I consider that
the Council of Europe should guide and accompany such a sensitive
task and propose that we address a targeted recommendation to the
Committee of Ministers in this respect. We should also call for
stronger engagement of our member States, through the Committee
of Ministers, in a constructive dialogue on all serious threats
to media freedom reported on the online Platform to promote the
Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists.
9.4. Countering
growing distrust about journalism and journalists
71. We must condemn strongly and
without hesitation practices which are aimed at fuelling public
distrust of the media. We have to do this as the Parliamentary Assembly,
but we must also do it as parliamentarians of our national legislatures.
72. Part of the problem derives, I believe, from the deviated
use of media – and namely new media – as a weapon against political
antagonists. Our recent report on “Online media and journalists:
challenges and accountability” has dealt with the issue of the post-true
society and increasing risks of manipulation of public opinion though
the media, which in turn provokes mistrust. Here we need to call
on media associations to be more active in identifying and denouncing
abuses. In addition, media organisations and journalists can help restore
trust in the work they produce by, for example:
- disclosing any financial interests
and funding mechanisms;
- developing journalistic codes of ethics based on international
practice and standards of quality journalism;
- implementing easily accessible complaint mechanisms.
This issue falls within the scope of our future report on
“Editorial integrity” and for this reason I will not suggest concrete
recommendations at this stage.
9.5. Facing
the erosion of the role of journalism in today’s media environment
73. A new phenomenon in this spectrum
is the use by political powers of social media and the internet
to circumvent traditional media and journalistic codes in their
communication with the public and the voters. In the framework of
competition between new and traditional media, the changing habits
of, in particular but not exclusively, the so-called digital generation
seem to play into the hands of this development. Journalism’s role in
the way the public acquires, values and exchanges information is
diminishing, and with it the possibility of independent media to
provide quality reporting and initiate quality public debate.
74. Finally, the development of internet and social media is a
great opportunity for reinforcing the independence of the media
and of journalists if we are able to guarantee the necessary conditions
for this. Here again, my report would overlap with other ongoing
reports; thus I would just stress here the importance of stronger
support by our decision makers on the one hand to media literacy,
namely intended to raise awareness of the importance of free media
and quality journalism for democracy, and on the other to journalist training,
intended to strengthen journalists’ loyalty to the truth and to
their audience.