1. Introduction
1. I have been following the situation
in Belarus for the past two and a half years. I was also previously rapporteur
for the Parliamentary Assembly from 2007 to 2009 and my work led
to the adoption of
Resolution 1671
(2009) and
Recommendation
1874 (2009) on the situation in Belarus
2. Subsequently, our Assembly took stock of the severe deterioration
of the situation of human rights and civil and political liberties,
which followed the 2010 presidential election, with
Resolution 1857 (2012) and
Recommendation
1992 (2012) on the situation in Belarus, with Mr Andres Herkel (Estonia,
EPP/CD) as rapporteur, who unfortunately never received an invitation
to visit the country during his rapporteurship from 2011 until 2014.
3. I was appointed rapporteur for a second time on 10 April 2014
and, in April 2015, I prepared an information note outlining the
state of play of the relations between our Assembly and Belarus
since 2010, taking stock of recent signs of opening up, highlighting
major human rights concerns and discussing the relations with the
international community and, in particular, with the Council of
Europe.
4. I have had the opportunity to visit the country several times
since my appointment, upon the invitation of the National Assembly
of the Republic of Belarus on 25 and 26 February 2015, and also
to attend a number of conferences, seminars and round tables on
specific themes, in particular in conjunction with the 2015 presidential
election and the 2016 parliamentary elections and also on the issue
of the death penalty. These events allowed me to maintain close
contacts both with authorities and with civil society representatives
and human rights defenders, who have always been involved in our
discussions.
5. In all interactions, I have always reiterated the Assembly’s
principled position on the establishment of a moratorium on executions
with a view to abolishing the death penalty. At the same time, I
have also stressed that it is high time for Belarus and our Assembly
to start looking in the same direction, build mutual trust and set
up an honest, transparent and regular collaboration.
6. Moreover, the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
has organised regular hearings both in Strasbourg and in Paris,
with the participation of elected representatives of the National
Assembly of Belarus, human rights defenders and opposition leaders.
The latest exchange of views took place on 24 January 2017. For
the first time in twelve years, an elected represented from the
opposition, Ms Hanna Kanopatskaya, from United Civic Party, attended
along with Mr Andrei Naumovich, Chairperson of the Standing Commission
on Human Rights, National Relations and Mass Media, as well a representative
of the Human Rights Centre Viasna, Mr Valiantsin Stefanovic.
7. On 23 and 24 March 2017, I carried out a final visit to Minsk
where I met with government representatives, including the President,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Speakers of both Chambers, as
well as with civil society representatives, including opposition
activists, journalists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
8. The visit took place in the context of large street protests
to defy the so-called “social parasite law” taxing the unemployed,
which culminated in a major demonstration on the annual “Freedom
Day” commemoration on 25 March 2017, the day after my visit. According
to media reports, since the beginning of March, over 100 journalists
have been subject to increasing pressure, detention, violence and
administrative charges, and hundreds of people, including opposition
leaders, have been arrested and many have been charged with hooliganism
and participation in unauthorised protest actions (see below sections
2 and 3).
9. My report inevitably takes into account this recent setback
but also takes stock of the situation over the past three years
and highlights a path of dialogue and trust which, as rapporteur,
I have striven to build, along with other countries and institutions
all over the world, including the Council of Europe, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union
and the United Nations, in what it is known as “critical engagement”
with a regime which has been in place for the past 23 years.
2. Recent political developments
10. My discussions with the Belarusian
authorities over the past years have been open and constructive.
As I stressed in the past, most of my contacts acknowledged that
problems and shortcomings should be discussed openly with all international
partners.
11. The Assembly’s concerns are well known to the Belarusian authorities.
What is less apparent is a clear-cut political will to uphold the
Council of Europe’s values and to engage in a comprehensive reform
process, starting with a moratorium on the execution of the death
penalty.
12. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea pushed the Belarusian
leadership to seek a further rapprochement with European governments
and institutions. Russia reportedly demanded that Belarus build
a Russian air base outside Babruysk, south-east of Minsk, which
Belarus opposed. Russia also introduced passport checks on the Belarusian–Russian
border in early February 2017.
13. At the same time, it is clear that Belarus’ preference for
privileged relations with Russia has strengthened over the years
and Belarus is an active member of the Eurasian Economic Union and
shares open borders and mutual defence commitments with Russia.
The Belarusian economy entered into recession in 2015, the first since
1995. Economic activity continues to stagnate, driven by the economic
contraction in Russia, lower export revenues and domestic structural
problems.
This is becoming very
apparent in the Belarusian society, especially among the elderly,
and street protests began to intensify in February and March 2017.
14. On 17 February 2017, independent trade unions and protest
movements took to the streets to put public pressure on the government
to abolish decree No. 3 “on prevention of social dependency” (known
as “social parasites decree”), signed by the President in April
2015 and imposing a tax (equivalent to more than €200 in compensation
for lost taxes) on those who “have not participated in the financing
of public expenditure or have done it for less than 183 days”.
15. Protests in the region have continued despite the President’s
decision to suspend the enforcement of the decree on 9 March.
According to media and human rights defenders’ reports, over 700
people have been detained since 3 March, including opposition leaders
and activists, journalists and ordinary protesters. The Belarusian
Association of Journalists stated that at least 107 journalists
faced repression and harassment for their professional activities
in March 2017.
16. On 21 March 2017, President Lukashenko accused “Western” organisations
of financing the protests in order to instigate “scuffles and bloodshed”
in the country. He also stated that some 20 “fighters” had been detained
for “preparing armed provocations” on 25 March, “Freedom Day”. On
25 March 2017, police raided the offices of the human rights group
Viasna and briefly detained around 60 people. Amnesty International’s monitors
personally witnessed the detention of many individuals, including
elderly people.
2.1. Presidential
and parliamentary elections
17. Belarus held presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Fourteen
years after the previous invitation in 2001, our Assembly was invited
to take part in the Election Observation Mission of the presidential
election of 11 October 2015 and subsequently the parliamentary elections
of 11 September 2016.
18. The 2015 report of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) indicated that Belarus still has a
considerable way to go to meet its OSCE commitments for democratic elections,
but also noted certain improvements and an open attitude. The campaign
and election day were peaceful and candidates were provided with
a platform to convey their messages despite a restrictive media environment.
However, the integrity of the elections was undermined by significant
problems, in particular voter registration, vote counting, tabulation
of results, concerns regarding access and transparency, early voting procedures
and a general lack of confidence in the independence and impartiality
of the election administration.
19. With a view to the 2016 parliamentary elections, upon my proposal,
the Assembly organised a round table in Minsk on 18 May 2016 on
“Electoral standards and the electoral process improvement in Belarus”,
as part of the Assembly’s activities in the Eastern Partnership
Programmatic Co-operation Framework, funded by the European Commission.
The aim of the round table was to involve the National Assembly
of Belarus in the discussions on the implementation of the OSCE
recommendations and to improve the political climate with a view
to the parliamentary elections of September 2016.
20. For the first time, an international event was hosted by the
National Assembly, with the participation of representatives of
the OSCE/ODIHR, the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), the European Parliament, the Commonwealth of
Independent States Executive Committee, the Center for European
Perspective (Slovenia), and, on the Belarusian side, members of
parliament, the Central Electoral Commission, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, as well representatives of the NGO “Tell the truth” and of
the Belarusian Helsinki Committee.
21. According to the 2016 Election Observation Mission, which
included a Parliamentary Assembly delegation, the parliamentary
elections of 11 September 2016 were efficiently organised but continued
to present long-standing systemic shortcomings, such as a restricted
legal framework for political rights, limited media coverage and
lack of visibility for many candidates, lack of pluralism in electoral
commissions, irregularities with early voting, counting and tabulation
procedures. NGOs also argued that the legislation changes were insufficient
to qualitatively change the character of the campaign towards greater
democracy and transparency.
22. Neither the amendments passed to the Electoral Code in 2013
and 2015, nor the Law on Political Parties, the Law on Mass Media
or the decisions and instructions of the Central Electoral Commission addressed
key recommendations of international organisations, including those
set out in the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Joint Opinion issued
in 2010, and they were not preceded by public consultations with
relevant stakeholders.
23. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Belarus, Mr Miklós
Haraszti, in his latest report noted that “elections in Belarus
remain fully guided and have transformed into ceremonial tools used
to perpetuate power”.
The leader
of the OSCE observer mission, Mr Kent Harstedt, hoped that “the
Belarusian government, together with the newly elected parliament,
will carry on with the democratisation process and undertake a comprehensive
effort to address our long-standing recommendations”.
Ms Gisela Wurm (Austria, SOC), Chairperson
of the Austrian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, stressed
the urgency “to begin immediately the necessary reform of the legal
framework” and that “PACE and the Venice Commission stand ready
to co-operate with Belarus in this regard.”
24. On 24 March 2017, Ms Lidia Yermoshina, Chairperson of the
Central Election Commission, informed me of the recent proposals
of the interagency expert group in charge of considering OSCE/ODIHR recommendations
on improving the electoral process in Belarus, which had just been
submitted to the Head of State for consideration. Proposed changes
include increased independence of election commissions, transparency
of the voting procedures and counting in the presence of observers,
concerns related to early voting, a better use of electoral funds
for nominated candidates who are not yet registered, improvement
of election campaigning and the organisation of rallies. In April
2017, analysts of the civil society campaign “Human Rights Defenders
for Free Elections” presented the results of the monitoring of the
2016 parliamentary elections to the 110 deputies of the lower house,
regretting the absence of any public information on previously announced
steps to improve election legislation
.
25. Speaking before the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
in Strasbourg in January 2017 and in a private meeting we had in
Minsk on 24 March 2017, opposition member Ms Anna Kanopatskaya,
from the United Civic Party, asked our Assembly to support the Belarusians’
right to choose their leaders, starting with the forthcoming municipal
elections of February 2018.
2.2. Signs
of progress
26. The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr Vladimir Makei, during our numerous exchanges, including the
last one we had in Minsk on 24 March 2017, has always stressed that
Belarus, as one of the founding members of the United Nations, is
party to most international human rights instruments, including
the six major human rights treaties
and aspires to fully
comply with its international obligations in this sphere.
27. In this respect, I will refer to a number of reports recently
published by the Council of Europe, the European Union and other
international organisations, including the United Nations, the OSCE
as well as human rights defenders, whose representatives I have
met on numerous occasions, both in Strasbourg and in Minsk.
28. While the human rights situation – which I will detail in
the next chapter – has clearly deteriorated in recent weeks, up
to March 2017 a number of signs pointed to Belarus’ willingness
to make progress and open up, namely:
i. Belarus’ relations with the diplomatic community in Minsk
have been steadily improving over the past few years. Just to mention
an example, the day I was in Minsk, prior to the demonstration of
25 March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs convened all European
Union Ambassadors to discuss the situation;
ii. regardless of the Belarusian leadership’s self-interest
and need to improve the country’s international image, one cannot
deny that Belarus has been playing an important role in the regional
context, with an autonomous stance vis-à-vis Russia on the Ukraine
conflict and also in its relations with the Republic of Moldova
and Georgia, which has also contributed to creating a positive climate
between the European Union and Belarus over the past three years;
iii. Belarus has no territorial conflicts and disputes with
its neighbours and openly supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity
and facilitated the de-escalation of the crisis;
iv. in August 2015, the government released six individuals
convicted in previous years on politically motivated charges (but
has not yet restored their civil and political rights);
v. opposition candidates were allowed to register more easily
at the last elections and observers were granted better access to
the vote count according to the OSCE/ODIHR report;
vi. independent candidate Anna Kanopatskaya, of the United
Civic party, and Yelena Anisim, of the Belarusian Language Society,
won a seat in parliament, and I was able to meet with both of them
during my last visit to Minsk;
vii. up to February 2017, the NGOs and human rights defenders
I met had all noted an improved political climate, despite persisting
human rights concerns, and were generally open to dialogue with
the authorities; obviously the latest events have dramatically changed
this perception;
viii. the Assembly was invited to monitor the past elections
and I was invited twice, as Assembly rapporteur, to visit the country
and to take part in a number of international conferences, which
were organised by the Council of Europe, the European Union and
the United Nations in Minsk, showing the authorities’ willingness
to engage in dialogue with the international community on human
rights and rule of law issues;
ix. in 2017, Belarus took over the Presidency of the Central
European Initiative . It chose “Promoting connectivity in
a Wider Europe” as the main theme of its Presidency.
3. Major
human rights concerns and a new wave of repression as of March 2017
3.1. Human
rights and fundamental freedoms
29. Despite an improved political
climate up to March 2017, there has been no systematic improvement
in the human rights situation in Belarus and government restrictions
on political freedoms, in particular freedom of speech, association,
peaceful assembly and religion, have remained in place.
30. Up to March 2017, according to the Human Rights Centre Viasna,
the Belarusian authorities had been implementing a policy of “soft
practices”, which began in August 2015, and had abstained from violently dispersing
unauthorised protests and detaining protesters and sentencing them
to short jail terms. At the same time, administrative sanctions
for exercising freedom of peaceful assembly and expression increased sevenfold
in 2016 compared to 2015.
31. In 2016, human rights defenders documented cases of prosecution
on political grounds against seven people: Vadzim Zharomski, Maksim
Piakarski, Viachaslau Kasinerau, Dzmitry Paliyenka, Eduard Palchys, Aliaksandr
Lapitski and Uladzimir Kondrus. According to them, new politically
motivated prison sentences were pronounced in 2016 against Aliaksandr
Lapitski and activist Mikhail Zhamchuzhny.
32. Article 193.1 of the Criminal Code continues to penalise the
activities of non-registered associations in Belarus and as a result
over 150 Belarusian NGOs have registered in Lithuania, Poland, the
Czech Republic and elsewhere. Restrictions also apply to political
parties and to some religious groups, which continue to experience
difficulties in obtaining registration, holding religious meetings
and finding suitable venues to hold religious services. The Minister
of Justice informed me of the ongoing proposals to simplify the
registration process, reduce the number of signatures required and
implement other OSCE recommendations. However, no real change has
taken place in the meantime.
33. With regard to freedom of expression and assembly, the use
of administrative detention and violence to intimidate the opposition,
especially in connection with the recent protests, is alarming and
particularly disturbing at this time of rapprochement between Belarus
and our Assembly. Everything should be done to avoid people who
have been held prior and during the demonstrations becoming political
prisoners. As I stressed in a statement following my visit, filling
up prisons is not the solution to deal with criticism and dissent and
only distances the country from the European standards of respect
for freedom of expression, assembly and human rights.
34. Already in
Resolution
2141 (2017) on attacks against journalists and media freedom in
Europe, adopted on 24 January 2017, the Assembly regretted that
media pluralism and diversity were still absent in Belarus. This
fact limits the Belarusian people in exercising public control over
government conduct and especially hampers the respect of democratic
standards during elections.
35. According to Reporters without Borders, freelance journalists
cannot get accreditation and are harassed by the judicial authorities.
The Information Ministry has stepped up its control over print media
distribution networks and the Internet, further restricted freedom
of expression by expanding the definition of “extremism” and banned
the software used to circumvent online censorship. Belarus ranked
157 out of 180 in the 2016 World Press Freedom Index.
3.2. Capital
punishment
36. In violation of its obligations
under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Belarus has continued to carry out death sentences, the
last one on 17 March 2017, despite the call for interim protection
measures issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and
repeated calls by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
the Committee of Ministers, our Assembly as well as the European Union
leadership.
37. Two men sentenced to death, Kiryl Kazachok and Siarhei Vostrykau,
are currently held on death row and the sentences can be enforced
at any moment. I have reacted strongly to each new execution and
death sentence
and
stressed that each new sentence sends yet another negative signal
to the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly, for which
strong opposition to the death penalty is a matter of principle.
Nothing in the Belarusian Constitution
or legislation would prevent President Lukashenko or the parliament from
declaring a moratorium, which is simply a question of political
will.
38. The Council of Europe is investing greatly in this issue and
organised two large-scale events in Minsk in co-operation with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one on “Religion and death penalty”
in 2013 and the latest, which I attended, on the “Abolition of the
Death Penalty and Public Opinion” on 13 December 2016. I have often stressed
that the Belarusian authorities should take this dialogue seriously
and immediately halt all executions.
39. In 2015, I had the opportunity to exchange with Mr Petr Miklashevich,
Chairperson of the Constitutional Court, and thoroughly discussed
Article 24 of the Constitution which reads as follows: “the death
penalty can be applied as an exceptional measure of punishment for
grave crimes in accordance with the law and only under court sentences
until it is abolished”. The scope of crimes punishable by the death
penalty has been reduced in recent years. The death penalty may
also, by means of a pardon by the President, be commuted to life
imprisonment. Mr Miklashevich confirmed that the death penalty is
a “temporary measure”, and that a moratorium could be introduced
by a decision of the President and parliament at any time. Two years
later, during a second meeting in Minsk on 23 March 2017, he reiterated
the same position but nothing has changed in the legislation or
in practice in the meantime.
40. During the last committee hearing in Strasbourg on 24 January
2017, Mr Andrei Naumovich, Chairperson of the Standing Commission
on Human Rights, National Relations and Mass Media and head of the
Working Group on the Death Penalty, announced his readiness to hold
parliamentary hearings on the issue of the death penalty in late
2017 or early 2018 and the working group is expected to decide how
to proceed this year.
41. I was pleased to attend a meeting of the Working Group at
the National Assembly on 23 March 2017, and noted with satisfaction
the participation of a civil society representative from the Belarusian
Helsinki Committee and of a number of representatives from the international
community, including ambassadors and a European Union representative.
I can only encourage the National Assembly to include a representative
of the parliamentary opposition as well in this group, involve civil
society representatives and human rights defenders on a permanent
basis and set up a clear timetable of meetings and expected results.
42. Public awareness is also key and parliament could organise
public campaigns, television debates, parliamentary hearings and
other public events, also in co-operation with the Council of Europe,
to promote a change of attitude in Belarusian society.
43. According to a public opinion survey conducted in 2016 by
the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies
(IISEPS), approximately 37% of the population supports the abolition
of the death penalty, almost twice as many as 20 years ago. Research
previously conducted in 2014 by the public survey firm Satio, commissioned
by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and Penal Reform International,
shows that the number of abolitionists is even higher: according
to the results of a general survey of Belarusians’ attitudes toward
the death penalty, 43.3% supported the immediate or graduate abolition
of the death penalty in Belarus.
4. Relations
with the international community
44. Belarus is keen to contribute
to creating a constructive atmosphere with neighbouring countries
and adjusts its foreign policy accordingly to strengthen regional
security, attract foreign investments, open new markets, remove
and avoid new sanctions and obtain economic aid.
4.1. Regional
co-operation
45. Against the background of the
Ukrainian crisis, Belarus has established what is known as “multi-vector foreign
policy”, which also aims to counterbalance the increasing dependence
on Russia.
46. Together with its partners (Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and
Kyrgyzstan), Belarus is Party to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU),
launched on 1 January 2015. In parallel, dialogue has been intensified
with the European Union, China, the United States and Latin America.
Bilateral relations with European countries also increased steadily
in 2016.
4.2. United
Nations
47. In September 2015, the President
of Belarus attended the United Nations Summit in New York to promote
individual initiatives within the United Nations on combating trafficking
of human beings and human organs, a sustainable energy agenda, youth
and traditional family values.
48. As I stressed in all my discussions, promoting human rights
in international fora, including co-operation with the United Nations
mechanisms, should remain a key priority for Belarus. The first
National Human Rights Action Plan in Belarus for 2016-2020, adopted
by the government in December 2016, contains steps for the implementation
of the recommendations made within the Universal Periodic Review
of the United Nations Human Rights Council. However, the plan does
not address important human rights concerns and proposed changes
in the area of political rights and civil liberties fall short.
Nevertheless, it increases the government’s increased awareness
of human rights, which should be welcomed.
49. In my view, it is particularly important to co-operate with
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Belarus, Mr Miklós Haraszti,
and, on behalf of our committee, I invited him to attend one of
our meetings. Unfortunately, Mr Haraszti has not yet been able to
attend. However, his recommendations provide us with information
on much needed reforms in the country and can be a source of inspiration
for our Assembly as well.
4.3. OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly
50. Prior to my visit, on 16 March
2017, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Christine Muttonen paid
a visit to Minsk and also met with the President of Belarus, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairperson of the House of
Representatives of the National Assembly. She expressed gratitude
for the intensive efforts underway in Minsk in preparation for the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 26th Annual Session, which is due
to take place in Minsk from 5 to 9 July 2017 and is expected to
include some 300 parliamentarians from North America, Europe and
Asia. The theme is “Enhancing mutual trust and co-operation for
peace and prosperity in the OSCE region”.
51. Ms Muttonen stressed that Belarus had long been “one of the
most active participants within the OSCE and our Parliamentary Assembly”
and that “its hosting of our Annual Session this year is an indication
of Minsk’s high level of commitment to dialogue, and likewise, demonstrating
the level of importance we attach to Belarus within our Assembly,
Mr Kent Harstedt has, since April 2016, led efforts to increase
engagement and promote the development of democracy in the country”.
4.4. The
European Union
52. During the past five years,
marked by sanctions and limited engagement, support for the European Union
amongst Belarusians has decreased considerably. In a 2015 poll,
over 50% were in favour of further rapprochement with Russia, against
only 30% with the European Union.
At
the same time, the war in Ukraine has undermined the credibility
of popular political protest for fear of intervention and instability.
This
trend seemingly reversed in March 2017 with the street protests
linked to increasingly widespread discontent.
53. The lifting of the European Union sanctions against Belarus
in October 2015, following the release of political prisoners in
August 2015, greatly facilitated the normalisation of relations
and the level of high-ranking political contacts considerably increased
in 2015-2016.
While
condemning the response of the Belarusian authorities to the March
demonstrations, the European Union stressed that steps taken by
Belarus to respect universal fundamental freedoms, rule of law and
human rights will remain key for the shaping of the European Union's
relationship with the country.
54. Negotiations on a Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement
and on a Mobility Partnership, the resumption of the EU–Belarus
Human Rights Dialogue, the signature of a Cooperation Arrangement
on an Early Warning Mechanism in the energy sector, and the proactive
participation of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership are all evidence
of a critical engagement and of a more positive agenda towards Belarus.
This may change in the coming weeks, in view of the recent wave
of repression.
55. The first visit of a European Parliament delegation for relations
with Belarus since 2002 took place on 18 and 19 June 2015. However,
the European Parliament has no official relations with the Belarusian Parliament.
On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
on the situation in Belarus in which it firmly states that progress
made by Belarus in terms of electoral standards and human rights
is still insufficient.
A second official visit to Minsk
of the European Parliament delegation for relations with Belarus is
planned for May 2017.
56. On 29 March 2017, in Malta, the European People’s Party Political
Assembly at the European Parliament voted unanimously to accept
the Belarus Christian Democratic Party as an observer member.
In a resolution on the situation
in Belarus, adopted on 6 April 2017,
the European Parliament condemned
the “crackdown on peaceful protesters” across Belarus. The MEPs
warned that in the event of a failure to carry out thorough and
impartial investigations into all allegations in connection with
the demonstrations, the European Union may impose new restrictive
measures.
57. The key priority sectors for the European Union's financial
support to Belarus in the period 2014-2017 were social inclusion
(employment, vocational education and training, support to the European
Humanities University) the environment and local and regional development,
with complementary support for civil society and for the modernisation
of public institutions. In 2016, Belarus also applied for financing
by the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development.
58. I noted a great interest in Minsk in increasing co-operation
both with the Council of Europe and the European Union on technical
matters such as trade, economic assistance, border management, the
fight against human trafficking and against corruption, education
and culture, children’s rights, and sport. As an active member of
the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, I can only encourage
more emphasis on the political and human rights spheres as well
and I was pleased that the Committee of Ministers approved the first
Council of Europe Action Plan for Belarus on 18 October 2016.
5. Relations
with the Council of Europe
59. The Council of Europe Action
Plan for Belarus covering the period of 2016-2017 aims to assist
the country in areas where the Council of Europe can offer its expertise,
and builds upon earlier co-operation with Belarus between 2012 and
2015. The Action Plan is structured around priorities defined jointly
between the Organisation and the Belarusian authorities, covering
the following areas:
- protecting
and promoting human rights;
- abolition of the death penalty;
- assistance in finding the optimal model for a human rights
institution;
- bioethics;
- domestic violence; violence against women and children;
human trafficking; gender equality;
- data protection;
- regional and minority languages;
- media, internet governance;
- social rights;
- ensuring justice;
- constitutional justice;
- criminal and civil justice;
- combating threats to the rule of law;
- fight against corruption and money laundering;
- fight against terrorism;
- cybercrime;
- drug use;
- fight against counterfeiting of medical products and similar
crimes;
- promoting democratic governance and participation;
- higher education reforms;
- culture, youth and sports;
- electoral issues;
- civil society;
- local democracy;
- environment.
60. Most of the proposed actions are not fully fledged projects
but rather a series of activities aimed at raising awareness about
Council of Europe standards in a given area and building confidence
between the two sides. Human rights defenders and civil society
representatives expressed optimism for this document and hope to be
involved in the assessment of its implementation by the Steering
Committee.
61. The Council of Europe is also considering opening an office
in Minsk and will discuss this possibility with the authorities.
In my view, this would be a good option as the Info-Point, inaugurated
in 2009, is confined to the Belarusian State University and can
no longer fulfil its potential.
62. As stressed by the Committee of Ministers in its reply to
Assembly
Recommendation
1992 (2012), the integration of Belarus into the Council of Europe
remains a strategic objective, on the basis of the Organisation’s
values and principles.
63. Belarus has joined 11 Council of Europe conventions, mainly
in the field of culture, education, international law, the fight
against corruption and human trafficking, anti-doping and sport.
It has been invited to sign the Council of Europe Convention on
the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats
to public health (CETS No. 211). Belarus is a member of seven steering
committees. Since 2010, it has been given the right to take part
in the meetings of the Venice Commission as an associated member.
64. On 1 September 2016, the Council of Europe’s Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO) published a summary of the Interim compliance
report on Belarus, saying that Belarus has implemented only one
out of the 20 pending recommendations on addressing corruption.
An evidence-based comprehensive strategy and plan of action, as
well as independent mechanisms to combat corruption are still lacking;
no initiatives have been taken to strengthen the independence either
of the Prosecutor General’s Office or of the judiciary. Presidential
immunity has not been limited to the term in office and the number
of officials who benefit from specific procedures that limit the
extent to which they can be investigated and prosecuted for corruption offences
still goes beyond what is acceptable in a democratic society.
65. On 3 July 2013, the Committee of Ministers agreed to accept
the request by Belarus for observer status with the Committee of
Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) “on the understanding
that the matter will be followed in the light of developments in
Belarus with respect to Council of Europe values”.
The Director of the General Department
of Legal Affairs and Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Belarus has participated in all CAHDI meetings so far.
66. In 2016, Belarus requested again an invitation from the Committee
of Ministers to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on the
Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse
(CETS No. 201). However, during the consultation process with Council
of Europe member States, objections have been raised and it was
not possible to obtain the majority necessary to invite the country
to accede.
67. I am convinced of the importance of promoting Belarus’ accession
to the core instruments of the Council of Europe rather than a policy
of a Council of Europe à la carte,
which disregards the essence of the Organisation. It is particularly
important, for instance, that Belarus expresses interest in acceding
to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126), which is not
the case for the moment.
68. The challenge for the Council of Europe, as well the United
Nations and the European Union, remains to promote a universalistic
agenda of human rights which should not be interpreted in terms
of geopolitical interests.
6. Conclusions
69. The Belarusian authorities
continue to send contradictory signals to the Council of Europe
and to its western and eastern partners.
70. The country is suffering a deep economic recession, exacerbated
by falling oil prices, a weak currency, depleted foreign currency
reserves and lack of economic reforms. Since 2015, Belarus consistently
seeks a rapprochement with European governments and institutions
but fails to take tangible steps to address the outstanding recommendations,
bring legislation in the sphere of human rights into line with international standards
and ensure effective implementation.
71. As I stressed during my talks with the authorities, Belarus
is at a turning point in its relations with the Council of Europe
and it is time to look in the same direction.
72. Severe restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression,
of association and of peaceful assembly remain in place and should
be revised. In addition to legal restrictions, a large number of
citizens, activists and journalists appear to have been arbitrarily
and indiscriminately detained during the March 2017 demonstrations throughout
the country and must be immediately released. The way the authorities
respond to these requests will inevitably determine the course of
action of our Assembly and other international organisations, and
many of the previous recommendations remain applicable today.
73. Around 400 people were executed in Belarus since its independence
in 1991 and new death sentences are handed down regularly, the last
one on 17 March 2017. Currently, two people are on death row.
74. The government continues to refuse co-operation with the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus. Our Assembly
should call on the government to open up the county to all human
rights mechanisms and institutions, be it at Council of Europe,
European Union, OSCE or United Nations level.
75. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that Belarus plays
a constructive role in the region and the authorities have shown
openness and willingness to discuss human rights issues with the
Council of Europe, the United Nations, the OSCE and the European
Union. Concrete, tangible results must follow declarations of principle
and declaratory diplomacy.
76. The government’s success in achieving its objectives to ensure
international acceptance, maintain neutrality and improve its economy
will very much depend on the degree of political liberalisation
and pluralism that the system is willing to accept, with a constructive
opposition that has a stake in governance.
77. My action as a rapporteur for the Assembly over the past two
and a half years aimed to find a common ground for dialogue and
I have always striven to remain judicious and objective in my relations
both with the authorities and the opposition forces in the country.
I believe that our role as elected representatives is not only to
criticise and condemn human rights violations but also to encourage
the convictions that lead towards democracy, human rights and the
rule of law. This can only happen through strenuous and consistent
efforts to keep the dialogue open, with extreme caution and in spite
of the obstacles.
78. The March events clearly represent a setback, but this should
not discourage the Assembly from remaining committed to a positive
reform agenda on the basis of common interests and based on the
values upheld by the Council of Europe.
79. I will repeat this tirelessly: a first and most urgent step
for Belarus to show sincere openness to a meaningful dialogue with
our Assembly would be an immediate moratorium on the death penalty,
with a view to its permanent abolition.
80. I firmly believe that our Assembly cannot remain on the sidelines
and hope that change will somehow occur. Democracy is a skill that
can also be practised through continuous dialogue and exchange of
experience and good practice. We must continue to engage both with
the authorities and with civil society to accompany and encourage
change and to ensure that Council of Europe values take root in
Belarusian society. We must dismantle barriers and establish stronger
relations, both with the authorities and with the opposition.
81. It is therefore important to strengthen the parliamentary
dimension of relations between Belarus and the Parliamentary Assembly
and to continue all activities, including high-level contacts, with
the Belarusian authorities. The Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy could also consider stepping up dialogue with the Parliament
and civil society of Belarus by inviting representatives of the
majority and of the opposition, as well as a representative of civil
society, to attend its meetings during the Assembly part-sessions
over the next two years.
82. At the same time, in the absence of a moratorium on the death
penalty and of substantial, tangible and verifiable progress in
terms of respect for the democratic values and principles upheld
by the Council of Europe, the Assembly is not in a position to call
on its Bureau to lift the suspension of the special guest status
for the Parliament of Belarus.