1. Introduction
1. I should like to begin by stressing
the excellent co-operation that exists between the Parliamentary Assembly
and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”).
It has often been said, but it is worth repeating, that the Assembly
is the Venice Commission’s best “client”. We regularly request its
opinion on numerous subjects. In my capacity as institutional representative
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to the Venice
Commission, it is my privilege to attend meetings and take part in
its work on a regular basis. That is why I can vouch for the close
co-operation between us and for the quality, the seriousness and
the promptness with which the Venice Commission responds to our
requests.
1.1. Procedure
2. On 21 June 2016, Ms Marina
Kaljurand, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, who was President
of the Committee of Ministers at the time, Ms Herdis Kjerulf Thorgeirsdottir,
Vice-President of the Venice Commission, and Ms Anne Brasseur, former
President of the Parliamentary Assembly, took part in an exchange
of views before the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
to present and discuss the Rule of Law Checklist
newly adopted by the
Venice Commission. Following that exchange of views, the committee prepared
a motion for a resolution entitled “Rule of Law Checklist”
with the intention of submitting
the checklist to the Parliamentary Assembly for endorsement.
3. Our committee was seized for report on 25 November 2016 and
I was appointed rapporteur on 13 December 2016. The committee held
a hearing on 26 January 2017, with the participation of Mr Kaarlo Tuori,
First Vice-President of the Venice Commission, and Ms Sarah Cleveland,
Member of the Venice Commission.
1.2. Genesis of
the Rule of Law Checklist
4. The very existence of this
list is in fact the fruit of a thought process set in motion by
our Assembly in 2007.
Indeed, whilst
the notion of the rule of law/
prééminence
du droit regularly appears in major political documents
produced by the Council of Europe, as well as in numerous conventions
and recommendations, the Council of Europe has not defined it in
any text, nor created a special monitoring mechanism in this regard. Thus,
having been invited by our Assembly to examine in depth the concepts
of “Rule of Law” and “
prééminence du
droit”, the Venice Commission embarked upon a study “to
identify a consensual definition of the rule of law which may help
international organisations and both domestic and international
courts in interpreting and applying this fundamental value”.
The Venice Commission decided not
to let the idea that the concept of the Rule of Law might be indefinable
deter it.
In its study, the Venice Commission
privileged a more operational approach,
concluding – beyond the question
of a formal definition – that a consensus exists on the core elements
of the Rule of Law, the
Rechtsstaat and
the
État de droit, which are
not only formal but also substantive or material. These core elements
are: 1) legality, including a transparent, accountable and democratic
process for enacting law; 2) legal certainty; 3) prohibition of
arbitrariness; 4) access to justice before independent and impartial
courts, including judicial review of administrative acts; 5) respect
for human rights; and 6) non-discrimination and equality before
the law.
5. Wishing to make the concept of the Rule of Law operational,
and faced with the lack of practical tools for ensuring that it
was respected,
the Venice
Commission continued its work by drawing up a checklist of the criteria
that make up the Rule of Law.
6. This report will present that checklist and, in the light
of that list, examine two current situations which – to different
degrees – present a serious threat to the Rule of Law. The analysis
will be based very specifically on the criteria defined in the checklist
and on the substantive work done by the Venice Commission in respect of
the two situations mentioned. It is important not only that we show
our support for the Rule of Law Checklist in abstract terms but
also that we make use of it as a practical tool in our work in the
Assembly.
2. Rule of Law Checklist: a monitoring
and prevention instrument
7. The Rule of Law Checklist provides
a functional means of assessing respect for the Rule of Law in a given
State, using objective criteria. The Venice Commission agreed that
the adoption of a checklist was an effective and objective means
of monitoring respect for this fundamental principle. The Rule of
Law Checklist is part of an effort to improve the assessment of
respect for the principle of the Rule of Law also undertaken at European
Union level, with the introduction in 2014 of a machinery for dealing
with systemic problems affecting the Rule of Law in the member States,
and by the United Nations, with the publication in 2011 of the “
Rule
of Law Indicators” and the adoption by the General Assembly in 2012 of
the
declaration of the high-level meeting on the Rule of Law at the
national and international levels. It is important to note that
the “Rule of Law Indicators” do not have the same practical scope
or use the same method as the Rule of Law Checklist.
8. While the rule of law concept exists in its own right, it
is also closely interlinked with the other two founding principles
of the Council of Europe: democracy and human rights. Preserving
and fostering human rights, democracy and the rule of law is nowadays
seen as “a single objective, the core objective of the Council of
Europe”.
The
Venice Commission affirms that “[t]he Rule of Law would just be
an empty shell without permitting access to human rights. Conversely,
the protection and promotion of human rights are realised only through
respect for the Rule of Law”.
As
for democracy, it is an inherent element of the rule of law.
However, not every
State based on the principles of the rule of law is necessarily
democratic. The two concepts are interdependent, overlapping in
part but each having characteristics of its own. This report thus
offers us an opportunity to reaffirm our unconditional support for
those three principles, including the Rule of Law, “which form the
basis of all genuine democracy” (as enshrined, for example, in the
Preamble to the
Statute
of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) and in Article 3 thereof, which makes it
a condition of accession for new members). In addition, the European
Court of Human Rights has ruled that the rule of law is a concept
inherent in all the articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”).
9. As explained above, the principal aim of the Venice Commission
is to put in place a tool for assessing the Rule of Law in a given
country from the viewpoint of its constitutional and legal structures,
the legislation in force and the existing case law.
The very essence of the rule of
law and therefore of its constituent elements cannot be reduced
to a purely legal dimension. In that regard, Ms Kjerulf-Thorgeirsdottir
warns us that it would be wrong to apply the components of this
checklist in a mechanical manner. The political and historical context, the
constitutional order and cultural traditions must also be taken
into account.
10. The Rule of Law Checklist is an instrument designed to help
make an assessment that is:
- thorough:
taking in each of the principal dimensions of the rule of law;
- objective and transparent: making explicit reference to
national and international standards;
- fair: because the criteria and the standards taken into
account are the same no matter which country is being assessed.
3. Presentation
of the different criteria
3.1. Legality
11. State action is subject to
the rule of law and respect for the law. In other words the action
of the State must be in conformity with the law and authorised by
it.
12. In addition, there is scrutiny of the relationship between
international law and domestic law, in order to make sure the national
legal system respects the obligations entered into under international
law. The other sub-categories concern the legislative powers of
the executive and their limitation, the legislative procedure and
any exceptions in urgent situations, in order to evaluate the limits
of exceptional measures that derogate from the normal level of protection
afforded to citizens. Lastly, the principle of legality or lawfulness
also imposes the duty to implement the law and applies to private
actors vested with public service missions.
3.2. Legal
certainty
13. This encompasses the accessibility
of the law and of judicial decisions; the foreseeability of the
law and the stability and consistency of the law and respect for
people’s legitimate expectations.
14. This criterion also includes non-retroactivity of the law,
especially criminal law, and the application of the principles of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no
crime or punishment without law) and res
judicata (the inalterability of judicial decisions).
3.3. Prevention
of abuse of office
15. Like the criterion of legal
certainty, the prevention of the abuse of office is a problem our
Assembly has addressed. In 2013, it adopted
Resolution 1950 (2013) “Keeping political and criminal responsibility separate”.
In
order to prevent abusive criminal proceedings against politicians,
the Assembly’s resolution states that the provisions of criminal
law must be clear, precise and interpreted narrowly.
3.4. Equality
before the law and non-discrimination
16. The prohibition of discrimination
on any ground such as sex, sexual orientation, presumed race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status
(Article 14 of the Convention) is essential. Compliance with this
provision also requires the legislation itself to respect the principle
of equality: “it must treat similar situations equally and different
situations differently”.
This equality
must not be merely formal. Affirmative action (both necessary and
proportionate) may be authorised in limited circumstances so as
to guarantee substantively equal treatment.
17. The assessment sub-criteria here are non-discrimination, equality
in law and equality before the law.
3.5. Access
to justice
18. This criterion mainly covers
the monitoring of the independence and impartiality of the justice
system itself (the judiciary), of judges individually, of the prosecuting
authorities and of the Bar, but also the right to a fair trial,
starting with the right of access to justice and the presumption
of innocence. The list of criteria also mentions the essential components
of constitutional justice.
19. The Assembly has regularly stressed the need to protect and
guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Two
examples are its
Resolution
2077 (2015) on abuse of pretrial detention in States Parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights and its
Resolution 2098 (2016) “Judicial corruption: urgent need to implement the Assembly’s
proposals”.
20. As the Venice Commission explains, the Rule of Law Checklist
is neither exhaustive nor final.
While it does aim to cover what
are considered to be the core elements of the Rule of Law, it is
not carved in stone. The checklist could change over time as new
problems arise, or to develop certain points in greater detail.
In addition,
the Venice Commission takes care to point out that assessments “have
to take into account the whole context, and avoid any mechanical
application of specific elements of the checklist”.
4. Specific
case studies
21. I believe it is interesting
to illustrate the relevance of the Rule of Law Checklist by examining
two situations of concern, albeit on different levels, in Poland
and Turkey, in respect of which the Venice Commission recently adopted
useful opinions.
4.1. Poland:
concerns about the laws governing the Constitutional Court
22. To understand the legitimacy
of our concerns regarding Poland a brief reminder of the facts is
needed. On 25 June 2015, the Polish Parliament (
Sejm) enacted a law on the Constitutional
Court, article 137 of which provided for parliament, before the
end of the legislature, to elect judges to replace all those whose
term of office would come to an end in 2015, including those whose
term of office would end after the end of the legislature then in
place. The law entered into force on 30 August 2015. On 8 October
2015, a few weeks before the 2015 legislative elections in Poland,
which the
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law
and Justice) party won, the outgoing legislature appointed five
judges to fill seats in the Constitutional Court that would become
vacant respectively on 6 November and 2 and 8 December 2015 (two
of the five seats concerned were not due to be vacated until after
the end of the outgoing legislature).
The President of Poland refused
to swear in the five newly appointed judges. However, on 19 November
the new
Sejm elected on 25
October 2015 amended the law on the Constitutional Court in urgent
proceedings, introducing the possibility of annulling the appointments proposed
by the previous legislature and giving itself the power to appoint
five new judges, including the three judges lawfully appointed by
the previous legislature. These new appointments were announced
on 2 December 2015,
one
day before the hearing of the Constitutional Court that was to rule
on the constitutionality of the legal basis for the election of
the judges in October. The same day, the President of Poland swore
in the five judges appointed by the new legislature. On 3 December
2015, the Constitutional Court declared the legal basis for the
appointment of two of the judges elected on 8 October 2015 (the
two who were to take up office in December 2015) unconstitutional,
but validated the legal basis for the election of the other three
judges by the previous legislature to fill the vacancies left in
November 2015; according to the Constitutional Court, the President
should also have agreed to swear in the three judges concerned.
23. Following the annulment by the Constitutional Court on 9 December
2015 of amendments to the law of 19 November 2015 on the Constitutional
Court, aimed at reducing the term of office of the President of
the Court, on 22 December 2015 the
Sejm adopted
a law amending the law on the Constitutional Court, which contained
controversial provisions on procedure before that Court. On 7 January
2016, the Constitutional Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction
to invalidate the resolutions of the
Sejm on
the November 2015 election of the judges. In its judgment of 9 March
2016, the Constitutional Court found the law of 22 December 2015 unconstitutional.
It reached that decision based directly on the Constitution, rather
than applying the disputed law, which would have prevented its proper
functioning. The Prime Minister, however, who is responsible for publication
in the Official Gazette, refused to publish the judgment, arguing
that the Constitutional Court had not been correctly composed in
the light of the disputed amendments. Thereafter no other decisions
of the Constitutional Court were published in the Official Gazette;
most of its decisions were not published until August and December
2016.
In its opinion,
prepared
at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland and
adopted on 11 and 12 March 2016, the Venice Commission found that
the amendments (which the Court had found unconstitutional) would
have compromised not only the rule of law but also the functioning
of the democratic system, stressing that refusal to publish the
judgment of 9 March would not only be contrary to the rule of law
but would be an unprecedented step that would further deepen the
constitutional crisis.
24. On 22 July 2016, the
Sejm adopted
a new law on the Constitutional Court. The Secretary General of
the Council of Europe asked the Venice Commission to examine the
law. It was published in the Official Gazette on 1 August 2016 (before
the Venice Commission adopted its opinion). On 11 August 2016, the
Constitutional Court declared several provisions of the law unconstitutional.
The Prime Minister once again refused to publish the Constitutional
Court’s decision. In its opinion
the
Venice Commission concluded that the new law did not resolve the
constitutional crisis but prolonged it by obstructing the Constitutional
Court, which could not play its constitutional role as the guardian
of democracy, the rule of law and human rights.
25. The very next day, after the term of office of the President
of the Court, Mr Andrzej Rzepliński, on 19 December 2016, three
new laws, two of which were dated 30 November 2016 – the law on
the organisation of and procedure before the Constitutional Court
and the law on the status of the judges of the Constitutional Court,
together with a law of 13 December 2016 on transitional provisions
–, were published in the Official Gazette and most of their provisions
entered into force the same day. They integrally replaced the existing
law on the Constitutional Court. Based on this new legislation,
on 20 December 2016 the President of the Republic appointed Ms Julia
Przyłębska, the judge with the longest experience in the judicial
system in general, interim President of the Constitutional Court
(where she had been a judge since 2 December 2015). The next day,
the new acting President appointed the three judges to the Constitutional
Court, who had been elected by the new Sejm on a legal basis that
had been found unconstitutional
and the
names of the three “October” judges elected by the previous Sejm
disappeared from the website
of the Constitutional Court. Then the acting President
of the Court convened the General Assembly of the Court responsible
for nominating the candidates for a new President of the Court,
which, with 14 judges out of 15 present, nominated two candidates
for the post, one of whom was the acting President. That election
was controversial and was challenged in legal circles: only six
judges had voted in favour, seven had refused to take part in the
vote and one had considered it null and void.
On 21 December 2016, the President
of the Republic appointed Ms Przyłębska President of the Constitutional
Court. At the same time, one of the judges, Mr Andrzej Wróbel, decided
to return to his post in the Supreme Court
and he was replaced by a new judge
appointed by the
Sejm on 24
February 2017.
At the beginning of January 2017,
the new President ordered the Vice-President of the Court, Mr Stanisław Biernat,
to take his holidays with immediate effect, claiming that he was
legally obliged to use up all his holiday entitlement before leaving
the Court,
thereby affecting the majority vote
in the Court. Furthermore, in January 2017, the Prosecutor General
– who is the Minister of Justice – instituted proceedings to examine
the validity of the election of three Constitutional Court judges
elected by the previous legislature.
26. The constitutional crisis in Poland raises serious issues
regarding the rule of law. The most relevant standards to be examined
here are the independence of the judiciary and the guarantee of
constitutional justice where it exists (i.e. respect for the Constitutional
Court’s status as the supreme arbiter, and the obligation for the
other branches of government to abide by its decisions; having said
that, the Rule of Law Checklist does not actually require the existence
of a constitutional court, but where one exists it must be the supreme
and independent guarantor of respect for the Constitution).
Criteria
of the Rule of Law Checklist and reference questions
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Relevant
situations
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A.
Legality
A1.
Supremacy of the law
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iv. Does
the action of the executive branch conform with the Constitution
and other laws?
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iv. The
refusal of the Prime Minister to publish the decisions of the Constitutional
Court is at odds with the Polish Constitution, Article 10.2 of which
explicitly provides that “the judicial power shall be vested in
courts and tribunals”.
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vi. Is
effective judicial review of the conformity of the acts and decisions
of the executive branch of government with the law available?
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vi. The
oversight exercised by the Constitutional Court is ignored and/or
rendered ineffective by the executive and the legislative branches.
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A2.
Compliance with the law
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|
i. Are
the powers of the public authorities defined by law?
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i. “By
adopting the Act of 22 July (and the Amendments of 22 December),
the Polish Parliament assumed powers of constitutional revision
which it does not have when it acts as the ordinary legislature,
without the requisite majority for constitutional amendments.” (CDL-AD(2016)026, § 27)
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ii. Is
the delineation of powers between different authorities clear?
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ii. According
to the Venice Commission, “Without any constitutional foundation,
the Chancellery of the Prime Minister has purported to arrogate
the power to control the validity of the judgments of the Constitutional
Tribunal, by refusing to publish its judgments” (CDL-AD(2016)026, § 126) and this “constitutes arrogation of the power
of constitutional review by the legislature”. (CDL-AD(2016)026, § 129)
Merging of the functions of Minister
of Justice and Prosecutor General and attribution of new powers
to that function without sufficient safeguards.
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A4.
Law-making powers of the executive
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|
Is the supremacy of the
legislature ensured?
ii. What
are these exceptions? Are they limited in time? Are they controlled
by Parliament and the judiciary? Is there an effective remedy against
abuse?
|
The law on the Constitutional
Court (amendments of 19 November 2015 and 22 December 2015, law
of 22 July 2016, all declared unconstitutional) paralyses the Court’s work.
The legislation in force since 20 December 2016 has modified the
presidency of the Court.
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E.Access to justice
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E1a. Independence
of the judiciary
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E1a. The
independence of the Constitutional Court is compromised by interference
in its functioning. (See A2ii above).
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E2.
Fair trial
E2d. Effectiveness
of judicial decisions
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i. Are
judgments effectively and promptly executed?
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i. The
Prime Minister’s refusal to publish certain decisions of the Constitutional
Court can deprive the judgments of legal effect.
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E3.
Constitutional justice
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iii. Are
Parliament and the executive obliged, when adopting new legislative
or regulatory provisions, to take into account the arguments used
by the Constitutional Court or equivalent body? Do they take them
into account in practice?
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iii.and iv. The Constitutional Court
examined the law of 22 July 2016 and declared several of its provisions unconstitutional.
That decision was ignored (not published in the official Gazette).
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iv. Do
Parliament or the executive fill legislative/ regulatory gaps identified
by the Constitutional Court or equivalent body within a reasonable
time?
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|
vi. If
Constitutional Court judges are elected by Parliament, is there
a requirement for a qualified majority, and other safeguards for
a balanced composition?
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vi. No
qualified majority required for the election of Constitutional Court
judges (according to the Constitution), new President of the Court
elected on the basis of a questionable procedure; Vice-President
of the Court obliged to take holidays; election of three acting
judges challenged seven years after their election.
|
27. The unconstitutional appointment
of certain judges of the Constitutional Court threatens the credibility and
the stability of the Polish legal system. Any verdict pronounced
by these judges is open to challenge by the courts below, seriously
jeopardising the supremacy of constitutional justice, which the
executive does not appear to respect in any event. The Venice Commission
concluded its opinion in these terms: “By prolonging the constitutional
crisis they [Parliament and the government] have obstructed the
Constitutional Tribunal, which cannot play its constitutional role
as the guardian of democracy, the rule of law and human rights.”
4.2. The
measures taken under the state of emergency in Turkey
28. Venice Commission member Sarah
Cleveland explained in her presentation to our committee that the current
situation in Turkey “vividly highlights” the utility of the Rule
of Law Checklist.
The Assembly,
for its part, decided in its
Resolution
2156 (2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey
to reopen the monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey until its
“serious concerns” regarding respect for human rights, democracy
and the rule of law “are addressed in a satisfactory manner”.
29. Following the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 a state of emergency
was declared on 20 July 2016 and was subsequently renewed. On 21
July 2016, notification of a derogation from the European Convention
on Human Rights under Article 15 was received. The Assembly firmly
condemned the attempt to overthrow the democratically elected institutions
and expressed its support for the Turkish people. As the ad hoc
Sub-Committee of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
rightly pointed out following its visit to Turkey, it is not a question
of criticising the fact that the Turkish authorities should identify
and punish those responsible for the attempted coup.
However, the
action taken should be framed within the rule of law and should
remain within the limits imposed by the Constitution and by international
law. The state of emergency, the effects of which should be strictly
limited and temporary, should be lifted as soon as possible. This
was also reiterated by the Venice Commission in its opinion on emergency
decree laws.
30. The Turkish authorities promulgated 21 “decrees with force
of law” under the state of emergency.
Veritable purges took place, including
what appear to be the arbitrary arrests of members of the judiciary,
public officials, members of the armed forces, the police, the parliamentary
opposition and journalists, in defiance of the presumption of innocence
and the right to defence.
The
following few figures give an idea of the scale of the repression:
150 000 people were dismissed, almost 4 000 members of the judicial
system were suspended, 177 media outlets were shut down and over
150 journalists were placed in detention, and around 2 100 schools,
student hostels and universities were closed. The Monitoring Committee’s
report likened the impact of these mass purges to “civil death”
for the people concerned and expressed concern that the measures
would have “a dramatic and prejudicial long-term effect on Turkish
society, which would need to find adequate means and mechanisms
to overcome this trauma”.
31. Eleven MPs, members of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP),
including its Co-Chairs, are currently in pretrial detention.
Our
Assembly expressed concern over the lifting of the parliamentary
immunity of a large number of MPs in its
Resolutions 2121(2016) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey
and
2127 (2016) “Parliamentary immunity: challenges to the scope of
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by members of the Parliamentary
Assembly”.
32. To be as concise as possible, like Ms Cleveland in her presentation
I shall confine myself here to examining the criteria in the Rule
of Law Checklist which are particularly relevant to the state of
emergency, namely, legality and access to justice, including the
independence of the judiciary. But it should be noted that other
measures, and in particular the constitutional reform, raise some
equally disturbing questions.
Criteria
of the Rule of Law Checklist and reference questions
|
Relevant
situations
|
A.
Legality
A1.
Supremacy of the law
|
|
iv. Does
the action of the executive branch conform with the Constitution
and other laws?
|
iv. In
the context of the implementation of the state of emergency:
The
government circumvented the proper legislative procedure by issuing
urgent legislative decrees impinging on parliamentary prerogatives.
Only 5 of the 21 decrees were approved by parliament in keeping
with the constitutional requirement that parliamentary approval
be obtained within 30 days of their publication. (Monitoring Committee report, § 24)
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vi. Is
effective judicial review of the conformity of the acts and decisions
of the executive branch of government with the law available?
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vi. Under
the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court cannot
verify the conformity of legislative decrees with the Constitution.
Nor can the Constitutional Court pronounce judgment on the merits
of proposed amendments to the Constitution.
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A5.
Law-making procedures
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A6.
Exceptions in emergency situations
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i. Are
there specific national provisions applicable to emergency situations?
Are derogations to human rights possible in such situations under
national law? What are the circumstances and criteria required in
order to trigger an exception?
|
i. The
declaration and implementation of a state of emergency are defined
and regulated by the Constitution and the law of 1983 on the state
of emergency. However, the amendments to the Constitution adopted
by Turkey’s Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017, and which
were submitted to a national referendum on 16 April 2017, provide for
the President alone to have the power to decide to declare a state
of emergency and promulgate decrees having the force of law on matters
related to the state of emergency. (CDL-AD(2017)005, § 73)
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ii. Are
derogations proportionate, that is limited to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, in duration, circumstance
and scope?
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ii. The
duration of the state of emergency (CDL-AD(2017)007, § 12, and CDL-AD(2016)037,
§ 40) and the scale of the purges raise important questions as to proportionality.
In particular the permanent character of the measures taken by urgent
legislative decree poses a problem (CDL-AD(2017)007, § 15). The
Venice Commission also reiterates that there must always be a strict
and genuine link between the reasons justifying the state of emergency
and the measures taken through the emergency decree laws, and considers
that in the current context “this is not always the case, which
is very problematic”. (CDL-AD(2017)007, § 18)
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iii. Are
the possibilities for the executive to derogate from the normal
division of powers in emergency circumstances also limited in duration,
circumstance and scope?
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iii. Structural
legislative changes of a permanent nature by legislative decrees
affecting the distribution of the powers of the State (in particular
amendments affecting safeguards in matters of criminal justice,
procedures authorising phone tapping, mass shutdowns of media and
so on) (CDL-AD(2016)037, §§ 151-176; CDL-AD(2017)007, § 51) or actions
of a permanent nature affecting individuals (dismissals or permanent
suspensions, dissolution of organisations, confiscation of assets,
etc.).
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iv. Are
there parliamentary control and judicial review of the existence
and duration of an emergency situation, and the scope of any derogation
thereunder?
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iv. The
declaration of the state of emergency was duly validated by the
Turkish Parliament. The Constitution provides for emergency legislative
decrees to be submitted to parliament for approval. However, parliament
did not interrupt its summer recess, so there was no parliamentary
oversight for two months after the state of emergency was declared. Although
parliament is supposed to examine any urgent decree within a month,
in practice that deadline is largely ignored. The Constitution does
not state explicitly that urgent legislative decrees which are not
validated by parliament are null and void. (CDL-AD(2016)037, §§
46-54)
The scope of the derogations made exceeds the
reality of the emergency because the measures taken consist of legislative amendments
and individual measures of a permanent nature. (CDL-AD(2016)037,
§§ 78-90)
Absence of judicial review/redress:
The
Constitution rules out any review by the Constitutional Court of
the declaration of the state of emergency. The Court cannot examine
the urgent decrees, but it could examine the laws ratifying them.
For the time being no appeal has been lodged with the Court.
What
is more, the Constitutional Court has not yet determined whether
it has the power to examine individual applications concerning the
conformity of the legislative decrees implementing the state of
emergency.
Since 23 January 2017 appeals may be lodged
with an administrative commission (Commission of inquiry into state of
emergency measures) against collective or individual dismissals
and liquidations of organisations (decided by legislative decree
via lists of names appended the urgent decrees) and the decisions
of the commission may be challenged before the administrative courts.
The commission, five members of which are to be appointed by the
executive (while the quorum needed for decisions to be taken is
only four) and any member of which may be removed by simple decision
of the commission itself, has yet to be formed and made operational.
“It remains to be seen whether this commission, in view of its size,
composition, duration of its mandate and principles of functioning,
will be able to give individualised treatment to all cases, and
issue reasoned decisions based on verifiable evidence” (it will
be composed of only seven members and have a two-year mandate in which
to review over 130 000 dismissals and several thousand liquidations
of private entities). (CDL-AD(2017)007, VIII esp. § 88)
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E.
Access to justice
E1.
Independence and impartiality
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E1. The
independence of justice in Turkey was already a subject of serious
concern prior to the attempted coup. Since then
the situation has deteriorated and has become truly alarming.
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i. Are
the basic principles of judicial independence, including objective
procedures and criteria for judicial appointments, tenure and discipline
and removals, enshrined in the Constitution or ordinary legislation?
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i. Thousands
of judges have been dismissed since the failed coup attempt.
The
dismissal decisions under legislative decree No. 667 are based on
vague standards and a lack of objective procedures. (CDL-AD(2016)037,
§§ 135-139)
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ii. Are
grounds for removal limited to serious breaches of disciplinary
or criminal provisions established by law, or where the judge can
no longer perform judicial functions? Is the applicable procedure
clearly prescribed in law? Are there legal remedies for the individual
judge against a dismissal decision?
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ii. Removals
of judges are not limited to serious breaches of disciplinary or
criminal law provisions. The Venice Commission particularly deplores
the lack of individualised sanctions and objective evidence. (CDL-AD(2016)037, §§136,
139, 140)
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viii. Is
there an independent judicial council?
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viii. The
Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which ordered the removal
of thousands of judges, is currently chaired by the Minister of
Justice.
The constitutional reform envisages doing
away with the election of more than half the members of the HSYK
by their peers, and reducing the number of members from 22 to 13. Four
will be appointed by the President; the Minister of Justice and
his undersecretary will be members ex
officio and the remaining seven members will be appointed
by parliament. (CDL-AD(2017)005, §§ 114 ff)
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33. Other criteria of the rule
of law could have been examined here, such as section C. “Prevention
of the abuse of authority”. The question of the existence of safeguards
against arbitrariness and abuse of power by public authorities arises.
Are public authorities required to provide adequate reasons for
their decisions, in particular when they affect the rights of individuals?
The mass dismissals and removals mentioned above, and the lack of
judicial review of these decisions all point to the conclusion that
they are not. Furthermore, according to the Venice Commission the
amendments to the Constitution adopted by Turkey’s Grand National
Assembly on 21 January 2017, which were submitted to a national
referendum on 16 April 2017, will lead, if approved, to an excessive
concentration of power in the hands of the President, reduce Parliament’s
authority to oversee those powers and weaken the judiciary (CDL-AD(2017)005,
especially paragraphs 109 and 124 ff.).
5. Conclusions
34. The Rule of Law Checklist obviates
the need for argument over the definition of the concepts of Rule
of Law/prééminence du droit,
enabling us to focus on realities. The criteria defined by the Venice
Commission make it possible for everyone to understand each other,
above and beyond definitions. Theoretical debate, which can be interesting
but sometimes (deliberately?) obstructive, can thus give way to
discussion of the reality of compliance or otherwise with one of
the pillars of the Council of Europe: the Rule of Law.
35. While the Rule of Law Checklist has already been endorsed
by the Committee of Ministers, in September 2016,
and
by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, in October 2016,
it
is important that our Assembly should also support it. In so doing
we will be making an active contribution to making it the reference instrument
for monitoring and assessing respect for the rule of law, in the
Council of Europe’s member States and beyond. The checklist will
thus become a veritable “Council of Europe product”.
36. The institutional and political support of the Parliamentary
Assembly for the Rule of Law Checklist will not only help introduce
a new, harmonised assessment standard, but will also be useful to
our Assembly in its activities. The different assessment criteria
identified by the Venice Commission can be used perfectly well in the
work of our committees, particularly the Monitoring Committee, and
help us accurately identify structural and systemic problems in
our member States.
37. The Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist is a practical
tool not only for the Council of Europe but also for all those involved
in promoting and strengthening the principles of the Rule of Law,
including the European Union, which has already expressed keen interest
in the Checklist. I therefore share the opinion expressed by our
former President, Anne Brasseur, who sees this Rule of Law Checklist
as a potential “export product” of the Council of Europe. While
our member States will be the main users of the checklist, it could
also be an important tool for other national or international players.
The list is available to State institutions at the national and
local level as well as to international institutions and civil society
(non-governmental organisations, think tanks, associations defending
rights and citizens in general).
38. We parliamentarians ourselves must take them on board and
refer to them in our work, both in the Parliamentary Assembly and
in our national parliaments. We should also invite the Ministers
of Justice but also other government institutions which have to
evaluate the need for and the implications of legislative reforms, as
well as civil society and international or regional organisations
like the Council of Europe as a whole and the European Union, to
refer systematically to the checklist. As Marina Kaljurand explained
before our committee, our ambition for this list could also be to
offer it up for global use – “as a gift from the Council of Europe
to any nation wishing to take their temperature vis-à-vis the rule
of law”, and also as a useful means of specifically aiming to enhance
the rule of law by any action taken.
39. The political endorsement of our Assembly for the Rule of
Law Checklist will also send a powerful message of support for the
Venice Commission.
40. Defending the Rule of Law is more important than ever, as
demonstrated by the two case studies presented as examples in this
report. As Marina Kaljurand said, “preventing the erosion of the
rule of law in our countries is our highest responsibility, especially
at difficult times of crisis, when mushrooming populist forces try
to coerce us into bending our principles”.