1. Introduction
1. In 2015, 8.6 million out of
a total of 12.4 million displaced persons moved internally within
their own country, which shows that the causes of mass migration
need to be addressed in the countries where poverty, conflict and
climate conditions are forcing whole communities to flee. The war
in Syria has tipped the scales to critical levels, but other conflicts
in Afghanistan, Burundi, Iraq, Libya, Niger and Nigeria, Central
Africa, Congo, South Sudan and Yemen amongst others have contributed
to increasing the gravity of the crisis. These countries should
be the focus of financial aid for sustainable development.
2. In parallel, the world population is continuing to rise. That
of Africa is expected to double and to reach over 2 billion by 2050.
By 2030, the number of young jobseekers in Africa will create an
ever-growing major incentive to migrate to neighbouring countries
and, directly or by a knock-on effect, to Europe. Again, development
aid and support programmes within the countries concerned should
enable sustainable political, economic and social structures to
be established or renovated and give prospects for the future to
the populations concerned.
3. The premise of this report is that one of the important characteristics
of development co-operation, although its first objective should
be to reduce inequalities and share wealth, is also a major tool
for regulating mass migration from the poorer countries of the African
continent. As such it is an investment which will contribute to
avoiding future sharp rises in migratory flows, through regional
capacity-building and assistance with economic development in less
developed countries. Through my research, however, it became clear
that the equation is not a simple one, as poverty itself is one
of the biggest obstacles to mobility, and one of the benefits of
surmounting poverty is the possibility to travel and move. Therefore,
results for migratory flows are to be seen over the long term, and
other results of development considered, such as reduction in birth
rates by offering education and employment to women and changing
traditional views of women’s role in society
4. In an ideal world, migration would be a true exercise of the
right to “freedom of movement”, rather than a last resort for populations
subjected to life-threatening conflict and hardship. In developed
countries this is largely the case, but evidently not for those
who are part of the recent radical increase in migratory flows,
for whom much greater efforts should be made towards this ideal.
5. My main research was gained from my visit to Burkina Faso
from 10 to 13 July 2018. This west African country is among the
poorest in the world, lacking in substantial natural resources and
with climatic extremes which complicate agricultural exploitation.
However, its comparatively stable governance and the success, in particular,
of some of the many small-scale local development projects in the
country allowed me to assess many of the challenges of development
present in the region as well as to compare the sustainability of
different types of initiative.
6. I would like to thank the Parliament of Burkina Faso for organising
the visit, especially Mr Antoine Elysée Zong-Naba, Advisor to the
President, and for the indispensable guidance of my colleague in
the Swiss Parliament, Ms Isabelle Chevalley, who has been implementing
co-operation projects with the country for many years. In this context
I was able to meet with several key ministers, ministerial departments,
among them the Minister for Youth and the Minister of Women, National
Solidarity and Family; I was given an audience with President Roch
Marc Christian Kaboré with whom I had a substantial discussion about
both Burkina Faso’s international involvement (such as forthcoming
presidency of the African-G7) and about the country’s own challenges.
Ms Chevalley also made a presentation to the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons in January 2018. Relevant findings
during the visit are included below. The country has served as a case
study for the report and enabled me to develop some of the practical
recommendations contained in the draft resolution.
7. Another important contribution to the report was made by a
hearing with Ms Rachel Scott, Head of the team Conflict, Fragility,
and Resilience, Development Co-operation Directorate of the Organisation
for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) in Paris on 4 June
2018. Her insights and the ensuing discussion explored the main
trends in development co-operation and helped to understand some
of the requirements for its successful implementation.
2. Definitions
8. The OECD’s Development Aid
Committee (DAC) defines development aid as financial flows to countries and
territories on the DAC List of Official Development Aid (ODA) Recipients
and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official
agencies, including State and local governments, or by their executive
agencies. Each transaction of aid is administered with the economic
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective,
has a concessional nature and conveys a grant element of at least
25%. No military equipment or services may be defined as ODA. Anti-terrorism
activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using donors’
armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible. Most peacekeeping
expenditures are excluded from the definition.
9. During my research, it was brought to my attention that a
better term for the type of assistance given and requiring stepping
up is “co-operation”, rather than “aid”, implying full involvement
of recipient countries in the conception, planning and implementation
phases of programmes, based on reliable and accurate needs assessment
using data from the field. For this reason, I obtained the committee’s
authorisation to change the title of the report to replace the term
aid by that of co-operation.
10. The report examines development co-operation through international
institutions which are the main channels of implementation for which
member States have decision-making power, but also looks at smaller-scale
projects which may serve as examples of good practice. Private initiatives
also play a major role in development, as do individual remittances
by beneficiaries’ diasporas. Although these are more complicated to
analyse, national policies can contribute to facilitating these
individual and entrepreneurial relations across continents while
seeking to ensure that activities are carried out legally and in
the best interests of the people of the countries concerned.
3. Issues
with development co-operation
3.1. From
humanitarian assistance to development co-operation
11. The transition from humanitarian
assistance in emergencies to programmes targeting both sustainable migration
management and help towards providing a future for young people
in their own countries have been examined to some extent in Mr Cezar
Florin Preda’s 2017 report on “Possible ways to improve the funding
of emergency refugee situations”.
He underlined the difficulties of
financial responsibility-sharing and the efficient targeting and
spending of funds made available. Most of the recommendations made
in
Resolution 2164 (2017) can be applied equally to the area of development aid:
greater transparency and simplified reporting requirements; data
streamlining and impartial needs assessments, support and funding
for local and national actors, increased use and co-ordination of
cash-based programming; as well as more participation by local actors
and beneficiaries.
12. The resolution called for “enhanced engagement between humanitarian
and development actors”, which refers to the difficult transition
in some countries and contexts between emergency crisis-response programmes
and longer-term sustainable development projects, which should be
more carefully planned and supervised. Organisations such as the
OECD also call for more cross-cutting activities and co-operation between
the different actors assisting with long-term crises and capacity-building.
3.2. The
negative consequences of prolonged humanitarian assistance
13. Development aid is at the nexus
of several complex questions related to migration management, as
part of the potential solution to the management of migratory flows
into Europe. The definition of development aid as a means of helping
developing, post-conflict and climate-affected countries to build
sustainable societies and eradicate poverty is necessarily used
in contrast to that of humanitarian assistance, considered as an emergency
response to major catastrophes and crises as they arise.
14. Looking at the effect on local economies of the free distribution
of humanitarian aid is a good example of why emergency life-saving
action needs to be rapidly replaced by measures to contribute to
development. Where refugee camps and reception centres for migrants
are located at a distance from urban settlements, free distribution
of food and other goods is often seen as a necessity and a means
of controlling the daily lives of migrants, refugees and displaced
persons. This has led in some cases to trafficking and organised
re-sale of aid. Where migrants and refugees live among communities,
any free assistance quickly leads to major disruptions of local,
regional and even national markets for goods and produce.
15. Free distributions should therefore be used only in situations
of emergency as a first life-saving measure. Voucher systems and
cash payments provide a much more sustainable means of ensuring
basic living standards and have the potential to become an economic
driver for the country of transit or destination, reducing at the
same time, at least to some extent, the risk of trafficking in goods
and corruption on a large scale. The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has experienced this transition
and bases its assistance on these types of assistance in refugee
centres and camps. We were able to see this at work on our visit
to the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan in March.
3.3. Selective
co-operation: the “Global Gag Rule” and other restrictions on co-operation
16. Some countries make their assistance
conditional on certain economic or ideological conditions being fulfilled.
The most serious problem in this respect is the so-called “Global
Gag Rule” applied by the United States. This rule prohibits NGOs
who receive United States global health assistance from providing
legal abortion services or referrals, while also barring advocacy
for abortion law reform. In 2017, President Donald Trump’s Protecting
Life in Global Health Assistance policy took the global gag rule
further and applied it to all US$8.8 billion of United States global
health funding, including for HIV and AIDS, health systems capacity-building,
and even water, sanitation, and hygiene programming. This results
in incomplete reproductive health services for women, unintended
pregnancies, higher rates of maternal mortality, and an increase
in unsafe abortions. In addition, the global gag rule has not decreased
rates of abortions overall while increasing the number of unsafe
abortions.
17. Other, less radical, restrictions are applied by some countries.
Others make development aid conditional on exclusive access to markets
or natural or manufactured resources, which can result in the economic success
of recipient countries being bound to that of donor countries well
beyond the end of funding for programmes. Although some reciprocity
may be envisaged and indeed help to structure commercial channels and
outlets for innovation, expected returns should be proportional
to the assistance provided. The problems related to what is termed
“investment migration”, ie. citizenship or residence rights to a
country given in exchange for investment, will be dealt with in
a new report on the subject currently being prepared in the committee.
3.4. Use
and misuse of development aid for the reception and integration
of migrants
18. A 1988 DAC rule allows donor
countries to count certain refugee expenses as ODA for the first
year after their arrival. ODA has played a crucial role in supporting
the costs of providing refugees with temporary sustenance in the
least developed countries, which host 86% of the world's refugees.
Austria, Germany, Greece and Italy, for example, used 20% of ODA
for refugee costs.
19. Migration management is now used as justification to the public
of spending on aid and co-operation and presented as a means of
reducing immigration to Europe, by the same token avoiding entry
of terrorists and violent extremism. The first goal of development
in aiming to make the world better by eliminating poverty no longer
suffices to explain funding. This reasoning has had an impact on
development and on aid, for a time it even reduced amounts earmarked
for programmes unrelated to migration. According to Rachel Scott
of the OECD, this trend has stabilised. At the same time, the refugee
and migrant populations in the poorest countries are affecting coping
mechanisms and it is a reality that aid to migration can contribute
to development where investment takes all stakeholders into account.
20. One of the problems of development co-operation is its uneven
distribution and diverse success according to the governance structures
of the beneficiary countries. Donor States with a colonial past
will have retained relations with their former subjects and will
therefore tend to prefer to contribute to development in these countries,
whereas international development assistance will either concentrate
on geo-strategical targets or go to countries in need regardless
of the political and democratic structures in place to ensure fair and
efficient implementation.
21. In several European Union member States, the costs of receiving
refugees have been paid from the budget for development co-operation
– precisely the funds reserved for tackling poverty and inequality.
In the last few years, countries like the Netherlands and Italy
have spent 25% to 30% of their development aid budgets on the first
year of receiving asylum seekers. This is to some extent understandable,
as around 1.5 million people claimed asylum in OECD countries in
2015 at the peak of the migration management crisis – the highest
number ever recorded.
22. In France, military activities are complemented by development
aid, which according to President Emmanuel Macron is too little
appreciated in counteracting Islamist radicalisation. The Alliance
for the Sahel was recently established to launch programmes supporting
agriculture, investment and education in the region. The French
Government announced a gradual increase in spending on development
aid in Africa and the Middle East from the current 0.38% of gross
domestic product (GDP) up to 0.55% by 2022. However, there are some
signs (and criticisms) that spending on development outside the
country has led to a reduction in budget spent to eliminate poverty
nationally.
3.5. Developing
countries as destination countries as well as countries of origin
23. Another way in which development
can serve as a powerful tool for migration management is in helping poor
countries to implement efficient migration policies and to benefit
from the potential of migration from neighbouring countries rather
than increasing the pressure on their weak economies.
24. Three African countries, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia (respectively
recipients of 3.2%, 4.9% and 7% of aid from OECD DAC member States)
are responding to migration management needs very positively. Uganda is
one of the most progressive refugee-hosting countries in the world,
allowing refugees the right to work and freedom of movement. Enabling
rural refugees to cultivate under-populated plots of land has offered
a means to support national development. By the 1990s, the approach
had been formalised as “the self-reliance strategy”. Both refugees
and the host community benefit: refugees can set up businesses,
and many trade with and employ host nationals. The number of refugees
in the country rose to 1.4 million during the recent South Sudanese
and Congolese conflicts, but the government has maintained its policies
and as new camps have been set up the right to work has encouraged
the development of new local market towns which create opportunities
for many Ugandans.
25. Kenya’s “encampment policy” does not allow the 500 000 refugees
the right to work or move freely, but recent progress has seen the
opening of a new refugee camp in Kalobeyei along a similar self-reliance
model to that of Uganda. The camp has provided greater opportunities
for agriculture and entrepreneurship and a shared marketplace for
refugees and the local population, leading to higher incomes and
better food security. Ethiopia is also gradually moving towards
self-reliance in planning to allow its 900 000 refugees to work
and move freely. With the help of development co-operation, Africa
is thus now increasingly able to manage intra-African migration
while empowering host communities.
4. International
organisations and development co-operation
4.1. United
Nations
26. On 21 October 2015, the United
Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which recognised
the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable
development and international migration as “a multidimensional reality
of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit
and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses”.
27. Member States undertook to co-operate internationally to ensure
safe, orderly and regular migration. This co-operation is seen as
a means of strengthening the resilience of host communities, particularly
in developing countries. Goal 10 of the agenda aims to “reduce inequality
within and among countries”.
28. The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals came into
effect in January 2016 to provide policy and funding guidance over
15 years. They build on the
Millennium
Development Goals to include new areas such as climate change, economic
inequality, innovation, sustainable consumption, peace and justice. They
are designed as implementing objectives of the “5 Ps” of the United
Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: people, planet,
prosperity, peace and partnership.
The declared aim of poverty eradication
is at the centre of the 2030 Agenda, as is the idea that the whole
world should be put on a more prosperous and sustainable development
path. The report will examine how the United Nations’ new policies
will be implemented by the Organisation.
4.2. European
Union
29. The United Nations Millennium
Development Goals set out the framework for the action of the European Union
and its member States in their efforts to combat poverty and promote
gender equality and environmental sustainability. The new Sustainable
Development Goals, adopted in September 2015, have constituted a further
step in this direction, broadening and deepening the targets set,
as well as rendering them applicable to both developing countries
and developed countries. To achieve this, policy coherence for development should
become a driver of EU policy-making, reinforcing the consistency
both of external policies themselves, through more coherent and
better-coordinated financial instruments, and of the European Union’s
internal and external policies.
30. The European Union’s Development Cooperation Instrument has
an annual budget of 19 700 million euros and the item for humanitarian
aid is endowed with a budget of 6 621 million euros. Finally, the
European Development Fund (EDF), with a budget of 30 506 million
euros for the period 2014-2020 financed directly by the member States
and outside the EU budget, is the main financial instrument of the European
Union’s development co-operation policy.
31. Criticism of the European Union’s recent priority given to
security emphasises the need to ensure that development aid is used
in accordance with its original purpose, with due consideration
of aid and development effectiveness principles. Monitoring and
evaluation systems are also inefficient, which makes it difficult
to measure results, although auditors’ reports have pointed out
positive findings related to EU development policies. Despite the
European Union’s constant support for development co-operation,
it is a fact that the increased budget allocated for the protection
of Europe’s borders has a negative effect on budgets for assistance
to countries outside Europe.
32. According to an
EUobserver report,
the European Commission’s proposal
for a European Investment Plan for Africa was presented in 2017
as a means of containing migration from Africa to Europe by promoting economic
growth, employment and private sector development. The idea would
be to use €3.35 billion of official development assistance to foster
up to €44 billion worth of private investment in Africa “as a key contribution
to addressing the root causes of migration”.
33. This seems to indicate that containing migration has become
the primary objective of EU development co-operation, which would
be in breach of the European Union's Lisbon Treaty, which states:
“Development co-operation policy shall have as its primary objective
the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.”
Sacrificing development aid to serve short-term migration interests
comes at a time when the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda
is urgently called for, especially in view of the 750 million poor
and vulnerable people, half of whom live in Africa.
34. Taking Burkina Faso as an example, however, the objectives
and programmes of the partnership with the European Union under
the 11th European Development Fund and the achievements of the €708
million 10th Development Fund in upgrading infrastructure and access
to water and sanitation, as well as promoting political, democratic
and local governance, appear in line with the development goals
and to focus on capacity-building in the country. I feel obliged
to say, however, that I did not see sufficient signs of these improvements, which
does not mean they are inexistent but rather that much more investment
is needed.
35. These apparently contradictory analyses demonstrate the need
to balance Europe’s budget spending and for cross-cutting programme
planning – if development is to make a difference to migratory flows
by providing future prospects in underdeveloped countries, then
money cannot be reduced to pay for the consequences of that migration.
5. The
role of civil society and private initiatives
36. During my visit to Burkina
Faso, I was able to see the positive effect of associative and even
individual action on the ground.
37. Since my visit, I was delighted to note that one of the 2018
“Right Livelihood Award” (known as the Alternative Nobel Prize)
winners, Yacouba Sawadogo, is a farmer from Burkina Faso who used
a traditional technique of capturing water in pits in the earth
to reverse desertification. I saw the implementation of several initiatives
of this type on local and regional levels, in particular those of
the Northern Regional Chamber of Agriculture with its project “Promoting
Sustainable Agriculture in the Northern Region: Needs Supporting Producers”,
and the agricultural collective “Burkina Vert”, which is allowing
farmers to use water resources more efficiently. I also met with
a group of women working on food transformation for export, which
was employing over 20 women, and through them their families. All
of the interlocutors I met with stressed the need for increased
resources for education and vocational training.
38. It is evident from the above examples that development funding
needs to be more concentrated on supporting local and regional projects
which are already well-defined by local actors and functioning in
the beneficiary territories, rather than importing new schemes less
adapted to realities on the ground. These projects appeared to depend
rather on periodic support from civil society actors and/or private
donors. More international support would come alongside these sources
of funding and provide greater sustainability.
39. During discussions in our committee and through our meeting
held in Jordan in March 2018, we were also informed of small civil
society organisations organising for instance courses for Syrian
and Jordanian women on starting businesses.
5.1. Remittances
40. Other types of financial flows
are affecting migration; remittances are both a product of and a
reason to solve the migration problem. Goal 10.c of the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals undertakes to “[b]y 2030, reduce to
less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate
remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%”.
This shows the organisation’s acknowledgement
of the important of remittances for developing countries (see Mr Preda’s
report, which shows that remittances, taken as a whole, amount to
more than all other types of development budgets for the African
Continent).
5.2. Loans
and micro-credits
41. Although not specifically related
to development co-operation, the increased use of cash-based assistance
to migrants is also a means of ensuring decent living conditions
for migrants in developing countries while benefiting host economies
at the same time. The UNHCR’s Mobile Money programmes are of particular interest
in this respect, for instance in Niger and other parts of western
Africa. This is also an example of the successful coordination of
different types of action towards coherent development plans.
42. During my visit to Burkina Faso, I learned that micro-credits
were available in the country, but that the conditions for access
were often too restrictive – means-based granting and interest rates
prohibited these facilities, especially for women. This impressed
upon me the need to adapt development to the needs present and to
evaluate accessibility in every context.
6. Conclusions
43. There is a real need to work
further on a coherent narrative on migration and development, to
achieve both development impact and regular, orderly and safe migration.
National parliaments should work to promote development policies
on international, national and regional scales. Investment in the
improvement of lives in the least developed countries should remain
a priority over the more immediate concerns of security, which to a
great extent are a consequence of the failure to help countries
of origin to deal with problems at their source.
44. I also wish to underline that prevention is the solution.
In Burkina Faso, much emphasis was put on the need for better, more
accessible education and training. The vocational training centre
I visited was not operating at full capacity due to course fees
which without being very high were still prohibitive for many potential
young students. The need for more accessible, generalised and vocation-oriented
education was stressed everywhere I went in the country. It is also
a key to overcoming traditional behaviours which are an obstacle
to progress, such as inefficient farming methods and rising birthrates,
having many children being seen as both a sign of successful womanhood
and a source of future sustenance for families through employment.
45. There is also a need to implement development programmes without
giving the governments of recipient countries the impression they
do not need to invest in social welfare themselves. Several countries
have fallen into this regime of “subsidisation” and more care is
required in decision-making on where investments should be made
and what incentives should be provided. This is where the concept
of “co-operation” is the most important, and where lessons should
be learned from earlier failures by thorough impact evaluation.
46. Governments and organisations alike must distribute budgets
as swiftly as possible, and give more attention to best practices
as well as new innovative projects.
47. Finally, my recommendations aim to show that aid will not
be effective unless there is more multilateral and multi-sector
coherence between all the actors working on the ground and in different
policy areas.