Print
See related documents
A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 15211 | 11 January 2021
Progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure (January-December 2020)
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
In its annual progress report, the Monitoring Committee takes stock of its activities since January 2020 and assesses the progress made by the 11 countries under the Assembly’s full monitoring procedure, and by the 3 countries engaged in a post monitoring dialogue, in honouring their obligations and commitments to the Council of Europe. It welcomes progress made and expresses concerns at setbacks and addresses specific recommendations to the countries concerned.
In this reporting period, the committee prepared reports on “The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland” on the basis of which the Assembly opened a monitoring procedure with respect of this country; on the “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation”; and on the “New crackdown on political opposition and civil dissenting Turkey: urgent need to safeguard Council of Europe standards, under urgent procedure”. The committee also initiated a current affairs debate on military hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Moreover, the committee launched its work on the periodic review reports in a new format approved by the Assembly and selected according to the new procedure.
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
acknowledges the work carried out by the Committee on the Honouring
of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council Of
Europe (Monitoring Committee) in fulfilling its mandate as defined
in Resolution 1115 (1997) (modified) on the “Setting up of an Assembly committee
on the honouring of obligations and commitments by member states
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)”. In particular
it welcomes the committee’s work in accompanying the 11 countries
under a monitoring procedure stricto
sensu (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, the Russian Federation,
Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine), and the 3 countries engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue (Bulgaria, Montenegro and North Macedonia) in their efforts
to fully comply with the obligations and commitments they entered
into upon accession to the Council of Europe, as well as the monitoring
of the membership obligations of all other member States through
its periodic review process. It recalls that, on 28 January 2020,
on the basis of a report presented by the Monitoring Committee, the
Assembly adopted Resolution
2316 (2020) on “The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland”
in which it decided to open a full monitoring procedure in respect
of Poland.
2. The Assembly is aware that the exceptional circumstances caused
by the pandemic crisis have affected the monitoring process in 2020
by preventing co-rapporteurs from conducting visits to the countries
under their responsibility and maintaining direct political dialogue
with stakeholders. Moreover, due to the absence of plenary sessions
which are a necessary pre-condition for an in-depth and balanced
political debate on regular monitoring reports, no monitoring reports
have been prepared under ordinary procedure.
3. It should be commended that despite objective constraints
imposed on their work, monitoring co-rapporteurs have closely followed
developments in their respective countries using all available means including
videoconferences with a view to keeping abreast of developments
in the countries under their responsibility as illustrated by numerous
public statements they have made over the reference period.
4. In response to the new crackdown on political opposition and
civil dissent in Turkey, the Monitoring Committee prepared a report
under urgent procedure which was the basis of the Assembly resolution addressing
challenges and shortcomings ranging from restrictions of election
rights to the weakening of the rule of law or limited freedom of
expression and media freedom in Turkey.
5. The Monitoring Committee followed the developments regarding
the military hostilities which broke out on 27 September 2020 in
the Nagorno Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It initiated
a current affairs debate on the subject, organised exchanges of
views with the participation of parliamentarians from both sides
and monitoring rapporteurs on Armenia and Azerbaijan issued statements
calling for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.
6. The Assembly welcomes the adoption and publication by the
Monitoring Committee of internal working methods for the selection
of countries for periodic review reports thus ensuring an impartial
and fully transparent selection process.
7. The Monitoring Committee contributed to the debate on the
Covid-19 pandemic which was organised at the Enlarged Standing Committee
meeting on 13 October 2020, by preparing an opinion on the report
of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy on “Democracies
facing the Covid-19 pandemic”.
8. The Assembly welcomes the positive developments and the progress
made during the reporting period in a number of countries under
a monitoring procedure or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue,
in particular in:
8.1. Albania:
the agreement between all political stakeholders on electoral reform
and the will expressed by the authorities to address, in line with
European standards, the serious shortcomings noted in the draft
amendments to the Law on Audiovisual Media Service;
8.2. Armenia: progress in the fight against corruption reflected
by the improvement in the ranking established by the NGO Transparency
International, from 105 to 77 out of 177 countries; the adoption of
the 2020-2022 strategy to reform police forces, which foresees creating
a new Ministry of Interior responsible for law enforcement agencies;
the declared intention of the Armenian National Assembly to increase
the transparency of political financing, and the ratification of
the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, Lanzarote Convention);
8.3. Azerbaijan: the acquittal of Mr Ilgar Mammadov and Mr Rasul
Jafarov in April 2020 while regretting that it had not been done
within the deadline for the implementation of the European Court
of Human Rights judgment; the release, on humanitarian grounds of
176 prisoners aged over 65 in need of special care due to their
age and state of health, including two prisoners, convicted following
the 2015 Nardaran events in unfair trials which raised concerns
in the international community, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic,
thus addressing concerns expressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner on
Human Rights with regard to the protection of the human rights and
health of people detained in prisons in Council of Europe member
States during the sanitary crisis;
8.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina: the return of a Bosnian delegation
to the Assembly in 2020, after a full year of absence, due to the
inability of political forces to reach an agreement on the formation
of a government at the State-level; the holding of postponed local
elections on 15 November 2020 and the political agreement signed
in June 2020 that allowed local elections to be held in Mostar on 20 December
for the first time since 2008, a requirement made both by the European
Court of Human Rights in its Baralija judgment
and by the Assembly in its Resolution
2201 (2018) “The honouring of obligations and commitments by Bosnia
and Herzegovina”;
8.5. Bulgaria: the declared will of the authorities to reform
the Constitution with a view to efficiently fighting corruption
and ensuring the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law
as well as its hitherto co-operation with the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) in this respect;
8.6. Georgia: the political agreement of March 2020 between
all political stakeholders on a more proportional election system,
which can contribute to a more pluralist and representative composition
of the Georgian Parliament;
8.7. Republic of Moldova: the continuous co-operation of the
Moldovan authorities with the Council of Europe and the smooth organisation
of the presidential election despite a polarised environment and
the challenging sanitary context. The Assembly takes notes of the
election, on 15 November 2020, of Maia Sandu, the first woman to
become President of the Republic of Moldova – with a clear majority
of votes;
8.8. Montenegro: the peaceful shift of power following the
general elections that took place in August, which constitutes a
major political change since the independence, and was made possible
thanks to the responsible attitudes shown by both the new majority
and the new opposition in the aftermath of the elections;
8.9. North Macedonia: the ability of the four main political
parties, despite their diverging views and different ethnic backgrounds,
to build consensus in order to postpone the date of the early parliamentary elections
(to 15 July) given the Covid-19 pandemic and allow the parliament
to fulfil its legislative functions; the revision of the much awaited
Law on the Public Prosecutor's Office, aimed at providing a sustainable
solution for the cases of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Related
to and Arising from the Content of the Illegal Interception of Communications;
the noticeable efforts made by the authorities to revise the legislative
frameworks to fight corruption, while expecting a consistent practical
application of these new rules;
8.10. Poland: the efforts of all political actors to organise
democratic elections despite the Covid-19 pandemic and the, albeit
belated, agreement between the stakeholders on the postponement
of these elections, including the new dates and the conditions for
their organisation under pandemic conditions;
8.11. the Russian Federation: the role played in peace brokering
over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
8.12. Serbia: the resumption of the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina
dialog after a 20-month halt and the establishment of a mini-Schengen
zone to increase co-operation with Albania and North Macedonia;
8.13. Turkey: the intention expressed by the Turkish authorities
to expand freedom of expression while preparing the Human Rights
Action Plan and the continuous dialogue and co-operation established
with the Council of Europe;
8.14. Ukraine: the efforts by the Ukrainian authorities to establish
and ensure the functioning of the institutions to fight corruption
in the country as well as the cease-fire agreement between the Ukrainian military
forces and the illegally armed formations in certain areas of Donetsk
and Luhansk, which has led to tangible disengagement along the contact
line.
9. At the same time, the Assembly expresses its concern about
developments and remaining shortcomings in a number of countries
under a monitoring procedure or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue,
and in particular:
9.1. Albania:
the delays in establishing a functional Constitutional Court as
well as the ongoing deep political polarisation in the country;
9.2. Armenia: the violence that erupted following the signature
of the trilateral statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia
on 9 November 2020, which resulted in the storming of institutional buildings
and in physical aggression against the President of the National
Assembly, that left him hospitalised; the rapid changes in the composition
of the Constitutional Court without the opinion of the Venice Commission
being fully taken into account;
9.3. Azerbaijan: reports of large-scale repression of government
opponents and restrictions on freedom of expression, including internet
access, under the pretext of safety measures against the Covid-19
pandemic, other outstanding concerns including, inter alia, lack of independence
of justice, lack of pluralism, violation of the rule of law and
human rights, as well as restrictions put on freedoms of assembly,
association, expression, and religion;
9.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina: the continuing verbal attacks
against the General Framework Agreement, including threats to declare
self-determination by the Republika Srpska; continuous rhetoric questioning
the legitimacy of some State-level institutions established under
the General Framework Agreement, including the refusal to implement
judgements issued by State-level courts; the lack of any progress
with regard to the implementation of the Sedjić
and Finci judgment; the lack of any progress with regard
to the implementation of the recommendations made by the European
Union’s group of experts in the 2019 Priebe report; the lack of
any improvement in the field of freedom of expression and in the
field of freedom of peaceful assembly in relation to the “Justice
for David” movement; the absence of progress in terms of transitional
justice and reconciliation;
9.5. Bulgaria: no substantial progress in the main outstanding
areas of concern including high-level corruption and media freedom;
9.6. Georgia: the shortcomings noted during the last parliamentary
elections while deeply regretting the decision of opposition parties
to boycott the newly elected parliament;
9.7. Republic of Moldova: the slow pace of the reform of the
judiciary, and slow progress in the fight against corruption, in
particular insufficient progress made in the field of corruption
prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors,
and, in this context, political migration of members of parliament
which triggered political instability, notwithstanding allegations
of political corruption;
9.8. Montenegro: the limited progress achieved in the four
key areas identified by Resolution
2030 (2015): the independence of the judiciary, trust in the electoral
process, the situation of the media and the fight against corruption;
the re-appointment of presidents of courts for more than the two-terms
limit set by the Constitution and the law; the failure to revise
the electoral framework before the general elections; no progress
with regard to the composition and independence of the Judicial
Council, nor in reviewing the disciplinary framework for judges;
no substantial progress in the reform of the funding of political
parties and electoral campaigns; no improvement in the situation
of journalists;
9.9. North Macedonia: the situation of the media which remains
unchanged, in particular issues such as the financial sustainability
of independent media, self-regulation, transparency of media advertising by
state institutions, political parties and public enterprises, and
the public service broadcaster’s independence;
9.10. Poland: the refusal of the Polish authorities to execute
judgements of its domestic courts and of the Court of Justice of
the European Union which they do not like, contrary to its international
obligations including to the Council of Europe;
9.11. Russian Federation: a number of outstanding concerns,
including, inter alia, lack
of pluralism, independence of the judiciary, restrictive environment
for activities of political extra-parliamentary opposition, civil
society, human rights activists and journalists, restrictions on
freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion as well
as a number of problematic laws including the Foreign Agents Law,
the Law on Undesirable Organisations or anti-extremist legislation;
the lack of progress with regard to implementing the demands of
the international community with regard to Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, the
occupied Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the
Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova;
9.12. Serbia: limited progress, if any, in the outstanding areas
of concern; issues raised with regard to general elections held
on 21 June 2020 including the boycott by several opposition political
parties which resulted, despite a last-minute lowering of the electoral
threshold, in the formation of a new parliament without a viable
opposition (with the exception of some members from minority parties);
the management of the Covid-19 pandemic in times of elections including
the lifting of restrictive lockdown measures during the election
campaign and their unexpected reintroduction after the repeat election
of 1 July which triggered clashes with – and disproportionate use
of violence by – the police; restrictions to media freedom and attacks
against journalists, as well as financial investigations launched
against NGOs and human rights activists;
9.13. Turkey: the new crackdown on political opposition and
civil dissent, the restrictions of freedom of expression and media
freedom; the dismissal of mayors on alleged terror-related charges
and their replacement by government-appointed trustees, the adoption
of amendments to the 1969 Attorneyship law which undermine the independence
of the bar associations and further deteriorate the rule of law;
9.14. Ukraine: the persistent shortcomings in the reforms of
the judiciary and the justice system and the still limited results
in the fight against the widespread corruption in the country; the
recurrent attacks on journalists.
10. Consequently, the Assembly urges all the countries which are
under the monitoring procedure or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue
to step up their efforts to fully honour their membership obligations
and accession commitments to the Council of Europe. In particular,
it calls on:
10.1. Albania: to foster
the freedom of media and to ensure that all Venice Commission recommendations
concerning the amendments to the Law on Audio-visual Media are fully
addressed; and calls on all political forces to fully implement
the new electoral framework which will allow for the conduct of
genuinely democratic elections on 25 April 2021;
10.2. Armenia: to continue pursuing the democratic path it has
chosen, and to solve the political crisis that followed the signature
of the trilateral statement within the framework of a democratic
state that respects the rule of law;
10.3. Azerbaijan: to address the outstanding concerns included
in past Assembly resolutions, including, inter
alia, lack of pluralism, violation of the rule of law
and human rights as well as the restrictions put on freedoms of
assembly, association, expression, and religion; and to refrain
from war rhetoric;
10.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina: to refrain from any attack against
the General Framework Agreement; to implement the Sedjić and Finci judgment; to implement
the recommendations contained in the Priebe report; to end acts
of intimidation against journalists, and to respect freedom of peaceful
assembly, notably in relation to the ‘Justice for David’ movement;
to engage in a genuine reconciliatory process, in the spirit of
the common statement signed by the Collegial Presidency during the
25th Anniversary of the General Framework
Agreement;
10.5. Bulgaria: to step up its efforts in addressing outstanding
concerns identified in Resolution
2296 (2019) “Post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria” including high
level corruption, media freedom, human rights of minorities, hate
speech and violence against women and to make full use of the Council
of Europe’s legal expertise in the process of the adoption of a
new Constitution;
10.6. Georgia: to fully and transparently investigate all allegations
of electoral misconduct during the October 2020 parliamentary elections;
the Assembly urges all political parties to take up the seats they won
in the new parliament and not to undermine its democratic functioning;
10.7. the Republic of Moldova: to ensure that all political
stakeholders engage in an inclusive dialogue and make the necessary
political compromises to ensure the functioning of democratic institutions
in line with Council of Europe standards for the benefit of all
citizens; to adopt, without further delay, the expected legal and
constitutional amendments, in line with the recommendations of the
Venice Commission; to improve the independence, accountability and
efficiency of the judiciary; to upgrade the election legislation
in line with the August 2020 Venice Commission opinion, in particular
to better regulate funding of election campaigns; to take meaningful
action to fight corruption and conduct a thorough investigation
into the 2014 bank scandal;
10.8. Montenegro: all political stakeholders to demonstrate
that Montenegro is not only able to manage a democratic shift of
majority, but also capable of confirming its European path and complying
with its obligations, notably in the four key areas determined by Resolution 2030 (2015) “The
honouring of obligations and commitments by Montenegro”;
10.9. North Macedonia: to pursue its efforts to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption,
in line with the recommendations of the Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO); to launch the reforms needed to improve the
situation of the media with due consultation of all stakeholders;
to further implement Resolution
2304 (2019) on the “Post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia”,
notably to increase the sustainability and functioning of democratic
institutions, consolidate the electoral framework and pursue inclusive
policies aiming at securing the rights of minorities;
10.10. Poland: to fully implement Resolution 2316 (2020) on “The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland”,
in particular regarding the independence of the judiciary and respect
for the rule of law; to respect the reproductive autonomy of women
and guarantee unhindered and timely access to sexual and reproductive
health services;
10.11. Russian Federation: to address, without further delay
a number of outstanding concerns, including, inter
alia, lack of pluralism, independence of the judiciary,
restrictive environment for activities of political extra-parliamentary
opposition, civil society, human rights activists and journalists,
restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, association and
religion as well as a number of problematic laws including the Foreign
Agents Law, the Law on Undesirable Organisations or anti-extremist
legislation; to implement the demands of the international community
with regard to Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, the occupied Georgian regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Transnistrian region of the
Republic of Moldova;
10.12. Serbia: to foster an inclusive dialogue with all political
parties in order to ensure pluralism of views when preparing the
reforms expected in the framework of the monitoring procedure, in
particular the revision of the Constitution to enhance independence
of the judiciary; to strengthen the position and action of independent
institutions; to review the election legislation on the basis of
a consensus of the main political forces in order to build trust
in election processes and ensure fair election conditions in the future;
to improve the situation of the media, investigate attacks on journalists
and create conditions allowing civil society and independent media
to express critical views and ensure a sound scrutiny of public
institutions leading to the necessary checks and balances in a democratic
society; to take a firm stand against hate speech which nurtures
hostility against journalists, human activists and political opponents;
10.13. Turkey: to implement Resolution 2347 (2020) “New crackdown on political opposition and civil dissent
in Turkey: urgent need to safeguard Council of Europe standards”
and notably to: refrain from systematic prosecution and investigation
of dissenting voices – including opposition politicians, human rights
defenders, journalists, academics – and protect their fundamental
freedoms; reinstate the dismissed mayors and make the expected legal
changes in the election legislation, in line with the June 2020
opinion of the Venice Commission; to release Osman Kavala and implement
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights; to amend and/or
ensure strict interpretation of the Anti-terror Law and the Penal
Code so as to ensure that their implementation and interpretation
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5),
as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights;
10.14. Ukraine: to take all necessary actions to strengthen the
structures necessary to fight corruption in the country, including
by restoring the effective functioning of the e-declaration system
and clarifying the legal status of the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine while at the same time refraining from any actions
that could have a lasting detrimental effect on the rule of law
and the independence of the judiciary in Ukraine; to ensure the
effective investigation of all attacks against journalists.
11. With regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Assembly
calls on all parties involved to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric
hindering political dialogue, Armenia and Azerbaijan to implement
as soon as possible the provisions of the trilateral statement related
to humanitarian issues, all parties involved to immediately put in
action the exchange of prisoners of war and bodies, to respect cultural
heritage; it invites the Monitoring Committee to explore avenues
to contribute at parliamentary level to an atmosphere conducive
to the peace process. The Assembly expresses its serious concern
about reports and allegations of violations of humanitarian and
human rights law by all sides during this conflict and allegations
of degradations to some religious sites and monuments, as well as
destruction of private property, and expects these reports to be
fully investigated and any violations to be remedied and the perpetrators
prosecuted.
12. The Assembly invites the Monitoring Committee to further reflect
on possible ways of adapting its working methods to the constraints
imposed by the pandemic crisis with a view to improving the efficiency
of the parliamentary monitoring procedures under challenging circumstances.
13. The Assembly invites all monitoring rapporteurs to resume
visits to the countries under their responsibility as soon as the
travel restrictions due to the pandemic are lifted and calls on
all countries concerned to facilitate the organisation of such visits
without undue delay.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
1. The basis for the Parliamentary
Assembly monitoring procedure is Resolution 1115 (1997) on the “Setting up of an Assembly committee on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee)” (as modified by Resolution 1431(2005), Resolution
1515 (2006), Resolution
1698 (2009), Resolution
1710 (2010), Resolution
1936 (2013), Resolution
2018 (2014), Resolution
2261 (2019) and Resolution
2325 (2020). It defines the mandate of the Monitoring Committee
and entrusts it with the task of ensuring “the fulfilment of the
obligations assumed by member States under the terms of the Statute
of the Council of Europe (ETS
No. 1), the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5) and all other Council of Europe Conventions to which
they are parties” as well as ensuring the “honouring of commitments
entered into by the authorities of member States upon their accession
to the Council of Europe”.
2. In accordance with Resolution
1115 (1997) as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to report to
the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress of the
monitoring procedures. In line with established practice, the committee
has entrusted me, as its chairperson, with the task of being the
rapporteur on the committee’s activities in the period from January
to December 2020.
3. In accordance with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows
all Council of Europe member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations, and if relevant, specific accession
commitments. Currently, 11 countries are subject to a monitoring
procedure sensu stricto (Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Republic of
Moldova, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine)
and 3 countries are engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue (Bulgaria,
Montenegro and North Macedonia). 3 countries (Hungary, Malta and
Romania) are subject to a periodic review report on the honouring
of obligations. The selection process for periodic review reports
is discussed in more detail below. The Monitoring Committee also
runs a sub-committee on “Conflicts between Council of Europe Member States”.
4. Previous annual progress reports based their country-specific
observations on the reports, statements and other public documents
prepared by respective co-rapporteurs. This year’s progress report
has created an unprecedented challenge in this respect. Due to the
exceptional circumstances caused by the Covid-19 crisis, co-rapporteurs
have been prevented from conducting visits to the countries under
their responsibility. As a consequence and due to the absence of
plenary sessions in the physical presence of members which are a necessary
pre-condition for an in-depth and balanced political debate on regular
monitoring reports, there have been no monitoring reports prepared
under ordinary procedure. However, the work of the committee has continued
in a remote manner thus allowing progress in the preparation of
the reports underway. Here I would like to underline that this year’s
country-specific comments have been prepared on the basis of rapporteurs’ statements
as well as the discussions in the Monitoring Committee and findings
of other Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms. All of them have
been checked by with respective rapporteurs before being published.
2. Overview of the committee’s activities
2.1. General comments
5. The year 2020 has created an
unprecedented challenge for the work of the whole of the Council
of Europe including its Assembly. The Assembly was only able to
meet in the physical presence of its members during its First Part-Session
in January 2020, the three others being either cancelled or replaced
by remote meetings of the Standing Committee. While from the reglementary
point of view, the Standing Committee acts on behalf of the Assembly,
it has been customary that ordinary monitoring reports are only
debated by the latter with a view to ensuring a wider political
balance in respect of sensitive issues.
6. Pan European restrictions imposed on travel have prevented
co-rapporteurs from carrying out in person fact-finding visits.
While they continued to proceed with the preparation of their reports
through remote meetings and exchanges of views with relevant stakeholders
and receive information from other sources including national and
international civil society, the committee has agreed that direct
political dialogue is a key element of the monitoring procedure
and as such, cannot be replaced in the framework of the preparation
of a report.
7. As a consequence, only four reports and one opinion have been
submitted by the committee over the reference period: three of them
in January (the progress report, “The functioning of democratic
institutions in Poland” and “Challenge, on substantive grounds,
of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation
of the Russian Federation”); one under urgent procedure at the meeting
of the Enlarged Standing Committee on 23 October 2020 (“New crackdown
on political opposition and civil dissent in Turkey: urgent need
to safeguard Council of Europe standards”), and the opinion on the
report prepared by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
on “Democracies facing the Covid-19 pandemic”, debated at the Enlarged Standing
Committee meeting on 13 October 2020.
8. The committee also adopted – but has not yet submitted to
the Assembly – a report and a draft resolution on the post-monitoring
dialogue with Montenegro. The co-rapporteurs for Albania have also
prepared an information note which was declassified by the committee.
9. Over the reference period, the Committee met nine times: once
in Paris in January, once in Strasbourg during the January part-session
of the Assembly and as from May 2020 it held seven remote meetings. Regrettably,
the external meeting of the committee, which was supposed to be
held at the invitation of the Turkish Parliament in Ankara on 30-31
March 2020, had to be postponed.
10. During these meetings, a number of hearings including on Georgia,
Serbia, Ukraine, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian Federation,
Armenia, Turkey, Albania as well as on membership obligations in
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic were organised. The committee
held exchanges of views with the President of the Assembly on the
PACE toolkit on the Guidelines for discussions on the impact of
the Covid-19 pandemic, with the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights on transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
with Ms Marija Pejčinović Burić, Secretary General of the Council
of Europe.
11. While a number of planned visits by co-rapporteurs had to
be postponed, some of them at the last minute, as a result of the
deteriorating sanitary situation (for example a visit to Moscow
on 17-18 March 2020, a visit to Ankara on 1-4 April 2020 and to
Kyiv on 6-8 April 2020), an increasing number of videoconferences and
remote bilateral meetings have been gradually put in place in order
to ensure that rapporteurs are kept abreast of the developments
in the countries under their responsibility. They included a round
table with Russian civil society representatives, exchanges of views
with the Head of the Russian parliamentary delegation and with the
Head of the Turkish parliamentary delegation, with the Head and
the full delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Montenegrin
experts and civil society representatives on the outcome of the general
and local elections held on 30 August, with the Ambassador of the
European Union delegation to Montenegro, with the Human Rights Defender
of the Republic of Armenia, with the acting-Secretary of the Venice
Commission on the Constitution of Armenia, with the Chairperson
of the Specialised Commission on Constitutional Reforms and Representative
of the Republic of Armenia before the European Court of Human Rights,
with a Carnegie Foundation expert on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
with Albanian experts and civil society representatives on electoral
reform; with Polish civil society representatives, and a round table
with representatives of civil society and media from Serbia.
12. The committee’s rapporteurs adopted a number of statements
with regard to developments in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, the
Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. Memoranda on developments
in Serbia and the Republic of Moldova were submitted by the respective
rapporteurs to the committee.
13. The committee reacted to the outbreak of military hostilities
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. It initiated a current affairs debate
on the subject which was held during the Enlarged Standing Committee
meeting on 22 October 2020 and mandated its Sub-committee on Conflicts
between Council of Europe member States to consult with the heads
of both delegations concerned as a possible follow-up to the discussions
in the committee. The rapporteurs for Armenia and Azerbaijan made
a number of joint statements with regard to the hostilities.
14. As a result of a long process of reflection, the committee
adopted its working methods concerning the procedure on the selection
of periodic review reports (see chapter 2.4).
15. The outstanding co-operation with the Venice Commission also
continued this year. Exchanges of views were organised with the
Chairperson of the Council of Democratic Elections on membership
obligations and conduct of democratic elections in the context of
the Covid-19 pandemic and with members of the Venice Commission
on the amendments to the Georgian Law on the Common Courts with
regard to the appointment of Supreme Court judges, the amendments
to the Albanian communication laws and the situation of dismissed and
replaced mayors in Turkey. On 28 January 2020, the committee requested
an opinion from the Venice Commission on the Romanian draft law
regarding the modification and completion of law nr 115/2015 on
the election of the authorities of local public administration and
draft laws amending the law nr 215/2001 on local public administration
and law nr 393/2004 regarding the status of local elections. On
27 May 2020, the committee requested two Venice Commission opinions
on constitutional amendments in the Russian Federation and the procedure
for their adoption and on the draft law on the bar associations
in Turkey. On 13 November 2020, the committee requested the Venice
Commission’s opinion on the recent amendments to the Law on Electronic
Communications and the Law on Broadcasting in Georgia. On 11 December
2020, the committee requested the Venice Commission’s opinion on
revised draft amendments to the law on Audiovisual Media Service
in Albania.
16. Regrettably, the committee also experienced, for various reasons,
great fluctuations among its rapporteurs this year. New rapporteurs
were appointed to replace the previous ones for North Macedonia,
the Russian Federation, Turkey, Albania, Armenia, Montenegro, the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. For these new co-rapporteurs –
as well as for the rapporteurs appointed for new reports (monitoring
report on Poland and periodic reviews on Hungary, Malta and Romania)
– it is particularly important to visit the countries under their responsibility
and establish in-person contacts with a view to conducting a meaningful
political dialogue. They have all expressed their wish to carry
out the visits as soon as conditions allow.
17. The co-rapporteurs concerned could not take part, in their
capacity of ex-officio members
– in the election observation missions scheduled – and later cancelled
due to sanitary situation – in Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro
and the Republic of Moldova.
18. The question of the modalities of the preparation of monitoring
reports, and, more generally of the efficiency of the committee’s
work during the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly if the present restrictions
continue into the next year, was the subject of an internal discussion
among the members.
2.2. Countries under a full monitoring procedure
2.2.1. Albania
19. The most recent report on “The honouring of obligations
and commitments by Albania” was presented to the Assembly on 2 October
2014 resulting in the adoption of Resolution 2019 (2014). The rapporteurs paid an information visit to Tirana
from 28 to 30 October 2019. They presented their findings to the
committee on 16 January 2020 in AS/Mon (2020) 01 Rev1. Mr Andrej
Hunko (Germany, UEL) whose five year term had ended was replaced
as co-rapporteur by Mr Petter Eide (Norway, UEL) on 30 January 2020.
on “The honouring of obligations
and commitments by Albania” was presented to the Assembly on 2 October
2014 resulting in the adoption of Resolution 2019 (2014). The rapporteurs paid an information visit to Tirana
from 28 to 30 October 2019. They presented their findings to the
committee on 16 January 2020 in AS/Mon (2020) 01 Rev1. Mr Andrej
Hunko (Germany, UEL) whose five year term had ended was replaced
as co-rapporteur by Mr Petter Eide (Norway, UEL) on 30 January 2020.20. One of the major developments in 2020 was the agreement, between
all stakeholders, on electoral reform. As mentioned by the co-rapporteurs
in their most recent information note, an electoral reform followed by
elections is widely considered to be key to resolving the political
crisis in Albania. This will allow the political forces to come
to a consensus on an electoral framework that can have the full
trust of all stakeholders. Such an agreement would allow for new
elections, which – in turn – could lead to the return of the opposition
to the parliament and hopefully normalisation of the political environment.
21. In a very welcome development, on 14 January 2020, the ruling
majority as well as parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition
agreed on the establishment of a Political Council for Electoral
Reform. The ruling majority committed itself to adopting any consensual
proposal developed by the Political Council. Following lengthy negotiations,
the Political Council reached an agreement on electoral reform on
5 June 2020. However, no agreement could be reached on a new election
system, which had been a main request of the parliamentary opposition.
The changes to the electoral legislation needed to implement this
agreement were adopted on 23 June 2020.
22. On 15 June 2020, a group of 28 parliamentarians (mostly from
the parliamentary opposition) tabled a set of amendments to the
Albanian Constitution for additional electoral reforms, which mainly
aimed to introduce an open list electoral system. This proposal
was supported by the ruling majority ensuring its passage through
parliament on 30 July 2020. These amendments were decried by the
extra-parliamentary opposition which noted that these, in their
view controversial, changes had been rejected by the Political Council
and therefore went against the 14 January and 5 June 2020 agreements
between all political stakeholders. Nevertheless, the parliament
adopted the changes to the electoral code necessary to implement
the constitutional amendments on 5 October 2020.
23. Fortunately, the adoption of these constitutional amendments,
while initially raising tensions, did not endanger the June agreement
on electoral reform and the President of Albania called for parliamentary elections
on 25 April 2021. At the same time, reflecting on the controversial
nature of the second set of changes to the electoral framework,
the President of Albania requested an opinion of the Venice Commission
on the amendments to the Constitution of 30 July 2020 and to the
Electoral Code of 5 October 2020.
24. The co-rapporteurs have also been closely following the amendments
to the Albanian law on the Audiovisual Media Service, which had
raised considerable concerns among domestic stakeholders and international
community. On 20 January 2020, the committee requested a Venice
Commission opinion on these amendments. In its opinion adopted in
June 2020, the Venice Commission expressed
serious concerns about the amendments in the form they were presented
in November 2019 which it considered “are not ready for adoption
in their current form”. In a welcome development, the authorities
withdrew the draft amendments from parliament and promised to revise
them before tabling them again.
the Venice Commission expressed
serious concerns about the amendments in the form they were presented
in November 2019 which it considered “are not ready for adoption
in their current form”. In a welcome development, the authorities
withdrew the draft amendments from parliament and promised to revise
them before tabling them again.25. This revision process is currently on-going with expertise
provided by the Council of Europe. An exchange of views with the
participation of the drafters of these amendments, the Venice Commission
and the Information Society Department (Directorate General I Human
Rights and Rule of law of the Council of Europe) was organised by
the committee on 13 November 2020. On 11 December 2020, the committee
agreed to request an opinion of the Venice Commission on the final
draft of the revised amendments before they are adopted in the final
reading by the Albanian Parliament.
26. On 27 July 2020, in line with the recommendations of the Venice
Commission in its opinion on “the scope of the power of the President
to set the dates of elections” the Albanian Parliament voted against
the impeachment of President Meta.
the Albanian Parliament voted against
the impeachment of President Meta.27. The interlinked processes of the reform of the judiciary and
the strengthening of the mechanisms to fight the widespread corruption
in Albania continued in 2020. While progress was made in this respect,
a number of issues remain outstanding and should be closely followed
by the committee. The High Court became operational on 11 March
2020. Regrettably the Constitutional Court is not yet fully functional,
and the appointment of its judges has been entangled in a dispute
between the Albanian Government and the President. On 19 June 2020,
upon request of the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament, the Venice
Commission adopted an opinion on the appointment of judges to the
Constitutional Court that should provide the basis for the resolution
of this problem.
28. With regard to the special anti-corruption and organised crime
structure (SPAK), the Special Prosecutors office is now fully functional
and on 30 July 2020 the Director of the National Bureau of Investigations
was appointed. In addition, the vetting process of all prosecutors
and judges, albeit slow, continues unabated. The high percentage
of judges and prosecutors dismissed as a result of the vetting process
both underscores its need and is a matter of concern.
2.2.2. Armenia
29. The last information note on
Armenia dates back to July 2019, following the fact-finding mission
to Yerevan by the co-rapporteurs in March 2019.
30. The most significant development in 2020 was the outbreak
of military hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the
Nagorno Karabakh region, on 27 September. They caused the deaths
of numerous civilians and soldiers on both sides and ended on 10
November 2020 following the trilateral statement by Armenia, Azerbaijan
and the Russian Federation, that included a ceasefire.
31. However, the outcome of the military hostilities created political
unrest in Armenia. Following the announcement of the trilateral
statement, protesters calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister,
Mr Nikol Pashinyan, violently stormed the parliament and government
buildings, with weak intervention of police forces, and severely
assaulted the President of the Parliament, Mr Ararat Mirozyan who
had to be hospitalised. On the same day, the President of Armenia,
Mr Armen Sarkissian, whose role is mostly ceremonial, publicly indicated that
he had not been informed of the trilateral statement and he started
political consultations to see a way out of the crisis. Deeply concerned
by the course of events, that could indicate a violent insurrectional
climate, the co-rapporteurs issued a statement on 10 November, in
which they condemned the attacks against the symbols of the democratic
institutions of the Republic of Armenia, reminded Armenians that
they had shown their ability to overcome immense political hurdles
peacefully in the past and called them not to deviate from the democratic
path they had chosen.
32. At the time of drafting, the situation seemed to have evolved,
allowing democratic mechanisms to function, and political solutions
to be proposed.
33. In the days following 10 November, extra-parliamentarian parties,
together with Prosperous Armenia, the
major opposition party within the parliament, took part in limited
demonstrations (some thousands of protesters) demanding the resignation
of the government and the recall of the trilateral statement they perceived
as a capitulation and a betrayal. Some participants, including leaders
of political organisations were arrested and quickly freed. Criminal
procedures could however be initiated against those who participated
to the storming of public buildings during the night of 9-10 November.
On 16 November, in his address to the Armenian people, President
Sarkissian presented the result of his consultations – all his interlocutors
pleaded for the termination of the government – and called for a
highly qualified Government of National Accord, before early parliamentarian
elections could be organised in accordance with the Constitution.
After the resignation of some members of his Cabinet and several
live addresses to the Armenian people, Prime Minister Pashinyan presented,
on 18 November, a road map describing the priorities of the government
until June 2021. He also announced that his government would be
reshuffled. Although the majority in parliament rejected the holding of
an extraordinary session dedicated to the resignation of the government,
leading the two opposition factions, Prosperous Armenia and Bright
Armenia, to boycott the resuming of the ordinary session, the proposal
from Bright Armenia to discuss the lifting of martial law during
a special setting on 26 November seemed to have been agreed.
34. The severe political repercussions of the military hostilities
occurred in a country deeply hurt by the Covid-19 pandemic, despite
sanitary measures being put in place right at the beginning of the
year. Apart from these developments, Armenia achieved several results
in the three pillars of the Council of Europe and saw one regrettable
event.
35. In January 2020, the NGO Transparency International published
its Corruption Perception Indicator, a widely used indicator of
corruption worldwide, for 2019. Armenia, which ranked 105 out of
177 countries in 2018, now ranked 77, in an area considered as a
priority for the government and the co-rapporteurs, as indicated
in their last information note.
36. In February 2020, the Ministry of Justice presented its 2020-2022
strategy to reform police forces, that foresees to create a new
Ministry of Interior responsible for law enforcement agencies that
are currently under the direct authority of the Prime Minister.
This creation has been a long-standing recommendation of the Assembly
and the co-rapporteurs pleaded for it during their last fact-finding
visit.
37. In March 2020, the Venice Commission together with the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) issued a joint
opinion on draft amendments to the legislation concerning political
parties at the request of the Armenian Parliament. The opinion on
a package dedicated notably to increasing transparency of political
financing was rather positive, but the adoption of the amendments
was postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The amendments to the legislation
concerning political parties were adopted by the parliament in the
first reading, on 10 December 2020.
38. In May 2020, Armenia became the 47th country
to ratify the Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, the Lanzarote Convention),
despite an active and politicised campaign launched by supporters
who presented themselves as defenders of “traditional Armenian values”.
39. In September 2020, the appointment of three new members to
the Constitutional Court, proposed by three different authorities
and endorsed by the parliament, was the last episode of a struggle
on the composition of the highest judicial authority, started in
2019. The level of tensions the struggle created between the Prime
Minister’s Office and the Presidency of the Constitutional Court
led the co-rapporteurs as well as the President of the Venice Commission
to call for restraint in separate statements, in January. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and thanks
to the active
dialogue between the Council of Europe and the Armenian authorities, the
government decided not to organise the referendum on the replacement
of constitutional judges initially planned, to come back to the
parliamentarian procedure in order to revise the Constitution and
to request the opinion of the Venice Commission on the drafted reform.
The Venice Commission issued its opinion in June, recognising the
legitimacy of the authorities’ wish to ensure that the composition
of the Constitutional Court reflected, within a reasonable time
frame, the provisions of the current Constitution, which was not
the case at the time. It also recommended to envisage a transitional
period which would allow for a gradual change in the composition
of the Constitutional Court, a recommendation that the Armenian
authorities did not follow, which led to the termination of three
judges and the demotion of the president to a position of a simple
judge, who otherwise would have remained president much longer than
the six years term set by the current Constitution.
2.2.3. Azerbaijan
40. The last report on the functioning
of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan was debated in the Assembly in
2017.
41. In February 2020, parliamentary elections, originally scheduled
for November 2020, took place. They were observed by the Council
of Europe and the OSCE observation missions, which in their conclusions
stated that despite the high number of candidates the restrictive
legislation and political environment prevented genuine competition
in the elections. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party won 72 out of
125 seats (it was later reduced to 70 when the results in two constituencies
were annulled). The second largest party, the Civic Solidarity Party
won 3 seats.
42. The monitoring co-rapporteurs in their statement of 7 January
2020 expressed their regret and disdain at the non-enforcement by
Azerbaijan of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
with regard to the annulment of the court sentences against Mr Ilgar
Mammadov, Head of the Republican Alternative Party (Real), and seven
other activists, which prevented them from running in the anticipated
parliamentary elections. The deadline for the implementation of
the Court’s decision expired on 31 December 2019. Mr Mammadov and Mr Rasul
Jafarov, lawyer and human rights defender were finally acquitted
in April 2020 after having spent respectively 5 and 1.5 years in
prison following unfair trials based on trumped-up charges.
43. Since March 2020 there have been numerous reports of large-scale
repression of government opponents and restrictions on freedom of
expression, including Internet access, under the pretext of safety measures
against the Covid-19 pandemic. Over 15 opposition activists and
journalists have been sentenced to detention of up to 30 days on
charges that include breaking lockdown rules or disobeying police
orders. Mr Ali Kerimli, leader of the opposition Popular Front Party,
has been placed under de facto house
arrest and had his internet and telephone lines blocked. The case
of opposition activist Agil Khumbatov, who was allegedly placed
in an asylum and forced to undergo psychological treatment following
critical statements, raised the utmost concern.
44. President Aliyev’s speech marking the Nowruz holiday, in which
he had proposed the “isolation” of the country’s political opposition
as a response to the coronavirus pandemic and described his country’s
legitimate political opposition as a traitorous ‘fifth column’ was
strongly criticised by the international community and the monitoring
rapporteurs.
45. On a more positive note, the rapporteurs welcomed the release,
on humanitarian grounds, of 176 prisoners aged over 65 in need of
special care due to their age and state of health, including two
prisoners, convicted following the 2015 Nardaran events in unfair
trials which raised the concerns of the international community,
in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic thus addressing concerns
expressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
with regard to the protection of human rights and health of people detained
in prisons in Council of Europe member States during the sanitary
crisis.
46. On 18 March 2020, Mr Afgan Mukhtarli, an Azerbaijani investigative
journalist and activist detained by the Azeri authorities since
May 2017 following his abduction from Georgia was released. However,
this welcomed step by the authorities was overshadowed by the arrest
of Mr Tofik Yakublu, leading opposition politician, for ‘hooliganism’.
47. The lack of independence of the justice illustrated by a long-standing
pattern of repression of the government’s opponents is a major problem
in Azerbaijan, which has a calamitous impact on the democratic process.
The troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention of government
critics identified by the European Court of Human Rights and the
‘structural problem’ of misuse of administrative detention, described
by the Committee of Ministers, persist. There is a specific report
on political prisoners in Azerbaijan prepared by the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights and adopted by the Assembly in January
2020.
48. Other outstanding concerns include, inter
alia, lack of pluralism, violation of the rule of law
and human rights as well as restrictions put on freedoms of assembly,
association, expression, (Azerbaijan is ranked 166th out of 180
countries in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index)
and religion.
49. The year 2020 was marked by the outbreak, on 27 September,
of military hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the
Nagorno Karabakh region which caused the deaths of numerous civilians
and soldiers on both sides and ended on 10 November following the
ceasefire agreement.
2.2.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
50. Following the agreement on
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Reform Programme, which paves the way forward
on BiH-NATO co-operation, and the establishment of a government
at the state-level in December 2019, both houses of the Parliamentary
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina appointed their members to standing
committees and inter-parliamentary delegations in January 2020.
That allowed the return of a Bosnian delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe after a year of absence and made
it possible for the co-rapporteurs to resume their dialogue with
their Bosnian counterparts. However, the 14 months delay in the
formation of a government at the State-level, an event that already
happened in past elections, and the inability of political parties
to build a coalition at the entity-level of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, from October 2018 until now, clearly indicated
that both the institutional framework and the political situation are
far from being optimal.
51. In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic prevented the rapporteurs from
going to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
52. As indicated by the annual report of the European Commission
(SWD(2020) 350 final) issued in October 2020, by the 57th (S/2020/345) and 58th (S/2020/1052) reports of the High Representative for Implementation of
the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and confirmed by
the exchange of views between the co-rapporteurs, the Bosnian delegates,
and the Commissioner for Human Rights, the overall situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina has either deteriorated or not improved in
almost all areas.
53. The main significant and positive development was achieved
at the local level. In parallel to the discussions on and the preparation
of local elections that were held in the two entities and in the
Brčko district, the leaders of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA)
and of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina) signed
an agreement in June 2020 to amend the Election Law of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The amendments were passed in July 2020 enabling the
holding of local elections in Mostar for the first time since 2008.
They took place on 20 December. This landmark achievement was in
compliance with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights
in the Baralija case by which
the Court considered that there was discriminatory treatment of
Mostar residents due to the State’s failure to enable the conduct
of democratic elections. It was also one of the demands by the Assembly
in its Resolution 2201
(2018). However, this agreement should not further entrench
existing divisions based on belonging to one of the three constituent peoples,
something that would contradict the Court judgment in the Sedjić and Finci case.
54. Concerning the implementation of this judgement, that dates
back to 2009, no progress was made in 2020 and the electoral system
of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains discriminatory. On 1st October
2020, the Committee
of Ministers reiterated that the retention of this electoral system
“constitutes a clear violation of the requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights and a manifest breach of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
unconditional obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, and
thus also of its undertakings as a member State of the Council of
Europe.”
55. In the field of democracy, a negative trend continued in terms
of verbal attacks against the General Framework Agreement, which
celebrated its 25th anniversary in November
and December 2020. On this occasion, the three members of the Collegial
Presidency issued a common statement, as an important sign of reconciliation.
These verbal attacks took the form of constant threats to declare
self-determination by the Republika Srpska, linking it to the future
of the Kosovo* status,
of continuous rhetorics questioning the legitimacy of some State
institutions established under the General Framework Agreement,
including the refusal to implement judgements issued by State-level
courts, of threats made on Serb civil servants at the State-level,
and constant critics against the presence of both international
judges in the Constitutional Court and the High Representative in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In overall, decision making is slowed down
or hindered in some cases by blockages used as a means of political
argumentation, and a lack of finding compromise among political
players.
status,
of continuous rhetorics questioning the legitimacy of some State
institutions established under the General Framework Agreement,
including the refusal to implement judgements issued by State-level
courts, of threats made on Serb civil servants at the State-level,
and constant critics against the presence of both international
judges in the Constitutional Court and the High Representative in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In overall, decision making is slowed down
or hindered in some cases by blockages used as a means of political
argumentation, and a lack of finding compromise among political
players.56. Concerning the rule of law, the European Commission noted
that the “obstruction of justice reform by political actors and
from within the judiciary, and the poor functioning of the judicial
system continued to undermine the citizens’ enjoyment of rights
and the fight against corruption and organised crime”. In 2019,
the decision of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council to dismiss
the disciplinary case against its president on the ground that he
could not be subject to disciplinary responsibility in an alleged
corruption case and was therefore above the law undermined further
the already low trust in the judiciary. Following this incident,
a group of experts mandated by the European Union issued a report
(Priebe report) with concrete recommendations to be implemented.
In 2020, the Bosnian authorities failed to do so.
57. In the field of human rights, worrying negative trends were
still observed.
58. Concerning freedom of expression, the situation did not improve,
journalists are still being subject to intimidation, in the form
of physical attacks or threats, use of civil suits, or the enforcement
of a legislation prohibiting the transmission of information that
may cause panic or severely violate public peace and order, as was
the case in Republika Srpska from 19 March to 17 April 2020.
59. In relation to the ‘Justice for David’ movement in Banja Luka,
the European Commission noted that “civil society organisations
have reported increasing attempts to restrict freedom of assembly,
in particular in relation [to this movement], whose activists have
been subject to intimidation, fines, and judicial prosecution” and
“have been unable to organise gatherings in Banja Luka ever since
the violent dispersal by the police in December 2018”.
60. On transitional justice and reconciliation, as the exchange
of views with the Commissioner for Human Rights held during the
meeting of the committee in October 2020 confirmed, no progress
was made. Genocide denial, glorification of war criminals, difficulty
of domestic courts to exhaust their backlogs of war crime cases were
still at work in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the year of the 25th anniversary
of Srebrenica.
2.2.5. Georgia
61. The co-rapporteurs visited
Georgia from 11 to 12 March 2020. They had been preparing to present
their monitoring report before the Georgian parliamentary elections
in October 2020. Regrettably, this was delayed due to the Covid-19
pandemic. They now hope to present their report in 2021, after a
visit to the country has been possible.
62. The political developments in the country in 2020, were dominated
by the preparations for the parliamentary elections that were scheduled
to take place in October 2020.
63. A political crisis had erupted in the country in November
2019, following the unexpected and sudden renegation by the ruling
party on its promise to introduce a fully proportional election
system before the 2020 parliamentary elections. This led to increased
tensions, not only between the ruling party and the opposition, but
also within the ruling party with several leading party members,
including the then Chairperson of the Georgian Delegation to the
Assembly, Ms Tamar Chugoshvili, leaving the party and the parliamentary
faction.
64. Under the joint mediation of the Council of Europe Office,
the European Union Delegation and the US Embassy in Tbilisi, a political
agreement was reached on 8 March 2020 among all political stakeholders.
As part of this agreement the number of majoritarian mandates was
reduced from 73 to 30 and the number of proportional mandates increased
from 77 to 120. This change implied a rezoning of the majoritarian
districts. While this demarcation of electoral districts was done
in consensus between all parties it should be noted that the variance
in size of 18 of the 30 electoral districts was larger than 15%,
which runs counter to European standards and the principle of equality
of the vote.
65. The threshold in the proportional elections for political
parties was reduced to 1% and a capping mechanism for the number
of mandates for each party was set up, whereby the percentage of
mandates received by a political party or election bloc could not
exceed 25% of the percentage of the votes received in the proportional
elections. In addition to their agreement on the elections system
all parties pledged to refrain from politicising the electoral process
and judiciary.
66. Despite this agreement on the election system the political
climate in Georgia remained polarised and contentious.
67. The parliamentary elections took place on 31 October 2020.
A second round for majoritarian districts where no candidate obtained
50% of the vote was organised on 21 November 2020. These elections
were observed by an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM)
of which the Assembly was a part. Reports from the IEOM and main
domestic observers from the International Society for Free and Fair
Elections and of Transparency international all concluded that the
elections were competitive with fundamental freedoms respected and
that parties could campaign freely. At the same time, they noted
an uneven playing field as a result of the abuse of administrative
resources and a blurring of the line between State and ruling party.
This was compounded by weak regulations for campaign financing and
transparency which allowed for clear financial advantage in favour
of certain parties, including – or especially – the ruling party.
Regrettably observers also noted a continuing trend of pervasive
allegations of pressure and intimidation of voters and party activists
and, for the first time, domestic observers noted inconsistencies
in the summary (results) forms of several polling stations (about
8% of the polling stations). Even if observers noted that these
irregularities would not affect the overall outcome it is essential
that all allegations of electoral misconduct, which were of serious
concern, are fully investigated and, if proven, perpetrators prosecuted.
68. Regrettably the opposition parties, alleging widespread fraud,
announced that they would boycott the second round and the new parliament.
This is especially regrettable given that the results for opposition
parties in these elections would give them a strong position to
execute parliamentary oversight. Parliament is the place for the
conduct of politics and debate and the Assembly has therefore consistently
opposed parliamentary boycotts. In the best interest of the country
all political parties are therefore urged to take up their parliamentary mandates.
69. The situation around the de facto occupied
Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has continued to
deteriorate, as the creeping annexation of these regions by the
Russian Federation continues unabated, which is of serious concern.
As a result, contacts between Georgians inside and outside these
two regions has become practically impossible. This has severe humanitarian
consequences, as it has become increasingly more difficult, if not
impossible, for inhabitants in these two Georgian regions to cross
the administrative borderline for schooling or for (emergency) medical
reasons in the rest of Georgia.
2.2.6. Republic of Moldova
70. In October 2019, in Resolution 2308 (2019) on “The functioning of democratic institutions in the
Republic of Moldova”, the Assembly stressed the need to adopt reforms
to the judiciary system and the prosecution office to comply with
Council of Europe standards and ensure that alleged cases of corruption,
interference in the judiciary and matters related to State capture
would be duly investigated. The Assembly also urged the authorities
to continue their efforts to improve the electoral legislation,
fight against corruption and money laundering and shed light on
the 2014 bank scandal.
71. Many changes occurred in 2020, marked by political volatility,
namely three changes of governments and the signing of a coalition
agreement in March 2020 by the Party of the Socialists and the Democratic
Party – which have strong diverging views. The Democratic Party
eventually withdrew its ministers (7 November) and support to the
parliamentary majority (19 November), leaving the parliament without
a clear majority after the presidential election. Political migration
of members of parliament is a major concern and triggers political instability,
notwithstanding allegations of political corruption.
72. The presidential election, held on 1 and 15 November 2020,
was a major political and disputed political stake. The amendments
to the election legislation assessed by the Venice Commission in
its Opinion of August 2020 failed to be adopted on time for the
presidential election. The Incumbent President Dodon, running as
an independent candidate supported by the Party of the Socialists,
and the leader of the Party of Action and Solidarity, Maia Sandu,
reached the second round. The businessman Renato Usaitii, who won
nearly 17% of the votes in the first round, appeared however as
the kingmaker, called on the voters not to vote for Mr Dodon and
demanded early elections to be organised. In the runoff of the election,
Maia Sandu won a clear victory (57%), with a massive support (92%)
of the voters from the diaspora and was the first woman elected
to this position.
73. The Assembly did not observe the elections due to the sanitary
context. ODIHR limited its election observation mission, concluded
that fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression continued to
be respected, but noted the negative and divisive campaigning and
polarising media coverage, lack of effective campaign finance oversight,
intolerant and divisive rhetoric in the second round, prominent
discussions over the role of the Moldovan diaspora, allegations
of undue influence on public officials and voters and possible vote-buying
and organised transportation of voters on election day.
74. In the justice sector, the strategy for justice reform and
its action plan, which had been prepared in cooperation with the
Council of Europe, were adopted by the parliament on 26 November
2020. Independence of the judiciary however remains a challenge,
as stressed by GRECO. The adoption of the legal and constitutional provisions
needed to de-politicise the judiciary was delayed. The Venice Commission
assessed positively the draft law amending the Law on the Superior
Council of Magistracy (SCM) (opinion of June 2020) and the draft constitutional amendments
(opinion of June 2020) seen as “generally positive and in line
with the applicable international standards” and likely to “improve
the independence, accountability and efficiency of the judiciary”.
75. These draft constitutional amendments were submitted to the
parliament, but the Constitutional Court, on 22 September 2020,
declared that some provision were not in line with the constitution,
citing procedural grounds, and considering that the termination
of the mandate of the lay members of the SCM (who were elected in
March 2020 by the parliament while a constitutional reform affecting
the selection of SCM members was in preparation) upon the entry
into force of the draft law was a disproportionate thus unconstitutional measure.
A revised version of the draft constitutional amendments was submitted
to parliament, while the Constitutional Court requested an amicus
curiae brief: the Venice Commission concluded in November 2020 that
the transitional provisions foreseen by the new draft law “[did]
not seem disproportionate” and were “striking a fair balance between
the two conflicting interests – the security of the mandate of the
lay members of the SCM and the need of maintaining the public order”.
76. In this context, recent nominations made by the SCM raised
further questions while the Constitutional Court faced a new crisis
after President Dodon called the president of the Constitutional
Court prior to the examination of the law of ratification of the
loan agreement with the Russian Federation adopted in April 2020 by
the parliament (and later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court) which prompted the Constitutional Court members to dismiss
their Chair and replace him by judge Domnica Manole.
77. The General Prosecutor, Mr Alexandr Stoianoglo, appointed
in November 2019 decided to drop charges in 9 out of 38 criminal
cases that had presumably been started based on political reasons
which was a request made by the Assembly in Resolution 2308 (2019).
78. Concerning the fight against corruption, in October 2020,
GRECO considered that insufficient progress had been made with the
authorities in the field of “Corruption prevention in respect of
members of parliament, judges and prosecutors”. GRECO reiterated
its call for the adoption of a code of conduct for MPs and the abolition
of the five-year probation period for judges, welcomed the abandon
of a much criticised previous draft law providing for a general
vetting of judges and recommended taking new measures to bolster
judicial independence There was no progress concerning a credible
investigation on the bank fraud scandal from 2014.
79. The Republic of Moldova had to manage the Covid-19 pandemic
and declared the state of emergency in March 2020. This crisis also
affected the settlement process with the Transnistrian region of
the Republic of Moldova, which had declared a “state of emergency”
on 17 March 2020. The “de facto” Transnistrian authorities forbade
the entry of non-residents, limited the possibility for local residents
to leave Transnistrian territory, and set-up, unilaterally, additional
check points and illegal posts in the Security Zone. The Moldovan
authorities denounced illegal actions taken by Tiraspol and worrisome
developments, especially as regards human rights, schools or travel
restrictions.
2.2.7. Poland
80. On 27 January 2020, the Assembly
adopted Resolution 2316 (2020) on “The Functioning of Democratic Institutions
in Poland”. As a clear signal of its serious concerns with regard
to the respect for the Rule of Law in Poland, and the deterioration
of the independence of the judiciary, the Assembly decided, with
a large majority, to open a full monitoring procedure in respect
of Poland. On 27 May 2020, the Committee appointed Ms Azadeh Rojhan
Gustafsson (Sweden, SOC) and Mr Pieter Omtzigt (Netherlands, EPP/CD)
as co-rapporteurs. Both were the rapporteurs for the report on the
functioning of democratic institutions in Poland.
81. With regard to the judicial reforms, while recognising the
challenges faced by the Polish justice system and judiciary, especially
with regard to the efficiency of the administration of justice,
the Assembly considered it unacceptable if judicial reforms amounted
to bringing the judiciary under the control of the executive or legislature,
or even worse, under the political control of the ruling majority.
The Assembly therefore expressed its serious concerns about the
reforms of the judiciary and justice system in Poland, which in
numerous aspects run counter to European norms and standards. These
reforms have cumulatively undermined and severely damaged the independence
of the judiciary and the rule of law in Poland. Moreover, the reforms
have made the judicial system vulnerable to political interference
and attempted to bring it under political control of the executive,
which challenges the very principles of a democratic State governed
by the rule of law.
82. Regrettably no progress has been made with regard to bringing
these reforms in line with European standards and norms. In this
respect it is especially worrisome that the Polish authorities,
have until now refused, in contradiction with their international
obligations, to implement the judgments of the Court of Justice of
the European Union with regard to these reforms, in particular with
regard to the Law on the Common Courts and the Supreme Court. It
should be highlighted that questions regarding the independence
of the domestic courts in Poland have repercussions far beyond Poland
itself and affect all Council of Europe member States. A case in
point was the decision by the international chamber of the Court
of Amsterdam to halt extraditions to Poland as a result of questions
with regard to the independence of the judiciary and guarantees
for a fair trial in Poland. It should be noted that in their report
the co-rapporteurs already expressed concern that the deterioration
of the independence of the Polish judiciary could lead to a considerable
increase in the workload of the European Court of Human Rights.
83. The constitutional crisis with regard to the composition of
the Constitutional Court remains unresolved, raising questions about
the legality of its benches and the decisions they reach. Indeed,
the first cases that challenge the legality of judgments by the
Constitutional Court of Poland have already been filed before the European
Court of Human Rights and have been declared admissible. The legality
of the Constitutional Court’s decisions again became an issue with
regard to its controversial decision with regard to the abortion
in case of foetal deformations.
84. A key issue in 2020, especially in the context of the Covid
pandemic, were the presidential election. The presidential election
was originally set for 10 May 2020. Following the outbreak of the
Covid-19 pandemic, the Polish authorities originally expressed their
wish to maintain the elections on the date set, but this position became
increasingly controversial not only because of the risk for public
safety but also due to the fact that a meaningful election campaign
would not be possible under Covid conditions, which would disproportionally benefit
the incumbent candidate. At the last moment the election was de facto cancelled. While this decision was
widely supported by all political stakeholders, questions were raised
about the legality of the manner in which they were postponed. This
could have led to legal challenges were it not for the wide consensus
about the date for the new election and the manner and conditions
in which they would be conducted. This election was conducted on
28 June and 12 July 2020 and won, in a close and competitive race,
by the incumbent president Duda with 51% of the votes. According
to election observers, including from the Assembly, the election
was well-organised and competitive. At the same time, they regretted
the increasingly polarised and confrontational political climate
in which they took place.
85. The political climate in Poland remains very polarised, contentious
and confrontational and the political discourse is increasingly
harsh and intolerant to others. This is especially true with regard
to LGTBI persons who are facing an increasingly intolerant and prejudiced
political climate. In this respect the declaration of several municipalities
in Poland of being “LGTBI free zones” can only be condemned as an
afront to human rights and respect of other human beings. In July
2020 the Polish Minister of Justice suggested that Poland should
withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and
combating violence against women and domestic violence (CETS No.
210, Istanbul Convention). His suggestion caused an outcry in the
Polish society and is reportedly also controversial among the ruling
coalition, which until now has not initiated any actions to this
extend. The President of the Assembly jointly with the Monitoring
co-rapporteurs and the General Rapporteur on violence against women
issued a
statement regretting the mis-representations and deliberate misinformation
about the aims and purpose of the Istanbul Convention and their
use for narrow ideological purposes and urged the ruling majority
not to follow through on the announcement of the Minister of Justice.
86. Following a petition filed by several MPs belonging to the
ruling majority, the Constitutional Court of Poland ruled that the
legal provisions that allowed abortion in the first 12 weeks of
pregnancy for foetal deformations and defects was unconstitutional.
This very controversial decision affects 98% of all legal abortions
in the country and has resulted in massive and sustained protests
in Poland. As mentioned above, this ruling was made by a bench of
judges that includes judges, the legality of whose appointment is questionable
which added to the controversy. The Commissioner for Human Rights
of the Council of Europe, Dunja Mijatović has called the decision
“a sad day for women’s rights” and stated that “removing the basis
for almost all legal abortions in Poland amounts to a ban and violates
human rights” Following the public outcry over this decision the
Polish authorities have delayed its implementation by not publishing
the judgment.
87. A fact finding visit by the rapporteurs to Warsaw had been
planned to take place from 25 to 27 November 2020. However, as a
result of the rapidly deteriorating Covid-19 situation all over
Europe the rapporteurs decided to postpone it to a later date as
soon as the conditions allowed.
2.2.8. Russian Federation
88. The last report on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation dates back to
2012. Since the return of the Russian Delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly in June 2019, two reports on the challenge of its still
unratified credentials were debated in the Assembly, in June 2019
and January 2020. The co-rapporteurs, appointed respectively in
November 2019 and January 2020, committed themselves to submit a
report as soon as the visit to the country takes places. However,
due to the Covid pandemic a visit scheduled on 19-20 March 2020
was cancelled a few days before it was supposed to take part. Since
then, the sanitary conditions in the Russian Federation have not
allowed for organising a new visit.
89. The major development in the Russian Federation during the
passing year was the adoption of the constitutional amendments proposed
by President Putin in January 2020. Both their content and the procedure for
their adoption raised concerns as to compliance with democratic
standards. The Venice Commission in its “Opinion on the draft amendments
to the Constitution (as signed by the President of the Russian Federation on
14 March 2020) related to the execution in the Russian Federation
of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights” concluded that the power of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to declare a judgement
non-executable contradicts the obligations of the Russian Federation
under the European Convention on Human Rights. These concerns should
be seen against the backdrop of the proposed amendment to Article
83 of the Constitution empowering the Council of Federation (Upper
Chamber of the Parliament) to dismiss the judges of the Constitutional
Court at the request of the President. This makes the Court vulnerable
to political pressure.
concluded that the power of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to declare a judgement
non-executable contradicts the obligations of the Russian Federation
under the European Convention on Human Rights. These concerns should
be seen against the backdrop of the proposed amendment to Article
83 of the Constitution empowering the Council of Federation (Upper
Chamber of the Parliament) to dismiss the judges of the Constitutional
Court at the request of the President. This makes the Court vulnerable
to political pressure.90. The Monitoring Committee is waiting for the Venice Commission’s
opinion on the remaining amendments and the procedure for their
adoption which it has requested in May 2020 and which is expected to
be delivered in March 2021.
91. The law on the amendments was adopted unanimously by the Duma
(which introduced an additional amendment paving way to the possible
extension of President Putin’s mandate by two additional terms)
on 11 March 2020 and by the Council of Federation on the same day,
also unanimously. On 12 and 13 March 2020 the law was approved by
the legislative councils of the 85 federal subjects, on 14 March
2020, it was sent to the Constitutional Court which issued, on 16
March 2020 an opinion finding that the amendments were in conformity
with the Constitution.
92. While according to the legislation, amendments could have
been adopted either by the Duma and legislative councils of the
subjects of the Russian Federation or, by means of a referendum,
the draft law as submitted in January, provided for a different
procedure, completing the adoption in the parliament and in regional
parliaments by an “All-Russian vote” which was unprecedented and
constituted a sort of a plebiscite and did not meet the requirements
for a referendum. It was initially scheduled for 22 April 2020 but
due to the Covid-19 pandemic it was postponed to 26 June – 1 July
2020 and spread over the week.
93. The respectful election watchdog, Golos, has been very critical
about the campaign, and in particular the lack of safeguards ensuring
level playing field for opponents to the amendments. The organisation
and administration of the vote itself has also been criticised for
giving the authorities more control over elections and not ensuring
necessary transparency thus limiting independent observers` abilities
to track voter fraud. The voting lasted a whole week and from the
first day of voting, Russians could cast ballots not only in regular polling
stations but also in makeshift mobile locations set up on park benches,
car trunks and shopping trolleys as evidenced by numerous videos
and photos posted on Internet. The ballots were subsequently moved
and kept in polling stations overnight which opened up a possibility
for mass tampering. In its assessment of the vote, Golos noted “multiple
voting, ballot stuffing” and “violating voter secrecy”. It stated
that “a significant portion of the votes were collected by voting
directly at enterprises and institutions, de
facto under the control of their leadership”.
94. Soon after the All-Russian vote, on 21 July 2020, the Duma
approved an amendment to the Electoral Code that allows voting over
as many as three days during future elections. The decision on whether
to hold a multiday voting is to be made by electoral officials.
95. The new voting system was used during the regional and local
elections in September 2020. Voting started on 11 September and
lasted for 3 days, with 13 September as the main election day. Candidates
for the ruling United Russia party and their allies won all 20 governorships
in the first round. However, the party lost their majority in the
regional parliaments of Tomsk, Novosibirsk and Tambov. Elections
organised in Crimea were not recognised by the international community
as held in violation of international law.
96. Among other developments in the Russian Federation over the
last year I should mention demonstrations and protests in Khabarovsk
in support of the then Governor, Sergiey Furgal, arrested on the charges
which were widely perceived as politicised. On 25 July 2020, an
unprecedented demonstration with participation of 50 000 (about
1/10 of the city population) was held calling for the Governor’s
reinstatement and the trial to be held in Khabarovsk and not in
Moscow. The demands were not addressed, and a new governor was appointed.
97. The poisoning of Mr Navalny, leader of the Anti-Corruption
Foundation on 20 August 2020 in Omsk raised alarm and utmost concern
inside and outside the Russian Federation prompting the monitoring rapporteurs
to issue a statement calling for full investigation as also demanded
by the international community. This issue will be the subject of
a separate report under preparation by the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights.
This issue will be the subject of
a separate report under preparation by the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights.98. There is a number of outstanding concerns which cannot be
raised here given the format of the current report, including, inter alia, lack of pluralism, independence
of the judiciary, restrictive environment for activities of political
extra parliamentary opposition, civil society, human rights activists
and journalists, restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly,
association and religion. A number of problematic laws including
the Foreign Agents Law, Law on Undesirable Organisations or anti-extremist
legislation raise concern. There is a specific report on political
prisoners in the Russian Federation under preparation in the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.
99. Unfortunately, no progress has been made with regard to implementing
the demands of the international community concerning Eastern Ukraine,
Crimea, the occupied Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
and the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.
2.2.9. Serbia
100. The year 2020 was dominated
by the parliamentary, provincial and local elections. The preparation
of these elections was marred by the boycott announced by several
opposition political parties, which demanded fair election conditions,
in particular fair access to media. The “Inter-Party Dialogue” organised
from October to December 2019 under the auspices of three current
and former MEPs and the National Assembly of Serbia resulted in
the drafting of “Conclusions on Improving the Conditions for Holding
Parliamentary Elections” and some improvement of election conditions
but failed to convince several opposition political parties not
to boycott the elections. These issues were discussed by the Monitoring
committee at its hearing of 16 January 2020 dedicated to the preparation
of the 2020 parliamentary elections.
101. Parliamentary, provincial and local elections were originally
scheduled on 26 April 2020. With the outbreak of the pandemic and
the declaration of the state of emergency by the President of the
Republic, without a debate in the parliament, all electoral activities
were suspended on 15 March. The parliament resumed its work in May
2020, amended the electoral legislation in view of the sanitary
context, lifted the state of emergency, thus paving the way to the
resumption of election activities on 11 May. Some opposition parties eventually
decided to compete, given the new circumstances.
102. The elections took place on 21 June, with 21 lists competing,
and a turnout nearing 49%. Despite the decision taken unexpectedly
by the parliament, on 8 February 2020, to lower the electoral threshold
from 5 to 3%, and repeat voting held in over 200 polling stations
on 1st July, only three mainstream political
parties or coalitions: the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the
“Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) – United Serbia (JS)” and the “Victory
for Serbia” [Serbian Patriotic Alliance] coalition, entered parliament.
In addition, four lists of national minorities (the Alliance of
Vojvodina Hungarians, the “Party of Justice and Reconciliation (SPP)
– Democratic Party of Macedonians (DPM) coalition”, the “Albanian
Democratic Alternative – United Valley coalition” and Mr Ugljanin’s
list” entered parliament with 19 seats altogether (out of 250).
103. ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission concluded on 22
June 2020 that despite challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic,
the elections were administered efficiently, contestants had been
able to campaign, and the fundamental freedoms of expression and
assembly were respected outside of the state of emergency. However,
the “dominance of the ruling party, including in the media, was
of concern. The advantage enjoyed by the governing parties, the
decision of some opposition parties to boycott the elections, and
limited policy debate narrowed the choice and information available
to voters”. The Assembly was not able to observe, due to the sanitary
context.
104. As a result of the election, President Vučić’s ruling party
won 75% of the seats in parliament. The two other parties eventually
joined the government formed in October 2020, thus leaving the parliament
without a viable opposition – with the exception of seven members
of parliament from minority parties who declared themselves as opposition.
This unprecedented situation raised concerns about the lack of political
pluralism and its possible impact on the functioning of democratic
institutions. The Monitoring Committee thus resolved to organise
a hearing on “democratic challenges in Serbia after the June 2020
elections”, pending the appointment of a new Serbian parliamentary
delegation.
105. Following the unexpected reintroduction of restrictive measures
and curfews few days after the repeat elections, thousands of persons
gathered in front of the parliament and other cities of the country
to express their dissatisfaction with the management of the COVID-19
crisis by the government. Some of these demonstrations degenerated
in violent clashes with the police on 7, 8 and 10 July 2020 and
resulted in the arrest of 100 demonstrators. In their statement, the rapporteurs Ian liddell-Grainger (United Kingdom,
EC/DA) and Piero Fassino (Italy, SOC) condemned the violence and
called for a thorough investigation. The Commissioner for Human
Rights, Ms Dunja Mijatović, deplored the violent dispersal of demonstrators,
and recalled that disproportionate use of force must never be tolerated,
thus urging the Serbian authorities to carry out “effective investigations
to establish responsibility and punish the officers responsible”. Several incidents targeted journalists.
According to the Safe Journalists Network, at least 16 media workers
were assaulted in three days, adding
to the tensions that arose under the state of emergency between
the authorities and the media pertaining to the flow and control
of information and the accuracy of the information provided to the public,
especially during the election campaign.
Several incidents targeted journalists.
According to the Safe Journalists Network, at least 16 media workers
were assaulted in three days, adding
to the tensions that arose under the state of emergency between
the authorities and the media pertaining to the flow and control
of information and the accuracy of the information provided to the public,
especially during the election campaign.106. Another adverse development concerned the financial investigations
launched by the Serbian Administration for the Prevention of Money
Laundering against over 50 prominent activists, NGOs and investigative
media, prompting the rapporteurs to react on 30 July 2020. They called on the Serbian authorities to
“refrain from any move that could amount to an act of intimidation
or lead to the unfounded criminalisation of these organisations”
while recalling that civil society and independent media contributed
to ensuring a sound scrutiny of public institutions leading to the
necessary checks and balances in a democratic society.
107. Due to the election campaign and the sanitary situation, the
rapporteurs, who were appointed respectively in April 2019 and September
2019, had not had a chance to pay a fact-finding visit to the country but
continued to look at the key areas identified by the Assembly in
its 2012 resolution on the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Serbia, namely the reform of the judiciary, the fight against
corruption, the situation of media and the rights of minorities.
The reform of the constitution in the field of judiciary and the upgrading
of the election legislation will also remain under scrutiny. Overall
the year 2020 was not conducive to major changes. There was limited,
if any, progress on the Assembly’s areas of concern, with the exception of
the welcomed resumption of the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina
dialog after a 20-month halt and the establishment of a mini-Schengen
zone to increase co-operation with Albania and North Macedonia.
2.2.10. Turkey
108. The Monitoring Committee continued
to closely follow the situation in Turkey after the adoption of Resolution 2260 (2019) in January 2019 on “The worsening situation of opposition
politicians in Turkey: what can be done to protect their fundamental
rights in a Council of Europe member State?”, where the Assembly expressed
its concerns about the deterioration of the situation regarding
the rule of law, democracy and human rights in Turkey. In 2020,
the co-rapporteurs Mr Thomas Hammarberg (Sweden, SOC) and Mr John
Howell (United Kingdom, EC/DA) issued several statements reflecting the lack of progress and further deterioration, related
notably to the situation in prisons under the Covid-19 pandemic,
the arrest of opposition members or the situation of human rights
defenders. These concerns triggered a debate under urgent procedure
held at the meeting of the Enlarged Standing Committee on 23 October
2020. In its Resolution
2347 (2020) “New crackdown on political opposition and civil dissent
in Turkey: urgent need to safeguard Council of Europe standards”,
the Assembly addressed several challenges and shortcomings ranging
from restrictions of election rights to the weakening of the rule
of law or limited freedom of expression and freedom of media.
109. The Assembly strongly condemned the dismissal or removal of
elected representatives (in the overwhelming majority belonging
to the opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)) after the March
2019 elections and their replacement by government-appointed trustees.
As a follow-up, on 13 November 2020, the committee held an exchange
with representatives of the Congress of local and regional authorities,
the Venice Commission and the Turkish Ministry of interior on the
situation of dismissed and replaced mayors and encouraged the Turkish
authorities to make the expected legal changes in the election and
to bring the anti-terror legislations in line with the Venice Commission opinion of June 2020, in order to respect the will of the voters
and improve the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey.
110. The Assembly also condemned the arrests of lawyers, their
detention on terror-related charges and the criminalization of their
activities, recalling that lawyers played a key role in the implementation
of rule of law standards and the effective administration of justice.
Following the opinion issued by the Venice Commission in October 2020 at the
request of the committee, the Assembly urged the authorities to
repeal the July 2020 adopted amendments to the Attorneyship Law
of 1969 which undermine the independence of the bar associations.
In addition, the issues of lack of separation of powers, lack of
independence of the judiciary and insufficient procedural safeguards
and guarantees to ensure fair trials remains a challenge, as highlighted
by the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights.
111. The Assembly repeated its call for the full implementation
of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights by Turkey.
In particular it urged the immediate release of the philanthropist
Osman Kavala, who had been in detention for three years despite
a final ruling of the Court. The Assembly also asked the Turkish authorities
to restore freedom of speech and media freedom and to restrict the
interpretation of its anti-terror legislation. The Assembly hoped
that the May 2019 strategy of the reform of the judiciary, as well
as the Action Plan on Human Rights in preparation, could bring progress,
provided there was a genuine political will to effectively improve
the independence, impartiality and transparency of the judiciary,
strengthen freedom of expression and the media, and ensure that
lower courts abide by the rulings of the Constitutional Court. In
this respect, the Assembly expressed its concerns about the continued
detention of (former) members of parliament and the lifting of their
parliamentary immunity. It also asked the Turkish authorities to
put an end to the judicial harassment of human rights’ defenders. No
progress was noted on the front of media freedom (Reporters Without
Borders ranked Turkey 154th out of 180
countries in its 2020 World Press Freedom Index) and the control
over social media was tightened in July 2020.
112. Other human rights concerns raised by the Assembly included
the continued restrictive effects on fundamental rights of certain
adopted laws that were put in place after the lifting of the state
of emergency in 2018 and credible allegations of torture in police
and detention centres. In this context, the publication of two reports
of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) by Turkey in 2020 was
welcomed. Serious concerns raised with regard to the compliance of
Turkey’s external actions, including military operations, with Council
of Europe obligations would be explored in future monitoring reports.
113. The committee vows to further encourage the authorities to
take meaningful steps to comply with Turkey’s obligations towards
the Council of Europe. As stressed by the Assembly, Turkey has a
dynamic political scene and a vibrant civil society with strong
aspirations to fully enjoy and exercise its fundamental freedoms,
which should be seen as a valuable asset for the country’s democracy.
2.2.11. Ukraine
114. The last report on Ukraine
was adopted on 25 January 2017 . The last fact-finding visit to
the country took place from 19 to 21 November 2018. As a result
of a combination of factors (parliamentary and presidential elections
in Ukraine, the temporary withdrawal of the Ukrainian delegation
from the work of the Assembly following the return of the Russian
delegation to the Assembly, as well as, in 2020 the Covid-19 pandemic),
no visits could be organised in 2019 and 2020. A visit foreseen
in Spring 2020 had to be cancelled as a result of the worsening
Covid situation in Europe. On 13 November 2020, Mr Birgir Thórarinsson
(Iceland, EPP/CD), was appointed as co-rapporteur to replace Ms Dzhema
Grozdanova (Bulgaria, EPP/CD), who had left the Assembly.
. The last fact-finding visit to
the country took place from 19 to 21 November 2018. As a result
of a combination of factors (parliamentary and presidential elections
in Ukraine, the temporary withdrawal of the Ukrainian delegation
from the work of the Assembly following the return of the Russian
delegation to the Assembly, as well as, in 2020 the Covid-19 pandemic),
no visits could be organised in 2019 and 2020. A visit foreseen
in Spring 2020 had to be cancelled as a result of the worsening
Covid situation in Europe. On 13 November 2020, Mr Birgir Thórarinsson
(Iceland, EPP/CD), was appointed as co-rapporteur to replace Ms Dzhema
Grozdanova (Bulgaria, EPP/CD), who had left the Assembly.115. The reform of the judiciary and the closely related fight
against the widespread corruption have been important items on the
political agenda of the country, in addition to the effects of the
ongoing military aggression in Eastern Ukraine.
116. With regard to the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, after
several failed attempts to implement a cease fire in the Donbas
region, on 27 July 2020 a full and comprehensive cease fire agreement
between Ukrainian military and illegally armed formations in the
Donbas region was established following an agreement between President
Zelensky and President Putin and supported by the French and German
Governments. This cease fire agreement, which is largely holding,
is considered a pre-condition for a further summit by the Normandy Group
and could pave the way for the implementation of other clauses of
the Minsk agreements. In a welcome development, this cease fire
agreement has led to the disengagement of Ukrainian and illegally
armed formations at several points along the contact line. Regrettably,
following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the movements of
the OSCE monitors to observe the cease fire agreement have been
unilaterally restricted by the illegally armed formations, which
was condemned in a statement by the co-rapporteurs.
117. In addition, in the context of resolving the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine, the authorities are implementing a comprehensive set of
decentralisation and administrative territorial reforms, including
a new territorial administrative division which reduced the number
of districts from 490 to 136. Following the territorial administrative
reform, local elections were organised on 25 October 2020. These
elections were a setback for the incumbent President, whose party
failed to win any of the nine mayoral positions that were up for
election and won the majority in only two out of the nine city councils.
118. The reform of the judiciary has been an important priority
for the authorities. In that context fighting corruption among the
judiciary, which is perceived as widespread, and increasing the
public trust in the judicial system have been important objectives
of these complex reforms.
119. Marked progress has been made with the establishment of the
institutional framework to fight the widespread corruption in Ukraine.
The High Anti-Corruption Court, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau
of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's
Office (SAPO) are fully operational and the National Agency for
Prevention of Corruption has been rebooted. However, the work of
these institutions has been undermined by a series of controversial
decisions by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. These decisions were
decried by the Ukrainian Government as well as by the international
community. In reaction, the Government of Ukraine initially announced
that it would ignore the Constitutional Court decisions and threatened
to adopt legislation that would remove the current judges of the
Constitutional Court. This would have had a detrimental effect on
the independence of the judiciary and respect for the rule of law
in the country. The co-rapporteurs adopted a statement in which
they called upon the authorities to take all necessary actions to
restore the effective functioning of the e-declaration system and
to clarify the legal status of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau
of Ukraine. At the same time, they urged the authorities to refrain
from any actions that would have a lasting detrimental effect on
the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in Ukraine.
2.3. Post-monitoring dialogue
2.3.1. Bulgaria
120. The last post-monitoring report
was debated in the Assembly in June 2019. Following the debate,
the Assembly resolved not to terminate the post-monitoring dialogue
and invited the rapporteurs to assess, over 2020, the progress made
in five specific areas of concern including high-level corruption;
transparency in media ownership; human rights of minorities; hate
speech; and violence against women (see Resolution 2296 (2019)). The pandemic crisis has prevented the rapporteurs
from going to Bulgaria (a visit scheduled for the beginning of April
had to be cancelled) and made it impossible to prepare a report.
121. Since July 2020, Bulgaria has been confronted with a major
political crisis. Corruption scandals triggered huge street demonstrations
as well as the occupation of major crossroads in Sofia and other
big cities lasting for many months now. On some occasions, protests
have allegedly been met with disproportionate violence from the
law enforcement authorities.
122. As the dismissal of five ministers including the Ministers
of the Interior and Justice did not appease the protesters, the
Prime Minister proposed to call a Grand National Assembly and to
reform the Constitution for the first time since 1991. On 20 September
2020 the ruling majority submitted a draft of a new Constitution. The
President of the National Assembly officially asked the Venice Commission’s
President to provide expert support and the issuing of an opinion
of the Venice Commission on the draft new Constitution. This urgent opinion
was provided on 11 December 2020. The Venice Commission observed
that the most important draft constitutional amendments concerning
the Bulgarian judiciary made several steps in the right direction
but that certain issues still had to be addressed and expressed
its readiness to provide assistance to the Bulgarian authorities
if the process of the constitutional reform advances further. On
25 November 2020, the motion to call elections for a Grand National
Assembly which could discuss the constitutional amendments submitted
by the government, was rejected by the parliament.
123. With regard to high level corruption, the situation continues
to be worrying. The country has been recently confronted with a
number of corruption scandals which contributed largely to the ongoing
protests. The new anti-corruption agency started to operate in January
2019. However, it is worrying that there is continuous lack of high-level
corruption investigations yielding tangible results although a number
of investigations of high-level corruption including cases with
cross-border aspects against high-ranking officials and persons
of high public interest have been recently opened. Corruption and
lack of accountability continue to be pervasive problems in the
judiciary. In this context, it is regrettable that the Venice Commission’s
previous recommendations on the Prosecutor General have not been
fulfilled.
124. Bulgaria continues to have the worst media freedom status
in the European Union (In 2019, Reporters without Borders ranked
Bulgaria 111th out of 180 countries).
Overall, the situation has deteriorated in recent years, and no
improvement has been noted since the adoption of Resolution 2296 (2019). The concentration and lack of transparency in media
ownership and newspaper distribution, no safeguards for the independence of
the regulatory authority for the Council of Electronic Media, political
and State pressure on the media, intimidation and use of the prosecution
as an instrument of pressure on journalists and editors remain outstanding
concerns. Although there are formal legal provisions for disclosure
of media ownership and prevention of undue pressure, the present
legal requirements are not effectively implemented in practice.
125. With regard to the human rights of minorities, the Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, noted with alarm in her
2020 report on Bulgaria: “the rampant intolerance manifested towards
minority groups, affecting especially Roma, Muslims, migrants and
asylum seekers, persons identifying as ethnic Macedonians and LGBTI
people”. The report refers to reported upsurge of hostile acts against
minorities including hate crimes and the wave of anti-Roma rallies
occurring across Bulgaria, the reported incidents of public incitement
to anti-Muslim and anti-Roma hatred, and the attacks against religious
sites and institutions such as the synagogue and the Grand Mufti`s
Office in Sofia in January and July 2019. At the same time, it has to
be acknowledged that the Bulgarian authorities have demonstrated
political will and made efforts regarding Roma integration elaborating
the National Strategy for Roma Integration (2012-2020) and its Action
Plan. However, the implementation of the Action Plan has been hindered
by the shortage of the financial resources.
126. Concerning hate speech, there have been no reported cases
of discriminatory remarks made by the members of the governmental
coalition since the last debate in the Assembly but hate speech
in the social media remains a problem in the country. In February
2020, the Mayor of Sofia, for the first time since 2003, imposed
a ban upheld by the court on the so called “Lukov march”, an annual
event gathering far right extremists from various European countries.
Furthermore, the authorities have initiated the procedure aimed at
the dissolution of the Bulgarian National Union Edelweiss, the organiser
of the march. In 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria
requested OSCE/ODIHR’s opinion on certain provisions of the Criminal
Code of Bulgaria pertaining to bias-motivated crime, hate speech
and discrimination. In its opinion, the OSCE/ODIHR expressed the
overall appreciation of Bulgaria’s efforts to tackle these problems
but it identified a number of shortcomings as regards the relevant
legislation which should be addressed.
127. Concerning violence against women, the issue of ratifying
the Istanbul Convention (signed in April 2016) remains unaddressed
as a result of the decision of the Constitutional Court which in
July 2018 declared the Istanbul Convention unconstitutional. While
a set of amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure
Code adopted in 2018 has been aimed to safeguard women’s rights,
material support for women subject to violence is far from satisfactory
and civil society organisations deplore insufficient number of shelters, counsellors
and assistance available for the victims.
2.3.2. Montenegro
128. The last report on Montenegro
dates back to 2015. In Resolution
2030 (2015), the Assembly decided to close the monitoring procedure
and to engage in a post-monitoring dialogue. It stated that this
dialogue could be concluded if Montenegro was to fulfil four requirements:
the independence of the judiciary, trust in the electoral process,
the situation of the media and the fight against corruption.
129. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the report prepared by the co-rapporteurs
to be presented during the April part session was discussed during
the June meeting of the Monitoring Committee and a draft resolution was
adopted with the aim of being debated during the January 2021 part-session.
130. In their report, the co-rapporteurs concluded that in the
fields where Montenegro was usually seen as a co-operative partner
or a good example for the region (minority rights, the fight against
discrimination, among others), the situation continued to improve.
This trend was confirmed by the adoption of the same-sex partnership
law in July, an achievement to be commended after two previous unsuccessful
votes in the parliament on this issue.
131. However, limited progress was achieved in the four key areas
identified by Resolution
2030 (2015). Even where improvements could be noted, such as in
the independence of the judiciary or in the situation of media for
instance, they were counterbalanced by opposing negative trends
which could be observed in the course of 2020.
132. The attempt to revise the electoral framework failed, due
to the boycott by the opposition of the ad
hoc parliamentary committee tasked for the reform.
133. Concerning the independence of the judiciary, the re-appointments
of Presidents of Courts for more than the two-terms limit set by
the Constitution and the law continued, despite previous warnings
by the co-rapporteurs, the GRECO and the European Union: on 7 February
2020, the Judicial Council re-appointed a new President of a Court
for a fifth term. In November 2020, it re-appointed another new
President of a Court for an eighth term, whose reappointment had
previously been cancelled by an administrative court.
134. Concerning the fight against corruption, although, on 6 February
2020, the Second Compliance report of GRECO terminated the Fourth
Round Compliance procedure in respect of Montenegro, GRECO stated
that no progress had been demonstrated as regards the composition
and independence of the Judicial Council, nor in reviewing the disciplinary
framework for judges. No substantial progress was neither achieved
in the reform of the funding of political parties and electoral
campaigns.
135. Concerning the situation of media, although the legal framework
seemed to have improved with the adoption of two laws on media and
the public broadcaster RTCG in July, concerns remained. Therefore,
the co-rapporteurs publicly decided to follow the legal proceedings
in the case of Jovo Martinović, an investigative journalist convicted
on 8 October for the second time on charges of setting up criminal
organisation and drug trafficking.
136. As Montenegro seemed to have reached a glass ceiling in the
four key areas, it was proposed in the draft resolution not to end
the post-monitoring dialogue, and to re-evaluate the situation after
the general elections.
137. The two main and intertwined developments that marked 2020
were the continued and massive protests against the Law on Freedom
of Religion, especially the part dedicated to the property rights,
passed by the parliament in December 2019, and the general elections
that took place in August.
138. The protests in which the Serbian Orthodox Church played a
significant part happened throughout the country, were mostly peaceful
and discontinued due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Tensions rose in
May and June when the Church’s Metropolite and some of his priests
were arrested for not complying with Covid-19 sanitary measures.
A dialogue initiated by the government in February did not come
to any breakthrough.
139. The Democratic Front (DF) and the Democrats (DCG) took the
opportunity of the debate on the withdrawal of the Law on Freedom
of Religion to boycott the work of the ad hoc parliamentary committee
tasked to reform the electoral framework, making it impossible to
reach the quorum. Therefore, this framework remained largely unchanged
during the general elections held on 30 August, with the same flaws
and limitations that the OSCE/ODIHR kept on advising to address.
The elections took place in a very polarised atmosphere on the issue
of church and national identity, but remained peaceful, with the
notable exception of worrying attacks against minorities, especially
Bosniacs, on the day the results were announced. This outburst of
violence was immediately condemned by all parties and by the Serbian
Orthodox Church, who was deeply involved during the campaign against
the ruling majority, according to the NGOs with which the co-rapporteurs had
an exchange of views on the elections.
140. Although a widespread abuse of office and State resources
gave the ruling party an undue advantage, according to the preliminary
findings of the OSCE/ODIHR, these elections with a very high turnout
of 76 % saw, for the first time since the independence of Montenegro,
a shift of power. President Đjukanović acknowledged the defeat of
the former ruling majority led by the Democratic Party of Socialists
of Montenegro (DPS), and the three main platforms from the opposition,
led by the DF, the DCG and United Reform Action (URA) announced on
31 August an agreement on the formation of a government of experts
with a Prime Minister to-be who was not affiliated to any political
formation. This new government would be supported by a tight majority
of 41 seats in the Parliament upon 81. This significant change is
an opportunity for all political stakeholders to demonstrate that
Montenegro is not only able to manage a democratic shift of majority,
but also capable to confirm its European path and comply with its
obligations, notably in the four key areas determined by Resolution 2030 (2015).
2.3.3. North Macedonia
141. In October 2019, the Assembly
adopted Resolution 2304
(2019) on the “Post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia”.
It welcomed the achievements reached by the country, notably the
name issue being solved by the signing of the Prespa agreement in
2018 and the launch of reforms and called on the authorities to
make further progress in increasing the sustainability and functioning
of democratic institutions, the independence of the judiciary, the
fight against corruption, the consolidation of the electoral framework
and the pursuance of inclusive policies aiming at securing the rights
of minorities.
142. The European integration process was marked by the decision
of the Council of the European Union to open membership negotiations
with North Macedonia [and Albania] on 26 March 2020 – a decision
the country had been waiting for since 2009. This was welcomed by the co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of the two countries.
The accession negotiations however have not started yet, as Bulgaria
is blocking the decision of the European Union Council of Minister
to adopt a negotiating framework for North Macedonia: Bulgaria is objecting
to the use of the Macedonian language in the negotiating framework
and has differing views on their shared history, despite the signing
of the Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations with North Macedonia
in 2017.
143. Overall democratic institutions have been functioning well.
The parliament was able to ensure constructive political dialogue
and to fulfil its legislative functions. The reforms undertaken
in 2019 continued, including in the judiciary: the much awaited
revised law on the Public Prosecutor's Office was adopted and entered
into force in June 2020; it should ensure a sustainable solution
for the cases of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Related to and
Arising from the Content of the Illegal Interception of Communications
after the former Chief Special Prosecutor was convicted in June
2020, in the first instance, in the so-called ‘racket case’ concerning
alleged extortion and abuse of office. The revised Law on the Council
of Public Prosecutors was also adopted and there is an ongoing reform
of the intelligence services. Progress was noted by the European Commission
in the implementation of the judicial reform strategy and the establishment
of mechanisms to ensure judicial independence and accountability.
144. While corruption remains prevalent, GRECO noted in October 2020 the “noticeable efforts made by
the authorities to revise the legislative frameworks” but consistent
practical application of the new rules remains to be seen, such
as for the revised Code of Ethics for MPs. Progress was noted to
prevent corruption of lay judges; however the Minister of Justice
was not removed from the Judicial Council. GRECO welcomed the substantially
strengthened regulation of the terms for the selection, appointment
and dismissal of the members of the State Commission for Prevention
of Corruption (SCPC) which remained pro-active in preventing corruption,
opening cases, including those involving high-level officials from
across the political spectrum. and addressing allegations of nepotism,
cronyism and political influence in the process of recruitment of
public sector employees.
145. The overall situation of media remains unchanged, including
previous issues identified, such as financial sustainability of
independent media, self-regulation, transparency of media advertising
by State institutions, political parties and public enterprises,
and the public service broadcaster’s independence.
146. The year 2020 was also marked by early parliamentary elections,
which were called following a common decision of political parties
after the country failed to obtain the opening of the European Union
accession negotiations in October 2019. The parliament was dissolved
on 16 February 2020, early elections were scheduled on 12 April
2020. However, following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and
the declaration of the state of emergency by the President of the
Republic in March 2020 (without a debate in parliament), both the
opposition and the ruling majority agreed to postpone the elections
until the state of emergency was lifted (in practice, on 23 June
2020). The rapporteur, Ms Lise Christoffersen (Norway, SOC), stressed that this decision demonstrated the ability of political
parties to build consensus despite their divergences, achieved through
concerted efforts undertaken by all stakeholders, including the
President of the Republic who facilitated the political dialogue.
The committee was informed about the preparation of these elections
at its hearing on 22 June 2020 on “Membership obligations and the
conduct of democratic elections in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic”,
held in the framework of the preparation of its opinion.
147. The early elections took place on 15 July 2020. They could
not be observed by the Parliamentary Assembly due to the sanitary
context. 12 political parties and 3 coalitions, all with a 40% gender
quota as required by the law, competed. The turnout was 51%.The
final results showed a slight victory for the Coalition led by the
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) with BESA (35,89% of
the votes, leading the race by 12 000 votes out of 900 000), while
the Coalition led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization –
Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) won 34,57%
of the votes. The Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) remained
the strongest Albanian party (11,48%). The Coalition of the Alliance
for Albanians (AfA) with AlternAtivA (8,95%) and the Democratic
Party of Albanians (DPA) (1,53%) also entered parliament. For the
first time, an openly anti-NATO party, the Left party (Levica),
entered parliament (4,1%).
148. ODIHR’s Special Election Assessment Mission (with a limited
presence) assessed the elections as generally effectively administered
and without major incidents or tension: “Legal stability was however undermined
by substantial revisions to the Electoral Code and subsequent ad
hoc regulations enacted during the state of emergency. The campaign,
although negative in tone, was genuinely competitive and provisions regarding
paid political advertisement [adopted by the parliament on 22 June
2020] favoured the three largest parties. Isolated cases of ministers
from different parties blurring their state functions and political
activities were observed.” A cyberattack which targeted the State
Election Commission and the Ministry of Interior on election day
is under investigation. Long-standing recommendations pertaining
to the voter register, the revision of electoral district boundaries,
universality and equality of the vote in the electoral district
abroad, and an effective campaign finance audit remain unaddressed.
149. Following the elections, Talaf Xhaferi (DUI) was re-elected
Speaker of the parliament in August 2020. In the same month, the
DUI formed a coalition with the SDMS and joined the government set
up by the Prime Minister, Mr Zaev, which will remain committed to
internal issues, namely the fight against the pandemic, the reform
of the justice system and the fight against corruption. These issues
will be further explored by the co-rapporteur Ms Lise Christoffersen
(Norway, SOC) and Mr Zsolt Csenger-Zalàn (Hungary, EPP/CD), appointed in
June 2020 as co-rapporteur.
2.4. Periodic reviews
150. The periodic review reports
are a key mechanism for the committee to fulfil its mandate “to
ensure and assess the fulfilment of obligations assumed by all member
States under the Council of Europe Statute, the European Convention
on Human Rights and all other conventions concluded within the organisation
to which they are party”. Over the last years, the Assembly has
continued to further develop and improve these reports and their
preparation, based on the experienced gained by the committee. An
important development was the decision of the Assembly, in 2019,
that from then onwards, the periodic review reports would be presented
to the Assembly as individual reports each with their own resolution,
and no longer as appendices to the progress report. In addition,
the Assembly decided that the order and frequency of the countries
selected for periodic review should be established by the committee
on substantial grounds, while maintaining the objective of producing,
over time, periodic reviews on all Member States.
151. Following a disagreement between the committee and the Bureau
of the Assembly on whether the Bureau could alter the list of countries
selected by the committee, which the latter felt would politicise
the selection process, and affect its impartiality, the Committee
on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs clarified,
in Resolution 2350 (2020) that “in order to ensure that a reference to the Monitoring
Committee for report is validated by the Assembly … [:] … The Monitoring
Committee is seized, in accordance with Rule 26 of the Rules of
Procedure, to carry out regular periodic reviews of the compliance
of the obligations entered into upon their accession to the Council
of Europe by member States that are not already under a full monitoring procedure
or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue. The order and frequency
of these reports will be decided upon by the committee in accordance
with its internal working methods based on substantive grounds,
with the objective of producing, over time, periodic review reports
on all member States.”
152. In order to ensure an impartial and fully transparent selection
process, the committee adopted, at its meeting on 13 November 2020,
a revised set of internal working methods for the selection, by
the committee, of countries for periodic review reports. These revised
internal working methods were declassified by the committee at the
same meeting and are attached to this report in the appendix in
order to ensure full transparency and provide a clear understanding
about this selection process, which concerns all member States of
the Council of Europe.
153. The committee had decided to suspend the preparation of the
periodic review reports in respect of Hungary, Malta and Romania
while the selection process was being clarified by the Committee
on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs. However,
in January 2020 the committee decided to proceed with the preparation
of these reports. On 27 May 2020, it appointed the co-rapporteurs
for the periodic review reports on the honouring of membership obligations
by Hungary and by Romania and on 22 June 2020 the co-rapporteurs
for the periodic review report on the honouring of membership obligations
by Malta.
154. As the reports on Hungary, Malta and Romania are the first
reports to be prepared in the new format, and with a view to harmonise
the format and the preparation process for these periodic reviews,
a co-ordination meeting between the six rapporteurs responsible
for these countries was organised on 30 November 2020. During this
meeting the rapporteurs agreed on the general scope of these reports
and the modalities for their preparation. In this context they requested
the committee to ask the Bureau of the Assembly to exceptionally grant
a six-month extension of the references for their reports to compensate
for the time lost as a result of the above mentioned suspension
of the preparations of these three reports.
2.5. Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe member States
155. The Monitoring Committee decided
on 27 January 2020 to re-constitute its Sub-Committee on Conflicts between
Council of Europe Members States. The sub-committee met on 30 January
and elected by acclamation Mr Egidijus Vareikis (Lithuania, EPP/CD)
as its Chair. Regrettably, following the outbreak of the Covid-19
pandemic no further meetings of the sub-committee could be organised.
156. During its meeting on 30 January, the sub-committee agreed
that in 2020 it would primarily focus on the Transnistrian settlement
process, and pending agreement of the parties concerned, Northern
Cyprus and Nagorno Karabakh.
157. The sub-committee has been able to engage constructively with
regard to the Transnistrian settlement process, with high level
involvement of all relevant parties. In that context the sub-committee
agreed it would organise a seminar on the “Human Rights aspects
of the Transnistrian settlement process and the role of the Council
of Europe” in the same format, and with the same high level participation,
as the first meeting of the sub-committee on the Transnistrian settlement
process. This seminar was scheduled to take place in April 2020
but was postponed as a result of the pandemic. It will now be organised
as soon as the sanitary conditions allow.
158. Regrettably, despite the best efforts of its chairperson,
the sub-committee was not able to obtain the agreement of all parties,
as it is required to do by its working methods, to start working
on the conflicts regarding Northern Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Following the outbreak of hostilities along the internationally recognised
border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020, the committee
invited the Sub-Committee to organise an exchange of views on the
mediation process in the framework of the Minsk Group. Regrettably, especially
in the context of the developments that followed, no agreement from
the parties could be obtained. Nevertheless, several exchanges of
views were organised on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict following
the outbreak of military hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan
along the line of contact in September 2020, which I will outline
in more detail below.
159. According to the working methods of the sub-committee, it
“will only commence work on a given conflict if it has the agreement
of the member States that are party to the conflict.” While this
is an important safeguard to avoid the possible instrumentalisation
of the work of the Sub-Committee by one of the parties to the conflict, its
strict interpretation has made it impossible for the sub-committee
to even inform itself about a particular conflict between member
States without the express agreement of States involved, or explore
its own possible role in relation to them without engaging in concrete
activities. In the long term this is clearly not sustainable and
I invite the sub-committee to reflect on the working methods at
its next meeting with a view to ensuring that it will be able to
inform itself, and explore its own role, with regard to the ongoing
conflicts even if it cannot obtain the express agreement of the
member States concerned. To avoid manipulation and instrumentalisation,
any practical activities with regard to the conflict should of course
continue to be covered by the understanding that the agreement of
all parties is necessary for the sub-committee to engage itself.
160. From 12 to 16 July 2020, there was a serious breach of the
cease-fire, brokered in May 1994, on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border,
resulting in casualties, including civilians. The military hostilities
took place on the internationally recognised border between the
North-Eastern Armenian province of Tavush and the Azerbaijani Western
district of Tovuz. According to the OSCE Minsk Group, “artillery
of various calibers reportedly was used by both forces” and both
“sides accused each other of initiating the fighting”. Fortunately, the
situation did not further escalate, and a relative stability resumed
along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.
161. On 17 July 2020, the co-rapporteurs for Armenia and for Azerbaijan
issued a joint statement in which they reminded both countries of
their membership obligation to resolve their differences peacefully.
They urged them to show restraint and to de-escalate the situation
including by refraining from inflammatory rhetoric. They also called
on both countries to resume peace talks in the framework of the
OSCE Minsk Group, in the manner indicated by its co-Chairs in their
statement of 15 July: creating an atmosphere conducive to the peace
process, holding negotiations on a settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh,
and allowing the return of OSCE monitors to the region.
162. On 27 September 2020, military hostilities broke out along
the line of contact, culminating in Azerbaijani military forces
launching a full-scale attack along the line of contact that since
the 1994 cease-fire has separated Azerbaijani and Armenian positions
in Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven Azerbaijani adjacent districts.
The conflict lasted six weeks.
163. It was characterised by high human losses, both civilian and
military and by several breaches of humanitarian law. The principle
of distinction between civilian and military targets, as well as
the principle of proportionality were not respected in many occasions,
leading to the targeting of cities in the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic, as well as in Azerbaijan itself, and reportedly to a lesser
extent in Armenia. As a consequence, private properties and civilian
infrastructures were hit. Troubling reports on the use
of cluster munitions that are in contravention of humanitarian law,
as they do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, were
made. Credible reports also mentioned
the summary execution of prisoners of war. The use of Syrian mercenaries
by Azerbaijan, with Turkey’s assistance, to shore-up and sustain
its military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, including
on the front-line was reported, notably by France and the Russian
Federation, as well as by the United Nations. This is denied
by Azerbaijan. During the conflict, Turkish authorities repeated
on many occasions that they would support Azerbaijan in the field
and at the table of negotiations.
Troubling reports on the use
of cluster munitions that are in contravention of humanitarian law,
as they do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, were
made. Credible reports also mentioned
the summary execution of prisoners of war. The use of Syrian mercenaries
by Azerbaijan, with Turkey’s assistance, to shore-up and sustain
its military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, including
on the front-line was reported, notably by France and the Russian
Federation, as well as by the United Nations. This is denied
by Azerbaijan. During the conflict, Turkish authorities repeated
on many occasions that they would support Azerbaijan in the field
and at the table of negotiations.164. Manipulation of information, as well as hate-speech were also
widespread.
165. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the Commissioner
for Human Rights, the co-rapporteurs for Armenia and Azerbaijan
and myself, on behalf of the Committee, issued several statements, calling
for a de-escalation of the situation, recalling that in times of
war, fundamental rights are to be protected, and again reminding
the parties of the explicit obligation incumbent on member States
of the Council of Europe that they should resolve the conflicts
between them by peaceful means only. I also underscored that the obligation
also means that all member States should refrain from any actions
or discourse which encourage or abet belligerent States to resolve
their disputes by force, and in that respect, the members of the
Monitoring Committee deplored inflammatory rhetoric by Turkey, as
well as its reported direct involvement in the conflict.
166. On 9 November 2020, after three failed attempts to broker
a cease-fire, and with Azerbaijani forces re-capturing four of the
seven adjacent districts, and entering into the self-proclaimed
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and re-taking the city of Susha, a trilateral
statement was signed under the auspices of the Russian Federation
between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. This trilateral
statement: established a cease-fire along the Armenian and Azerbaijani
positions on 10 November; organised the deployment of Russian military
peace-keepers for an initial duration of five years; instituted
a peacekeeping cease-fire control centre; set a calendar for the
return to Azerbaijan of the three districts still under Armenian
control, excluding the Lachin corridor; and foresaw the opening
of all transport communications, including between the western regions
of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic
under the foresight of the border service of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation. The trilateral statement also
indicated that internally displaced persons and refugees shall return
to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts under the control
of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and that
prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons and bodies
are exchanged.
167. According to the Azerbaijani authorities, the outcome of the
conflict led to the implementation by force of the four United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (822, 853, 874 and 884), regarding
the withdrawal of “all occupying forces” from “occupied areas of
Azerbaijan”. In that context it should be noted that this leaves
unresolved the other requirement of these resolutions namely: “to
continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within
the context of the [O]SCE Minsk process”. Although not explicitly
mentioned in the trilateral statement, the OSCE Minsk Group should
play its part in the negotiations on the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh
region, in accordance with UNSC resolutions.
3. Covid-19: impact on the functioning of democratic institutions
168. The Covid-19 pandemic has had,
and continues to have, a great impact on the main areas of our Committee’s
competence. The functioning of democratic institutions in all Council
of Europe member States has been to a varying extent affected by
emergency measures aimed at increasing health safety with a potential
to put at risk democratic processes thus increasing the challenge
for our monitoring functions.
169. The committee has welcomed the debate on the Covid-19 pandemic
which was organised by the Assembly on 13 October 2020 and to which
it contributed by preparing an opinion on the report of the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy on “Democracies facing the Covid-19
pandemic”. The preparation of the opinion created an opportunity
for reflection within the committee on improved safeguards for the
democratic process under public health emergency conditions. It
is the right time to draw the first conclusions, take stock of different
ways of dealing with the crisis and identify measures which would
allow to better handle future similar crises in the framework of
democratic structures.
170. The members of the committee unanimously expressed the conviction
that no public health emergency may be used to undermine democratic
acquis and that the introduction of any emergency measures should meet
clear requirements compatible with democratic standards. At the
same time, they stressed the importance of looking at specific contexts
in different countries. In particular, they pointed out that in
the absence of internationally recognised standards in the area,
the assessment of compliance of these measures with democratic standards
can only be done against the background of particular legal order
and practice in the given country prior to the pandemic. In line
with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows on permanent
basis the situation in Council of Europe member states with regard
to the conformity with their commitments and obligations.
171. The committee has committed to devote a special chapter on
compliance of emergency measures with democratic standards in all
forthcoming reports prepared under the monitoring procedure, in
the framework of post-monitoring dialogue and in periodic reviews.
In this way it hopes to provide an exhaustive overview of the different
ways in which member States reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic, to
identify possible shortcomings and to come up with recommendations
for the future.
172. The issue of elections as a source of democratic legitimacy
in the context of a pandemic and other emergency situations is of
utmost importance for the committee’s work. Given the particular
responsibility of parliaments and elected institutions in times
of crisis, it is crucial that their legitimacy cannot be questioned. The
assessment of compliance of electoral process with democratic standards
is a cornerstone of the monitoring procedure. Therefore, the committee
has reflected on the possible consequences of non-observation of
elections by the Assembly, should the travel restrictions continue.
Indeed, some countries may feel tempted to reject any possible criticism
of the electoral process because of the lack of observation by international
monitors.
173. In addition, as highlighted in each monitoring procedure,
the genuinely democratic nature of an election is determined not
only by the conduct of the vote on election day but equally by the
pre-electoral political environment and the existence of an equal
playing field for all electoral contestants. At the same time, it
should be emphasised that a number of measures implemented to allow
elections under pandemic conditions, such as the increased use of
postal and internet voting, lessen the impact and effectiveness
of observation of the voting on election day. This development strengthens
the importance of the long-term assessment of election preparation
and the political environment in which elections take place, which
have been, and continue to be, important areas of attention of the
Monitoring Committee.
174. While election observation should continue to be an important
tool for the assessment of electoral process, in case it cannot
be organised due to emergency measures, it must not be used by the
country as a pretext to reject any criticism from the international
community. In particular, the monitoring rapporteurs acquire their
information on a permanent basis from a variety of sources and have
the competence to assess the compliance of electoral process with
democratic standards on this basis.
175. That said, the committee stresses the need for the elaboration
of appropriate international standards for the functioning of democratic
institutions under emergency situations which could guide the countries
when confronted with possible future crises to avoid putting at
risk democratic acquis in Council of Europe Member States.
4. Efficiency of the committee’s work under Covid-19 restrictions
176. The rapporteurs of the Monitoring
Committee have not suspended their work during the Covid-19 pandemic.
In particular, they have been closely following developments in
their respective countries and made public statements where appropriate.
Many of them communicated with the authorities and held exchanges
of views with different stakeholders via videoconference.
177. However, the committee’s usual activities have been inevitably
jeopardised, and probably even more than in the case of other Assembly
committees. Indeed, the monitoring rapporteurs rely to a much larger
extent on inter-personal communication, and specially dedicated
political dialogue with the authorities constitutes a crucial part
of their work. The main objective behind the monitoring procedure
is to achieve a common understanding between the rapporteurs acting
on behalf of the committee and the authorities with regard to democratic
standards and functioning of democratic institutions in the country,
and this can hardly be done through videoconference. Therefore,
visits of rapporteurs are a necessary condition for the preparation
of each report.
178. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept that monitoring reports
be submitted to the Assembly at virtual sessions. This threatens
first and foremost to put the Assembly’s unique political dialogue
at stake, as well as risking that technical problems may occur and
impact the final content of the resolution.
179. However, taking into account the possible long duration of
the sanitary crisis, the committee should be prepared to adapt to
alternative efficient ways of monitoring dialogue with the countries.
On several occasions the committee has reflected on possible working
methods in times of crisis. It was pointed out that broader use of
electronic means to gather information should be envisaged. Meetings
aimed at identifying concerns or establishing facts at parliamentary,
governmental or judicial levels could certainly be held by videoconference as
illustrated by the recent experiences of some of our rapporteurs.
The rapporteurs should continue to make full use of this excellent
tool at their disposal in order to advance their work.
180. While I fully appreciate the benefits of remote meetings,
I am convinced that they cannot be a substitute for in-person meetings
at political level and I am against the rapporteurs preparing a
monitoring report under ordinary procedure without a prior visit
to the country.
181. However, in some cases, it may be possible for the rapporteurs
to tackle specific issues and developments in a country by virtual
means only, the results of which could be presented to the committee
in the format of an information memorandum, similar to those produced
after visits. When integrated in the overall monitoring report they
would be covered by the in-person political dialogue.
Appendix – Decision on revised internal working methods for the selection by the Monitoring Committee of countries for periodic review on the honouring of membership obligations
(open)Prepared by the chairperson of the committee and adopted by the committee on 13 November 2020
1. According to its terms of reference
the Monitoring Committee is tasked to ensure and assess the fulfilment
of obligations assumed by all member States under the Council of
Europe Statute; the European Convention on Human Rights and all
other conventions concluded within the Organisation to which they
are party. To that extent, the committee shall prepare regular periodic
review reports on the honouring of membership obligations for all
member States that are not under a full monitoring procedure or
engaged in a post monitoring dialogue. In line with Resolution 2261 (2019), the committee shall select the countries for periodic
review according to its internal working methods, on substantive
grounds, while maintaining the objective of producing, over time,
periodic reviews on all member States.
2. The number of countries for periodic review will be determined
each year by the committee based on its expected workload and available
resources .
Each year it will aim to select between two and three countries for
periodic review. The exact number will be determined by the chairperson
each year prior to the launching of the selection procedure.
.
Each year it will aim to select between two and three countries for
periodic review. The exact number will be determined by the chairperson
each year prior to the launching of the selection procedure.3. The selection of countries for periodic review will take place
on substantive grounds based on:
3.1. the
findings and conclusions of reports of other monitoring bodies of
the Council of Europe;
3.2. findings of the Assembly, in particular contained in resolutions
and reports prepared by other committees of the Assembly;
3.3. questions raised by members of the committee, international
and national civil society and the media regarding developments
related to the functioning of democratic institutions as reported.
4. Based on these grounds, the chairperson of the committee will
prepare a reasoned draft shortlist of, at least, five member States.
5. This draft shortlist will be sent to all members of the committee
at least three weeks before the meeting in which the countries for
periodic review is to be selected.
6. All members of the committee may send written proposals with
detailed reasoning for additional countries to be included on the
short list up to two weeks before the start of the meeting.
7. All members` contributions received up to two weeks before
the meeting takes place will be included in a revised short list
that will be sent to all members within the reglementary deadlines
namely one week before the meeting takes place. In order to ensure
the high quality of the selection process, no proposals to that
list will be accepted after the deadline.
8. Following a general discussion, a vote will be held
on each of these countries. The countries receiving the most votes
will be tentatively proposed for inclusion in the final list to
be agreed upon by the committee.
will be held
on each of these countries. The countries receiving the most votes
will be tentatively proposed for inclusion in the final list to
be agreed upon by the committee. 9. The committee will confirm the final list as a single package
by a majority of votes cast. Rule 25.2 on the requisite of quorum
for the adoption of motions for resolution by committees will be
applied mutatis mutandis. In
the event that the committee rejects this list, the process will
recommence at the stage mentioned in paragraph 4.
10. In line with Resolution
1115 (1997), the committee shall appoint two co-rapporteurs for
each country selected for periodic review. It shall strive to produce
the periodic reviews for the countries within a maximum of two years.