1. Introduction
1. On 27 January 2025, with the
support of more than 30 members of the Parliamentary Assembly present in
the Chamber belonging to at least five national delegations, Ms Boriana
Åberg (Sweden, EPP/CD) challenged the still unratified credentials
of the Georgian delegation on substantive grounds on the basis of Article
8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.
2. The substantive grounds on the basis of which the credentials
were challenged are the assertion that the 26 October 2024 parliamentary
elections and subsequent developments, including violations of the freedom
of assembly and expression and the crackdown on the opposition and
civil society, are in contradiction to Georgia's membership obligations
and accession commitments to the Council of Europe.
3. In line with Article 8.3 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) was seized for report
and the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional
Affairs for opinion.
4. At its meeting on 27 January 2025, the Monitoring Committee
appointed me rapporteur.
2. Membership obligations and accession
commitments
5. Upon accession, Georgia undertook
to honour the obligations incumbent on all member States under Article
3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) with regard
to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In addition,
it undertook to honour a number of specific commitments listed in
Opinion 209 (1999) “Georgia's application for membership of the Council
of Europe”, adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 1999.
6. On 24 May 2024, the Assembly Standing Committee held current
affairs debate entitled “Recent challenges to democracy in Georgia”
after hearing statements by the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Mr Shalva
Papuashvili, and the Vice-President of the European Commission for
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and member in respect
of the Czech Republic, Ms Veronika Bílková.
7. On 27 June 2024, the Assembly adopted, following a debate
under urgent procedure,
Resolution
2561 (2024) “Challenges to democracy in Georgia”. In this Resolution,
the Assembly expressed its deep concern about “the country’s commitment
to international democratic norms and Euro-Atlantic integration,
and about its willingness to honour its membership obligations and
accession commitments to the Council of Europe”. Noting that the
26 October 2024 parliamentary elections would be a
de facto referendum on Georgia’s
democratic trajectory and foreign alignment, the Assembly reiterated
its commitment to co-operation and dialogue with all forces and
civil society in Georgia “to reverse the recent backsliding and
to uphold the honouring of Georgia’s membership obligations and
commitments to the Council of Europe”.
8. Parliamentary elections took place in Georgia on 26 October
2024. Regrettably, these elections did not fully comply with European
norms and standards for democratic elections. The International
Election Observation Mission, of which the Assembly was a part,
noted that the elections took place in an extremely polarised and
divisive electoral environment, with persistent reports of widespread
pressure on voters, especially public sector employees, as well
as extensive tracking of voters on election day combined with frequent
instances of compromised voting secrecy which raised concerns about
the ability of voters to vote freely without fear of retribution.

In addition, and worrisomely in the
context of the disputed election results, the final report of the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which
observed the post-election proceedings, concluded that: “Overall,
the handling of post-election day complaints by election commissions
and courts undermined the right to due process, failed to provide
an effective remedy, and did not comprehensively address widespread
concerns about the integrity of election results”.

The manner in which the
election complaints have been handled raises serious questions about
the independence of the judiciary and the political control over
it, confirming concerns already raised in the last monitoring report
to the Assembly.
9. These serious shortcomings in electoral conduct led Mr Iulian
Bulai (Romania, ALDE), Chairman of the Assembly
ad hoc Committee to observe the
elections, to conclude in his report to the Assembly that there
were serious concerns about the “correctness of the election results,
namely whether the election results truly reflect the will of the
voters. Additionally, serious doubts persist regarding whether the
electoral environment provided the necessary conditions for a fair
election, enabling voters to make an informed choice free from intimidation and
undue pressure.”

10. Widespread popular protests broke out following the announcement
of the results of the elections. The Georgian opposition, as well
as the President of Georgia, Ms Zourabichvili, refused to recognise
the outcome of these elections, citing widespread electoral fraud,
including through intimidation of voters and violations of the voting
secrecy. On these grounds, the President of Georgia, as well as
several individual MPs, challenged the results of the elections,
and the legality of the mandates of all 150 MPs, before the Constitutional
Court. All four opposition parties that passed the threshold for
entering parliament announced that they would not do so. Three of
these opposition parties, namely “Coalition for Change”, “Unity-National
Movement”, and “Strong Georgia” have asked the Central Election
Commission (CEC) to cancel their party list and requested that the parliament
invalidate their mandates. While making it clear that it does not
recognise the legitimacy of the new parliament and will not participate
in its proceedings, former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s “For
Georgia” party did not formally ask for its lists to be cancelled
or its mandates revoked. The CEC cancelled the three respective
lists on 26 November 2024 and the Georgian parliament is set to
decide on the revocation of the mandates at its February 2025 Session.
The decision of the combined opposition not to enter the new parliament
has removed an important institutional mechanism for resolving the
ongoing social and political crisis in Georgia. It should be recalled
that the Assembly, irrespective of the merits or the grounds for
such a decision, has always been very cautious and even reluctant
about supporting parliamentary boycotts.
11. On 13 December 2024, the nine MPs of Georgian Dream who form
the People’s Power faction announced that they would leave the ruling
majority and enter into opposition on the ground that, even if “
there are no fundamental disagreements with
the majority” the country needs a “
healthy
opposition”.

While their nature as genuine opposition
is questioned in Georgia, they were recognised as the opposition
in parliament and provided with the reserved posts and other privileges
for opposition parties.
12. The first meeting of the new parliament took place on 25 November
2024. The legitimacy of its convocation was questioned by the opposition,
as well as several constitutional lawyers, on the grounds that the
new parliament could not have been convened before the Constitutional
Court had given its decision on the legitimacy of all 150 MPs.

This raised
questions about the legality of the decisions taken by the newly convened
parliament including its call for presidential election on 14 December
2024.

On 14 December,
an election panel that was fully controlled by Georgian Dream unanimously
elected Mr Kavelashvili as President of Georgia; he ran unopposed
and is known for his hardline positions and anti-Western rhetoric.
The legitimacy of his election is not recognised by Ms Zourabichvili
and the opposition in Georgia, nor by a significant proportion of
the population, who still consider Ms Zourabichvili to be the legitimate
President of the country.
13. The situation escalated and dramatically changed on 28 November
2024 following the ruling majority’s announcement that it would
pause all efforts to open accession negotiations with the European
Union until 2028 and therewith de facto suspending
Georgia’s EU integration process, against its explicit election
promise that it would be the guarantor of rapid EU accession. This
decision led to a dramatic increase, both in number and size, of
round-the-clock large-scale demonstrations in Tbilisi and many other
cities and towns in Georgia. These protests were increasingly met
with police brutality and retaliation against protesters and opposition, which
only seemed to galvanise the protests and transformed them into
a social movement in favour of the country’s European direction
and for an end to the polarised, radical zero-sum political environment.
14. The suspension of the EU accession process, as well as the
increasing police brutality against protesters and journalists and
the crackdown on opposition voices, were strongly condemned by the
international community, including the Assembly. On 29 November
2024, the Assembly Standing Committee strongly condemned “the brutal
repression of the peaceful demonstrations” in violation of the fundamental
rights to freedom of expression and assembly. It urged “Georgia
to remain faithful to
European values
and to fully comply with its obligations and commitments as a member
State of the Council of Europe” and expressed its continuing
readiness to work, “in close co-operation with the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe and the Committee of Ministers, in a constructive
dialogue with the Georgian authorities, democratic forces and civil society,
in particular youth”,

to achieve those objectives.
15. The developments in Georgia have been marred by police brutality
and disproportional use of force against demonstrators, as well
as journalists and civil leaders. In addition, there are increasing
reports of violent attacks against protesters and journalists by
so-called “titushky” (unidentified masked thugs) with the police
idly standing by. The Georgian Public Defender (Ombudsman) has publicly
denounced the police brutality as torture. In addition, there have
been numerous arrests of opposition and protest leaders and searches
of their offices and houses. In total, more than 400 persons have
been arrested for their participation in the demonstrations. Many
of these arrests have taken place on the basis of provisions in
the controversial code of administrative offences

which is prone to political abuse.
In the light of these concerns, the President of the Assembly requested,
on 23 December 2024, an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission
on the compliance with Council of Europe standards of the Georgian
law on Administrative Offences, in particular with reference to
freedom of assembly. The Venice Commission has already started its
work on this opinion. Recently, there has been an increase in criminal
proceedings against demonstrators. These developments have raised questions
about politically motivated prosecution and the abuse of judicial
powers to repress or retaliate against dissent and protest.

16. The human rights and judicial abuse against demonstrators,
journalists and opposition members has been strongly condemned by
the international community, including the Monitoring Committee
co-rapporteurs, who issued a statement

on
10 December 2024 condemning the police violence and expressing concern about
possible politically motivated administration of justice. On 19
December 2024, 38 participating States of the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) invoked the so-called “Vienna
Mechanism” in response to concerns about freedom of peaceful assembly,
arbitrary arrests and detentions, targeting of political opposition
and targeting of journalists, and mistreatment that may constitute
torture.

In addition, the EU and most of
its member States have maintained a policy of
de
facto non‑co-operation and non-engagement with the Georgian
authorities in protest against the police brutality and violations
of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
17. Dialogue and contacts between the Council of Europe and the
Georgian authorities, all democratic forces and civil society have
continued extensively in order to seek a solution to the ongoing
crisis. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr Alain
Berset, visited Georgia from 18 to 20 December 2024.

The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring
Committee, Mr Claude Kern (France, ALDE) and Ms Edite Estrela (Portugal,
SOC) carried out a fact-finding visit to Georgia from 14 to 16 January
2025.

In addition, the Commissioner for
Human Rights visited Georgia from 21 to 23 January 2025.

3. Current
situation and possible way forward
18. The political and constitutional
crisis that developed after the elections has turned into a deep
social crisis following the suspension of the EU integration process
by the ruling majority, against the aspirations and interests of
the Georgian population. The crisis is characterised by a complete
breakdown of trust in the political institutions of the country
in the eyes of the Georgian society, compromising their legitimacy.
19. The daily protests and demonstrations in Tbilisi, as well
as in other cities in Georgia, are continuing unabated and for the
moment show no signs of slowing down. It is important to note that
these demonstrations are largely society-driven and spontaneous.
They represent a social movement that is neither controlled nor led
by political opposition parties. As a result, the space for manoeuvring
by any political party is limited, and any solution to the ongoing
crisis needs to involve and include these social actors and civil
society.
20. The situation is currently a complete political stalemate,
with neither side willing or able to move beyond their respective
positions. The core demands of the opposition and civil society
are the organisation of new elections and the release of all arrested
protesters. Many explicitly reject any form of domestic or international mediation
beyond these core demands, citing their experience with the failed
agreement brokered by former EU Council President Charles Michel
following the 2020 elections, from which Georgian Dream withdrew
soon after it was signed, as an ominous example. For its part, the
ruling majority maintains that it represents the will of the people
and therefore has the mandate to implement policies and decisions
as it sees necessary for the country. It has dismissed demands by
the European Union for legal and political reforms as political
blackmail, and makes no secret of its desire to disband the opposition,
which it considers to be foreign-funded representatives of an undefined
global war party aiming to draw the country into an all-out war
with the Russian Federation.
21. In these circumstances, the crisis of trust and legitimacy
of the political institutions may only be resolved by the Georgian
society itself. In a democratic society, the most appropriate, and
possibly only, response to such a deep social and political schism
is to refer the matter to its citizens through democratic elections. However,
it is clear that new elections, without first resolving the many
shortcomings and deficiencies in the electoral environment that
were noted by domestic and international elections observers, would
not resolve the current crisis in Georgia. The first step should
therefore be the start of an inclusive process involving all stakeholders
and social actors, including the ruling majority, opposition and
civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings
noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an
electoral environment that is conducive to genuinely democratic
new elections. This would also provide a limited, but well-defined,
framework for interaction between the different sides.
22. However, it is clear that such an inclusive process cannot
take place under the conditions of police brutality and oppression
and retaliation against protesters, journalists and political representatives.
In order to create the preconditions for the resolution of the ongoing
crisis, the authorities should put an immediate end to these practises,
which are incompatible with Georgia’s obligations as a member State
of the Council of Europe and release those arrested or detained
on remand.
4. Conclusions
23. Developments since the 26 October
2023 parliamentary elections, including violations of the freedom
of assembly and expression and the crackdown on the opposition and
civil society, are in contradiction to Georgia's membership obligations
and accession commitments to the Council of Europe. The Assembly therefore
needs clear assurances from the authorities that they are genuinely
committed to reversing the democratic backsliding and fulfilling
their membership obligations.
Option A
24. In light of these considerations
and as a signal of its own openness to maintaining dialogue, the Assembly,
pending a reconsideration of the Georgian delegation’s credentials
and an overall re-assessment of the situation in the country at
its April 2025 part-session, should decide to ratify at this part-session
the credentials of the Georgian delegation while, at the same time,
insisting that the Georgian authorities:
24.1. immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all
stakeholders and social actors, including the ruling majority, opposition
and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted
during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral
environment that is conducive to genuinely democratic new elections;
24.2. take immediate and effective steps to enable Georgia to
resume the European Union accession process, in line with the European
aspirations of the people, and to accelerate with determination
the necessary reforms;
24.3. put an immediate end to police brutality and human rights
abuses, effectively investigate these practices and end the misuse
of legal proceedings as a means of deterring or retaliating against protesters,
journalists and civic leaders, and fully respect the right to freedom
of expression and assembly;
24.4. step up co-operation with the Council of Europe and engage
in good faith in the process initiated by the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe;
24.5. address, without delay, the concerns and recommendations
of the Assembly expressed in
Resolution
2438 (2022) and
Resolution
2561 (2024), including the recommendation to repeal the Law on Foreign
Influence in its current form, and the concerns about the Law on
Administrative Offences, which should be addressed by taking into
account the upcoming urgent opinion of the Venice Commission;
24.6. continue to engage fully with the Assembly’s monitoring
procedure.
25. At the same time, as a clear sign of its condemnation of the
police brutality and other human rights abuses, which so far have
not been addressed by the authorities, the Assembly should suspend
the following rights of the members of the Georgian delegation:
25.1. right to be full member or alternate
of the following committees: the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, the Monitoring Committee, the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, the Committee on the Election of Judges to the
European Court of Human Rights and the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities, and Institutional Affairs;
25.2. right to be a member of election observation committees;
25.3. right to be appointed rapporteur;
25.4. right to be a candidate for the office of the President
of the Assembly, chairperson or vice-chairperson of a committee
or a sub-committee;
25.5. right to represent the Assembly in Council of Europe bodies
by Bureau decision, and right to represent the Assembly on an occasional
basis (by Bureau or committee decision) at events, meetings, conferences
organised by Council of Europe bodies, international organisations
or interparliamentary assemblies.
26. The Assembly should furthermore explore ways of strengthening
the participation of Georgian extra-parliamentarian opposition and
civil society in its actions with regard to Georgia, including within
the framework of the Monitoring Committee.
27. The Assembly will have the opportunity to reconsider the credentials
of the Georgian delegation, including the suspension of the above-mentioned
rights, at its April 2025 part-session, in the light of progress achieved
in relation to the issues mentioned in paragraph 11, under the conditions provided
for in Rule 9 of its Rules of Procedure.
Option B
28. Therefore, the Assembly should
not ratify the credentials of the Georgian delegation.
29. Furthermore, the Assembly should demand that the Georgian
authorities:
29.1. immediately initiate
an inclusive process involving all stakeholders and social actors,
including the ruling majority, opposition and civil society, to
urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during
the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment
that is conducive to genuinely democratic new elections;
29.2. take immediate and effective steps to enable Georgia to
resume the European Union accession process, in line with the European
aspirations of the people, and to accelerate with determination
the necessary reforms;
29.3. put an immediate end to police brutality and human rights
abuses, effectively investigate these practices and end the misuse
of legal proceedings as a means of deterring or retaliating against protesters,
journalists and civic leaders, and fully respect the right to freedom
of expression and assembly;
29.4. address, without delay, the concerns and recommendations
of the Assembly expressed in
Resolution
2438 (2022) and
Resolution
2561 (2024), including the recommendation to repeal the Law on Transparency
of Foreign Influence in its current form, and the concerns about
the Law on Administrative Offences, which should be addressed by
taking into account the urgent opinion of the Venice Commission;
29.5. step up co-operation with the Council of Europe and engage
in good faith in the process initiated by the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe
30. The Assembly should explore ways of strengthening the participation
of Georgian extra-parliamentarian opposition and civil society
in its actions with regard to Georgia, including within the framework
of the Monitoring Committee.