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Report | Doc. 12045 | 29 September 2009
Reconsideration on substantive grounds of previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation (Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly)
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
The Monitoring Committee reaffirms that the war between Georgia and Russia in itself constitutes a serious violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe, as well as of specific obligations and accession commitments of both countries. In this respect, the committee regrets that, one year after the war, most of the Assembly’s key demands have not been implemented and that very little progress has been made in addressing the consequences of the war in a satisfactory manner.
However, the committee recognises that, in such a complex situation as that of the consequences of the war, the fulfilment of the Assembly’s demands may not be easily achieved within the strict deadlines fixed. In addition, it acknowledges that these demands were directed to the Russian authorities whose policies are not in the hands of the members of the Russian delegation. Therefore, also taking into account the importance of a continued dialogue between the members of the Russian delegation and the Assembly, the committee proposes to confirm the ratification of the credentials of the Russian delegation to the Assembly.
At the same time, the committee considers that a culture of mutual respect should be created and proposes to step up its monitoring procedure with respect to Russia, including in relation to the demands made in the respective resolutions of the Assembly dealing with the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia, and, in that context, to draw up a specific roadmap for compliance, including timelines.
A. Draft resolution
(open)1. On 11 September 2009, a motion was tabled, signed
by 72 members, requesting the reconsideration on substantive grounds
of previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation, under
rule 9.1a of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly,
in view of the persistent failure of Russia to honour its obligations and
commitments imposed upon it by the Assembly Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647
(2009) and its lack of co-operation in the Assembly’s monitoring
procedure within the meaning of Rule 8.2.b of the Assembly’s Rules of
Procedure. In particular, the authors of the motion pointed out
that Russia had not only “failed to fulfil the key demands of Resolutions
1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009) adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly”
but had also “undertaken steps that further depart from their implementation”.
2. The Assembly reiterates that the war between Georgia and Russia
in itself constitutes a serious violation of the Statute of the
Council of Europe, as well as of specific obligations and accession
commitments of both countries (Resolution 1631 (2008)). In Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647
(2009), the Assembly therefore formulated a series of concrete
demands on both Georgia and Russia, which together form an impartial
and transparent roadmap for both countries, as well as for the Assembly
itself, to address the consequences of the war.
3. The implementation by both countries of the above-mentioned
demands of the Assembly has been a main point of focus in the work
of the Assembly over the past year. Regrettably, the Assembly has
to conclude that one year after the war most of its key demands
have not been implemented and that very little progress has been
made in addressing the consequences of the war in a satisfactory
manner.
4. However, the Assembly also considers that, in such a complex
situation as that of the consequences of the war, especially in
the light of the ongoing controversy about the precise circumstances
surrounding the outbreak of the war, the fulfilment of its demands
may not be easily achieved within the strict deadlines fixed. In
this respect, the Assembly notes the publication of the report by
the international fact-finding mission on the origins and course
of the conflict between Georgia and Russia established by the European
Union due on Tuesday 29 September 2009. It recalls that it has resolved
to return to that specific issue after the fact-finding mission
has presented its report.
5. While regretting that members of the Russian delegation have
publicly spoken against compliance by Russia with the Assembly demands,
it acknowledges that its demands were directed to the Russian authorities whose
policies are not in the hands of the members of the Russian delegation
to our Assembly. Moreover, the Assembly remains convinced that the
establishment of a genuine dialogue between Russia and Georgia and between
the Assembly and the parliamentary delegations of these two states
is the only way forward for the resolution of the conflict and for
securing the long-term stability of the region.
6. Therefore, the Assembly, notwithstanding the lack of compliance
by Russia with most of its demands, decides to confirm the ratification
of the credentials of the Russian delegation, on the understanding
that this will enable the Russian authorities to engage in a meaningful
and constructive dialogue with a view to addressing all the issues
mentioned in the Assembly resolutions on the consequences of the
war between Georgia and Russia.
7. The Assembly considers that a culture of mutual respect should
be created, whereby partners can disagree with each other but accept
the obligation to engage in a dialogue to explain the disagreements
and declare readiness to look for mutually acceptable compromises.
Such explanations would contribute to a better mutual understanding
and, in so doing, would be the best contribution to possibly overcoming
the disagreement one day.
8. The Assembly reiterates its resolve, as expressed in Resolution 1633 (2008), to step up its monitoring procedure with respect to
Russia, including in relation to the demands made in its respective
resolutions dealing with the consequences of the war between Russia
and Georgia, and, in that context, to draw up a specific roadmap
for compliance, including timelines.
B. Explanatory memorandum
(open)1. Introduction
1. On 11 September 2009, a motion (Doc. 12014 (2009)) was tabled by Mr Michael Jensen (Denmark, ALDE)
and 71 other members, requesting the Parliamentary Assembly to reconsider
the previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation on
substantive grounds, on the basis of Rule 9.1.a of the Rules of Procedure
of the Parliamentary Assembly, in view of the persistent failure
of Russia to honour its obligations and commitments imposed upon
it by the Assembly Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647
(2009) and its lack of co-operation in the Assembly’s monitoring
procedure within the meaning of Rule 8.2.b of the Assembly’s Rules of
Procedure. In particular, the authors of the motion pointed out
that Russia has not only “failed to fulfil the key demands of Resolutions
1633 (2008) and 1647 (2009) adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly”
but also has “undertaken steps that further depart from their implementation”.
2. In Resolution 1633
(2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia,
adopted on 2 October 2008, the Assembly considered that, during
the war and in its immediate aftermath, both countries had violated
human rights and principles of humanitarian law as well as the Statute
of the Council of Europe and specific accession commitments. On
that basis, the Assembly formulated a series of concrete demands on
both countries to address the consequences of the war in a manner
incumbent on them as a member state of the Council of Europe.
3. In Doc. 11726 of 2008, I already reported on a request to reconsider
the previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation on
substantive grounds. From this report drafted one year ago, I would
like to recall the following paragraphs:
“8. Let me first of all state that the escalation of what used to be called by some a “frozen conflict” into a war between two member states of the Organisation is simply unacceptable.
9. Since the early 1990’s, the various parties to the conflict had numerous opportunities to de-escalate the conflict and put an end to human hardship. Instead, they pursued various forms of provocation leading to a deterioration in the security situation.
10. It is clear that the recent war between two member states of the Organisation constitutes in itself a serious violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe and has led to further infringements of the obligations and commitments that both Russia and Georgia took on when acceding to the Council of Europe.
[…]
13. Therefore, both states are, to different degrees, responsible for the disproportionate use of armed force, including in civilian areas. This is a violation of international law principles, as well as of the obligation and commitment of the two states, as member states of the Council of Europe, to resolve conflicts by peaceful means.
[…]
18. On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, there appear to be good reasons for sanctioning both Russia and Georgia, the latter at least as regards the outbreak of an open war.
[…]
21. The added value of the Council of Europe and of our Assembly, in particular, is that both Russia and Georgia are part of it. By punishing one of the two delegations at this stage we would simply amputate ourselves and deprive ourselves of the possibility of a dialogue. I believe that it would be more important to ensure that dialogue can be pursued between the two sides, but also between each of them and our Assembly.”
4. In its Resolution
1647 (2009) on the implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the
consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, adopted four
months later, on 28 January 2009, the Assembly reconfirmed its position
and its demands as expressed in its earlier Resolution 1633 (2008). The consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia,
including its humanitarian aspects, 
as well
as the compliance of both states with the Assembly demands, have
been a main point of focus of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly for
the last year.
as well
as the compliance of both states with the Assembly demands, have
been a main point of focus of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly for
the last year.5. It is important to recall that, in Resolution 1633 (2008), in the light of the controversy over the start of the war
and the diametrically opposed views on these events of both Russia
and Georgia, the Assembly called for an independent and impartial
international investigation into the precise circumstances regarding
the outbreak of the war. In Resolution
1647 (2009), the Assembly therefore welcomed the establishment by
the European Union of an international fact-finding mission on the
origins and course of the conflict between Georgia and Russia and
resolved to return to that issue after the fact-finding mission
has presented its report. The report of the international fact-finding
mission (“Tagliavini” Report) is due to be presented in Brussels
and made public on 29 September 2009, two days before the debate
on the credentials of the Russian delegation.
2. Limitations with respect to compliance with the Assembly demands
6. The developments with regard to the consequences
of the war and the compliance by Russia and Georgia with the demands
made by the Assembly in this respect have been described in detail
in the reports of the Monitoring Committee that were debated by
the Assembly in January and April 2009 (Resolution 1647 (2009) and Docs 11800 and 11876), as well as in the most recent report on “The war between
Georgia and Russia: one year after” (Doc. 12010), which was adopted by the Monitoring Committee on 9
September 2009 and was debated by the Assembly on 29 September 2009.
These reports give a detailed overview of the developments with
regard to the consequences of the war and I therefore have no need
to repeat them here.
7. It is clear that our Russian colleagues should understand
the disappointment of many of the members of the Assembly about
the fact that, one year after the war, little tangible progress
has been achieved in addressing the consequences of this war, and
that, in particular, Russia has not implemented most of the demands,
including those that have no bearing on the status question of the
two regions. However, as an Assembly, we should also recognise the
limitations of our own power and resolutions and acknowledge that no
country will accept our resolutions as a dictate. We cannot impose
ourselves, we can only convince others. Assembly resolutions are
an expression of a political opinion. Their
implementation is rather a process of constant dialogue and co-operation
in which both sides show mutual respect and understanding. In this
report, I will therefore take a closer look at the factors that
have influenced the implementation by Russia of the demands of the
Assembly and the lessons the Assembly should draw from that. Those
considerations will be the basis for my recommendation regarding
the ratification of the credentials of the Russian delegation.
Their
implementation is rather a process of constant dialogue and co-operation
in which both sides show mutual respect and understanding. In this
report, I will therefore take a closer look at the factors that
have influenced the implementation by Russia of the demands of the
Assembly and the lessons the Assembly should draw from that. Those
considerations will be the basis for my recommendation regarding
the ratification of the credentials of the Russian delegation.8. First of all, one has to consider the ongoing controversy
regarding the exact circumstances of the war and the precise responsibilities
of both Georgia and Russia in this respect. The consequence of the
adoption by the Assembly of its political position and the formulation
of its demands on Russia before the finalisation of the international
inquiry into the origins of the war has been that many people in
Russia, especially among its political elite, have concluded (rightly
or wrongly) that the Assembly’s position was not based upon an objective analysis
of different factors, but, instead, was influenced by anti-Russian
sentiment.
9. While I personally would not subscribe to such a view, I do
realise that, for that reason, it became politically very difficult,
if not well high impossible, for our Russian colleagues to put pressure
on their authorities for ensuring compliance with the demands of
the Assembly. In this respect, it should not be forgotten that, regrettably,
a segment of the population, including members of the political
elite is sceptical towards the Council of Europe, probably due to
misunderstandings, and will all too happily use any perceived lack
of understanding for the Russian position against our Assembly and
the whole Council of Europe.
10. Such an attitude is as wrong and misleading as the bad feelings
of many colleagues who suffered too long and too heavily under the
totalitarian rule of the USSR and still blame today the Russian
Federation and its authorities for all the sufferings and wrongdoing
they had to endure in the past. This historical heritage is often
re-enforced by a kind of revanchism and the unrealistic idea that
it would be possible to cast off the heritage of hundreds of years
of autocratic regimes within a few decades.
11. Another point that needs to be acknowledged, and which I feel
is often underestimated, is the limits of the influence of the Russian
Parliament, and by extension of our Russian colleagues, on the political
course of the government. The members of the Russian Parliament
represent the Russian electorate, which, as said earlier, is to
a certain extent sceptical towards the Council of Europe. Moreover,
it is frequently observed in many democracies that, in practice,
the government aims at influencing the position of the parliament
rather than strengthening its function of democratic oversight of
government policies.
12. Lastly, we should recognise that a number of our demands have
a direct impact on the security and foreign affairs policy of Russia.
As in many, if not all, member states of the Council of Europe,
these policy areas are considered to be areas of national interest
which are directly related to the sovereignty of a country, especially
in young democracies, where, rightly or wrongly, no outside interference
is accepted and the parliament’s influence, especially if it argues
against mainstream assumptions, is rather weak.
13. However, having said the above, it is also of the utmost importance
that the Russian colleagues, and indeed the Russian political leadership,
understand the frustration of the Assembly about the lack of any response
to its resolutions and the questions they raise in them. The Assembly
not only does not see its demands being implemented, it also does
not see any dialogue on the reasons why that is so, or any willingness
of the Russian authorities to engage in a dialogue with the Assembly
on how, a number of its concerns can be addressed.
14. While Russia rightly demands respect by the Assembly, it likewise
has to show the same respect to the Assembly and it does not do
so by ignoring the latter’s position completely. A fruitful co-operation
between Russia and the Assembly can only flourish on a basis of
mutual respect and mutual willingness to engage in a genuine dialogue.
In this respect, I repeat my proposal that the highest political
authorities in Russia should accept the possibility to have an exchange
of views on the position of the Assembly with respect to the war
and the concerns it has raised within its midst.
3. Consequences of sanctions
15. When considering sanctions, the Assembly should have
in mind what it is that it wants to achieve if it were to impose
such sanctions and the effect they would have. In this respect,
it is important to note that, while the Assembly is rightly frustrated
about the lack of change, despite all its efforts, this change will
not suddenly come about if the Russian delegation is expelled from
the Assembly.
16. On the contrary, it is my firm belief that change can only
be achieved on the basis of dialogue and dialogue cannot take place
with the Russian delegation if we expel them from our midst. On
the contrary: we can only try to convince those who do not share
our convictions and ideas as we have no means to impose them on
to anyone. But in order to convince someone, he or she has to be
a member of our Organisation; one cannot establish a relation of
mutual trust and understanding, factors which support efforts to
convince, after having expelled a delegation from the Assembly and
generated distance and mistrust.
17. There are two diverging views with regard to how the core
values of our organisation affect our member states. According to
one of them, the core values are absolute criteria that all member
states are obliged to stand for if they do not want to face expulsion
from our Organisation. According to the other view, representing the
opposite concept or self-understanding of the Council of Europe’s
identity, it is acknowledged that many states became members when
it was perfectly clear that they were not fully up to our standards
and we should therefore value their efforts to live up to the standards
of our Organisation as a sufficient expression of political will.
18. I would urge for the acceptance of a third view, where we
see adherence to the core values of the Organisation as a continuous
individual and collective (societal) learning process that can only
be stimulated and accelerated by dialogue, intense communication
efforts and better mutual understanding. In this view, the Council
of Europe is not so much the “House of Democracy” but a kind of
European hospital of democracy and a healing process can not be
based on the expulsion of the sick and wounded.
19. One of the main reasons why we have to put all our efforts
into continuing the co-operation and dialogue with Russia is the
fact that we are the only Organisation dealing with democracy and
human rights in which countries like Russia are full members and
bound by our Statute to pursue dialogue and co-operation on these values.
It is our raison d’être to
confront all the difficulties which are the consequence of membership
and to try to invest as many human resources and efforts as possible
to overcome the heritage of the past which still undermines the
common implementation of our basic values on a daily basis in the
day-to-day life of all people.
20. Just like Georgia, Europe has to deal with Russia because
it is our common neighbour. Nobody can choose its neighbours. But
everyone has to live with them. The only way to establish good and
peaceful neighbouring relations is together with, and never against,
the neighbour. In this sense, the only manner to live together and
next to a neighbour peacefully is to engage with him or her in a
first difficult dialogue which hopefully always improves.
21. In this respect, I should like to stress that, unfortunately,
as regards Georgia and Russia, that relationship has now been stained
by violence and violence is always very hard to forget, if at all.
However, we should not give in to pessimism and should not give
up on dialogue as there are many examples to guide us – Cyprus being
one of them – where violence eventually gives way to the start of
a dialogue and a healing process.
22. Lastly, when discussing the question of sanctions and credibility,
we have to ask ourselves in the interest of whom we are working.
Are we working for the political elite or for the people at the
grassroots? Surely, all Russian citizens, including those whose
human rights are most seriously put at risk, would be the last ones
to benefit from an expulsion of the Russian delegation from this
Assembly as we are one of the few who can actually help them to
achieve their human rights.
4. Conclusions
23. The motion presented by Mr Jensen and others proposes
to the Assembly to reconsider the previously ratified credentials
of the Russian delegation on substantive grounds under Rule 9.1.a
of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. According to Rule 9.1a,
the Assembly may reconsider the ratified credentials of a national
delegation as a whole in the course of the same ordinary session,
inter alia, “on a motion for a resolution to annul ratification
on the grounds set out in Rule 8.2”.
24. According to Rule 8.2 the credentials of a national delegation
may be challenged on substantive grounds for:
a. serious violation of the basic principles of the Council of Europe mentioned in Article 3 of, and the Preamble to,
b. persistent failure to honour obligations and commitments and lack of co-operation in the Assembly’s monitoring procedure.
25. The motion presented by Mr Jensen and others is based on sub-paragraph
b of Rule 8.2, namely on the persistent failure of Russia to honour
its obligations and commitments imposed upon it by the Assembly Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647
(2009) and its lack of co-operation in the Assembly’s monitoring
procedure.
26. It is important to note that, from the outset, the Assembly
has placed the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia
in the context of the fulfilment by these member states of their
commitments and obligations to the Council of Europe, as is clear
from Resolutions 1633
(2008) and 1647
(2009). It should be noted in this respect that these Resolutions
were adopted by the Assembly on the basis of reports presented by
the Monitoring Committee of the Assembly
27. In the chapter above, I have tried to outline the obstacles
faced by the Russian delegation in its co-operation with the Assembly,
and the limitations the Assembly has to accept with regard to the
compliance of a country with its demands, especially when they deal
with a highly controversial issue that has far reaching implications
for a country and its sovereign policy-making process. At the same
time, the Russian delegation should understand the frustration of
the Assembly about the total lack of dialogue and of willingness
of the Russian decision-makers to engage in an open discussion with
the Assembly over its concerns.
28. This lack of comprehension for each others’ rightful demand
to be respected and taken seriously, has led to a situation where
almost none of the demands of the Assembly, including very reasonable
demands that have nothing to do with the status issue of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, have been implemented by the Russian leadership.
29. Moreover, to my great regret, members of the Russian delegation
to the Assembly have publicly ruled out any possibility of compliance
by Russia with the Assembly demands, which appears to be the expression of
a strange relationship with an Organisation you seek to be part
of because you share its normative commitments. Nevertheless, the
Russian delegation cannot be held solely responsible for Russia’s
non compliance with each and every demand the Assembly has placed
on the Russian authorities.
30. In its Resolution
1633 (2008), the Assembly stressed – and reconfirmed this in its Resolution 1647 (2009) – that it believed that the establishment of a genuine
dialogue is the only way forward for the resolution of the conflict
and for securing the long-term stability of the region. However,
it equally stressed that a number of minimum factors, outlined in
Resolution 1633 (2008), needed to be met for such a dialogue to
be meaningful.
31. The need to ensure a genuine dialogue between the two sides,
as well as between them and the Assembly, was also the main argument
for the Assembly’s decision to confirm the ratification of the credentials of
the Russian delegation in its Resolution
1631 (2008) on the “Reconsideration on substantial grounds of the previously
ratified credentials of the Russian delegation”, adopted one year
earlier, on 1 October 2008.
32. Under Rule 9.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly,
the report issued as a result of a motion for a resolution to reconsider
the credentials of a delegation on substantive grounds shall contain
a draft resolution proposing in its operative part:
a. confirmation of the ratification of the credentials;
b. annulment of the ratification of the credentials;
c. confirmation of the ratification of the credentials together with depriving or suspending the exercise of some of the rights of participation or representation of members of the delegation concerned in the activities of the Assembly and its bodies.
33. Notwithstanding the lack of compliance by Russia with the
demands of the Assembly, as expressed in Resolutions 1633 (2008) and 1647
(2009), I would propose that, given the utmost importance of
fostering and consolidating a meaningful dialogue between Russia
and Georgia and between these two delegations and the Assembly,
as well as taking into account the obstacles faced by the Russian
delegation in explaining, let alone complying, with its demands,
the Assembly confirms the ratification of the credentials of the
Russian delegation, in line with Rule 9.4a.
34. However, I would strongly recommend that the Assembly step
up its monitoring procedure with respect to Russia, including in
relation to the demands made by the Assembly in its respective Resolutions
dealing with the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia,
and that, in that context, a specific roadmap for compliance, including
timelines, be drawn up.
35. Furthermore, I would plead for the creation of a culture of
mutual respect. In such a culture, it should be acceptable that
partners can disagree with each other, but accept the obligation
to engage in a dialogue to explain the disagreements and declare
readiness to look for mutually acceptable compromises. Such explanations
would contribute to a better mutual understanding and, in so doing,
would be the best contribution to possibly overcoming the disagreement
one day.
36. Such a culture would be based on a communicative engagement
and not on sanctions. At the same time, sanctions would of course
still be applicable if one country’s regime or one delegation, or
the other, would reject this culture of respect for disagreement
and reject a genuine dialogue in a total and absolute and never
ending way. I would suggest that the Assembly committee concerned
could be seized to develop a code of conduct for such a culture
of respect for disagreement. Moreover, such a culture can not be
based on a constant threat of sanctions. I would therefore suggest
that an amendment to the Rules of Procedure could be considered
that would limit the number of times that previously ratified credentials
of a delegation can be challenged on substantive grounds to once
a year.
***
Reporting committee: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Reference to committee: Reference No. 3590 of 28 September 2009
Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 29 September 2009
Members of the committee: Mr Serhiy Holovaty (Chairperson), Mr György Frunda (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Konstantin Kosachev (2nd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Leonid Slutsky (3rd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Aydin Abbasov, Mr Pedro Agramunt Font de Mora, Mr Miloš Aligrudić, Mrs Meritxell Batet Lamaña, Mr Ryszard Bender, Mr József Berényi, Mr Luc van den Brande, Mr Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Mr Sergej Chelemendik, Ms Lise Christoffersen, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mr Georges Colombier, Mr Telmo Correia, Mrs Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Juris Dobelis, Mrs Josette Durrieu, Mr Mátyás Eörsi, Ms Mirjana Ferić-Vac, Mr Giuseppe Galati, Mr Jean-Charles Gardetto, Mr József Gedei, Mr Andreas Gross, Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajibayli, Mr Michael Hancock, Mr Davit Harutyunyan, Mrs Olha Herasym’yuk, Mr Andres Herkel, Mrs Sinikka Hurskainen, Mr Kastriot Islami, Mr Mladen Ivanić, Mr Bjørn Jacobsen, Mr Michael Aastrup Jensen, Mr Miloš Jevtić, Mr Hakki Keskin, Mr Haluk Koç, Mrs Katerina Konečná, Mr Jaakko Laakso, Mrs Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Göran Lindblad, Mr René van der Linden, Mr Eduard Lintner, Mr Pietro Marcenaro, Mr Bernard Marquet, Mr Dick Marty, Mr Miloš Melčák, Mrs Nursuna Memecan, Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, Mr João Bosco Mota Amaral, Mrs Yuliya Novikova, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou, Mr Alexander Pochinok, Mr Ivan Popescu, Mrs Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin, Mr Christos Pourgourides, Mr John Prescott, Mrs Mailis Reps, Mr Andrea Rigoni, Mr Ilir Rusmali, Mr Armen Rustamyan, Mr Indrek Saar, Mr Oliver Sambevski, Mr Kimmo Sasi, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Sergey Sobko, Mr Christoph Strässer, Mrs Chiora Taktakishvili, Mr Mihai Tudose, Mrs Özlem Türköne, Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Mr José Vera Jardim, Mr Piotr Wach, Mr Robert Walter, Mr David Wilshire, Mrs Renate Wohlwend, Mrs Karin S. Woldseth, Mrs Gisela Wurm, Mr Andrej Zernovski.
N.B.: The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed in bold
Secretariat of the committee: Mrs Chatzivassiliou, Mr Klein, Ms Trévisan, Mr Karpenko