1. Introduction
1. The phenomenon of post-electoral “floor-crossing”
consists of a change at national level of political affiliation
by a parliamentarian or a group of parliamentarians in the course
of their electoral mandates. It is also known as “political nomadism”
and is common in many parliaments in Council of Europe member States.
2. Party switching is not a recent phenomenon; it has been a
traditional feature of politics in many countries across Europe
and beyond for several decades. Even where switching is infrequent,
the phenomenon is not entirely absent and its occurrence varies
over time. However, despite its scale across the continents,
![(2)
In Australia, from
1950 to 2004, 245 members of parliament crossed the floor, representing
24% of all members of parliament who served in this period. Senator
Reg Wright, who served from 1950 to 1978, crossed the floor 150
times!](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the issue has received limited attention,
especially from political and parliamentary players, so the breadth
and depth of its significance remain underestimated.
![(3)
Reference may be made
here to the report, “Nomadisme ou transhumance politique postélectoral
et discipline de parti dans l’espace francophone” by the Parliamentary
Assembly of la Francophonie (APF) (2012), which includes information
on parliamentary nomadism in 23 French-speaking parliaments which
are members of the APF.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
3. When it occurs, party switching raises criticism and questions
– in particular in ethical and moral terms – relating to political
opportunism, threats to public confidence in the political class
or the internal discipline of political parties. In a 2009 report,
the Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission) nevertheless underlined the importance of
the independence of parliamentarians’ mandates, freedom of opinion
and freedom not to be subject to an “imperative mandate”.
![(4)
Report of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the
imperative mandate and similar practices, Study No. 488/2008, CDL-AD(2009)027.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
These
same principles are included in the standards promoted by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
![(5)
See the document of
the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
“Existing commitments for democratic elections in OSCE participating
States”, 2003, pursuant to the commitment set out in paragraph 7.9
of the Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE (Copenhagen Document, 1990), which requires States to ensure
that “candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required
by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain
in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an
end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic
parliamentary and constitutional procedures”. It follows that any grounds
other than incompatibility of the mandate with another duty are
inadmissible, in particular when they undermine political freedom
or freedom of opinion: this applies if a party seeks to withdraw
the mandate of one of its members who has left the party after being
elected or if a State grants parties the right to control the mandates
won in their name.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
pursuant to the Copenhagen
criteria.
4. Apart from these general criticisms, the post-electoral switching
of members of the Parliamentary Assembly from one political group
to another, or their decision to leave a party to sit as independent
members, may have implications for the balance of political forces’
representation within national delegations to the Assembly.
5. The Assembly’s Rules of Procedure (Rule 6.2.
a) stipulate that national parliaments
shall appoint their representatives and substitutes from among their
members so as to ensure a fair representation of the political parties
or groups represented therein. In this connection, post-electoral
switching in political affiliation may also affect the composition
of national delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly and may lead
to grounds for challenging a delegation’s credentials. The motion
for a resolution referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs for a report therefore suggests
analysing the reasons that lead to “floor-crossing” and its implications
for the functioning of parliaments in order to “complete the criteria
on a fair representation of political parties and groups within
a national delegation laid down by the Rules of Procedure”.
![(6)
See Doc. 13125, motion for a resolution on the post-electoral shifting
in members’ political affiliation and its repercussion on the composition
of a national delegation, tabled by Mr Gross and others, 31 January
2013.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
6. In order to obtain first-hand information on existing provisions
and statistics on this phenomenon, a questionnaire was sent in November
2013 to national parliaments’ correspondents through the European Centre
for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD).
![(7)
Request No. 2417 of
8 November 2013.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Key questions focused on constitutional, legal
and regulatory provisions regulating post-electoral party switching,
internal control mechanisms, safeguards in place at parliamentary
level and recent examples of members who had changed political affiliation
during their mandates and the reaction of public opinion.
7. Forty replies to the questionnaire were received from 36 national
parliaments.
![(8)
Andorra,
Austria, Belgium (Chamber of Representatives and Senate), Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic
(Chamber of Deputies), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France (National
Assembly), Georgia, Germany (Bundestag and Bundesrat), Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Italy (Senate), Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro,
Netherlands (Tweede Kamer), Norway, Poland (Sejm and Senate), Portugal,
Romania (Chamber of Deputies), Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia
(National Assembly), Spain (Congress of Deputies), Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine,
United Kingdom (House of Commons and House of Lords).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
The
comprehensive and detailed information obtained gives a precise
overview of how the issue is handled internally, new trends and the
main challenges to be addressed. It also enables us to discuss whether
the rules for the fair representation of political parties and groups
within national delegations are still relevant.
2. The floor-crossing
phenomenon in Council of Europe member States
8. Examples of floor-crossing are frequent in Council
of Europe member States. High percentages of switches are often
registered in politically unstable countries, such as Greece and
Italy, where between 1996 and spring 2000 one in four deputies switched
parties at least once;
![(9)
Dealing
in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000, William B. Heller and Carol Mershon, American Journal of Political Science,
2008.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
similarly, in younger democracies like the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. Among recent examples, in the
Czech Republic 12% of the total number, namely 24 MPs, switched
political affiliation during the 2010-2013 parliament, while in
Romania during the current term, 35 MPs have crossed the floor (namely
8%).
![(10)
Information
dating from January 2014.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
In Ukraine, the phenomenon
took on such proportions – 60% of MPs apparently switched parties
at least once between the third and fourth parliaments (1998-2002
and 2002-2006), with some even changing group around ten times –
that the parliament took action to end the practice.
![(11)
A law was passed in
2004 to amend the Constitution and introduce a provision on withdrawing
the mandates of MPs who defect from the political party or group
for which they were elected; the Constitutional Court declared the
law unconstitutional in 2010.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
9. Conversely, in more established democracies, like Norway and
Sweden, these episodes are very rare. In Norway, the last two terms
saw no switches, while in Sweden during the current term only one
case has been reported.
10. It could be argued that the degree of political stability
or instability and strength or weakness of the institutions make
a State more or less prone to floor-crossing. These elements may
also explain why a country that was immune to the phenomenon registers
higher rates of floor-crossing following a period of internal disorder
and political volatility. This is particularly true of Greece, where
switching parties did not used to be very common, but as a result
of current tensions related to the economic crisis, there have been
an unusually large number of cases: since the beginning of the current
term (started in 2012), 15 MPs have already crossed the floor. However,
the phenomenon is unlikely to be confined only to new or weakly
institutionalised democracies, as many other aspects influence the
choice.
3. Reasons for switching
11. On the basis of the information collected, ideological
and electoral considerations, political ambition and vote buying
are all factors that explain legislators’ decisions to switch parties.
In other terms, the choice is generally the result of strategic
interactions between the MPs, party leaders, the various political
parties, legislative and party systems and also the electorate.
![(12)
Political
Parties and Legislative Party Switching, William B. Heller
and Carol Mershon, Palgrave McMillan, 2009.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
12. When members leave or are expelled from their political party,
they have three choices: registering as independent/non-registered
members, joining another political group or setting up a new one.
Naturally, regardless of what parliamentary rules do or do not allow
in this respect (see Chapter 4), the reasons behind the switch in
affiliation will influence the choice.
3.1. Ideological reasons
13. In the majority of cases, party switching occurs
because of disagreement with the party line, or its principles,
values or political programme, or with the party leader. When parliamentary
rules of procedure so allow, floor-crossing members are then more
likely to set up their own political groups or join another group
to which they are ideologically closer.
14. The following examples illustrate the point:
- In 2008, José Paulo de Carvalho,
member of the Portuguese CDS-PP parliamentary group (Social Democratic
Centre-Popular Party), left his group, claiming that this was due
to profound differences in terms of the party’s overall political
strategy and its ability to react to the pressing demands of society. In
accordance with the rules of procedure of the Assembly of the Republic,
he then sat as a non-registered member.
- In the Czech Republic, in 2012, following a corruption
scandal involving the leader of the Public Affairs Party and its
withdrawal from the ruling coalition, 14 members left the parliamentary
group and some set up a new party supporting the ruling majority
(while keeping their seats in the chamber as independents, in accordance
with the rules of procedure).
- In France, the November 2012 split in the UMP group in
the National Assembly following the battle for the chairmanship
of the party – 70 members set up a new group, “Rassemblement-UMP”
(but joined the UMP group again in January 2013) – is a special
case which probably was more a matter of differences between individuals
than ideological issues.
- In 2013, three members of the Andorran Parliament left
the Social Democrat group and joined the “mixed parliamentary group”
(that is the non-registered), in accordance with the rules of procedure,
while forming a new political party.
- In Canada, the seven cases of floor-crossing during the
current parliament have been the result of ideological differences
or a reaction to a party leader involved in a scandal.
3.2. Expulsion
15. Apart from legislators’ explicit decisions to change
parties, floor-crossing may also result from a party’s decision
to expel one or more members. This particular aspect concerns internal
party regulations and disciplinary mechanisms, which are triggered
in the case of disorderly behaviour, violation of party discipline, disagreement
with the party line/the party leader or votes against the party
line.
16. On 2 June 2011, the Cypriot parliamentary group of the Democratic
Party (DIKO), which was then part of the government coalition, decided
to expel a member, Mr Zacharias Koulias. This was a result of Mr Koulias’ refusal
to vote in favour of the re-election of DIKO’s party leader to the
Presidency of the House. This decision outraged the party, not least
because Koulias’ decision not to support his party’s candidature
was pivotal in terms of the election of the President of the House
and ultimately in transforming the balance of power within it.
17. In Finland, during the current term, the Left Alliance, which
is part of the government coalition, expelled two representatives,
Mr Markus Mustajärvi and Mr Jyrki Yrttiaho, who then formed their
own Left Faction Parliamentary Group. The two members were expelled
after they voted against the election of the Prime Minister and
sided with the opposition when a vote of confidence in the government
was held in connection with the debate on the government programme.
18. The United Kingdom offers several examples of members of the
House of Commons being expelled from their parliamentary parties;
during the current parliament, this has been the case in connection
with the parliamentary expenses scandal (for instance, a member
suspended by Labour in 2010 became an independent, then joined the
parliamentary party again in 2012 before being expelled again a
few months later in the face of new charges) and members facing
criminal prosecutions.
19. These cases pose a series of questions concerning the balance
between MPs’ free electoral mandates and subordination to the party
line. How do political parties control the exercise of political
mandates? To what extent should this control be considered legitimate?
20. Regulations depend on the party and vary from one country
to another. Almost no Council of Europe member States penalise the
departure of MPs from political parties or voting against party
lines with the loss of parliamentary seats. Party discipline must
not undermine the principle of the free exercise of mandates … and,
conversely, few parliamentarians are willing to commit political
suicide. Nonetheless, many parties have rules on suspension and
expulsion. It may, however, be desirable to keep these means aimed
at protecting the party system within certain limits (see also Chapter 5).
3.3. Political strategy,
personal gain, bribery
21. Opportunism is the last explanation for party switching
and involves personal ambitions and goals. In this case, the switch
in political affiliation is simply the outcome of a strategy, which
may either be the calculation of a personal benefit related to ambition
and greater political influence or the result of corruption, namely
financial or other benefits received in exchange for switching.
22. The decisions to leave a party and join another may be part
of an overall strategy for political “survival”, especially when
elections are approaching. For instance, ahead of the 2014 parliamentary
elections in the Republic of Moldova, in successive waves members
of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova joined the
Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, or the newly created
party “Patria”. In younger democracies where the parliamentary system
is still weak and the party system volatile, party loyalty may give way
to personal interest. Members of weakened political parties will
be tempted to join the ruling majority. Following the parliamentary
elections in Georgia in 2012, for instance, nine members of the
United National Movement defected and joined the rival Georgian
Dream bloc (while one Georgian Dream member became an independent).
23. Party corruption is likely to be a major problem in developing
and transitional countries where political institutions tend to
be weak. However, in a broader context, political corruption also
has the effect of undermining political trust and threatening the
viability of democracy.
24. One example was the accusation against the former Italian
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, that he had bribed ex-Senator
Sergio de Gregorio. Mr Berlusconi was charged with paying 3 million
euros in 2007 to Sergio de Gregorio, who was then a member of Antonio
di Pietro’s centre-left party, “Italia dei Valori”, to persuade
him to switch parties. Mr De Gregorio’s switch to the centre-right
helped to topple the government of Romani Prodi, prompting fresh
elections that Mr Berlusconi won. Sergio de Gregorio helped investigators
and was given a 20-month prison sentence, while the proceedings
against Mr Berlusconi are still in progress.
4. Effects of floor-crossing
4.1. On the situation
and status of the parliamentarians concerned
25. Unlike what happens in other countries outside Europe,
![(13)
The Constitution provides
that members lose their seats in the event of resignation, floor-crossing
or expulsion from a political party or group in Belize, Kyrgyzstan,
Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore
and Zimbabwe. Anti-defection legislation exists in a larger number
of countries, for instance Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, as well
as in several African countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi,
the Republic of South Africa and Uganda.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
there
is no possibility to revoke an MP’s mandate in the course of a legislature
if they cross the floor in any Council of Europe member State.
![(14)
In Serbia, until 2003,
the electoral law provided that MPs’ mandates would be revoked if
they resigned or were expelled from their parties. See also footnote 12.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Nonetheless,
many countries have introduced measures aimed at discouraging the
practice and reducing party fragmentation. For instance, there is
a requirement in several States for MPs to sit in the political
group or party for which they stood for election (Austria, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Estonia,
inter alia).
26. An exception to this rule is Portugal, where, according to
Article 8 of the Statute governing members of the Assembly of the
Republic, members who register as members of a political party other
than the one for which they stood for election lose their seats.
Although the constitutional rules are not explicit here, Portuguese expert
opinion holds that members who join a different parliamentary group
also lose their seats, even if they do not register as members of
a party other than that for which they stood for election. Nonetheless,
and in order to guarantee members and the parliament itself essential
freedom, members who voluntarily or by the choice of their party
stop belonging to a political group and do not join another do not
lose their seat, but become “unaffiliated”.
27. In Estonia, regulations on the subject are quite similar:
when MPs leave their faction, they are not officially able to join
another political faction, as the rules of procedure provide that
members of the Riigikogu who are elected from the list of candidates
of a single political party may form only one faction. This means that,
in the case of floor-crossing, the members concerned become independents.
28. When members leave their political party, they could theoretically
have the choice either to register as independent members, join
another political group which best reflects their beliefs, or set
up a new one. However, the rules vary significantly from country
to country; some, for example, do not allow changes of political
groups during electoral terms and floor-crossers are therefore forced
to exercise their mandates as non-registered/independent members
(for instance, in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Estonia).
Cases of members joining the independent faction are thus very common.
29. Parliamentary procedure may also allow the establishment of
new parliamentary groups in the course of a legislature. One example
is the group, “Together for Serbia”, set up in 2012 by a breakaway
faction of seven members of the Serbian Democratic Party. The only
limitation which the Serbian rules of procedure stipulate is that
parliamentary groups should consist of at least five members.
30. However, the establishment of new groups may be subject to
restrictions, with a minimum number of members normally being required
(sometimes higher than the number required for groups established
at the start of a legislature, for instance in the Czech Republic;
this requirement does not apply in Finland, where groups may consist
of single members). In Austria, groups may only be set up within
30 days of the start of a parliamentary term.
31. New groups may also result from the merger or splitting of
existing parties. In the former case, two or more groups merge into
a new entity; in the latter, the breakup of one group results in
the establishment of two or more separate groups.
32. Anti-defection legislation in Europe has introduced measures
penalising the decision to change political affiliation during electoral
terms. As a rule, these measures are as follows:
- the obligation on the members
concerned to register as independent or non-registered members (for example
in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Estonia),
- the loss of certain participation and representation rights
and privileges (allowances and representation on committees) and
reduced powers.
33. As a general rule, strict anti-defection laws are rare in
established democracies, but common in most recent ones, where they
are often defended as temporary measures to consolidate a chaotic
party system.
![(15)
Laws
against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor-Crossing in National
Parliaments, Kenneth Janda, Northwestern University, 2009.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
34. In Ireland, a member who leaves a parliamentary party and
becomes independent usually has reduced speaking time in the Dáil
during both government and private members’ business. They also
no longer have access to the resources of the parliamentary party
like party research and the press office.
35. In Sweden, members leaving a group during the electoral term
can neither form a new group nor join another one during the same
electoral term. Nothing prevents them, however, from forming an
informal party group, which neither has formal status nor receives
any financial contributions or other benefits.
36. In most parliaments, members who switch groups lose all their
positions in parliamentary bodies (committees, delegations to international
organisations, etc.) which they held in respect of their former
political groups (Austria, Bulgaria), either automatically or by
decision of the assembly/chamber or committees (Croatia). In some
cases, they automatically lose their membership of committees (Andorra,
France). In some other cases, however, they may keep their committee
membership but lose their posts as committee chairs or vice-chairs
(Canada).
37. Although these measures are usually automatic, they sometimes
require a formal decision by the parliament concerned. To give an
example, MP Josip Salapić (Croatia), who in 2012 left the Croatian Democratic
Union and on the same day joined the Croatian Democratic Alliance
of Slavonia and Baranja, lost all his representative functions,
whereas another MP, Mirela Holy, who left the Social Democratic
Party in 2013, was able to retain her functions, initially as an
independent and then as a member of the Sustainable Development
group.
38. Some other parliaments have more flexible regulations: in
Denmark, MPs keep their committee seats but lose all posts as chairs
or vice-chairs.
39. Floor-crossers are not only confronted with internal restrictions,
but also have to face the electorate. The public usually regards
floor-crossing unfavourably, and public frustration with switching
is most evident when MPs switch for personal gain. In contrast,
cases of floor-crossing motivated by ideological differences are
more acceptable. In any case, floor-crossers face problems of loss
of credibility and have a higher risk of not being re-elected.
4.2. On the situation
of political groups
40. Political groups affected by defections may be confronted
with several difficulties depending on the scale of the phenomenon.
The main effects include a risk of under-representation or even
dissolution, a reduction in financial contributions and allowances
and the loss of political influence in parliamentary bodies.
41. Under-representation affects those groups which, under rules
of procedure, are required to have a minimum number of members to
exist. In Belgium, political groups in the Chamber must include
at least five members. If political groups can no longer remain
in existence, their members may either join another group or continue
sitting as independents. In the latter case, they face further restrictions,
such as withdrawal of voting rights in the parliamentary committees.
42. In Andorra, too, political groups whose membership falls below
the limit are automatically dissolved and their members join the
“mixed parliamentary group” (that is the non-registered).
43. The Czech Republic has also introduced a limitation on the
formation of new political groups in the course of a legislature:
groups must comprise at least ten members, as against the three
needed at the beginning of a term. Further restrictions provide
that newly established political groups are not entitled to be proportionally
represented in the organs of the Chamber (unless the plenary decides
otherwise in a vote) and that public contributions will continue
to be paid to the political party on whose electoral list the MPs
had been elected.
4.3. On the composition
of parliamentary bodies
44. Party-switching also affects parliamentary bodies
such as committees, the membership of which is usually proportionate
to the size of groups, while positions at the head of these bodies
are also allocated on the basis of group membership.
45. With regard to seats in parliamentary bodies (committees,
delegations to international organisations, etc.) allocated on the
basis of proportional representation of groups:
- either the political group which
has lost one or more members following a switch retains its seats,
as the distribution cannot be changed in the course of a legislature
(Belgium, except if a group ceases to exist or splits into two);
- or the membership of the bodies is altered to take account
of the change in affiliation of one or more of the members, either
automatically (Bulgaria) or by decision of the assembly/chamber
or committees (Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia and Finland);
- or the membership of the bodies is not altered, except
for committee chairs and vice-chairs.
46. In Cyprus, when a political shift occurs, the Committee of
Selection of the House of Representatives decides what changes in
the membership of committees will be carried through. Members’ participation
in committees does not usually change in the event of a political
shift; however, should the member have been designated for an official
function by the party, for example chairmanship of a committee,
parliamentary spokesperson or participation in international organisations
as part of a parliamentary delegation, then appointments are made
by the party and a new member is appointed.
47. The Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg
state that the Chamber, on a proposal by the Conference of Presidents,
decides upon the number of seats to allocate to each political group and
independent members in each committee considered individually, on
a proportional basis. Changes in political affiliation are relatively
rare in Luxembourg and there are no written provisions regulating
the reorganisation of parliamentary committees. These issues are
accordingly examined on a case-by-case basis by the Conference of
Presidents. Recently, it was decided that MPs would retain the seats
in the committees in which they previously sat.
48. In the Slovak Republic, MPs changing political affiliation
usually retain their seats. Nonetheless, four committees – the Mandate
and Immunity Committee, the Committee on the Incompatibility of
Functions, the Committee on European Affairs and the Constitutional
and Legal Affairs Committee – must necessarily be constituted on
the basis of the principle of proportionality and members must give
up their membership in the event of party switching.
4.4. On overall institutional
functioning
49. Party-switching by a large number of MPs may produce
consequences on an entirely different scale, possibly even plunging
a State into political instability. For example, in February 2014,
the Romanian National Liberal Party decided to leave the coalition
government and join the opposition. This decision marked the official
breakup of the coalition Social Liberal Union, consisting of the
PNL and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Romania’s Social Democrat
Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, managed nonetheless to secure the continuation
of the left-wing government thanks to the participation of the UDMR,
the ethnic-Hungarian party.
50. In Albania, in 2013, the defection of a single member of the
opposition to the ruling parliamentary and government coalition
gave the latter the 84 seats needed to pass laws requiring a qualified
majority of three-fifths of MPs.
5. Addressing the
problem: different national approaches
51. It can be seen from the above that major differences
in terms of party-switching regulations exist across Europe. It
should be stressed that in some countries, generally speaking stable
democracies, floor-crossing is not perceived as a problem, due to
the limited extent of the phenomenon; while, in others, the practice
is taken more seriously, as the number of defections is so high
that it threatens institutional stability and political representation.
It is possible to classify European countries according to the level
of regulation that exists in this area. Three systems have been
identified here: strictly regulated, moderately regulated and under-regulated.
5.1. Strictly regulated
systems
52. This category comprises countries whose legislation
comprehensively regulates floor-crossing, whose provisions are usually
the strictest, and where party-switching normally occurs very frequently.
The best examples are Austria, Hungary and Spain.
53. Historically, in Austria, floor-crossing of single members
happened occasionally, but the situation changed drastically in
2012 with the foundation of a new party and the resignation of members
of the National Council from their parliamentary group in order
to join it and form a new political group. Following this episode, in
June 2013 the National Council changed the rules of procedure so
that it is now only possible to form a parliamentary group within
30 days following the constituent sitting of the newly elected chamber.
Furthermore, MPs who ran on the same list are allowed to form only
one single parliamentary group. Possibilities for post-electoral
switching by MPs are now more limited, as they may now only either
become MPs without party or group affiliation or join existing groups.
The rules of procedure also stipulate that parliamentary groups
decide upon the appointments for committees and committee functions;
accordingly, when members leave their parliamentary groups, they
are immediately recalled from all their memberships and functions
by their former groups.
54. Existing provisions in Hungary require members who leave or
are expelled from their groups to be regarded as independents; they
may join other factions only after a period of six months after
leaving or being expelled. As regards participation in parliamentary
bodies, the National Assembly has the right during its constituent
sitting to decide which committees should operate and how many vice-chairs
and members they should have, on the basis of consensus among the
different factions. The number of members delegated to standing
committees by each group must be proportionate to the number of
members of the factions themselves. In the case of political shifts,
it is up to the faction concerned to decide whether or not the MPs
can stay in the committees.
55. In Spain, switching from one parliamentary group to another
is accepted, but, except for the mixed group, it must take place
within the first five days of each session. If the membership of
a parliamentary group is reduced during the life of the parliament
to less than one half of the minimum required for formation, the
group is dissolved and its members automatically become members
of the mixed group. As regards members’ participation in committees,
political switching also entails the loss of certain privileges,
such as the position of chair, vice-chair or spokesperson in committees
and other parliamentary bodies.
5.2. Moderately regulated
systems
56. The moderately regulated category includes all systems
that have some regulations on the issue, but which mostly rely on
non-binding mechanisms or case-by-case discussion.
57. In Denmark, switching does not have any consequences for a
member’s participation in committees during the sessional year in
question, as committees are set up at the opening of each year.
However, members who change political affiliation often lose their
functions as chairs or vice-chairs. Ordinary members of committee
who change their party affiliation will only take part in the committees
again if the party they now represent is big enough to secure representation
in the committees.
58. Apart from the four committees which are necessarily established
on the basis of the principle of proportionality and where members
must give up their seats in the case of switches, in the Slovak
Republic floor-crossers retain their membership in parliamentary
bodies. Nonetheless, a different situation applies if the members
concerned are committee chairs or vice-chairs. In such cases, MPs
do not lose their seats ex lege, but
under a political practice whereby the parliament calls a vote to
recall them from their functions and elect new chairs.
59. In Croatia, when an MP switches party, the Committee on Elections,
Appointments and Administration, after in-depth discussion, prepares
and submits to the assembly a draft decision on the recall of the
member from the working body of the parliament and the appointment
of a new member. The draft decision is then discussed in plenary
session, which ultimately decides whether the MP can remain a member
of the same working bodies.
5.3. Under-regulated
systems
60. Finally, under-regulated systems could be defined
as those where disputes are largely solved through conciliation
and dialogue, instead of norms and regulations. This situation is
usually found in countries almost immune to the phenomenon.
61. Appointments in the parliament in Sweden are valid for the
whole electoral term. Therefore, members who leave their party group
are entitled to keep seats they already hold in committees. However,
independent members usually leave their committee seats of their
own free will in order not to upset the political balance in committee
work.
62. In Norway, an MP is entitled to change political party during
an electoral term, but this is not specifically regulated in any
provision, as it is regarded as a consequence of the fact that the
mandate belongs to the MP personally. Nor is the situation specifically
regulated in terms of retention of seats in parliamentary committees, which
is often addressed by means of negotiation with the political party.
63. Almost the same practice exists in Finland, where the Constitution
does not include provisions on the rearrangement of bodies during
electoral terms. Decisions are entirely up to the plenary session
and the Speaker’s Council, which may make proposals in this regard.
In practice, however, such matters are generally resolved through
negotiations, thus avoiding the need to reappoint the body.
6. Implications for
the Parliamentary Assembly of floor-crossing by its members
6.1. Existing regulatory
provisions
64. The Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly
do not explicitly regulate changes in political affiliation by its
members during their electoral mandates. They do, however, refer
to fair political representation as a requirement for the validity
of the credentials presented by national delegations, which can
ultimately lead to a ground for challenging credentials.
65. Rule 6.2.
a states that
“national delegations should be composed so as to ensure a fair
representation of the political parties or groups in their parliaments”.
At the same time, under Rule 7, national delegations’ credentials
can be challenged in the Assembly on the specific ground that the
composition of the delegations concerned fails to meet the requirement
of fair representation. In this connection, in 2011, the Assembly adopted
principles for assessing the concept of fair representation of political
parties and groups in national delegations to the Parliamentary
Assembly (
Resolution 1798
(2011) on fair representation of the political parties or groups
of national parliaments in their delegations to the Parliamentary
Assembly).
![(16)
In
this respect, parliaments are asked to take decisions on appointments
which are “fair, that is, honest, impartial, just, equitable, non-discriminatory”.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
66. Nevertheless, these provisions do not cover the issue of political
switching within national delegations.
6.2. Impact of switching
national political affiliation on the functioning of the Parliamentary Assembly
67. National delegations’ credentials are ratified at
the opening of the ordinary session for the duration of that session
(one year). When a delegation member changes political group in
his or her national parliament in the course of a year, it is not
unusual for the delegation to seek to alter its composition, generally
at the request of the relevant member’s former parliamentary group,
which wishes to fill the seat with another of its members. Yet both
the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) (Article 25) and
the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure (Rule 11.4) make provision for
new appointments in the course of a year solely to fill seats left vacant
through death or resignation.
68. The above applied to Mr Michel Hunault (France, EDG) in 2010,
when he left his national political party but remained in the delegation
even though the party wished to replace him. There is also the example
of Mr Yusuf Ziya Irbeç, member of the Turkish delegation, who resigned
from his political group in March 2011 but remained a member of
the delegation until the Assembly ratified a new delegation in October
2011, notwithstanding the provisions in the rules of procedure of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly which provide that resignation
from a group ipso facto entails
resignation from the delegations to which the member belongs.
69. In January 2012, the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary
delegation of Ukraine were challenged, in accordance with Rule 7,
on the ground that the composition of the delegation did not satisfy
the criterion of fair representation of the political parties or
groups. Indeed, the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities
and Institutional Affairs noted that the list of members of the
Ukrainian delegation contained misleading information as regards
the political affiliation of three members, listed as members of
the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, but who actually sat in the parliament
under other political labels.
![(17)
On the basis
of the criteria laid down in Assembly Resolution 1798 (2011) on fair representation of the political parties or groups
of national parliaments in their delegations to the Parliamentary
Assembly, the Rules Committee concluded that the credentials of
the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation should nevertheless be ratified.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
The
Committee on Rules of Procedure noted that the legal uncertainty
hanging over the functioning of the Ukrainian parliamentary institutions
– groups of parliamentarians leaving one bloc for another; the creation
in 2010 and 2011 of two groups of deputies; parliamentarians who
had become independents more or less unofficially joining forces with
the majority – and the difficulty in obtaining reliable data as
to the exact number of parliamentarians affiliated to political
opposition formations, did not enable the committee to assess to
what extent the requirements laid down in the Assembly’s Rules of
Procedure as regards fair political representation had been met.
6.3. Impact of switching
Parliamentary Assembly political groups on the functioning of the Assembly
70. It is not unusual for members of the Parliamentary
Assembly to switch groups. For instance, all the French members
from the UMP left the EDG group en masse in January 2004 and joined
the EPP/CD group. More recently, in June/July 2014, the EDG group
(now EC) decided to suspend its Russian members and to expel two
Italian members belonging to the Lega Nord – all of whom became
non-registered.
71. Of course, while the voluntary departure or the expulsion
of an individual member does not in itself hinder the smooth running
of the Assembly (for instance, Mr Remigijus Ačas, member of the
Lithuanian delegation was a member of the EDG from 2008 to 2011
and then of the ALDE in 2013-2014), the mass switching of members
from one Assembly group to another raises very specific questions,
in particular because the number of members in a group determines
the budgetary allocation it receives and the distribution of posts
in the committee bureaux, the number of seats to be filled in three
committees (Monitoring Committee, Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs and, as from January 2015,
Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human
Rights) and members’ places on the list of speakers for debates
in plenary.
72. In July 2014, the rapporteur sent a questionnaire to the Assembly’s
political groups in order to assess more accurately the scale of
political switching within national delegations and its impact on
political groups and to ascertain the internal rules which groups
may apply in the relevant cases.
73. The replies provided by the group secretariats show that there
are no specific formal rules on floor-crossing. In general terms,
the rules of procedure and statutes of the Assembly’s political
groups focus more on the requirements for membership than on suspension
or expulsion from the groups.
![(18)
Only
the statute of the Socialist Group in the Assembly provides that
members of the group may be temporarily suspended if their conduct
“repeatedly violates the standards decided by the Socialist Group”
and that they may be excluded if they “[continue] to behave in a
manner contrary to the standards of conduct decided by the Group”.
The rules of procedure of the EPP/CD, ALDE and EC (formerly EDG)
groups (the latter’s rules of procedure are under revision) do not
include any provisions governing suspension, expulsion or resignation
from the groups, either in terms of procedure, conditions or consequences.
Lastly, it should be noted that the UEL group does not have formal
rules of procedure.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
In addition, not all the groups
keep records or statistics on the matter. Decisions by members to
switch political affiliation, for ideological or other reasons – whether
this involves resignation from a member national party or joining
a different Assembly political group – or changes in a national
party’s membership of a political group are considered by the groups
on a case-by-case basis.
7. Conclusions
and proposals
74. The Committee on Rules of Procedure has carefully
analysed the phenomenon of floor-crossing in national parliaments
across Europe, the scale of political switching within the national
delegations in the Assembly, its possible impact on the composition
of the national delegations and the provisions governing the functioning
of the Assembly in this respect.
75. The committee notes that there are great differences at national
level in positions regarding floor-crossing – and still more in
the existing regulations, which are complex and vary greatly from
country to country. This report does not therefore seek to determine
whether or not switching political affiliation is a right of parliamentarians
– which is inherent in the nature of their mandates – or needs to
be authorised or, on the contrary, prohibited. However, it does
seek to ensure that greater account is taken of the phenomenon in national
parliaments and also in the Parliamentary Assembly’s political groups.
76. National parliaments are therefore invited to:
- look in depth at switching of
political affiliation by members so as to determine whether measures
should be taken to restrict switching between political groups;
- revise their internal regulations if they do not already
include provisions providing for or prohibiting switching of political
affiliation, as well as the requirements for and consequences thereof;
- take switches in political affiliation during the life
of a parliament into account in the composition of parliamentary
bodies and in their chairs; determine or clarify the rules and procedures
governing the consequences for political groups and their members,
in particular in terms of participation and representation in parliamentary
bodies, of changes in their composition in the course of a year;
- promote specific rules of conduct concerning members’
integrity so as to prevent and punish certain forms of corruption
such as vote buying or selling or bribing members to change groups;
- draw up a record of switches in affiliation by their members.
77. In terms of taking account in the Parliamentary Assembly’s
political groups of the consequences of switches in political affiliation,
the committee believes it would be desirable for the political groups
to implement the following proposals:
- supplement their statutes or rules of procedure, as appropriate,
so that they set out more clearly the values and principles on which
the group is based and the objectives it pursues, and include provisions specifying
the procedure and requirements for, and consequences of, switches
in political affiliation and the suspension, expulsion or resignation
of members;
- draw up a record of switches in affiliation by their members
at national level and in the Assembly;
- invite affiliated national political parties to promote
in their internal regulations specific rules laying down the requirements
for and consequences of switches in political affiliation and the
suspension, expulsion or resignation of members.
78. The committee further believes that it is not necessary to
amend the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure or draw up a specific complementary
text to address the issue in the Assembly. However, national parliaments are
asked to take due account of switches in political affiliation by
their members which may alter the representativeness of their delegations:
- before the opening of each annual
session of the Assembly, by submitting credentials which take account
of any changes in the composition of political groups and the balance
of forces between the majority and the opposition;
- in the course of a session, by notifying the Assembly
presidency of any switches in political affiliation by their members.