1. Introduction
1. 24 February 2022 will be remembered
as one of the darkest hours in European history. On that day, the Russian
Federation escalated its aggression against Ukraine, which it had
started in 2014, into a large-scale invasion. For millions of Ukrainians
life abruptly changed. For Europe, it was a point of no return.
That day, the project of a single European legal space without dividing
lines, in which Council of Europe member States had invested so
much hope, energy and effort, came to a halt.
2. And yet, as acknowledged by the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, Ms Marija Pejčinović Burić, Russia did not lose its willingness
to abide by Council of Europe commitments all of a sudden.
It happened piece by piece, over
the years. The full-blown aggression launched in 2022 was the culmination
of a process of wilful rejection of Council of Europe values and
standards by Putin’s regime, both domestically and internationally.
European democracies pursued a policy of appeasement and engagement
with Russia, under the illusion of being able to have an influence
on a system which was becoming increasingly totalitarian. They witnessed
with complacency the consolidation of Putin’s autocratic regime,
failing to understand to what extent it would constitute a threat
to their own security, despite history having abundantly demonstrated
the link between domestic repression and preparedness to use force
in international relations.
3. Europe woke up from its naivety on 24 February 2022. I was
proud that, during an extraordinary session organised on 15-16 March
2022, the Parliamentary Assembly unanimously agreed that Russia
could no longer be a member of the Council of Europe.
On
17 March, the Committee of Ministers expelled the Russian Federation
from the Organisation.
4. In spite of the courage, determination and sacrifice of the
Ukrainian people and wide condemnation from the international community,
Putin’s regime persists in violating international law and committing
crime of aggression and war crimes in Ukraine. One of the main political
consequences of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against
Ukraine is that it has forged a renewed unity amongst democracies.
The 4th Summit of Council of Europe Heads of State and Government,
held in Reykjavik on 16-17 May 2023, is the expression of this unity
around common values, of the resolve to support Ukraine for as long
as it takes, and the willingness to ensure that the Russian Federation
is held to account for its manifold crimes.
2. Scope and procedure of the report
5. Since 24 February 2022, the
Assembly has adopted numerous texts concerning the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine, addressing different aspects, its consequences,
and the response of the Council of Europe. Most of these texts have
been adopted unanimously, which is a clear indication of the common
understanding amongst national parliamentarians of the gravity of
this war of aggression and how it should be responded to.
6. Following the debate on
Resolution 2463 (2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine” during the October 2022 part-session, I was re-appointed
rapporteur for a new report in January 2023. In May 2023, the Committee
on Political Affairs and the Bureau of the Assembly agreed that
this report should be debated under urgent procedure during the
June 2023 part-session.
7. Despite the obvious constraints linked to the urgent procedure,
which does not allow for extensive research and analysis to be carried
out, for the preparation of the report I have been able to avail
myself of the input coming from a number of friends with in-depth
relevant expertise, who sent me their contributions. In this regard,
I would like to thank Sergey Davidis, an eminent human rights defender
and Director of Memorial; Mr Sergei Guriev, Economist and Provost
at Sciences Po in Paris; the Hermitage Foundation headed by Mr Bill Browder;
and Dossier Center Great Britain headed by Mr Mikhail Khodorkovski
for their generosity in providing guidance, comments and suggestions.
In addition, I also gathered input for this report from:
- a hearing with Mr Hugo Acha,
Senior Research Fellow, Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) and Director
of Research and Outreach for the Foundation for Human Rights in
Cuba (FHRC), Washington, which the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy held on 20 March 2023;
- a current affairs debate on Russia’s role in escalating
tensions in the Republic of Moldova, which was held on 27 April
2023 at my initiative;
- a hearing with Ms Evgenia Kara-Murza, wife of Mr Vladimir
Kara-Murza, laureate of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize, and
Mr Vadim Prokhorov, Mr Kara-Murza’s lawyer, held during the April
2023 part-session.
8. The report also takes into account the work aimed at setting
up a comprehensive system of accountability of the Russian Federation
carried out by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, including
a joint hearing organised with the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy during the April 2023 part-session and Resolution
2482 (2023) on “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine” (Rapporteur: Mr Damien Cottier, Switzerland, ALDE).
I also had the opportunity to visit Kyiv in my capacity as member
of the Lithuanian Parliament on the anniversary of the beginning
of the large-scale invasion, on 16 February 2023, to testify my
full support to the Ukrainian authorities and people. I also visited
Ukraine on other occasions, including Bucha and Irpin, with the ad hoc sub-committee of the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to evaluate the level of atrocities
committed by Russian occupational forces, and with the delegation
of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
9. The present report focuses on the geopolitical implications
of the aggression, which is the largest armed conflict in Europe
since the Second World War. It explores the broader security risks
deriving from the aggression, highlighting the need for Ukraine
and its supporters to step up diplomatic efforts with a view to countering
the false narratives spread by the Russian Federation. The report
also develops in great detail the issue of sanctions against the
Russian Federation and how to improve their effectiveness. As this
issue would require an in-depth debate which is not possible in
an urgent procedure, I have included only general recommendations
on it in the draft resolution. I think, however, that the Assembly
should prepare a specific report on this topic, and I have included
detailed recommendations in the conclusions of this report, to serve for
guidance for further reflection and deliberation.
10. Inspired by the personal sacrifice of thousands of Putin’s
opponents and their families, the report highlights that Russians
who share Council of Europe values and long for a democratic change
in their country can be a part of the solution. Europe can be durably
at peace only if Russia becomes a democracy and loses its military
potential to attack its neighbouring countries.
3. The
imperative to support Ukraine
11. By defending the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of their country, Ukrainians
are protecting the basic principles enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations, which are the foundations of the peaceful co-existence
between States. This is the reason why Ukraine needs and deserves
the full support of all countries which cherish peace and reject
the use of force as a way to achieve their objectives.
12. On 16-17 May 2023, the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government
of the 46 Council of Europe member States gave Ukraine a strong
and unequivocal message of support at the highest political level.
This was reiterated at the second meeting of the European Political
Community, which was held in Chisinau on 1st June
2023.
3.1. Addressing
human suffering and material destruction
13. At the time of writing, the
large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation
has entered its 17th month. It is not
possible to translate into words the immense suffering provoked
by the aggression. Since 24 February 2022, the whole territory of
Ukraine has been targeted with different kinds of weapons, causing
a high number of casualties, massive population displacement, and
widespread destruction of critical infrastructure. Mass atrocities
and war crimes committed by Russian troops and their proxies have been
widely documented and it is reasonable to fear that, as larger swathes
of territory are freed from the occupier, new evidence of crimes
will be uncovered. One third of the country is believed to be contaminated by
landmines and unexploded ammunition.
14. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), since the beginning of the large-scale invasion,
24 425 civilian casualties have been recorded in Ukraine, of whom
8 983 killed and 15 442 injured.
The OHCHR believes that the actual
figures are considerably higher, as the receipt of information from
some locations where intense hostilities have been ongoing has been
delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration. This concerns,
for example, Mariupol (Donetsk region), Lysychansk, Popasna, and
Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk region), where there are allegations of
numerous civilian casualties.
15. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reports that, as of 23 May 2023, there were around 8.2 million Ukrainian
citizens registered across Europe for Temporary Protection or similar national
protection schemes. In addition, around 2,8 million Ukrainians were
forcefully transferred or have crossed into the Russian Federation.
As of 23 January 2023, an estimated
5.4 million persons are internally displaced within Ukraine.
16. The damage caused to housing facilities since 24 February
2022 is estimated at US$50 billion. A further US$36 billion have
been recorded in losses from damages to infrastructure. The total
direct war damage of Ukraine is currently estimated at US$135 billion
over the same period.
The damage to infrastructure will require
time and financial resources to be restored. Furthermore, the aggression
has severely undermined Ukraine’s international trade, disrupting
the routes used for exports and imports and affecting its economy.
17. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on the river Dnipro on
6 June 2023 has had enormous consequences for the communities concerned
and represents a major environmental and health hazard. In fact,
as with other Russian acts of aggression with disastrous environmental
consequences, it represents not only a war crime but an ecocide,
as underlined by the Ukrainian authorities.
18. Overall, 600 square kilometres of Kherson Oblast are reportedly
under water, with nearly 70% of the flooded communities under Russian
military control. Water levels reached a peak of 5.6 metres on 9
June, leaving thousands of people in urgent need of water, food,
hygiene and other vital items. The Ukrainian government has called
upon international organisations, including the United Nations and
the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assist people in
the affected areas, while the Russian side has stated that it has
evacuated at least 40 000 people, although the credibility of these
data remains at least questionable.
19. The extent of the impact of the disaster caused by the destruction
of the Kakhovka Dam will only be known in the coming weeks. It can
be expected that it will affect the provision of drinking water
and agricultural production. There is also an increased risk of
mine accidents due to the movement of explosives caused by the flooding
in heavily contaminated areas. The destruction has also increased
the risk of nuclear accidents by potentially affecting the water
supply to the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, in Zaporizhzhia.
3.2. Supporting
Ukraine’s right to self-defence
20. In June 2023, Ukraine began
its long-anticipated counteroffensive. The country’s resilience
has not been dented by the months of drone and missile attacks aimed
at civilian and military targets alike. Despite human losses and
strenuous efforts to hold Bakhmut – the longest battle in this war
– the Ukrainian army has been bolstered by the delivery of additional
weapons from democratic countries who are supporting it in its right
to self-defence.
21. The United States is the largest provider of military assistance
to Ukraine, having committed US$18.3 billion in security assistance,
US$23.5 billion in weapons, and US$4.7 billion in loans and grants
for the purchase of weapons and military equipment.
22. As the second largest donor, the United Kingdom has committed
£4.6 billion in military assistance to Ukraine so far (£2.3 billion
in 2022 and a commitment to match that funding in 2023). The United
Kingdom is also hosting a training programme (Operation Interflex),
which is supported by several allies, with the aim of training 30 000
new and existing Ukrainian personnel by the end of 2023. The United
Kingdom has recently committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots
and is providing long-range precision strike missiles.
23. In an unprecedented decision, EU member States agreed to supply
Ukraine with military equipment, including lethal weapons, through
the European Peace Facility. The issue of whether to supply Ukraine
with heavy weapons or light weapons or no weapons at all has sparked
fierce debates in capitals across Europe. While countries such as
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia have delivered heavy weaponry
including T-72 tanks, others such as Austria and Ireland have decided
to provide exclusively non-lethal equipment, in line with their
policies of neutrality. So far, only Hungary, Malta and Cyprus have
decided not to supply Ukraine with any military equipment at all.
In addition to military equipment, many member States have provided significant
military aid.
24. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as an alliance,
has been clear in its political backing of Ukraine and fully supports
the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies.
It is helping to co-ordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian
Government and is supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal
aid.
25. A new development of which to take stock is that, increasingly,
acts of sabotage against the war of aggression take place in Russian
territory, with the Russian Volunteer Corps, the National Republican
Army (Russia), the Freedom of Russia Legion and other Russian volunteer
formations fighting with Ukraine launching cross-border incursions
into Belgorod Oblast and conducting other disrupting operations.
These groups oppose the Russian regime
of Vladimir Putin and its invasion of Ukraine. They consist of defectors
from the Russian Armed Forces and other Russian volunteers, some
of whom emigrated to Ukraine.
26. Earlier in the year, the Association of Security Forces of
Belarus (Bypol), an organisation of Belarusian activists opposed
to the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, claimed responsibility for
a drone attack against a Russian military aircraft stationed in
a military base on Belarusian soil. Other acts of sabotage aimed
at disrupting the transportation of weapons and military equipment
have been carried out in Belarus since the start of the large-scale
aggression.
3.3. Supporting
democratic governance and recovery
27. Since 24 February 2022, the
whole territory of Ukraine has been under martial law, with some communities
being run by civil-military administrations. Remarkable efforts
have been made to ensure the continued functioning of democratic
institutions and the delivery of services to the population. The
situation, however, remains challenging throughout the country,
with specificities depending on the length of time a given area
has been under Russian occupation, whether it is on the front line
or far away from it. Despite this, Ukraine continued to fulfil Council
of Europe standards and the Verkhovna Rada even ratified the Council
of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”).
28. A major decentralisation reform, which was finalised before
the beginning of the large-scale invasion, has been crucial in ensuring
the resilience of communities against the invasion and will continue
to be crucial in the reconstruction phase.
29. Even if Ukraine is still the target of a war of aggression,
it should lay down the foundations for a stronger, resilient and
democratic Ukraine. The principles “Build Back Better” should apply
to all sectors, ranging from energy to housing, from agriculture
to health. It should also apply to democratic governance, and the
Council of Europe is particularly well placed to help in this endeavour.
30. In December 2022, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Action
Plan
for
Ukraine “Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction” (2023-2026).
The main objective of the Action
Plan is to contribute to Ukraine’s stability, security and prosperity
by addressing immediate and medium-term needs in time of war and then
during the post-war period, in the areas where the Council of Europe
has expertise and added value. It is of the utmost importance that
Council of Europe member States contribute to this Action Plan and
make resources available to ensure the long-term democratic resilience
of Ukraine.
31. In June 2022, Ukraine formally requested to become a member
of the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB). At the Joint Meeting
in July 2022, the CEB’s member States unanimously endorsed Ukraine’s request,
and as a tangible sign of support in light of the exceptional circumstances
that Ukraine is facing, agreed to exonerate the country of any payment
requirement for accession. Following the unanimous adoption by the
Verkhovna Rada of the law that allows the country to join the CEB,
high level representatives from the Ukrainian Government attended
this year’s Joint Meeting in Athens.
32. On this occasion, the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Oleksandr
Kubrakov, underlined how the CEB will be instrumental in creating
conditions for the return of Ukrainians who were forced to leave
their homes. As the Governor of the CEB, Carlo Monticelli, explained
to the Standing Committee of the Assembly in Riga, on 26 May 2023,
the Bank will operate in Ukraine with a distinct focus on social
sectors such as healthcare and housing, deploying its long-standing
expertise as Europe’s oldest multilateral development bank. This
is especially important as needs have increased in these sectors
due to recent attacks on critical infrastructure. The Bank’s Strategic
Framework 2023-2027 envisages a volume of operations of around €200 million
this year, increasing gradually to about €400 million per year by
2027.
4. Ensuring
accountability
4.1. A
comprehensive system of accountability
33. The gravity of the crimes committed
by the Russian Federation is such that very early on in the large-scale
aggression, a consensus developed that a comprehensive system should
be set up to ensure the aggressor’s accountability and avoid any
jurisdictional gaps.
4.2. The
Register of Damage
35. The establishment of the Register
of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against
Ukraine is the most important deliverable of the 4th Summit of Council
of Europe member States and represents a milestone in multilateral
efforts to ensure the accountability of the Russian Federation.
The fact that it takes the form of an Enlarged Partial Agreement,
and such it is open to any country in the world, adds to its political
relevance.
While 45 States and the European
Union have already joined or indicated their intention to join the
Register, the Assembly should promote the largest possible number
of countries to join.
36. Defined as “historic” and “one of the first legally binding
decisions to hold Russia accountable for its acts” by the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe Marija Pejčinović, the Register
will support victims in recording their losses and it will pave
the way for a future international compensation mechanism.
37. The European Union has provided a substantial contribution
towards the startup costs. The Register will have its seat in The
Hague, with a satellite office in Ukraine. It will be established
for an initial period of three years and will serve as a record
of evidence and claims information on damage, loss or injury caused
by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine.
38. The Register will serve as a record, in documentary form,
of evidence and claims and information on damage, loss or injury
caused, on or after 24 February 2022, in the territory of Ukraine
within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its
territorial waters, to all natural and legal persons concerned,
as well as the State of Ukraine, including its regional and local
authorities, State-owned or controlled entities, by the Russian Federation’s
internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine.
39. It seems obvious to me that the wrongful acts to be recorded
are not only those committed by the Russian army stricto sensu, but also those committed
by all its proxies, including paramilitary groups and private military
companies involved in the aggression. I would expect that this issue,
which is not explicitly mentioned in the Statute of the Register,
shall be clarified by the Conference of the Parties when they establish the
Register’s Rules on admissibility. In this respect, I would also
like to recall that Kadyrov’s military forces are also fighting
in Ukraine. On 31 May 2023, the Institute for the Study of War reported
that Kadyrov's forces may replace the role of the Wagner Group as
Russia's main “shock troops” in Donbas.
4.3. The
Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression
40. While the Register of Damage
is a historic result, the Assembly should continue to pursue its
efforts to ensure that the political and military leadership of
the Russian Federation is held to account for its war of aggression
against Ukraine.
41. The Assembly has consistently called for the establishment
of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression in all its previous
texts concerning the aggression and, most recently, by a Written
Declaration for which I was the first signatory.
It is important to note that the
4th Summit of Council of Europe Heads of State and Government welcomed
the progress towards this objective, and for the Council of Europe
to be a part of relevant consultations and negotiations and provide
its expert and technical support.
42. In its most comprehensive text on the matter,
Resolution 2482 (2023), the Assembly reiterated “its unanimous call on member
States and observer States of the Council of Europe to set up a
special international criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression
against Ukraine, which should be endorsed and supported by as many
States and international organisations as possible, and in particular
by the United Nations General Assembly”.
43. It also spelt out the features of this Tribunal, addressing
the issue of immunities and underlining that its role should be
complementary to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court and in no way limit or affect the latter’s exercise of jurisdiction
over war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible genocide committed in
the context of the ongoing aggression and its jurisdiction in general.
44. At the initiative of Ukraine, a Core Group of States working
towards the setting up of the Special Tribunal has been formed,
which now includes 37 States. On 9 May, the Core Group held a Summit,
chaired by President Zelenskyy, in which leaders confirmed their
full political support for the creation of the Special Tribunal
despite having different views on how it should be set up.
45. It is also important that the activity of the International
Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine
(ICPA) shall be launched soon. It will be the first international
effort on investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression
in case of its perpetration after World War II. The Assembly and
the Council of Europe shall support the launch of the ICPA.
4.4. Accountability
for the Wagner Group
46. In March 2023, Mr Markus Wiechel
and other members of the Assembly tabled a motion for a resolution proposing
that the Wagner Group be declared a terrorist organisation.
This motion has been referred to
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to be taken into
account in the preparation of the report on “Legal and human rights
aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”.
47. The Wagner Group is a private military company linked to the
Russian State and has been involved in the Russian aggression against
Ukraine since its outset. It is responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law and should be held accountable
for this.
48. Following the launch of the large-scale invasion, the Group
has increasingly recruited and deployed Russian convicts without
military training, which has resulted in a high level of casualties
amongst them. It continues to recruit mercenaries also outside Russia
using profiles on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
On 31 May, the UK-based disinformation research company Logically
came across job offers from the Wagner Group targeting doctors,
drone operators and psychologists for participation in warfare in
Ukraine and other countries. The posts are published in dozens of
languages, including French and Spanish.
49. There are clear indications that Putin’s regime will continue
to rely on the Wagner Group and private military companies. On 31
May 2023, a bill allowing people with criminal records to undertake
contract military service was submitted to the Russian parliament.
Those recruited will have their sentences dismissed or their criminal
records expunged. Those convicted of sexual offences against minors,
as well as treason, terrorism and extremism, will still not be allowed
to enlist in the military.
50. The European Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada and other national
legislatures have already expressed the opinion that the Wagner
Group should be designated as a terrorist organisation, while others
are considering this option.
51. On 8 December 2022, the Latvian Parliament adopted a statement
on Russia’s international crimes in Ukraine and the prosecution
of those responsible, calling on the European Union to include the
Wagner Group in the list of persons, groups and entities involved
in terrorist acts (EU terrorist list). Respectively in March and May
2023, through non-binding resolutions the Lithuanian and the French
parliaments designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation,
calling on other countries to do the same.
On 11 May, Tobias Billström, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, stated that his country, which currently
presides over the Council of the European Union, is ready to develop
a consensus among EU member States on including the Wagner Group in
the EU terrorist list.
52. Outside the European Union, the United States considers the
Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organisation, while the
United Kingdom is reportedly planning to officially designate the
Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. This would put Wagner
on a list with 78 other groups, including ISIS, al Qaeda and newer white
supremacist organisations. This would make it a criminal offence
to belong to Wagner, attend its meetings, encourage support for
it, or carry its logo in public. It would impose financial sanctions
on the group and there would be implications for Wagner’s ability
to raise money if any funds went through British financial institutions.
53. Apart from the powerful significance of designating the Wagner
Group as a terrorist organisation, there are a number of legal issues
which need to be examined. I therefore encourage the rapporteur
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to look very
attentively into this matter.
5. Security
implications for Europe
5.1. A
context fraught with risks
54. The Russian Federation’s war
of aggression against Ukraine has ushered the world into a new security environment
fraught with risks. While some countries and regions are particularly
exposed, the tension is palpable in all corners of Europe. Not only
has Russia brought back a devastating war in the heart of Europe but
it has also pushed the limits of what can be used as a weapon and
an instrument of interference, from migrants to energy, from economic
leverage to elite capture.
55. Hard security is a grave concern. Representatives of the Russian
Federation have been brandishing reckless threats of nuclear warfare.
In May 2023, Russia started the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in
Belarus and, reportedly, the deployment of strategic weapons is
under discussion.
In May 2023, the Russian Federation
and Kyrgyzstan agreed to develop Russian military facilities on
the territory of the latter, a country which co-operates with the
Council of Europe including through the status of partner for democracy
for its parliament. Through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,
Russia is in a military alliance with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – all of them OSCE Participating States.
56. In this new climate of confrontation, multilateral mechanisms
involving Russia and set up to enhance security in Europe are not
contributing to their intended purpose. Against the background of
an evolving multilateral security architecture, membership in the
European Union and NATO appears as a bulwark, guaranteeing much
needed security and stability.
5.2. Escalating
tensions in the Republic of Moldova
57. Nobody can better summarise
the challenges faced by the Republic of Moldova than its President,
Maia Sandu. Addressing the 4th Council of Europe Summit in Reykjavik
she said: “We are on the receiving end of Russian-backed hybrid
methods which are designed to destabilise our democracy. The aggression
unleashed by Russia against Ukraine has impacted our national security
and created an uncertain environment. Our citizens and entrepreneurs
continue to struggle with the economic repercussions of soaring
energy prices and disruption of trade routes. Our economy needs
to grow for democracy to stand a chance. We have been holding the
line against Russia’s destabilisation efforts, and we will continue
to do so. Our democracy is backed up by strong political will, but
it cannot stand alone against the magnitude of the challenges we
are currently facing. Russia will continue to be a source of instability
for the region for years to come. Our best way to consolidate our
democracy and freedom is to join the European Union. Continue helping
Ukraine, continue helping Moldova, so that together we can carry
on defending our democracies and the European values that we chose
as our present, and our future”.
58. The Republic of Moldova is on the front line in facing the
consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine.
Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion, it has seen the
largest influx per capita of people fleeing the war. Over 780 000
people had crossed the border from Ukraine into the Republic of
Moldova by March 2023, and over 107 000 people are currently being
hosted by the country. This reception effort has significant budgetary
implications, which add up to disruptions in supply chains and rising
food and energy prices, putting a strain on the economy and causing
socio-economic tensions.
59. The Republic of Moldova also faces long-term challenges. The
Assembly discussed this in January 2023, during the debate on “The
honouring of obligations and commitments by the Republic of Moldova”.
The government is committed to implementing
key reforms in the areas of democratic governance and the rule of law,
including reforming the judiciary, fighting corruption and the influence
of oligarchs in public life.
60. In this already complicated context, the Russian Federation
is playing a deliberate role in escalating tensions and amplifying
the country’s internal fragilities through an aggressive strategy
of destabilisation. The events of recent months confirm it. They
include:
- anti-government demonstrations
organised by the People's Movement (linked to the Shor Party);
- reports of plots to overthrow the government and prevent
it from joining the European Union;
- arrests of alleged saboteurs, including the Wagner Group;
- the deportation of foreign nationals for espionage.
61. On 10 February 2023, the Russian Federation fired 71 missiles
against Ukraine. Some of them violated the airspace of the Republic
of Moldova. On the same date, the government led by Natalia Gavrilita
resigned. Following a reshuffle, a new government was formed, with
Dorin Recean as Prime Minister.
62. On 21 February 2023, President Putin repealed the 2012 Presidential
Decree on Measures to Implement the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation. This was a very significant gesture, as the decree committed
the Russian Federation to seek solutions to the situation of Transnistria
“on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in determining the
special status of Transnistria”.
63. The Kremlin’s website says the decision was taken to “ensure
Russia's national interests within the framework of the profound
changes taking place in international relations.” The move echoes
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's comment that Moldova is
the “next Ukraine.”
64. These statements and events fully confirm the observation
made in January 2023 by the Assembly, and in April 2023 by the European
Parliament,
that the Russian Federation is waging
a hybrid war against Moldova, relying on:
- extensive disinformation campaigns, based on pro-Russian
political forces in the country and media outlets that convey the
narrative of the Russian authorities, on the situation in Moldova
as well as on the war against Ukraine;
- the use of economic and energy blackmail;
- cyber-attacks.
65. The multilateral mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of
the Transnistrian issue based on the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Moldova are also weakened because of
the new geopolitical context. The last meeting in 5+2 format was
held in 2019. Furthermore, the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Moldova
was only extended until 30 June 2023.
66. The Russian Federation illegally maintains in Transnistria
the Operational Group of Russian Forces, counting approximately
1 500 troops and controlling the Cobasna depot where 22 000 tons
of ammunition and military equipment from Soviet times are stored.
Maintaining these troops and having failed to remove the ammunition
are two serious violations of the Russian Federation’s international
obligations and constitute a constant security threat – and the
latter also an environmental threat – to the Republic of Moldova
and the Black Sea region.
67. Against the background of these major security challenges,
the further deepening of European integration of the Republic of
Moldova represents a factor of stability. Also through its Action
Plan,
the Council of Europe should strengthen
its support to the Republic of Moldova with a view to advancing
its progress towards membership in the European Union. Similarly,
support by Council of Europe member States should be further encouraged,
through bilateral or regional initiatives such as the tripartite
co-operation agreement between the Republic of Moldova, Romania
and Ukraine signed on the occasion of the 2023 Back Sea Security Conference,
or the Moldova Support Platform,
bringing together Germany, France, Romania and the United States.
68. Overall, with a view to strengthening the capacities of the
Republic of Moldova in the areas of national security, stability
and resilience, the European Union has committed €87 million since
the establishment of the European Peace Facility. The latest assistance
package was decided in May 2023. It is worth €40 million over a
period of 36 months and will finance training and non-lethal equipment
including air surveillance, mobility and transportation, logistics,
command and control and cyber-defence.
On 24 April 2023, at the request
of Moldova’s authorities, the EU established a civilian mission
in Chisinau, with the aim of contributing to strengthening Moldova’s
crisis management structures, enhancing its resilience to hybrid
threats, including cybersecurity, and countering foreign information
manipulation and interference.
5.3. The
situation in Georgia
69. The repeated pattern of the
flouting of international law by the Russian Federation in Ukraine,
the Republic of Moldova and Georgia was condemned by the Heads of
State and Government of the member States of the Council of Europe
gathered in Reykjavik.
70. The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has
major implications for the situation in Georgia. The vulnerability
to Russian military threats is apparent, with Russian forces still
illegally on the territory of Georgia following the aggression of
2008, in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Georgia.
71. Tbilisi has repeatedly underlined its firm support for Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thousands have taken to the
street in protests against the Russian Federation and in support
of Ukraine. In its annual report submitted to the Georgian parliament
on 5 June 2023, the Georgian government recalled expressing its
solidarity with Ukraine in international platforms, as well as providing
humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine.
72. Since 24 February 2022, more than 160 000 Ukrainians have
entered Georgia, which has served as both a transit and a destination
country, with some 26 000 Ukrainians currently in the country. Citizens
of Ukraine can stay in the territory of Georgia for two years before
needing to apply for a form of residence or apply for asylum, following
a decree of the Government of Georgia in February 2023.
73. At the same time, a high number of Russian citizens have entered
Georgia since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine. Entries
into Georgia became particularly pronounced following the announcement of
a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation, with the Ministry
of Internal Affairs bolstering staff at the Dariali border point
in a ten-day period which saw 78 742 entries into Georgia from Russia.
74. Despite various international and domestic calls to align
itself with Western sanctions, the Georgian government has been
reluctant to do so, even if it has repeatedly stated that it respects
them. Since the beginning of its large-scale invasion of Ukraine,
Russia has become Georgia’s second-largest trading partner in imports
and its third-largest trading partner in exports in 2023. Concerns
have been raised that this trend may be driven by companies circumventing
Western sanctions.
The resumption of direct flights
between Moscow and Tbilisi in May 2023 following the removal of
four-year-old ban also caused a stir amongst those who oppose any
rapprochement with Russia.
75. The worsening security situation also has had implications
for the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian
efforts to bring the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
into Russia’s social, economic, political and judicial spheres have
continued, reflected not least through the de
facto authorities of both regions “recognising” the so-called
“people’s republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk”, and their stated support
for the activity of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.
76. An additional aspect of the worsening security situation is
the disruption of the work of the forum for discussing the consequences
of the 2008 conflict in Georgia – the Geneva International Discussions
(GID). The participants to the Discussions have underlined the key
role played by the GID as a platform for predictability and dialogue
for the benefit of security and stability.
Planned to take place
four times a year, the Discussions were postponed for nearly a year
following the large-scale aggression against Ukraine. According
to the Co-Chairs this was done in order to protect the process.
77. Changed geopolitical realities also impact the evolution of
the relationship of Georgia with the European Union. Following the
2008 conflict, the relationship was upgraded with the establishment
of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009 to accelerate greater
integration with the EU. The clear support of the population for
the EU-orientation of the country has been well-documented over
the past decade, with support levels as high as 89% in April 2023.
78. The relationship, however, has suffered a number of setbacks,
including the breakdown of the political agreement negotiated by
the European Council president in 2021 to overcome the political
crisis that had followed the 2020 elections. The chance to rectify
this now exists with the Georgian bid for EU membership. The continuing
steps to fulfil the conditions of the EU to join Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova in being granted candidate country status are
crucial to shape the future of the EU-Georgia relationship.
79. Actions towards political depolarisation, the strengthening
of the independence of the judiciary, increased democratic oversight,
the reform of the electoral system, addressing media independence
and the rights of vulnerable groups should be high on the government’s
political agenda, as should be the further alignment with the EU
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which seems to have decreased
from 44% in 2022 to only 31% in 2023.
5.4. The
Western Balkans on a geopolitical fault line
80. In its Resolution 2456 (2022),
the Assembly acknowledged that the past few years have witnessed
a geo-politicisation of the Western Balkans, with the Russian Federation
extending its political influence through an array of soft power
tools, including economic investments, media presence, energy policy
and vaccine diplomacy. While this influence has been growing for
some time, in the new security context created by its aggression
against Ukraine, there is even a greater risk that Russia uses it
to deepen existing fractures and lead to further destabilisation,
while boosting its profile and discrediting European institutions.
81. All countries of the region have expressed support for the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine,
but they differ in their relations with the Russian Federation and
the West. For instance, while Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia
and Kosovo*
have joined EU sanctions
against the Russian Federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia
have not. This is because EU candidates or potential candidates
are invited to align with EU CFSP decisions, including sanctions,
but are not obliged to do so.
82. As regards Euro-Atlantic integration, Albania, Montenegro
and North Macedonia are NATO members and KFOR – a NATO-led peacekeeping
force – has been stationed in Kosovo since 1999. Bosnia and Herzegovina
is a NATO partner; any further integration into the Alliance, however,
is opposed by Republika Srpska. Serbia is a member of the NATO Partnership
for Peace since 2009 while, at the same time, its National Assembly
has been an observer with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Common
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) since 2013.
83. Russia exerts a strong soft power on Serbia, through culture
and religion. Politically, Russia has consistently sided with Serbia
on the Kosovo issue. In recent years, Russia has also strengthened
its military ties with Serbia and is currently Serbia’s biggest
arms supplier. In May 2022, Serbia signed a new three-year gas contract
with the Russian Federation. In September 2022, the two countries
signed an agreement for mutual consultations on foreign policy matters.
84. In its second resolution on “Foreign interference in all democratic
processes in the European Union”, the European Parliament observes
that Russia is using its influence in Serbia to destabilise the
region and interfere in domestic developments, for instance in Bosnia
and Herzegovina via the Republika Srpska, in Montenegro via the
country’s pro-Serbian sentiments and the Serbian Orthodox Church;
and in Kosovo by exploiting and inflaming existing disputes in the
North and undermining attempts to normalise relations between Belgrade
and Pristina.
Since the launch of the large-scale
invasion of Ukraine, several pro-Russian demonstrations have taken
place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, at the initiative
of far right groups.
85. Like the European Union, the Council of Europe has an interest
in strengthening democratic resilience and respect for the rule
of law and human rights, promoting reconciliation and good neighbourly
relations, and creating the conditions for stronger economic and
social progress in the Western Balkans.
86. The Council of Europe should redouble its efforts to enable
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia
and Kosovo to meet their aspirations for closer European integration.
It should seek to promote further alignment of the region with the
EU CFSP and improve its resilience against hybrid threats and disinformation.
6. The
global perspective
6.1. Peace
initiatives
87. As the war of aggression continues,
a number of initiatives have been proposed to put an end to the hostilities.
While we all want peace, and nobody more than Ukraine, it is my
firm conviction that any peace settlement which would recognise
a change of borders in favour of an aggressor would be unjust and
would not be lasting; on the contrary, it would lay the ground for
new aggressions and undermine the fundamental principles which are
the foundations of international peace and security.
88. Let me also recall that, in its
Resolution 2463 (2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine”, for which I was Rapporteur, the Assembly called
on Council of Europe member States to “reiterate their unwavering
support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, and that
any peace talks can only take place on the conditions set by Ukraine”
(paragraph 13.1).
President Zelenskyy’s 10-point
peace formula
89. In November 2022, President
Zelenskyy launched the 10-point peace formula,
which calls for:
- nuclear safety, including the
restoration of safety conditions around Europe's largest nuclear
power plant, Zaporizhzhia, which is currently under Russian occupation;
- food security, including protecting and ensuring Ukraine's
grain exports to the world's poorest nations;
- energy security;
- the release of all prisoners and deportees, including
prisoners of war and forcibly deported children;
- restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming
it in accordance with the UN Charter;
- the withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities,
the restoration of Ukraine's State borders with Russia;
- justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal;
- the prevention of ecocide, the need for protecting the
environment, with focus on demining and restoring water treatment
facilities;
- building a security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic
space, including guarantees for Ukraine;
- the confirmation of the end of the war, including a document
signed by the parties involved.
90. It is important to underscore that, at the Reykjavik Summit,
the Heads of State and Government of Council of Europe member States
officially declared: “Without accountability, there can be no lasting
peace and we support the principles for a just and lasting peace
as outlined in President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula”.
China’s position on the “Political
settlement of the Ukraine crisis”
91. On the anniversary of the large-scale
invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, China released a paper
on its position on the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”.
Far from being a peace plan, this document offers an insight of
how China sees its role on the global scene.
Using China’s own language, some
of its main points are:
- the
sovereignty of all countries should be respected;
- the Cold War mentality should be abandoned, and the security
of a region should not be achieved by strengthening or expanding
military blocs;
- cessation of the hostilities and resuming peace talks;
- facilitating grain exports;
- stopping unilateral sanctions;
- keeping industrial and supply chains stable;
- promoting post-conflict reconstruction.
92. While claiming that China will continue to play “a constructive
role”, the language and the content of the position paper reinforce
the view that China cannot be considered as a neutral mediator.
In addition to the speculations that China may supply weapons to
Russia,
its voting records at the United
Nations Security Council and the UN General Assembly are very telling,
and so are the official visits its leadership has paid to or received
from Russian and Belarusian counterparts since the launch of the
large-scale invasion of Ukraine. The recent joint military drills
with China are also a visible sign of where the country stands,
and are a matter of serious concern for global security.
The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution of 23 February 2023
93. To date, the framework for
peace which has received the widest support remains the one set
out by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution of 23 February
2023,
which points out that:
- the only just, comprehensive
and lasting peace is the one which is based on the respect of international law;
- the Russian Federation should immediately, completely
and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces from the territory
of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders;
- no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or
use of force should have any legal effect.
94. In all, 141 members of the United Nations voted in favour
of the resolution. Seven opposed it (Russia, Belarus, North Korea,
Syria, Mali, Eritrea, and Nicaragua), and another 32 abstained (amongst
them Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India,
Iran and Pakistan, as well as a number of African countries, including
South Africa). Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did not take part in
the vote.
6.2. Diverging
narratives and views
95. Supporting Ukraine does not
mean only offering all the assistance that can help the country
restore control over its territory, providing humanitarian support
to civilians and ensuring that the aggressor is held accountable
for its crimes but also providing support to counter the false narratives
about the war spread by the Russian Federation.
96. During the hearing which the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy held on 20 March 2023 in Paris, Mr Acha alerted members
to the success of Russian, Chinese, Cuban and Iranian media outlets
in promoting the view that Ukraine and Russia are to be considered
equally responsible for the war, or that responsibility completely
lies with the United States and NATO expansion. This view is not
uncommon in Latin America
and in Africa,
the latter being the target
of increasing influence by the Russian Federation, including because
of the role of the Wagner Group.
97. In Latin America, Cuba is one if not the most relevant transatlantic
ally of Russia in its aggression against Ukraine: Russia is partnering
with Cuba to challenge the US and European influence both globally
and regionally. It is used as a platform for Russian propaganda,
spreading narratives blaming Ukraine for war, portraying it as anti-Semitic,
corrupt, and a puppet of the United States. Russia has also established
financial platforms to help Cuba “avoid hostile oversight” and to
create “links that evade the financial organisations of unfriendly
States.” These platforms are an ideal way for Russia to bypass sanctions
and to participate in the triangulation of resources resulting from
money laundering coming from illicit activities.
98. This support for the Russian narrative about the war, according
to Mr Acha, explains the numerous abstentions during the vote on
relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly. Council of Europe
member States, therefore, should step up their diplomatic efforts
to garner even greater support for Ukraine worldwide, as the Russian
Federation is not as isolated as it may appear from a European vantage
point.
99. One of the messages spread by the Russian Federation and echoed
by its partners around the world is that international sanctions
imposed on Russia are to blame for the surge in food and fuel prices,
besides being unfair. Such messages have been circulated in multiple
languages, in Europe, its neighbourhood and beyond, and have been
echoed by African and Chinese media, boosting their global reach.
100. The Russian Federation also enjoys sympathy for its positions
amongst the BRICS, a platform which brings together the Russian
Federation, Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Together, these
countries account for 40% of the world’s population, 28% of global
GDP, and 20% of export goods. Co-operation between them is based
on three pillars: political and security, economic and financial,
and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
BRICS increasingly looks like
a coherent geopolitical bloc, competing with the G7 and with an
increasing number of countries wishing to join.
101. Tellingly, despite Brazil being the only member of BRICS supporting
the UNGA Resolution of 23 February 2023, its newly re-elected President
Lula has repeatedly stated, including during a visit to China,
that Ukraine is also to be blamed
for the Russian invasion and has called for a negotiated peace.
In April 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, visiting Brazil,
thanked the Brazilian authorities for “their excellent understanding
of the situation”.
102. BRICS have been particularly vocal in expressing concern about
the consequences on the global economy of the sanctions imposed
against the Russian Federation. In addition, by increasing their
purchases of energy, fertilisers and other key products from Russia
they are helping Putin’s regime to soften the impact of Western
sanctions.
103. Western countries have activated diplomatic and information
channels to explain that international sanctions imposed on Russia
target the Kremlin's ability to finance its military aggression,
which remains the main cause of the food crisis, and do not include
agricultural products. It is undeniable that the sanctions imposed
against Russia have effects on the global economy, especially on
the global South, but the responsibility for this state of affairs
lies with the aggressor regime. Without its serious violations of
international law there would have been no need for sanctions.
104. The Assembly will have the opportunity to examine this issue
more in-depth in the debate on “Globalisation in times of crises
and war: the role of the OECD since the Russian Federation's aggression against
Ukraine” (Rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy:
Mr George Katrougalos, Greece, UEL) which will take place in October
2023. In addition, a report on “Addressing the social and economic
effects of sanctions” is currently in preparation in the Committee
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development (Rapporteur:
Ms Sibel Arslan, Switzerland, SOC).
7. Strengthening
sanctions and improving their effectiveness
7.1. Restrictive
measures
105. Supporting Ukraine also means
impacting the Russian Federation’s capacity to finance the war of aggression
and imposing clear economic and political costs on Putin’s regime.
To this end, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States of America, and several other countries have introduced economic
and financial sanctions of unprecedented magnitude. Currently, Russia
is the most sanctioned country in the world, and the coalition of
sanction-imposing countries represents over half of the world’s economy.
106. So far, the European Union has adopted ten packages of sanctions
and an eleventh package is currently
being negotiated. The restrictions affect over 1 200 individuals
and 200 organisations as well as various sectors of Russia’s economy.
They fall into several categories:
- sanctions against specific individuals
and companies;
- sectoral sanctions;
- sanctions against exports of technology;
- sanctions against imports of Russian goods;
- financial sanctions.
107. The sanctions have had a serious effect on trade between Russia
and Europe. Notably, the European Union has been able to curb most
of its imports of Russian energy, despite years of dependence. Sectors
of Russia’s economy, such as the aviation industry, have been isolated
and are experiencing a severe crisis. At the same time, the sanctions
have not yet achieved their main goal – to make it economically
impossible for the Kremlin to continue its war of aggression against
Ukraine. The Russian economy barely shrank in 2022 and, according
to some estimates, could experience growth this year.
Moreover, Russia continues to import Western
goods, including military and dual-use goods, using them against
the Ukrainian army and civilians.
108. This is made possible by an extensive network of sanctions
circumvention and parallel imports that the Kremlin has deployed
over the past decade. A number of large economies and key trading
partners of the Russian Federation are not part of the coalition
applying sanctions. They include Brazil, India and China (the remaining
BRICS). Amongst Council of Europe member States, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia,
and Türkiye do not apply sanctions towards the Federation, and neither
do Central Asian countries.
109. Russia, therefore, has ample room for manoeuvre to circumvent
sanctions via third country imports, direct or indirect re-export
and false transit. The Russian government and businesses are highly entrepreneurial
in inventing various ways for circumventing technological sanctions
(thus important crucial components for producing military equipment)
and even oil sanctions. Tellingly, Russia’s trade with some of the
above-mentioned countries has grown considerably since the beginning
of the large-scale invasion.
110. The EU has stepped up its ‘sanction diplomacy’ with the nomination
of David O’Sullivan as the first International Special Envoy for
the Implementation of EU Sanctions, in charge of reaching out to
third countries to address sanction circumvention and broaden the
coalition, and to organise a Sanctions Coordinators Forum to strengthen
international enforcement.
7.2. Addressing
circumvention
111. The enforcement of existing
sanctions should also become a bigger focus for the European authorities. In
the 11th sanctions package, proposed
in May 2023, the EU has begun to address this issue but its efforts
so far have been limited and finding consensus is difficult.
112. Trade with third countries outside the European Union is currently
the most common way of importing goods and technology into Russia.
According to calculations by Reuters on the basis of data from the
German Federal Statistical Office, for the first quarter of 2023
the volume of exports from Germany to Kyrgyzstan rose by 949%, to
Georgia by 92%, while those to Kazakhstan rose 136%, to Armenia
172% and to Tajikistan 154%. Exports to Türkiye were up 37%.
113. The procurement of goods through third countries became possible
thanks to Russia’s government permission of parallel imports in
early 2022. Moreover, some countries of the Caucasus and Central
Asia, such as Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are in a customs
union with Russia, which means that goods can move freely between
countries.
114. Under the proposed 11th sanctions
package, if illegal re-exports are suspected, the EU would be able issue
a warning to offending countries. Furthermore, the EU would have
the right to restrict exports of certain goods to these countries.
These measures would be an important
step forward. However, to make them more effective, a dedicated
European Anti-Circumvention Task Force could be set up, which would
work in close co-operation with foreign governments to carry out
end-user certificate checks, monitor companies that re-export goods
to Russia, and propose secondary sanctions when necessary.
115. Despite numerous financial sanctions against Russia, several
Western banks are still operating in the country, including Raiffeisen
Bank (RBI, Austria), UniCredit Bank (Italy), and OTP Bank (Hungary)
. According to researchers, in the
first nine months of 2022, RBI earned half its net profit from the
Russian market, and, in 2023, made €1.4 billion in profit in Russia
– four times more than in the same period last year, all while paying
taxes to the Russian government
. Moreover, Raiffeisen bank continues
its co-operation with the Russian State-owned Sberbank.
116. The private sector should take legal and moral responsibility
for making sure that nobody profits from the war and human suffering
and that nobody supports the aggressor. As regards European banks,
more pressure should be put on them to enforce sanctions against
Russia. Those remaining in Russia should be asked to disclose data
on transactions potentially linked to the military-industrial complex.
117. Publicity is an effective tool to remind those who undermine
and circumvent the sanction regime of their responsibility. I propose,
therefore, to establishment a special Register of companies, banks,
and companies involved in circumventing the sanctions, to be updated
regularly and to be made public. In addition, States who are helping
to avoid the sanctions and creating special conditions for circumventing
the sanctions should also be listed.
118. Finally, the issue of the purchase of refined petroleum products
based on Russian energy should be looked into. The EU Special Representative
for Foreign Policy, Josep Borrell, recently highlighted the role
of India in the resale of Russian oil products. According to him,
exports of refined petroleum products from India to Europe have
increased sevenfold compared to the pre-war period. India has every
right to buy Russian oil. However, reselling refined petroleum products
of Russian origin to the EU is a circumvention of sanctions. At the
same time, Mr Borrell held European importing companies responsible
for this.
8. Dialogue with Russian democratic forces
and civil society sharing Council of Europe values
119. In order to prepare and wage
its aggressive warfare, the Putin regime has destroyed the strongest
and most visible of the surviving non-governmental organisations.
In 2022-2023, the Moscow Helsinki Group, the SOVA Center for Information
and Analysis, the Sakharov Center, the Memorial Human Rights Center,
and International Memorial were virtually liquidated.
120. The liquidation of the Memorial organisations and the ongoing
repression of associated structures and individuals also reflect
the Kremlin's policy of destroying the historical memory of Soviet-era
crimes and their victims. These efforts are designed to establish
an ideology of all-power and infallibility of the State, individual disenfranchisement,
contrasting Russia with the West and multilateralism, justifying
the war of aggression.
121. Repression aimed at eliminating opponents of the regime, intimidating
and controlling society became the foundation of the war of aggression.
According to incomplete data from Memorial, there are at least 550 political
prisoners in Russia today. Amongst them, many good friends of mine
and of the Council of Europe, including Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei
Navalny, and many others. According to OVD-Info, at least 600 people have
been criminally prosecuted for anti-war protests. The scale of repression
has reached Soviet-era levels. All new punitive norms, which often
contravene basic legal principles, are intended to create the conditions
for even greater levels of repression.
122. Since the beginning of the large-scale war of aggression,
many Russians have left the country. They are political opponents
of the regime, human rights defenders, human rights activists, journalists,
NGO representatives, democratically minded civil society. A lot
of people have also left because they do not agree with the war,
or because they do not want to fight in it.
123. Russians in exile are not a uniform group and are divided
on many issues. It should be mentioned, however, that on 20 May
2022, the Second Anti-War Conference decided to establish the Russian
Action Committee. By signing a Declaration on the vision of the
future of Russia, its members support:
- the liberation of all Ukraine’s occupied territories and
the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine in accordance
with its internationally recognised borders;
- the compensation of Ukraine for the damaged caused by
Putin’s aggression;
- the setting up of an International Tribunal to prosecute
the crime of aggression.
124. I believe that this platform meets the conditions set out
by the Assembly in its
Resolution
2433 (2022) on “Consequences of the Russian Federation's continued
aggression against Ukraine: role and response of the Council of
Europe”, in which the Assembly resolved “to intensify its engagement
with Belarusian and Russian civil society, human rights defenders,
independent journalists, academia and democratic forces respecting
the values and principles of the Organisation, including the territorial
integrity of sovereign member States” (paragraph 18.2).
125. Also on the strength of the exchanges that, at the initiative
of the President of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee had
with some key representatives of the Russian Action Committee in
Paris in March 2023, I hope that the Assembly will pursue dialogue
with these interlocutors. Only a democratic Russia without the capacity
to attack its neighbours can be a guarantee of lasting peace in
Europe. And that day will come.
9. General conclusions
126. The Council of Europe was created
from the ashes of the Second World War in the conviction that “the pursuit
of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital
for the preservation of human society and civilisation”. In 2023,
74 years since its creation, the oldest pan-European organisation
operates against the background of a multipolar geopolitical system,
in which rules-based multilateralism is weakened, international
peace and security are undermined and values such as democracy,
human rights and the rule of law are put in question and sometimes
even rejected.
127. For more than five hundred days we have been witnessing Russia’s
illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. Despite
the immense suffering caused to the Ukrainian people and the devastating
consequences globally, Russia and its allies have chosen to continue
violating international, human rights and humanitarian law, committing
war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity in Ukraine and endangering
the entire international rules-based order.
128. Resuming the 11th emergency special session of the UN General
Assembly, its President Csaba Kőrösi said that in this “new chapter
of history the world is facing stark choices about who we are as
an international community. These choices will either set us on
a path of solidarity and collective resolve to uphold the tenets of
the UN Charter, or a path of aggression, war, normalised violations
of international law and collapsed global action.”
129. I cannot agree more with his words. The way in which we respond
to the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine will set
the course of European history and affect the system of global governance in
the years to come. The international community must demonstrate
determination and unity in responding to Russia’s unprovoked war
of aggression and standing by Ukraine for as long as it takes.
10. Recommendations on how to improve
the effectiveness of sanctions
130. Sanctions have been crucial
in creating meaningful and tangible consequences in response to
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. They play an important part in curtailing
Putin’s access to funds for the war. The Russian Federation, however,
continues to receive funds through the sale of oil and gas. Furthermore,
many Russian oligarchs complicit in corruption and human rights
abuses remain free from sanctions, and methods have been devised
to bypass and evade sanctions.
131. In order to contribute to the reflection, and possibly to
a more specific report on this issue, I see the following way forward
to improve the effectiveness of the sanction system:
Reduce Europe’s Reliance on
Russian Oil and Gas
132. Mechanisms for further reducing
Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and gas need to be supported. In addition,
measures to reduce the resale of Russian oil and gas to Europe via
third countries need to be enacted.
Expand Personal Sanctions
133. Personal sanctions should continue
to be expanded to include individuals (and the entities they control) who
provide support for and/or do not materially, financially and publicly
oppose the war against Ukraine carried out by the Kremlin regime.
Monitor Sanctions Compliance
and Impose Secondary Sanctions
134. Mechanisms need to be strengthened
to address loopholes and sanctions evasion, including in the form of
purported transits via Russia to third countries, resale of Russian
goods, including oil and gas via third countries, transfer of Russian
banking services and assets to third countries, and use of nominee
structures to hide the ultimate owners and managers of Russian assets
and companies.
135. There is a need to strengthen the system for monitoring compliance
with existing sanctions by third parties (secondary sanctions).
136. It is crucial to identify the major categories of entities
and individuals that play a significant role in sanction avoidance.
These categories should include banks, insurance companies, financial
advisers, financial institutions, transport and logistics companies,
ports, and service companies.
137. To effectively combat sanction avoidance, it is necessary
to propose sanctions mechanisms that inflict more significant damage
on those involved in such activities than any potential benefits
they may gain. This can be achieved by introducing sanctions that
specifically target key individuals within each category of sanction.
By doing so, a clear message can be sent, and it can serve as a
deterrent to other individuals or entities considering involvement
in said illicit business.
138. It is important to strengthen co-operation and harmonise sanctions
efforts amongst like-minded countries. The current situation where
individuals may be sanctioned by one jurisdiction but not by another creates
loopholes that allow for sanction avoidance.
Create a Register of companies/individuals
working for Russian interests and a Register of persons assisting
in sanctions avoidance
139. It is advisable to require
disclosure from Council of Europe entities and persons of all work,
for or in the interest of Russian entities and persons, whether
sanctioned or not. This measure can be first rolled out on a voluntary
basis.
140. To counter attempts to circumvent sanctions, the creation
of a register of companies aiding Russian persons and entities in
bypassing sanctions could be established, and appropriate restrictive
measures should be imposed on them within the Council of Europe,
to enable transparency and awareness across membership.
Impose Sanctions on Putin's
Allies and Enhance Sanctions Avoidance Measures
141. In response to Putin's illegal
aggression against Ukraine, it is crucial to impose sanctions on
his allies, including on Iran, Belarus, Cuba, and other key players
supporting Putin’s murderous war in Ukraine. By identifying specific
areas where these allies provide support to Putin's aggression,
targeted sanctions can be implemented against individuals, institutions,
or entities involved.
Significant Financial Penalties
for Sanction Avoidance
142. To address the potential cost
issues related to regulating and enforcing sanction avoidance, the introduction
of legal mechanisms imposing substantial financial penalties is
essential. These penalties can be utilised to fund the budget for
sanction avoidance regulation and enforcement efforts. By imposing
significant financial consequences, the incentive to engage in sanction
avoidance will be reduced, and the resources required to combat
these illicit activities can be effectively managed.
Civil and Criminal Liability
for Sanction Avoidance
143. To further deter sanction avoidance,
it is important to consider the criminalisation of deliberate assistance
by individuals and groups of individuals for the purpose of evading
sanctions. Introducing criminal liability for sanction avoidance
would serve as a strong deterrent and reinforce the seriousness
of such actions. In addition, persons involved in abetting sanctions
avoidance should be banned from engaging in certain professional
activities in the Council of Europe.
Establishment of a pan-European
institution with the authority to investigate and prosecute persons involved
in sanctions avoidance
144. Establishing a permanent pan-European
legal institution with the authority to investigate and prosecute individuals
on the sanctions lists and those abetting them as war criminals
is advisable. This institution, such as a tribunal or specialised
prosecutor's office, should be empowered to issue arrest warrants
for individuals and to confiscate their assets, as well as to seek
extradition from third countries. The decisions made by this institution
should be binding on all Council of Europe member States.
Monetary incentives for whistle-blowers
reporting specific details of sanction avoidance
145. Establishing monetary incentives
for those with important information on sanctions avoidance, can increase
motivation for whistleblowers to come forward and expose individuals
or entities for aiding and abetting sanctions avoidance.