1. Introduction
1. The basis for the Parliamentary
Assembly’s monitoring procedure is
Resolution 1115 (1997) on the setting up of an Assembly Committee on the honouring
of obligations and commitments by member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee) (as modified by
Resolution 1431 (2005),
Resolution
1515 (2006),
Resolution
1698 (2009),
Resolution
1710 (2010),
Resolution
1936 (2013),
Resolution
2018 (2014),
Resolution
2261 (2019),
Resolution
2325 (2020),
Resolution
2357 (2021) and
Resolution
2428 (2022).
Resolution
1115 (1997) defines the mandate of the Monitoring Committee and
stipulates that “it shall be responsible for verifying the fulfilment
of the obligations assumed by the member States under the terms
of the Council of Europe statute [(ETS No. 1)], the European Convention
of Human Rights [(ETS No. 5)] and all other Council of Europe conventions
to which they are parties, as well as the honouring of the commitments entered
into by the authorities of member States upon their accession to
the Council of Europe.”
2. In accordance with Paragraph 14 of
Resolution 1115 (1997) as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to report
to the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress of the
monitoring procedures. In line with established practice, the committee
has entrusted me, as its chairperson, with the task of being the rapporteur
on the committee’s activities for the period from January to December
2023.
3. In line with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows
all Council of Europe member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations, and if relevant, specific accession
commitments. Currently, 11 countries are subject to a full monitoring
procedure (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Georgia, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Türkiye and
Ukraine).
4. Three countries are currently engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue (Bulgaria, Montenegro and North Macedonia). The post monitoring
dialogue involves the States that have progressed to this stage
following the termination of a full monitoring procedure. It is
a less intensive procedure focusing on a limited number of remaining
issues that are expected to be resolvable within limited timeframe.
Therefore, the Rules of Procedure specify that only two post-monitoring
dialogue reports will be issued. The second post-monitoring report
has to determine whether the post monitoring dialogue can be ended
for the relevant country. If not, the country will return to a full
monitoring procedure.
5. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Monitoring
Committee is tasked to ensure and assess the fulfilment of obligations
assumed by all member States under the Council of Europe Statute,
the European Convention on Human Rights and all other conventions
concluded within the Organisation to which they are party. Therefore,
as set out in
Resolution
2261 (2019), the Monitoring Committee prepares periodic review reports
on the honouring of obligations to the Council of Europe for all
member States that are not subject to one of the two specific monitoring
procedures mentioned above. As specified in this resolution, the
Monitoring Committee selects the countries for periodic review according
to its internal working methods, on substantive grounds, while maintaining
the objective of producing, over time, periodic monitoring reports
on all member States. These reports have gained an increasing importance
in the work of the committee. Reports on San Marino and France were
submitted to the Assembly in 2023. The consideration of the report
on the Netherlands has been postponed to 2024 as a result of the
pre-term parliamentary elections called for 22 November 2023. On
5 December 2023, the Monitoring Committee held an exchange of views
on the selection of the next three countries for periodic review
reports and following a vote, selected Greece, Spain and Sweden.
6. The Monitoring Committee also has a Sub-Committee on Conflicts
concerning Council of Europe Member States in line with Rule 49
of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure and the committee’s revised
decision of 24 May 2022 which defines its mandate as covering “a
situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an
end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the
conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants. Therefore, legally
the conflict can start again at any moment, creating an environment
of insecurity and instability”.
7. The country-specific comments which follow in the next section
below have been prepared in consultation with the responsible rapporteurs
on the basis of their reports, notes and statements as well as the discussions
in the Monitoring Committee (with the participation of representatives
of the majority and the opposition of countries concerned in accordance
with Article 10 of
Resolution
1115 (1997)), and findings of other Council of Europe monitoring
mechanisms.
2. Overview
of the committee’s activities
2.1. General
comments
8. The committee has made good
progress in overcoming the backlog and delays caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Nevertheless, also during 2023, the work and agenda of the committee
were affected by frequent changes of rapporteurs and their understandably
demanding domestic agendas, as well as by the election cycles in
the countries being monitored.
9. Over the reporting period, the rapporteurs carried out a number
of visits to the countries under their respective responsibility
including two visits to Armenia and two visits to Azerbaijan, and
one visit each to Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France,
Georgia, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia and Türkiye.
10. At the initiative of the relevant rapporteurs, several hearings
were held during committee meetings such as on recent developments
in Serbia, on “The legal situation and the functioning of institutions”;
on “Combating undue influence: anti-oligarch legislation in Ukraine,
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova” and on “Human rights and humanitarian
concerns as a result of the situation in the Lachin corridor”. The
committee also held joint hearings on “Threats to life and safety
of journalists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan” (with the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and the Committee on Culture,
Science, Education and Media); “SLAPPs as a threat to media pluralism
and measures implemented to counteract them” (with the Committee on
Culture, Science, Education and Media); “The financing of political
parties” (with the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy);
and “Human rights and humanitarian situation of Karabakh Armenians
and international obligations of Azerbaijan” (with the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons).
11. The Monitoring Committee submitted three country reports to
the Assembly during the reporting period: on “The honouring of obligations
and commitments by the Republic of Moldova” on “The honouring of membership
obligations to the Council of Europe by San Marino”; and on “The
honouring of membership obligations to the Council of Europe by
France”. In addition, it prepared an opinion to the report prepared
by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy on “The role
of the Council of Europe in preventing conflicts, restoring credibility
of international institutions and promoting global peace”.
12. On 5 December 2023, the Monitoring Committee considered a
draft report on “The honouring of obligations and commitments by
Azerbaijan” and adopted a draft resolution.
13. The preliminary draft reports on “The honouring of obligations
and commitments by Albania” and “The post-monitoring dialogue with
Bulgaria” were considered by the committee on 5 December 2023 in
order to be transmitted to the relevant authorities with a view
to holding debates in the Assembly in April 2024.
14. During the year 2023, the committee considered and declassified
information notes on the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Türkiye, Armenia, Poland, Georgia and Serbia.
15. The rapporteurs on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Poland and
Türkiye, made several statements on the developments in the countries
under their responsibility.
16. As in previous years, the outstanding co-operation with the
Venice Commission continued in 2023. The committee requested opinions
on the Ukrainian Law on the “prevention of threats to national security
related to the excessive influence of persons who have significant
economic or political weight in public life (Oligarchs)” (Reg. No.
5599); on the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine;
on the draft law on “Amending some legislative Acts of Ukraine that
limit the participation in State power for individuals associated
with political parties, whose activities are prohibited in accordance
with the Law”; on the Dutch Judiciary Organisation Act; on amendments
to the organic Law on Common Courts as adopted by the Georgian Parliament
on 13 June 2023; on amendments to the Law on National Minorities
(Communities) of Ukraine; as well as an urgent opinion on the Law
on the State Commission to investigate Russian Influence on the
Internal Security of the Republic of Poland in the period of 2007-2022
as well as on the amendments to this law proposed by President Duda as
adopted by the Sejm on 16 June 2023. In addition, several exchanges
of views were held with the Secretary and members of the Venice
Commission on opinions produced.
17. Reflecting the sensitive nature of its mandate, the work of
the Sub-Committee on Conflicts concerning Council of Europe Member
States has been influenced, and regrettably limited, by external
factors including the tense and often unpredictable security situation
regarding the conflicts that are part of its terms of reference. The
seminar on the human rights aspects of the Transnistrian settlement
process and the role for the Council of Europe, originally foreseen
to take place in April 2023 had to be cancelled due to transport
strikes in France. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to agree
on new dates for this seminar due to the tense security situation in
the Republic of Moldova as a result of the ongoing Russian aggression
against Ukraine. Understandably, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has
continued to be an important point of attention. Given its importance
for the overall work of the committee it was agreed to address these
issues in the framework of the plenary meetings of the committee
instead of at the more restricted level of the sub-committee. In
his function as chairperson of the sub-committee, Mr Claude Kern
(France, ALDE) was appointed rapporteur for opinion on the report
on “The role of the Council of Europe in preventing conflicts, restoring
credibility of international institutions and promoting global peace”
of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy. The committee
over the course of the next year will reflect on how to implement
the two recommendations contained in this opinion, in its overall
work. On proposal of the chairperson of the sub-committee, the Monitoring
Committee held, on 5 December 2023, an exchange of views on the
future direction of the sub-committee and its work.
18. As mentioned, in the context of its monitoring procedure for
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the committee closely followed the development
with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this context, it
held various exchanges of views with the chairpersons of both delegations
as well as, on 13 September 2023 an exchange of view with Mr Toivo
Klaar, European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus,
on “Human rights and humanitarian concerns as a result of the situation
in the Lachin corridor”. On 12 October, the committee held a joint
hearing with the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and
the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons on “Human
rights and humanitarian situation of Karabakh Armenians and international
obligations of Azerbaijan”. The committee had also agreed to send
a joint mission of the co-rapporteurs for Azerbaijan and Armenia
to the region to observe the developments regarding the conflict
on the ground. Regrettably, this joint mission could not take place
over objections by the delegation of Azerbaijan. Instead, this issue
was addressed by the respective co-rapporteurs in the context of
their monitoring visits to the countries concerned. In February
2023, the co-rapporteurs for Armenia visited Goris and Vardenis
and in June 2023 the co-rapporteurs for Azerbaijan visited Aghdam.
19. With regard to the duration of the terms of reference for
the periodic review reports, as mentioned in the previous progress
report, the current two-year reference is insufficient for the preparation
of these reports, also as a result of the specific conditions and
procedural requirements linked to the preparation of monitoring reports.
The Bureau of the Assembly subsequently decided to refer the issue
of the duration of the terms of reference for periodic review reports
to the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs
to be dealt with in the next general revision of the rules of procedure.
During the consultations on the forthcoming report on “Modification
of various provisions of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure”, the
members of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities, and
Institutional Affairs, as well as the rapporteur for this report,
Ms Ingjerd Schie Schou (Norway, EPP/CD), supported the proposal
to increase the time limit for the preparation of periodic review
reports to at least 3 years, with the possibility for a further
extension. However, the report on “Modification of various provisions
of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure” has not yet been submitted
to the Assembly. It is hoped that this will happen swiftly so that
the next periodic review reports can be prepared under this 3-year
terms of reference.
20. Also in 2023, several changes of rapporteurs took place. This
underscores the issue of the availability of monitoring rapporteurs,
as well as the time they have to carry out such intensive tasks,
that has already been highlighted in previous progress reports.
In the next progress report, the committee intends to formulate concrete
proposals for a possible revision of the current single five-year-term
limit for rapporteurs for a country under a full monitoring procedure
or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue to three three-year terms,
which would allow for the possibility of recall and for the retention
of available and competent rapporteurs for a given country that
was recommended in
Resolution
2483 (2023).
21. In his opinion
![(3)
Doc. 15824.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on the report on “The role of the
Council of Europe in preventing conflicts, restoring credibility
of international institutions, and promoting global peace”, Mr Claude
Kern highlighted the role of the reports of the Monitoring Committee
as an early warning mechanism to detect and address situations and developments
in our member States that risk posing a threat to the rule of law,
democratic security and good neighbourly relations. At the same
time, he noted that, while the reports of the Monitoring Committee
had produced the necessary early warnings and alerted the members
of the Assembly and the public at large, they rarely resulted in
any decisions of appropriate action by the Assembly or the Council
of Europe. In
Resolution 2515
(2023), the Assembly therefore decided to “strengthen the capacity
of both the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy and the
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), in particular in
terms of early warning, in line with the conclusions of the 2023
Council of Europe Summit and give consideration to mechanisms to
ensure that due account is taken of such early warnings”
![(4)
Resolution 2515 (2023), paragraph 14.3.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
. In the next year,
the Monitoring Committee intends to develop concrete proposals to
implement this decision with regard to its work. In that context,
the committee should also reflect on manners in which it can strengthen
its reactivity and ability to quickly respond to developments in member
States that are not under a full monitoring procedure, engaged in
a post-monitoring dialogue or subject to periodic review of their
obligations to the Council of Europe.
22. The progress report is an important instrument to take stock
of the progress made by member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations and, where relevant, accession commitments,
to the Council of Europe and to reflect on the development of the
monitoring procedures themselves. At the same time, the annual preparation
of these reports entails a considerable workload and demand on the
resources of the committee. I would therefore suggest that the committee
reflects on manners to strengthen the impact of the progress reports
as well as on the frequency of its presentation.
2.2. Countries
under a full monitoring procedure
2.2.1. Albania
23. On 21 March 2023, Mr Joseph
O’Reilly (Ireland, EPP/CD), whose term had ended, was replaced as rapporteur
by Mr Ionuţ-Marian Stroe (Romania, EPP/CD). From 25 to 28 September
2023, the co-rapporteurs, Mr Asim Mollazada (Azerbaijan, EC/DA)
and Mr Ionuţ-Marian Stroe made a fact-finding visit to Albania.
During their stay, in addition to meetings in Tirana, they also
visited Fier, Vlore and Himara to see at first-hand the results
of the administrative territorial reform that aimed to strengthen
local self-government in the country, as well as the situation of
minority communities in these areas.
24. As welcomed by the co-rapporteurs in their statement following
their visit, in 2023 Albania has continued to make marked and tangible
progress in honouring its obligations and commitments to the Council
of Europe. At the same time, a number of concerns remain to be addressed
and a more consistent implementation of the key reforms that have
been adopted is necessary.
25. The extreme polarisation of the political environment is continuing
unabated and remains a point of concern. Following the parliamentary
elections in 2021, the systemic political crisis that had plagued
the country for many years has been largely subdued although many
of its causes remain unaddressed. The political polarisations are
compounded by a fragmented opposition, also as the result of a leadership
crisis within the main opposition party. The combination of the
political polarisation and the fragmentation of the opposition is
undermining parliamentary oversight and proper functioning of the
system of checks and balances, which are essential for the democratic
consolidation of the country.
26. The vetting procedure for all judges and prosecutors in Albania,
which is a key component of the reform of the judiciary, and the
efforts to combat the persistent corruption and influence of organised
crime in the country, have continued unabated in 2023. By 30 September
2023, 694 out of a total of 805 judge and prosecutor positions had
been vetted. The results of the vetting procedure have been dramatic.
Over 62% of all the persons vetted were dismissed, mostly because
they failed to justify their assets, or resigned to avoid the vetting
process. This result underscores both the importance and need for
the vetting procedure. As a result of the enormous caseload, the
deadline for the Independent Qualification Commission to finish
the vetting process was extended until 31 December 2024. The Independent
Qualification Commission has stated that they expect to finalise
their work within this deadline. The deadline for possible appeals
to be finalised is 17 June 2026.
27. The Specialised Structure for Anti-Corruption and Organised
Crime is now fully functional and starts to deliver tangible results,
including on high-level cases. On 25 September 2023, the Specialised
Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Court sentenced 7 officials,
including a former Minister of Environment of the ruling majority,
to lengthy prison sentences for corruption in the so-called incinerator
scandal. It is now important that these first tangible results become
a non-reversible trend, which will show that there is no longer
any impunity for corrupt behaviour in Albania.
28. Local elections that took place on 14 May 2023 were widely
seen as a barometer for the political sentiment at national level.
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of
Europe observed these elections and concluded that they had been
well organised but characterised by continued deep polarisation
between the main political forces, with national issues dominating
the campaign. Similar to what had already been noted in the 2021
parliamentary elections, abuse of administrative resources and consistent reports
of vote buying and pressure on public-sector workers were reported.
This is a trend that is to be deplored.
29. The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) adopted its Fifth
Opinion on Albania on 6 June 2023. In this report, the Advisory
Committee welcomed the diverse, multicultural society of Albania
that has a strong history of interreligious dialogue and tolerance. However
it deplored that three essential by-laws to implement the Law on
the Protection of Minorities had not yet been adopted, more than
five years after the adoption of the law in 2017, which impeded
its implementation. The authorities are urged to adopt the missing
by-laws, following consultation with the Advisory Committee, without
further delay.
30. In a welcome development, on 27 October 2023, the Financial
Action Task Force removed Albania from the so-called “grey list”
of countries that are under increased monitoring to address systemic
deficiencies to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and
proliferation financing.
31. The co-rapporteurs have prepared a preliminary draft report
on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania that
was considered by the committee during its meeting in Rome on 4
and 5 December 2023. In line with the rules governing the preparation
of Monitoring reports it was subsequently sent to the Albanian authorities
for comments and is expected to be presented to the plenary Assembly
during the 2024 April part-session.
2.2.2. Armenia
32. During the whole reporting
period, the conflict with Azerbaijan and the fate of the ethnic
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh overshadowed other topics
in Armenia. At the end of 2022, the Lachin corridor – the only road
connecting Armenia with the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh,
placed under the responsibility of Russian peacekeeping forces –
was closed by the Azerbaijani authorities. Armenia appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights and to the International Court of
Justice for interim measures. Despite the decisions of these two
international tribunals, the blockade continued, and the ethnic
Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region suffered shortage
of food, medical and energy supplies. Just when diplomatic negotiations
seemed to allow for some humanitarian relief to enter the territory,
Azerbaijan decided to resort to military force to overtake the territory
inhabited by ethnic Armenians and placed under the protection of
Russian peacekeeping forces. As the Azerbaijani troops entered the
territory on 20 September 2023, almost all the local population
fled to Armenia in a matter of days. Armenia had to organise the
resettlement of more than 100 000 refugees, representing roughly
3 % of its population.
33. The reaction of Armenia to this incredible challenge is commendable.
The refugees have been provided with housing and emergency support,
thanks to the measures taken by the authorities and the solidarity
of the population. However, in the long term, Armenia will need
more international support. The committee endorses the call by the
Commissioner for Human Rights “on Council of Europe member states
to provide full support to ensure the sustainability of the necessary
assistance to respond to the needs of the persons recently displaced to
Armenia, especially in relation to their medium and long-term situation.”
34. International support to the negotiations on a comprehensive
peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also paramount.
On 14 May 2023, Armenian and Azerbaijan leaders confirmed their
unequivocal commitment to the 1991 Almaty Declaration and the respective
territorial integrity of Armenia (29 800 km2)
and Azerbaijan (86 600 km2) during a
meeting in Brussels hosted by European Council President Charles
Michel. This means that the administrative borders of the ex-Soviet
republics are now the State borders of the countries, and thus,
their inviolability must be respected. Establishment of transport
links in the region on a mutually agreed basis and in the respect
of the sovereignty of all parties is extremely important for the economic
development and the long-term stability of the region, as stated
by
Resolution 2517 (2023).
35. These developments of extraordinary importance for the Armenian
society have not impaired the determination to continue improving,
in line with international standards the functioning of the country’s democratic
institutions and its respect for human rights and the rule of law.
36. On 17 September 2023, local elections were held for the city
council of Yerevan. These elections have nationwide relevance as
a third of the Armenian electorate is registered to vote in Yerevan.
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which observed these
elections, welcomed the peaceful and well-managed election day and
highlighted the important efforts undertaken by the Central Electoral
Commission to reduce the possibility of fraud and to reinforce the
trust of voters in electoral processes. The head of the Congress’ delegation
stated: “We were satisfied to see some of our recommendations being
addressed on the ground and welcomed the wide acceptance of the
results by all contestants”.
37. On 9 October 2023, the Venice Commission issued an opinion
on draft amendments to the electoral code requested by the Armenian
authorities. The Venice Commission considered that: “The proposed
draft amendments demonstrate a continued effort to bring the electoral
legislation in line with international obligations and Council of
Europe standards (…)”. However, some previous recommendations by
the Venice Commission have not been followed and further changes
are needed to address them. That said, the Venice Commission concluded
that “many of the proposed amendments are positive and a welcome
improvement, in particular, with respect to transparency and accessibility
of elections, equal campaign conditions for all contestants, as
well as the structure and functioning of the Central Electoral Commission.”
38. During their visit in Yerevan from 6 to 8 November 2023, the
co-rapporteurs discussed the topic of electoral law with political
parties, members of government and the Central Electoral Commission.
In their view, progress regarding the integrity of the electoral
progress is striking. Their conclusions and recommendations will
be outlined in their next monitoring report.
39. In December 2022, upon request from the Armenian authorities,
the Venice Commission issued an opinion on the draft Constitutional
Law on making supplements and amendments to the Constitutional Law
on the Judicial Code. The Venice Commission “welcomed the openness
of the Armenian authorities to a genuine dialogue with the Council
of Europe, and their continued effort to improve the system of judicial
governance in line with the European standards, within the boundaries
set by the national Constitution, and in view of the overall legal
and political context of the country.”
40. The issue of disciplinary liability of judges is central in
order to improve the situation of the judiciary. The use of disciplinary
measures to address the allegations of corruption among members
of the judiciary has been preferred over a vetting procedure for
the whole judiciary after consultations with Council of Europe’s
expert bodies. Independent institutions have been established, such
as the Ethics and Disciplinary Committee of the General Assembly
of Judges, but it still has to fully seize the mandate it has received.
In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice keeps the power to initiate
disciplinary proceedings, raising concerns over the political neutrality
of the disciplinary procedure. A draft reform of the Ethics and
Disciplinary Committee has been submitted to the Venice Commission
for opinion by the Ministry of Justice. The co-rapporteurs have
urged the authorities to address any concerns and recommendations
raised by the Venice Commission in its forthcoming opinion.
41. The fight against corruption is a priority for the government
and several important steps have been taken in this regard. Two
new bodies have been created over the last three years: the Corruption
Prevention Commission and the Anti-Corruption Agency. These bodies
have strong mandates and real powers. Over the last years, high-ranking
officials, including ministers of the current government, have been
arrested on corruption charges. Wages of judges, prosecutors and
investigators have been raised. A reform of the road police has
almost eliminated petty corruption. However, systemic problems remain
to be tackled and the authorities have just adopted the 2023-2026
anticorruption strategy to this end.
2.2.3. Azerbaijan
42. In 2022, the Monitoring Committee
focused on the preparation of a monitoring report on Azerbaijan.
The co-rapporteurs, Mr Ian Liddell-Granger (United Kingdom, EC/DA)
and Ms Lise Christoffersen (Norway, SOC) visited the country (Baku
and Aghdam) in June 2023.
![(5)
See <a href='https://rm.coe.int/pace-rapporteurs-issues-of-serious-concern-persist-in-azerbaijan-despi/1680ab983e'>a
statement</a> published following their visit on 13 June 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
At
its meeting on 13 September 2023, the committee considered a preliminary
draft report and on 5 December 2023, it considered the final draft
report and adopted a draft resolution.
43. A number of concerns pointed out in Assembly
Resolution 2184 (2017) with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law,
and human rights remain unaddressed. As regards pluralist democracy,
the Law on political parties of 16 December 2022, criticised by
the Venice Commission and the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), might have a chilling effect on pluralism
in the country and following its entry into force, some political
parties faced difficulties in re-registering.
44. Regarding respect for the rule of law, further measures are
needed to combat corruption and ensure full independence of the
judiciary, in line with the recommendations of the Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO). However, the reform of the Judicial
Legal Council (JLC), approved by the parliament on 9 June 2023,
is to be welcomed. Following its adoption, the composition of the
JLC no longer includes a representative appointed by the President
of Azerbaijan; the Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the Supreme
Court are no longer its ex officio members;
and its chairman can only be elected from amongst its judge members.
The number of judges in the JLC has been increased and now 9 of
the 15 members of the JLC are elected by the Conference of Judges
and one member is appointed by the Constitutional Court.
45. The human rights situation has regrettably not improved in
the past year. Serious concerns remain about the restrictions on
the rights to freedom of expression, of association and of assembly
(which have a negative impact on the overall situation of civil
society) as well as on the use of torture or ill-treatment by law
enforcement authorities and poor conditions of detention. The co-rapporteurs
on Azerbaijan also expressed concerns about the continuing presence
of prisoners allegedly detained on politically motivated charges.
Moreover, in its
Resolution
2494 (2023) “Implementation of judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights”
![(6)
Adopted
on 26 April 2023, see Doc. 15742, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, rapporteur: Mr Constantinos Efstathiou (Cyprus, SOC).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
of
26 April 2023, the Assembly noted that Azerbaijan was one of the
countries having the highest number of non-implemented Court judgments
and still facing serious structural or complex problems, some of
which had not been resolved for over ten years. In
Resolution 2509 (2023) “Transnational repression as a growing threat to the
rule of law and human rights”, it condemned the use by Azerbaijani
authorities of certain transnational repression techniques such
as renditions and cross-border abductions, mainly against journalists.
![(7)
Adopted on 23 June
2023, see Doc. 15787, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, rapporteur: Sir Christopher Chope (United Kingdom, EC/DA).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
As
stressed in
Resolution
2513 (2023) “Pegasus and similar spyware and secret state surveillance”,
there is “strong evidence” that Azerbaijan used the Pegasus spyware
against journalists and civil society activists, including in connection
with the conflict with Armenia.
![(8)
Adopted on 11 October
2023, see Doc. 15825, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, rapporteur: Mr Pieter Omtzigt (Netherlands, EPP/CD).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
46. As regards its conflict with Armenia, the Monitoring Committee
and its co-rapporteurs closely followed the humanitarian and human
rights situation in the Lachin corridor.
![(9)
See the <a href='https://pace.coe.int/en/news/8930/pace-monitors-urge-the-restoration-of-freedom-of-movement-along-the-lachin-corridor'>statement</a> of 16 December 2022 and the <a href='https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9065/the-lachin-corridor-statement-by-the-pace-monitors-for-azerbaijan-and-armenia'>statement</a> of 26 April 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
On 13 September
2023, during its meeting in Paris, the committee held an exchange
of views with Mr Toivo Klaar, European Union Special Representative
for the South Caucasus. The Assembly also examined this issue in
Resolution 2508 (2023) “Ensuring free and safe access through the Lachin Corridor”
of 22 June 2023
![(10)
See
also report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced
Persons (Doc. 15796), rapporteur: Mr Paul Gavan (Ireland, UEL).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
and
in
Resolution 2517 (2023) “Humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh” of 12 October
2023.
![(11)
See also
report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons
(Doc. 15840), rapporteur: Mr Domagoj Hajduković (Croatia, SOC).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
In
the latter, it condemned the military operation launched by the
Azerbaijani army on 19 September 2023 and regretted that almost
the entire Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh (more than 100 600
persons) had left this region and had fled to Armenia, which led
to allegations of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly thus did not exclude
the possibility of initiating a complementary joint procedure.
2.2.4. Bosnia
and Herzegovina
47. The reporting period marked
a return to functionality for most of the main institutions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee, Mr Zsolt
Németh (Hungary, EC/AD) and Mr Aleksandar Nikoloski (North Macedonia,
EPP/CD) undertook a visit to Sarajevo and Banja Luka in September 2023.
The co-rapporteurs concluded that following the decision of the
European Council on 15 December 2022 to officially grant candidate
status to the country, a political momentum now exists in the country,
after many years of political stalemate and stagnation, to implement
the reforms called for by the Council of Europe and the European
Union.
48. Following the parliamentary elections which took place in
October 2022, the State Council of Ministers was appointed in January
2023 supported by a ruling coalition including the Alliance of Independent
Social Democrats (SNSD), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (H DZ BiH), and the troika (Social Democratic Party
(SPD), People and Justice Party (NiP), Naša Stranka). Ms Borjana
Krišto (HDZ BiH) was designated chairwoman of the Council of Ministers,
knowing that it is the first time that this position is occupied
by a woman. New legislative assemblies were fully formed by March
2023, and a State budget for 2023 was adopted. The Council of Ministers
adopted a strategy on organised crime, and action plans on anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, as well as
on migration and on terrorism. Important laws on integrity in the
judiciary, torture prevention and freedom of access to information
were subsequently adopted in August and September 2023, offering
a welcome contrast with the poor legislative output of the former
parliament.
49. However, the constitutional framework and the electoral legislation
are still in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
since the 2009 judgment in the case of Sejdić and Finci. On 7 June
2023, the Committee of Ministers exhorted the political leaders
and all relevant authorities to “take all actions required to ensure
the adoption of the constitutional and legislative amendments aimed
at eliminating discrimination based on ethnic affiliation in elections
for the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
In its 2023 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission
noted that: “No steps were taken by the Parliament […] to remove
from the Constitution any ethnic and residence-based discrimination
in voting rights, in line with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
rulings. The country needs urgently to finalise the pending constitutional
and electoral reforms. These reforms should be advanced as an utmost
priority.”
50. The co-rapporteurs continued to maintain their dialogue with
elected representatives of all communities. Several of these interlocutors
explained that a solution to this fundamental issue could be at
hand and avenues for reform have been discussed. The Monitoring
Committee will follow very closely the developments in this regard
as reforming the electoral legislation and the Constitution is critical
for the future of a democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.
51. Regarding the electoral regulation, all stakeholders advocated
for a reform improving the integrity of the electoral process. Allegations
of fraud during 2022 elections have not been quieted by the rulings
of the Central Election Commission. The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR
have issued a number of recommendations in this regard, and the
necessary legislation must be adopted in a near future.
52. The repartition of State property between State and other
levels of authority (Entities and Cantons) needs to find an acceptable
and sustainable solution, but the positions seem hard to reconcile.
The Constitutional Court twice annulled legislation adopted in Republika
Srpska on this topic, after the High Representative had suspended
them. As a reaction, the authorities in Republika Srpska have ruled
that decisions of the High Representative would not be implemented
and challenged the authority of the Constitutional Court. The relations
between the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Office of the
High Representative have become extremely tense, to the point that
the President of Republika Srpska, Mr Milorad Dodik, has been indicted
for refusing to implement the High Representative’s decisions. The
functioning of the Constitutional court is further put in jeopardy
by the failure from both Entities’ parliaments to elect new judges. The
retirement of one of the judges in January 2024 could put the institution
in a stalemate, whereas the proper functioning of the Court is vital
for the respect of the rule of law and the protection of the rights
of citizens.
53. In September 2023, amendments to the law on the High Judicial
and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) were adopted in order to establish
integrity checks for judges, prosecutors and HJPC members. These
amendments constitute an important and welcome step, however the
adopted draft has been criticised by the president of the HJPC on
several points that did not satisfy the Venice Commission recommendations,
and the co-rapporteurs have been told that further modifications
would be adopted to satisfy these remarks.
54. On 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted the 2023
Enlargement Package, providing its detailed assessment of the state
of play and the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina on the path towards
accession to the European Union. While acknowledging the positive
dynamic since the elections, the Commission recalled the urgency
of adopting important rule of law and judicial reforms and moving
forward with constitutional and electoral reforms. The Commission
recommends opening EU accession negotiations once the necessary
degree of compliance is achieved. This underlines how much Bosnia
and Herzegovina is facing a decisive moment: the country has the
opportunity to make swift progress on reforms vital for stability and
prosperity while its institutions face significant challenges endangering
their viability.
2.2.5. Georgia
55. The co-rapporteurs for Georgia,
Mr Claude Kern (France, ALDE) and Ms Edite Estrela (Portugal, SOC) undertook
a fact-finding visit to Georgia from 27 to 29 March 2023. To recall,
following Georgia’s application for EU membership, which it made
together with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the European Commission
decided, in June 2022, that Georgia should be provided with a membership
perspective, and that candidate status could be granted when the
country had satisfactorily addressed 12 conditions, also known as priority
areas. Addressing these conditions or priority areas, which largely
coincide with the concerns and recommendations of the Assembly expressed
in
Resolution 2438 (2022), has been the key priority for the country in 2023.
56. Regrettably, the political climate in Georgia has remained
extremely polarised and co-operation and dialogue between opposition
and ruling majority seems few and far between. This has had a large
impact on the implementation of the different reforms in the country,
including those needed to obtain EU candidate status. The reform
process is cumbersome, despite progress in some areas. Regrettably,
the reforms implemented often seem to only partially address key
concerns and recommendations.
57. In a development that underscored the continuing political
polarisation in the country, on 1 September 2023, the ruling party
announced that it would start impeachment proceedings against President
Salome Zurabishvili as, in their view, she had violated the Constitution
by making a series of visits to European Union countries, to lobby
for Georgia to be granted EU candidate status, without the government’s
approval. Subsequently, on 12 September 2023, 80 MPs from the ruling
majority filed a formal complaint with Georgia’s Constitutional
Court. Following 3 days of reportedly acrimonious meetings, which
mainly centred on the constitutional articles governing the President’s
visits, the Constitutional Court ruled, with 6 votes in favour and 3
against, that President Zurabishvili had breached the Constitution
by making working visits abroad without the government’s approval.
This opened the possibility for the parliament to vote on the President’s impeachment.
On 18 October 2023, the motion of the ruling majority to impeach
the President failed to obtain the required 100 votes in favour
in the parliament, thereby ending the impeachment proceedings.
58. On 6 March 2023, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Georgian
Parliament, on initiative of the ruling majority, adopted a draft
law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. This draft law bore uncanny
similarities with the Russian foreign agents’ law and the Hungarian
“anti-Soros laws” and led to an outcry within the Georgian society
and raised grave concerns within the international community, including
the Assembly, who questioned the compatibility of the draft law
with European democratic and human rights standards. In a welcome
development, in response to the increasingly widespread protests
within the Georgian population, the ruling majority announced that
it would no longer support the draft law, which was subsequently
voted down in the parliament.
59. On 30 November 2022, the term of the previous Public Defender
(Ombudsperson), Ms Nino Lomjaria, came to an end. According to legal
provisions, the Public Defender is appointed by the Georgian Parliament with
a qualified 3/5 majority (90 votes). In a welcome development, on
7 March 2023, the Georgian Parliament, reached an agreement on a
consensual candidate and elected Mr Levan Ioseliani as the new Public
Defender for a (non-renewable) six-year term. Until his election
as Ombudsperson, Mr Ioseliani was an opposition member in the Georgian
Parliament and a member of the Georgian delegation to the Assembly.
60. Georgia has been historically at the forefront of the fight
against corruption. However, international anti-corruption bodies,
including GRECO, have warned the Georgian authorities against complacency
and urged them to further strengthen the legal framework and institutional
mechanisms to fight corruption at all levels. Fighting corruption
and undue influence of financial interest have been 2 of the 12
conditions set by the EU for Georgia’s candidate status. In response,
the Georgian Parliament,
inter alia,
established an Anti-Corruption Bureau and adopted a draft law on
de-oligarchisation. The latter was sent to the Venice Commission
for opinion. In its opinion,
![(12)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)009-e'>CDL-AD(2023)009</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the Venice Commission expressed
misgivings about the so-called “personal approach” taken in this
law which it felt was overbroad, raised questions about its compatibility
with the Convention and was open for political abuse in the highly
polarised political environment in the country. The Venice Commission
therefore recommended a so-called systemic approach that would focus
on strengthening the legal tools and institutional mechanisms to
fight corruption and excessive political influence by vested economic
interests. Subsequently, in a welcome development, the Georgian
Parliament, on initiative of the ruling majority, voted down the
draft de-oligarchisation law in third reading on 20 September 2023
and on 27 November 2023 adopted a de-oligarchisation strategy (Action
Plan on Avoiding Excessive Influence of Interests in Political,
Economic and Public Life in Georgia), based on the systemic approach
recommended by the Venice Commission and the European Commission.
61. The deepening of the reform of the judiciary, with a view
to ensuring its genuine impartiality and independence has been a
priority for the Assembly as expressed in
Resolution 2438 (2022), and one of the 12 priority areas defined by the European
Commission. Regrettably, only scant progress has been made in this respect.
As noted in
Resolution
2438 (2022), the functioning of the High Council of Justice is one
of the main obstacles that impedes the independence and impartiality
of the judiciary. A far-reaching reform of this judicial institution
and its decision-making process is therefore essential. On 13 June
2023, the Georgian Parliament adopted a series of amendments to
the Organic Law on Common Courts. On 23 June 2023, the Monitoring Committee
requested an opinion of the Venice Commission on these amendments.
In its opinion,
![(13)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)033-e'>CDL-AD(2023)033</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the Venice Commission concluded
that, despite some improvements, these amendments could not be considered
as the comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice as recommended
by the Venice Commission and the Assembly.
62. On 5 October 2023, the Georgian Parliament adopted, via accelerated
procedure, an amendment to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations
that allows the police to prohibit the erection of temporary structures, like
tents, during demonstrations and assemblies if they,
inter alia, are deemed to pose a
threat to the safety of participants or to disrupt public order.
On 18 October 2023, President Zurabishvili vetoed the amendments citing
concerns about their infringement on the fundamental freedoms of
assembly and expression. On the same day, citing the same concerns,
the Georgian Ombudsperson requested an opinion of the OSCE/ODIHR on
these amendments. On 10 November 2023, the OSCE/ODIHR issued its
urgent opinion
![(14)
<a href='https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/2023-11/2023-11-06 FINAL ODIHR Urgent Opinion on 2023 Draft Amendments to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations of Georgia_ENGLISH.pdf'>Urgent
opinion</a> on proposed amendments to the Law on Assemblies and
Demonstrations and to the Administrative Offences Code.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on
these amendments in which it concluded that “the draft amendments
would not fulfil the strict requirements under international law
when restricting the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Consequently,
their adoption should not be pursued”. The Georgian authorities
are therefore urged to withdraw these amendments.
63. On 19 October 2023, the Georgian Parliament adopted a series
of amendments to the Law on Broadcasting to bring Georgia’s legislation
in line with the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive. These controversial
amendments, adopted via accelerated procedure, expand the powers
of the national media regulator, the Georgian National Communications
Commission. Civil society organisations and media stakeholders have
expressed concern about these amendments which in their view could
be abused to limit freedom of the media and stifle critical broadcasters.
On 21 February 2023, the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule
of Law of the Council of Europe provided an expertise
![(15)
<a href='https://rm.coe.int/eng-georgia-legal-opinion-law-on-broadcasting-feb2023-2777-8422-2983-1/1680aac48e'>DGI(2023)1</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on the original law – so before
the October amendments were adopted – in which it considered that
the Law on Broadcasting does not align with EU and Council of Europe
standards and a number of provisions would likely be in breach of
Article 10 of the Convention. In addition, it underscored that the
national regulatory authority could not be considered an independent
institution according to Council of Europe standards on the independence
of regulatory bodies. The October amendments do not seem to have
addressed the concerns and recommendations of the Council of Europe
expressed in this expertise and in some cases reportedly aggravated
them. Also, in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections
in Georgia in 2024, the Assembly should urge the Georgian authorities to
request a follow-up expertise from the Council of Europe and fully
address any concerns and recommendations therein, as well as that
of the previous expertise.
64. In a welcome and important development, the European Commission
recommended
![(16)
2023 <a href='https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2023-communication-eu-enlargement-policy_en'>Communication</a> on EU Enlargement Policy.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on 8 November 2023,
to grant candidate status to Georgia on the clear understanding
that the following concrete steps are taken by the country: “(1)
Fight disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference
against the EU and its values; (2) Improve Georgia’s alignment with
the EU common foreign and security policy; (3) Further address the
issue of political polarisation, including through more inclusive
legislative work with opposition parties in Parliament, notably
on legislation related to Georgia’s European integration; (4) Ensure
a free, fair and competitive electoral process, notably in 2024,
and fully address OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Finalise electoral
reforms, including ensuring adequate representation of the electorate, well
in advance of election day; (5) Further improve the implementation
of parliamentary oversight notably of the security services. Ensure
institutional independence and impartiality of key institutions,
notably the Election Administration, the National Bank, and the
Communications Commission; (6) Complete and implement a holistic
and effective judicial reform, including a comprehensive reform
of the High Council of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office, fully
implementing Venice Commission recommendations and following a transparent
and inclusive process; (7) Further address the effectiveness and
ensure the institutional independence and impartiality of the Anti-Corruption
Bureau, the Special Investigative Service and the Personal Data
Protection Service. Address Venice Commission recommendations related
to these bodies, in an inclusive process. Establish a strong track
record in investigating corruption and organised crime cases; (8)
Improve the current action plan to implement a multi-sectorial,
systemic approach to deoligarchisation, in line with Venice Commission
recommendations and following a transparent and inclusive process
involving opposition parties and civil society; (9) Improve the
protection of human rights including by implementing an ambitious
human rights strategy and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression.
Launch impartial, effective and timely investigations in cases of
threats against safety of vulnerable groups, media professionals
and civil society activists, and bring organisers and perpetrators
of violence to justice. Consult and engage with civil society, allowing
for their meaningful involvement in legislative and policy-making
processes and ensure they can operate freely”.
65. With this recommendation, the European Commission recognised
the reform efforts undertaken by the country and the overwhelming
support of the Georgian population for European integration and
EU membership. At the same time, the Commission underscored that
the ongoing polarisation and lack of co-operation between political
actors – as well as obstacles to the involvement of civil society
– had hindered the decision-making processes and implementation
of important reforms, as evident from the fact that only 3 out of
the 12 priority areas had been fully addressed.
![(17)
To consolidate efforts
to enhance gender equality and fight violence against women; to
adopt legislation so that Georgian courts proactively take into
account European Court of Human Rights judgments in their deliberations;
and to ensure that an independent person is given preference in
the process of nominating a new Public Defender (Ombudsperson) and
that this process is conducted in a transparent manner and ensure
the Office’s effective institutional independence.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
The
Commission therefore urged the stakeholders to step up their efforts
to overcome the extreme political polarisation and called for a
more positive engagement by the ruling party with opposition parties
and civil society.
66. The Assembly has repeatedly reiterated its full support for
Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally
recognised borders and expressed its concern and condemnation of
the illegal occupation and creeping annexation by the Russian Federation
of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South
Ossetia that cause a dire security, humanitarian and human rights
situation on the ground, with increased illegal militarisation and
restrictions on freedom of movement. The human costs and risks of
this illegal occupation for the human rights situation on the ground
were sadly underscored when, on 6 November 2023, the Russian occupation
forces killed a Georgian citizen when trying to arrest him near
the administrative boundary line with the Tskhinvali region/South
Ossetia. This deplorable action by military troops of the Russian
Federation should be condemned in the strongest possible terms.
2.2.6. Hungary
67. In its
Resolution 2460 (2022), the Assembly concluded that the cumulative effects
of the measures that negatively impact the independence of the judiciary,
the situation of media, transparency and accountability of State
institutions overall undermined the functioning of democratic institutions
in Hungary. As a consequence, the Assembly decided to open a monitoring
procedure in respect of Hungary. The Monitoring Committee appointed
Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross (Estonia, ALDE) and Mr George Papandreou (Greece,
SOC) as co-rapporteurs in January and March 2023.
68. The Assembly at that time urged the Hungarian authorities
to strengthen the self-governance of the judicial system and guarantee
its independence more effectively, in line with the recommendations
of the Venice Commission. With regard to the media environment,
the Assembly concluded that the great market concentration resulting
from the creation in 2018 of the Central European Press and Media
Foundation (KESMA) – a conglomerate of 470 media outlets – and the
overwhelming distribution of advertising by the State or State-owned
companies to pro-governmental media have distorted media pluralism
and amounted to State capture of media. The Assembly also called
on the Hungarian authorities to repeal the legislation criminalising
the dissemination of false information which threaten journalists
with a three-year prison sentence.
69. In its resolution, the Assembly also expressed concerns regarding
new legal structures known as “public interest trusts”. These private
structures are tasked to provide public services in the areas of
higher education, healthcare, and the management of public assets.
Most universities and significant amounts of national assets have
been transferred to these trusts. They are managed by a board appointed
by the government, and once established, the Hungarian State has
no power of control over these structures, depriving the parliament
of its budgetary control function and of the possibility to oversee
the policies implemented.
70. In December 2022, the European Union decided to impose measures
against the consequences of breaches of the principles of the rule
of law, concerning public procurement, the effectiveness of prosecutorial action
and the fight against corruption in Hungary. Among the remedial
measures that Hungary has to fulfil, four aim at restoring the independence
of the judiciary and one deals with the transparency of public interest trusts.
On 3 May 2023, the Hungarian Parliament adopted, after consultation
with the European Commission, a judicial reform to address some
of these demands. The European Commission is currently assessing
the practical implementation of these reforms before making a conclusion
on the fulfilment of the conditions. On 30 October 2023, the government
announced it has decided to launch a national consultation over
the disputes with EU institutions. On 15 November 2023, the General
Affairs Council of the EU discussed the issue of respect for EU
values in Hungary. The Commission informed ministers about the progress
made, and remaining steps to be taken, with regard to the judicial
independence and the fight against corruption in Hungary since the
last hearing. At the same time it highlighted its continuing and
serious concerns related to, inter alia,
media independence and pluralism, the rights of migrants and persons
belonging to minorities, including LGBTI persons, pressure on civil
society and the extensive use of emergency powers by the government.
71. The Assembly also expressed concern over the fact that the
country has been ruled under a special legal order since 2020. The
Fundamental Law was amended to allow the government to trigger a
“state of danger” in “the event of an armed conflict, war situation
or humanitarian catastrophe in a neighbouring country”. Since then,
an uninterrupted state of danger has been in place in Hungary, on
the ground of the war in Ukraine. On 6 November 2023, the state
of danger was extended by parliament until 23 May 2024. According
to
Resolution 2460 (2022): “the Assembly recalls that the use of special legal
orders must be restricted to what is strictly necessary and proportionate
and must be limited in time. It also stresses that parliamentary
oversight, political deliberations involving all political forces
in the parliament and proper checks and balances are crucial in
times of crisis.”
72. On 21 November 2023, the Hungarian Parliament started consideration
of a bill on “defence of sovereignty” which potential effects on
the functioning of democratic institutions have raised concerns
both in Hungary and internationally. The co-rapporteurs have urged
the Hungarian Parliament to postpone the consideration of this bill
until an opinion from the Venice commission has been issued,
![(18)
<a href='https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9289/hungary-should-submit-the-bill-on-the-defence-of-national-sovereignty-to-the-venice-commission-pace-monitors-say'>Statement</a> by the co-rapporteurs (27 November 2023).<a href=''></a>](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
and the Commissioner for Human Rights
considered that the bill posed “a significant risk to human rights
and should be abandoned.”
![(19)
<a href='https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/hungary-the-proposal-for-a-defence-of-national-sovereignty-package-should-be-abandoned'>Statement</a> by the Commissioner for Human Rights (27 November 2023).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
2.2.7. Republic
of Moldova
73. On 26 January 2023, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2484
(2023) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by the
Republic of Moldova, based on a report prepared by the co-rapporteurs
Mr Pierre-Alain Fridez (Switzerland, SOC) and Ms Inese Lībiņa-Egnere
(Latvia, EPP/CD). On 20 June 2023, the committee appointed Ms Zanda
Kalniņa-Lukaševica (Latvia, EPP/CD) as co-rapporteur to replace
Ms Lībiņa-Egnere, who had left the Assembly. As a result of the
change of rapporteurs, as well as due to domestic and international developments,
no monitoring visit took place in 2023.
74. In
Resolution 2484
(2023), the Assembly welcomed the current authorities’ commitment
to European integration and programme of far-reaching reforms, notably
with regard to the judiciary and fight against corruption, aimed
at tackling the roots of “State capture” and restoring the integrity
of and public trust in State institutions. At the same time, the
Assembly expressed concern about the manner and speed with which reforms
were drafted and implemented, and officials in State institutions
and independent bodies appointed. This was affecting the transparency
and inclusiveness of the reform process. The Assembly therefore
urged the authorities to ensure that the reforms are implemented,
and persons appointed, in accordance with legal provisions and Council
of Europe standards and based on an inclusive bi-partisan consultation
process. This was essential to ensure a wide cross-border support
for, and acceptance of, the reform programme among the Moldovan
society.
75. The reform of the judiciary is a key priority for the Republic
of Moldova. Considerable progress has been made with the implementation
of this reform. A key component of the justice reform, as well as
fight against corruption and state capture, is a pre-vetting process
for the candidates for the Superior Council of Magistrates and Superior
Council of Prosecutors – the main self-governing bodies of the judiciary
– and for their specialised bodies. The Commission for the Assessment
of Judges’ and Prosecutors’ Activities (“Pre-Vetting Commission”)
was set up in April 2022 and is composed of national and international
members. It finalised the vetting of the candidates in January 2023,
with only eight passing the vetting – five judge candidates and
three non-judge candidates. On 30 March 2023, the parliament adopted
a law on the external evaluation of sitting judges and candidates
for the Supreme Court of Justice, on the same basis as for the Superior
Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. When
this draft law was announced in February 2023, 20 of the 25 Supreme
Court of Justice judges resigned in protest. However, this did not
affect the adoption of the law and judges from lower-level courts
were transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice to assure its functioning.
In July 2023, the parliament adopted a law extending the pre-vetting
procedure to all judges and prosecutors in high-level positions.
This law was further amended to address Venice Commission recommendations.
These amendments were sent to the Venice Commission for opinion
in September 2023. In its follow-up opinion,
![(20)
<a href='https://venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)035-e'>CDL-AD(2023)035</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
adopted during its session on 6
and 7 October 2023, the Venice Commission welcomed that all its
recommendations had been addressed in these amendments but recommended
that a “provision ensuring the principle of non-retroactivity of
law, which was present at the drafting stage of the Law, be reintroduced
in the final text of the Law.”
![(21)
ibid, paragraph 26.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Given
the sensitivity of this matter, it is important that the authorities
fully implement any Venice Commission recommendations on these amendments.
76. In a welcome development, on 30 March 2023, a new law on the
Supreme Court of Justice which changes and reduces its composition
was adopted in line with Venice Commission recommendations.
77. The Republic of Moldova has continued its efforts to combat
the pervasive corruption in the country. The Law on Whistle-blowers
was amended to strengthen the protection for whistle-blowers. The
fight against the state capture and excessive influence by oligarchs
and financial interests in public life is a key challenge for the
country and a key condition for the opening of accession negotiations
with the European Union. In order to address this issue, the authorities
produced a draft law “on limiting excessive economic and political
influence in public life (de-oligarchisation)” that was based on
the oligarch legislation adopted by the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada.
As it was the case for the Ukrainian Law and similar legislation
in Georgia, the Venice Commission expressed misgivings about the
so-called “personal approach” taken in this law which raised questions
about its compatibility with international standards including the
European Convention on Human Rights and was vulnerable to political
abuse. The Venice Commission therefore recommended the adoption
of a so-called systemic approach that would focus on strengthening
the existing legal tools and institutional mechanisms to fight corruption
and excessive political influence by vested economic interests.
This was followed by the authorities: in May 2023, following public
consultation, they adopted an action plan to strengthen existing
mechanisms and tools to fight the excessive influence of oligarchic
interest in public life.
78. With regard to elections, a new electoral code was adopted
in December 2022 that went into force in January 2023. This new
legislation addresses a number of recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR
and Venice Commission regarding the previous election legislation.
79. On 19 June 2023, the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Moldova found the Şor Party to be unconstitutional as a result
of the fact that the party and its leaders had persistently engaged
in actions that were detrimental to the sovereignty and independence
of the Republic of Moldova. Subsequently, on 31 July 2023, the Moldovan
Parliament adopted a series of amendments to the electoral legislation
introducing the possibility to ban for five years, members of the
executive body and members who hold an elected office of political
parties that have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court. These amendments were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court on 3 October 2023. The day after the Constitutional Court decision,
new amendments were introduced – and later adopted – by the parliament
that in its view would allow the banning of certain members of unconstitutional
parties, but in line with the Constitutional Court decision. As
noted by the Venice Commission in its opinion on the original amendments,
these restrictions affect the right to stand for elections as enshrined
in Article 3, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 9) and should therefore be very strictly limited to clearly
defined legal grounds, with the possibility of judicial review.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, on 4 November
2023, asked for an amicus curiae brief
from the Venice Commission on the ineligibility of persons connected
to political parties declared unconstitutional. It is important
that any recommendations of the Venice Commission in that brief,
are fully implemented. Regrettably, the Constitutional Court decision
on the constitutionality of the 4 October amendments is still pending,
as a result of which the local elections took place under these
amendments.
80. Elections of the Bashkan (Governor) of the autonomous region
of Gagauzia were held on 30 April 2023 (first round) and 14 May
2023 (second round). The elections were won by Ms Evghenia Guțul,
with 52.3% of the vote. Ms Guțul was a candidate of the pro-Russian
![(22)
Ms Guțul, for example,
had announced that she wished to open a liaison office in Moscow.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Șor
party (which had not yet been declared unconstitutional at the time
of these elections). On 16 May 2023, Officers of the Republic of
Moldova’s National Anticorruption Centre, raided the Central Election
Commission of Gagauzia following allegations of electoral fraud.
On the same day, People’s Assembly of Gagauzia validated Ms Guțul’s
elections, which were also confirmed by the Appeal Court in Comrat
(capital of the autonomous region of Gagauzia) on 22 May 2023. Regrettably,
the events around the gubernatorial elections in Gagauzia have raised
tensions between Comrat and Chisinau. It is important that all stakeholders
co-operate constructively and take all necessary measures to reduce
the tensions between them.
81. Local Elections took place in the Republic of Moldova on 5
November 2023. They were organised under a state of emergency resulting
from the war in Ukraine. These elections were observed by the Congress
of Local and Regional authorities of the Council of Europe in the
framework of an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM),
together with the European Parliament and the OSCE/ODIHR. The IEOM concluded
that, while conducted peacefully and efficiently, interference from
abroad and restrictive measures imposed due to national security
concerns, negatively affected the elections. Two days before the
day of the vote, all 8.605 candidates from the Change Party, which
is linked to the Șor Party were deregistered without a realistic
possibility for appeal. Moreover, the Commission for Exceptional
Situations suspended 12 TV stations on concerns of misinformation
and threats to national security, while the Security Service blocked
access to 73 websites on similar grounds, which, in the view of
the IEOM, limited freedom of speech in a disproportionate manner.
A second round for those mayoral races where none of the candidates
obtained 50% of the votes took place on 19 November 2023.
82. On 8 November 2023, the European Commission published its
2023 communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Welcoming the significant
reform efforts by the Republic of Moldova, despite severe impact
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the
Commission recommended opening accession negotiations with the Republic
of Moldova – under the understanding that it continues its reform
efforts on the nine steps needed to open accession negotiations;
continues to make significant progress in appointing vetted Supreme
Court Judges, members of judicial and prosecutorial self-governance
bodies, and in nominating a new Prosecutor General in a merit-based
and transparent process; assigns adequate resources and structures to
the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Moldova;
undertakes further steps on de-oligarchisation. Moreover, the European
Commission considered that the Republic of Moldova has to continue to
fight against corruption by building a further track record of corruption
investigations and convictions.
2.2.8. Poland
83. In 2023, the political developments
in Poland were dominated by the preparations and conduct of the parliamentary
elections of 15 October 2023, which both the ruling majority and
opposition considered to be a defining election for the country’s
future. The co-rapporteurs carried out a fact-finding visit to Poland
from 13 to 15 March 2023.
84. In the information note following this visit, the co-rapporteurs,
Ms Azadeh Rojhan (Sweden, SOC) and Mr Peter Omtzigt (Netherlands,
EPP/CD) expressed their concern that the deep polarisation between opposition
and ruling majority was deteriorating and had permeated many levels
of the polish society, which was negatively affecting the system
of checks and balances, and the overall functioning of the democratic institutions
in the country.
85. The situation with regard to the respect for the rule of law
continues to dominate the domestic political agenda as well as relations
of the country with its international partners, in particular the
Council of Europe and the European Union. Regrettably, the situation
has continued to deteriorate in this respect. While some political actors
have expressed hope that this situation could now change as a result
of the last elections, most have indicated that no quick resolution
of the rule of law crisis is to be expected or possible.
86. As outlined in the previous progress report, the European
Court of Human Rights had found that certain benches of the Constitutional
Court, as well as the Disciplinary and Extraordinary Review and
Public Affairs Chambers of the Supreme Court, could not be considered
tribunals established by law within the meaning of the Convention.
It is important to note that the relevant cases are the leading
cases. At least 57 other cases that concern the independence of
the judiciary have already been communicated to the Polish authorities
by the Court. In total, the number of pending cases before the Court
dealing with one or more aspects of the reform of the judiciary
was 195 in October 2022.
87. Regrettably, the current authorities have continued to indicate
that they do not intend to comply with the above judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights. This is further complicated by the
questionable decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal that,
under certain conditions, Article 6 of the Convention is not compatible
with the Polish Constitution and that therefore the above-mentioned
judgments cannot be implemented.
88. The execution of these judgments is now in the hands of the
Committee of Minsters, but a solution is not yet forthcoming. It
should be underscored that, with regard to the two Chambers of the
Supreme Court, the judgments are based, in the words of the European
Court of Human Rights, on manifest breaches in the appointment of
judges to these newly established chambers, as a result of the fact
that these judges are proposed by the reformed National Council
of the Judiciary, also known by its Polish acronym KRS. Following its
reform, the KRS according to the European Court of Human Rights,
as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union, can no longer
be considered a body that is independent from the legislative or
executive powers, as required by European standards in this respect.
It is clear that this reasoning by the European Court of Human Rights
could also hold for other chambers when new judges will be appointed
to them in sufficient numbers, and indeed for all judicial benches
that will contain judges appointed by the reformed KRS. This need to
be addressed as a matter of urgency as it undermines the legitimacy
of the entire judicial system.
89. In
Resolution 2513
(2023) “Pegasus and similar spyware and secret state surveillance”
the Assembly considered that in Poland, “Pegasus surveillance spyware
has been illegally deployed for political purposes to spy on journalists,
opposition politicians, lawyers, prosecutors, and civil society
actors”, which has affected the fairness of the 2019 parliamentary
elections. I wish to reiterate the recommendations made in this
resolution, which should be addressed without delay.
90. In the context of the investigations of the Polish Senate
into the abuse of the Pegasus spyware by the authorities, it was
underscored that the number of (secret) services and law enforcement
agencies that are legally allowed to conduct covert surveillance
has proliferated in Poland after independence. The judicial and parliamentary
oversight is similarly fragmented and clearly no longer adequate.
Moreover, there are questions about how well the oversight mechanisms
are adapted to Poland’s increasingly polarised political and social environment.
It is therefore recommended that the authorities consider reforming
the covert surveillance functions of the different secret services
and law enforcement agencies with a view to creating a single agency with
the technical capacity and mandate to execute such surveillance
and with the necessary mechanisms to ensure proper judicial and
bi-partisan parliamentary control over its operations.
91. In the run up to the parliamentary elections, the ruling majority
introduced a controversial draft law on “the State Commission for
Investigating Russian Influences on the Internal Security of the
Republic of Poland in the period of 2007-2022”. This law was adopted
by the Sejm on 14 April 2023. The Senate vetoed the law on 11 May
2023, but its veto was overruled by the Sejm on 26 May 2023 after
which it was signed into law by President Duda on 29 May 2023. However,
in the face of the domestic and international outcry regarding this law,
President Duda, on 2 June 2023, proposed a number of amendments
with a view to addressing some of the criticism.
92. Deeply concerned about the serious questions with regard to
the compatibility of this law with European principles and norms
on due process and the rule of law, as well as about its possible
impact on the democratic nature of the upcoming elections, the Monitoring
Committee, on 21 June 2023, requested an urgent opinion of the Venice
Commission on this law as well as on the amendments proposed by
President Duda. The Venice Commission issued its urgent opinion
![(23)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2023)021-e'>CDL-PI(2023)021</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on 26 July 2023, in which it concluded
that the law was fundamentally flawed and could lead to serious
violations of human rights and rule of law standards and norms.
In addition, the Venice Commission expressed its concern about the
possible impact of the law on the democratic process and the October
2023 parliamentary elections, as it lacks guarantees against political
misuse and could easily become a tool in the hands of the majority
to eliminate political opponents. In addition, the Venice Commission concluded
that the amendments proposed by President Duda would not resolve
the fundamental flaws of the law and therefore recommended that
the law be repealed in its entirety. Regrettably this advice was
ignored by the Sejm who proceeded, on 31 August 2023, without participation
of the opposition, to appoint the members on the investigation Commission.
However, this Commission never met before October 2023. It is hoped
that it will now be disbanded without any undue delays.
93. On 15 October 2023, parliamentary elections took place in
Poland in an extremely polarised political and social environment,
with both ruling majority and opposition publicly stating that these
elections would be a defining moment for the future development
and identity of the country. This was also reflected in the very
high turnout for these elections of more than 72%, the highest since
the fall of communism in Poland. These elections were observed by
the Assembly as part of an IEOM with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
and OSCE/ODIHR. The IEOM concluded that the elections had been competitive,
with a wide choice of political alternatives for the voters, but
in which the ruling party “enjoyed a clear advantage through undue
influence over State resources and public media”. As noted by the
observers, the campaign was marred by “wide use of intolerant, xenophobic
and misogynistic rhetoric” which is of concern. While the incumbent
Law and Justice Party (PiS) obtained the most mandates in the elections
but not sufficient to form a government of its own, the three main
opposition parties, Civic Coalition (PO), Third way (PL2050/PSL)
and the Left (NL), who together have a majority of 248 seats in
the 460-seat parliament announced that they were ready to form a
coalition government. The hard right Confederation Party announced
that it would neither support a government formed by PO, nor by
PiS.
2.2.9. Serbia
94. In 2023, the co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee held an exchange of views on the legal
situation and the functioning of institutions with Mr Oliver Kask,
substitute member of the Venice Commission in respect of Estonia.
On 2-4 October 2023, the co-rapporteur Mr Axel Schäfer (Germany,
SOC) undertook a fact-finding visit to Serbia (Belgrade and Novi
Sad) (in the absence of Ms Eva Decroix (Czech Republic, EC/DA)).
This had been the first visit of a rapporteur of the Monitoring
Committee since 2017.
95. On 13 October 2023, President Aleksandar Vučić announced that
early parliamentary elections, along with local elections in Belgrade
and in Vojvodina province, would be held on 17 December 2023. This
decision was due to the mounting pressure that the ruling party
– Progressive Party (SNS) – had been facing from the opposition
after two deadly mass shootings in May, which sparked public outrage
and triggered massive protests.
![(24)
In two separate mass
shootings which took place in a local school in Belgrade and in
villages near the city of Mladenovac, respectively on 3 and 4 May
2023, 17 people died, including 7 students, and 21 were injured.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
96. In his
statement made after his visit, the rapporteur of the Monitoring
Committee recalled that since 2000, all but one parliamentary elections
had been early elections and stressed that “the frequent organisation
of elections at short intervals destabilises the functioning of
democracy and State institutions.” Moreover, as regards the electoral
framework, further changes are needed to implement the recommendations
included in the
joint
opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR of December
2022 (issued at the request of the Monitoring Committee), in particular
with regard to the use of public media to promote the government,
the lack of independence of the Central Electoral Commission, the
financing of political parties and election campaigns, the failure
to verify voters' lists, misuse of administrative resources and
the limited access to litigation procedures.
97. As regards the recent reform of the justice system launched
following the constitutional amendments adopted on 9 February 2022
(following a referendum), the new laws – on the organisation of
courts, on judges, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the High
Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council – have been aligned
with the constitutional amendments and entered into force on 10
May 2023. These laws, which had been rather positively assessed
by the Venice Commission in its opinions of
October
2022 and
December 2022, seek to make the judiciary more independent and efficient
and reduce the influence of the executive and parliament on the
appointment of judges and prosecutors. The Monitoring Committee’s
rapporteur praised the authorities’ commitment to fully implementing
this reform in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR as well as those of the GRECO and encouraged
the authorities to adopt the secondary legislation as soon as possible
and according to the adopted time-schedule.
98. As regards the fight against corruption, information is still
awaited on how Serbia intends to implement the recommendations contained
in
GRECO’s
Fifth Evaluation Round, which tackles preventing corruption and promoting integrity
in central government (top executive functions) and law enforcement
agencies.
99. As stressed by the rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee,
the state of freedom of expression and media remains an issue of
concern, mainly due to the State monopolisation of the majority
of media outlets as well as the harassment of journalists expressing
critical views or investigating cases of corruption and organised
crime. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection
of journalism and the safety of journalists issued
nine
alerts concerning Serbia in 2023.
![(25)
As of 20 October 2023,
see the <a href='https://fom.coe.int/en/pays/detail/11709576'>Platform</a> to promote the protection of journalism and safety of
journalists.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
100. In a
report
following her visit to Serbia in March 2023,
![(26)
Of
6 September 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović noted that pressure on independent
voices, including independent journalists, had intensified in response
to the public protests against the May 2023 massive shootings. She
also expressed concern about the widespread use of strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPPs) against not only journalists
but also human rights defenders and activists, about restrictions
to freedom of peaceful assembly, biometric surveillance of public
spaces and biometric data processing as well as about persisting
discriminatory gender stereotypes and the prevalence of all forms
of violence against women. According to the findings of the Commissioner
for Human Rights, Serbia needs to show a genuine commitment for
investigating and adjudicating war crimes cases. In particular,
it should do more to ensure the resolution of about 9 800 pending cases
of missing persons in the region and to counter the widespread public
glorification of war criminals, denial and relativisation of war
crimes and genocide.
101. As of 30 September 2023, Serbia ranked 9th in the ranking
of countries having the highest number of applications pending before
the European Court of Human Rights, with 1 750 applications pending
(2,3 % of the total number of applications). As regards the execution
of Court judgments, there are 62 cases pending before the Committee
of Ministers.
![(27)
As
of 22 September 2023, see the <a href='https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/serbia'>Department</a> for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Three main groups of cases
are under the “enhanced procedure”’ of the Committee of Ministers:
ill-treatment by police officers and ineffective investigations
into such allegations (the Stanimirović group of cases), excessive
length of different types of judicial proceedings (the Jevremović
group of cases) and non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic
decisions against socially/State-owned companies (the Kačapor group
of cases). While in 2023 some progress was achieved in the execution
of the Jevremović group of cases, information is still awaited on
execution measures required in the two other groups of cases.
102. The political environment was also marked by tensions with
Kosovo, notably following the 24 September 2023 terrorist attacks
on Kosovan police-officers by ethnic Serb para-militaries in the
north of Kosovo.
2.2.10. Türkiye
103. In 2023, the Monitoring Committee
focused on the presidential and the early parliamentary elections
in Türkiye and the case of philanthropist and human rights defender
Mr Osman Kavala, who has remained in prison since 2017 despite two
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights ordering his release.
![(28)
Application No. 28749/18,
judgment of 10 December 2019 and of 11 July 2022 (Grand Chamber
judgment on Article 46, paragraph 4, of the Convention).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
104. The Assembly’s co-rapporteurs for Türkiye, Mr John Howell
(United Kingdom, EC/DA) and Mr Stefan Schennach (Austria, SOC),
who had been appointed rapporteur on 24 January 2023 following the
departure of Mr Boriss Cilevičs (Latvia, SOC), took part in the
Assembly’s election observation missions for the parliamentary and
presidential elections of 14 and 28 May 2023. Shortly before the
elections, they condemned police raids of 25 April 2023, targeting
politicians from the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), lawyers, journalists
and civil society activists and called on the authorities to end
all forms of reprisals against them.
![(29)
<a href='https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9074/pace-turkiye-monitors-react-to-recent-police-raids-in-the-country'>Statement</a> of 27 April 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
105. As regards the first round of elections on 14 May 2023 (held
in the wake of devastating earthquakes), there was a high turnout,
with 87% out of almost 61 million people registered to vote in the
country, as well as 3.5 million abroad. The People’s Alliance led
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 323 seats in the
Grand Assembly, out of 600. The Republican People’s Party (CHP)
with its Nation Alliance won 212 seats, while other smaller parties
(Labour and Freedom Alliance) won a combined of 65 seats. Prior
to the election, the electoral threshold for a party to enter parliament
was lowered from 10% to 7%.
106. According to the joint observation mission from the OSCE/ODIHR,
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Assembly, the 14 May elections
were “well-managed” and “offered voters a choice between genuine political
alternatives”. However, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling
parties enjoyed an “unjustified advantage”, mainly due to biased
media coverage. Continued restrictions on the rights to freedom
of assembly, association and expression had hindered the participation
of some opposition politicians and parties as well as civil society
and independent media. The observers also found that the legal framework
did not provide fully adequate basis for holding democratic elections
and that women were underrepresented as candidates and generally
in politics.
107. Following the second round of the presidential election on
28 May, the incumbent President Erdoğan was re-elected with 52.18%
of the votes against the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu,
who received 47.82%. The joint observation mission found that the
second round of elections was well run and had given the voters
the opportunity to choose between real political alternatives. However,
they deplored increasingly inflammatory and discriminatory language
used by both sides during the campaign period and an unjustified advantage
to the incumbent, due to media bias and ongoing restrictions to
freedom of expression.
108. The composition of the new cabinet was announced on 3 June
2023, following the inauguration of President Erdoğan. The cabinet
comprises one Vice-President and 17 ministers (all newly appointed,
with two exceptions, and all being AKP members or having close association
with the party or the President). The new Minister of Family and
Social Services, Ms Mahinur Özdemir Göktaş, is the only woman within
the Cabinet. Local elections will take place in 2024.
109. On 12-13 January 2023, the Assembly co-rapporteurs Mr Howell
and Mr Cilevičs made a fact-finding visit to the country to discuss
the case of Mr Osman Kavala. During the visit, they met with Mr Kavala
at the Marmara prison.
![(30)
Information
note, <a href='https://rm.coe.int/the-honouring-of-obligations-and-commitments-by-turkiye-information-no/1680aa00db'>AS/Mon
(2023) 01 REV 2</a> declassified of 31 January 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
110. On 29 September 2023, the co-rapporteurs expressed their “deep
consternation” at the decision of the Turkish Court of Cassation
of 28 September which had confirmed the aggravated life sentence
for Mr Kavala.
111. On 9 October 2023, the Assembly
awarded Mr Osman Kavala the 11th Václav Havel Human Rights Prize
and, on 12 October, it adopted
Resolution 2518 (2023) “Call for the immediate release of Osman Kavala”
![(31)
On the basis of a report
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 15841 of 10 October 2023, rapporteur: Ms Petra Bayr (Austria,
SOC).](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
. The Assembly considered that Mr Kavala
fell within its definition of “political prisoner” and called again
for his immediate release. It also called on the authorities of
Türkiye to “urgently improve the legal framework and conditions
for respect for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary,
the protection of human rights and compliance with the Court’s judgments”,
and in particular to urgently reform the Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
![(32)
Paragraph 13.3 of the
resolution.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Therefore, in light of these “exceptional
circumstances”, it considered “the time ha[d] now arrived to take
steps to initiate the complementary joint procedure foreseen in
its
Resolution 2319 (2020)”.
![(33)
Paragraph
12 of the resolution.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
The Assembly also called
on Council of Europe member States to apply 'Magnitsky legislation' towards
officials responsible for the unlawful and arbitrary detention of
Mr Kavala.”
![(34)
Paragraph
14.3 of the resolution.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
Moreover, in its
Recommendation 2261 (2023) concerning the same subject, the Assembly called on
the Committee of Ministers to establish country monitoring in respect
of the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
by Türkiye under the 1994 Declaration process.
112. As regards the execution of the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights in general, in its
Resolution 2494 (2023) of 26 April 2023, the Assembly noted that Türkiye was
one of the countries having the highest number of non-implemented
Court judgments and still facing serious structural or complex problems, some
of which had not been resolved for over ten years.
2.2.11. Ukraine
113. As a result of the Russian
Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, no visit to Ukraine
by the co-rapporteurs could take place, despite the efforts by both
the co-rapporteurs and the Ukrainian delegation to organise such
a visit. If the situation allows, the co-rapporteurs will visit
the country in the first half of 2024. It is clear that, as long
as the war is ongoing, no normal monitoring of obligations and commitments
can take place, but the co-rapporteurs have nevertheless continued
to closely follow the situation in the country with regard to the
ongoing reforms and functioning of democratic institutions.
114. The Assembly has continued to closely follow the developments
with regard to the Russian Federation’s ongoing aggression against
Ukraine. In the course of 2023, the Assembly debated the following
reports regarding the consequences of the Russian Federation's aggression
against Ukraine: “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian
Federation’s aggression against Ukraine” (
Doc. 15689); “Supporting Ukraine one year since the beginning of
the Russian Federation’s large-scale war of aggression: the role
of the Council of Europe”, current affairs debate; “Deportations
and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children and other civilians
to Russian Federation or to Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied:
create conditions for their safe return, stop these crimes and punish
the perpetrators” (
Doc.
15748); “Political consequences of the Russian Federation's war
of aggression against Ukraine” (
Doc. 15797); “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security
in Europe” (
Doc. 15842).
115. In the previous progress report, the Assembly already lauded
the efforts by the Ukrainian authorities, and indeed whole society,
to ensure the continuing functioning of the democratic and rule
of law institutions, in spite of the challenging situation presented
by the war. These efforts continued unabated in 2023.
116. On 28 February 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership. On
23 June 2022, following a positive opinion by the European Commission,
the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine on the understanding
that Ukraine would implement a number of so-called key steps, namely:
implement legislation on a selection procedure, including an evaluation
of integrity and professional skills for judges of the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine; finalise the vetting of the candidates for the
High Council of Justice and the selection of candidates to establish
the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine; strengthen
the fight against corruption, in particular at high level and complete
the appointment of a new head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor’s Office as well as new Director of the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine; ensure that anti-money laundering legislation
is in compliance with the standards of the Financial Action Task
Force and adopt a strategic plan for the reform of the entire law
enforcement sector; implement anti-oligarch law to limit the excessive
influence of oligarchs in economic, political, and public life in
line with the opinion of the Venice Commission on this law; adopt
a new media law that limits the influence of vested interests in
the media sector, empowers the independent media regulator and aligns
Ukraine’s legislation with the EU audio-visual media services directive;
reform the legal framework for the protection of national minorities
in line with Venice Commission recommendations.
117. The implementation of these key steps has been the priority
of the ongoing reforms process in Ukraine. The European Council
decision granting candidate status to Ukraine underscores the essentiality
of these reforms adhering to Venice Commission recommendations and
accords a central position to the Venice Commission opinions in
its own evaluation process. This should be strongly welcomed.
118. With regard to anti-oligarch legislation, the draft anti-oligarch
law was tabled already in July 2021. At that moment, while supporting
the stated objective of law, the co-rapporteurs, as well as other
international and domestic actors expressed concerns about the methodology
taken in the law which they feared would be at variance with the
European Court of Human Rights and vulnerable to political abuse.
On 10 September 2021, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada requested
an opinion from the Venice Commission on this law which was regrettably
adopted without waiting for the Venice Commission. The adoption
of the opinion was delayed on request of the Ukrainian authorities,
also as a result of the war situation in the country. In the meanwhile,
the Ukrainian anti-oligarch legislation, with its deficiencies,
was used as the basis for similar legislation in Georgia and the
Republic of Moldova.
119. The Venice Commission adopted its opinion
![(35)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)018-e'>CDL-AD(2023)018</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on the law in June 2023. Similar
to its conclusions in the opinions on the anti-oligarch legislation
in Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, the Commission expressed misgivings
about the so-called “personal approach” taken in this law which
it felt was overbroad, raised questions about its compatibility
with the Convention and was open for political abuse. The Venice
Commission therefore recommended a so-called systemic approach that
would focus on strengthening the existing legal tools and institutional
mechanisms to fight corruption and excessive political influence
by vested economic interests. The Ukrainian authorities have announced
that they have put the implementation of the anti-oligarch legalisation
on a hold in order to address the Venice Commission recommendations.
120. Combating the endemic corruption in the country has been a
long-standing focal point of the monitoring procedure and a key
priority for the current authorities. This has become all the more
important in relation to the large volume of assistance given to
Ukraine by the international community in the context of the war
of agression by the Russian Federation. Underscoring his determination
to root out corruption in the armed forces, and in the light of
concerns regarding the handling of military contracts, President
Zelensky, in September 2023, replaced the Minister of Defence
![(36)
President Zelensky
had stressed that the Minister himself was not suspected of any
wrongdoings in this respect.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
and fired all heads
of the regional recruitment offices. The government appointed a
new Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) on 6
March 2023. This follows the appointment in July 2022 of a new Specialised
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. Their appointments have started to show
tangible results as evident from,
inter
alia, the arrest of the Chairperson of the Supreme Court
of Ukraine for accepting a € 2.5 million bribe.
121. The Constitutional Court is composed of 18 judges, 6 of which
are appointed by the President of Ukraine, 6 by the Verkhovna Rada
and 6 by the Congress of Judges. As outlined in previous reports,
serious concerns had been raised about the impartiality and integrity
of Constitutional Court judges leading to the Constitutional Court
crisis in 2020 and subsequent reform of this court. In its opinion
![(37)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2020)039-e'>CDL-AD(2020)039</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on the reform of the Constitutional Court,
the Venice Commission found that the existing selection procedures
for each of these three groups did not ensure the highest level
of moral and professional qualifications of the candidates. It therefore recommended
the establishment of a special screening body in which the international
community would have a decisive role. On 12 August 2022, the Verkhovna
Rada adopted in first reading a series of amendments to the legislation
covering the appointment of Constitutional Court judges that established
an Advisory Group of Experts with the task of assisting the three
appointment bodies with assessing the integrity and professional qualifications
of the candidates. In line with the Venice Commission recommendations,
the international community is represented in this body with three
members, one of which is appointed by the Venice Commission. These
amendments were sent to the Venice Commission for opinion. In a
laudable process of close co-operation between the authorities and
the Venice Commission, further amendments were drafted by the Verkhovna
Rada, and follow-up opinions adopted, to address the recommendations
and concerns expressed by the Venice Commission on this appointment
procedure. As a result, on 25 September 2023, the Venice Commission
adopted a follow up opinion
![(38)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)042-e'>CDL-AD(2023)042</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
on these amendments in which it
concluded that its key recommendations had all been addressed in
the final amendments that were adopted on 27 July 2023 and that therefore
the Venice Commission would be ready to appoint a member and a substitute
on the Advisory Group of Experts.
122. Ukraine has a diverse and multi-ethnic population and a strong
multicultural tradition. According to the 2001 census, Ukraine comprises
more than 130 different nationalities, most of them very small in
number. According to this census, the population self-identified
as: Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%, Romanian 1.1% (including Moldovan
0.8%), Belarusian 0.6%, Crimean Tatar 0.5%, Bulgarian 0.4%, Hungarian
0.3%, Polish 0.3%, Jewish 1.0%, and 1.8% other nationalities. Minorities
and minority rights are complex and sensitive issues in Ukraine,
compounded by the illegal Russian aggression against Ukraine which
was inter alia justified by
the denial of the existence of a Ukrainian identity by the Russian
Federation. Strengthening the legal system to protect minority rights
has been a long-standing point of attention of the monitoring procedure
and was one of the seven steps demanded by the European Commission
to start accession negotiations.
123. In its opinions on the 2017 Law on Education and the 2019
Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the
State Language, the Venice Commission had recommended that the Ukrainian authorities
adopt a new law on Minorities to replace the outdated legislation
that was in place. On 13 December 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted
the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine. On 26 January 2023,
the Monitoring Committee requested an opinion of the Venice Commission
on this law. In its opinion
![(39)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)021-e'>CDL-AD(2023)021</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the Venice Commission welcomed the
law but considered that a number of provisions should be reconsidered in
order to make the law fully in line with international standards.
In addition, it recommended that other laws be amended in connection,
in particular their provisions limiting the use of minority languages
in the media and the education system. The Ukrainian authorities
announced subsequently that they had prepared a number of amendments
to the law with a view to making it fully compatible with the Framework
Convention on National Minorities and to address Venice Commission
recommendations. Both the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada as well
as the Monitoring Committee requested a follow-up opinion of the
Venice Commission on these amendments. In that opinion,
![(40)
<a href='https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)028-e'>CDL-AD(2023)028</a>.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
the Venice Commission welcomed several
amendments that implemented its recommendations. However, a number
of recommendations were not or only partly followed, including with regard
to: moving provisions related to the use of the Russian language
in the context of the ongoing agression into specific legislation
and the provisions relating to the use of the Russian language that
would allow limitations on its use to continue after the end of
the war. The amendments also foresee the revision of the laws on
the State language, on media and on education. The authorities are
urged to draft this amendments in close consultation with the Venice
Commission and minorities concerned.
124. On 8 November 2023, the European Commission published its
2023 communication on EU Enlargement Policy in which it recommended
the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine as soon as the
country will have increased the staffing cap for the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine (NACCP); removed from the law on corruption prevention
the provisions that restrict the NACCP's verification powers; adopted
a law regulating lobbying in line with European standards, as part
of the anti-oligarch action plan; and adopted legislation addressing
the remaining Venice Commission recommendations regarding the Law
on national minorities, including those linked to the laws on State
language, on media and on education.
2.3. Post-monitoring
dialogue
2.3.1. Bulgaria
125. The last post-monitoring report
was debated in the Assembly in June 2019. The Assembly resolved
not to terminate the post-monitoring dialogue and invited the Monitoring
Committee to submit, in 2020, its assessment of the progress made
by Bulgaria in some specific areas of concern, including in particular
high-level corruption, transparency in media ownership, human rights
of minorities, hate speech and combating violence against women.
126. However, since July 2020 and until recently, Bulgaria has
been confronted with a major political crisis which resulted in
five consecutive parliamentary elections held over a period of two
years: on 4 April 2021, 11 July 2021, 14 November 2021 (on the day
of presidential election), on 2 October 2022 and on 4 April 2023.
For the majority of this period, Bulgaria was governed by the appointed
technical governments.
127. The crisis was triggered by mass street demonstrations in
reaction to corruption scandals and the underlying causes including
a lack of respect for the rule of law. The situation was aggravated
by growing economic concerns and polarisation with regard to energy
policies and the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
128. Following the April 2023 parliamentary elections, six political
parties and coalitions entered the parliament. On 6 June 2023, a
new coalition government was approuved. It is composed of the two
biggest political groups: the GERB-SDS and PP-DB. According to the
coalition agreement, Mr Nikolay Denkov from the PP-DB will be Prime
Minister for the first nine months and after that period, the position
will be taken over by Ms Mariya Gabriel from GERB who until then
will be deputy Prime minister and foreign minister.
129. The coalition government has agreed on a pro-European Union
agenda including top priorities: membership in the Schengen area
and accession to the Euro-monetary Union. It is determined to fight
Russian influence in Bulgaria's security sector. The government
has also agreed to conduct a constitutional reform which is a necessary
condition for the reform of the judiciary and the effective fight
against high-level corruption.
130. In the framework of the ambitious programme of reforms, a
number of draft laws is currently proceeded in parliament, including
amendments to Chapter VI of the Constitution with regard to the
system of governance of the judiciary and of the prosecution service,
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and to the Judicial Act
System. All drafts have been submitted to the Venice Commission
for opinion. If adopted, taking into account Venice Commission's
recommendations, these legislative acts will address long-standing
concerns with regard to the functioning of democratic institutions
in Bulgaria expressed by the Assembly in its monitoring resolutions
on Bulgaria, and in particular in
Resolution
2296 (2019).
131. The co-rapporteurs carried out a visit to the country on 17-19
September 2023 and met the highest representatives of the legislative,
executive and judicial authorities as well as the representatives
of civil society.
132. The preliminary draft report was submitted to the Monitoring
Committee on 5 December 2023 and sent to the Bulgarian authorities
for comments with a view to final consideration by the committee
in March 2024.
133. In accordance with the revised rules on the parliamentary
monitoring procedure, the Monitoring Committe can prepare only two
reports in the framework of the post-monitoring dialogue; the second
one should either propose the termination of the post-monitoring
dialogue or return to the full monitoring procedure.
2.3.2. Montenegro
134. The reporting period was dominated
by national elections. At the end of August 2022, the former government
lost the confidence of parliament. It has been acting in a caretaker
function since then. This situation is hampering the adoption of
expected reforms in the field of the rule of law and democratic
institutions to advance on the path towards accession to the European
Union. Few days before the presidential election of 19 March 2023,
incumbent President Đukanović announced a call for early parliamentary
elections in June, triggering a full renewal of national political
institutions.
135. The presidential election was marked by the decision of the
State Election Commission (SEC) to deny registration to Mr Spajić
– who was leading in the opinion polls at that time – on the basis
of contradictory information regarding his citizenship and permanent
residence. The IEOM, of which the Assembly was a part, concluded
that “the SEC’s denial of registration to Mr. Spajić, the inconsistency
in decision making and the lack of transparency in verifying support
signatures and other nomination documents significantly undermined
the inclusiveness of the candidate registration process and impacted
confidence in the election administration.” Mr Spajić was replaced
by Mr Milatović as candidate for the newly created party “Europe
Now!”.
![(41)
“Europe
Now”: describes itself as an economically focused, liberal and anti-corruption
movement](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
136. The presidential election was won by Mr Jakov Milatović with
58,88 % of the votes, over Mr Milo Đukanović. The IEOM found that
the presidential election was competitive but regretted that long-standing shortcomings
in the legal framework and campaign finance regulations remained
unaddressed.
137. In the subsequent parliamentary elections on 11 June 2023,
“Europe Now!” received most of the votes and took 24 out of the
81 seats in parliament. Lacking an absolute majority, the party
needed to find partners for a coalition. President Milatović charged
Mr Milojko Spajić to find a governing coalition as Prime minister designate.
138. On 31 October 2023, the Parliament of Montenegro appointed
the government of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić, with a majority
of 46 out of 81 members of parliament. The coalition backing the
government is composed of “Europe Now!”, Democrats (DCG), the Socialist
People’s party (SNP) as well as Albanian minority parties and pro-Serb
parties (NSD and DNP). Mr Andrija Mandić, president of the New Serbian
Democracy (NSD) party, was elected as Speaker of parliament. His
election caused protests due to his criticism during the campaign
of NATO membership and Montenegro’s independence from Serbia, as
well as his calls for closer ties with the Russian Federation. However,
Mr Mandić pledged to “reconcile the divisions”. Mr Spajić outlined his
government’s priorities as: “full membership of the EU, active,
credible membership of NATO and improvement of good relations with
neighbours”. In its 2023 communication on the enlargement policy,
the European Commission stated, regarding Montenegro that: “progress
in the accession negotiations will depend on reforms in the area
of rule of law”. The capacity of this government to deliver will
depend on the cohesiveness of the ruling coalition and its willingness
to step aside from divisive nationalistic and religious debates
and prioritise the search of consensus to undertake the much expected
economic, social and judicial reforms.
139. To complete the post-monitoring dialogue, Montenegro needs
to improve the independence of the judiciary, the trust in the electoral
process, the fight against corruption and the situation of the media,
as called upon by the Assembly
Resolution 2374 (2021).
2.3.3. North
Macedonia
140. In 2023, there were no visits
by the co-rapporteurs in the framework of the post-monitoring dialogue
with North Macedonia, due to changes in the rapporteurship: the
co-rapporteur, Ms Ria Oomen-Ruijten (Netherlands, EPP/CD) resigned
in April 2023 and was replaced by Mr Joseph O’Reilly (Ireland, EPP/CD)
on 13 September 2023.
![(42)
Ms
Sibel Arslan (Switzerland, SOC) remains the other co-rapporteur.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
However,
the co-rapporteurs followed closely the developments in the country.
141. There has been no progress as regards the revision of the
Constitution in order to include a reference to the Bulgarian minority
as well as other minorities in the Constitution’s preamble. This
revision is a requirement for North Macedonia’s accession to the
European Union. The persisting polarisation in parliament between
the ruling parties and the opposition, including the main opposition
party VMRO-DPMNE, has prevented the adoption of the constitutional
amendments, which requires a majority of two-thirds; a parliamentary
debate on this subject held on 18 August 2023 ended without a vote.
142. As regards the fight against corruption, in its
Second
Compliance report published in October 2023 concerning the Fifth
evaluation round on preventing corruption and promoting integrity
in central governments and law enforcement agencies, the GRECO concluded
that North Macedonia was not “in sufficient compliance”, as it had
implemented only 13 out of its 23 recommendations. Nevertheless,
GRECO noted some progress with respect to integrity risk assessments
in central government, the strengthening of the resources of the
State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption and some measures
taken to enhance integrity within the police.
143. In May 2023, MONEYVAL adopted its
Fifth
Round Mutual Evaluation Report on North Macedonia, in which it urged the authorities
to further enhance efforts in combating money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. While it concluded that the country had
made progress in strengthening its legal framework to investigate
and prosecute money laundering, it noted that only modest results
had been achieved in terms of money laundering investigations and
prosecutions.
144. The Committee of Ministers is currently supervising the execution
of 28 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning
North Macedonia, including 13 “leading” cases. The following judgments/groups of
judgments are under the enhanced supervision procedure: cases concerning
ill-treatment by police and lack of effective investigation in this
respect (Kitanovski
![(43)
Application
No. 15191/12, judgment of 22 January 2015.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
group),
the X. judgment
![(44)
Application
No. 29683/16, judgment of 17 January 2019.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
concerning
lack of legislation on conditions and procedures for changing, on
birth certificates, the sex of transgender people (an issue which was
also raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
in a
letter sent to the parliament on 3 July 2023) and cases concerning
refusal to register certain associations as religious entities (Orthodox
Ohrid Archdiocese
![(45)
Application
No. 3532/07, judgment of 16 November 2017.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
group).
As regards the first group of cases, only limited progress has been
achieved in 2023, while in the two other groups of cases, information
is still awaited on execution measures.
145. In October 2023, the European Committee for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
carried out a periodic visit to the country, in order to assess
mainly the treatment of persons held in prisons and the progress
made in developing a professional prison management system.
![(46)
<a href='https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-carries-out-periodic-visit-to-north-macedonia'>Press</a> release of 17 October 2023.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
146. In March 2023, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings (GRETA) adopted its
report on North Macedonia in the framework of its Third evaluation
round: Access to justice and effective remedies for victims of trafficking
in human beings, on the basis of which, in June 2023, the Committee
of the Parties adopted Recommendation
CP/Rec(2023)04 calling on the authorities to take without delay further steps
to facilitate and guarantee access to justice for victims of human
trafficking.
147. As regards combating discrimination and protection of minorities’
rights, in June 2023, the ECRI published its
Report
on North Macedonia (sixth monitoring cycle), in which it concluded that
since 2016, progress has been made and good practices had been developed
in a number of fields (amongst others, the establishment of a new
equality body, the Commission on Prevention and Protection against
Discrimination (CPPD), the adoption of a new Law on Prevention and
Protection against Discrimination, and numerous measures taken to
improve Roma inclusion in the areas of housing, health, education
and employment). Nevertheless, it also pointed some issues of concern
(such as lack of financial independence of the CPPD and the Ombudsperson
institution, incidents of violence against LGBTI persons and persons
identifying themselves as Bulgarians and social marginalisation
of Roma). Moreover, following the
Fifth
opinion on North Macedonia of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities of May 2022, on 8 February
2023, the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution
CM/ResCMN(2023)2, in which it called on the authorities to take further
steps to promote “an integrated society that is based on respect
and trust between the various communities”, to prevent human rights
violations against Roma by the police and to improve access of Roma
children to quality education.
148. In September 2023, the Group of Experts on Action against
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) published
its
Baseline
Evaluation Report on North Macedonia, in which it commended the authorities for having established
a solid legal framework to prevent and combat violence against women
and domestic violence but regretted significant gaps in its implementation
as well as traditional beliefs that such violence is a private matter.
2.4. Periodic
monitoring reports
2.4.1. France
149. In 2019, France was selected
by the Monitoring Committee for a periodic review report on its
honouring of the obligations incumbent on every Council of Europe
member State in the areas of democracy, rule of law and human rights.
Ms Yelyzaveta Yasko (Ukraine, EPP/CD) and Ms Fiona O'Loughlin (Ireland,
ALDE) were appointed co-rapporteurs in April 2021.
150. In April 2022, Mr Emmanuel Macron was elected for a second
mandate as President of the Republic. The following elections to
the National Assembly in June 2022 resulted in a hung parliament.
A minority government was set up with Ms Elisabeth Borne as Prime
minister.
151. After the parliament and the government were formed, the co-rapporteurs
made a first visit in Paris in September 2022 to meet representatives
of civil society organisations. During a second visit, in January
2023, the co-rapporteurs held meetings with representatives of governmental
authorities and of independent administrative authorities, as well
as members of parliament. Some matters of concern that had been
reported by civil society organisations and various monitoring bodies
were presented and discussed.
152. On 27 April 2023, the committee decided, in line with the
rules of procedure, to send the preliminary draft report to the
French authorities for comments. At the same time, it decided to
request two opinions of the Venice Commission: one on Article 65
of the French Constitution concerning the composition of the Superior Council
of Magistracy and the status of the judiciary, and another on Article
49 of the French Constitution.
153. The Venice Commission and the Directorate General Human Rights
and Rule of Law released the joint advisory opinion on the Superior
Council of Magistracy and the status of the judiciary on 10 June
2023. This advisory opinion recalled that recent reforms had progressively
strengthened separation of the judicial authority from the executive
power and reinforced the principle of independence of the judiciary,
and that possible amendments at both the constitutional and the
legislative levels were being prepared to further this reform process.
In that context, the Venice Commission recommended changes to the
composition of the Superior Council of Magistracy and reforms of
the procedures for the nomination, promotion and disciplinary procedures for
magistrates.
154. The Venice Commission adopted an interim opinion on Article
49.3 of the French Constitution and, before making its final conclusions,
resolved to carry out a comparative analysis of the manner in which motions
of no confidence and other means by which the executive may intervene
in the legislative powers of parliaments are regulated in the constitutions
and legislations of its member States.
155. The comments of the French authorities were taken into consideration
in the draft report and the resolution that was adopted by the Assembly
on 10 October 2023.
156. In
Resolution 2512
(2023), the Assembly acknowledged the longstanding democratic
tradition and the respect for human rights in France but also expressed
some concerns. The high number of people injured during demonstrations
was considered alarming, and the Assembly urged the authorities
to provide more detailed statistics on the number of people injured
and killed during demonstrations, and called for a reflection on
law enforcement techniques. It also encouraged the authorities to
improve the criminal law treatment of cases of unlawful violence
committed by law enforcement officers and to reform the police and
gendarmerie inspectorates so as to improve perceptions of their
independence and impartiality, while increasing the resources allocated
to them. Regarding the fight against discrimination, the Assembly
called to open a wide-ranging debate about police practices and
to address ECRI’s recommendation to introduce, without delay, an effective
system of recording identity checks by law enforcement officials.
157. The Assembly endorsed the recommendations by the Venice Commission
on the composition of the Superior Council of Magistracy and the
status of members of the judiciary and invited the authorities to
adopt these recommendations in a future constitutional reform.
158. The Assembly recalled the series of judgments ordering France
to put an end to a situation of systemic prison overcrowding that
causes detention conditions in breach of the prohibition of inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment as provided for in Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Welcoming the many
measures decided by the authorities to reduce prison overcrowding,
the Assembly nevertheless noted that the prison population statistics
showed that the situation was steadily worsening. It recalled the Committee
of Ministers’ decision which, in view of the consistent recommendations
of several competent national institutions and the urgency of the
situation, “invited again the authorities to consider rapidly new legislative
measures that would regulate the prison population in a more binding
nature”. The Assembly therefore called on the authorities to implement
a binding mechanism for regulating the prison population, at least
until such time as the other measures to reduce the prison population
have an effect and make such a mechanism unnecessary.
159. The Assembly also commended the protection of journalists’
freedom and the planned reform to improve their protection against
vexatious proceedings; welcomed the advances in the regulation of
political financing and the efforts to combat violence against women;
and expressed its interest in the experiments of participatory democracy
being conducted in France.
2.4.2. Netherlands
160. The Monitoring Committee selected
the Netherlands for a periodic review in January 2021 and was seized
for the preparation of a report in March 2021. Due to multiple changes
in rapporteurs, as well as the calling of pre-term parliamentary
elections for November 2023, the validity of the reference has been
extended by the Bureau of the Assembly until March 2024.
161. The co-rapporteurs, Ms Stephanie Krisper (Austria, ALDE) and
Mr Titus Corlăţean (Romania, SOC), visited the Hague on 17-19 April
2023 and established a direct political dialogue with the Dutch
authorities on the issues identified prior to the visit including
during the exchange of views on the 2021 rule of law report on the
Netherlands with a representative of the European Commission held
on 9 March 2021.
162. In their discussions with representatives of legislative,
executive and judicial authorities, the co-rapporteurs, sought, inter alia, to evaluate whether
the concerns identified by the Venice Commission`s Opinion on the
legal protection of citizens prepared following the so-called child
allowances scandal had been addressed.
163. The child allowances scandal revealed malfunctioning of the
democratic institutions in the context of emerging reports about
significant malpractice within the Tax Administration`s collection
since 2005. While democratic safeguards including the judicial institutions
initially failed to remedy the situation, in the end a special parliamentary
inquiry committee was established in 2020, whose report led to the
resignation of the Government in January 2021.
164. In particular, the following questions were raised during
the visit: the role of the parliament in the appointment of the
judges of the Supreme Court; the Council of State, the double mandate
of State councillors and the disciplinary regime of its judicial
members; the role of the Minister of Justice and Security with regard to
the Council for the Judiciary and the court management boards in
terms of appointments of and disciplinary powers against the respective
members, as well as to the Public Prosecution Service; the double
mandate of judges and members of parliament.
165. Fight against corruption and organised crime was another major
issue discussed during the visit.
166. On 30 May 2023, the Monitoring Committee requested the Venice
Commission's Opinion on the Judiciary Organisation Act and specifically
its aspects listed above. On 6 October 2023, a joint Opinion of
the Venice Commission and DGI on legal safeguards of the independence
of the judiciary from the executive power was adopted by the Venice
Commission.
167. The Venice Commission and DGI while recalling that in general
they are of the opinion that the Netherlands is a well functioning
State with strong democratic institutions and safeguards for the
rule of law, made a number of recommendations to address vulnerabilities
including concerning the transparency of the process by which the
House of Representatives designates Supreme Court judges as well
as the process by which the Minister of Justice and Security nominates
members of the Council for the Judiciary; aligning the position
of councillors of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Council of State to the position of other judges in disciplinary
matters, and, as regards the possibility for the Vice-President
to issue a written warning against a councillor, providing a remedy
before an independent instance; integrating in statutory law both
the new procedure for appointing court administrators, and the mechanisms
(to be developed and implemented) to ensure a broader representation
of all levels and types of courts in the Council for the Judiciary;
defining in a more concrete and precise manner the concept of “unsuitability”
and rephrasing the wording “serious suspicion” of unfitness required
for the suspension or dismissal of a member of the Council for the
Judiciary and of the court management boards by including reference
to concrete elements of proof, as well as abolishing differences
in treatment between judicial and non-judicial members in disciplinary
matters and removing the Minister’s power to give instructions not
to prosecute in specific cases, or at least to limit this prerogative
to clearly defined exceptional circumstances.
168. At its meeting on 30 May 2023, the committee considered a
preliminary draft report and agreed to send it to the Dutch authorities
for comments with a view to submitting it for debate in the Assembly
in October 2023.
169. However, on 7 July 2023, the government headed by Mr Rutte
collapsed due to disagreements on immigration policies. Early general
elections have been scheduled on 22 November 2023. In accordance
with the Monitoring Committee`s practice, no country reports can
be debated during the electoral campaign in order to prevent its
possible political abuse.
170. The co-rapporteurs intend to meet the authorities once a new
government is formed in order to confirm their commitment to address
the concerns identified by the Venice Commission.
2.4.3. San
Marino
171. On 3 February 2021, San Marino
was selected for a periodic review of its honouring membership obligations
to the Council of Europe. On 19 April 2021, Mr Andrej Hunko (Germany,
UEL) and Mr Viorel-Riceard Badea (Romania, EPP/CD) were appointed
as co-rapporteurs for San Marino. On 26 January 2023, the committee
appointed Mr Joseph O’Reilly (Ireland, EPP/CD) to replace Mr Badea
who had left the Assembly. The report on the honouring of membership
obligations to the Council of Europe by San Marino was debated by
the Assembly on 6 April 2023, which led to the adoption of
Resolution 2497 (2023).
172. In its resolution, the Assembly recognised the unique collegiate
governing structures of San Marino which are shared among the citizens
of the country for limited terms. These governing structures, adapted
to the needs of a changing society, reflect the country’s historic
democratic heritage and specificity as a micro-State. At the same
time, the Assembly noted the concerns regarding effectiveness of
the system of checks and balances in the country and vulnerability
of its democratic institutions and office holders to corruption
and conflicts of interest. The Assembly therefore welcomed the numerous
reforms implemented to strengthen the functioning and resilience
of the democratic and rule of law institutions in San Marino.
173. The Assembly welcomed the central role of the Great and General
Council, the Sammarinese Parliament, in the governance of the country.
At the same time, it noted that the Great and General Council is formally
a part-time parliament whose members are not receiving a full-time
salary for their parliamentary work. The Assembly expressed concern
about the lack of legal provisions for employers in the private
sector to provide members of the Great and General Council with
the necessary time off to pursue their parliamentary work, as is
the case for those working in the public sector and recommended
the authorities to address this issue. This would also increase
the equality of arms between the legislative and executive powers
in San Marino, which at this moment is skewed in favour of the executive.
174. San Marino has historically a well-developed institutional
and legal system for the protection of fundamental human rights.
However, this should not be a reason for complacency, especially
as in a number of cases the legal framework for the protection of
human rights has run behind the existing developments and acceptance
of rights in the Sammarinese society. In that context, the Assembly
welcomed implementation of far-reaching reforms of the judiciary
with a view to strengthening its independence and resilience against external
interference, which had been a point of concern.
175. While welcoming the diverse and pluralistic media environment
in San Marino, the Assembly expressed its concern that strict privacy
laws and the continuing criminalisation of defamation hindered access
to public information and could lead to self-censorship by journalists.
It urged the authorities to address these concerns.